Chapter 5 - Syria and Lebanon...Joshua Busby Draft Manuscript December 2019 3 Lebanon experienced a...

JoshuaBusbyDraftManuscriptDecember2019

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Chapter 5: Drought in the Middle East – Contrasting Fortunes in Syria and

Lebanon

Wehaveherepointedtoaconnectedpathrunningfromhumaninterferencewithclimatetoseveredroughttoagriculturalcollapseandmasshumanmigration.Thispathrunsthroughalandscapeofvulnerabilitytodroughtthatencompassesgovernmentpoliciespromotingunsustainableagriculturalpractices,andthefailureofthegovernmenttoaddressthesufferingofadisplacedpopulation.OurthesisthatdroughtcontributedtotheconflictinSyriadrawssupportfromrecentliteratureestablishingastatisticallinkbetweenclimateandconflict.–ColinP.Kelleyetal.20151AmongstotherthingsitshowsthatthereisnoclearandreliableevidencethatanthropogenicclimatechangewasafactorinSyria'spre-civilwardrought;thatthisdroughtdidnotcauseanywherenearthescaleofmigrationthatisoftenalleged;andthatthereexistsnosolidevidencethatdroughtmigrationpressuresinSyriacontributedtocivilwaronset.–JanSelbyetal.20172

InMarch2011,Syriadescendedintoacivilwarthatinitsfirstfiveyears

claimed400,000lives.3Asresearcherstriedtounderstandthecircumstancesthat

leduptothecivilwar,anumberofthemsurfacedamulti-yearseveredroughtthat

underminedagriculturalconditionswhich,inturn,ledtolarge-scalepopulation

movementsthatultimatelycontributedtoprotestsandensuingviolence.4Other

scholarshavedisputedthoselinks,identifyingwatermismanagement,repression,

andothergovernmentpoliciesthattheybelieveweretheprimarydriversofthe

war.5.

1 Kelley et al. 2015, 3245. 2 Selby et al. 2017a, 232. 3 CNN 2019. 4 Kelley et al. 2015; Gleick 2014; Femia and Werrell 2012; Werrell and Femia 2013; Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015. This sequence was captured vividly in comic strip form by Quinn and Roche 2014. 5 Selby et al. 2017a; Fröhlich 2016; Châtel 2014. The back and forth has led to a vigorous exchange between those dismissive of the links between climate factors and conflict and those supportive of those connections. Kelley et al. 2017; Gleick 2017; Hendrix 2017b; Hendrix 2017a; Werrell and Femia 2017.


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Debatesabouttherelativeimportanceofdifferentfactorsintheleadupto

theSyriancivilwararelikelyunproductive,astheysimilarlywerewhenAlexde

WaalandThomasHomer-Dixondebatedthecausalcontributionofclimatechange

totheonsetofcivilwarinDarfur,Sudaninthemid-2000s.6Suchdebatesreplicate

theproblemMarcLevyidentifiedinhiscritiqueoftheenvironmentalsecurity

literatureofthe1990s.7Bytakingasinglecountryandexploringwhetherclimate

driverswereassociatedwiththecivilwar,scholarshavenotbeenabletoexplain

whyclimateexposureledtoconflictinthatinstancebutnotothers.Hereiswhere

comparativecasestudiescanhavevalue.AsinthediscussionbetweendeWaaland

Homer-Dixon,thedebatequicklydescendedintoadiscussionofrelativecausal

weightforwhichqualitativemethodsarenotespeciallywell-suited.8

Asinthelastchapter,droughtsdonotleadtohumanitarianemergenciesin

allsituations,nordotheyleadtoalwaysleadtocivilwar.Ifdroughtdidinfact

contributetotheSyriancivilwar,wehavetoisolatetheconditionsthatfacilitated

theviolencealongsidethedrought.Todothat,weneedacomparablecasethatis

enoughaliketotheSyriancasetobeplausiblebutthatfailedtohaveacivilwarin

thewakeofseveredrought.Whiletherearenoperfectcomparisoncases,the

neighboringstateofLebanonofferssomecomparability,intermsofthekindof

climate,agriculturalconditions,andsomesimilarculturalandlinguistic

characteristics.

6 Homer-Dixon 2007; de Waal 2007. 7 Levy 1995. 8 George and Bennett 2005, 25; Bennett 2016, 36.


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LebanonexperiencedaseveredroughtaroundthesametimeasSyria.

Lebanonhasknowncivilwarinitsnottoodistantpast–from1975to1990–and

hashadsomethingofafragilepeacesince.Afifteen-yearoccupationbySyriacame

toanendin2005inthewakeoftheassassinationofprimeministerRaficHariri.

IsraelcarriedoutbombingraidsonLebanontopursueHezbollahinJuly2006.More

thanamillionrefugeespouredintoLebanoninthemidstoftheSyriancivilwarthat

startedin2011,comingtocompriseabout20%ofthecountry’spopulation.9And

still,Lebanondidnotexperienceanothercivilwar.Bytheendof2019,Lebanonwas

teeteringonthevergeofpoliticalrevolutionbutwithoutthekindofviolencethat

buffetedSyria.IfdroughtinfactwasacatalystfortheSyriancivilwar,whyhas

Lebanonnotexperiencedoneofitsown?

Thefirstsectionofthischapterprovidesanoverviewofthecriteriaforcase

selectionandreviewsthecasescoveredandhowtheserelatetomytheoretical

expectations.ThesecondsectioncontraststheSyriaandLebanonexperienceswith

eachothertoshowwhyLebanonavoidedSyria’sfate.Thissectionreviewshazard

exposureandpresentsdataoncapacity,inclusion,andassistance.Thethirdsection

putsthepiecestogetherinasyntheticnarrativeofwhySyriaandLebanon

experienceddifferentoutcomesafterdroughts.Thefourthsectionexplores

alternativeexplanations.

9 Government of the Netherlands 2019, 5.


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ExpectationsandCaseSelection

BeforeoutliningtherationaleforcomparingSyriaandLebanon,itisworth

exploringclaimsmadeinthedebateoverexistingaccountsofclimateandtheSyrian

civilwar.Anumberofscholars,advocates,andjournalistshavearguedthatclimate

changeisoneofthecausalfactorsthatledtotheSyriancivilwar.Whilethese

narrativesofthegenesisofthecivilwarhighlightotherfactorsincludingthebrutal

repressionbytheAssadregime,theyhighlighttheroleplayedbyclimatechange.

Theyfocusontheeffectofamulti-yeardroughtthatroughlystartedaround2006,

whichcontributedtomajordeclinesinagriculturalproduction,reducedrural

livelihoods,andledtoasignificantexodusfromruralareastourbanareas.Inthe

tellingofthisclimate-conflictnarrative,thosemigrantsinturnstressedurban

locations,addingtopressuresforemploymentandservicesthat,inturn,servedasa

sourceofresentmentandrecruitmentforrebelmovementswhentheconflictbegan

in2011.

KelleyandGleickhavecapturedtheacademicversionofthisnarrative,

thougharguablytheircontributionisstrongeronthephysicalscienceofthe

drought.10WerrellandFemiafromtheCenterforClimateandSecurityhave

providedaquasi-academic,thinktankversionofthenarrative,connectingthe

droughttosecurityoutcomes.11Thiscausalstoryhasbeenre-toldindocumentaries

suchasTheAgeofConsequencesandYearsofLivingDangerously,thelatterwith

10 Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015. 11 Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015; Werrell and Femia 2013; Femia and Werrell 2012. See also this account from former U.S. diplomat Polk 2013b.


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claimsmadebyjournalistTomFriedmanwhereheinterviewsrebelcombatants

whoclaimtobeformerfarmerswhoselivelihoodswereaffectedbythedrought.12

Thefactualbasisoftheclaimshavebeendisputedbyothersocialscientists,

namelyapaperbySelbyetal.thatdisputes(1)theclaimthatanthropogenicclimate

changecanclearlybeascribedasthecauseofthedrought,(2)thatthedrought

causedmigrationonthescalethatothershaveclaimed,and(3)thatthedrought-

relatedmigrationcanbecrediblyclaimedtohaveainfluentialroleintheonsetof

theSyriancivilwar.13deChâtelalsodownplayedtheimportanceofclimatechange

asacausalfactorintheSyriancivilwar,focusingonwatermismanagementandthe

removaloffuelsubsidiesasmoreimportantdriversofproblemsinSyria’s

agriculturalsector.14Fröhlichdisputedthenotionthatclimatemigrantswere

heavilyinvolvedintheprotestsagainsttheSyrianregime.15.

MuchofthedebatebetweenSelbyandKelleyandGleickrestsonsemantic

andmethodologicaldisagreementsoverthemeaningofcauseandhowtoascribe

relativecausalweightincasestudies.Selbyetal.concedethatclimatechangecould

havebeenafactorinthecivilwarbutthenwrite:

itisworthreflectingonwhatGleickandKelleyetal.meanwhentheyinsistthatclimatechangewasacontributoryfactortotheuprising.Doesthismeanthatclimatechange-relateddroughtwasoneofasmallhandfuloffactorsbehindSyria'sdescentintocivilwar;orthatitwasoneamongstathousand,orevenamillion,others?Istheirclaimthatclimatechangewasasignificantfactorbehindtheuprising;orthatitwasafranklytrivialone?Wedonotknow.16

12 Friedman 2013. 13 Selby et al. 2017a. 14 Châtel 2014. 15 Fröhlich 2016. Gleick, Kelley, and others vigorously responded to the Selby et al. critique with their own claims about weaknesses in the Selby et al. piece and the strength of their claims. Kelley et al. 2017; Gleick 2017; Hendrix 2017b; Selby et al. 2017a; Hendrix 2017a; Werrell and Femia 2017. 16 Selby et al. 2017b, 253.


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Gleickrespondsthattheydisagreeovertherelativeimportanceofclimatedrivers:

Theytrytoparsethedifferencebetweenwhethersomethingisa“significant”causeora“contributory”factorandjudgebasedon“significance.”Thedifficultyinthisapproachisthat“significant”isameaninglesstermwithoutquantification,buttheauthorsdonotattempttoquantifyit…Atthesametime,theauthorsregularlysuggestthattheyagreethattherewassomenon-zeroroleorlinkamongthesefactors.Iftheonlyrealcomplaintisadisagreementabouttherelativecontributionofthemany,complexfactorsinvolved,thatisafarsimplerandmorejustifiablepaper.17Asnotedalready,IamremindedofthesimilardebatebetweenAlexdeWaal

andThomasHomer-DixonovertheDarfurcivilwarintheearly2000swhichthen-

UnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralBanKi-Moonlabeledasthefirstclimatewarina

provocativeop-edintheWashingtonPost.18Inanexchange,deWaalandHomer-

Dixonvigorouslydebatedclimatechange’simportance.DeWaaldownplayed

climatefactorsasimportant,suggestingthatpoliticalfactorswerefarmore

importantdrivers.19Homer-Dixonforhispartdisputedthatqualitativecasestudies

cangetatrelativecausalweight,particularlyforcomplexcausalmechanismswith

feedbackloops.20Inhisview,thetestiswhetheronecanplausiblytellthestoryofa

conflictwithouttheclimatehazard.Ifonecannot,thenyouhavetoincludeitaspart

ofthecausalanalysis.Theproblemhasasmuchtodowiththeslipperinessofthe

causallanguageweuse.Bycause,dowemeanthefactorthatwasthetinderor

triggerthatprecipitatedanevent?Or,dowemeanaspartofthebackground

conditionsortrendsthatmadeaparticularoutcomemorelikely?

17 Gleick 2017, 249. 18 Ki-Moon 2007. 19 de Waal 2007. 20 Homer-Dixon 2007.


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Scholarsarenotalwayscarefulinthesedistinctions.Indeed,Selbyetal.

pointedoutfourdifferentpossibleusesofcausalanalysisbyscholarsand

commentatorsoftheSyriacase:(1)asthefinalsparkfortheconflict,(2)the

primarycausalfactor(3)thatclimatewasasignificantcontributoryfactor,and(4)a

causalfactorofunknownorunspecifiedcausalweight.21Theyarguetheclaimthat

climatechangehadnoroleintheonsetoftheconflictisitselfunfalsifiablesothey

attempt,instead,toevaluatetherobustnessoftheevidencefortheclaimsofa

connectionalongthecausalchainfromdroughttoconflict,namely(1)thattheareas

affectedbydroughtwerethesameonesthatweresourcesofout-migration(2)that

therewasasignificantspikeinout-migrationafterthedroughtcomparedtonormal

migrationpatterns(3)andthatclaimsforredressofgrievanceswererelatedtothe

drought22Here,Selbyetal.raiselegitimateconcernsaboutthestrengthofthe

evidenceconnectingeachpieceofthecausalchain.

TheSelbycritiquedoesnotdisputethattherewasamajordroughtthat

affectedpartsofSyria,namelythenortheast,butfaultstheotherstudiesfor

exaggeratedclaimsaboutthelong-termseculardeclineinrainfallintheregionand

ourabilitytodetectananthropogenicclimatechangesignalinclaimsofattribution

aboutthedrought.Kelley’sclaimsoflong-termdryingarenotsocentraltothe

argument.23Mostotherscholarsseethe2006-2010perioddroughtasthetrigger

fortheconflict,ratherthanalong-termbackgroundcondition.Evenifonedisputed

21 Selby et al. 2017a, 234. 22 Ibid. 23 There is other evidence supporting related claims. Hoerling et al. found since 1902 that 10 of the 12 driest winters in the Mediterranean occurred between 1990-2010. Climate change was thought responsible for about half of that drying. Hoerling et al. 2012, 2146–2147.


