Chapter 1

Chapter I

Chapter I

“I know of no problem more frustrating or more bedevilled by mean spiritedness and

lack of mutual confidence, or of a problem where all concerned would so easily gain

from a reasonable settlement”. 1

Brian Urquhart: The former Undersecretary-General of the United Nations

The Historical Survey of the role of the UN as a mediator in the Cyprus conflict

1.1 Introduction

According to Brian Urquard “more than 50 years have passed since the

internationalization of the Cyprus Question and the adoption by the United Nations General

assembly of resolution 814 (IX) of December 17, 1954”.2 The United Nations (UN) is still

working to solve the Cyprus question with a serious examination of its peacekeeping and

peacemaking operations. This chapter sets out to study the UN’s peacemaking efforts in

Cyprus from 1954 to 2001 and why UN peacemaking efforts failed to bring a peaceful

settlement to the Cyprus problem. The Chapter first examines how this protracted conflict

affected the UN’s peacemaking agenda’s response to its various periods. It is then to

consider why the two communities authorized, tolerated or opposed the UN involvement in

the Cyprus conflict. The chapter will also examine the failure of the UN efforts, which

originates from the intercommunal mistrust, the influence of the international community,

the politics of the great powers and two communities’ political aims and their relation with

the great powers.

These factors would be studied within the framework of the eleven periods of the Cyprus

Conflict: (a) The early UN involvement to Cyprus, 1945-1960; (b) The origin of the UN

presence in Cyprus, 1960-1963; (c) The UN’s Mediation, 1964-1965. (d) The

1 Brian Urquard, “A Life in Peace and War”, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1987), p.198.

2 Van Coufoudakis, the United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question, (The western political quarterly, Vol.29, No.3, Sep., 1976), p.457. For a detailed account of the parliamentary diplomacy of the 1954-1958 periods, see Stephen G. Xydis, 1954-1958, Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University of Press, 1967).

18

Chapter I

intercommunal discussions, 1967-1973; (e) The division of the island: the 1974 events in

Cyprus; (f) The Vienna talks and high-level agreements, 1975-1982 (g) The declaration of

the ‘TRNC’ and the draft Framework Agreement, 1982 – 1986; (h) The set of ideas and

Confidence Building Measures 1988 – 1994; (i) The New Actors: European Union

dimension, 1994-1997. (j) The reviving of peace efforts, 1997-2000.

Secretaries-General of the UN have been actively involved in efforts to solve the Cyprus

conflict since the 1960’s. Their peacemaking plans will be the primary focus of this chapter

but it is also to explore circumstances under which the UN became involved in an issue that

at first appeared to be a domestic ethnic dispute.

1.2 The Historical Background to the UN’s involvement with Cyprus

1.2.1 The early UN involvement in Cyprus, 1945 -1960

The mid 1950’s was an important historical period for the Cyprus conflict. It is

identified by the scholars as one of decolonisation and self-determination for the Greek

Cypriots. According to Richmond, “at the end of the Second World War the Greek

Cypriots expected that their old national aspiration of Enosis would be granted in return for

having fought on the side of the British”.3 The Greek word eνωσις (Enosis) means “union”.

It is primarily used to refer to the unification of Cyprus and Greece, and became a political

issue, and a goal of Greek foreign policy, during the years of British colonial rule in Cyprus

(1878-1960). The struggle for Enosis was derived from the concept of Megali the struggle

of the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire. Enosis was part of a much wider Pan-Hellenic

movement which aimed at reconstructing the Byzantine Empire under Greek Hegemony.4

The British Government in 1948 supported the idea of a constitution that granted equality

between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in the island. The suggested

3 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, “The Work of the UN in Cyprus-Promoting Peace and Development”, (England: Palgrave Publishers, 2001), p.4.

4 J. Reddaway, “Burdened with Cyprus”, (London: Weiden & Nicolson, 1986), p.14.

19

Chapter I

constitution would end the British rule in Cyprus.5 According to historians “the Ottoman

Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571 and administrated it until 1878 when she assigned its

administration to the UK by the Cyprus Convention in exchange for a tribute and promises

of UK defence in the Caucasus region against Russia. Upon Turkey’s entry into the World

War I, the UK annexed Cyprus. The position was internationally regularised by the treaty

of Lausanne 1923, whereby, in Article 20, Turkey adaptation of such a constitution would

end the British rule”.6 The suggestion was rejected by the AKEL party (The Progressive

Party of Working People) and the church. The AKEL party was established in 1921 as the

Communist Party of Cyprus. The Communist Party supported the independence of Cyprus

and opposed Enosis (union with Greece) which was the main aim of most Greek Cypriot

non-communists. The party became illegal in 1931 when the British colonial government

imposed restrictions on civil rights following a nationalist riot.

The rejection was the turning point in the history of the Cyprus conflict. Hubert Faustmann

stated that “ when faced with British intransigence concerning any change in the status of

the island and in the light of arrests of several politicians (mainly the AKEL partisans), the

Greek Cypriot leaders decided to break the deadlock and internationalise the problem

through the UN in 1949”.7 British Government was intransigent for two primary reasons.

Cyprus was a crucial strategic colony and an important passage for British troops. The

second reason was that it was against the idea of Enosis because of the loss of the other

colonies of Britain. It was incorporated into the UN charter that the Greek Cypriots wanted

to join with Greece on the right of self-determination.

The years from 1949 to 1952 provided hope and frustration for Greek Cypriot society. At

the beginning, all the Greek Cypriot political parties on both the left and right agreed to

defend the concept Enosis. Also on 5 December 1949, the Church announced that it would

hold a plebiscite on Enosis.8 This was a sign that the church and the political parties were

5 Claire Palley, “An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General’s Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004”, (Oxford, England and Portland, Oregon: Hart publishing, 2005), p.14.

6 Ibid., p.14.

7 Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.4.

8 Ibid., p.4.

20

Chapter I

unified to fight for Enosis. “The referendum was held in January 1950 and 95.7% of the

Greek Cypriot voted in favour of Enosis”.9

The plebiscite had a short life for three main reasons. The first reason was the political

divisions inside of the Greek Cypriot society. There was a troubled partnership between the

Church and the communist party, AKEL.10 Secondly even if the Greek Cypriot society had

found some support from the mainland Greek public and the mainland Greek politicians,

the Greek Government at that time did not support Enosis. Thirdly, it was not feasible to

obtain international support by lobbying the Greek Cypriot cause.11 Makarios was

Archbishop and Primate of the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church (1950-1977) and

first President of the Republic of Cyprus (1960-1977).12 He proposed that the only way for

the Enosis to succeed was for him to visit Athens regularly to organize mass rallies in

support of his and the Greek Cypriot cause.13 Eventually he succeeded and the Greek

government reluctantly gave its support to the Enosis. On 15 February 1951, the Greek

Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, gave his famous speech concerning the Cyprus issue.

“I am happy to have the opportunity to express from this official tribune to the Chamber and the

whole of the Greek people the demand for the union of Cyprus with Mother Greece, a matter

which constitutes the ardent desire both of the Cypriot and the Greek People.” The speech of the

Prime Minister of Greece Sophocles Venizelos on 15 February 1951 14

Until the early 1950’s it was almost impossible for Greece to make an official request from

the UN. The Greek Government changed its policy in 1952 and Marshal Papagos was

elected. His election was supported by the United States (US) and Britain. The US

9 Ibid., p.4. See Doros Alastos, “Cyprus in History: a Survey of 5,000 years”, (Greece: Zeno, 1976), pp.379-80.


11 Ibid., p.5.

12 Christopher Hitchen, Cyprus, (London: Quartet Books 1984), p.23. See Glafkos Clerides, My Deposition, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing 1992), p.25.


14 Ibid., p.5. See Ludwig Discher, “Die Zypernfrage: Dokumente XXXIII”, (Frankfurt: M. Alfred Metzner, 1960), p.28.

21

Chapter I

supported Papagos because he promised to put an end to a period of internal political

instability and the Americans advised Greece to adopt a majority electoral system.15

Papagos was newly elected and he did not want to take the Cyprus issue to the UN. This

attitude worried Archbishop Makarios who responded by increasing the international

pressure. From October 1952 to March 1953, he travelled to the US, UK, France and

Greece, holding the press conferences and asking for international support for Enosis. On

13 August 1953, Makarios sent a memorandum to the UN requesting that the Cyprus

problem be registered on its agenda.16 Greece wanted bilateral negotiations with Britain. At

the same time, Greece had used the UN for the first time as a forum but merely to announce

that it did not intend to use it as such.

