CHAPTER I Turning Disasters into Peacemaking …TURNING DISASTERS INTO PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES...

World 2006

C H A P T E R 7 late. Volun- d targets are r region can on its own. ;but there is termination, I Turning Disasters into : authors of went report naining data Peacemaking Opportunities ow mercury I ~vironmental address the Michael Renner and Zoe Chafe

iial to human

Over the span of just a few weeks in f d 2005, the underbelly of rich and poor countries major disasters devastated the southern alike. These dsasters have revealed, in horrific United States, Central America, and Pak- detail, that poverty and the decay of key istan/India, dominating international head- ecosystems can make storms, floods, and lines. These events-less than a year after the earthquakes far more lethal. massive Indian Ocean tsunami-provide dra- Some dsasters have had powerful political matic evidence of the devastation that nature's repercussions-sparlung domestic upheaval fury is capable of inflicting. and even civil war in some places, yet prompt-

In New Orleans, streets flooded by crum- ing cooperation and reconciliation in others. bling artificial levees prevented thousands of In August 1970, for instance, catastrophic stranded residents-most of them poor- floods claimed an estimated 300,00~500,000 from leaving the steaming, filthy stadium lives in what was then the eastern province of where they sought shelter from Hurricane Palustan, today's Bangladesh. Having long Katrina. In Guatemala, relatives raced to find resented the political and military dominance survivors in villages completely buried by of West Palustan, many residents accused the landslides. And in the earthquake-shattered government in Islamabad of botching relief mountains of Pakistan, as planes of supplies efforts, being indifferent to their suffering, from political rival India prepared to touch and even delaying aid shipments. Demands for down, survivors struggled to find food and political autonomy, already on the rise, received shelter in devastated towns. an added jolt as a result. Pakistan's military

As the world watched, what began as the government responded with increased repres- stories of powerful storms and earthquakes sion, provoking a war for secession that cost slowly emerged as tales of immense human some 3 million lives but succeeded in making suffering, environmental destruction, and Bangladesh independent in December 1971.' gross socioeconomic inequities-exposing That same month, Nicaragua's capital

State of the World 2006 TURNING DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

Managua was devastated by an earthquake yet in Sri Lanka initial euphoria has given that killed about 10,000 inhabitants and left way to worries over the possible resumption some 50,000 families homeless. The ofhostilities. National Guard joined the widespread loot- ing of businesses in the aftermath. Dictator Defining Natural and Anastasia Somoza Debayle and his cronies "Un-Natural" Disasters subsequently profited from massive embezzlement of international aid for reconstruc- Virtually no place on earth is immune to the tion. But this led to crumbling support unexpected onset of a flood, storm, or earth- among the business community and pro- quake, although some locations are at much duced growing unrest in the country amid greater risk than others. Natural disasters are deteriorating economic conditions. The San- most often the product of hydrological, geo- dinista National Liberation Front grew logical, or meteorological events. Sudden rapidly in the following years and by 1979 shifting in the earth's crust causes earth- overthrew the Somoza regime.2 quakes and, depending on the location, occa-

In 1999, a series of powerful earthquakes sionally tsunami waves. Floods, windstorms, shook Turkey and Greece, which have been and extreme temperatures are disasters that quarrelling over Cyprus and other territor- can, in turn, provoke landslides. ial issues for centuries. The quakes unleashed A combination of human-related factors- destructive geological forces, but they also including ecosystem destruction, climate elicited a surprising degree of mutual assis- change, population growth, and the growth of tance and an outpouring of goodwill often poorly constructed human settlements between the two nations, which sent rescue in vulnerable and inappropriate areas-has set teams, doctors, and emergency supplies to the stage for more frequent and devastating each other in the wake of their respective dis- "un-natural" disasters: natural disturbances asters. This impromptu cooperation facili- made worse by human activities. Human pop- tated steps t o improve overall political ulations are straining against the environ- relations between them.3 mental safety net that has, until recently,

Following the December 2004 tsunami offered them a measure of protection from the in the Indian Ocean, there was hope that a effects ofnatural disasters. This becomes obvi- similar positive outcome was possible in the ous when examining the sharp trends in the civil wars in Aceh, Indonesia, and in Sri Lanka. frequency of disasters reported, and the scale This chapter describes recent trends in disas- to which people are affected by them. ters and some ofthe connections between dis- The Center for Research on the Epidemi- asters and peace efforts or ongoing conflicts, ology of Disasters (CRED) based in Belgium and then it turns to the cases ofAceh and Sri collaborated with the Office of U.S. Foreign Lanka for insights into the opportunities for Disaster Assistance to maintain a database of peacemaking and the obstacles to it after a disasters that have occurred since 1900. natural disaster. Both areas suffered numbers Because the reporting methodology was only of dead and displaced that rivaled or sur- recently standardized, it is most useful to focus passed what many years of violent conflict on trends over the past 25 years. (See Figure had wrought. They are also instructive 7-1.) The number ofnatural disasters-events because of the nearly opposite outcomes to where at least 10 deaths occur, at least 100 peo- date: in Aceh, a peace agreement was struck, ple are affected, a state of emergency is

rld 2006

las given ,umption

d ers me to the or earth- : at much asters are $cal, geo- . Sudden ies earth- pn, occa- bdstorms,

that

Sta t e o f t h e World 2006

declared, or the area requires international assistancc-has increased fairly steadily in recent years. But it is difficult to say whether this increase is related to weather patterns, climate change, o r the fact that population growth and environmental degradation increase the number of people affected by d ~ s - asters. Since 2000, an average of 387 natural disasters havc been 1 recorded by CRED

TURNING DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

Number of Natural D~sasters

Source: OFDAICRED

Other

Figure 7-1. Frequency of Natural Disasters, 1980-2004

each year. Reinsurance agency Munich Re also keeps a record of all "natural catastrophes," and reports on histor- ical "great catastrophes." In 2004, Munich Re recorded 641 natural catastrophes. T h s

I number is "in line with the average of the past ten years," according to the ~ o m p a n y . ~

Thc CRED database shows that the number of people killed by natural disastcrs has varied widely since 1980, with no clear increase or decrease. However, the number of people affected by natural disasters-those injured, made homeless, or otherwise requir-

I ing immediate assistance-has risen over the same time period. (See Figure 7-2.) This trend is due, in large part, to an overall increase in vulnerable populauons as well as to population encroachment in areas at high risk for natural disaster^.^

A World Health Organization regional environmental advisor noted the effects of population structure and of the increasing frequency of disasters. Dr. Hisahi Ogawa recently observed that the incidence of storms in the Western Pacific Region rose about 2 percent between the early 1980s and the late

1990s, probably as a result of rising global temperatures. During that same time, the number of deaths due to natural disasters increased more than 30 percent. Ogawa sur- mised that the increasing proportion of older people in the regional population might be a factor behind that i n~ rease .~

It is becoming more and more clear that intact ecosystems provide unique protection against natural disasters-something that is difficult, if not inlpossible, to recreate. "We learnt in graphic and horrific detail that the ecosystems, such as coral reefS, mangroves and seagrasses, which we have so casually destroyed, are not a luxury," said U.N. Envi- ronment Programme (UNEP) Executive Director Klaus Topfer after the tsunami in December 2004. (See Box 7-1 .) "They are lifesavers capable of helping to defend our homes, our loved ones and our livelihoods from some of nature's more aggressive acts."'

