CHAP I. THE PROBLEM W/ AMERICAN DEMOCRACY CHAP I. THE PROBLEM W/ AMERICAN DEMOCRACY A. FAITH -...

CHAP ICHAP I. THE PROBLEM . THE PROBLEM W/ W/ AMERICAN AMERICAN DEMOCRACYDEMOCRACY AA. FAITH - KEEPING. FAITH - KEEPING Americans chose:Americans chose:

- peace in ‘64 and got Vietnam- peace in ‘64 and got Vietnam

- law & order in ‘68 and got Watergate- law & order in ‘68 and got Watergate

- to restore an effective presidency in ‘76 - to restore an effective presidency in ‘76 and got a “crisis of confidence,” gas lines and got a “crisis of confidence,” gas lines and helplessness vs. a hostage-taking Iran and helplessness vs. a hostage-taking Iran

A. Faith - KeepingA. Faith - Keeping (cont)(cont)

Americans chose (cont)

- bold leadership in ‘80 but got a secret “arms for hostages” deal- prosperity in ‘88 and got a slump in ‘99- “the most ethical administration in history” in 92 and saw a president impeached on grounds of perjury and obstruction of justice

A. Faith - Keeping A. Faith - Keeping (cont)(cont)

Thus … the problem with American democracy is that it too often does not keep faith with the public

B. American Democracy Democracy divides and distributes

power much more broadly than any other form of government

B. American B. American Democracy Democracy (continued)(continued) With no single source of control,

tyranny nearly impossible in a demo.

Fragmentation and stalemated leadership and …

the consequent failure to follow through are much more typical of democracy

B. American B. American DemocracyDemocracy (continued)(continued) Fragmentation likely in the U.S. where

government was divided from the start Question: Is American democracy working? Answer: “No” or, at least, “not well

enough.” With weakened parties - the chief

instrument of democracy - American democracy delivers less dependably on paths the American public has chosen

B. American B. American DemocracyDemocracy (cont)(cont) Weak parties reduce the practical

consequences of voting The legitimacy of American

government suffers …. not because elected officials do not want to keep promises

but because they lack the means viable parties once provided

B. AmericanB. American DemocracyDemocracy (cont)(cont) With notable exceptions (?) , today’s

parties do not produce working governing majorities capable of keeping a promised public agenda

Nor do they have the power to curb special interests

As a result, victories of diverse interest groups have grab-bag effect on policy

instead of enacting a promised public agenda in recognizable form

B. AmericanB. American DemocracyDemocracy (cont)(cont) Participation declined in last 1/3 of

20th century Why vote if government does not

respond to “people like me” anyway? Feelings of cynicism and inefficacy

have increased Partisanship and the belief in the utility

of voting have decreased

B. Am. B. Am. Democracy Democracy (cont.)(cont.) The impossibility of holding officials

accountable = 1 consequence 2nd follows from the 1st: i.e.,

Democracy itself is an issue in the United States. - Democracy requires political institutions capable of proposing and insisting on public agendas and that, in turn, requires resilient electoral and governing majorities

B. Am. DemocracyB. Am. Democracy (cont)(cont)As coalition builders working parties: put the pieces together to achieve

majorities are the electorate’s means of making

and implementing public choicesWhen parties are weakened as

coalition builders power of interest groups increases … majorities do not drive policy-making

- - - - minorities do

B. Am. B. Am. DemocracyDemocracy (cont) (cont) Groups represent much narrower “publics” Governmental divisions + strong groups

+ weak parties = problems with American government’s :1. Efficacy of government

2. Accountability of government

3. Legitimacy of government

B. Am. B. Am. DemocracyDemocracy(cont)(cont) One could argue that

popular sovereignty in United States centers NOT in the public or electorate…

…but in the organized public (i.e., universe of interest group constituencies)

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism and Elitism Pluralism and Elitism Democracy = making and

implementation of public choices through majoritarian means

Democracy may be direct or indirect (define.)

Necessarily indirect in the United States ... (Why?)

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) Indirect democracy leads readily

lead to pluralism Pluralism = the

competition over policy between organized groups

Many would consider pluralism part & parcel of democracy

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) BUT … pluralism responds to the

organized public democracy responds to the

general, or at least the attentive, public - especially as represented through electoral and public opinion processes

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) The organized public is a subset of

the general or attentive public BUT … the organized public is more

advantaged demographically …. … and so, advantaged psychologically

and, … and so, more involved politically ERGO: two publics are not the same

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism Pluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) Political associations (i.e., groups) are

a legitimate part of pluralist democracy Groups specialize in the vital function of

interest articulation = expression of support, expectations, needs, interests, preferences & demands to government

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism Pluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) BUT … the group’s leadership - usually an

oligarchy - may act more on its own than out of responsiveness to the organized public or even to its own constituency

In that case, the oligarchy replaces the group and pluralism moves toward elitism

Political Elitism = the development of public policy by oligarchies

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & Elitism Pluralism & Elitism (cont)(cont) Pluralism and elitism merge as

interest group oligarchies or elites articulate interests not just to and from their own members, ….