Richmond argues that “by 1954, it was evident that Britain was not willing to discuss with

Greece the question of Cypriot independence and Enosis with Greece”.17 Archbishop

Makarios’ Enosis propaganda worked in Greece. The domestic pressure on the Greek

government increased. In mainland Greece pressure was being applied. Both Cypriot

pressure groups and opposition parties for Enosis were forcing the government of Marshal

Papagos to appeal to the UN. The Papagos government had no choice left but to bring the

Cyprus question to the General Assembly of the UN. The Greeks appealed to the General

assembly to terminate the colonial rule and accept self-determination on the island. The

choice of the General Assembly indicated that “it was the best for the existing international

institutions, in terms of its membership, proceedings, and public exposure, to present the

Greek Case”.18 Richmond stated that “the General Assembly then became a primary

political instrument in the search for bilateral negotiations with Britain”.19 At the same time

in Cyprus the EOKA anticolonial movement was initiated by General George Grivas.20

EOKA: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters]

15 Nancy Crawshaw, “the Cyprus Revolt: an Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece”, (England: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p.67.


17 Ibid., p.7.

18 Ibid., p.7.

19 Ibid., p.7.

20 Ford Jones W., “1959, Grivas and the story of EOKA”, (London: Robert Hale ltd, 1959), p.26. See General Grivas, “letter of 18 February 1959 to Averoff in: G Clerides, Cyprus: my deposition”, (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, Vol. 1, 1989), p.73.

22

Chapter I

was a Greek Cypriot military resistance organization that fought for self-determination and

union with Greece in the mid- to late- 1950s.

In this time, the EOKA Guerrillas were attacking the British forces on the island. The

General Assembly considered the Greek application during five sessions. The Greek

Cypriots also continued their propaganda to the rest of the world and the crucial European

organisations such as the Council of Europe. The Ankara Government and Turkish

Cypriots expressed their objections towards the Greek Cypriot campaign for the liberation

of Cyprus. In the late 1950’s the slogan Taksim (partition or double Enosis) was formed by

the Turkish Cypriots in response to the formation of EOKA. Taksim envisaged a popular

Turkish idea that the island should be divided between Greece and Turkey, which was seen

by the Turkish community as a compromise, as they had envisaged that should Britain ever

leave Cyprus, it would revert back to Turkey. Richmond stated that “The Turkish Cypriots

formed VOLKAN, later renamed the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) in which Denktaş

was reputedly involved as a founder member”.21 Denktaş was later became the President of

the de facto state Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and leader of the Turkish

Cypriot Community. TMT was a Turkish Cypriot terrorist organization against the EOKA

and Enosis.

From 1954 to 1958, the General Assembly considered the Greek government’s application

for self-determination of the Greek Cypriots. According to Dodd, “the British, as a last

desperate effort, advanced in 1958 the Macmillan Plan, a partnership plan that principally

provided for a Greek and Turkish official to work alongside a British governor, which

could lead to partition”.22

This plan was similar to a British political offer in late 1940’s. The plan would provide the

co-operation and participation of Turkey and Greece in a joint effort to achieve peace,

progress and prosperity of the island. The island would have a system of representative

21 Oliver Richmond, Doctor of Philosophy thesis: “Being Mediated Upon: The Cyprus communities and the United Nations 1964-1994”, (England: University of Kent, 1997) p.63.

22 Clement Dodd, “Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A briefing”, (England: The Eothen press, 2002), p.10. See Polyvios G. Polyviou, “Cyprus: the Tragedy and the Challenge”, (London: John Swain & Son, 1975), p.4.

23

Chapter I

Government with each community exercising autonomy in its own communal affairs. The

international status of the island would remain unchanged for seven years.

Macmillan stated that “the governor, acting after consultation with the representatives of

the Greek and Turkish Governments, would have reserved powers to ensure that the

interests of both communities were protected”.23 The British Government's proposal was

refused both by Greece and Makarios. The British government partnership plan principally

provided for a Greek and Turkish official to work alongside a British governor. Therefore,

“U.S attempted to blunt the impact of the Greek appeals on the UN assembly and this was

achieved by (a) the casting of negative votes on the inclusion of the Cyprus question in the

agenda of the General Assembly”.24 The rejection of the Macmillan Plan caused diplomatic

activity to shift to the UN. The Greek Government's new policy was based on an interim

period of self-government leading to independence under the UN auspices, “that status not

being subject to alteration without UN consent”.25

Stephen G. Xydis stated that “Archbishop Makarios informed Britain that he was ready to

accept independence with guarantees for the Turkish Minorities. The British stand had been

to stress that the solution they were seeking was one acceptable to the three Governments

and to the peoples of Cyprus and to achieve this end they were ready to enter into

discussions with all concerned at the appropriate time”.26

The Turkish Foreign Minister, F. Zorlu, stressed that “the right to self-determination or

independence should be given to both Cypriot peoples”.27 He explained that in Cyprus,

“there were two separate peoples but not a nation and consequently each of them was

entitled to equal rights vis-à-vis independence and self-determination”.28

23 Harold Macmillan, “Riding the Storm: 1956-1959”, (England: Macmillan, April 1971), p.67.

24 Van Coufoudakis, “the United Nations Peacekeeping and Peacemaking and the Cyprus Question”, (The western political quarterly, Vol.29, No.3, Sep, 1976), p.460.

25 John Reddaway, Op. Cit., p. 115.

26 Stephen G. Xydis, “1954-1958-Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation”, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University of Press, 1967), p.294.

27 John Reddaway, Op. Cit., p.115.

28 Ibid., p.115.

24

Chapter I

“The adopted final draft called for a conference between the three governments directly

concerned and the representatives of the Cypriots and considered that the self-government

and free institutions should be developed in accordance with the charter of the UN to meet

the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots. It urged such a conference to be convened and

that all concerned should cooperate to ensure a successful outcome in accordance with the

purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN”.29

The General Assembly, had considered the question of Cyprus, recalling its resolution

1013 (XI). The resolution expressed its confidence that continued efforts would be made by

the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter

of the UN.

Following this resolution Zorlu's personal approach to Averoff suggesting bilateral talks

between themselves was accepted by the Greek Government.

In 1958, the foreign minister of Turkey Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and his Greek counterpart

Evangelos Averoff agreed to meet to discuss the Cyprus question. Averoff accepted the

request and the discussions went ahead. In due course, both governments and the Cypriot

communities became involved.

The British had accepted with difficulty that they would have only bases in Cyprus, not

Cyprus as a base.30 Dodd stated “the Greek-Turkish talks reached fruition in Zurich in the

February 1959 in Zurich when bots sides finally reached on the agreement”.31 The

agreement was to form the basis of the Republic of Cyprus and Zorlu and Averoff came to

London more or less to tell Britain how it was to give up its own colony.


30 Clement H. Dodd, “Strom Clouds over Cyprus”, (Huntington: the Eothen Press, 2001), p.11.

31 See appendix 2 for the treaty of Guarantee and the treaty of alliance.

25

Chapter I

The Treaty of Alliance and the treaty of Guarantee were prepared with the basic structure

of the Republic of Cyprus divided into 4 different stages (see figure one).32 The Republic of

Cyprus was the partnership agreement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot

communities on the basis of 70 percent to 30 percent.

The basic elements of a constitution for the new Republic of Cyprus had been drawn up by

Greece and Turkey in consultation with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The

constitution established a president, vice president and veto powers in order to protect the

identity and the rights of the minority. The General executive authority was vested in a

council of ministers with a ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks. A House of

Representatives of fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately

elected by communal balloting on a universal suffrage basis. In addition to this the separate

Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control

in matters of religion, culture, and education. According to Article 78 (2) any law imposing

32 Metin Tamkoç, “the Turkish Cypriot State: Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination: figure 4”, (Lefkoşa: K.Rüstem & Brother, 1988), p.71.