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thelong-termdryingtrend,thereisstillevidenceofaseveredroughtwhichcould

haveactedasthetrigger.AsIarguedinthepreviouschapter,whetherSyria’s

droughtwasattributabletoanthropogenicclimatechangeisalsolessimportant

thanthepresenceofadroughtitself.24Scholarsarelookingtoproxiesforthe

expectedeffectsoffutureclimatechangeonsecurityoutcomes.Ifclimatechangeis

expectedtoyieldmoreextremedroughtsintheregioninthefuture,whichiswhat

scientistsexpect,thenthe2006-2010droughtisausefulcase,evenifsomedispute

theclarityoftheclimatesignalinthatparticulardrought.25

Hendrix,inreflectingontheclimateconnectionstotheSyriancivilwar,

makessomeadditionalobservationsoncausalpathways.Heproblematizesthe

processofcausalinferenceinsinglecases.Hearguesthatourconjecturesabout

causalityincasestudiesoftenassumecertainfactorsarenecessaryconditions,but

themoreappropriatewaytothinkaboutcausalityisprobabilistic:“Thatis,climate

shocksareprobabilisticallycausalinthesensethattheymakesomethingmore

likely.Theyarenotdeterministicallycausalinthesensethattheyarewholly

responsiblefortheoutcome.”Hegoesfurthertonotethat“Thatis,theevidenceis

strongerintheaggregatethanasevidentinanyindividualcase.”26Asalargely

quantitativesocialscientist,Hendrix’sbetisthatwecanidentifythecentral

tendenciesofcausationfromhundredsofcases,butitisperhapsafool’serrandto

trytosingleoutthecausalroleinindividualcases:

24 Again, there is evidence that the drought of the severity and duration of the Syrian drought was made twice as likely because of climate change. Kelley et al. 2015, 3241. 25 Regional climate models project higher average temperatures, lower rainfall, days of extreme temperatures, and longer drought periods. Government of the Netherlands 2019, 4. 26 Hendrix 2017a.


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Whenthisevidenceismarshalledtoexplainanyparticularevent,however,itoftentakesontheairofanecessarycondition-ifbutfortheclimateshock,theeventwouldnothaveoccurred.Thisclaimisalmostalwaysimpossibletosubstantiateandinvitessignificantcriticism-towit,theexchangehere.27

Iagreethatthelengthierandmorecomplexcausalchainbetweenclimatehazards

andconflictoutcomescomplicatestheascriptionofacausalroletoclimatehazards.

Inhumanitarianemergencies,itiseasiertosaybutforthecycloneorevenslow

onsetdroughts,largenumbersofpeoplewouldnothavebeenatriskofdeath.That

said,Iammorepersuadedthatcarefulprocesstracingofthecausalsequencecan

identifythecausalcentralityoftheclimatehazard.FollowingtheworkofGeorge

andBennett,Collier,andMahoneyonprocesstracing,Iremainconvincedthatwe

canisolatethemicro-processesconnectingcauseandeffectinindividualcases.28

WhilesomeofSelbyetal.’sspecificclaimsandcounter-claimsareworthyof

furtherexploration,alloftheseaccountsfocusonSyria.Pairedcaseswithother

countriesthatalsoexperienceddroughtbutnocivilwarareabsent.29Hendrix,inhis

responsetoSelbyandtheoriginalarticle,arguedthatthecaseunderscoredtheneed

formorecontingentcausalclaimsintheliteratureonclimateandsecurity:“Evenif

andwhenclimatematters,itmattersinaspecificpolitical,social,andeconomic

contextthatmustbetakenintoaccount.”30Pairedcasescanhelpidentifythescope

conditionsforcausalclaims.But,whatarethepossiblecomparisons?

FeitelsonandTubiusethecomparativecasemethodtocomparetworiver

basinsintheMiddleEast–theEuphrates(whichincludesSyria,Turkey,andIraq)

27 Homer-Dixon 2007. 28 George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney 2012; Bennett 2010. 29 For a corrective, see Feitelson and Tubi 2017. 30 Hendrix 2017b, 251.


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andthelowerJordanRiver(whichincludesIsrael,Jordan,andPalestiniansonthe

WestBank).Theyultimatelyhighlightdifferencesinthesocietalresponseto

droughtbetweenthebasinstoexplainwhyoutcomesintheEuphratesbasinwere

worse.Bothbasinswereaffectedbydroughtinthisperiod,butthiscaseselection

hasitsownchallenges.Eventhoughdroughteffectstranscendtraditionalpolitical

boundaries,theriverbasinsthemselvesarenotpoliticalactorssothebasinasaunit

ofanalysisisachallengingonetoevaluatedifferencesinsocietalresponse.

Moreover,thedroughteffectsonproductiondonotappearallthatcomparable,

whichmaybeafunctionofpoliciesandsocietalresponsesofdifferentactors.As

theynote,thestructureofregionaleconomies(withIsraelbeingapost-industrial

statewithdesalinizationcapacity)madestatesintheregionverydifferentfrom

eachotherintermsoftheirvulnerabilitytodroughteffects.31

AsSelbyetal.noted,bothnorthernIraqandsoutheasternTurkeywerealso

affectedbythesamedrought.32However,bothcountrieswerealreadyexperiencing

conflictatthetimeofthedrought,makingcomparisonwithSyria’scivilwaronset

problematic.33Arethereothercasesthatarepotentiallyabetterfit?Inhiscomment

ontheSelbyetal.pieceandwiderdiscussionHendrixidentifiessomepossible

cases,“ThedroughtthataffectedSyriaalsoaffectedneighboringJordan,Lebanon

andCyprus,yetwidespreadviolencedidnotoccurthere.”34Iusetheseobservations

31 Feitelson and Tubi 2017. 32 Selby et al. 2017a, 234. 33 Iraq was in the throes of an on-going civil conflict that grew out of the U.S. invasion in 2003. Turkey has long had an insurgency in the southeast of the country in the Kurdish region which was heavily affected by the drought. 34 Hendrix 2017b, 251.


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asthepointofdepartureforcaseselection,ultimatelytakingtheSyriaandLebanon

casesaspairedcases.

IfthestylizednarrativeofSyria’scivilwariscorrect,thenweneedacountry

withacomparableagriculturecommunitytohavebeenaffectedbydrought,with

concomitantlossesinagriculturalproduction.LebanonandpossiblyJordanmaybe

suitable,albeitimperfectcomparisoncasesforSyria.

Comparingcountriesfromoutsidetheregionmightbeproblematicbecause

ofverydifferentagro-ecologicalconditions.LevantcountriessuchasSyria,Lebanon,

andJordanmayshareasimilarclimateattheintersectionofthehumid

MediterraneanandthearidArabiandesert,thoughtherestillmaybesignificant

climaticdifferencesbetweenthem.AccordingtotheWorldBank,Syria’saverage

annualprecipitationis252mm/year,placingthecountry155thintheworld.

Lebanonforitspartiswetter,reaching661mm/year(forarankof114th)while

Jordanisdrierwith111mm/year(arankof168).35However,whenwecompare

widerfreshwaterresourceswhichwouldincludeflowsfromrivers,differences

betweenLebanonandSyriaarelessstark.Intheperiod2007,thepercapita

resourcesavailableinLebanonwere1,102m3perpersonperyearcomparedto

855.7m3inSyriaandonly151.3m3inJordan.36ThatputsLebanonjustaboveand

Syriajustbelowthethresholdof1000cubicmetersperpersonperyearforwater

scarcity.37

35 Verner et al. 2018, 38. 36 Food and Agriculture Organization 2019a. 37 Fanack Water 2019.


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Evencountriesthatsharesimilarclimatesmightbedifferentinother

respectssuchasthesizeoftheirterritoryandtheirpopulation,thedegreeof

urbanization,andtheirdependenceonagriculture.In2007,thelastdatapointfor

whichtheWorldBankprovidesdataforSyria,thecountry’sGDPpercapitain

currentdollarswas$2032comparedto$2735inJordanand$5217inLebanon.38

SyriaisamuchlargercountrythanbothLebanonandJordan(184,000squarekm

comparedto10,000and89,000squarekilometers)andwasfarlessurbanized

(55.6%)thaneitherLebanon(87%)orJordan(84%).39In2008,Lebanonhada

muchsmallerpopulationthanSyria–4.1millionto20.3million–butitsproportion

ofthepopulationemployedinagriculturewassimilartoSyria–13.5%inLebanon

comparedto17.5%inSyria.Jordan,foritspart,onlyhad3.9%ofitsworkforce

employedinagriculture.40In2007,Syria’sdependenceonagriculture,forestry,and

fishing,asashareofGDP,wasalsogreater(19.5%)thanLebanon(4.9%)orJordan

(2.5%).41

Ifwethinkthattheeconomicdislocationofbadharvestssetinmotiona

chainofeventsthatledtotheSyriancivilwar,thecomparisoncaseshouldhavean

agriculturalsectorsizableenoughthatanunhappyfarmingclasscouldhavestoked

aprotestmovement,arebellion,or,attheveryleast,beenpartofinternal

populationmovementsofsufficientsizetotriggerdomesticcontestationbetween

groupsoverresources.GiventhesmallsizeoftheagriculturesectorinJordan,itis

38 World Bank 2019d. 39 Verner et al. 2018, 38. 40 World Bank 2019c; World Bank 2019e. Other data sources suggest Lebanon’s share of agricultural employment in 2008 (2.97%) was more similar to Jordan’s (3.57%) than Syria (14.53%). Roser 2013. 41 World Bank 2019b.


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lessclearthattheseconditionsaremet.Lebanonlookslikeamoreplausible

comparisoncase,thoughotherdatasourcessuggestLebanon’sagricultural

employmentwasnotdissimilartoJordan’s.Whilenocasecomparisonsareperfect,

SyriaandLebanon,whichweretogethercarvedoutoftheOttomanEmpireandthen

latercleavedbyFranceintoseparatepolities,areperhapsthebestcasesfor

comparison.

Here,weneedtoshowthatbothcountriesfacedseveredroughts.Unlikethe

chaptersonhumanitarianemergencies,wealsohavethemoredifficulttaskof

showingthelengthiercausalchainconnectingdroughtinSyriatocivilwarand

interventionsthatattenuatedthatchaininLebanon.ForSyria,thatrequires

connectingthedroughttoadeteriorationinagriculturalproductionandincomes,

and,inturn,otherstepsthatmightspeaktothemotivationsforpoliticalviolence

andtheinabilityoftheSyriastatetostemsaidviolence.Ontheinabilityside,that

wouldintersectwiththeSyrianstate’sincapacityand/orunwillingnesstorespond

effectivelytothedrought.TheSyrianstate’sfailedresponsetothedroughtcould,in

turn,feedthemotivationsfordiscontent,includingfarmers’protestsandpopulation

movementsthatfurtherinflamedsocietalcleavages.

ForLebanon,Ishouldfinddifferencesinstatecapacityandpoliticalinclusion

fromSyriawhichshouldhelpexplainwhythecountrydidnotexperienceconflict

afterthedroughtsthatbeganin2007-2010.Thoughdroughtscreatedproblemsand

pressuresforthepopulacetodemandredressthroughprotest,Iexpecttoseethat

theLebanesegovernmentprovidedthepublicwithavenuestoexpresstheir

grievancesthroughthepoliticalprocess.Atthesametime,Ishouldbeabletoshow


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thegovernmentwasmoreresponsivetothesecomplaintsandmoreeffectiveinits

redressoffarmers’concerns.Inotherwords,Lebanonhadbothamoreinclusive

andcapablegovernment,evenasitwasincreasinglytestedwiththeflowofSyrian

refugeesintoitsterritoryinthewakeofthecivilwarnextdoor.Weshouldalsofind

evidenceofforeignfinancehelpingbothLebaneseandrefugeesaliketohelp

dampentherisksofconflictasLebanon,particularlyafter2011whenSyrians

migratedenmassefleeingviolence.

Table1:SyriaandLebanon

Country Hazard Events

Capacity Institutions International Assistance

Outcomes

Syria Droughts 2006-2010

Intermediate capacityà Diminished capacity (2007)

Exclusive

Limited access

Civil war 2011-

Lebanon Droughts 2006-2009

Intermediate capacity

Somewhat inclusive

Broad-based aid delivery

Protest activity but no civil war

SyriaandLebanon

Syriaexperiencedadevastatingcivilwarin2011whileLebanon,despite

oftenbeingonthevergeofpoliticalbreakdown,has,asoflate2019,yettodescend

againintocivilwar.If,asIarguedinchapter2,theprojectofsustainingpeacein

countriesislargelyafunctionofelitebargainsaboutrepresentationandequitable

servicedelivery,weshouldfindevidencetosuggestthattheSyriastatedidnothave

eithermeansormotivetoservicethedrought-strickencommunitiesaffectedbythe

2011drought,eitherinareasaffectedbythedrought,mostlyintheeastofthe

country,orinthetownsandcitiesmanySyriansmigratedtoaftertheirlivelihoods

asfarmersbecameuntenable.


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Lebanon,bycontrast,withitselaboratepowersharingagreementshadboth

incentiveandcapabilitytorespondtothedroughts,toensurethatfarminggroupsin

theBekaavalleyaffectedbythedroughtsof2007/8,2010,and2014didnot

experiencelarge-scalesuffering,discrimination,which,inturn,mightendangerthe

fragilepeacethatthecountryenjoyed.

Tosupportthisargument,First,Ineedtoshowthatbothcountries

experienceddrought.Second,Ishouldbeabletoshowdifferencesinstatecapacity

inSyriaandLebanon,thoughIamlesscertainthatthisiscentraltothedifferences

inoutcomesbetweenthetwocases.Third,IshouldbeabletoshowthatLebanon

hadmorepoliticalinclusionthanSyria,whatItaketobethekeydifferencebetween

thegovernmentstructures.Fourth,totheextentthatbothcountriesreliedon

internationalaidinthemidstoftheiron-goingdroughts,myexpectationisthat

Lebanon,givenitsmoreinclusivegovernment,wouldensurethatresourceswere

sharedequitably.

