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Transcript of Chapter 12Slide 1 Oligopoly Characteristics Small number of firms Product differentiation may or may...
Chapter 12 Slide 1
Oligopoly
CharacteristicsSmall number of firms
Product differentiation may or may not exist
Barriers to entry
Chapter 12 Slide 2
Oligopoly
ExamplesAutomobiles
Steel
Aluminum
Petrochemicals
Electrical equipment
Computers
Chapter 12 Slide 3
Oligopoly
The barriers to entry are:Natural
Scale economiesPatentsTechnologyName recognition
Chapter 12 Slide 4
Oligopoly
The barriers to entry are:Strategic action
Flooding the marketControlling an essential input
Chapter 12 Slide 5
Oligopoly
Management ChallengesStrategic actions
Rival behavior
QuestionWhat are the possible rival responses to a
10% price cut by Ford?
Chapter 12 Slide 6
Oligopoly
Equilibrium in an Oligopolistic MarketIn perfect competition, monopoly, and
monopolistic competition the producers did not have to consider a rival’s response when choosing output and price.
In oligopoly the producers must consider the response of competitors when choosing output and price.
Chapter 12 Slide 7
Oligopoly
Equilibrium in an Oligopolistic MarketDefining Equilibrium
Firms doing the best they can and have no incentive to change their output or price
All firms assume competitors are taking rival decisions into account.
Chapter 12 Slide 8
Oligopoly
Nash EquilibriumEach firm is doing the best it can given
what its competitors are doing.
Chapter 12 Slide 9
Oligopoly
The Cournot ModelDuopoly
Two firms competing with each otherHomogenous goodThe output of the other firm is assumed
to be fixed
Chapter 12 Slide 10
MC1
50
MR1(75)
D1(75)
12.5
If Firm 1 thinks Firm 2 will produce 75 units, its demand curve is
shifted to the left by this amount.
Firm 1’s Output Decision
Q1
P1
What is the output of Firm 1if Firm 2 produces 100 units?
D1(0)
MR1(0)
If Firm 1 thinks Firm 2 will produce nothing, its demand
curve, D1(0), is the market demand curve.
D1(50)MR1(50)
25
If Firm 1 thinks Firm 2 will produce 50 units, its demand curve is
shifted to the left by this amount.
Chapter 12 Slide 11
Oligopoly
The Reaction CurveA firm’s profit-maximizing output is a
decreasing schedule of the expected output of Firm 2.
Chapter 12 Slide 12
Firm 2’s ReactionCurve Q*2(Q2)
Firm 2’s reaction curve shows how much itwill produce as a function of how much
it thinks Firm 1 will produce.
Reaction Curves and Cournot Equilibrium
Q2
Q1
25 50 75 100
25
50
75
100
Firm 1’s ReactionCurve Q*1(Q2)
x
x
x
x
Firm 1’s reaction curve shows how much itwill produce as a function of how much it thinks Firm 2 will produce. The x’s
correspond to the previous model.
In Cournot equilibrium, eachfirm correctly assumes how
much its competitors willproduce and thereby
maximize its own profits.
CournotEquilibrium
Chapter 12 Slide 13
Oligopoly
Questions
1) If the firms are not producing at the Cournot equilibrium, will they
adjust until the Cournot equilibrium is reached?
2) When is it rational to assume that its competitor’s output is fixed?
Chapter 12 Slide 14
Oligopoly
An Example of the Cournot EquilibriumDuopoly
Market demand is P = 30 - Q where Q = Q1 + Q2
MC1 = MC2 = 0
The Linear Demand CurveThe Linear Demand Curve
Chapter 12 Slide 15
Oligopoly
An Example of the Cournot EquilibriumFirm 1’s Reaction Curve
111 )30( Revenue, Total QQPQR
122
11
1211
30
)(30
QQQQ
QQQQ
The Linear Demand CurveThe Linear Demand Curve
Chapter 12 Slide 16
Oligopoly
An Example of the Cournot Equilibrium
12
21
11
21111
2115
2115
0
230
MCMR
QQQRMR
Curve Reaction s2' Firm
Curve Reaction s1' Firm
The Linear Demand CurveThe Linear Demand Curve
Chapter 12 Slide 17
Oligopoly
An Example of the Cournot Equilibrium
1030
20
10)2115(2115
21
1
1
QP
QQQ
Q
QQ 2:mEquilibriu Cournot
The Linear Demand CurveThe Linear Demand Curve
Chapter 12 Slide 18
Duopoly Example
Q1
Q2
Firm 2’sReaction Curve
30
15
Firm 1’sReaction Curve
15
30
10
10
Cournot Equilibrium
The demand curve is P = 30 - Q andboth firms have 0 marginal cost.