In the midst of the death and destruction associated with large disasters, researchers are able to study the effects of environmental degradation on protection and resilience

State o f the World 2006 TURNING DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

Million People Affected 1500 1 1 Source OFDAICRED

Other Flood WavelSupe

The year 2004 was the fourth warmest year ever recorded, after 1998,2002, and 2003, and 9 of the past 10 years are among the 10 warmest years since 1861. Munich Re clearly linked the severity of the 2004 hurricane season-second only to 2005 in economic loss-to climate change trends. In Florida alone, four

1980-84 1985-89 199694 1995-99 200604 hurricanes came in rapid succession, ac-

Figure 7-2. Number of People Affected by Natural Disasters, cruing local damages 1980-2004 of $30 billion. Early

from disasters. A study of mangrove forests in Sri Lanka after the tsunami showed that intact mangroves were not uprooted, even when they bore the brunt of the waves' force. In areas where the mangroves had been even slightly disturbed, however, the local impact t o the coast was much greater. Scientists also found that the illegal destruction of coral reefs eroded the coastline's natural defense, allowing a much bigger and more powerful wave to hit the shore than in adjacent areas where the wave was broken by intact reefs.8

In addition, forests provide important ecosystem services that can mitigate the effects of natural disasters. Trees intercept ramfill and allow soil to absorb much of the water before it runs off. This keeps an area moist, pre- venting drought and desertification, while also staving off erosion. Deforestation, on the other hand, can raise the risk of wdd fires, worsen local flooding, and contribute t o global warming.

Climate change has fast become an influ- ential factor in the severity of natural disasters.

estimates suggest that total economic damages from Hurricane Katrina and the associated floods may top $125 billion. Overall, economic losses from natural disasters in 2004 totaled $145 billion, with two thirds of this attributed t o windstorms and the other one third t o geological events, including the tsunami in South A ~ i a . ~

In September 2005, a group of meteo- rologists reported an 80-percent increase, over the past 35 years, in the most powerful types of tropical cyclones-storms fueled by warm ocean water. Though most researchers agree that increases in tropical ocean temperatures have been caused by rising levels of greenhouse gases, the mechanism by which climate change may influence the frequency and severity of hurricanes remains unclear.1°

What is clear, however, is that the world must expect to face more intense storms in the years to come. Peter Hoppe, Head of Geo &sks Research at Munich Re, observed that several "extreme weather events" during 2004 "are just further evidence that a correlation between global warming and the considerable

rise in is beco pie, th Brazili that, t cane-f tures i

d 2006

wa$ the 'st year i, after d 2003, past 10 )ng the ars siice ~ c h Re Y sever- 4 hurri- -second in eco-

-to cli- rends. In le, four :ame in ;ion, ac- damages

I In. Early damages

i j


After the devastating Indian Ocean earthquake while 70 percent of Indonesia's fishing industry and tsunami in December 2004, the United was destroyed. Munich Re estimates that the

people had been affected. Some 228,000 people tsunami will reach $ 10 billion. though the are believed to have died. Environmental con- "insured loss" will be only about $1-2 billion. servation may have saved some lives, however. The initial outpouring of assistance from the In several areas affected by the tsunami, healthy international community-through both public mangrove forests, coastal vegetation, and coral and private donations-has totaled more than reefs acted as a buffer against the powerful $4 billion, according to UNER In a Humanitar- waves, saving lives as they absorbed the impact. ian Flash appeal, issued just days after the disas- This was especially true in Sri Lanka'sYala and ter, the United Nations asked for $977 million Bundala National Parks, where vegetated sand to support the immediate relief activities of 40 dunes completely stopped the waves except at U.N. agencies and nongovernmental organiza-

tions (NGOs).This figure was later revised In areas with degraded environments, the upwards to $1.27 billion. Included in this amount

story was different. Previous environmental are provisions for emergency housing and food damage may have contributed to the scale of supplies, training for fishers and farmers,and the disaster.The U.N. Environment Programme, funds to establish an Indian Ocean tsunami in i t s "Rapid Environmental Assessment," notes warning system.As of August 10,2005, contri- that some of the heaviest damage in S r i Lanka butions amounting to 82 percent ($1.04 billion) came in areas that had been mined or where of the total requested had been secured from coral reefs had sustained significant damage in donor governments and organizations, though the past. Hazardous waste from illegal coastal 16 of the 40 agencies and organizations partici- dumpsites has contaminated groundwater in pating in the appeal had received less than 50

and debris on the ground in Banda Aceh, The challenge now is to avoid reconstruc- Indonesia, contain high concentrations of heavy tion techniques that might exacerbate environ- metals that are contributing to poor air quality. mental damage, placing people in the region at

As clean-up and reconstruction efforts pro- even higher risk during future natural disasters. gress, there has been an effort to estimate the The governor of Aceh, Azwar Abubakar, has damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami. declared Aceh a "Green Province," effectively In the Maldives alone, 87 tourist resorts were setting aside 40 percent of i t s land surface for damaged, resulting in losses of $ I00 million. limited use. UNEP sponsored a "Green Aceh" A further 3 15 hotels and 234 restaurants were conference during June 2005 to encourage ex- destroyed in Thailand. Sri Lanka lost approxi- ploration of sustainable rebuilding techniques. mately two thirds of i t s 29,700 fishing boats,

SOURCE: See endnote 7.

rise in the number of extreme weather events The Connection between is becoming increasingly plausible." For example, the first hurricane ever recorded off the Disasters and Conflict Brazilian coast formed in March. Prior to The world is plagued by both frequent dis- that, this area had been considered hurri- asters and violent conficts. Still, only rarely do cane-fiee because of the low water tempera- the fault lines of conflict intersect with the tures in the area.IL geography of these disasters. While Thai-

State of the World 2006 T U R N I N G DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

land's Phuket province was heavily damaged notice, to assist in Katrina-devastated areas by the December 2004 tsunami, for example, along the Gulf Coast.13 the nearby provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Some types of disasters, such as droughts, and Yala-where almost 900 people have exhibit characteristics that are less conducive been killed since early 2004 in violence to peacemalung than others, such as earth- between separatists and state security forces- quakes and floods. As droughts gradually escaped unscathed.12 build to a crescendo of famine, disputes over