… but directly to public policy elites or oligarchies (e.g., ?) who make policy

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) American government - like any

other government - is not wholly democratic nor pluralist nor elitist

Rather … some issues are addressed by democratic process, others by pluralism, others by elitism and still others by some combinations or blends

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) e.g.,

- Who shall lead and with what agenda? resolved democratically

- Policies having to do with various group stakes resolved pluralistically

- Policy oligarchies (elites) determine the most specific policies …. unless …...

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont)

Unless …. (continued)

- the oligarchy or elite represents a coalition - the broader the array of interest represented…the broader the oligarchy’s policy concerns- may then enact policy agendas - coalitional elites may represent a majority

C. Democracy, C. Democracy, Pluralism & ElitismPluralism & Elitism (cont) (cont) 1992 and ‘94 elections looked like

democracy or majoritarianism in action Public to Clinton: restore the economy BUT public expected moderate policies Promise re economy seemed to be

kept BUT public got liberal spending (e.g.,

health care proposals) initially


In apparent attempt to correct Clinton’s expensive, leftward leanings, public elected opposition party to Congress in 1994

BUT … 1994 results can just as easily be described as pluralism in action.

Republican members of Congress had convinced interests to switch contributions to Republican candidates for Congress


It is difficult for a president to keep promises if pluralist and elitist elements in decision-making (d/m) supplant the majoritarian election processes organized by parties

P.S.: 2000 election was extremely partisan - but can pres keep promises?

1. 1. TwoTwo MandatesMandates Compounding the difficulties

that arise from pluralism and/ or elitism is that the president must respond not to one but to TWO mandates:

One DOMESTIC the other INTERNATIONAL

1. Two 1. Two Mandates Mandates (cont)(cont) It is to this double mandate - NOT

to a specific promise - that the public holds presidents to account

Public will forgive breaking 1 or several promises

BUT it will NOT forgive breaching the domestic NOR international mandate

1. Two 1. Two Mandates Mandates (cont)(cont) In the last 1/3 of the 20th century

a less partisan and more evaluative public has required a passing grade on both agenda tests for a president to be returned to office

1. Two Mandates 1. Two Mandates (cont) (cont)

Since Eisenhower (1952 - 1960) only two have earned passing marks on both tests

Both unable to keep specific promises (Reagan: balanced budget, Clinton: health care reform)

(JFK did not get the chance) Both RR & WJC were judged to have kept

faith w/ public expectations domestically and internationally (not always the personal faith - e.g. Lewinskygate)

1. Two 1. Two Mandates Mandates (cont)(cont) Today’s public can be very supportive of

a president judged to keep 2 mandates RR reelected & helped successor, Bush (R) WJC reelected in 1996 plus his party

gained 5 seats in the mid-term elections of 1998 during impeachment of him by Republican Congress

1.Two Mandates 1.Two Mandates BUT … public in last 1/3 of 20th swift to punish

for failing to keep faith with either mandate LBJ passed domestic but failed international

test RMN was the other way around GF healed but pardoned domestically JC failed both Domestic & International tests GHWB passed “big I” but failed “big D”

(Public classic: What have you done for me lately?)

“Dubya”??

2. 2. Partisanship and Political Partisanship and Political ConsumerismConsumerism Weak partisanship results in “shopping” ..

.. discarding of incumbent presidents Voter/shoppers may “buy” 1 candidate’s

appeal over another whatever “brand” (i.e., party) label

Results : change over continuity in gov. more than in more partisan eras and …...

2. 2. Partisanship & Political Partisanship & Political Consumerism Consumerism (cont)(cont) …. and (continued), in today’s

“fix-it,” technocratic society, the public expects presidents to solve problems (i.e., lead) BUT ..

without supplying structured and dependable (i.e., partisan) support to do so

2. 2. Partisanship & Pol.Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Public mandates would be easier for

pres to honor if public more inclined to stick with a party choice

BUT … w/ decline of partisanship in the last 1/3, 2nd terms were rarer than in middle 1/3 (‘32 - ‘64: Democratic) or the first 1/3 (1900 - ‘32: Republican)

2. 2. Partisanship & Pol.Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) A more apartisan and evaluative

public disposed to judge a president as failing either at home or abroad or both

Also less likely to empower a winning candidate as president with a partisan maj. in the leg. to enact their promises