Chapter 12 Slide 19
Oligopoly
MCMRMR
QQRMR
QQQQPQR
and 15 Q when 0
230
30)30( 2
Profit Maximization with CollusionProfit Maximization with Collusion
Chapter 12 Slide 20
Oligopoly
Contract Curve
Q1 + Q2 = 15
Shows all pairs of output Q1 and Q2 that maximizes total profits
Q1 = Q2 = 7.5
Less output and higher profits than the Cournot equilibrium
Profit Maximization with CollusionProfit Maximization with Collusion
Chapter 12 Slide 21
Firm 1’sReaction Curve
Firm 2’sReaction Curve
Duopoly Example
Q1
Q2
30
30
10
10
Cournot Equilibrium15
15
Competitive Equilibrium (P = MC; Profit = 0)
CollusionCurve
7.5
7.5
Collusive Equilibrium
For the firm, collusion is the bestoutcome followed by the Cournot
Equilibrium and then the competitive equilibrium
Chapter 12 Slide 22
First Mover Advantage--The Stackelberg Model
AssumptionsOne firm can set output first
MC = 0
Market demand is P = 30 - Q where Q = total output
Firm 1 sets output first and Firm 2 then makes an output decision
Chapter 12 Slide 23
Firm 1Must consider the reaction of Firm 2
Firm 2Takes Firm 1’s output as fixed and
therefore determines output with the Cournot reaction curve: Q2 = 15 - 1/2Q1
First Mover Advantage--The Stackelberg Model
Chapter 12 Slide 24
Firm 1
Choose Q1 so that:
122
1111 30
0
Q - Q - QQ PQ R
MC, MC MR
0 MR therefore
First Mover Advantage--The Stackelberg Model
Chapter 12 Slide 25
Substituting Firm 2’s Reaction Curve for Q2:
5.7 and 15:0
15
21
1111
QQMR
QQRMR
211
112
111
2115
)2115(30
QQQQR
First Mover Advantage--The Stackelberg Model
Chapter 12 Slide 26
ConclusionFirm 1’s output is twice as large as firm 2’sFirm 1’s profit is twice as large as firm 2’s
QuestionsWhy is it more profitable to be the first
mover?Which model (Cournot or Shackelberg) is
more appropriate?
First Mover Advantage--The Stackelberg Model
Chapter 12 Slide 27
Price Competition
Competition in an oligopolistic industry may occur with price instead of output.
The Bertrand Model is used to illustrate price competition in an oligopolistic industry with homogenous goods.
Chapter 12 Slide 28
Price Competition
AssumptionsHomogenous goodMarket demand is P = 30 - Q where
Q = Q1 + Q2
MC = $3 for both firms and MC1 = MC2 = $3
Bertrand ModelBertrand Model
Chapter 12 Slide 29
Price Competition
AssumptionsThe Cournot equilibrium:
Assume the firms compete with price, not quantity.
Bertrand ModelBertrand Model
$81 firms both for
12$P
Chapter 12 Slide 30
Price Competition
How will consumers respond to a price differential? (Hint: Consider homogeneity)The Nash equilibrium:
P = MC; P1 = P2 = $3Q = 27; Q1 & Q2 = 13.5
Bertrand ModelBertrand Model
0
Chapter 12 Slide 31
Price Competition
Why not charge a higher price to raise profits?
How does the Bertrand outcome compare to the Cournot outcome?