In some places where the destructive access to scarce land and water may mount forces of conflict and disaster d o overlap, among different communities, drawing devastation eventually gives way to new attention to rifts rather than common inter- opportunities for peace and reconciliation. ests. In Sudan's Darfur region, for example, But there may be good reasons why peace- severe droughts caused by desertification in making overtures d o not emerge. Smaller- theory might have given a common cause to scale disasters or slow-onset disasters may farming and nomadic communities that have simply not generate the sudden drama nec- a history of competing over resources but essary to transform on-the-ground dynamics also a record of economic interdependence and capture the world's attention and sym- and a tradition of seelung negotiated solu- pathies. The suffering inflicted by a disaster tions. But increasing scarcity led to rising may not be shared across a conflict's divide antagonism instead. The situation was wors- and hence fail t o catalyze the necessary ened by the actions of the central govern- change in attitudes. Or the political leadership in affected countries may simply not possess the courage or wisdom to take advantage of peacemaking opportunities when presented with them.

Some conflicts may be t oo thorny o r intractable to have their fundamental nature altered by post-disaster dynamics. For instance, when the Iranian city of Bam was destroyed by an earthquake in 2003, U.S. medical personnel and supplies were sent, but the gesture of goodwill failed to thaw the icy relations between the two countries. Like- wise, an Iranian offer to send 20 million bar- rels of crude oil t o alleviate energy shortages in the wake of Hurricane Katrina (but tied to the demand that U.S. sanctions against Iran be lifted) did not lead t o any diplomatic breakthroughs. And ideological hostility ban- ished even the thought of a possible rap- prochement when the U.S. State Department turned down a Cuban offer to dispatch more than 1,500 doctors and medical supplies, assembled and ready to go at a moment's

ment. In the 1990s and in the early years of the twenty-first century, it stoked the rivalry by playing up ethnic distinctions and by arming nomad militias, in order to divide its opponents and t o crush a rebellion that began in 2003.14

There are also cautionary examples where world reaction to a disaster, however well- intentioned, actually worsened rather than improved the outcome. When Somalia was ravaged by drought and famine in the early 1990s, killing an estimated 300,000 people, the United States rushed troops t o provide emergency food aid. The intervention subsequently evolved into one of the largest U.N. peacekeeping operations. Because Somalia was in the grip of a vicious civil war at the time, policymakers in Washington and New York assumed that Somali warlords had to be brought t o heel in order to safeguard aid supplies and stabilize the country. Dis- patched in the name of peacemaking, the international forces became combatants in a widening conflict. Confronted with growing

such as s ones such hoods anc impacts ( the loss

I severe & i agricultu

Whlle so cases the viability ( The outc severity c liness ant program affected t

Econc worsen t nic minc of the w exposur

,hts, cive rth- ially over )unt iing iter- lple, ,n in Ee to have but

ence iolu-

State ofthe World 2006 --

TURNING DISASTERS INTO PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

anarchy, they pulled out in 1995.15 The disaster-peacemaking connection

poses a challenge not just to governments, rebel groups, and civil society in affected countries, but also to dplomats, relief groups, development aid administrators, enuiron- mental advocates, and others worldwide. How can we grasp opportunities for peacemaking and translate them into tangible gain? What needs to be done to transform a groundswell of good will in the aftermath of disasters into lasting commitments? What needs to happen to prevent "spoilers"-those who see gain from continued conflict-from derailing the peace process? And how can the sometimes disparate demands of humanitarian action, reconstruction, long-term sustainable development, and conflict resolution be reconciled with each other?

Storm Clouds and Silver Linings

Natural disasters-both rapid-onset events such as storms and floods and slow-onset ones such as droughts-can undermine livelihoods and compromise human security. These impacts can be due to destroyed dwellings; the loss of critical physical infrastructure; severe damage to industries, fisheries, and agriculture; job loss; and health epidemics. While some effects are temporary, in other cases the long-term habitability or economic viability of an affected area is compromised. Thc outcome is determined not only by the severity of the disaster, but also by the time- liness and adequacy of relief and rebuilding programs and by the degree of resilience in affected communities and societies.

Economic and ecological marginalization worsen the impacts on poor people and ethnic minorities. A disproportionate number of the world's poor live on the frontline of exposure to disasters: countries with low

human development account for 53 percent of recorded deaths fi-om dsasters even though they are home to only 11 percent of the people exposed to natural hazards worldwide. In urban areas, poor people contend with precarious housing in slums. In rural areas, inequitable land dstribution means that small farmers are often forced onto steep hillsides, where they are much more vulnerable t o massivc crosion and landslides. Since the cop- ing capacity of poor pcople tends to be very limited, a disaster may push them over the edge econ~mical ly.~~

What needs to be done to transform a groundswell of good will in the aftermath of disasters into lasting commitments?

Aside from livelihood impacts, disasters may trigger a range of societal conflicts. As a recent O x h International report explains, disasters "are profoundly discriminatory in their impact on people." And the human response may well reinforce such unequal impacts:17

Disasters often exact a heavy economic toll. In poorer countries, they may obliterate hard-won social gains and sharpen the prob- lcms of indebtedness, poverty, and unemployment. Losses of $2 billion from a 2001 earthquake in El Salvador, for instance, were equivalent to a whopping 1 5 perccnt of gross domestic product (GDP). (In con- trast, the $100 billion of damage due to a 1995 earthquake in Kobe was equal t o just 2 percent of Japan's GDP.) Such adverse effects can easily deepen fault lines- between rich and poor, urban and rural comn~unities, men and women, and different ethnic groups.ls Disputes may erupt over propcr compensation for land, buildings, and lost or damaged property. Where a disaster wipes out public records-identification cards, birth

State o f the World 2006 T U R N I N G DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNIT IES

and marriage certificates, property titles- people cannot easily prove their identity or property ownership. A disaster may alter the physical landscape so fundamentally that it becomes nearly impossible to iden- tify property lines and other boundaries or to adjudicate property disputes. In divided societies, conflict may arise if relief and reconstruction aid are wielded as a tool for dispensing favors to one community or group over another or for tight- ening the government's political control. Even the perception of such discrimination can complicate reconciliation efforts. Competitive relief efforts involving opposing forces in a civil war situation may reinforce rather than surmount distrust. Conflicts may ensue if resettlement and reconstruction are driven forward without properly consulting affected communities and protecting their rights. Also, disaster- displaced populations may not be welcome elsewhere and could be seen as competitors for scarce land, water, jobs, and social services, particularly in countries that are already confronting social, economic, environmental, or political stress. Conflicts like these in the aftermath of d s -

asters are not necessarily carried out by violent means. But at least in some cases, they could sow the seeds of future violent conflict by increasing discontent and polarization.