33 Clement H. Dodd, Op. Cit., p.11.

26

32

Figure 1

Chapter I

duties or taxes would require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek

and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.34

The legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the

President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto on foreign affairs, defence and

internal security and other matters. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme

Constitutional Court, composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and

presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country. Britain requested permanent

British military bases on the island. Taksim (partition) and Enosis were banned according

to new agreement.

On 11 February 1959 the treaty was known as the London and Zurich agreements. This

treaty was signed by the new Republic of Cyprus with Britain, Greece and Turkey. The

Guarantor powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey, also guaranteed ‘the state of affairs

established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution’. Dodd stated, “they agreed if the

terms of the treaty were breached, to consult each other, whilst recognising that any one of

the guarantor states could if necessary to take action ‘with the sole aim of re-establishing

the state of affairs created by the treaty”.35 The crisis was over only for three years. In the

early 1960’s the intercommunal troubles resumed. Both sides reluctantly signed the

agreements. Neither Greek Cypriots nor Turkish Cypriots would surrender from their

political movements: Enosis and Taksim.

In the late 1950’s the UN’s involvement in the Cyprus question provided a new way for

states to settle their differences, police the world, and support decolonisation. Richmond

stated that “however the General Assembly was still divided between those who

encouraged a more active role for the UN and those who favoured a neutral stand and no

active international mediation”.36 The major powers, Britain and the US, managed to

prevent any UN involvement beyond a vague statement of support for further negotiations.

34 Dr Tuncer Arifoğlu, the General Secretary of the National Unity Party (UBP), private interview, the date of Interview: 8 July 2005, Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Cyprus.

35 Clement Dodd, Op. Cit., p.11.


27

Chapter I

The part-involvement of the UN in Cyprus at this time was based on the fear of many

member states of the escalation of animosities into a full-blown Greco-Turkish war.

There were other factors. Only the Greek side wanted the self-determination. Britain,

Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were against the idea of self-determination. The British

considered the UN involvement as unnecessary. They presumed that the UN’s involvement

would preclude it from siding with the Greek demands from the International

Community.37 The UN involvement was partly effective in the establishment of the

Republic of Cyprus by internationalising the Cyprus issue.

1.2.2 The origins of the UN presence in Cyprus, 1960-1963

On August 1960, Cyprus became an active member of the UN and the British flag

came down as Cyprus ended eighty-two years of colonial rule. Archbishop Makarios

became the president and Dr. Fazil Küçük became the vice president in the Republic of

Cyprus. Kyriacos C. Markides stated that “the Republic was established to last only three

years and it was unsurprising that most attached very little legitimacy to the new Republic

of Cyprus and hoped that the island would eventually be able to unite with Greece”.38

Turkish Cypriots accepted the arrangements. Groom argued that “In 1960’s the extremists

within both communities were working to try to bring about Enosis and Taksim, by force

of arms if necessary”.39

Many Greek Cypriots have claimed since 1960, including Makarios, that the ‘1960’

accords were forced upon them and they denied the right of the Greek Cypriot majority to

rule the island, a right to claimed on the grounds that the Turkish Cypriots were a

‘minority’, not more than eighteen percent of the population. According to Dodd, “there

37 The London Tripartite Conference in 1955 and Radcliffe’s constitutional proposals of 1956 were part of such strategic manoeuvres. Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.40.

38 Kyriacos C. Markides, “The Rise and the fall of the Cyprus Republic”, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977), p.88.

39 Professor John Groom, Professor of International Relations in University of Kent, private interview, Date of interview: 5 May 2005, Canterbury.

28

Chapter I

was also some dissatisfaction on the anti-imperialist left in Greek Cypriot politics that

Britain should still retain military bases”.40

The UN became actively involved in Cyprus after the constitutional crisis was sparked by

Archbishop Makarios on 21 December 1963. There was disagreement over certain

constitutional feature of the Republic-taxation, the creation of separate municipalities and

the legislative veto system. According to the Turkish Cypriot leadership Dr Fazil Küçük

the Vice President of Cyprus and Denktaş (Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber) these

problems led to a stalemate in communal and state politics. Repeated but unsuccessful

attempts were made to solve these disputes by the two community leaders. Eventually, on

30 November 1963, Makarios announced the thirteen-point amendments.

The amendments were consolidated to remove hindrances in order for the functioning of

the political system. The thirteen amendments included the constitutional improvements

containing the abandonment of the veto power by both the President and the Vice

President. Turkey, as a guarantor state, initially rejected the amendments. In the weeks that

followed tensions grew between the two communities. Turkey readied itself for a military

intervention. “At the last moment, the three Guarantor powers agreed to establish a joint

peacekeeping force under British leadership”.41 Following threats of an imminent invasion

by Turkey the United Kingdom stepped in to secure the observance of a cease-fire between

the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots in the fracas that erupted, by positioning its

forces in areas of high tension. The UK soon requested the UN take over.

As the British force was hampered by Greek Cypriot opposition because of their perception

of a link to the colonial period, a NATO force had been discounted by Makarios on the

grounds of Turkey’s significant role in NATO. Dodd stated that “while the Greek Cypriots

were determined to reduce the status of the Turkish Cypriot community to a protected

minority, the Turkish Cypriots sought the physical separation of the two communities”.42

40 Clement H. Dodd, Op. Cit., p.6.

41 Ibid., p.11.

42 Ibid., p.11.

29

Chapter I

The intercommunal strife continued on this issue. Turkey was anxious about the status of

the Turkish Cypriot community and renewed its threat to intervene.

1.2.3 The UN’s mediation, 1964-1965

On 4 March 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186, which

provided for: “(a) the creation with the consent of the government of Cyprus of a UN

Peacekeeping Force; (b) the composition and size of the force to be established by the

Secretary-General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece

and Turkey; (c) the functions of the force to be to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to

assist in the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal

conditions; (d) the force and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

(e) the force to be stationed on Cyprus for three months; (f) the force to be financed by

voluntary contributions; (g) a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General in

agreement with the four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and

an agreed settlement of the problem”.43

At the same as it established a peacekeeping force, the Council also recommended that the

Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties and the Guarantor Powers, designate a

mediator to take charge of formal peacemaking efforts.44 The force itself was to use its best

efforts to prevent a recurrence in fighting and to contribute to the maintenance and

restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The force came to Cyprus

for three months but because of the conflict in Cyprus, the force has been stationed in the

island for more than 40 years.45 Jose Rolz-Bennet was the first candidate for the position of

Secretary-General’s representative for Cyprus. Turkey rejected him due to his lack of

knowledge of the island’s affairs.46

43 Van Coufoudakis, Op. Cit., p. 464.

44 See appendix 4 for The UN Security Council Resolution (186) of March 4th 1964.

45 The definitive texts on peacekeeping in Cyprus are Michael Harbottle, “The Impartial Soldier”, (London; New York: OUP, 1970) and James A. Stegenga, “The United Nations force in Cyprus”, (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1968).

46 Ibid., p.11.

30

Chapter I

The UN Secretary-General U Thant decided to appoint a Finnish diplomat Sakari

Tuomioja. According to Richmond, “Tuomioja thought that Turkey would prefer Enosis

with concessions and had a little faith in the potential effectiveness of the UN peacemaking

mission”.47 The intercommunal violence erupted between the two sides in 1964 resulting in

Turkish warplanes bombing the Kokkina-Mansoura area in the Northwestern part of

Southern Cyprus. There was a war between Turkish Cypriots and the Greek commander

Grivas. Grivas wanted to invade the area in order to stop the Turkish Cypriots receiving

military help from Turkey. Therefore, Turkish fighter jet planes attacked Grivas army. The

US had a different perspective. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in early June, following another

Turkish threat to invade, Washington launched an independent initiative under Dean

Acheson, a former Secretary of State”.48 In July 1964, the Acheson plan was presented to

unite Cyprus with Greece, subject to the following conditions: (a) Turkey receives the

Greek Island of Kastellorizon, (b) two Turkish cantonments are established in Cyprus, and

(c) a military base is ceded to Turkey.49

The suggestion was rejected by Makarios. He argued that giving territory to the Turkish

army would be a limitation on Enosis. After the rejection of the first plan, a second version

of the plan was offered by the US. This proposed the following condition: Turkey receives

a 50-year lease on a base in Cyprus, rather than full sovereignty.50 This offer was rejected

by the Greek Cypriots and Turkey. The US tried to do more to convince both sides to find a

solution but no agreement was reached to solve problem under the Acheson Plan.