The Bertrand model demonstrates the importance of the strategic variable (price versus output).
Bertrand ModelBertrand Model
Chapter 12 Slide 32
Price Competition
CriticismsWhen firms produce a homogenous good,
it is more natural to compete by setting quantities rather than prices.
Even if the firms do set prices and choose the same price, what share of total sales will go to each one?
It may not be equally divided.
Bertrand ModelBertrand Model
Chapter 12 Slide 33
Price Competition
Price Competition with Differentiated ProductsMarket shares are now determined not just
by prices, but by differences in the design, performance, and durability of each firm’s product.
Chapter 12 Slide 34
Price Competition
AssumptionsDuopolyFC = $20VC = 0
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
Chapter 12 Slide 35
Price Competition
AssumptionsFirm 1’s demand is Q1
= 12 - 2P1 + P2
Firm 2’s demand is Q2 = 12 - 2P1 + P1
P1 and P2 are prices firms 1 and 2 charge respectively
Q1 and Q2 are the resulting quantities they sell
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
Chapter 12 Slide 36
Price Competition
Determining Prices and OutputSet prices at the same time
202-12
20)212(
20$ :1 Firm
212
11
211
111
PPPP
PPP
QP
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
Chapter 12 Slide 37
Price Competition
Determining Prices and Output
Firm 1: If P2 is fixed:
12
21
2111
413
413
0412
'
PP
PP
PPP
curve reaction s2' Firm
curve reaction s1' Firm
price maximizing profit s1 Firm
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
Chapter 12 Slide 38
Firm 1’s Reaction Curve
Nash Equilibrium in Prices
P1
P2
Firm 2’s Reaction Curve
$4
$4
Nash Equilibrium
$6
$6
Collusive Equilibrium
Chapter 12 Slide 39
Nash Equilibrium in Prices
Does the Stackelberg model prediction for first mover hold when price is the variable instead of quantity?
Hint: Would you want to set price first?
Chapter 12 Slide 40
A Pricing Problem for Procter & Gamble
Scenario
1) Procter & Gamble, Kao Soap, Ltd., and Unilever, Ltd were entering the market for Gypsy Moth Tape.
2) All three would be choosing their prices at the same time.
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
Chapter 12 Slide 41
Scenario
3) Procter & Gamble had to consider competitors prices when setting their price.
4) FC = $480,000/month and VC = $1/unit for all firms
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
A Pricing Problem for Procter & Gamble
Chapter 12 Slide 42
Scenario
5) P&G’s demand curve was:
Q = 3,375P-3.5(PU).25(PK).25
Where P, PU , PK are P&G’s, Unilever’s, and Kao’s prices respectively
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
A Pricing Problem for Procter & Gamble
Chapter 12 Slide 43
ProblemWhat price should P&G choose and what is
the expected profit?
Differentiated ProductsDifferentiated Products
A Pricing Problem for Procter & Gamble
P&G’s Profit (in thousands of $ per month)
1.10 -226 -215 -204 -194 -183 -174 -165 -155
1.20 -106 -89 -73 -58 -43 -28 -15 -2
1.30 -56 -37 -19 2 15 31 47 62
1.40 -44 -25 -6 12 29 46 62 78
1.50 -52 -32 -15 3 20 36 52 68
1.60 -70 -51 -34 -18 -1 14 30 44
1.70 -93 -76 -59 -44 -28 -13 1 15
1.80 -118 -102 -87 -72 -57 -44 -30 -17
Competitor’s (Equal) Prices ($) P&G’sPrice ($)1.10 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.70 1.80
Chapter 12 Slide 45
What Do You Think?
1) Why would each firm choose a price of $1.40? Hint: Think
Nash Equilibrium
2) What is the profit maximizing price with collusion?
A Pricing Problem for Procter & Gamble
Chapter 12 Slide 46
Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Why wouldn’t each firm set the collusion price independently and earn the higher profits that occur with explicit collusion?