Areas of past and current armed conflict face additional dangers. Warfare depletes a country's economic resources, rends its social fabric, and damages its natural environment- all affecting the resilience needed to recover from a disaster. Anti-personnel landmines, often scattered indiscriminately by armed protagonists, become even more randomly deadly when they are carried by floodwaters or mudslides to new and hence unknown locations. This has happened in the wake of disasters in Mozambique, Bosnia Herzegov-

ina, and most countries in Central America, for instance.19

Disasters may thus well generate new storm clouds. But by dramatically reshaping the societal landscape, they may also have a silver lining-transforming conflicts in ways that generate fresh opportunities to bring long-running conflicts to an end. A disaster may create suffering that cuts across the divides of conflict and thus prompts common relief needs and interests. The destruction wrought by a disaster may be of such a scale that reconstruction can only proceed by striking at least a cease-fire or by negotiating a peace agreement. Competent and fair disaster relief can improve a government's image tremendously in the eyes of people who are demanding greater autonomy or independence, easing existing resentments and per- haps paving the way for a more serious dialogue to address grievances.

Whether such peacemaking opportunities are realized depends strongly on the sincer- ity and commitment of a country's political leadership. And peacemaking will need to take the interests and motivations of various actors into account in order to succeed. If opposition parties or other important seg- ments of society are left out, they may well see political benefit in opposing peace.

The role of the mhtary is especially critical. Post-disaster relief efforts typically rely heavily on the armed forces, due to their unparal- leled numbers and logistical capacities. But this is the same institution that is the very instrumerlt of oppression in countties plagued by civil war. Indeed, a government embroiled in civil war may be tempted to turn tragedy into military advantage, subjecting a rebel- lious area to renewed central government control. Or the military leadership may pursue interests and agendas in conflict with the wishes of the civilian leadership.

Large-scale natural calamities usually trig-

structic Over tl cornin! politica of con torped

But ful tha Somali side in of dist percen nents. comm dynm create beyon

Thc questi' uurn. action aid-( structi susta11 those on nal

'ate new eshaping io have a s in ways to bring i disaster :ross the ?ts com- destruc - of such a ,oceed by gotiating i fair dis- ~t's image :who are indepen- and per-

j serious

rtunities e sincer- political need to various ceed. If nt seg- well see I 1 trig-

TURNING

ger humanitarian assistance efforts by the United Nations, donor nations' aid agencies, and a large number of NGOs. The influx of many foreigners, accompanied by intense (though typically short-lived) global media interest, turns the spotlight on a war-torn area that may previously have been ignored or even off-limits to outsiders. These circumstances offer an opportunity for enhancing transparency and reducing the likelihood of continued violence and human rights abuses.

Outsiders may indeed need to play an assertive role in encouraging and cajoling warring parties to resolve their conflict or at least adopt a cease-fire. International donors will likely insist that the protagonists under- take concrete steps toward that end, so that emergency aid can be delivered and reconstruction efforts are not ultimately in vain. Over the longer term, a key challenge is over- coming the resistance of those who benefit, politically or materially, fiom the continuation of conflict and who therefore might seek to torpedo efforts at conflict resolution.

But outside actors also need to be mind- ful that a poorly designed intervention, as in Somalia, could worsen the situation. Out- side involvement can itself become a source of distrust if the different sides of a confhct perceive it to be benefiting mostly their opponents. The central goal for the international commullity is t o bring about a different dynamic, to reinforce shared interests, and to create maneuvering space for civil society beyond the armed protagonists.

There is also the broader and longer-term question of the relief-development contin- uum. The imperatives o f humanitarian action-focused on delivering rapid relief aid-differ from the requirements of reconstruction and longer-term development and sustainability and may at times conflict with those needs. Rebuilding needs put pressure

, on natural resources such as forests, and if the

i

DISASTERS INTO PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

reconstruction proceeds without proper attention to environmental impacts, it may simply create conditions for additional natural calamities. Environmental restoration plays a critical role in ensuring that rebuilding efforts not only reduce vulnerability to future natural disturbances but also help foster social and economic structures that are less conducive to future conflict.

Aceh: Breaking the Logjam

The December 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh luck-started negotiations to end a conflict that has lasted for almost 30 years and led to widespread violence and dis- placement. (See Table 7-1 .) Before the tsunami, peace negotiations between Acehnese rebels and the Indonesian government had collapsed in May 2003, leading to the imposition of martial law.20

After Aceh-located at the northern tip of Sumatra-was incorporated into the newly established Republic of Indonesia in 1945, a disagreement developed between Jakarta's insistence o n strong central control and Acehnese longings for independence. Promises of special autonomy for the province remained unfulfilled. Rebellion broke out as early as 19 53, but the current conflict dates t o 1976, when the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) was founded with the express goal of seceding from I n d o n e ~ i a . ~ ~

Aceh is rich in natural resources, including oil, natural gas, timber, and minerals, and provides 15-20 percent of Indonesia's oil and gas output. But this wealth benefited mostly multinational companies and cronies of the long-reigning Suharto dictatorship. Aceh today remains one of Indonesia's poor- est provinces. Unemployment is rampant and about 40 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, compared with about

State of the World 2006 State of TURNING DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

Table 7-1. Impacts of Civil War and the have grown substantially in all 2004Tsunami on Aceh's 4.2 Million People' of Indonesia. Profits from legal

and illegal ventures have sup- People or Housing Affected

plemented the official defense (number) budget and enriched military

Civil war and police commander^.^^ 15,000 Some elements of the mil-

Displaced in 1992-2002 1.4 million Displaced in 2003-04 1 20.000- 1 50,000 itary in Aceh are involved in

Tsunami marijuana production and traf- ficking, prostitution, and

13 1,000 extortion from individuals and 37,000 businesses. Fishers have been Displaced or homeless, initial estimates 500,000-1 million

Displaced or homeless, remaining2 more than 500,000 forced to sell part of their 800,000 Dependent on food aid3 catch, and coffee growers part

Damaged and destroyed houses 1 16,880 of their harvest, at below mar-

2003 census. l As ofAugust 2005. 3World Food Programme ket rates the food recipients. in turn sell these at vastly SOURCE: See endnote 20. inflated prices.25

One of the most lucrative sources of income for the mil-

10 percent in 1996 and 20 percent in 1999. itary and police is illegal logging. (See Box In 2002,48 percent of the population had no 7-2.) Confict has been a convenient cover for access to clean water, 36 percent of children those plundering the region's natural under the age of five were undernourished, resources, and elements of the security forces and 38 percent of the Acehnese had no access have not shied away from orchestrating vio- to health fa~i l i t ies .~~ lence to justify a continued military presence