Ambassador Tuomioja then suddenly died on August, 1964. Galo Plaza Lasso was chosen

as a mediator by the Secretary-General U Thant. Polyviou stated that “Plaza supported an

independent and unitary Cyprus with effective protection of individual and minority

rights”.51 The Secretary-General on the 26th of March 1965 accepted Dr. Plaza’s 66 pages

report. It was argued that “Dr. Plaza described the 1960 constitution as a ‘constitutional

47 Oliver P Richmond and James Ker -Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.109.

48 James Ker-Lindsay, “EU Accession and UN peacemaking in Cyprus”, (England: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005), p.11.

49 Polyvios G. Polyviou, Op. Cit., p.47.

50 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.11.


31

Chapter I

oddity’ and could not help wondering whether the physical division of the minority from

the majority, which was sought by the Turkish side, was not a desperate step in the wrong

direction”.52 Plaza also stated that “The UN Charter and Principles also recommended that

the establishment of a truly independent unitary Cypriot state with majority rule and

safeguarded proportional rights for the minority”.53

According to UN officials, the Greek Cypriots were eager for Enosis and the Turkish

Cypriots were demanding a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. The Greek Cypriots

accepted the Galo Plaza report and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected it. Turkish

Cypriots and Turkey accused Plaza of exceeding his mandate and called on Plaza to resign.

According to Ker-Lindsay, “the Greek Cypriots also made it clear that if Galo Plaza

resigned they would refuse to accept a replacement”.54 At the end of 1965 Plaza resigned

from his post. The Secretary-General U Thant initiated the function of the good offices for

the two sides. Good offices involve little more than informal contacts and suggestions on

the part of the Secretary-General with the disputant.

1.3 The UN Peacemaking efforts in Cyprus

1.3.1 The intercommunal discussions, 1967-1974

The years between 1967 and 1973 are known as the normalisation period as a result of

the number of UN peacekeepers considerably reducing the intercommunal conflicts.

However the Turkish Cypriots were frustrated with the UN peacekeeping mission.55 The

Turkish Cypriots believed that the UN peacekeeping force sent to the island in 1964 was

ineffective and helpless in defending the Turkish Cypriot community against the Greek

Cypriots attacks. “In March 1966, a more modest effort attempt at peacemaking was

52 Ibid., p.42.

53 Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, “Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation”, (England: Palgrave-Macmillan; 1st edition, January 17, 2004), p.108.


55 The point of view was approved by Mr Akay Cemal and Mr Sabahattin İsmail. Mr Sabahattin İsmail, the journalist/writer of the Volkan newspaper, the private interview, Date of interview 17 July 2005, Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Cyprus. Mr Akay Cemal, The chief editor of the Halkın Sesi: [People Voice] newspaper in the North Cyprus, the private interview, Date of Interview: 15 July 2005, Nicosia (Lefkoşa), Cyprus. This interview was translated from Turkish to English.

32

Chapter I

initiated under the auspices of Carlos Bernades, the Secretary-General’s Special

Representative for Cyprus”.56

Bernades aimed to encourage the two sides to agree to a settlement through direct dialogue.

However Greece was enduring a series of turbulent political events that led to severe

uncertainty. The crisis eventually got out hand for both the elected government and King

Constantine II and ended dramatically in the early hours of April 21 1967.57

On 9-10 September 1967, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers attended two meetings

in Thrace. The result of the meetings was unsatisfactory. The Greek Junta declared Enosis

as a solution to Cyprus problem. The Turkish Government responded with the declaration

of rejection. Greece was now forced to abandon the idea of union for the foreseeable

future.58

In November 1967 the intercommunal violence resumed. Turkey bombed the Greek

Cypriot force in response to major attacks on Turkish Cypriot villages in the south of the

island. At the same time Greece decided, after the Turkish bombing, to recall General

Grivas and reduce its forces in the island.

The Turkish Cypriots declared their own provisional administration. Makarios rejected the

declaration and labelled it illegal. According to Polyvios G. Polyviou, “the Secretary

General, having heard various consultations suggested at the beginning of 1968 the

commencement of local talks in Cyprus under the aegis of his Special Representatives in

Cyprus”.59 The Secretary-General’s initiation of talks was supported by Greece, the UK,

US and Turkey. They were held between the presidents of the communal chambers,

Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktaş. “From the very beginning it was mutually agreed that

the aim of the local talks would be an exploration of various possibilities for the solution of


57 Richard Clogg, “A Short History of Modern Greece”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2nd edition, December 11, 1986), p.154.

58 Ibid., p.12.


33

Chapter I

the constitutional problem on the basis of an independent, unitary and sovereign state”.60

The four rounds of intercommunal talks occurred between 1967 and 1974. Ker-Lindsay

stated that “in the first round talks the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make several

concessions regarding constitutional matters, but Makarios refused to grant them greater

autonomy”.61

The second round talks were focused on local government issues and were unsuccessful. In

third round from 1970 to 1971 the Turkish Cypriots agreed to relinquish many of the

special rights obtained under the Zurich settlement, such as the veto right and the 70:30

ratio.62 However they aimed to create a state within a state and the setting up of two

completely separate regional administrations. The result of the talks was again failure. The

Greek Cypriots refused the suggestion of the Turkish Cypriots getting a completely

separate regional administration. The fourth round attempted to find a solution on

constitutional issues. The final intercommunal talks collapsed due to the events of 1974 in

Cyprus.

1.3.1 The division of the island, the 1974 events in Cyprus

In September 1971 EOKA-B was formed by Grivas. EOKA-B was the Greek Cypriot

fascist pro-Enosis paramilitary organization formed in 1971. It was supported by the ruling

Greek junta which came to power in 1967 having overthrown the legitimate Greek

government of George Papandreou. When George Grivas returned to Cyprus in 1971, he

created EOKA-B in response to President Makarios's apparent failure to deliver on the

policy of Enosis. He was angered by Makarios rejection of Enosis in 1959, and was further

upset when the President reaffirmed this position on his re-election in 1968. Grivas then

took the reins of EOKA-B, planning to overthrow Makarios and achieve Enosis through

violent means. Grivas returned to the island without the knowledge of the Junta in Greece.

From 1971 to 1974, Grivas repeatedly tried to remove Makarios from power. The

deterioration prompted Clerides to appeal to the US ambassador to Cyprus to persuade the

60 Ibid., p.44.



34

Chapter I

Greek government not to try to overthrow Makarios. In early 1974 Grivas was dead and

Brigadier Dimitros Ioannidis took the control of the junta. In July 1974 Makarios tried to

persuade the military dictatorship in Greece to leave the island.

Yet Ioannidis was determined to remove Makarios from power. In July 1974 he was

replaced by the ultra Greek nationalist Nicos Sampson. The Prime Minister of Turkey Mr

Bülent Ecevit flew to London to try to persuade the British Government to intervene on the

island. The American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the British Foreign Secretary

James Callaghan refused to join Turkey in attempts to restore the situation to that of 1960,

as allowed under the Treaty of Guarantee. According to Dodd “some Greek and Turkish

Cypriots believe that Kissinger engineered the coup that overthrew Makarios in order to

bring about the Turkish intervention and division of the island between two reliable Cold

War allies.63 Dodd states that “it is asserted, not without some truth, that Kissinger made

little attempt to stop the Turkish action, unlike President Johnson in 1964”.64 On 20 July

1974 Turkey launched the military invasion of the island. “The first phase of action

resulted, after fierce fighting, in the capture of small section of the north of the island,

including Kyrenia”.65As a result of the first intervention the three guarantor powers decided

to meet in Geneva.