Chapter 12 Slide 47
Assume:
16$ 6$ :Collusion
12$ 4$ :mEquilibriuNash
212 :demand s2' Firm
212 :demand s1' Firm
0$ and 20$
12
21
P
P
PPQ
PPQ
VCFC
Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Chapter 12 Slide 48
Possible Pricing Outcomes:
4$204)6)(2(12)6(
20
20$206)4)(2(12)4(
20
4$ 6$
$16 6$ :2 Firm 6$ :1 Firm
111
222
QP
QP
PP
PP
Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Chapter 12 Slide 49
Payoff Matrix for Pricing Game
Firm 2
Firm 1
Charge $4 Charge $6
Charge $4
Charge $6
$12, $12 $20, $4
$16, $16$4, $20
Chapter 12 Slide 50
These two firms are playing a noncooperative game.Each firm independently does the best it
can taking its competitor into account.
QuestionWhy will both firms both choose $4 when
$6 will yield higher profits?
Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Chapter 12 Slide 51
An example in game theory, called the Prisoners’ Dilemma, illustrates the problem oligopolistic firms face.
Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Chapter 12 Slide 52
ScenarioTwo prisoners have been accused of
collaborating in a crime.
They are in separate jail cells and cannot communicate.
Each has been asked to confess to the crime.
Competition Versus Collusion:The Prisoners’ Dilemma
Chapter 12 Slide 53
-5, -5 -1, -10
-2, -2-10, -1
Payoff Matrix for Prisoners’ Dilemma
Prisoner A
Confess Don’t confess
Confess
Don’tconfess
Prisoner B
Would you choose to confess?
Chapter 12 Slide 54
Payoff Matrix forthe P & G Prisoners’ Dilemma
Conclusions: Oligipolistic Markets
1) Collusion will lead to greater profits
2) Explicit and implicit collusion is possible
3) Once collusion exists, the profit motive to break and lower price is significant
Chapter 12 Slide 55
Charge $1.40 Charge $1.50
Charge$1.40
Unilever and Kao
Charge$1.50
P&G
$12, $12 $29, $11
$3, $21 $20, $20
Payoff Matrix for the P&G Pricing Problem
What price should P & G choose?
Chapter 12 Slide 56
Implications of the Prisoners’Dilemma for Oligipolistic Pricing
Observations of Oligopoly Behavior
1) In some oligopoly markets, pricing behavior in time can create a
predictable pricing environment and implied collusion may occur.
Chapter 12 Slide 57
Observations of Oligopoly Behavior
2) In other oligopoly markets, the firms are very aggressive and collusion is not possible.
Firms are reluctant to change price because of the likely response of their competitors.
In this case prices tend to be relatively rigid.
Implications of the Prisoners’Dilemma for Oligipolistic Pricing
Chapter 12 Slide 58
The Kinked Demand Curve
$/Q
Quantity
MR
D
If the producer lowers price thecompetitors will follow and the
demand will be inelastic.
If the producer raises price thecompetitors will not and the
demand will be elastic.
Chapter 12 Slide 59
The Kinked Demand Curve
$/Q
D
P*
Q*
MC
MC’
So long as marginal cost is in the vertical region of the marginal
revenue curve, price and output will remain constant.
MR
Quantity
Chapter 12 Slide 60
Implications of the Prisoners’Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing
Price Signaling
Implicit collusion in which a firm announces a price increase in the hope that other firms will follow suit
Price Signaling & Price LeadershipPrice Signaling & Price Leadership
Chapter 12 Slide 61
Implications of the Prisoners’Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing
Price Leadership
Pattern of pricing in which one firm regularly announces price changes that other firms then match
Price Signaling & Price LeadershipPrice Signaling & Price Leadership
Chapter 12 Slide 62
Implications of the Prisoners’Dilemma for Oligopolistic Pricing
The Dominant Firm ModelIn some oligopolistic markets, one large
firm has a major share of total sales, and a group of smaller firms supplies the remainder of the market.
The large firm might then act as the dominant firm, setting a price that maximized its own profits.
Chapter 12 Slide 63
Price Setting by a Dominant Firm
Price
Quantity
D
DD
QD
P*
At this price, fringe firmssell QF, so that total
sales are QT.