Excessive political centralization and unjust in A ~ e h . ~ ~ exploitation of Aceh's natural resources lie at The military had been the dominant insti- the heart of the conflict. Military repression, tution in Indonesia since the mid-1960s-a massive human rights violations, and a high virtual state withm a state. After the fall of the degree of impunity enjoyed by the security Suharto dctatorship in 1997, political reform- forces have additionally fueled discontent and ers began the difficult task of loosening the resentment among the Acehnese. With mem- military's grip on Indonesian society. Reduc- bership surging in the late 1980s and 1990s, ing its power and making it more accountable GAM was transformed into a genuine popu- is of great importance to the outcome of the lar movement, posing an increasingly serious Aceh peace proces~.~ ' challenge to Jakarta in an escalating A 2004 law requires the military to end its

The Indonesian military has long been lucrative business ventures within five years, opposed to resolving the Aceh confhct through and Army chief General Endriarto Sutarto negotiations and appears at times to have pledged to comply by 2007. Efforts have undermined the fledghg peace efforts under- also been made to reduce the military's direct taken between 2000 and 2003. Economic political influence. The number of parlia- interests explain this attitude. Since the 1950s, mentary seats allocated to representatives of the business dealings of the security forces the armed forces was reduced from 75 to 38

State o f the World 2006 T U R N I N G DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

Aceh's natural treasures are under threat of governments throughout the country were rapid depletion.The Leuser Ecosystem-at 2.6 given the right in January 200 1 t o license million hectares, almost the size of Belgium-is small-scale logging. Issuing such concessions the largest remaining forest on Sumatra, strad- became an easy way for local authorities t o dling Aceh and North Sumatra provinces. A t its raise much-needed revenue, and district heads heart is the 800,000-hectare Gunung Leuser often tolerate illegal logging. Deforestation National Park, part of a World Heritage Site continues, despite the central government's since July 2004.The Leuser Ecosystem is a bio- efforts t o institute a moratorium. By 2002.26 diversity hotspot, with some 700 different ani- percent of Gunung Leuser Park had been ma1 species and about 4,500 plant species. It is destroyed, and a major planned road project home to some 4 percent of all known bird could increase the portion of affected forest species worldwide and to a rich range of to 40 percent by 20 10.

Both the military and the police have been and rhinos, elephants, orangutans, hornbills, and involved in illegal logging in Aceh, working in cloud leopards. Leuser also has the world's partnership with private entrepreneurs and largest flower (Rafflesia arnoldi) and the tallest levying fees on trucks that carry logs out of one (Amorphophallus tatinum). Aceh. Loggers pay the security forces for pro-

Aceh is rich in tropical hardwood trees like tection against prosecution. Rivalries among dif- semaram, merbau, kruing, and meranti, which ferent units of security forces have at times fetch a high price on international markets and apparently led to armed turf battles.The secu- make logging very lucrative.The World Bank rity forces also have a stake in oil palm and and the Indonesian government estimated in other plantations that are being set up on the late 1990s that 69 percent of Acehf total cleared forest areas. land area remained forested. Since then, how- Logging has caused a growing number of ever, annual deforestation is believed to have flash floods and landslides, sweeping away home reached 270,000 hectares. and destroying nearby rice fields. In just the

During the long reign of President Suharto, half-year after the tsunami, there were five forests were carved up into huge logging and major floods and landslides; since 2000, a total plantation concessions assigned to cronies of of 143 such incidents have been documented. the regime. In the post-Suharto era, district

in January 1999 and is slated to go to zero. But in Indonesia's restive provinces, the armed forces still hold considerable sway.28

The humanitarian emergency triggered by the tsunami provided a critical opportunity for change in Aceh-prying open the province, which was under martial law, to international scrutiny, promising an end to the security forces' human rights violations and freedom from prosecution, and offering an avenue for ending the conflict. The military's tight grip over Aceh slipped in the aftermath of the

tsunami. For one, its system of control was largely washed away-military and police sta- tions were destroyed or damaged, and many documents relating to martial law, including mandatory identity cards, were lost. Although hardliners were pressing to bar foreign relief personnel from Aceh, the huge scale of the catastrophe made the need for massive international assistance irrefutable.29

The tsunami shifted the political dynamic quite decisively, as Richard Baker of the East- West Center explains: "It provided a power-

State of the World 2006 T U R N I N G DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNIT IES

ful and catalyzing shock; it produced a focus including Germany and Japan, made it clear on common goals of relief, recovery and to both sides that they expected progress in reconstruction; and it brought increased inter- the peace negotiations so that reconstruc- national attention." With the eyes of the tion could proceed unimpeded.31 world trained on Aceh, both the government From January to July 2005, five negoti- and the rebels were anxious to seize the high ation rounds took place in Helsinki, medi- moral ground and not to be seen as sabo- ated by former Finnish President Martti taging the peace process.30 Ahtisaari. Low-level violence between the

President Yudhoyono came to power in Indonesian army and GAM continued 2004 committed to resolving the Aceh con- throughout the talks but did not derail them. fict. His government saw an opportunity to Once GAM dropped its demand for Aceh repair Indonesia's international credibility, independence in favor of autonomy, an sullied by endemic corruption and the mili- agreement was reached fairly quickly and tary's reputation for brutality. For their part, signed on August 15,2005. Table 7-2 sum- the rebels had suffered significant military marizes its major provision^.^^ setbacks during martial law and they real- As of October 2005, both sides were ful- ized that negotiations were the only way to filling their responsibilities under the agree- gain international legitimacy for their strug- ment. Optimism among observers is gle. While not making aid directly condi- somewhat tinged by concern that the peace tional on conflict resolution, several donors, deal could still fall apart, either because of

Table 7-2. Selected Provisions of the Aceh Peace Agreement, August 2005

Issue Provision

Human rights

Amnesty

Reintegration

Security

Political participation

Economy

Monitoring

A Human Rights Court and a Commission forTruth and Reconciliation will be established.

GAM members receive amnesty and political prisoners will be released.

Former combatants, pardoned prisoners, and affected civilians are to receive farmland, jobs, or other compensation.

GAM is to demobilize its 3,000 fighters and relinquish 840 weapons between 15 Septem- ber and 3 1 December 2005.

Simultaneously, non-local government military forces are to be reduced to 14,700 and non-local police forces to 9.100.

Free and fair elections are to be held in April 2006 (for Aceh governor) and in 2009 (for Aceh legislature).

The government is to facilitate the establishment of local political parties (by amending the national election law) no later than January 2007.

Aceh is entitled to retain 70 percent of its natural resource revenues.

GAM representatives will participate in the post-tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilita- tion Commission.

The European Union and ASEAN contributing countries establish an Aceh Monitoring Mission. It will monitor human rights, demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration progress and will rule on disputes.

combat2 but also of resou acti~lties be deple being de local eco less dep resource provide

Sri SOURCE: See endnote 32.