2. 2. Partisanship & Pol. Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Increasingly, dividing vote meant

divided government 5 of last 7 presidents (prior to

Dubya) have faced opposition Congresses during all or parts of their term(s)

(i.e., Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush & Clinton) Dubya may in 2004

2. 2. Partisanship & Pol. Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Contrast: in 1st 2/3 of 20th only 2

of 9 pres.s were frustrated in staying pres

Hoover was defeated in 1932 Truman would have lost in 1952 had

he chosen to run Two presidents died prior to running

a 2nd time (Harding and Kennedy)

2. 2. Partisanship & Pol. Partisanship & Pol. ConsumerismConsumerism (cont) (cont) Only 3 of 9 presidents in the 1st

2/3 of 20th faced opposition Congresses for all or part of their term(s)

i.e., Woodrow Wilson, Truman S Truman and Dwight David Eisenhower

3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong Parties and Strong GroupsGroups Interest Groups operate in a widened

sphere of influence when parties fail to organize consistent, resilient majorities

Fluidity in public support for parties leads to policy-making w/o clear pattern

… groups pursue particular and diverse goals not public mandates nor party agendas (grab bag not agenda politics)

3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong GroupsParties and Strong Groups (cont) (cont) In 1992 candidate Clinton promised the public affordable health care rates.

BUT coalition of anti’s nickeled & dimed

Every bill in Congress is time limited Pressure groups compromised &

delayed health care bill to death.

3.3. Weak Weak Parties and Strong GroupsParties and Strong Groups (cont) (cont) Moreover, 1 group coalition may

win only to see opposing coalition win the same issue the next time.

e.g., organized labor got a minimum wage increase in November of 1997.

Clinton tried to give them another when he needed political support (“Lewinskygate”)

3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong Groups Parties and Strong Groups (cont) (cont) A conservative coalition defeated the

2nd attempt to raise labor’s wages So… policy zigzagged in 1 year

because of shifting fortunes & the resultant opportunism of groups coalitions

Little sign of a public or party agenda

3. Weak 3. Weak Parties and Strong GroupsParties and Strong Groups (cont)(cont) In U. S., pluralism/elitism largely supplanted

majoritarianism in policy-making… .. due to party/group imbalance (mediation) Narrowly based group power fills the vaccuum

left by weak parties - minoritarianism Historically parties - more than groups -

have been chief link between public majorities and gov policy-making elites

4. Prospects 4. Prospects Party/Group RedressParty/Group Redress What are prospects for solving

mediation problem (strong groups / weak parties)?

One possibility: Restore Parties That would check groups somewhat

and improve majoritarianism. But is it possible?

4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Partyfor Party/ / Group RedressGroup Redress (cont)(cont) Historically, parties achieve new

life via new mandates stemming from realigning issues

i.e., a “realigning” election (e.g., 1800, 1828, 1860, 1896 & 1936)

electorate’s partisanship & voting predispositions were realigned by such elections for the next 28 – 36 yrs

4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Party for Party / / Group RedressGroup Redress (cont)(cont) May never be another nat. realignment :- power of media in mediation- multiplication of primaries- finance reforms & individualization of candidate donor bases - candidate more than party-centered

campaigns

4. 4. Prospects for Party Prospects for Party // Group Group RedressRedress (cont) (cont) More than party cues, TV transmits

candidate appeals into voter/ viewer’s home

Political consumers less loyal to a party “brand” than traditional partisan voters

Results: one-term presidencies, divided gov’ent and policy-making NOT constrained by a majority agenda

4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Party for Party / / Group Redress Group Redress

SO… democratic and majoritarian politics have lost ground to pluralism & elitism

At times, policy-making is driven by elect/gov majority w/ policy agenda ...

But … often the result of various groups articulating demands to responsive elites in government especially mid-term

4. Prospects 4. Prospects for Party for Party // Group RedressGroup Redress (cont)(cont) chief instrument of democracy =

party Party must regain strength if

majoritar - ianism to be revitalized Realignment less likely today than in

past (why?) Alternative Scenaro: “New Machines”

5. The 5. The “New Machines”“New Machines” A theory: The New Machines A set of new oligarchies in

government will emerge called the- “President’s Party”- “Speaker’s Party” and …- “Majority Leader’s Party.

These would be the “new machines.”

5. The “New 5. The “New Machines” Machines”

(cont)(cont) Like old party machines, new machines would have resources to influence office seeking & so office holding

How? … By putting party and group

resources (i.e., #’s & $’s) together.

Examples ------ ?

D. D. Structural/FunctionalisStructural/Functionalis

mm 1. The Point is Decision

• Politics stresses decision-making

• government the implementation of decisions

•Decision-making plus decision - implementation = leadership within social collectivities

2. Political 2. Political Functions Functions and and StructuresStructures So pol or gov functions = activities involved in making or implementing decisions for social collectivities.