P1
QF QT
P2
MCD
MRD
SF The dominant firm’s demandcurve is the difference between
market demand (D) and the supplyof the fringe firms (SF).
Chapter 12 Slide 64
Cartels
Characteristics
1) Explicit agreements to set output and price
2) May not include all firms
Chapter 12 Slide 65
Cartels
Examples of successful cartels
OPEC International
Bauxite Association
Mercurio Europeo
Examples of unsuccessful cartels
Copper Tin Coffee Tea Cocoa
Characteristics
3) Most often international
Chapter 12 Slide 66
Cartels
Characteristics
4) Conditions for successCompetitive alternative sufficiently
deters cheatingPotential of monopoly power--inelastic
demand
Chapter 12 Slide 67
Cartels
Comparing OPEC to CIPECMost cartels involve a portion of the market
which then behaves as the dominant firm
Chapter 12 Slide 68
The OPEC Oil Cartel
Price
Quantity
MROPEC
DOPEC
TD SC
MCOPEC
TD is the total world demandcurve for oil, and SC is the
competitive supply. OPEC’s demand is the difference
between the two.
QOPEC
P*
OPEC’s profits maximizingquantity is found at the
intersection of its MR andMC curves. At this quantity
OPEC charges price P*.
Chapter 12 Slide 69
Cartels
About OPECVery low MC
TD is inelastic
Non-OPEC supply is inelastic
DOPEC is relatively inelastic
Chapter 12 Slide 70
The OPEC Oil Cartel
Price
Quantity
MROPEC
DOPEC
TD SC
MCOPEC
QOPEC
P*
The price without the cartel:•Competitive price (PC) where DOPEC = MCOPEC
QC QT
Pc
Chapter 12 Slide 71
The CIPEC Copper Cartel
Price
Quantity
MRCIPEC
TD
DCIPEC
SC
MCCIPEC
QCIPEC
P*PC
QC QT
•TD and SC are relatively elastic•DCIPEC is elastic•CIPEC has little monopoly power•P* is closer to PC
Chapter 12 Slide 72
Cartels
ObservationsTo be successful:
Total demand must not be very price elastic
Either the cartel must control nearly all of the world’s supply or the supply of noncartel producers must not be price elastic
Chapter 12 Slide 73
The Cartelizationof Intercollegiate Athletics
Observations
1) Large number of firms (colleges)
2) Large number of consumers (fans)
3) Very high profits
Chapter 12 Slide 74
QuestionHow can we explain high profits in a
competitive market? (Hint: Think cartel and the NCAA)
The Cartelizationof Intercollegiate Athletics
Chapter 12 Slide 75
The Milk Cartel
1990s with less government support, the price of milk fluctuated more widely
In response, the government permitted six New England states to form a milk cartel (Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact -- NIDC)
Chapter 12 Slide 76
The Milk Cartel
1999 legislation allowed dairy farmers in Northeastern states surrounding NIDC to join NIDC, 7 in 16 Southern states to form a new regional cartel.
Soy milk may become more popular.
Chapter 12 Slide 77
Summary
In a monopolistically competitive market, firms compete by selling differentiated products, which are highly substitutable.
In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of production.
Chapter 12 Slide 78
Summary
In the Cournot model of oligopoly, firms make their output decisions at the same time, each taking the other’s output as fixed.
In the Stackelberg model, one firm sets its output first.
Chapter 12 Slide 79
Summary
The Nash equilibrium concept can also be applied to markets in which firms produce substitute goods and compete by setting price.
Firms would earn higher profits by collusively agreeing to raise prices, but the antitrust laws usually prohibit this.
Chapter 12 Slide 80
Summary
The Prisoners’ Dilemma creates price rigidity in oligopolistic markets.
Price leadership is a form of implicit collusion that sometimes gets around the Prisoners Dilemma.
In a cartel, producers explicitly collude in setting prices and output levels.
End of Chapter 12
Monopolistic Competition and
Oligopoly
Monopolistic Competition and
Oligopoly