At the same time the Junta regime in Greece collapsed. Turkey gave five days to achieve a

settlement between the two sides. Necatigil stated that “the Geneva conference ran into

difficulties on the second day owing to the conflicting interpretations of the UN”.66 On 30

July 1974 after five days of negotiations between the guarantor powers the declaration was

signed by three ministers of the guarantors’ states.67 According to the agreement the areas

controlled by the opposing armed force should not be extended and a security zone should

be set up.68


64 Ibid., p.17.

65 Ibid., p.17.

66 Zaim M. Necatigil, “The Cyprus question and the Turkish position in International Law”, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.82.

67 See appendix 7 for the Geneva Declaration (30 July 1974).

68 Zaim M. Necatigil, Op. Cit., p.83.

35

Chapter I

Additionally the Greek or Greek Cypriot forces should be immediately withdrawn from the

occupied Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The foreign ministers also agreed that the negotiations

should continue to secure the restoration of peace in the area and the re-establishment of

the constitutional government in Cyprus. On 8 August 1974, in Switzerland another round

of discussions was initiated by the Greek and Turkish representatives.

The Turkish Cypriots persisted on the geographical division of both communities in the

island. The Greek Cypriots, mainly Makarios, found this request unacceptable. On 14

August 1974, the talks ended in frustration.69 Within the hours Turkey continued its second

military operation in the island. Turkey invaded and occupies 36 per cent of the northern

part of Cyprus.

Joseph Luus, the Secretary-General of the NATO, sent a secret letter to the UN. According

to O’Malley, “the letter indicated that America was directly responsible for the coup by

EOKA B and for allowing the Turkish invasion take place”.70 The consequence of the

division was a disaster. “Following a Turkish military invasion in 1974 there ensued an

internal movement of populations with Greek- Cypriots fleeing south from the advancing

Turkish army and Turkish-Cypriots gathering in the north”.71 Today over thirty five

thousand Turkish troops are located in North Cyprus. According to Reddaway “history has

bequeathed to Cyprus a legacy of strife, in which the years from 1960 to 1974 have special

place. It has aptly been observed that the Turkish Cypriots cannot forget those years and

that the Greek Cypriots cannot remember them”.72

1.3.2 The Vienna talks and high-level agreements, 1975-1982

69 See the appendix 4 UN Security Council Resolution 357 (1974). See appendix 7 the UN general Assembly Resolution 3212 (1 November 1974).

70 O'Malley, Brendan and Ian Craig, “The Cyprus Conspiracy”, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), p.48.

71 George Yiangou, “The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order”, (European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) University of Cambridge, UK, Vol.2, 2002), p.2.

72 John Reddaway, “Odi et Amo: Vignettes of an Affair with Cyprus”, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), p.83.

36

Chapter I

On the Turkish Cypriot side, the Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration was

succeeded by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), which was proclaimed on 13

February 1975.73 “A democratic constitution was drawn up by the assembly, approved by a

referendum held on 8 June 1975 and published in the Official Gazette on 17 June 1975”. 74

The 99.4 percent of the Turkish Cypriots voted yes to the constitution. Necatigil stated that

“this was the interim constitution which left the door open for the creation of a federal

Republic of Cyprus of which the Turkish Federated State would be one of the

components”.75

In Security Council debates which followed the proclamation of the Turkish Cypriot

federated State of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot representative stressed that separation of the

two communities came about as a result of acts of the Greek Cypriots and that there could

be no return to the 1960 constitution. Physical separation was vital to the safety of Turkish

Cypriots. According to Necatigil, “The Security Council adopted resolution no 376 of 12

March 1975 without vote regretting the decision to declare the part of the Republic of

Cyprus would become a ‘Federated Turkish State’ ”.76 It was, in fact, noted by the

resolution that the proclamation was not intended to prejudge a final settlement.

In early 1975, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots had a number of meetings in the presence of

the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative at that time, Mr Weckmann-Munoz and

exchanged views concerning the basis for the start of talks on the substance of the Cyprus

problem.77 Both sides agreed to talk on humanitarian issues and the powers and function of

the federal state. On 28 April 1975, the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim initiated a

new mission of Good Offices.

73 Zaim M. Necatigil, Op. Cit., p.89.

74 Ibid., p.89.

75 Ibid., p.89.

76 Ibid., p.90.

77 PIO, “Cyprus Intercommunal talks: Following the Turkish Invasion of July-August 1974”, (Cyprus: Public Information Office Nicosia, July 1981), p.7.

37

Chapter I

Clerides and Denktaş decided to negotiate the humanitarian issues relating to the events of

1974 in Vienna. The territorial nature of the government issues was also discussed in the

Vienna meetings. At the beginning of the Vienna meetings the UN Security Council

adopted on the 12 March 1975 resolution 367. The resolution, inter alia, called on all states

to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the

Cyprus Republic.78

At these meetings both sides declared many proposals to the UN. During 1976 the

negotiations were constantly undermined by the issues of recognition for the Turkish

Cypriots while for the Greek Cypriots allegations of the forcible expulsion of Greek

Cypriots from the Turkish controlled area of the island were the dominant issues. In 1976,

the Secretary-General was unable to bring the Turkish Cypriots to make concrete written

proposals. The main obstacle preventing the negotiations from restarting remained the

unwillingness of the Turkish Cypriots to present proposals and the unwillingness of the

Greek Cypriots to negotiate without having some idea of what the Turkish Cypriot position

was.

The most significant step towards solid progress was the agreement worked out between

Denktaş and Archbishop Makarios. On 12 February 1977, Denktaş and Makarios met in

Nicosia. This meeting was organised by the UN Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim. Ker-

Ker-Lindsay stated that “on 12 February, The two leaders signed a four point agreement

confirming that a future Cyprus settlement would be based on a federation made up of two

states (bi-zonal) and two communities (bi-communal)”.79 According to High-Level

agreement “the territory under each side’s administration would be discussed in the light of

economic viability, productivity and land ownership”.80 The Central government would be

given powers to ensure the unity of the state. “Principles such as freedom of movement,

settlement, rights of property, were open to discussion taking into consideration the

fundamental basis for a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties”.81 An

78Ibid., p.12.


80 See appendix 9 for the High level agreement on 12 February 1977.

81 See appendix 9 for the High level agreement on 12 February 1977.

38

Chapter I

agreement was signed that Enosis and Taksim were officially ended. The Cyprus would be

reunited as a federation and that both sides would have their own zone of control.

On 31 March and 7 April 1977 the second series of Vienna Talks occurred. According to

Farid Mirbagheri, “during the second series of the Vienna talks, the Greek Cypriots

submitted proposals on the territorial aspect of the problem and the Turkish Cypriots on the

constitutional aspect”.82

The Turkish Cypriots offered the proposal of federation by evolution. The Turkish Cypriots

wanted an effectively autonomous state under a loose federal structure. The Greek Cypriots

claimed that the role and the function of the central government would lead to

confederation rather than federation and would further separate the two communities.83

The Turkish Cypriots claimed that the Greek Cypriot’s plan ignored the essentials of the

bizonality and economic viability. The second round of these discussions ended with very

little progress. On May 1977 Archbishop Makarios died and was replaced by the Foreign

Minister Spyros Kyprianou. According to Ker-Lindsay “the following November a new

twelve-point proposal was drafted by the US, Britain and Canada and presented to the two

sides by the Secretary General”.84 The plan known as the American-British-Canadian

initiative was aimed to establish a federation of the two states. The plan would allow the

Greek and Turkish Cypriot states to join under the weak federation.

The Plan had similarities with the Macmillan plan. According to Plan “the central

government would deal with foreign affairs, external defence, currency and central banking

interregional and foreign trade”.85 The states would take the responsibility for the issues

which was not covered by the central government. Mirbagheri stated that “a bicameral

parliament, the upper chamber composed of equal numbers of representatives, and lower

chamber proportional to the size of the two populations would be created”.86 The army size

82 Farid Mirbagheri, “Cyprus and International Peacemaking”, (London: C.Hust & Co, 1998), p.92.

83 Ibid., p.92.


85 Ibid., p.15.

86 Farid Mirbagheri, Op. Cit., p.93.

39

Chapter I

of Greece and Turkey on the island would be reduced to 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops.