Pol or gov structure (or agency, institution, organization, etc.) = adaptive yet patterned behavior affecting decision- making & implementation over time

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & StructuresStructures (cont)(cont) For every function there is

structure(s) many structures perform several

functions as society changes, structures (etc.)

evolve to ensure decision-making and implementation (i.e., patterned yet adaptive)

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont)Political Socialization Function : = learning pol. relevant attitudes &

behavior = induction of individuals into citizenry … collectively creates political culture Socialization Structures = family, peer

group, church, media, formal & informal associations, parties, etc.

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Recruitment Function = special form

of socialization - goes beyond citizenship

… inducts people into specialized political or governmental roles

Structures = election systems, parties, groups, bureaucratic exams, appointive processes & co-option (?) into pol/gov structures

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Communication Function = dissemination of pol info or propaganda

Structures of Political Communications: e.g. formal (?) or informal (?) media

via primary (?) AND secondary or reference groups (?)

e.g., parties or interest associations

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Interest Aggregation Function = activities that combine interests into coalition that determines leaders & paths in social collectivities

Elect & gov coalitions - majorities may be formed thru interest aggregation. If so …

insures majority rule or majoritarianism

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & StructuresStructures (cont) (cont) Structures: interest aggregation =

central party function since 1790s Other institutions: temporary or

“per issue” coalitions of groups. BUT …

…. latter are temporary and … … have less behavioral constraint or

pattern (little commitment to public policy agendas)

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & Structures& Structures (cont)(cont) Function: Interest Articulation = act’s

that express demands for policies It is via interest articulation that

leaders learn of constituent needs AND …

minority rights are protected Structures: interest group’s primary

function, other structures ____ ???

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Parties share in function of interest

articulation to some degree BUT … interest aggregation & articulation

are negatively related parties have broad (inclusive)

membership base SO... if they get too specific (articulate) about policy their coalition will divide

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) Groups have a narrow (exclusive) base If groups stress aggregation more than

articulation they become too broadly structured to get specific about policy

Ergo: inclusive parties specialize in interest aggregation and exclusive groups in interest aggregation

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & Structures& Structures

(cont)(cont) Structures & Functions of political social., recruitment, communication, interest aggregation and interest articulation together = overarching function of political mediation

Political mediation = linkages of support, expectations and demands from society to government

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & StructuresStructures (cont)(cont) Rule-Making, rule-application and rule - adjudication are phases in transition from decision-making to decision-implement.

Handled respectively - but not exclusively - by leg., exec. and jud. branches

all occur w/i broad process of converting societal inputs into governmental outputs

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) rule-making, -application & adjudication together = conversion function.

Gov’tal elites (oligarchies) perform the conversion function. (e.g., __?)

Parties are formally involved in convers. Interest groups are informally involved

2. Political Functions 2. Political Functions & & Structures Structures (cont)(cont) (Again, agg & art negatively related) U.S. politics tend to move from stress

on interest aggregation toward stress on interest articulation ….

…then toward a new balance that is itself redressed all over again (cycle)

E. Mediation in Am. E. Mediation in Am. PoliticsPolitics

Mediation may emphasize democracy, pluralism or elitism

Emphasis is determined by the relative powers of structures (i.e., parties, groups and oligarchies)

1. Democracy and 1. Democracy and the the Building of Building of MajoritiesMajorities Demo= provision & implementation of public choices in leaders and paths thru majoritarian means

Electoral & governmental majorities are aggregated thru such agencies as elections, public opinion and parties

a. the a. the Public Public ThreatThreat Am. electorate can “fire” elected officials … by voting other majority party in power to hire and fire = the public

threat Demo requisites of democracy

guaranteed by public threat most fundamental democratic requisite

= public choices in leaders and paths

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) The cacophony of sound bites and

kaleidoscope of photo opts along with the horse-race & hoopla created by infinite # of candidate appeals is reduced in U.S. to …

…two enormous public alternatives by the Republican & Democratic Parties as …

public choice-definers (i.e., choice-givers)

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont)

Efficacy, dependability & legitimacy of democratic gov are underwritten to extent parties effective in implementing public mandates

ERGO: working majority parties are choice-givers and faith keepers


In the process of choice-making and implementation there is the enormous gift to democracy of the peaceful resolution of conflict: e.g., leaders vs. led &/or public v. gov. choices in paths

parties resolve such conflicts by offering alternatives in leaders and paths

a. the Public Threat a. the Public Threat (cont)(cont) While election results are subject

to much interpretation re paths, their answer to the question of “who shall lead” is determinative (except 2000!!)

Elections thereby resolve a profound and potentially violent societal question (i.e., “who shall lead.” )


The peaceful transfer of power thru competing parties guarantees majority rule as well as minority rights

Also, the means by which a minority can become a majority which, in turn, ...