126

,it clear ess in

State o f the World 2006 TURNING DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

irreconcilable differences in interpreting the agreement's provisions o r because of aggrieved opponents determined to waylay the process. There is genuine commitment on both sides, but some elements-nlllitary units, rebel warlords, pro-government militias, and criminals pretending t o be rebels-would rather see the conflict continue due to ideological reasons or to maintain opportunities for lucrative drug smuggling, illegal logging, and protection rackets.33

Ultimately, the peace deal will need t o deliver tangble benefits to members of GAM and anti-GAM militias, many of whom are unskilled and unemployed young men. Aceh's unemployment rate stands at 27 percent. To provide livelihoods that can sustain peace, the economy will have to undergo a transition not only from short-term emergency aid to long-term recovery and from demobilizing combatants to reintegrating them into society, but also from the unsustainable exploitation of resources to a broader mix of economic activities. Aceh's oil reserves are expected to be depleted by 201 1, and its forests are rapidly being decimated. Given these pressures, the local economy must be transformed into one less dependent o n the province's natural resources and at the same time better able to provide secure livelihood^.^^

S r i Lanka: Nei ther W a r nor Peace

Even though Sri Lanka was hit by the same disaster as Aceh, post-disaster developments there were dramatically different. Infighting anlong the various actors and the presence of powerful "spoilers" stalled the peace process and underlined the fact that local political dynamics are critical in determining the ulti- mate outcome.

Sri Lanka was tormented by civil war from 1983 until a fragile cease-fire was reached in

February 2002. The underlying conflict had its origins in the assertive Sinhala nationalism post-independence vis-A-vis the country's minority Tamils. During British colonial rule, Tamils benefited from superior educational opportunities and they constituted a significant portion of the English-spealung admin- istrative class. Then from 1956 onward, Sinhala-dominated governments pursued lan- guage and education policies that discrimi- nated against Tamils. Until the early 1970s, Tamil leaders responded by pressing for equal rights and autonomy in the largely Tamil- speakmg regions of the north and east through negotiations and civil disobedience. But the two main Slnhala political parties-the United National Party and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party-repeatedly reneged on agreements when they were in government. And when either was in the opposition, they stirred up Sinhala passions to thwart any compromise. The resulting growth in Tamil militancy was greeted by violent r e p r e ~ s i o n . ~ ~

Still, Sri Lanka's civil war is not the product of simple "ethnic hatreds." Rather, much of the violence has been instigated by the government security forces and other armed groups. As Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake of the International Centre for Ethnic Stud- ies in Colombo has observed: "A variety of politicians as well as members of the defense industry and paramilitary groups have used the armed conflict to acquire personal and political profit," and thus have a vested interest in prolonging the conflict. But the conflict has drained the country's economy, and it is often growing deprivation rather than ethnic passion that leads young people to join armed groups.36

Much of the violence has actually taken place within the different communities. Sinhala insurrections in the early 1970s and late 1980s were suppressed with great brutality. Among Tamil militant groups, infighting has been

---- ---- State o f the World 2006 ---- State oft


rampant, with the ruthless Liberation Tigers if not active collaboration, is essential.39 tsunami of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) seeking to eliminate The infighting and wrangling intensified unite thc rivals and imposing unquestioned control over so much tha t a resump tion of war had war. Go Tamil politics. Some Tamil p a r d t a r y groups become a dreaded expectation by the time regardec were bankrolled by the government and fought the tsunami struck. It took nature's fury to other en alongside the Sinhala-dominated army. Sri give the foes a shared challenge and to revive context Lankan Muslims have been caught in the mid- interest in peacemaking. (See Table 7-3.) Colombc dle; even though many of them are Tamil- Sinhala, Tamil, and Muslim communities distribut; speaking, the LTTE has massacred and all suffered tremendously. About half the corrobor expelled Muslims in areas under its control.37 dead were found in the northern and east- At the s

After three failed attempts between 1985 ern parts of the country, where Tamils pre- the LT'I and 1995, a government-LTTE cease-fire dominantly live.40 tribute a facilitated by Norway has held since Febru- Indeed, the immediate aftermath of the LTTE-a1 arv 2002. Both sides had fought each other tsunami was marked by a groundswell of sol- nization to a standstill, suffered desertions, and faced idarity, with many spontaneous acts of empa- relief carr growing public demands for peace. Despite thy across the conflict's dividing lines. An and Hur initial enthusiasm, peace negotiations stalled, array of political and religious leaders called for that the I and the LTTE broke off the talks in April national unity, and public opinion became in refuge 2003 after it was excluded from an interna- stronglvinclined toward reconciliation. On the tional donors meeting. An October 2003 ground, the disaster led to the closest coop- proposal by the LTTE for a five-year Interim eration since the cease-fire was signed, with Self Governing Authority in areas under its soldiers from both sides working together to control divided the Sinhala parties. Some repair roads and distribute relief aid.41 charged that this was little more than a blue- Even so, the basic rifts reemerged before print for a separate Tamil state, and an long, and it became apparent that the post- extended power struggle ensued that led to the disso- Table 7-3. Impacts of Civil War and the lution of parliament and new 2004Tsunami on Sri Lanka's 19.6 Million People' elections in April 2004.3x

Impacts Another problem inherent People or Housing Affected

in the 2002 cease-fire-one (number) Civil war that continues to cloud the ---

prospects for peace-is that it narrowly focused on a deal between the two main actors, the governing party and the LTTE. I t effectively ignored o r sidelined several constituencies-the Sinhala- nationalist Tanatha Vimukhti

Killed 65,000 Displaced, at peak I million Displaced, as of August 2005 347,500

(plus 143,000 refugees in India)

Tsunami

Killed 33,900 Missing 5,000 Displaced or homeless, initial estimates 800,000-1 million Displaced or homeless, remaining 457,500

~e ramuna ( p, or Pea- Dependent on food aid2 -

9 15,000

ple's Liberation Front), the Damaged and destroyed houses 90,000

Muslim parties, and the Bud- ' 2004 population. World Food Programme food recipients. dhist clergy-whose consent, SOURCE: See endnote 40.

practice c Intern

sure on mechanis $3 billio struction they wa directly t( rorist grc igible fa because sible in I Tigers' cc as a confi vigorate

After ment an Tsunami in June governr tives of 1 mend, se projects and east.

