Chapter 4 part 1(The Political Economy of International Trade)

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International Business 7e by Charles W.L. Hill McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Transcript of Chapter 4 part 1(The Political Economy of International Trade)

Page 1: Chapter 4 part 1(The Political Economy of International Trade)

International Business 7e

by Charles W.L. Hill

McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2009 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Chapter 6

The Political Economy of International Trade

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Agricultural Subsidies & Development

Rich Countries provides $300 billion as SUBSIDIES to farmers in their own countries.

EU has set the price of per ton butter at euros 3,282. If price falls below that then the EU would compensate the farmers in the form of SUBSIDY.

The US provides $0.70 to her farmers for every pound of cotton they harvest.

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Agricultural Subsidies & Development

This results in surplus production This surplus is then dumped in the world market. EU provides $4000 per acre subsidies to sugar beet

producers. EU farmers produce more than the EU market can

absorb The 6 million tons per year is dumped in the world

market. If EU stopped dumping then sugar price would increase

by 20%. This would benefit the South American economy by $ 40

million from sugar exports.

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Agricultural Subsidies & Development

US cotton subsidies reduced world cotton price by 50% since the mid 90s

This cost Brazil $640 million in lost revenues. In 2001 , Mali lost $43 in export revenues more than the

$37million it received from the US as foreign aid. An UN official said, “Its no good building up roads,

clinics, and infrastructure in poor areas if you do not give them access to markets and engines for growth.”

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Introduction

Free trade occurs when governments do not attempt to restrict what its citizens can buy from another country or what they can sell to another country While many nations are nominally committed to free trade, they tend to intervene in international trade to protect the interests of politically important groups

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Instruments Of Trade Policy

The main instruments of trade policy are:TariffsSubsidiesImport QuotasVoluntary Export RestraintsLocal Content RequirementsAdministrative PoliciesAntidumping Policies

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Tariffs

Tariffs are taxes levied on imports that effectively raise the cost of imported products relative to domestic products Specific tariffs are levied as a fixed charge for each unit of a good imported ($3 per barrels of oil)Ad valorem tariffs are levied as a proportion of the value of the imported good (EU tariff on Banana import from Latin America, 15 to 20 % for the first 2.5 million tons)Tariffs increase government revenues, provide protection to domestic producers against foreign competitors by increasing the cost of imported foreign goods, and force consumers to pay more for certain importsSo, tariffs are unambiguously pro-producer and anti-consumer, and tariffs reduce the overall efficiency of the world economy

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Subsidies

Subsidies are government payments to domestic producers

Consumers typically absorb the costs of subsidies

Subsidies help domestic producers in two ways: they help them compete against low-cost foreign importsthey help them gain export markets

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Import Quotas And Voluntary Export Restraints

Import quotas directly restrict the quantity of some good that may be imported into a country (US allows only certain firms to import cheese) Tariff rate quotas are a hybrid of a quota and a tariff where a lower tariff is applied to imports within the quota than to those over the quota Voluntary export restraints are quotas on trade imposed by the exporting country, typically at the request of the importing country’s government (Japanese exports of automobiles to the US in 1981 to 1.68 million.).Countries agree due to avoid more damaging actions. A quota rent is the extra profit that producers make when supply is artificially limited by an import quota (the Japanese gained $1 billion per year from 1981 to 1985)Import quotas and voluntary export restraints benefit domestic producers by limiting import competition, but they raise the prices of imported goods

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Local Content Requirements

A local content requirement demands that some specific fraction of a good be produced domestically Local content requirements benefit domestic producers, but consumers face higher prices.(India enforces this on cement import from Bangladesh)

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Administrative Policies

Administrative trade polices are bureaucratic rules that are designed to make it difficult for imports to enter a country These polices hurt consumers by denying access to possibly superior foreign productsNetherlands’ export of tulip bulbs to Japan suffered as they were all checked.France required all imported video tape recorders enter though a single small entry point which was poorly staffed.