Insures political equality and individual freedoms

aa. the. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) (One of the most neglected

lessons in all of politics is that protecting minority rights is in majority’s self-interest ….

… because the ultimate right of a minority is to become a majority and …

… if they do, they’ll remember !!)

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Exercising public threat is popular

sovereignty & limited gov. in action Pop. consultation guaranteed when

officials worry about being “fired” Popular consultation also served by

“loyal opposition” party tattling on the party in power

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Pol. parties stress #’s more than

$’s In fact, modern parties originated in

U.S. in 1790s to mobilize #’s vs natural political advantages of $’s

In aggregating majorities parties provide persuasive pol communication, stimulate voting & organize gov’ment

a. a. the Public Threat the Public Threat (cont)(cont)

Pol communication of parties serves to inform and mobilize the pubic and ...

helps insure gov’tal accountability of party in power

Once elected, the winning party organizes popular branches (i.e., leg. & exec.) – and, in time, …

affects jud branch (87 of first 100 judges)

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Theory: Jefferson’s responsible party

gov. i.e., parties offer & honor public agendas then stand for public judgement

Practice: responsible party model is problematic & only sporadically successful

Model is especially difficult when parties are weak and groups are strong …

BUT ...

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) All democratic theory insists

individual liberties be guaranteed protection of such participation rts

(e.g., __?) insures broadest structuring of preferences in demo - e.g., elections

Elections = the making of public choices in leaders and paths.

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Elections are democracy in action since public choice-making (&

implement.) is what democracies do Elections express public mandates

and agendas (i.e. paths) via majoritarianism

Ironically, public agenda is subject to many interpretations (i.e., hidden)

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Since public alternatives in leaders

and paths are the 1st requisite of democracy, political theorists insist that

…parties must be competitive.

Party theorists also insist that party structures have to be inclusive (why?)

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) If parties are competitive & based on

enduring socioeco. divisions (e.g., ?) .. … issue and ideological differences

become well known over time … ergo: public choices clearer over time …parties will try to broaden support by

extending suffrage (esp. which party?)

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Two important American Party

Theorists: Key & Schattschneider E.E. Schattschneider favored

“socialization” of conflict w/ nat issues. “privatization” dominated by haves

Parties socialize conflict since majorities or near majorities drive them - - not minorities

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) Schattsneider felt political power of

haves was their wealth whereas ... …political power of have-nots was

numbers In 2-party systems, parties consolidate

& mobilize masses of have-nots (1800)

In one-party system no countervailing power to eco & pol power of the haves

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) V.O. Key illustrates E. E.

Schattsneider’s point in finding $ interests stronger in 1-party areas (i.e., old American South)

Key: The grand objective of the haves is obstruction … Organization is not always necessary to obstruct; it is essential, however, for the promotion of a sustained ...

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont)Key (cont) ….. program in behalf of the have-

nots … over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics

Conservative, moneyed groups become stronger in 1-party situations since can dominate funding of office seekers

a. thea. the Public Threat Public Threat (cont)(cont) In a competitive (e.g., 2-party)

situation, elected officials heed #’s of have-nots if mobilized by alternative party

Key & Schattsneider both note: when parties are not competitive, it is the have-nots that suffer

b. The Fluidity in b. The Fluidity in Am. Am.

MajoritarianismMajoritarianism Have & have-not orientations = fundamental & resilient distinctions between constituencies of 2 majority parties in U.S.

In addition - and often derived from - have vs. have-not distinctions are other demographic differences

e.g., regional, age, ethnic/racial, educational, religious & gender characteristics

b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism

(cont)(cont) In addition to demographic differences, party coalitions differ by their constellations of allied political organizations

i.e., social movements and interest groups tend to favor either the have or have-not party coalition (why?)


(cont)(cont) Psych characteristics in party motive structure also from have/ have-not characteristics

e.g., partisan strata w/in the public ID w/ one party over the other given their have or have-not predispositions

less partisan “leaners” favor 1 or other but not so dependably as strong partisans


(cont)(cont) Non-partisan strata - i.e., most

evaluative or “pure” independents - - make party choices per vote per

election (T-splitters, switchers) Motive-structures w/in party

constituencies govern the party’s predisposition towards change vs. continuity in leaders & paths


(cont)(cont) If a party constituency tends toward change, assumes & insists on responsiveness in government

Continuity in support for leaders & paths across elections favors gov’tal discretion ..

…. since public support is structured, enduring and dependable (i.e., partisan)


(cont)(cont) Partisans = affective toward choices ….