For ti tri butio

;ified had time ry to evive 7-3.) lities f the east-

I pre-

if the if sol-


tsunami political developments could either unite the war-torn island or reignite the civil war. Government and rebels increasingly regarded aid distribution, repair work, and other emergency assistancc in a conlpetitive context. The Tamil Tigers accused the Colombo government of discrimination in aid distribution against Tamil areas, a charge not corroborated by most independent observers. At the same time, there were reports that the LTTE was hijacking shipments to distribute aid through its own network. The LTTE-affiliated Tamil Rehabilitation Orga- nization aggressivcly took control of many relief camps along the eastern coast. UNICEF and Human Rights Watch verified reports that the LTTE was recruiting children living in refugee camps, resuming its reprehensible practice of relying on child ~oldiers.4~

International donors increased their pressure on both sides to agree upon a "joint mechanism" for the equitable distribution of $3 billion in international relief and reconstruction aid pledges. One reason was that they wanted to avoid channeling funds directly to the Tigers-officially listed as a ter- rorist group in many countries and thus inel- igible for aid. An agreement was critical because little to no reconstruction was possible in L71TE-controlled areas without the Tigers' consent. And a deal was also regarded as a confidence-buildng tool that could rein- vigorate thc dcadlocked peace process.43

After months of wrangling, the government and LTTE finally agreed on a Post- Tsunami Operational Management Structure in June 2005. Under the pact, a panel of government officials, rebels, and representatives of Muslim communities would recom- mend, set priorities among, and monitor aid projects in six affected regions in the north and

For the LTTE, a formal role in the distribution of international reconstruction

funds would yield significant political benefits-solidifying its control over the north- eastern part of the country and conferring newfound legitimacy. Yet this prospect is utterly unacceptable to the JVP, the third- largest party in parliament. Vehemently opposcd to any measures that would legit- imize the LTTE or help it carve out a separate state, the party withdrcw from thc government coalition in protest.45

In response to a complaint brought by the JW, arguing that the aid-sharing deal is uncon- stitutional, Sri Lanka's Supreme Court tem- porarily suspended it in July 2005. Although the court ruled that the deal is in principle legitinlate, it objected to specific clauses regard- ing the managenlent of donor finds in rebel- held areas. The aid dcal is now held hostage to political maneuvering. A Court hearing to help decide the fate of the agreement was expected in late November 2005, after presi- dential elections that may well reshuffle the political deck and bring further complications for the faltering peace efforts.46

Yet aid is needed swiftly: by July 2005, only $459 million in tsunami recovery out of a promised $3 billion had actually been delivered, and many survivors arc still living in dis- mal conditions, with frustration rising. If humanitarian assistance remains sluggish and uneven in different communities, it fi~rther complicates the task of rec~ncil iat ion.~~

Additional storm clouds are gathering. In the eastern part of the country, a shadow war has been going on ever since a renegade faction of the Tamil Tiger rebels broke away in March 2004. The LTTE accuses the government of using the breakaway group as a proxy force. Meanwhile, political killings among rival Tamil factions, most committed by the LTTE, have been rising sharply. Wor- ries that full-scale conflict might resume surged in August 2005, when Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar was

State of the World 2006 T U R N I N G DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING O P P O R T U N I T I E S

assassinated, a murder the government ment that reduces the likelihood ofrecurring blamed on the LTTE.48 conflict as much as the vulnerability to h ture

Still, neither side is ready for renewed.war. disasters. (See Table 7 4 . ) Both were weakened by the tsunami. The In disaster-affected areas, especially where International Monetary Fund warned that a political tensions run high, better coordina- failure to revive the peace process would risk tion is desperately needed anlong humani- compounding serious economic problems, tarian action, reconstruction, disaster including high inflation, large fiscal deficits, prevention, environmental protection, eco- and growing public debt. By September, the nomic development, and post-conflict disar- Sri Lankan government called for a "redesign" mament efforts. Too often, agencies and of the country's stalled peace process, indi- organizations with similar goals operate in cating it wanted greater involvement from the parallel spheres, with little communication international community.49 or collaboration. They often have different

agendas, constituencies, operational cultures, Humanitarian and and time horizons. And they may well com-

Envi rOn mental Peacemaking pete for influence and visibility. A 2004 report by the U N Development Programme

As the recent experiences in Aceh province (UNDP) laments that "the divisions between and Sri Lanka indicate, humanitarian action those working on natural disaster risk reduc- in the aftermath of natural disasters can be a tion and con~plex political emergencies and ti01 powerhl catalyst for transforming conflict development have hindered the search for ree. dynamics, sometimes providing the impetus ways to address such situation^.^'^^ sia. needed to overcome deep human divides and Greater coherence, with a focus on inte- inci jump-starting peace efforts. The devastation grating different perspectives and drawing mis caused by earthquakes, floods, or other nat- on unique strengths, should be the goal of Pro ural calamities can have a strong psycholog- working with the multitude of actors pre- q U t

ical and emotional impact even on those sent after a natural disaster strikes. l'eople 1 hardened by many years of armed confhct. from these different fields of expertise need cer

But a rush of post-disaster goodwill alone to be brought together to reconcile the needs ern is unlikely t o carry warring factions through and agendas of different stakeholders and t o alrc the complexities and stumbling blocks of a bridge short-term and long-term concerns. ass( peace process. To maintain momentum, Such collaboration should begin before a tha humanitarianism needs to be transformed natural disaster actually strikes. By building Yea into political change-addressing the root coahtions and participating in integrated plan- me causes of the conflict at hand, putting in ning sessions, relief agencies, U.N. offices, civil sty;

place confidence-building measures, and tak- society groups, and international donors can fra~ ing on the vested interests of those who ben- strengthen their collective impact. Wo efit from a continuation o f conflict. A d and reconstruction efforts, while grim g ui Policymakers and humanitarian groups must in their origin, provide real opportunities for ti01 be proactive in dealing with the remnants of pragmatic planning and innovative rebddmg. resl conflict, designing a rebuilding process that Environmental restoration is an important anc addresses the social and economic needs of aspect of any such project. Natural disasters loci ex-fighters and disaster victims alike and cal- often wreak havoc o n ecosystems, especially sus ing for sustainable and equitable develop- those left vulnerable from previous degrada- alrc

130

lrring future

where rdina- mani- laster

eco- idisar- a and bte in

State o f the World 2006 T U R N I N G DISASTERS I N T O PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNIT IES

Table 7-4. Key Tasks for Post-disaster Reconstruction and Peacemaking

Issue Task

Conflict Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants

Peace monitoring and peacekeeping

Security sector reform (subjecting military institutions t o democratic oversight, impartial policing)

Human rights training, enforcement

Social issues Poverty reduction (and thus reduction of disaster vulnerability and of social inequities that may fuel future conflict)

Civil society involvement in reconstruction and disaster mitigation

Strengthening the rights of minorities and indigenous communities

Environmental Protection and restoration of ecosystems that offer shelter against storms, floods, issues landslides, droughts,and so on

Ensuring that reconstruction of housing and infrastructure does not accelerate environmental degradation