Beyondthesegeneralexpectations,therearemorespecificones.InSyria’s

case,Ishouldbeabletoshowthattheimpactcouldnotorwasnotdiminishedwith

irrigationtopreventlargedeclinesinagriculture.Moreover,Ishouldfindthose

productiondeclineswerenotoffsetwithsatisfactorycompensatorymechanismsto

ensurefarmers’livelihoodswerenotdrasticallyreduced.InLebanon’scase,Ishould

beabletoshoweitherirrigation-basedinterventionstopreventlarge-scale

productiondeclinesand/orcompensationmechanismstohelpfarmersmaintain

livingstandards.Lebanon,givenitsrelativewealth,couldhaveself-financedthese

interventionsorbeenabletochannelinternationalassistancetosupportfarmers.


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InSyria’scase,differentpathwayscouldhaveledthecountrydownapathto

civilwar.Forthedroughttohavecontributedtocivilwar,thedeclinesinfarmers’

incomeshouldhavealsocausedsufficienthardshipthattheybecamemorelikelyto

participateinrebelactivityinsitu.Alternatively,theymayhavemigratedtoother

citieswheretheybecamerecruitablebywould-berebelsbecauseoflowliving

standards.Anotherpossibleexplanationisthatmigrantpopulationscouldhave

competedwithurbanpopulationsintheirnewlocationsoverhousing,jobs,and

services,makingthosenewsitesmoresubjecttopoliticalproteststhatcouldhave

escalatedintoviolence.

Thisexplanationdoesnotdependonthemigrantsthemselveshavingjoined

theprotestsorrebelmovementsinmassnumbers.OnecritiquefromFröhlich,

basedonlimitedinterviewswithSyrianrefugees,isthatthereisnoevidencelinking

migrantstohavingtakenpartintheinitialproteststhatkickedofftheuprisingin

Syria.Theirownprecariousstandinginnewurbanareascouldhavemadethemless

likelytoparticipateinprotestsand/orviolence,buttheirpresencemayhaveledto

dissatisfactionfromexistingresidents.42ThisconjectureisconsistentwithSalehyan

andGleditsch’sworkonhowmigrationcanleadtointer-groupconflictbetween

incumbentpopulationsandmigrants(particularlyifincumbentsrespondnegatively

tonewcomers),butthisobservationisalsoconsistentwiththeclimateandsecurity

literaturethathasnotedmigrantsthemselvesmaybelesslikelytoengageinprotest

42 Koubi 2017, 201; Koubi 2019, 374.


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giventheirownvulnerabilitytoreprisalsfromhostcommunitiesiftheyengagein

politicalprotests.43

Lebanon,givenitshighurbanization,mighthavebeenmoreatriskof

domesticunrestthanSyriathroughanothermechanism,thepriceoffood.Drought

domesticallyandinternationallycouldhavehadanimpactonfoodprices,thus

triggeringdomesticprotests.Indeed,theroleofincreasedinternationalfoodprices

hasbeenmootedasoneoftheprimarydriversoftheArabSpringandthe

emergenceofprotestpoliticsinEgyptandotherNorthAfricancountries.44Smith

showedcountriesofteninsulatetheirpopulationsfromthepassthrougheffectsof

internationalfoodincreases,butthatwheretherearedomesticfoodpriceincreases,

protestsaremorelikely.45Similarly,HendrixandHaggarddemonstratedthat

democraciesandanocraciesaremorelikelytoexperienceprotestsinthewakeof

foodpricesincreases,asauthoritariangovernmentsaremorelikelytofearurban

unrestasathreattoregimestabilityandseektobuyoffthroughsubsidiesandother

measures.Withmoreelectoralcompetitionindemocraciesandanocracies,those

regimeshavetobemoreresponsivetoruralconstituents,wherefoodsubsidiesfor

urbanconsumersmightcomeattheirexpense.46Lebanonisaninterestingcasewith

aPolityIVscoreof6,thethresholdbetweenanopenanocracyandademocracy,

suggestingitmighthavebeenvulnerabletofood-relatedprotestactivitiesthatcould

haveescalatedintosomethingmoregiventhefragilityoftheregime.47

43 Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Raleigh, Jordan, and Salehyan 2008; Linke et al. 2018. 44 Lagi, Bertrand, and Bar-Yam 2011. 45 Smith 2014. 46 Hendrix and Haggard 2015; Hendrix 2013. 47 An anocracy is a mixed regime with democratic and authoritarian features. Syria, for its part, was a -8 in the period 2008-2012 before become fully authoritarian -10 in 2013. Center for Systemic Peace 2018.


18

Thissetofexplanationscapturesthemotivationsforparticipatinginrebel

movementsbutanother--notmutuallyexclusiveexplanation--fortheviolencein

Syriawouldbetheeffectsofoutputdeclinesonstatecapacityitselfbydecreasing

availabletaxrevenuefromagriculture.Theseeffectswouldmakeitharderforthe

statetoprovideessentialservicestothefarmersand/orsuppressviolence.Such

declinesinstatecapacitymayverywellpredatethedroughtandlargelybea

functionofothersocialandeconomicchangesthatmakeitharderforthestateto

affordservicedeliveryortosuppressviolence.48

Itmaybedifficulttodisentangletheeffectsofthedroughtitselfonstate

capacityandalonger-rundeteriorationincapacitywroughtbymismanagement.As

discussedinmoredetail,someSyriascholars,forexample,identifytherootsofthe

government’sproblemswithrespecttoagricultureandwatermanagementto

earlierdecisionstopursuefoodself-sufficiencyinwaterintensivecropssuchas

wheatthatcouldonlybesustainedwithirrigation,whichitselfwasdependentupon

fuelsubsidiesforpumping.Whenthegovernmentremovedsuchsubsidies,

productioncollapsed,hasteningafurtherdeclineintheagriculturalsector.49I

returntothesethemesinsubsequentsections.

Whatfollowsisanattempttodocumentevidencethatsupportsmy

expectationsforhazardexposure,statecapacity,inclusion,andforeignassistance.

Asinpreviouschapters,Idrawonareastudiesexpertsandexistingscholarly

narrativesofthetwocountries’divergenttrajectories.

48 Koubi 2017, 201; Koubi 2019, 374. 49 Châtel 2014.


19

EvidenceofHazardExposure

Thepointofdepartureforunderstandingthetwocasesbeginswitha

justificationfortheclaimthatthetwocountriesexperiencedseveredroughtsin

similartimeframes.InthecaseofSyriaandLebanon,thedroughtsweremore

directlyoverlappingtemporallythantheexperienceofSomaliaandEthiopia

documentedinthepreviouschapter.

AsIarguedinthatchapter,thereisnouniversaldefinitionofwhat

constitutesadrought.Somescholarslooktorainfallmeasuresforevidenceof

drought,whileothersseetemperatureasabettermetricgivensomechallengesof

dataquality.Someindicatorsofdroughtcombineinformationderivedfromrainfall,

temperature,andsoilconditionstoidentifydroughtperiods.Giventhatweare

mostlyinterestedintheimpactsontheagriculturalsector,itmakessense,asinthe

lastchapter,toidentifytheimpactsofclimaticconditionsonagriculture,suggesting

thatgrowingseasonconditionsmattermost.50

Forbothcountries,itiseasyenoughtoestablishgrowingseasondroughtsin

theperiod2006-2010aswellalongerhistoryofrainfallandtemperature

deviations.Asinthepreviouschapter,Iusetherainfallandtemperaturedatafrom

theClimateResearchUnit(CRU)attheUniversityofEastAnglia.Initsclimate

portal,theWorldBankaggregatedthisstation-leveldatauptothenationallevelto

providemonthlymeansdatingbackto1901.51Icalculatedthedeviationfrom

growingseasonrainfallandtemperaturelevelsforthemaincrop,wheat,ona

50 This again is inspired by the work of von Uexkull et al. 2016 on growing season droughts. I also use Smith 2014 for the methodology of deviations from rolling 20-year monthly mean rainfall and temperature. 51 World Bank Undated.


20

rollingbasisfortheprevious20years,extendingtheanalysisbacktothe1970s.For

bothcountries,themonthlymeanisbasedonrainfalltotalsforOctober-Maybased

ontheFoodandAgricultureOrganization’s(FAO)cropcalendar.52

Forrainfall,thatmeanscomparingthemonthlyrainfalltotalsforOctoberto

theprevioustwentyOctobersanddoingthesameforeachmonthbetweenOctober

andMay.Ithencalculatethecumulativedeviationfortheentireperiodtoshowhow

differentthetotalamountofrainwasforthatgrowingseasoncomparedtowhat

farmersconsidertobenormal,forwhichatwentyyearbackwardtimehorizon

seemsreasonable.Fortemperature,Iusetheaveragedifferenceratherthantotal

deviationfromnormaltemperaturelevelssincetemperaturedoesnotcumulatein

thesamewayasprecipitation.Iusebothrainfallandtemperaturemostlytocheck

toseeifthereareyearswhenrainfalllevelswerenottoofarbelownormallevels,

butwemightseehightemperaturescreatingwaterstressforcropsthatmightshow

upinyielddeclines.AsKelleyetal.note,“whatmattersforcropsissoilmoisture,

whichisinfluencedbytemperatureaswellasrainfall.”53Asinthepreviouschapter,

Icomplementsuchnationalleveldatawithsubnationalportraitsofagriculture

stressfordroughtperiodsofinterestusingmapsfromtheFAO.

Beforepresentingthatrainfalldata,itisworthnotingthatthechallengesof

wateraccessforagricultureandotherusesbecomemoreurgentwhenaccompanied

byotherchangesandproblemssuchasrapidpopulationgrowthandmanagement

ofgroundwaterresources.54InSyria’scase,thecountry’spopulationgrew

52 FAO 2019a; FAO 2019b. 53 Kelley et al. 2017, 246. 54 Null and Risi 2016, 26; Adelphi 2015.


21

dramaticallyfromnearly9millionin1980toalmost20millionby2007.The

countrywasalsohosttosome1millionIraqirefugeesbetween2003-2007.55Other

severedroughtshadbuffetedSyriainthe1990s.Syriawasalsoaffectedby

upstreamdiversionofwaterbyTurkey’sconstructionofdams.Gleickshowsthe

averageannualflowsoftheEuphratesatJarabulusjustdownfromtheTurkish-

Syriaborderdeclinedfromabout1000cubicmeterspersecondbetween1937-

1989toabout650m3persecondbetween1990-2010.56Thus,theamountofwater

availabilitypercapitadeclinedfrom744cubicmeterspercapitain1982to363m3.

57Suchproblemsaremagnifiedwhenwaterismismanaged,directedtowards

water-intensivecropssuchascottonandwheat,orwhereirrigationtechniquessuch

asfloodirrigationusemorewaterthanisneeded.58Thismakesitchallengingto

distinguishclimateandenvironmentalstressfrompopulationandresource

management.OtherscholarssuchasKahlbundlesuchdynamicsunderthebroader

labelofdemographicandenvironmentalstress.59Whilethesewereimportant

backgroundconditionsthatshapedthewiderresourceenvelope,therewasstilla

markeddeclineinrainfallduringthisperiodthathadamajorimpactonagricultural

production.

Forrainfall,theCRUdatashowsthat2006-2009wereallbelownormal

growingseasonrainfallyearsinSyria,with2008being123mmbelownormalfor

thegrowingseason,thecountry’sworstdroughtsince1973.Whilethe2006-2009

55 World Bank 2019e. 56 Gleick 2017, 334. 57 Ritchie and Roser 2017. 58 The New Humanitarian 2010. 59 Kahl 2006.


22

droughtisthemostseveresince1973,itisnottheonlymulti-yeardroughtoverthe

last40years,as1982-1987wasalsoadryperiod,ifnotbythesamemagnitude.Any

explanationforwhydroughtcontributedtocivilwarinthecontemporaryperiod

2006-2009oughttobeabletoexplainwhyanothermulti-yeardroughtdidnot

resultinasimilaroutcome,arguablywhenthecountry’sworkforcewasevenmore

employedinagriculture,withabout30%oftheworkforceemployedinagriculture

in1984(seeFigure1).60

Figure1:SyriaGrowingSeasonRainfallDeviations1973-2016

Source:Author’scalculationsusingCRUdata

Evenasrainfallreturnedtonormallevelsin2010,thetemperaturedatashowthat

2010wasthesecondhottestyearsince1973withtheaveragegrowingseason

deviationintemperaturenearly2degreesCelsiusabovenormal(seeFigure2).

60 Library of Congress 1988.

-200-150-100-50050100150200

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

SyriaAnnualRainfallDeviation1973-2016

October-MayCumulativeDeviation


23

Figure2:SyriaAverageGrowingSeasonTemperatureChange1973-2016


InLebanon’scase,between2007and2010,thecountryexperiencedfour

continuousyearsofbelownormalrainfall,with2008being200mmbelowthe

averagegrowingseasonrainfallfortheprevioustwentyyears.Thatwasthelargest

negativedeviationinrainfallsince1973,thoughLebanonhasexperiencedanumber

ofseveresingle-yeardroughtsovertheyearsincluding1979,1986,1989,and1999

(seeFigure3).

-2

-1

0

1

2

31973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

SyriaAverageAnnualTemperatureChange1973-2016

October-MayAverageDeviation


24

Figure3:LebanonGrowingSeasonRainfallDeviations1973-2016


TheWorldBankhasidentifiedboth2010and2014assignificantdrought

years,thoughtherainfalldeviationfor2010–negative25mmforthegrowing

season–isnotnearlyassevereas2008.However,whenwelooktolarge

temperaturedeviations,2010wasanespeciallyhotyearwhengrowingseason

temperaturesaveragednearlytwodegreesCelsiusabovenormal(seeFigure4).