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Antidumping Policies

Dumping refers to selling goods in a foreign market below their costs of production, or selling goods in a foreign market below their “fair” market value (the US accused EU of dumping Steel)Dumping enables firms to unload excess production in foreign markets Some dumping may be predatory behavior, with producers using substantial profits from their home markets to subsidize prices in a foreign market with a view to driving indigenous competitors out of that market, and later raising prices and earning substantial profitsAntidumping polices (or countervailing duties) are designed to punish foreign firms that engage in dumping and protect domestic producers from “unfair” foreign competition. The US imposed 9% and 4% tariffs on two Korean semi conductor exporters.

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The Case For Government Intervention

Arguments for government intervention: Political arguments are concerned with protecting the interests of certain groups within a nation (normally producers), often at the expense of other groups (normally consumers) Economic arguments are typically concerned with boosting the overall wealth of a nation (to the benefit of all, both producers and consumers)

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Political Arguments For Free Trade

Political arguments for government intervention include:protecting jobsprotecting industries deemed important for national securityretaliating to unfair foreign competitionprotecting consumers from “dangerous” productsfurthering the goals of foreign policyprotecting the human rights of individuals in exporting countries

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Protecting Jobs And Industries

Protecting jobs and industries is the most common political reason for trade restrictions : Japan imposed Import quotas on Rice to protect jobs in the agricultural sector.)

Usually this results from political pressures by unions or industries that are "threatened" by more efficient foreign producers, and have more political clout than the consumers that will eventually pay the costs .

(The EU applied CAP or Common Agricultural Policy to protect the politically powerful farmers.)

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National Security

Industries such as aerospace or electronics are often protected because they are deemed important for national security.In 1986 , the US semiconductor manufacturing consortium of 14 companies , SEMATECH, convinced the government that their product was vital to defense industries and so the US could not rely on foreign supplies for these. As a result the government provided $100 million per year as subsidies. It was withdrawn in 1996 only after the rise in demand for personal computers and Intel processors.

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Retaliation

When governments take, or threaten to take, specific actions, other countries may remove trade barriers. The US threatens China to face trade sanctions unless they impose Intellectual Property Laws. This caused the US millions of dollars due to piracy. After threats to impose 100% tariff on certain Chinese imports , China agreed to tighten its implementation of Intellectual property laws.

If threatened governments don’t back down, tensions can escalate and new trade barriers may be enacted.

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Protecting Consumers

Governments may intervene in markets to protect consumers. The US banned import of 58 types of assault weapons to avoid incidents of shooting in 1998 after such an incident took place in Arkansas, home state of the then president Bill Clinton, that killed four children and a school teacher.Austria and Luxembourg banned import of Genetically modified cotton seeds by Monsanto as they can cause genetic pollution.

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Furthering Policy Objectives

Foreign policy objectives can be supported through trade policyPreferential trade terms can be granted to countries that a government wants to build strong relations with.(US relations with Israel) Trade policy can also be used to punish rogue states that do not abide by international laws or norms.(US sanctions against Iran)However, it might cause other countries to undermine unilateral trade sanctionsThe Helms-Burton Act and the D’Amato Act, have been passed to protect American companies from such actions

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Economic Arguments For Intervention

Economic arguments for intervention include: the infant industry argument strategic trade policy

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The Infant Industry Argument

The infant industry argument suggests that an industry should be protected until it can develop and be viable and competitive internationally The infant industry argument has been accepted as a justification for temporary trade restrictions under the WTOHowever, it can be difficult to gauge when an industry has “grown up” Critics argue that if a country has the potential to develop a viable competitive position its firms should be capable of raising necessary funds without additional support from the government

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The Infant Industry Argument

Brazil had the 10th largest auto industry in the world with protection for 30 years. But after the protection was removed in the 1980s it turned out to be one of the most inefficient in the world.

But TATA is an example of government protection being fruitful.

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Strategic Trade Policy

Strategic trade policy suggests that in cases where there may be important first mover advantages, governments can help firms from their countries attain these advantages. (US govt. gave substantial R & D grants to Boeing which built the 707 passenger jet following a military plane)

Strategic trade policy also suggests that governments can help firms overcome barriers to entry into industries where foreign firms have an initial advantage. (The Japanese government provided research support in the 70s an early 80s to LCD manufacturers who ultimately beat the Americans who entered the market first.)

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Development Of The World Trading System

How has the current world trade system emerged?