… Independents more evaluative Evaluative support promotes change Affective support promotes continuity SO.. change in leaders/paths occurs

more often with weak partisanship … … (i.e., political consumerism goes ^)


(cont)(cont) Demos & Repubs build temporary majorities to “throw the rascals out” - in periods of weak partisanship (consumption by voters of per election party appeals)

Both also favor change over continuity in paths - during periods of weak partisanship

Hypo: Changes in paths will not occur every 28 - 40 years or even in 4 year cycles in 2000’s


(cont)(cont) As long as American major’ism is fluid, American electorate will alter paths or instructions to officials every 2 years (i.e., congressional sessions)

SO… party coalitions w/ evaluative public base do not endure across elections and Am majoritarianism …

…is very fluid as a result


(cont)(cont) Another element in party motive structures involves material ($) and purposive (cause or ideological) incentives

Predominance of either haves or have-nots w/in a party’s constituency affects the party’s orientation toward change or continuity in leaders and paths


(cont)(cont) Have-nots favor change in life situation whereas haves are more status quo

“the various and unequal distribution of property” always divides societies

So have vs. have-not differences in party constituencies insure bases for 2 opposing public alternatives


(cont)(cont) Partisans w/ purposive incentives disposed toward change or continuity given party have or have-not predispositions

Purposive voters favoring change like the have-not or moderate to liberal party

Voters favoring tradition, the status quo or conservatism favor the party of the haves


(cont)(cont) If material divisions are enduring

party bases, an individual’s SES should tie them to the have or the have-not party

It does, but not so as securely as past

Why?

b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am.

MaterialismMaterialism (cont) (cont) SES separated voters during Depression when some Republican voters switched their vote and..

w/ some, their allegiance, to the Democrats

Many non-voters joined the electorate to vote for the attractive alternative path offered by the New Deal


(cont)(cont) BUT… the Depression was decades ago Party allegiances stemming from the ‘32

realigning election have eroded as one age cohort succeeded the last since then

Another realigning election should have occurred in late 60’s or early 70’s

That almost happened.


(cont)(cont) The “social issue” could have

realigned but.. … two things happened 1. television and 2. Watergate Squeezed between Vietnam &

Watergate new voters said “a pox on both your houses.”


(cont)(cont) TV- new under political sun - transmits candidate appeals more than party cues

So voters “shopped” for candidates via TV

Parties thus lost some cue-giving power precisely when a realigning issue was due


(cont)(cont) Haves and have-nots alike remained less partisan for a time and …

Majority building became fluid & constant enterprise for parties

Electoral and governing party coalitions were still tied together by partisanship (albeit weakened)


(cont)(cont) Party activists remain bound together and

to party leaders by affective or emotive ties ...

… for activists in the party organization (i.e., PO), by solidary (?) incentives as well

So parties continue to offer have and have-not alternatives to Am. democracy

BUT…who’s buying and what?


(cont)(cont) Independents = @ 1/3 of electorate added only temporarily to the

affective base of identifiers by independent evaluations of party appeals.

But frequently, Independents “buy” the appeals of candidates rather than investing in party agenda or long term party appeal


(cont)(cont) Despite SES divisions, even have AND have-not voters became less partisan and …

majoritarianism was more fluid as a result Parties left w/ a larger contingent who are

subject to rational persuasion or dissuasion and…

a smaller set of supporters who are resistant


(cont)(cont) affective partisans remain loyal across elections because emotive loyalties not subject to rational dissuasion

evaluative Independents vote per office per election …. i.e., “shop”

“pure” Independents (@ 15%) are disproportionately political consumers ….

means governing support is more fluid


(cont)(cont) rise of pol. consumerism during the

info age explains 2 yr. mandates independency and consumerism

explain the quicker and more exact adjustments in governing mandates

(every two years)


(cont)(cont) In sum: fluidity in political majorities increased ….

from the 1960s until 1990s Majoritarianism weakened as

evaluative voting (i.e., consumerism) increased (or plateaued)

… and partisan or affective voting declined (or bottomed out)


(cont)(cont) The “agenda politics” of democracy

and strong parties declined as …. … “grap-bag” pluralism increased. Electoral and governing majorities

have become less enduring and dependable

Change in paths is favored over continuity


(cont)(cont) Majoritarianism has declined w/

party power in the U S minoritarianism has increased w/

group power ERGO: the problem with

American democracy = cannot keep the public faith well enough

b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism (cont(cont)) All governments - whether demo., plural,

or elitist - must be responsive to some degree

BUT … all governments must also exercise some autonomy or discretion, too

Affective nature of partisanship strengthens government’s autonomy & discretion

…. even against popular sentiment

b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism Majoritarianism (cont)(cont) Affective (i.e., partisan) voters guarantee the electorate enduring bases for public choices and gov’tal autonomy (i.e., leadership)