-300-200-100

0100200300

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

LebanonAnnualRainfallDeviations1973-2016

October-MayCumulativeDeviation


25

Figure4:LebanonAverageGrowingSeasonTemperatureChange1973-2016


Kelleyetal.putthedroughtintocontext:“BeforetheSyrianuprisingthat

beganin2011,thegreaterFertileCrescentexperiencedthemostseveredroughtin

theinstrumentalrecord.”61Inasubsequentpiece,Kelleyetal.anchoredthedrought

intheregion’swiderhistory:“And,ifinstrumentaldata,modelresultsandtheory

arenotenough,ananalysisofanewgriddedtreeringdatasetofwinter/spring

surfacemoistureavailabilityforallofEurope,NorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast

(Cooketal.ScienceAdvances,2015)concludedthat1998-2012wasthedriest15-

yearperiodintheLevantinthelast900years.”62Thisdroughtandthedryingofthe

region,theyargued,wasrootedinanthropogenicclimatechange:“Analysesof

observationsandmodelsimulationsindicatethatadroughtoftheseverityand

durationoftherecentSyriandrought,whichisimplicatedinthecurrentconflict,has

61 Kelley et al. 2015, 3241. 62 Kelley et al. 2017, 246.

-2

-1

0

1

2

31973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

LebanonAverageAnnualTemperatureChange1973-2016

October-MayAverageDeviation


26

becomemorethantwiceaslikelyasaconsequenceofhumaninterferenceinthe

climatesystem.”63

Eveniftheperiod2006-2010wasamajordroughtepisodeinbothcountries,

theeffectswereunequallydistributedwithinSyriaandLebanon.Wecanseethe

geographicdistributionofdroughteffectsbylookingatthemostintensedrought

yearof2008andFAOmapsofagriculturalstress.64InSyria’scase,severe

agriculturestress–wheremorethan85%ofagriculturallandexperienceddrought

conditions–extendedthroughoutmuchofthenorthofthecountryin2008,

affectingHasakaprovinceinthefarnortheast,ArRaqqahinthecentralnortheast,

andaportionofAleppoprovinceinthenorthwest.Smallpocketsofdroughtaffected

otherprovinces,includingtheadjoiningprovincesofHamaandHomsinthecenter

ofthecountryaswellasthreesouthernprovincesDar’a(whereearlyprotests

againsttheregimeoccurred),Damascus,andAs-Sweida(seeFigure5).65About75%

ofthecountry’swheatproductionwashistoricallygrowninthenortheastofthe

country.66

63 Kelley et al. 2015, 3241. Gleick summarized additional science on the likely warming and drying of the Middle East. Gleick 2014. 64 The FAO defines this indicator in terms of the extent of cropland affected by drought over the entire crop season: “The Annual ASI depicts the percentage of arable land, within an administrative area, that has been affected by drought conditions over the entire cropping season.” It is based on the Vegetative Health Index and looks at the duration and intensity of crop cycle stress over the growing season. Food and Agriculture Organization 2019b. 65 Food and Agriculture Organization 2019d. 66 USDA 2008.


27

Figure5:AgriculturalStressinSyriain2008

Source:FoodandAgriculturalOrganization

Theareasaffectedbythedroughtinthenortheastofthecountryincluded

theheavilyKurdishregionsofHasakaprovinceandthenorthernpartofAleppo

provinceborderingTurkey.ThecityofAlHasakahlocatedcentrallyinthatprovince

isalsowherealargeconcentrationofSyriansChristianslived.Thedroughtalso


28

affectedDruzepopulationsconcentratedinthesouthofthecountryinDar’aandAs-

Sweidaprovinces.Inthecenterofthecountry,thedroughtprimarilyaffectedSunni

dominatedregionsinHomsprovince.67Theruralareasaffectedbythedrought–

particularlyinthenortheastofthecountry–tendedtobethepoorestpartsofthe

country.In2007,averageannualpercapitaexpendituresintheruralnortheast

werelessthanhalf--2051SyrianLira–oftheircoastalurbancompatriots(where

theaveragewas4339Syrian).Between2004and2007,thecountryexperienced

improvedequalitybetweenregionsbutadeteriorationinincomesinbothurban

andruralareasandinmostregionsofthecountry.68

InLebanon’scase,thedroughtin2008affectedmostlytheagriculturalrich

landsofBekaagovernorateintheeastofthecountry,especiallythesouthern

districtofRachaya,wheremorethan85%oftheagriculturallandwasaffected

throughout,andNabatiye,agovernorateinthefarsouthofthecountry.Pocketsof

severedroughtwerealsofoundinothergovernorates–MountLebanonandNorth

(seeFigure6).69

67 Locations of ethnic groups are derived from Wucherpfennig et al. 2010. 68 Abu-Ismail, Abdel-Gadir, and El-Laithy 2011, 24. 69 Food and Agriculture Organization 2019c.


29

Figure6:AgriculturalStressinLebanonin2008

Source:FoodandAgriculturalOrganization

Asmentioned,theBekaaValley,runningnorthtosouthintheeastofthe

country,isLebanon’sprimaryagricultureregionandwasgreatlyaffectedbythe

2008drought.Thesouthernpartofthecountryismostlysmallfarmerswhilethe

NorthandBekaaValleyfarmersaremostlylargecommercialfarmers.70Hezbollah

hasaparticularlystrongpresenceinthefarsouthandthefarnorthofthevalleyin

70 World Bank 2010.


30

Shia-dominatedareas.ThesouthwasanespeciallyrichtargetofIsraelisortiesin

the2006militarycampaign.ThecentralpartoftheBekaaValleywouldbecomethe

mainrecipientofSyriarefugeesaftertheonsetofthe2011war.Ruralregionsin

Lebanontendtobepoorerthanurbanareas.In2004-2005,about18%oftheNorth

wasestimatedtobeextremelypoor,with12%and11%intheSouthandBekaa

Valleyrespectively,comparedtothenationalaverageof8%andlessthan1%in

Beirut.71

Theeffectsofthedroughtshowupinagriculturalproductiondeclinesin

bothcountries.BothLebanonandSyriastilloverwhelminglyrelyonrainfed

agriculture,thoughirrigationwasmoreavailableinbothcountriesthaneither

EthiopiaorSomalia.About20%ofLebanon’sagriculturallandwasirrigatedin2007

comparedto9.8%inSyria,thoughabouthalfwheatproductioninbothcountries

wasirrigated.72Whileirrigationmighthavecompensatedforsomeofthewater

shortfallsfromlowerrainfalltotals,thedroughtshouldstillshowupinproduction

declinesofmajorcrops,giventhelimitedpenetrationofirrigation,particularly

amongsmallholders.In2008,Syria’swheatproductionintonneswasnearly60%

belowproductionin2006.Whileproductionsubsequentlyrebounded,itremained

morethan20%belowthepeaklevelevenbeforethefurtherdramaticdeclineafter

thecivilwarcommenced(seeFigure7).

71 UNDP 2007. 72 World Bank 2019a. Wheat statistic for Lebanon from Verner et al. 2018, 25. Wheat irrigation statistic of 45% from USDA 2008.


31

Figure7:WheatProductioninSyria1972-2017

Source:FoodandAgricultureOrganization

InLebanon’scase,productiondeclinesshowupinmultipleyears.Production

peakedin2006,withproductionin2007down25%ofthatpeakbeforerebounding

in2008to93%of2006levels.Wheatproductionin2009was72%ofpeaklevels

beforebottomingoutin2010at54%ofpeak2006production(seeFigure8).Wheat

isespeciallysensitivetotemperaturespikes,witha1degreeCelsiusincrease

contributingtoa13%reductioninproduction.73Recallthattemperaturesin2010

werenearly1.8Cabovenormal.TheWorldBankwritesthatthe2010droughtwas

thesignificantdroughtyearintheLebanoncontextwithacombinationofdrought,

temperature,andfireleadingtodeclinesofwheatproductionbyasmuchas83%.74

73 Verner et al. 2018, 25. 74 Ashwill et al. 2013, 57.

0

1000000

2000000

3000000

4000000

5000000

6000000

Tonnes

SyriaWheatProduction1972-2017


32

Figure8:WheatProductioninLebanon1972-2017

Source:FoodandAgricultureOrganization

At this stage, we have evidence of a severe drought that affected both

countries,withwheat production in both experiencing a significant decline.What

effectdidthedroughthaveonlivelihoods?Here,avarietyofpolicyinterventions—

from support for irrigation, income and food support, food for work, insurance

mechanisms, assistance for asset rebuilding and recover—could have protected

people from harm. Nonetheless, there should be evidence of distress in both

countriesbeyondproductiondeclinesintermsof incomedeclines, foodinsecurity,

and/orlivestockdeathsthatwouldhavetriggereddemandsforapolicyresponse.

IntermsofSyria,somedatapointshavebeenreportedevenbythosemore

skepticalofthelinksbetweenclimateandconflict.deChâtelnotesthat“According

toseveralUNassessmentsbetween2008and2011,1.3millionpeoplewereaffected

020000400006000080000100000120000140000160000180000

Tonnes

LebanonWheatProduction1972-2017


33

by the drought,with 800,000people ‘severely affected’.”75That assessment found

80% of those severely affected were living on bread and sugared tea, only good

enoughforabout50%ofdietaryneeds.76Fröhlichcitesotherimpacts:“Herdersin

the Northeast lost 85% of their livestock, affecting 1.3 million people. In 2009,

according to theUN,more than 800,000 Syrians had lost their livelihoods.”77One

2011 estimate for theUN International Strategy forDisasterReduction suggested

the droughtwas theworst in 40 years, causing a tributary of the Euphrates –al-

Khabour – to dry up, with wheat production in non-irrigated areas declining by

82%. The report suggestednationally that total livestock levelsdropped from21

millionpre-drought to14-16millionafterwards.78AMay2008U.S.Embassycable

released by Wikileaks also reported that the regime increased prices on

domesticallyproducedfoodinApril2008,wheatby40%,sugarbeetsby30%,and

almost a 100% increase forwheat and barley, leading to at least one food price-

relatedprotest.79

Lebanon’s drought, which had similar effects on wheat production is not

recordedasadisaster.But,foodpricesdidincreasedramaticallyinthe2007/2008

period,withaveragefoodpricesrising18.2percentin2008alone,suggestingthat

the regime faced a risk of protest activity. That study suggested the government

respondedbyre-introducingsubsidiesonwheat,breadandflourthathadbeen in

process of being phased out. The report noted themore significant challenges to

75 Châtel 2014, 525. 76 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2009. 77 Fröhlich 2016, 40. 78 Erian, Katlan, and Babah 2010, 15. 79 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008.


34

food security in the country occurred later in 2014 after more than 1 million

migrants fromSyria floodedintothecountry,particularly insouthernLebanonin

theagriculturalrichBekaaValley.80Theimplicationhereisthatgovernmentactions

mayhavestanchedtheriskoffood-relatedprotests.

Atthesametime,thedeclineinwheatproductioninthisperiodcouldhave

adverselyaffectedfarmers’incomesinthewaytheydidinSyria,potentiallyleading

tofoodinsecurityinruralareas,abandonmentoffarms,suicides,migrationtourban

areas,andultimatelyconflict.WheatproductionhasbeensubsidizedinLebanonas

a strategic priority to enhance national self-sufficiency and insulate farmers from

fluctuationsinglobalwheatprices.Lebanonstillimportsmorethan80%ofitsfood

stuffs,including cereals.81Given that international prices canvarywidely (as they

didafterRussiabannedgrainexportsinAugust2010inthewakeofadroughtand

wildfires), the decision to subsidize production of awater-intensive crop such as

wheatmaymakemorestrategicsense.82Syria,asdiscussedfurther,alsohistorically

adoptedasimilar,evenmoreambitious,commitmenttofoodself-sufficiency.

InLebanon’scase,thegovernmentthroughtheGeneralDirectorateofWheat

and Sugar Beet Subsidy (GDCS) plays a critical role to subsidize production by

paying farmers a premium when international prices are low and through

subsidized loans. Thoughproductionwasbelow2006 levels, one study suggested

thatrobust internationalprices in2007and2008allowed farmers tosellall their

wheat directly to themarket without relying on state subsidies. The researchers

80 UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 2016, 10. 81 Ibid., 20. 82 Parfitt 2010.


35

notedthatin2010,however,theimpactofthedroughtonproductionmadefarmers

evenmoredependentonthestateforsupport.Inasurvey,lessthan10%offarmers

were willing to continue to grow wheat without state subsidy. Here, too, the

implication is that were it not for state subsidy, the situation of wheat farmers

would have been much worse in the midst of the drought.83I will discuss these

policiesfurtherbelowaswecontrastthesuccessfuleffortsbyLebanontoshoreup

both consumers’ access to food and farmers’ income from food saleswith Syria’s

failedeffortstoprotectfarmerandconsumers’interests.

The differences in governance, both state capacity and inclusion, between

Syria and Lebanon loom large here. Even though Lebanon has its share of

governancechallenges,especiallyasaresultofmisalignedincentivesfromitsnow

thirty year-old power-sharing agreement, the country has managed to avoid a

descentintoanothercivilwar,despiteoccupationfromSyriaandexternalmeddling

fromIsrael.

EvidenceofStateCapacity

Thefirstdimensiontoevaluateisstatecapacity.Asinthelastchapter,Ibegin

by examining broad indicators of governance from the World Bank and other

sources before discussing in more detail agriculture-specific governance

arrangements.

The World Bank governance measures capture different dimensions; a

number of them—government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of

83 Tawk et al. 2019, 199, 203.


36

corruption—mayberelevantforthinkingaboutthestate’sabilitytodeliverservices

in the midst of a multi-year drought.84The core expectation is that Lebanon’s

capacity should have been higher than Syria’s at the onset of the drought. The

droughtitselfcouldhavehadaneffectonstatecapacityitselfintermsofresources

toservethepopulaceandalsoitsabilitytoretainamonopolyonforcethroughout

its territory, but, as suggested earlier, it is less clear how quickly a slow-onset

droughtcanhavesuchanegativeimpactoncapacity.