Adoption of more sustainable practices in agriculture,forestry, and industry

tion, such as the mangrove forests and coral reefs on the coasts of Sri Lanka and Indone- sia. Ignoring such problems, o r actually increasing the scope of destruction through misguided reconstruction, leaves a disaster- prone area even more vulnerable to subse- quent natural d i s a ~ t e r s . ~ ~

Innovative partnerships between con- cerned environmental organizations, government officials, and industry groups are already tackling environmental problems associated with the vast reconstruction efforts that will follow the Indian Ocean tsunami for years to come. In April 2005, the government of Indonesia adopted Green Recon- struction Policy Guidelines for Aceh, a framework document developed by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). These guidelines address where to get reconstruction materials, what types of environmental restoration techniques are most effective, and the importance of building legitimate local institutions-all of whlch will help guide sustainable reconstruction in a province already battling rapid deforestation. And in

a unique partnership between two environmental groups (WWF and Conservation International) and an industry group (Amer- ican Forest and Paper Association), donations of U.S. timber will be collected and shipped t o Aceh, reducing the pressure on the province's forests.s2

Environmental restoration is not only a core ingredient of disaster prevention and mitigation strategies, it can also be an unpar- alleled opportunity to promote cooperation among actors who otherwise might see each other as adversaries. The 2004 UNDP report mentions that "in Colombia, violently opposed local communities in the Depart- ment of Meta have worked together t o mitigate the impact of floods as a means not only of protecting livelihoods, but also of building trust and reconciliation." But it con- cludes that on a global scale, "little or n o attention has been paid to the potential of disaster management as a tool for confhct prevention initiatives." ss

The time is right, however, for such initiatives to multiply. As much as disasters may have

State of the World 2006 TURNING DISASTERS INTO PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES

cooperation on environmental protection and provided training to evaluate earthquake risk,

regional seas agreements, and joint environ- tries that often suffer from political tensions.ss mental monitoring programs-built on the UNESCO, through its Intergovernmental notion that shared concerns and vulnerabili- Oceanographic Commission, has also been ties can facilitate cooperative behavior among active in establishing an Indian Ocean otherwise adversarial communities or coun- Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System. tries. Similar notions are applicable to disas- When the December 2004 tsunami hit, no ter management.s4 unified warning system existed in the region,

Natural disasters often provide unique sit- and this proved to be a major factor in the cat- uations in which political and aid-related astrophic loss of life. The proposed warning decisions can either hasten peacebuilding system is slated to be part of a global network, efforts or deepen existing divides within and strengthening and uniting national warning between countries. Governments, multilateral systems. More broadly, the United Nations is agencies, and civil society organizations, all coordinating implementation of the Hyogo H with access to capital and international atten- Framework of Action, a 10-year natural dis- acco tion, yield great influence in post-disaster aster risk reduction plan adopted by 168 stren reconstruction efforts. International coop- country delegations at the U.N. World Con- grou eration around natural disaster prevention ference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan, post and mitigation can be effective in reducing in January 2005.56 well risk, while also bridging long-standing polit- Both war-affected and disaster-ravaged cial- ical tension between countries. populations need comprehensive assistance, natu

and it makes sense to blend their needs into ernn

Natural disasters often provide unique a comprehensive program. Broad, commu- whai

situations in which political and aid-related nity-based reconstruction efforts will benefit war-displaced individuals and

decisions can either hasten peacebuilding ex-combatants as well as the general popu- efforts or deepen existing divides within lation if they provide housing, infrastruc- and between countries. ture, vocational skills, and jobs in a timely and

non-discriminatory manner. (The provision In a series of U.N.-backed initiatives, coun- of arable land-a much scarcer commodity,

tries in the Arab, South Asian, and Eastern particularly in the aftermath of disasters- Mediterranean regions have collaborated to tends to be far more problematic and can reduce earthquake losses. Following a strong trigger fresh conflicts.) Measures to deal with earthquake in Algeria in 1980, which lulled post-conflict issues are of importance to the 3,000 people and displaced nearly a half-mil- population at large as well: weapons collec- lion others, the Arab Fund for Economic tion reduces the level of lawlessness, and Development and the Islamic Bank worked efforts to locate and collect anti-personnel with UNESCO to create the Programme for landmines mean that once-populated and

132

World 2006

'Earthquake )rogram has hquake risk, )visions into 1 seismome- :CO, Tunisia, gpt-coun- a1 tensions. 55

overnrnental as also been Iian Ocean ion System. lami hit, no I the region, lor in the cat- sed warning kbal network,

a1 wdrnlng

State of the World 2006 -


fertile areas become accessible again.57 These tasks require adequate funding.

Large-scale aid flows-some $9 billion has been pledged by governments and multilateral agencies, and another $5 billion by private sources for tsunami-affected countries, for instance-can serve as an economic incen- tive for peace. Yet that very inflow also pre- sents a tempting target for embezzlement. Indonesia has long been one of the most corrupt countries (30 percent or more of aid funds are typically pilfered before r e a c h g the intended recipients), while Aceh's is among the most corrupt provincial authorities within Indonesia. And as developments in Sri Lanka have shown, aid flows can trigger political infighting that slows or paralyzes the actual delivery of assistance to victims and may even endanger pea~emak ing .~~

High standards of transparency and accountability cannot be achieved without strengthening c i d society. Community- based groups play a pivotal role in ensuring that post-disaster and post-conflict programs are well implemented and are broadly benefi- cial-with regard to social equity as well as natural resource management. Donor governments and U.N. agencies must consider what they can do to discourage top-down

approaches and to broaden the maneuvering space of civil society groups.

Since the end of the cold war, n~ululateral agencies, governments, and NGOs have struggled to design appropriate and workable responses t o the challenges of "complex humanitarian emergencies"-situations requiring political, hun~anitarian, and military action. Many lcssons have been learned (though not necessarily always applied later) with regard to peacekeeping, disarmament, human rights, anti-corruption, sustainable development, and other related issues. But recent disasters, espccially the Indian Ocean tsunami, have exposed the need for more creative and imaginative collaboration between the multitude of agencies and organizations responding to disasters.

By learning from past situations in which natural disasters exposed regional or community-based violencc and inequities, by anticipating an increasc in the frequency and severity of natural disasters, and by recog- nizing the synergies bcnveen humanitarian efforts and environmental peacemaking, governments and relief agcncies have the invalu- able opportunity-and indeed the responsibility-to incrcase the sustained effec- tiveness of their post-disaster assistance.

CHAPTER I Turning Disasters into Peacemaking …TURNING DISASTERS INTO PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES...

Documents

Transcript of CHAPTER I Turning Disasters into Peacemaking …TURNING DISASTERS INTO PEACEMAKING OPPORTUNITIES...