BUT… evaluative voters (Independents) determine which choice taken in election

ERGO: evaluative voters guarantee change and governmental responsiveness


(cont)(cont) As party power declined, affective/ evaluative balance changed > evaluative

… “shopping” reduced long-term service of parties to democracy …

In a majoritarian system, leadership is tricky

Followers have little loyalty to leader’s majority in a majoritarian system

(requires what in a president?)

b. Fluidity in Am. b. Fluidity in Am. Majoritarianism (cont)Majoritarianism (cont) BUT… w/o some fluidity in party support

the prospects for gov’tal responsiveness and policy change suffer …

… also a disservice to democracy SO… affective/evaluative balance in

public support governs policy change v. continuity AND governmental responsiveness vs. discretion

c. Majority Parties: c. Majority Parties: Republicans & Republicans &

DemocratsDemocrats Majority parties = inclusive & decentralized pol structures that specialize in interest aggregation most especially but, also, in pol recruitment, communications & conversion

Majority parties qualify as majority parties if they have the potential of building electoral and governing majorities

c. Maj. Parties: c. Maj. Parties: Repubs & Repubs &

Demos(cont)Demos(cont) Party leaders link gov’ning coalitions to elect’al coalitions by providing, explaining and implementing public choices

ERGO: Republicans and Democrats are the chief instruments of American Democracy

3rd parties = instruments of policy change balances w/i party motive structures

determine party’s stance toward..


Demos(cont)Demos(cont) … towards policy continuity/change, governmental responsive./discretion

have/have-not balance w/in party motive structure provides enduring bases for public choice

Working parties are public choice-givers and faith-keepers


Demos(cont)Demos(cont) Republicans and Democrats implement public agendas - if they are working

As yet there is no substitute for parties in American Democracy.

No other structure able to pull pieces of electoral and gov’tal majorities together


Demos(cont)Demos(cont)If parties weaken as coalition builders: fragmentation occurs rule by groups and oligarchies occurs minoritarianism competes w/

majoritarianism &... public agendas and trust compromised

2. Pluralism & the 2. Pluralism & the Threat of Minority RuleThreat of Minority Rule

Pluralist theory = conflict arises among groups as each applies resources to struggle over policy (gov a means to that end)

Relative importance of different issues plus changing value & unequal distribution of political resources yields ….

highly fluid and situational decision-making

2. Pluralism & Threat 2. Pluralism & Threat of of Minority Rule Minority Rule (cont)(cont) Complexity is compounded by multi-

centeredness of pluralism (no 1 source of division in government) There are many policy fragments or

oligarchies (e.g., _?_ ) at nat. and state levels

These ally with some interests and oppose others in trying to win a policy victory

2. Pluralism & 2. Pluralism & Threat of Threat of Minority Rule (cont)Minority Rule (cont) Pluralism assumes activity by formal &

informal groups or networks of groups (e.g., iron triangles & policy networks)

Pluralism also assumes that groups or group networks operate both outside and inside government

- i.e., both private (e.g., ___?) & public (e.g., ___?) groups

2. Pluralism & 2. Pluralism & Threat of Threat of Minority Rule (cont)Minority Rule (cont) Importance of multi-centeredness

of pluralism = numerous points of access to policy makers

Importance of fluidity of pluralism = lose now, win later

In a pluralistic system everyone gets to play and nobody gets left out -- at least in theory

a. Groups and a. Groups and

MinoritarianismMinoritarianism If elections, parties and public opinion processes are majoritarian mechanisms that drive democracy,…

IGs = central structures w/i pluralism groups perform critical role of alerting

& pressuring government re needs in society or - at least - organized society

a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism

(cont) (cont) Groups apply their resources in finances, visibility, expertise, prestige, organization & leadership and, possibly “nerve” issues toward winning policy contests

Added to these resources are constituent advantages in numbers, affluence, strategic location, time and education

a. Groups and a. Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism (cont)(cont)

As with any other political agency, the motive or incentive structure within groups (e.g., ? ) explains much political behavior

For instance, material groups have a tougher time forming than purposive groups but they have much more endurance (why?)

a. Groups and a. Groups and MinorMinoritarianism itarianism

(cont) (cont) Have-not materialism w/in a group will tend to favor change while have predispositions tend > status quo

both material/purpose and affective/ evaluative motive structures in pressure groups may favor governmental responsiveness over autonomy and discretion

a. Groups and a. Groups and MinoritarianismMinoritarianism

(cont)(cont) In applying their political resources, groups inform, advertise, lobby, supply or deny grass roots and/or financial support and otherwise pressure decision-makers to act favorably towards their interest

ERGO & AGAIN: they specialize in interest articulation


Minoritarianism (cont)Minoritarianism (cont)To a lesser extent than interest articulation, groups are involved in:

Political socialization - e.g., whether government responds to “people like us”

political communications: w/i group communiqués to mobilize, public ads, or persuasion re decision-makers


(cont)(cont) Political recruitment of IGs: PACs, endorsements, “delivering” a vote, etc

Political Conversion: groups are informally involved in conversion - e.g., aid & pressure d/m’ers, recruit allies to office and to right committees, testify, lobby, etc.