World Bank measures typically reflect investor evaluations of country

performance and are only available back to 1996 and were only available every

otheryearuntil2002.Asnapshotviewofall threemeasuresshowshigherquality

governanceinLebanonforallthreedimensionsinlinewithmybasicexpectations.

Early in the drought period in 2007, Lebanon’s government effectivenesswas 45

percentilerankwhileSyria’swas22.Onregulatoryquality,the2007dividebetween

LebanonandSyriawaswiderwithbothcountriesscoringpoorlyoncorruption(see

Table1).

84 World Bank 2019f. Government effectiveness captures “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.” Regulatory quality captures “perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.” Control of corruption reflects “perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.”


37

Table1:GovernanceIndicatorsforLebanonandSyria

Source:WorldBankWorldwideGovernanceIndicators

BytheadventofSyria’scivilwarin2011,investors’perceptionsofSyria’s

governmenteffectivenessandregulatoryqualityactuallyimproved.Theupswingin

overalleffectivenessiseasiertoobserveinFigureX.Thesteepdeclinein


38

perceptionsofeffectivenessonlyreallycrystallizesinthewakeofthecivilwaritself

(seeFigure9).

Figure9:GovernmentEffectivenessinLebanonandSyria1996-2018

Source:WorldBankWorldwideGovernanceIndicators

Asdiscussedinthelastchapter,thePRSgrouphasanindicatorof

bureaucraticqualitythatdatesbackto1984.85Ittooisbasedlargelyoninvestor

perceptions.ThatindicatoritselfisacomponentofWorldBankgovernment

effectivenessmetric.Lebanon’sbureaucraticqualityreacheditsnadirin1990,just

asthecountry’slong-runningcivilwarended.BureaucraticqualityinLebanon

improvedthroughoutthe1990s,eclipsingSyria’sin1997andremaininghigher

thereafter,thoughwouldexperienceasteadydeclineovertime.Syria’sbureaucratic

85 Bureaucratic quality “measures institutional strength and quality of the civil service, assess how much strength and expertise bureaucrats have and how able they are to manage political alternations without drastic interruptions in government services, or policy changes. Good performers have somewhat autonomous bureaucracies, free from political pressures, and an established mechanism for recruitment and training.” Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010.

0

20

40

60

80

19961998200020022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018

PercentRank

LebanonandSyriaGovernmentEffectivenessPercentRank

1996-2018

Lebanon SyrianArabRepublic


39

qualitywouldremainlowerthroughthe2000swithaslightimprovementin2008

(seeFigure10).

Figure10:BureaucraticQualityinLebanonandSyria1984-2017

Source:PRSGroup

Onsomelevel,theseindicatorsconfirmtheexpectationthatLebanonhad

bettergovernancethanSyriaintheleaduptoSyria’scivilwar.However,theWorld

Bankgovernmenteffectivenessindicatorssuggestaconvergenceofcapabilitiesup

inthe2000sto2011,evenaftermultipleyearsofdrought,raisingquestionsabout

therelevanceofthisindicatororthecontributionofdifferencesinstatecapacityto

theoutcomesinbothcountries.Here,itmaybeusefultothinkaboutthereputation

thatBasharal-Assadenjoyedpriortohisrepressiveresponsetotheprotestsof

March2011.Assadcameintoofficein2000afterhisfatherdied.Heestablished

somethingofareputationasaneconomicreformerthroughoutthe2000sashe

soughttoreorientthecountryonthebasismoreofamarketeconomywithless

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

BureaucraticQualityinLebanonandSyria1984-2017

Lebanon Syria


40

heavy-handedstateintervention.86Thatreformagendapickedupin2005,which

correspondstotherenewedinvestorconfidenceingovernmenteffectivenessinthe

WorldBankdata.87

Internationalinvestorsmaywellhavejudgedtheremovalofsubsidieson

dieselfuelandfertilizersin2008tohavebeenmarket-friendlyandthereforea

symbolofgoodgovernance.Thatdecisionondieselfuelthoughhadanimpacton

theirrigationpumpingcapacityoffarmersinthemidstofthelaterdroughtaswell

astheirabilitytogettheirgoodstomarket.88Alongwithotherpolicies,such

decisionsmighthavemadethesituationworseandlesstenableforfarmers,butit

mightnotbereflectedinforeigninvestors’perceptionsofgovernanceuntilthe

situationbecamemiredinviolence.

Asinthelastchapter,wecanalsolookforindicatorsofstatecapacityspecific

todroughtpreparednessandresponse.Thiswouldincludepredictionandearly

warningsystemsfordrought,programstopreparefordroughtsandinsulatethe

populationfromadverseimpactsincludinggrainstorage,irrigation,insurance

schemes,income,andfoodsupport.Wecanalsoevaluatetheresponsemeasuresthe

countryhasestablishedtopreventmalnutritionandstarvationsuchasfood-for-

workschemesandfooddonationsaswellasprogramstore-startagriculturesuch

asseed,agriculturalinputs,andlivestockrestockingprograms.Becausebothof

thesecountriesweremorereliantonirrigationthaneitherEthiopiaorSomalia,

86 Horn 2012; Haldevang 2017. 87 Bennet 2005; Raphaeli 2006; Butter 2015. 88 Châtel 2014, 527.


41

watermanagementinstitutionsthatregulateandapportionirrigationarealso

relevant.

Here,Ifocusonpoliciesofproductionsubsidiesinbothcountries,asthese

seemtobemostrelevantforthinkingthroughdifferentialstatecapacity.Idiscuss

somemoredetailsintheinclusionsectionbelow.

Bothcountrieshaveencouragedsomemeasureoffoodproduction,evenfood

self-sufficiencyinSyria’scase,throughsystemsofsubsidy.Thesecanprovecostly

bothtosustainbutalsoifremovedinhaste.

Syriahadanaggressiveprogramtofosternationalself-sufficiencyinfood

productiondatingbacktothe1960s.Onthewatermanagementside,thiswas

facilitatedbyeffortstodamriversandextendirrigationinthenortheastofthe

country.Ontheproductionside,thiswas,asFröhlichnoted,“definedbysubsidies

forfarminputsandfuels,especiallyforstrategiccropssuchaswheat,cottonand

barley.”89

Aftertheintroductionofdieselmotorpumpsinthe1960,lowcostcreditand

subsidizedfuelfacilitatedtheextensionofdrillingwellsandpumpingfromthe

1970stothe1990s.Groundwaterlevelsdeclinedsignificantly.Ostensiblytocontrol

groundwaterlevels,thecountrylaterinitiatedanannualwellpermittingprocess,

thoughthiswouldbecomepoliticizedandsubjecttocorruption.90Evenbeforethe

drought,watermismanagement,waste,alongsideotherfactorshadledtosignificant

declinesinwateravailability,byasmuchashalfbyoneestimatebetween2002and

89 Fröhlich 2016, 41. 90Châtel 2014, 531.


42

2008.91Staffcompetenceinthisareawasverylow.AccordingtodeChâtel,“The

majorityofstaffintheministriesofAgricultureandIrrigationhasbarelyfinished

secondaryschoolandonlyasmallminorityhasauniversitydegree.”92What’smore,

shedescribedtheinstitutionalstructureofwatermanagement“arcane”and

“fragmented”withnolessthan22differentministries,councils,anddirectorates

involved,withlittlecoordinationbetweenthemdespitesimilarresponsibilities.93

Alongsidethisweresubsidiesforfarmers.A2008WorldBankassessment

reviewedthecountry’ssubsidyprogramandnotedavarietyofpressureswere

makingitmoredifficulttoafford,includinglowoilrevenues.UnderitsAnnual

AgriculturalProductionPlan,Syriabegancreated“agriculturalstabilityzones”

beginningin1975toregulatelandallocationsfordifferentcropswithagoalof

nationalself-sufficiencyinwheatandcotton.Thoselicensestooperate,inturn,were

tiedtoaccesstocredit,inputs,andmarketingservices.Thestateregulatedthesale

ofstrategicallyimportantcropsthroughstate-controlledcompanies.Thestate

offeredpricesubsidiesforwheat,cotton,sugar,sugarbeet,barley,andtobacco,

thoughinsomeyearsinternationalpriceswerehigherthandomesticprices,

lesseningtheneedfordomesticsubsidy.94

Thisreportsuggestedagriculturalsubsidiescollectivelyamountedtoabout

4%ofGDP,withdieselsubsidies2.6%ofGDP,fertilizerandseedupto0.3%,credit

0.1%(augmentedbybaddebts),withpricesubsidiestocottongrowers(0.9%)and

91 Fröhlich 2016, 40. 92 Châtel 2014, 531. 93 Ibid., 530–531. 94 World Bank 2008.


43

beetfarmers(0.1%)othersignificantsubsidyitems.95Thereportnotedthat

agriculturefunctionedasasortofsafetynetandwherethelowskilled,ruralpoor

wereconcentrated.96However,thissubsidyprogramwascapturedbylargefarming

interests,thoughalsoweredirectedtothepoorestregionsofthecountryanddid

includesubsidiesforpoorcottonlaborers.TheBank’sgeneralconclusionwas

Syria’sstatistapproachtoagricultureandsupportfor“strategiccrops”wasleaving

thecountryill-equippedtotakeadvantageofmorelucrativeinternationaltrade

opportunities,bothforsellingwheatabroadbutalsodiversifyingintofruitsand

vegetables.97TheBankcounseledthatdieselsubsidyremovaloughttobeenacted

alongsidemoresupportforstrategiccropslikewheattodampenthesocialimpacts

offuelsubsidyremoval.98

Syriabeganaprocessofliberalizationthatwouldscalebacksubsidies.This

subsidyreformagendastartedinthemid-1980sbutpickedupin2005,whenSyria

releasedits10thFiveYearPlanfor2006-2010.In2008and2009,asthecountry

faceditsworstdroughtindecades,thegovernmentcancelledsubsidiesondiesel

fuelandfertilizer,leadingtoimmediatepricehikes.99Suchpricehikesonfuelmade

itbothhardertoirrigatewhatlittleharvesttheywereexpectingandaffected

productioninthefinalweeksandincreasedthecostsoftransportinggoodsto

market.100OnereasoncitedforthechangeinpolicieswasthesizeofSyria’sfiscal

deficit.Byoneaccount,fuelsubsidiesamountedto15%ofSyria’sGDP.Repealing

95 Ibid., 4, 8. 96 Ibid., 11. 97 Ibid., 6. 98 Ibid., 8. 99 Châtel 2014, 526. 100 Ibid.


44

thosesubsidiesapparentlyquadrupledfuelpricesovernightinMay2008.101InMay

2009,thegovernmentalsocutsubsidiesforfertilizersandpricesdoubled.102

Intheleaduptothedrought,otherchoicesalsomadeitharderfortheSyrian

statetorespond.deChâtelwritesthatthe“thelackofsocialsafetynetsleftmanyin

theagriculturalsectorunabletocope.”103Relevanttothis,in2006,thecountrysold

itsstrategicwheatreservestocapitalizeonhighinternationalprices–some1.5

millionmetrictonsandtwiceasmuchasyearbefore–andthushadtoturnto

importstwoyearslaterasthedroughtunderminedproduction.104Syriahadbeena

netexporterofwheatsincethe1990sandthuswereforcedtoimportwheatin2008

forthefirsttimeinfifteenyears.105

InNovember2008,inacablelaterreleasedbyWikileaks,anFAO

representativeaskedUSAID,theUSbilateralforeignassistanceprogramforhelp

withthedrought.Callingthedroughta“perfectstorm,”theofficialnotedthatthe

SyrianMinisterofAgriculturesaid“that[the]economicandsocialfalloutfromthe

droughtwas‘beyondourcapacityasacountrytodealwith.’”106Oncetheimpactson

foodsecuritywererecognized,thegovernmentadoptedanumberofmeasureunder

the2009droughtappealtodeliveremergencyfoodsuppliestothemostaffected

regionsaswellaslivestockfeed,seedstock,replacementlivestock,andtechnical

assistance.107

101 Fröhlich 2016, 42. 102Châtel 2014, 526. 103 Ibid. 104 Polk 2013a; Polk 2013b. See Wikileaks released U.S. government cable for confirmation of reserve sales. U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008. 105Châtel 2014, 527. 106 Quoted in Polk 2013a. 107 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2009.


45

Asnotedearlier,Lebanonsubsidizesbothconsumptionof

wheat/flour/breadaswellasproductionofwheat.Lebanonhassubsidizedand

continuestosubsidizeothercropssuchassugarbeetsandtobacco,butIfocuson

wheatforillustrativepurposesandforwhichmoreinformationisavailable.Since

the1960’s,theLebanonhasdiversifieditsagriculturalproductionintomorehigh

valuefruittreesandvegetablesforexport(especiallytoGulfcountries),forwhich

additionalsubsidiesandincentivesareprovided,mostofwhicharecapturedby

largelandowners.108

TheLebanesegovernmentestimatedthatwheatsubsidiescostLL129billion

between2007and2011(roughly$85million)onanetbasis,withnearlyallofthe

costsassociatedwithconsumersubsidies.Thosesubsidieswerepaidforwith

protectionisttariffsonimportedcerealsandotherfoodstuffs,foreignaid,taxeson

services,andotherrevenuesources.Therewereeffortsinthe2005-2006periodto

scalebackandreducefarmersubsidies.Becausefarmerswereunabletoselltheir

wheatin2006,thispolicywassuspendedandsubsidieswererestoredtobenefit

some1,300farmers(lessthan1%ofthecountry’s170,000farmers).109The2007

and2008internationalpriceswerehigherasbeforeandonlylimitedsubsidieswere

offered.Thepolicyofsubsidyphaseoutwasfullyreversedin2009,with2010being

animportantyearasaconsequenceofavarietyofweatherextremes,highdaytime

temperatures,lownighttimetemperatures,aswellasfloodingwhichreducedcrop

yieldsbyasmuchas60%.Becauseproductionwassolow,thequantityof

subsidizedwheatthatwasboughtwaslessthan20%ofwhatthegovernmenthad

108Banfield and Stamadianou 2015, 44. 109 Ibid., 22.