This was similar to the 1960 agreements. The Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish

Cypriot Vice-President had the same right of veto on foreign affairs, defence and internal

security and other matters.87 The Greek Cypriots rejected the idea. They claimed that the

freedom of movement, settlement and the right to own property were not protected on the

basis of the plan.

The UN continued as a broker to find a solution to Cyprus problem. On 19 May 1979 the

ten point agreements was reached between President Kyprianou and Denktaş. The

agreement was the result of two days of intense negotiations chaired by the UN Secretary-

General. The 10-point agreements included a number of new provisions, such as

demilitarization and a commitment to refrain from destabilising activities and actions.

Famagusta is a city on the east coast of Cyprus. The city was occupied by the Turkish

military during the invasion of the island by Turkey in 1974. “Most of the modern part of

the city, known as Varosha (in Turkish: Maraş), was deserted, becoming a closed-off

military zone, something which persists to this day”.88 The Varosha problem would be

solved under the territorial and constitutional aspects. Then the new round of discussions

initiated in Nicosia failed for two reasons. The Turkish Cypriots did not want to discuss the

Varosha and the concept of bicommunality also was not agreed by the two sides. In

summer 1980, Secretary-General Waldheim wanted to reinitiate the negotiations between

Greek and Turkish Cypriots by putting forward a proposal for an ‘Interim Agreement’.

The aim of the proposal was the reopening of the international airport to civilian traffic, the

placing of Varosha under UN administration and the removing the economic embargo

imposed by the Republic of Cyprus on the Turkish Cypriots. The proposal initiated a series

of intercommunal talks. On 9 August 1980, the auspices of the UN Secretary-General is

special representative Hugo Gobi monitored the new negotiations. Four topics were

discussed in the negotiations: the improvement of the level of goodwill between the two

sides, the return and resettlement of Greek Cypriot refugees in Varosha, constitutional

87 Ibid., p.93.

88 See Republic of Cyprus government web page: www.cyprus.gov.cy (accessed 26 December 2005).

40

http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/

Chapter I

matters and territorial issues. The talks between the two sides failed due to a disagreement

on the term bi-zonality. Ker-Lindsay stated that “the Greek Cypriots insisted sovereignty

must rest with the central state according to the standard model of federation”.89

1.3.4 The declaration of the ‘TRNC’ and the draft Framework Agreement, 1982-1986

Javier Perez de Cuellar became the new Secretary-General in January 1982. Perez de

Cuellar found it useful to have frequent, top level meetings with the leaders of the two

Cypriot communities. In April 1982 in Geneva he met with both Kyprianou and Denktaş.90

He believed that the intercommunal negotiations were the best available method of

continuing the negotiating process. Thus on May 1983 the UN General Assembly passed a

resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic

of Cyprus.91

The Turkish Cypriots were angered at the resolution. They threatened to proclaim their

independence. Mirbagheri stated that “in August de Cuellar gave the two sides a set of

proposals for consideration that called for a rotating presidency, the establishment of a

bicameral assembly along the same lines as previously suggested and 60:40 representations

in the central executive”.92 The amount of territory to be given back by the Turks would be

8-13 percent, reducing the existing 37 percent to either 29 or 24 percent.93 In the eyes of

most Greek Cypriot politicians, this was nowhere near enough of a compromise by the

other side. Unlike in the 1960 constitution the legislature was to be bicameral rather than

unicameral and each community would vote for its own parliament.94

The Principles of the proposal were accepted by both community leaders- Kyprianou and

Denktaş. According to Secretary-General, “however despite positive development hopes



91 The UN General Assembly Resolution 37/253, 13 May 1983.


93 ‘The Aide Memoire Text’, Cyprus Mail, August 1983.

94 ‘The Aide Memoire Text’, Cyprus Mail, August 1983.

41

Chapter I

for settlement was damaged in a few months later”.95 On 15 November 1983, the Turkish

Cypriots proclaimed the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). The TFSC

(Turkish Federated State of Cyprus) was changed to the TRNC. The Turkish Cypriots took

advantage of the post-election political instability in Turkey, which was just returning to

civilian rule after a military coup in 1980. The UN Security Council passed a resolution on

UDI (Turkish Cypriot unilateral declaration of independence).96 According to the UN the

UDI decision upset the possibility of reaching a settlement. Denktaş rejected resolution

541. Ker-Lindsay stated that “in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General informing him

of the decision, he insisted that the wore was not intended to kill the settlement hopes”.97

He claimed that any future settlement would be truly federal in nature.

On 10 September 1984, the proximity talks began in New York. Three suggestions were

offered by the Secretary-General. These were confidence building measures, the structure

of the federal government and territorial adjustment. The new state would be established as

a bi-zonal, bi-communal and non-aligned federation. The Proximity talks offered similar

plans to those of the UN: the Turkish Cypriots would retain 29 percent of their federal state

and all foreign troops would leave the island.

In January 1985, the two leaders met for their first face to face talks since the 1979

agreements. However the draft agreement was rejected by both sides. Mirbagheri stated

that “Kyprianou insisted that the package was incomplete and vague about important issues

such as the time frame for the withdrawal of foreign armed forces, so he could not agree

until these points had been clarified”.98 The Turkish Cypriots appeared to be against an

immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops while the Turkish side began to modernise its

equipment.

Denktaş’s view was that Turkey should have intervened earlier than it did, and that he

could not afford to let the troops leave as a similar situation could arise again. On January


96 See appendix 12 for the UN resolution 541 (1983) adopted by the Security Council on 18 November 1983.



42

Chapter I

1985, the summit was concluded with no progress achieved. The Proximity talks had

collapsed. In August 1985 “Denktaş agreed to discuss the new version of the draft

agreement with the Secretary-General revised with the aid of Kyprianou but argued that it

contained more negative aspects for the Turkish Cypriots compared with the previous

version”.99 Therefore this time the Turkish Cypriots rejected the agreement. By November

the Secretary-General was able to report that “he believed that the two sides were within

reach of an agreement, although the leaders of both sides were less optimistic”.100 This was

to be expected since there was already a deep history of disappointment despite some

attempts at innovation by both sides. The Secretary-General was enthusiastic to continue

his peacemaking mission. On 29 March1986 de Cuellar offered a new Draft Framework

Agreement.101

The 1986 Draft Framework agreement in many ways was parallel to the failed January

1985 summit proposals. For example the issue of security and defence were left for later

negotiations of new defence treaties. According to Mirbagheri, “the legislature was the

same as that proposed in January 1985, but important matters would require separate

majorities for each community represented in the parliament”.102 The withdrawal of the

foreign troops, 29 percent of the amount of territory given the Turkish Cypriots,

independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, bi-zonal state in Cyprus was also presented in the

Draft Framework agreement.

“On the basis of the draft agreement of March 1986 Kyprianou accused the Secretary-

General of being influenced by the US favourable position towards Turkey”.103 There was

also controversy between the Cypriot Government and the UN Secretariat over the

Secretary-General’s proposals on the withdrawal of Turkish troops. Therefore, the Greek

Cypriots rejected the draft. The Greek Cypriots argued that the Draft Framework

Agreement on the removal of the Turkish troops, the three freedoms (movement, residency,

99 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17.Cyprus mail, 29 August 1985, p.1.

100 Ibid., p.17. New York Times, 15 December 1985, p.20.

101 See appendix 13 for the United Nations resolution the Draft Framework Agreement, (29 March 1986).


103 James Ker-Lindsay, Op. Cit., p.17. New York Times, 17 April 1986, p.10.

43

Chapter I

and treaty of establishment) and the question of the Turkish settlers was not clear. Also the

Greek Cypriots believed that the proposed structure of the state was of a confederal nature.

Further attempts to establish a solution to the problem failed. The following year Greek-

Turkish hostility in the Aegean Sea was tremendously increased which delayed the

peacemaking mission of the UN.