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From Smith To The Great Depression

Until the Great Depression of the 1930s, most countries had some degree of protectionismThe Smoot-Hawley tariff was enacted in 1930 in the U.S creating significant import tariffs on foreign goodsOther nations took similar steps and as the depression deepened, world trade fell further

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1947-79: GATT, Trade Liberalization, And Economic Growth

After WWII, the U.S. and other nations realized the value of freer trade, and established the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) The approach of GATT (a multilateral agreement to liberalize trade) was to gradually eliminate barriers to trade

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1980-1993: Protectionist Trends

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the world trading system was strainedJapan’s economic strength and huge trade surplus stressed what had been more equal trading patterns, and Japan’s perceived protectionist (neo-mercantilist) policies created intense political pressures in other countriesPersistent trade deficits by the U.S., the world’s largest economy, caused significant economic problems for some industries and political problems for the governmentMany countries found that although limited by GATT from utilizing tariffs, there were many other more subtle forms of intervention that had the same effects and did not technically violate GATT

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The Uruguay Round And The World Trade Organization

The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations began in 1986

The talks focused on several areas:Services and Intellectual Property-going beyond manufactured goods to address trade issues related to services and intellectual property, and agriculture The World Trade Organization-it was hoped that enforcement mechanisms would make the WTO a more effective policeman of the global trade rules

The WTO encompassed GATT along with two sisters organizations, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)

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WTO: Experience To Date

Since its establishment, the WTO has emerged as an effective advocate and facilitator of future trade deals, particularly in such areas as services So far, the WTO’s policing and enforcement mechanisms are having a positive effectMost countries have adopted WTO recommendations for trade disputes

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WTO: Experience To Date

In 1997, 68 countries that account for more than 90% of world telecommunications revenues pledged to open their markets to foreign competition and to abide by common rules for fair competition in telecommunications102 countries pledged to open to varying degrees their banking, securities, and insurance sectors to foreign competitionThe agreement covers not just cross-border trade, but also foreign direct investmentIn 2005 , all the quotas on textile and apparel exports vanished.

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WTO: Experience To Date

The 1999 meeting of the WTO in Seattle was important not only for what happened between the member countries, but also for what occurred outside the buildingInside, members failed to agree on how to work toward the reduction of barriers to cross-border trade in agricultural products and cross-border trade and investment in servicesOutside, the WTO became a magnet for various groups protesting free trade

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The Future Of The WTO: Unresolved Issues And The Doha Round

The WTO is encouraging members to strengthen the regulations governing the imposition of antidumping duties(India , EU and the US benefit from such laws as they account for half of the antidumping cases between 2000-2002)The WTO is concerned with the high level of tariffs and subsidies in the agricultural sector of many economies (Agricultural subsidies cover agricultural costs: 64% in Japan, 49% in EU, 24% in the US, 23% in Canada.)

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The Future Of The WTO: Unresolved Issues And The Doha Round

TRIPS(Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) obliges WTO members to grant and enforce patents lasting at least 20 years and copyrights lasting 50 yearsThe WTO would like to bring down tariff rates on nonagricultural goods and services, and reduce the scope for the selective use of high tariff rates

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The Future Of The WTO: Unresolved Issues And The Doha Round

The WTO launched a new round of talks at Doha, Qatar in 2001

The agenda includes:cutting tariffs on industrial goods and servicesphasing out subsidies to agricultural producersreducing barriers to cross-border investmentlimiting the use of anti-dumping laws

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Implications For Managers

Managers need to consider how trade barriers affect the strategy of the firm and the implications of government policy on the firm

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Trade Barriers And Firm Strategy

Trade barriers raise the cost of exporting products to a countryVoluntary export restraints (VERs) may limit a firm’s ability to serve a country from locations outside that countryTo conform to local content requirements, a firm may have to locate more production activities in a given market than it would otherwise.(The Japanese automobile industry setup manufacturing facilities in the 70s and 80s to overcome such barriers)All of these can raise the firm’s costs above the level that could be achieved in a world without trade barriers

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Policy Implications

International firms have an incentive to lobby for free trade, and keep protectionist pressures from causing them to have to change strategies While there may be short run benefits to having governmental protection in some situations, in the long run these can backfire and other governments can retaliate