46

budgetedfor.The2010netcostswereestimatedtobesmall,only0.01%ofGDP,

benefitingfewerthan700farmers.110Whilethenumberofbeneficiarieswas

relativelylow,theperpersonsubsidieswereontheorderof$6000to$6500,which

suggeststhebeneficiarieswerereasonablywellofffarmers,asmeanpercapita

consumptioninBekaaValleywasonlyabout$2300in2004-2005.111Ifthesewere

thekindsoflocalelitesinthecountry,pricesupportscouldhaveservedtosecure

theiron-goinggoodwilltotheregimeinotherwisedifficultproductionmoments.

Themorecostlyinterventionwasacaponthepriceofbreadthatinthe

season2007-2008alonehadanetcostof93billionLebanesepounds(about$61

million),whichwasmorethan70%ofthesubsidytotalovertheentireperiod.This

constitutedabout.21%ofthecountry’sGDPinthatperiodandnearly1%of

primaryexpenditures.BetweenApril2007andtheearlymonthsof2008,

internationalwheatpricesincreasedfrom$200permetrictontonearly$450per

metricton.Thegovernment’spricecapsnegotiatedwithdomesticbakery

syndicateshadsetpricesatalevelbasedonchargingthebakeriesabout$210per

metricton.Itisalittleunclearthenumberofbeneficiariesbutgiventhecostoutlay

andthenumberoftonspurchased—morethan240,000—itpresumablywas

ordersofmagnitudemorethanthenumberoffarmers.In2010-2011,after

additionaldroughtsdomesticallyandinternationally,anotherversionofthesubsidy

policyforconsumerswasreinstatedwithnetcostsof21billionLebanesepounds

110 Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Finance 2012, 7–9. 111 This is based on consumption adjusting for regional prices differences. UNDP 2007, 5.


47

($13million).112ThissuggeststhattheLebanesegovernmentwasmoreconcerned

abouttheprotestpotentialofurbanconsumersthanthoseoffarmers.

Intermsofqualityofgovernance,theWorldBankin2018evaluated

Lebanon’sdroughtresponseand,likeSyria,notedfragmentationbetweenmultiple

agenciesandlackofclarityoveragencyroles.Thereportcitedanundatedstudy

thatsaidthecountrylackedadroughtemergencyplanandthattheseproblems

persistedthrougha2014drought.Coreconclusionswerethattherewasno

concerteddroughtmanagementeffort,thatthecountrydidnotprioritizedrought

riskmanagement,andhadnodroughtmonitoringsystem.113In2016,aUSAID

projectwashelpingfundaregionaldroughtpreparednessinitiativetocorrectthese

deficiencies,butthissuggeststhatLebanon’scapacityinthisspacethroughthemid

2010’swaspoor.114Thissuggeststhatwhilecapacitymayhavebeenbetterin

LebanonthanSyria,Lebanon’sdrought-relatedgovernancewasnotespeciallygood,

thoughthestatemanagedtomaintainsomesubsidiestoconsumersandproducers

inthemidstofthedrought.

Thusfar,IhavecomparedstatecapacityinSyriaandLebanon,asexante

differencebetweenthem,butitisalsopossiblethatthemulti-yeardroughtaffected

statecapacityitselfbyreducingtaxrevenuefromagriculture.Whiledisaggregated

sectoraltaxreceiptsarenotreadilyavailable,thereareestimatesoftaxcollectionas

apercentofGDPthrough2008.Neithercountrycollectsalargeshareofrevenuein

taxes.Denmark’sshare,forcomparison,wasover40%.Here,weobservethe

112 Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Finance 2012, 17. 113 Ashwill et al. 2013, 67–68. 114 National Drought Mitigation Center 2016.


48

countriesdiverginginthemidstofthedroughtwithtaxrevenuesasashareofGDP

goingdownfrom14%in2006inSyriatoabout10.5%in2008whileLebanon’s

wentupfrom15.4%to16.6%.Whiletheremayhavebeenotherreasonsforpoor

taxcollectioninthisperiod,thissuggeststhatthedroughtcouldhavehadaneffect

onSyria’savailableresources,bothforservicedeliveryandsuppressionofdissent

(seeFigure11).115

Figure11:TaxRevenueasaShareofGDP

Source:ICTD/UNU-WIDERviaOurWorldinData EvidenceofPoliticalInclusion

Thesecondrelevantdimensionisthedegreeofpoliticalinclusion,arguably

themostimportantdifferencebetweenthesetwocountrieswithimplicationsfor

115 Ortiz-Ospina and Roser 2016.


49

equitableaccesstoservicesandattentivenessofthegovernmentstodifferent

constituencies.Arguably,theSyriastatesince1970shasexhibitedahighdegreeof

politicalexclusion,rewardingtheminorityAlawitegroupthatcontrolledthe

governmentattheexpenseofothergroups.TheLebanesestatehashadelaborate

power-sharingagreementsinplacewhichwerereaffirmedinthewakeofitsfifteen

civilwarthatendin1990.Thosecarefullycraftedarrangementshaveensuredthat

thevarietyofLebanesestakeholdershavehadrepresentationingovernmentanda

meansofsurfacingtheirconcernsandclaimsforservices,includingfarmers.

AsaresultoftheUNmandatesystemthatemergedafterWorldWarIandthe

partitionoftheOttomanEmpire,SyriaandtheLebanoncametobeadministeredby

France.LebanonboundarywithSyriareflectseffortsbytheFrenchtocreatea

MaroniteChristiancontrolledstateinthe1920s.116DespiteFrencheffortstocreate

alargelyMaronitestate,SyriaandLebanonarebothdiversecountrieswithavariety

ofethnicandreligiouscleavagesuponbecomeindependentinthe1940s.While

bothhaveultimatelysufferedfromcivilwarsinthemodernera,Syriawas

nominallymorestableduringthelatterpartoftheColdWarwhenHafezal-Assad

seizedpowerthroughaseriesofcoupsandconcentratedpowerinhispresidency

whichlastedfrom1971untilhisdeathin2000.Assadruledthiscountryinfavorof

hisminorityAlawitegroup,asectofIslamthatisdistinctfromShiaandSunniIslam,

themajorsourceofintra-Islamcleavages.TheAlawitesconstituteabout13%ofthe

populationinSyriaandhaveretaineddominantcontrolofthepoliticalapparatus

116 Sly 2013.


50

sincethe1970s,withmajorimplicationsforpatronageandpoliticalrewardsthat

theSyriastatehasofferedtoitsprimarysupporters.

ThesedifferencesarecapturedintheEthnicPowerRelationsdatasetthat,as

discussedinpreviouschapters,chartsthepoliticalrepresentationofdifferentethnic

groupsincountriesovertimeasgovernmentscomeandgo.Previousworkby

Bretthauersuggestedthatpoliticallyexclusiveregimeswereoneswheremorethan

20%ofthepopulationwasexcludedfrompower.117InSyria’scase,theminority

Alawites,asjustmentioned,constituteabout13%ofthecountryandhavebeenthe

dominantpartneringovernmentsince1970.Fully86%ofotherethnicgroupshave

beenexcludedfrompoliticalrepresentationeversince.ThemajoritySunniArabs,

whichaccountfor65%ofthepopulation,wentfrombeingjuniorpartnersinthe

governmentfrom1966-1969tobeingdiscriminatedagainstthereafter.Kurds,who

accountfor8%ofthepopulation,havebeendiscriminatedagainstthroughoutthe

country’shistory.Christianswhoamountto10%ofthepopulationhavebeen

powerlessunderbothHafezal-AssadandhissonBashalal-Assadwhoassumed

powerin2000.BothKurds(8%ofthepopulation)andDruze(3%)havealsobeen

powerless.

InLebanon’scase,Shias(32%),Sunnis(20%),andMaroniteChristians

(16%)wereallseniorpartnersingovernmentbetween1992-2017.Druze(6%),

GreekOrthodox(5%),ArmenianOrthodox(4%),andGreekCatholic(3%)haveall

beenjuniorpartnersoverthistimerperiod.Excludedpopulationsonlyconstituted

13%ofthepopulation.OnlyArabPalestinians(10%)havebeendiscriminated

117 Bretthauer 2015.


51

againstwithArmenianCatholics(1%),Protestants(1%),andAlawites(1%)being

powerless.Atnotimefrom1946onwardhasLebanoneverhadmorethan13%of

thepopulationexcludedfrompower,includingthelengthyperiodofcivilwarfrom

1975to1990.From1971to1991,however,ShiaMuslims–32%ofthepopulation–

werejuniorpartnersingovernment.118

Asinthelastchapter,IalsoshowthemeasureofsocialexclusionfromtheV-

DEMdataset.119Relevantforthinkingaboutbothsocialserviceprovisioninthelead

upandinresponsetodrought,themeasureofsocialgroupsreflectsthedegreeto

whichthereisequalityofaccesstopublicservicesbasedonotherdistinctionssuch

asethnicity,caste,language,race,andregion.120AsacontrasttobothLebanonand

especiallySyria,highlyinclusiveDenmarkisalsoshown.Consistentwiththe

politicalrepresentationfiguresfromtheEthnicPoliticalRelationsdata,V-DEM

showsSyriawithconsistentlyhighsocialexclusionwithLebanonbeingmore

inclusivethroughoutandimprovingovertime(seeFigure12).

118 ETH Zurich 2018. Historically, rural farmers were mostly Shia and Maronite Christians, with the Maronites somewhat better off than the Shia. 119 V-Dem Project 2019. 120 Ibid., 195–198.


52

Figure12:SocialExclusioninSyria,Lebanon,andDenmark

Source:V-DEM

TheAssadfamilyruledSyriawithgroup-basedfavoritismtotheminority

Alawitesecttowhichtheybelonged,whichismostlyconcentratedalongthecoast.

Originallyapoorgroup,theAssadfamilyelevatedthisgroupbyappointingAlawites

tokeypositionsinthesecurityservices.121TheBa’athcoupthatultimatelybrought

Hafezal-Assadtopowerin1970notonlyservedtoelevateanewelitebuiltsome

widerlegitimacywithpeasantsthroughlandreformandloyaltiesofanemergent

middleclassthroughpublicsectoremploymentfromaprogramofnationalization.

CoupledwithArabnationalism,investmentsinhealth,education,andelectrification

continuedtobuildabaseofsupportinruralareas.122Thisprocessof“selective

goodsprovision”toregimesupportersincludedthenorthwesterngovernorateof

Latakia,where¾ofAlawitesarefromaswellasotherregionspartoftheBa’athist

121Sachs 2000. 122 Hinnebusch 2012, 95–96.

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

11980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

SocialExclusioninSyria,Lebanon,andDenmark1980-2018

Denmark Lebanon Syria


53

coalitionincludingthesouthernregionofHawran(whichincludesDar’a,thelocus

forsomeofthefirstprotestsinMarch2011),theruralareasaroundAleppo,andthe

northeasternpartofDeiral-Zor.123

WhilesomeoftheSunnimajorityinDamascuswerealsobeneficiariesof

governmentfavoritism,otherSunnisresentedthisarrangement,withrebellionsby

theMuslimBrotherhoodintheearly1980sputdownwithgreatbrutality.The

regime’sabilitytocontinuethismodelbecameharderovertime.Thenational

securitystate,whichwasnecessarytosuppressinternaldissentwasexpensive.

Patronagejobsandsubsidizedfoodalsowereadrainonthepublicpursue.Asa

consequence,thecountry’seconomicbasedeteriorated,withthestateinthe1980s

forcedtoembraceausterity,includingmassivepublicsectorspendingcuts.Partial

privatizationofstate-ownedimportmonopoliescreatedanewclassofbeneficiaries

whoweredependentupontheregimefortheirwealth,withremainingsocial

programslikesubsidizedfoodandjobskeepingasemblanceoflegitimacywiththe

middleandlowerclasses.124

ThesecontradictionsacceleratedwhenHafezal-Assaddiedin2000.Hisson

Basharal-Assadsoughttobothdeepentheliberalizationagendaandretainsomeof

thesocialprotectionsforthemasses,throughaso-called“socialmarket”economy

withreformsbeginningin2005.However,hewasmoredependentuponanarrower

groupofsupportersintheAsad-Makhflouffamilyclanwhichwererichlyrewarded

withpatronage,whichangeredsomeoldguardelites.Theinexperienced

123 De Juan and Bank 2015, 94. 124 Hinnebusch 2012, 98.


54

technocratsthatAssadrecruitedtopursuetheliberalizationagendawerenot

especiallyskilledsincesalariesforthesenewofficialswerelow.125

Despiteoilrevenue,theparlousstateofthecountry’seconomicsituation,

madeworsebyWesternisolationandsanctionsbecauseofAssad’ssupportfor

SaddamHussein,ledtheregimetoabandonsomeofthesocialprotectionsand

subsidiesithadmaintainedtoretainlegitimacywiththemasses,startingwithfuel

subsidiesandthenagriculturalinputsandpricesupport.126Tradeliberalizationled

tocheapimportscomingintothecountrywithsmallbusinessesbadlyaffected.

Hinnebuschdescribesthecontoursofthisemergentsystem:“Attheheartofthe

regimecoalitionwerethe‘cronycapitalists’—therent-seekingalliancesofpolitical

brokers(ledbyAsad’smother’sfamily)andtheregime-supportivebourgeoisie.”127

Thiswasthesceneasthecountryenteredintoamulti-yeardroughtin2007.