1.3.5 The Set of ideas and Confidence Building Measures, 1988-1994

In January 1988, George Vassiliou was elected as the new president of Cyprus. He

decided to use a new approach in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. There were also

certain improvements in the relations between Turkey and Greece. For example according

Ker-Lindsay, “there was the ground breaking meeting between Prime Ministers Turgut

Özal and George Papandreou in Davos, Switzerland”.104 In August 1988, the Greek

Cypriots decided to apply for membership in the EU. Denktaş was against the Greek

Cypriot application. Denktaş objected strongly pointing out that the so-called Republic of

Cyprus had no legal grounds to claim sovereignty over the Turkish Cypriots.

Denktaş also pointed out that EC membership would, in effect, bring about union with

Greece (Enosis) which the 1960 treaties forbade. In June 1989, the UN offered a new

document to the two communities named as the set of ideas. The set of ideas were rejected

by Denktaş who disagreed with the substance of the proposal. He disliked the idea of

presenting the formal plans to both sides. However, in February 1990 the two sides met

again in New York. Denktaş wanted the word ‘communities’ to be used in a way that

implied a right of self-determination. The Turkish Cypriots had questioned the UN

authorities and therefore its legitimacy and consequently Perez de Cuellar decided to end

the talks. On 4 July 1990, Cyprus formally applied for full membership to the European

Community. Turkey, which had applied for EC membership in 1987, was strongly opposed

to the application. A similar response came from the Turkish Cypriots. However, in

September 1990 the EU Commission accepted the Cypriot application.

In response to the EU Commission, Turkey and the TRNC announced a declaration to

introduce a customs union and the removal of passport controls. In 1991, the Secretary-104 Ibid., p.18.

44

Chapter I

General reported that “he was focusing on a new constitutional arrangement to regulate the

relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on a federal, bi-zonal and bi-

communal basis”.105 However the Secretary-General’s arrangements were rejected by both

sides. In October 1991, de Cuellar ended his efforts.

In January 1992 Boutros Boutros Ghali was elected as the new Secretary-General of the

UN. He continued to work on the set of ideas. Ker-Lindsay stated that “on 3 April 1992, he

presented the Security Council with the outline plan for the creation of a bi-zonal, bi-

communal federation that would prohibit any form of partition, secession or union with

another state”.106 Again, the Turkish Cypriots rejected negotiation on the set of ideas. They

argued that the UN was exceeding its authority. Furthermore the Turkish Cypriots

demanded direct talks with the Greek Cypriots without UN involvement. The offer was

rejected by the UN. However the Greek Cypriots accepted the set of ideas as the basis of

the negotiations without any preconditions.

Eventually the Turkish Cypriots returned to the negotiations on the set of ideas. According

to Dodd, “the Turkish Cypriots accepted 91 of the 100 UN proposals but they wanted a

rotating presidency, equality in the council of ministers, the rotation of ministers, the

removal of disparities between two states and the retention of 29% plus of the territory”.107

Ghali understood that too many conditions were being demanded from the Turkish side.

Ghali decided to approach the problem in a different way. He offered Confidence-Building

Measures (CBMs) for the development of goodwill. Five points were offered. These were

(a) reducing the military forces in the island, (b) transferring Varosha to direct UN control,

(c) reducing the restriction on contacts between the two sides, (d) undertaking an island-

wide census and (e) conducting feasibility studies regarding a solution.108

In February 1993, Glafkos Clerides was elected as the new president of Cyprus. According

to Ker-Lindsay, “Preelection hopes existed that the long standing relationship between

105 Ibid., p.19. New York Times, 5 August 1991, p.4.

106 Ibid., p.19.


108 See appendix 14-15 for the UN Security Council Resolution 789, 25 November 1992.

45

Chapter I

Clerides and Denktaş might enable the two sides to reach an agreement more easily were

seemingly confirmed when, shortly after the election, the two men met for dinner under

UN auspices”.109 On 24 May 1993 the CBMs were presented to both sides. The Turkish

Cypriots rejected the CBMs.

According to Dodd, “the main idea was for the area of Varosha on the east coast to be

ceded to the Greek Cypriots in return for the reopening of Nicosia International Airport”.110

The Turkish Cypriots feared losing its best bargaining counters. Greek Cypriots thought the

CBMs would give some sort of recognition to North Cyprus. At the same time the Republic

of Cyprus took a step towards joining the European Union (EU). The European

Commission (EC) agrees to start the negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. “Instead,

after noting that a settlement would further reinforce its European vocation, the

commission concluded that as soon as the prospect of a settlement was surer it would be

ready to start the accession process”.111

At the end of the CBMs Ghali blamed the Turkish Cypriots for the collapse of talks. In

January 1994 Clerides informed Joe Clark, the UN envoy, that “discussions could not be

resumed on the CBMs as Denktaş refused to move from the position that he had adopted

the previous June in New York”.112 A few days later Denktaş accused the UN officials

particularly the Special representative of trying to force him to accept the CBMs. Clerides

then stated that “he could not continue to negotiate on the CBMs as Denktaş still did not

accept them”.113

1.4 The New Actors and the UN’s evolution in the Cyprus Problem

1.4.1 The New Actors: The European Union dimension, 1994-1997




112 Ibid., p.20.

113 Ibid., p.20.

46

Chapter I

Henceforth Clerides concentrated on the issue of EU accession, the procurement of

arms and defence with Greece. At the Corfu European Council, held on 24-25 June 1994,

the EU officially confirmed that Cyprus and Malta would be included in the next wave of

enlargement. Shortly after the Corfu meeting the European Court of Justice forced

limitations on the export of goods from Northern Cyprus into the EU.114 The economic

activities were restricted to North Cyprus. The EU and Turkish relations were also

damaged when Greece blocked the final implementation of a custom union. According to

Semin Suvarierol “Therefore Turkey and the TRNC signed a common declaration on

December 28, 1995, which asserted that they only approve the accession of Cyprus to the

EU within the framework of a definite solution of the Cyprus problem”.115

In July 1996 the EU decided to open full membership talks with Cyprus six months after

the completion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Turkey reacted to the situation

with rejection. According to Ker-Lindsay, “Mr Murat Karayalçın, The Turkish Foreign

Minister, warned that the decision could lead to the permanent division of the island and

that any integration of the EU and the Greek Cypriots would be matched by Turkey and the

TRNC”.116

In August 1996, the most serious intercommunal clashes took places in Cyprus. “An anti

occupation motorcycle rally erupted into violence and eventually led to the death of two

Greek Cypriots. The fighting happened when a number of Greek Cypriot broke through

UN barriers and entered the buffer zone near the eastern town of Deryneia. There they

clashed with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot youths from the Grey wolves, a paramilitary

organisation. This led to the death of a Greek Cypriot. Soon afterwards, another Cypriot

was shot dead as he attempted to climb a Turkish flag pole.”117 The Greek Cypriots claimed

114 Stefan Talmon, “The Cyprus Question before the European Court of Justice”, (European Journal of law, Volume 12, Number 4, 2001), p.376.

115 Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union”, (Turkish Studies; Vol.4, No.1, 2003), p.59.


117 Ibid., p.21

47

Chapter I

to have identified the killer as being Kenan Akın, the Minister of Agriculture and Natural

Resources of the TRNC.118

In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) concluded the Titina Loizidou case.

The court declared that Turkey was an occupying force in Cyprus. It was a legal case

regarding the rights of refugees wishing to return to their former homes and properties in

Kyrenia. According to the ECHR decision, “Titina Loizidou was awarded around $825,000

dollars after ruling that Turkey had violated her human rights by denying her access to her

property in the Turkish-controlled north of Cyprus”.119 For many years, Ankara refused to

pay the compensation. According to commentators “the significance of this case is not so

much in its financial impact but in the political repercussions. The stunning victory by

Titina Loizidou against Turkey is likely to impact […] on the UN brokered talks aimed at

reuniting Cyprus […] No refugee and/or land owner will surrender their land to facilitate a

bizonal bicommunal settlement which will lead to the permanent division of Cyprus”.120

In 1997, the Greek Cypriots had agreed on a contract with Russia to buy S300 surface to air

missiles. According to David Hannay, “the missiles in question had a sufficient range to

shoot down Turkish aircraft taking off from their bases in southern Turkey”.121 On the other

hand, the Clerides administration denied the Turkish complaint. The administration

claimed that the S300 anti-aircraft missile system was bought for the defence of southern

Cyprus. “The Turkish government protested vigorously when the Republic of Cyprus

announced its decision to purchase Russian S-300 missiles with a range of 150km in

January 1997”.122 The International community observed the situation as presenting a

118 The Cyprus New Agency, 10 September 1996, Akin denied the claims: Aktuel, (31 October 1996).

119 ‘World: Europe Turkey declines to pay damages to Greek Cypriot woman’, BBC, 28 October, 1998, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/203362.stm (accessed 5 May 2007).

