Chapter 11: Externalities & Property Rights Part I.
-
date post
20-Dec-2015 -
Category
Documents
-
view
240 -
download
5
Transcript of Chapter 11: Externalities & Property Rights Part I.
Chapter 11: Externalities & Property Rights
Part I
Externality
An externality (or spillover) is a cost or benefit arising from an economic activity that falls on people who do not participate in that activity. Disposal of chemical wastes in a river (negative
production externality) Proving a mathematical theorem (positive production
externality) Consumption of Liquor (negative consumption
externality) Consumption of education (positive consumption
externality)
How effective do the private resolve the problem of externalities
Consider a doctor whose ability to examine patients is disrupted by the noise of machinery operated by a confectioner (candy maker) in an adjacent building.
Historically, the economic and legal view is simple and clear: the confectioner’s noise is harming the doctor and should be restrained.
Challenge by Coase (1960): The confectioner’s noise does harm the doctor. But if we prevent the noise, we harm the confectioner.
The Coase Theorem
Suppose the damage inflicted to the doctor is 40, while the gain the confectioner receives from operating the shop is 60. When bargaining cost is low, the same efficient outcome prevails (the confectioner will keep on operating).
If confectioner is liable for his damage to the doctor, he will pay the doctor in order to harass him. If not, the confectioner will simply ignore the doctor and keep on operating.
Coase theorem states that: When the parties affected by externalities can negotiate costlessly with one another, the efficient outcome results no matter how the law assigns liability for damages. (In the absence of transaction cost, ownership does not matter.)
Gain to the confectioner from operating w/o soundproofing: 60; soundproofing costs 20; loss to the doctor: 40; cost of negotiation: 25.
net benefit
legal regime
outcome doctor confectioner total
confectioner liable
confectioner installs soundproofing at his oown cost
40 40 80
not liable confectioner does not install soundproofing; doctor shuts down
0 60 60
In the presence of negotiation costs, the efficient outcome (confectioner to install soundproofing) emerges only when he is made liable for noise damage.
Is Coase theorem relevant?
Why the Coase theorem may not work in practice? Sunk costs--the one who initiates the
negotiation will have some cost sunk upfront. Transaction costs--costs of negotiating, writing
and enforcing a contract. Multiple parties--the issue may involve a large
number of people, and reaching an arrangement among such a large number of people is prohibitively difficult.
Some applications of the Coase theorem why smoking in public is prohibited but in private
is not?
why protecting freedom of speech when it could be wrongly used?
For a developer to build a hotel in the airspace above my land, he must first secure my permission. But the law permits commercial airliners to fly over my land without payment whenever they choose. Why this distinction?
Externality and Supply Curve
0 1 2 3 4quantity
Supply based on private cost only
Supply after taking external cost into consideration
External cost per unit of output=marginal external cost
Negative Production Externality Leads to Overproduction
Quantity (tons of Aluminum)
Pri
ce, c
ost,
an
d be
nefi
t (d
olla
rs/t
on o
f A
l)
C1
0
D
Supply when externality is taken into account
P0
P1
SC0
Q1 Q0
Supply when externality is not taken into account
Pollution cost(Externalcost)
Competitiveequilibrium
Point ofallocativeefficiency
Public Policy on Externalities
Government has a wide range of measures to deal with negative production externalities (e.g. chemical waste) Complete prohibition Quantity Restriction Pollution tax (Pigou tax) Marketable Permits Improvement in Pollution Abatement
Technology
Quantity Restriction vs Pigou Tax
Suppose there are two firms A and B each releasing 600 tons of wastes into water each year. And the government wants to restrict to a total of 600 tons each year. It could restrict each firm to release up to 300 tons of waste a year. (quantity restriction)
Taxes can be used to provide incentives for firms A and B to cut back on its production that creates external costs. For instance, levy a pollution tax of $20K/ton of waste. (Pigou tax)
Quantity Restriction vs Pigou Tax
Suppose both measures can achieve the 600 tons target. Then which is better?
Most economists think that taxation is better than quantity restriction.
Suppose the cost of abatement for firm A is $10K per ton and for firm B is $50K per ton.
Then each reducing to 300 tons of wastes requires a total cost of $10K x 300 + $50K x 300 = $18M.
Quantity Restriction vs Pigou Tax
Clearly, the least costly way is to let firm A do all the abatement. Total cost = $10K X 600 = $6M.
To implement this outcome, the government can levy a pollution tax of $20K per ton. Then firm A will do all the abatement.
Marketable Permits
Besides Pigou tax, government can also issue marketable permits to all involving firms.
e.g. Issue a permit to firm A and firm B, respectively, to allow each of them to release up to 300 tons of waste a year. Then firm B will buy a permit of 300 tons from firm A to release up to 600 tons of waste.
Market Environmentalism!!! Issuing marketable permits requires the least information on the part of government about the industry.
Currently used by the EU countries to control carbon dioxide release.
Part II
Public Goods and Common Resources
Nonrivalry and Nonexcludability
Non-rivalry A good is nonrival if the consumption by
one person does not decrease the consumption by another
Non-excludability A good is nonexcludable if it is
impossible, or extremely costly, to prevent someone from benefiting from a good
Public Goods and Private Goods
Fish in the ocean
AirCongested highway
Pure private goods Club goods
Common resources Pure public goods
Food
Car
House
Cable television
Bridge, Non-
congested toll road
Lighthouse
National defense
Non-cong. highway
Rival?Yes No
Exc
lud
able
?
No
Yes
Fisheries--Many fisheries have common access such that anyone can fish and no one has a property right to a fish until it is caught.
Many species have been driven to extinction. The catch of Atlantic cod fell from about 4 million tons in the mid-60s to about 1 million tons today due to overfishing. The tragedy of commons!
Common Resource
Case: Easter Island: tragedy of commons? Easter Island is a small Pacific island over 3,200 km
from the coast of Chile, with a population of 2.1k. Viewed as a major archaeological and
anthropological mystery.
Enormous statues, carved from volcanic stone. Many rested on large platforms at various locations on the
island largest “moveable” statues weigh > 80 tons the largest yet unfinished weighs ~ 270 tons
Easter Island
Easter Island
the culture seemed too poor to support a large artisan class
the statues were moved substantial distances; the population too small to move the larger statues
the island had no trees suitable for making tools such as levers, rollers, rope and wooden sleds
Conclusion: rising wealth and rising population, followed by decline.
Easter Island: Brander & Taylor (1998, AER) To explain: the cyclical overshooting on Easter
Island vs the monotonic behavior on the major Polynesian islands
All else the same: no a priori reason to believe difference in demographics, tastes, or technology.
The only variable: nature of resource. palm tree on Easter Island is a very slow-growing palm (40 to 60 years to yield fruit). It grows nowhere else in Polynesia, and probably the only palm that can live in Easter Island’s relatively cool climate.
Easter Island: Brander & Taylor
The two most common large palms in Polynesia are the Cocos (cononut palm) and the Pritchardia (Fuji fan palm). Neither of these palms can grow on Easter Island, and both are fast-growing trees that reach fruit-growing age in approximately 7 to 10 years.
Resource and population dynamics: slow regeneration
population
Resource stock
Year (A.D.)400 1900
Res
ourc
e an
d po
pula
tion
sto
ck
012
,000
Key parameter: resource growth rate: 0.04
Resource and population dynamics: fast regeneration
population
Resource stock
Year (A.D.)400 1900
Res
ourc
e an
d po
pula
tion
sto
ck
012
,000
Key parameter: resource growth rate: 0.35