AsforLebanon,managingsectariandividesasinSyriahasalwaysbeena

challenge.Sincethe1860s,Lebanon’sgovernancestructurehasconsistedof

differentpower-sharingagreementsthathavetriedtomaintainadelicateabalance

ofthecountry’seighteendifferentreligiousgroupsorconfessions,someperiods

withmoresuccessthanothers.128Becausepowerdistributioningovernmentis

basedonthehistoric1932census,nonewonehasbeencompletedsincethen,even

thoughgroupshavelikelyexperienceddifferentialpopulationgrowth.129

125 Ibid., 99. 126 Ibid., 102. 127 Ibid., 101. 128 Zahar 2005. 129 Barshad 2019; Brown 2009.


55

Inthepost-independenceperiod,theprojectbecamelesstenableovertime.

Inthe1970s,theinfluxofPalestinianrefugeesledtofurthercleavagesbetweenthe

dominantMaroniteChristiansandleftistgroupssympathetictothePalestinians.In

1975,disputesovereffortsbytheformerpresidentChamountomonopolizzfishing

rightsforhisMaronitecommunityiscreditedasthesparkforafisherman’sstrike.

Thatstrikeinturn,whensuppressedbythegovernment,escalatedintothelong-

runningcivilwarthatwouldultimatelyclaim120,000lives.130

Inoneassessment,Lebanonwaspost-civilwarseenascarvedupintoa

landscapeofdifferentgeographies:“Thecivilwarproducedamosaicofsmall

territoriesandsocialspaces,inwhichthepowerofthestate,andtheinfluencesof

thelocalpoliticalelite,arerelative.”131WhiletheTaifAgreementof1989helpput

anendtothecivilwarthrougharenewedpower-sharingagreement,withSyria

chargedwithbeingthemainpowerbrokerinthecountry.132Likeotherpower-

sharingagreements,itwasnotfullydemocraticandencumberedbyinertia.The

countryattimeslackedapresidentandhadparliamentaryparalysisin2013.Since

thattime,theevolutionofpluralismandconsociationalismhassuccessfullyaverted

areturntoviolencesincetheendofthecivilwarin1990butjustbarely.133

Lebanon’spower-sharingagreementmayhaveavertedconflictinthe

contemporaryerabuthascreateditsownproblems,namelyalegacyoflog-rolling

130 Reilly 1982. 131 Banfield and Stamadianou 2015, 23. 132 The Taif Agreement shifted power from the president to a Council of Ministers, provided for parliamentary, cabinet, and civil service parity between Muslims and Christians regardless of demographic trends. Bahout and Bahout 2016. 133 Kota 2012; Hartzell et al. 2016. For a more pessimistic take on the semi-feudal nature of Lebanon’s confessional system of parliamentary representation, see Ignatius 1983.


56

corruptionandclientelismthathasimpededservicedeliveryandcreateda

perceptionthatelitesareservingtheirowninterestsratherthanthemasspublic:

Hospitals,roads,schoolsandotherprojectsaredistributedtofavoredcontractorsaccordingtosectarianquotasthatensureeverygroupbenefits,regardlessofnecessity.”134

A 2019 garbage crisis underscored the limits of this sectarian patronage-based

mode.Apreviousgarbagecontractwasapportionedtoprovidehundredsofmillion

dollar contracts for two separate landfills, one to the brother of an aide to a top

Sunni politician and the other to a businessman close to the senior Christian

politician. Even as these elites have gottenwealthy,much trash has been instead

dumpedmuchgarbageintheoceanandalongthecoast.

Such self-dealingbyelites acrossdifferent groupswasamajor impetus for

massive popular protests in 2019 that (peacefully) toppled the primeminister.135

But,therelativeopennessofthestatetotoleratesuchprotestsprovidesameansby

thesocietycanpeacefullyexpressitsgrievancesandseekredress.Asoneobserver

notedin2016asSyrianrefugeestestedtheregime’stability,“TheLebanesepolitical

systemisdefinitelyinneedofaraftofpoliticalreforms,butthebasicinclusiveness

ofthesystemremainsakeybulwarkatleastagainstseriouscivilconflictofthekind

weseeinseveralneighboringArabcountries.”136

EvidenceofInternationalAssistance

Bothofthesecountriesweremiddle-incomecountriesandreliedlesson

foreignaidinthecontemporaryerathanpoorerstatesintheinternationalsystem.

134 Yee and Saad 2019. 135 Ibid. 136 Salem 2016.


57

Figure11showsaidasapercentageofgovernmentexpenseandshowsLebanon

andSyriacomparedtoEthiopia,arelativelyaiddependentstatediscussedinthe

previouschapter(seeFigure13).

Figure13:DevelopmentAssistanceasShareofGovernmentExpense

Source:WorldBankviaOurWorldinData

Thatsaid,Lebanonhasreliedonitsdiasporacommunityforarelativelylarge

shareofitsGDP,formorethanSyria(seeFigure14belowwithEthiopiaagain

includedforcomparison).


58

Figure14:PersonalRemittancesasaShareofGDP

Source:WorldBankviaOurWorldinData

Giventhatbothcountriesfacedseveredroughtsinthelate2000s,flash

appealsforhumanitarianassistancecouldhavebeenrequestedfromtheUnited

NationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(UNOCHA).However,

therewerenodrought-relatedappealsforfinanceforLebanonfrom2006-2011but

therewereforSyria.

SyriacoordinatedwiththeUNinSeptember2008andAugust2009toissue

emergencydroughtappealsbutjustforthenortheasternprovincesofHasaka,

Raqqa,andDeirez-Zor.Noassistancewassoughttoaiddisplacedpopulationswho

hadrelocatedtothesouth.Just$5.4millionofthe$20.4millionrequestedin2008


59

wasprovidedbytheinternationalcommunity,andonly1/3ofthe$43million

requestedin2009wasprovided.137

In2006and2007,Lebanondidhaveemergencyappealsforfinanceinthe

wakeofIsrael’s34-daymilitaryoperationagainstHezbollahthatstartedinJuly

2006,whichdisplacedsome700,000peopleinLebanon.UNOCHAcoordinateda

$150humanitarianappealin2006withanothersmallerappealof$20millionin

2007foron-goingrefugeesupport.138ThefirstLebanonappealsecuredmorethan

120%oftheinitialfundingappealwhilethe2007appealonlysecuredabout45%of

thefundingneeds.Whilethenatureofthefundingappeal(refugeesdisplacedby

armedattackinLebanoncomparedtodroughtvictimsinSyria)wasdifferent,the

differencesbetweentheefficacyoffundraisingappealsdoessuggesttherelative

isolationofSyriafromtheinternationalcommunitycomparedtoLebanon.

Châtelsuggeststheunderperformanceofinternationalcommunitysupport

forSyriawasinpartbecausetheSyrianwasambivalentaboutseekinginternational

assistanceanddownplayedthedrought’ssignificanceinitsownmediaandto

donors.Giventhecountry’sprideandself-imageasself-sufficientinfood

production,fullyacknowledgingthedroughtwasperceivedasabridgetoofar.

Moreover,donorswerenotquitesureaboutthegovernment’sstrategy.Adrought

managementplan,startedin2000andcompletedin2006,wasapparentlynot

activated.139

137 Financial Tracking Service 2019b; Financial Tracking Service 2019c. 138 Financial Tracking Service 2019a. 139 Châtel 2014, 527–528.


60

CablesfromtheU.S.governmentnotedthatitdidnotcontributetothe

appealin2008,whichwaslimitedtoprovidingaidtojust10,000families.Bad

relationsbetweentheU.S.andSyriaseemedtobeattheheartoftheObama

administration’sreluctancetosupportaid,thoughthechallengesofactually

deliveringassistancethroughtheWorldFoodProgramwerealsonoted.140In2009,

theUNaskedtheUnitedStatestomakea$10millioncontribution,whichmight

havehelpedsignaltootherdonorstomakecontributionsoftheirown.141The

UnitedStatesalsodidnotcontributetothateffort.142A2010cablereleasedby

WikileaksshowedthattheWorldFoodProgrammecontinuedtohavedifficulty

gettingitsfundingappealssupportedin2010.Ofthemorethan$22million

requestedinNovember2010,abitmorethan$5millionhadbeenmobilizedby

February,limitingthenumberofbeneficiariesto240,000,sixtythousandlessthan

intended.TheObamaadministrationhadwantedtocallthecrisisanemergency

whiletheSyriagovernmentwasreluctanttolabelitassuch.143Syria’sexperienceas

donoroutcastisakintoEthiopiainthe1980sundertheDergandSomaliainthe

leaduptothe2011famine.Whencountriesareledorsubstantiallycontrolledby

groupsorindividualsdeemeduntrustworthybytheinternationalcommunity,that

canbeassignificantadecisionaseffortsbytherecipientcountriestoblockaid

themselves.

140 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2009. 141 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2010a. 142 Financial Tracking Service 2019c. 143 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2010b.


61

PuttingthePiecesTogether

Thusfar,Ihaveshownthatthecountriesbothexperiencedseveredroughts

in the period 2006-2010 that led to major declines in agricultural production. I

showed that the countries differed in state capacity and political inclusion and

traced thedifferences insubsidyregimesanddroughtresponse inbothcountries.

Whatisthesequenceofeventsthatleadsfromdroughtinbothcountriesbuttocivil

warinonlyoneofthem?

Here, I need to show that the drought led to populationmovements from

affectedareasinSyriatosomeofthesoutherncitieslikeDar’athatweretheearly

sites for political protest against the regime. Fröhlich has disputed that

northeasterners displaced by drought were in a position to protest, given their

tenuous standing asmigrants to the south.That claim isplausible, thougheven if

theywerenotinvolvedindissentagainsttheregime,thatisnotfataltotheclimate

migration connection to conflict here. The presence of largemigrant populations

competing for housing, jobs, and services from the Syrian regime might have

triggered dissatisfaction of long-time residents, even if the migrants themselves

shunned participation in the protests themselves. While drought might have

surfaced as a reason for the protests themselves, it is quite possible that other

driverswerethesparksforprotestsandultimateviolencethattookplace.Drought

could have played an important role in either creating an underemployed

population of youngmen who took part in the protests and later violence or by

displacingalargenumberofpeopletoareaswherecompetitionforworkwithother

underemployedmencreatedarecruitablepopulationoffighters.


62

In Lebanon, the absence of violence is unobserved, but aside from the

provision of subsidies to consumers and producers, there may have been crisis

momentsduringthedroughtsuchasstreetproteststhatcouldhavegoneadifferent

waybutwereresolvedpeacefully.Here,IfocusonSyriaanddiscussLebanonmore

fullyinthealternativeexplanationssectionbelow.

In 2018, Ide surveyed the Syria evidence and concluded that (1) the links

betweenclimatechangeandthedroughtareplausiblebutnotproven,(2)thatthere

isstrongevidenceofthedroughtleadingtomassivelossofagriculturallivelihoods

but that evidence is contested, (3) as is the evidence for massive rural to urban

migration,and(4)thattheroleofmigrationin intensifyinggrievances isplausible

butlimitedinformationexists.144

Ashenoted,thereisgoodevidencetosuggestthatthedroughtdiddisplace

largenumbersofpeoplefromthenorthofSyriatosoutherncities,butthereis

disagreementamongscholarsaboutthesizeofdisplacementandwhethermigrants

themselvesparticipatedinprotests.145InaNovember2008cablereleasedby

Wikileaks,theU.S.EmbassyinSyriareportedthefearsoftheUNFAOrepresentative

AbdullahbinYehia:“Withoutdirectassistance,Yehiapredictsthatmostofthese

15,000small-holdingfarmerswouldbeforcedtodepartAlHasakahProvinceto

seekworkinlargercitiesinwesternSyria.”Yehiaworriedthat15,000unskilled

laborerswouldaddtothesocialandeconomicpressurespresentlyatplayinmajor

Syriancities,”alreadyburdenedbyIraqirefugees,inflation,middleclass

144 Ide 2018. 145 Nasser, Mehchy, and Abu Ismail 2013, 26; Erian, Katlan, and Babah 2010, 32; Wodon et al. 2014, 55; Abu-Ismail, Abdel-Gadir, and El-Laithy 2011, 24.


63

dissatisfaction,and“aperceivedweakeningofthesocialfabricandsecurity

structures.”146Ina2009reportfortheemergencyaidappeal,theUnitedNations

estimatedthesizeofinternalmigration:“Migrationfiguresrangefrom40,000–

60,000families.36,000familieshavereportedlymigratedfromHassakeh

Governoratealone.”147In2009,thatreportedlyleftabout60–70percentofvillages

inthegovernoratesofHassakehandDeirez-Zor.148InaJune2009cablereleasedby

Wikileaks,theU.S.EmbassyinSyriareportedthatsome250,000to300,000had

migratedoutoftheregionaccordingtoFAO,mostlytoseekcasuallaborinmajor

citieslikeDamascus,Aleppo,andHomsaswellascasualfarmlabornearthe

JordanianborderinDar’aandAs-Suwaida.149AFebruary2010cablefromtheU.S.

Embassynotedthattherewassomereversemigrationbacktothenortheastasthe

rainshadreturned,buttherewasstillimmensehumansufferingintheregion.

Moreover,thecablenoteditwasstill“taboo”toacknowledgepubliclythescaleof

migration.150

SomeresearchersreportevenhighernumbersofdisplacedSyrians.