120 Ayla Gürel & Kudret Özersay, “The Politics of Property in Cyprus Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities”, Institutt for fredsforskning (International Peace Research Institute), Oslo (PRIO), PRIO Report 3, 2006, p.26. See Eleni Apeyitou, ‘The Case of Loizidou vs. Turkey’, Human Rights Action, 24 September 1998, emphasis added; available at http://www.hr-action.org/action/ (accessed 5 May 2007).

121 David Hannay, Op. Cit., p.70.

122 Semin Suvarierol, Op. Cit., p.59. “It is worth noting that Cyprus is the most militarized island in the world. For further information on this and the crisis over the S-300 missiles", see Madeleine Demetriou, “On the Long Road to Europe and the Short Path to War: Issue-Linkage Politics and the Arms Build-up on Cyprus,” Mediterranean Politics, Vol.3, No.3, (Winter 1998), pp.38–51.

48

http://www.hr-action.org/action/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/203362.stm

Chapter I

dangerous shift in the military balance of Cyprus. Hannay stated that “the reaction in the

North of the island and in Ankara was strong and the Turkish foreign minister in particular

made some extremely bellicose statements which implied, although they did not state in

terms, that force might be used to prevent the delivery of the missiles from Russia or

against them once deployed”.123

1.4.2 The Revival of Peace Efforts, 1997-2001

In Early 1997 Mr Kofi Annan became the Secretary-General of the UN. He decided to

soften relations between the two sides and reactivated the peace process mission. Kofi

Annan wrote a letter to Clerides and Denktaş to invite them for face to face talks. Meetings

were held in Troutbeck (New York) in July and in Glion (Switzerland) in August. The UN

Secretary-General adopted different tactics from those used in 1984-1986 and in 1992. The

UN Secretary-General did not propose a constitution this time. He tried to get both sides to

agree on principles that would provide the basis for a constitution. This was a courageous

attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. There were difficulties from the outset especially

over where sovereignty would be located The Greek Cypriots disagreed with the UN

suggestion that sovereignty emanates equally from the Greek and Turkish communities.

According to Dodd, “in Glion the UN changed its second draft Declaration mainly in

favour of the Greek Cypriot side dropping the shared sovereignty”.124 The Turkish Cypriots

decided to leave the meeting when the EU, towards the end of the Troutbeck meeting,

decided to open accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. This also encouraged

Denktaş to say “he was only going to Glion to make the point that he could not participate

in any meaningful way if the TRNC was not recognized as equal”.125

The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey forgot that the UN only recognized the legitimate state of

the Republic of Cyprus. The TRNC is a de facto state which is only supported by Turkey.

Dodd stated that “after the Glion talks, Turkey and TRNC announced that the two states

123 David Hannay, Op. Cit., p.70.


125 Ibid., p.31.

49

Chapter I

would pursue a policy of integration in the spheres of economy, finance, defence and

foreign affairs with a joint council to implement an agreement”.126

On 31 August 1998 Denktaş declared the confederal model as a solution to the Cyprus

problem. The International Community and the UN rejected the proposal. In December the

Clerides administration declared that the S300 missiles would be installed on Crete, rather

than Cyprus. After the huge 1999 earthquake in the south of Turkey Greco-Turkish,

tensions were softened. It was the year that Turkey broke the ice with Greece after years of

hostility which had often threatened to assume a military form. First Greece sent rescue

teams of doctors and nurses to Turkey. Then the Foreign Minster George Papandreou and

Ismail Cem agreed on a process of rapprochement.

In December 1999 in Helsinki, Greece lifted its veto against Turkey. Turkey obtained its

candidate status from the EU. The UN noted the positive movements between Greece and

Turkey and on 3 December UN decided to initiate the proximity talks in New York. Ker-

Ker-Lindsay stated that “even though the discussions continued through more rounds held

in Geneva and New York, by the fifth round, held in Geneva in November 2000, Denktaş

was increasingly critical of the role of the EU in the process”.127

On January 2001 Denktaş declared that he would not attend the sixth round of negotiations.

He again requested direct talks with the Greek Cypriots. In September 2001, Annan hoped

that the process of negotiations would start again but Denktaş rejected the request.

On 4 November, Prime Minister Ecevit announced that Turkey would not cave in to

pressure from the EU to reach settlement on the island. According to Ker-Lindsay, “If the

EU confirmed that Cyprus would join the EU Turkey would even consider annexing

Northern Cyprus”.128 This was the first time in history that the Turkish Prime Minister used

the term annexation in a direct manner. The EU decided to conclude the entry negotiations

with Cyprus and gave a 1 May 2004 membership deadline for the Republic of Cyprus.

126 Ibid., p.31.


128 Ibid., p.23.

50

Chapter I

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated the important historical events in Cyprus. There are many

phases where the UN tried to break the Gordian knot between the two sides. Since 1963, all

the efforts of the UN have ended in frustration. The UN was far more effective in its

peacekeeping function rather than its peacemaking mission. However some of the factors

necessary for a successful mediation were present in the peacemaking effort in Cyprus

between 1964 and 2001. Throughout the twenty-five years under review the peacemaking

efforts of the International Community centred mainly on the UN. The reader can also see

that the UN could not create an objective plan for both sides.

The crucial area of dispute on the Cyprus problem is clearly that of creating a political

system that satisfies both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Another factor is that of the time

factor. It is possible to observe that since the mid-1980’s finding a solution to the Cyprus

problem became more difficult with the 1990’s considered a time of deadlock between the

two sides. The Turkish Cypriot leadership managed to establish their state free from the

Greek Cypriot domination. The Greek Cypriots were aware that in fact the new Cyprus

would not look like the 1960 agreement. The main objection for the Greek Cypriot

leadership was the constant presence of the Turkish army, the property issues and the

Turkish settlers. On the other hand, The Turkish Cypriots always feared the issues of the

removal of the Turkish troops and the function of the new state.

The process was informal and flexible, and this suited the parties. The outside influence on

the Cyprus situation was also another major problem for the UN peacemaking agenda. The

US and its allies were very influential on both parties in the last 45 years. US policy on

Cyprus usually supported a prevention of the escalation of the conflict in shape of a Greco-

Turkish war. The British tried to secure their sovereignty bases. Russia throughout the

period under review tried to exploit the Cyprus problem for the furtherance of two main

objectives: to weaken the southern-eastern flank of NATO and maintain the independence

and non-alignment of Cyprus.129

129 See Robert Cutler, “M. Domestic and foreign influences on the Policy Making: the Soviet Union in the 1974 Cyprus conflict”, Soviet Studies, Vol. 37, No.1, January 1985, pp.60-89.

51

Chapter I

Nevertheless, Russia was not directly involved in the problem. In this chapter it is possible

to observe that the mainland countries had a great influence over both communities and this

disturbed the UN. Turkey enjoyed a more direct and uninterrupted cultural and political

influence on the Turkish Cypriot community. The Greece and the Greek Cypriots tried to

achieve Enosis but there were many interruptions to their agenda. The 1974 Military

invasion of Turkey of the island changed Greek policy on Cyprus. It is also possible to

observe that Makarios’ thoughts on the concept of enosis fluctuated. After the 1990’s the

EU factor also became an important catalyst for both communities. In the early 1990’s the

EU supported the Greek Cypriots. This was because of Denktaş’s rejectionist politics on

the UN peacemaking agenda and the confederal idea of a solution to the Cyprus problem.

However, the EU changed its policy in the 1990’s deciding to cooperate with the UN.

52

Chapter 1

Documents

Transcript of Chapter 1