Femia/Werrell,Gleick,andKelleyreportasmany1.5oreven2milliondisplaced

personsasaresultofthedrought.151Selbyetal.critiquethisestimateaswildlyout

ofproportiontomostestimatesofbetween40,000and60,000families,orabout

300,000people.Theygoontodisputewhetherornotthedroughtwasallthat

criticalindrivingeventhosenumbers,givingexistingseasonalmigrationfromthe146 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008, 4. 147 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2009. 148Châtel 2014, 527. 149 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2009. 150 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2010b. 151 Kelley et al. 2017; Gleick 2014; Femia and Werrell 2012; Werrell, Femia, and Sternberg 2015; Werrell and Femia 2017.


64

regionandotherdriversofmigrationfromtheregionsuchaseconomic

liberalization.152Ide’sconclusionofthedisputeisthatauthorsofcompetingcamps

arepotentiallyexaggeratingtheirdifferences,andthedisciplinewouldbebetter

servedbyacknowledgingthechallengesofestimatingprecisenumbersindata-poor

Syria:

Insum,thefigureofupto1.5millionrefugesusedbyKelleyetal.,butalsobyFemiaandWerrell,FeitelsonandTubi,Gleick,andWerrelletal.isalmostcertainlyoverstated.Butitisstillverylikelythatseveralhundredsofthousandsofadditionalpeoplemigratedfromthedrought-affectedareastotheoutskirtsofurbancentres.ThisnumberismoresignificantthanimpliedbytheestimatesprovidedbySelbyetal.andcouldhavehadconsiderablenegativeimpactsonsocialserviceprovisionandresourceavailability.153

The precise size of drought-related migration may not be knowable, given

challenges of understanding the baseline levels of seasonal migration and other

disruptions thatwereoccurring in Syria at this time, including Iraqi refugees and

thereturnhomeofSyriansaftertheendofthecountry’soccupationofLebanon.154

Itisdifficulttodisentanglethephysicaleffectsofthedroughtfromthegovernance

failuresofresponse.AsdeChâtelconcluded:“Similarly,climatechangeperse–to

theextentthatitspredictedeffectswouldalreadybevisible–didnotdriveSyrians

intothestreetinprotest;itwastheSyriangovernment’sfailuretoadapttochanging

environmental,economicandsocialrealities.”155

152 Selby et al. 2017a, 238. 153 Ide 2018, 351. 154 Selby et al. 2017a, 239; Ash and Obradovich 2020, 6. 155Châtel 2014, 522. . 522


65

Thespecificmagnitudeofthemigrationmaybelessimportantthanthe

socialconsequences.Werethenumberslargeenoughtopotentiallytriggerthekinds

ofproblemstheFAOfeared,namelylocalcontestationoverresources?Accordingto

deChâtel,thoughtherehadbeenseasonalmigrationofyoungmeninthepast,this

droughtwassoseverethatwholefamiliesmigratedtosoutherngovernorates,with

anumbersettlingintentcampsoutsideofthesoutherncityofDar’a,156thesiteof

earlyprotestsagainsttheregimeinMarch2011afterfifteenteenagerswere

imprisonedandtorturedforwritinganti-governmentgraffiti.

HinnebuschalsosawthedroughtplayingapartinDara:“InDera,formerlyabaseof

theBa’ath,where it began, the loss ofwork opportunities in Lebanon, corruption

anddroughthadencouragedSalafismamongunemployedyouth.”157

Ash and Obradovich try to connect the migration within Syria through a

uniquedatastrategy.Theyuselightsatnightasaproxyforpopulationdensityand

show changes in light penetration between 2005 and 2010 to suggest population

growthanddecline.Theythencorrelatesuchchangeswiththelikelihoodofprotest,

findingthatareasinthenortheastthatexperiencedadeclineinlightintensitywere

associatedwithlowerprotestriskswhileSunniArabareasthatexperiencedhigher

light intensity (and hence were recipients of displaced populations) were more

likely to experienceprotests.158This finding complements a studybyDe Juan and

Bankthat,alsousingnighttimelight,foundbothselectivedistributionofelectricity

156 Ibid., 526. 157 Hinnebusch 2012, 107. 158 Ash and Obradovich 2020.


66

to regions preferred by the regime and lower levels of violence in those areas

comparedtolessfavoredareas.159

Whilebothofthesestudieshavesomebearingontheconnectionsbetween

drought-relatedmigrationmovementsandprotest,AshandObradovichnotethatin

theirqualitativereviewofdemandsbyprotestersattheearlystageoftheuprising

in March and April 2011 that the drought was not mentioned, nor were many

economicdemandsingeneral,theemphasisbeingonfreedomandcallsforreduced

corruption.Theyseethisasprovidingsomesupportforoneoftheirhypothesisthat

people migrated to areas with similar kin and religious identities so rather than

foster inter-group cooperation, migration served to accentuate the claims of the

nowlargeridentitygroup.160Theynotethepresenceofsharedtiesbetweensending

andreceivingareasintheirtechnicalappendix:

Specifically,thereisevidenceSyria’smigrantsandlocalssharedtribal,inadditiontosectarian,connections.Inparticular,Syria’sSunniArabshaveacomplexpatchworkofkinshipnetworksandthesesometimestranscendregionalboundaries(Tibi,1990).Severaltribesandtribalconfederationshavepopulationsinbothareasstrickenbydroughtandthosethatreceivedmigrants:thereareBaggarainbothAleppoandDeirez-Zour,FadaninRaqqaandAllepo’sAinal-Arab,Al-AbdainHasakehandHamaandAl-HarbinHasakeh,Aleppo,DamascusandHoms(Zakariya,1983).161

Their argumentprovides aprovocativenew lineof potential research inquiry.On

some level, it is not surprising that two to three years after the beginning of the

droughts, there is no explicitmention in the protest activity in 2011, though the

relativeabsenceofeconomicclaimsissomewhatsurprising.Moreover,asSelbyet

al. note, while Dar’a is often flagged as the first case of mass post-Arab Spring

159 De Juan and Bank 2015. 160 161 See Appendix C2 in Ash and Obradovich 2020.


67

protest in Syria, there were at least two other protests in Damascus as well as

ongoingprotests in theKurdish regiondatingback to February2011.162Asnoted

earlier,theU.S.embassycablesofMay2008alsosignalthattherewasatleastone

food-relatedprotestatthetimebutthatitwasquicklydispatchedwithwaterhoses:

“Aminority-runpolicestatewithheavy-handedinternalsecurityservices,theSARG

keepsaclosewatchonanycivilunrest thatcouldposea threat to theregime.”163

Nearly three years later, such demands for redress of food-related concernsmay

havemorphedintobroadercallsforpoliticalreform.Thus,thisworkraisesasmany

questionsasitanswers.

Moreover,itisalsounclearwhichsocialgroupswerethemainprotagonists

in anti-government activity, at least at the start.Hinnebuschwrites that the early

protagonistsweremiddle-class intellectualswho reachedout to Islamists and the

Kurds.WiththeKurdsambivalentbecauseofoffersofcitizenship,manyoftheinitial

protesterswereSunnis.Whatprotestshadincommonwas“reactiontotheneglect

ofareasoutsidethemainurbanareas.”164

ThegeographyofwheredifferenttribalandreligiousgroupsliveinSyriais

notwellunderstoodoutsideofSyria.ThegeoreferencedversionoftheEthnicPower

Relations dataset that I consulted is based on dated ethnic maps from a 1964

GREG/AtlasNarodovMiraDataset, though includessomeupdatedrefinements.De

Juan and Bank use another dataset from Izady to generate dummy variables for

SunniandAlawiteareas.Theynotethat“Tothebestofourknowledge,noreliable

162 Selby et al. 2017a, 240. 163 U.S. Embassy in Syria 2008. 164 Hinnebusch 2012, 107.


68

databeyondroughapproximationsexiston theexactsizeandsettlementareasof

the various communities. Moreover, most regions of Syria have actually been

ethnicallyand/orreligiouslymixed.”165Theyarguetheirresultsareconsistentwith

thewithdrawaloftheSyrianstatefromserviceprovisionintownslikeDar’a:

In what was traditionally a Ba‘athist stronghold and the administrativecenteroftheHawrangovernorate,localstateinstitutionsgraduallywithdrewfromthecityandtheadjacentregionsincethe1990s,therebyweakeningthepreviouslystrongpatron–clienttiesbetweentheregimeandimportantlocalconstituencies.166

Thesetwoperspectivesseematoddssincetheformeremphasizespoliticalcriteria

while the latter focuses on withdrawal of the Syrian state from their history

clientelism.Theyperhapscanbereconciledwithfutureresearchwhichassessesthe

claimsthatmigrantswereofthesametribal/identitygroupsofreceivingareas.The

DeJuanandBankargumentisconsistentwithminethatdecliningstatecapacityin

anincreasinglyexclusiveregimetranslatedintolossofpublicsupportinthewakeof

thedrought,evenifthatwasnotarticulatedasthereasonfortheprotestactivity(if

AshandObradovicharetobebelieved).

EvenifwehavemoreconfidenceinthecausalroleofthedroughtinSyria’s

2011uprising,dowehavemuchclarityforwhyLebanondidnotexperiencesuchan

outcome?Bothcountriespossessedgovernancewithsomedegreeofself-serving

elitesandseemedpoisedforviolenceatdifferentmomentsintime.Inthesection

belowonalternativeexplanations,IfirstaddresswhySyriaandLebanonmightbe

fundamentallydifferentfromeachotheranddifficulttocompare,beforeturning

165 De Juan and Bank 2015, 98. 166 Ibid., 101.


69

backtomymainargumentaboutthedifferentialroleofcapacity,inclusion,and

assistance.

AlternativeExplanations

Thestrongestalternativeexplanationforthediscrepantoutcomesbetween

thetwocountriesisthatSyriaandLebanonaredifferentintoomanyimportant

respects.Lebanonisricher,farmoreurbanized,andlessdependentonagriculture

thanSyria.Indeed,theeffectsofthedrought,thoughsignificantforwheat

production,donotshowupintermsoflarge-scalehumansuffering.

Thislineofargumentsuggestsacoupleofdifferentpossibilities,(1)thatthe

droughtwasnotassevereinLebanonand(2)thatthecountriesaredifferentfrom

eachotherinfundamentalwaysintermsofsocio-economicdevelopment.Interms

oftheformer,thelogicofthatcritiquewouldonlyreinforcethecausalsignificance

ofphysicalexposuretodrought.Ifthedroughthadbeenmoresevere,thelogicgoes,

Lebanontoowouldhavebeenatriskofconflictandstatebreakdown.

Thesecondexplanationsuggeststhatthepoliticaldifferencesingovernance

intermsofcapacityandinclusionarelesscentraltotheoutcomethanSyriaand

Lebanon’sdivergentlevelsofeconomicdevelopment.IfLebanonhadbeenpoorer

andmoreagriculturallydependent,wouldittoohavesuccumbedtoviolenceinthis

period?Assuggestedearlier,theregimeisvulnerabletofoodpriceshocksinurban

areas,andthegovernmentundertookexpensiveeffortsin2008toinsulatethe

populacefromtheseproblems.Morebroadly,Lebanon’ssituationhasbeen

precarious,bothintheleaduptothedroughtandinitsaftermath.Thetwo

countriesareintertwinedwiththeSyrianstatefunctioningasanoccupyingforce


70

untiltheassassinationofLebanon’sprimeministerin2005forcedSyria’s

withdrawal.Lebanonweathereddifficultprotestsandviolencebetween2006and

2008,includinganIsraeliaircampaignagainstHezbollahin2006aswellasviolent

protestsin2008inresponsetothegovernment’seffortstoshutdownaHezbollah

communicationsnetwork.IntheaftermathofSyria’scivilwar,Lebanonwouldtake

inmorethan1millionSyrianrefugees.Despiteallofthesedevelopments,Lebanon

has,ofthiswritinginlate2019,notlapsedyetagainintolarge-scaleviolence.While

resources(bothinternalresourcesandinternationalfundingmobilizedbythe

internationalcommunityandLebanon’sdiaspora)helpedfacilitateamore

aggressiveresponsetoavarietyofchallenges,whatwouldLebanonlooklikeif

publicgrievanceshadbeenviolentlyrepressedthroughoutthisperiodasinSyria?

Conclusion

Thisprecedingdiscussionunderscoresthatdifferencesingovernance

betweenthetwocountriesareimportantbothintermsoftheLebanesestate’s

abilitytowithstandandrespondtothedroughtitfacedin2008-2010butalsoother

challengessuchasIsrael’sbombingcampaignof2006andon-goingchallengesfrom

HezbollahaswellastheinfluxofSyrianrefugees.WhileLebanon’sinternalsituation

isfarfromperfect(andperhapsdeteriorating),itisnotablethatLebanon,which

facedsimilarchallengestoSyriaoffragmentationinitspopulation,didnotsuccumb

tothekindsoflarge-scaleviolencethatplaguedSyriainthe2010s.Atthesametime,

theself-dealingbyelitestousepower-sharingarrangementsthatwereintendedto

makesureallgroupshadastakeinLebanon’sgovernmentthreatenedtocleave


71

elitesofvariousconfessionsfromthemasspublic.Thatcertainlyhascreated

openingforprotestmovementsin2019thatbroughthundredsofthousandsouton

tothestreets.ThisissimilartothewaytheSyrianprotestsinitiallyevolved,as

Hinnebuschargued:

Theshocktroopsofrebellionwereyoung,unemployed,deprivedpeoplewithlittlestakeinthestatusquo,widelydispersedandunknowntothegovernment,hencequicklyproducingnewleaderstoreplacethosearrestedorkilled.167Theroleforleaderlessmassprotestsissomewhatatoddswiththe

argumentsIhavemadeaboutelitepactsinfosteringand/orunderminingstability

andsuggestsanumberofimportantconsiderationsasweturninthenextchapterto

whyinternationalactorsmightcareaboutclimatesecurityconcernsoutsidetheir

ownbordersandwhatthepolicyagendaoughttobeinaworldwheremoreregimes

willbetestedlikeSyriaandLebanon.

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