(parties are formally involved in conversion)


MinorMinoritarianism (cont)itarianism (cont) But (and again), special function for groups is interest articulation

in fact, it is the petitioning of gov that separates interest groups from all other voluntary associations.

ERGO: membership basis must be exclusive (why?)


(cont)(cont) Group leaders and activists are motivated especially by affective (and solidary) incentives and ...

by either material or purposive goals Group leadership tends toward

oligarchy (iron law of oligarchy. R. Michelles)

Supporters may be affective or evaluative


(cont)(cont) IGs narrowly based … may assert minority against majority in policy dispute

SO.. IGs criticized as serving minority rule (re policy) rather than just minority rights

Why control of policy rather than government as a whole? - exclusiveness


(cont)(cont) Minoritarianism driven by groups refers to minority rule over policy rather than government as a whole

Pressure groups are not broadly structured enough to control government as a whole

May have a “confederacy of oligarchies” instead of a federal government


(cont)(cont) In sum, Am IGs described as exclusive and centralized political structures that specialize in interest articulation but also > recruitment, communication & conversion.

IGs leaders link group constituencies to gov by applying group resources toward the persuasion of policy-makers

a. a. Groups and Groups and Minoritarianism Minoritarianism

(cont)(cont) Evaluative/affective & material/ purposive balances in group motive structure may favor gov’tal responsiveness over discretion and either change or continuity in policy

Briefly defined, American interest groups = policy

advocates of organized publics.

b. The Benevolent b. The Benevolent GroupGroup

First of modern or “analytic” pluralists in the U.S. was Arthur F. Bentley

Bentley: The Process of Government (1908)

major break with “staatswissenschaft” Inspired political scientists toward

“group approach”

b. The Benevolent b. The Benevolent Group Group

(cont)(cont)Bentley’s major points re groups: wealth main source of divisions in

society “When groups are adequately

stated, everything is stated. When I say everything, I mean everything.”

individual interests were trivial in interpreting society. BUT …..

bb. The Benevolent . The Benevolent Group Group

(cont)(cont) (but) … group activity was “first, last and all the time” essential to such interpretations

National interest a myth. “The balance of groups pressures is the existing state of society.”

group pressures were the one and only determinate of government policy

b. The b. The Benevolent Benevolent Group (cont)Group (cont) Mostly, group pressures yielded decisions

= reasonably fair while class divisions were most common

basis for groups, numbers were more important than wealth as a group resource

Larger, more nearly general interests would defeat smaller, narrower special interests

closest thing to “control by the people.”


(cont)(cont)David Truman another group theorist much influenced by Bentley also felt that groups were benign groups weakened and divided by greed overlapping memberships across

groups with different interests Some members would object as a

result


(cont)(cont) Another check on greed = “potential group”

if, for instance, a tariff was excessive, consumers would organize an opposing lobby - specter checks group’s greed

(Truman is author of the “disturbance theory” - more later)

c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent GroupGroup

Most group theorists are less optimistic

These authors assume that majoritarian government is often frustrated by the exclusiveness of groups and that …

minority rule re policy that can result

c. The Malevolent c. The Malevolent Group Group

(cont)(cont) Madison: important advantage of well constructed union was “its tendency to control the violence and mischiefs of faction.”

1 lesson of Am rev. clear: if loyalties attached more to groups than political community as a whole, unity of action was impossible, anarchy would result


(cont)(cont) Madison’s thought always included the notion of balance in government

In fact, constitutionalism was a balance between anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other

BUT… which did Madison fear more: anarchy or tyranny (?)

c. The c. The Malevolent Malevolent Group (cont)Group (cont) Madison feared the suppression of factions

more than the violence of faction How to maintain a balance between T/A? Madison’s answer: structuring government

- (1) a republican form of government and (2) a division of governmental authority (How does that keep balance?)


(cont)(cont) But Madison’s greater fear = tyranny - tyranny would be thwarted by divisions

and representativeness But still feared “tyranny of the majority” ?: What of power within divisions? Could fragmentation provide sufficient

minority power to thwart majoritarianism?


(cont)(cont)E.E. Schattschneider: Group greed had worsened Depression -

i.e., U.S. tariffs spawned retaliatory tariffs Solution to group greed: broaden scope of

conflict - results more nearly nat’al or maj. Broadening conflict was better achieved

by inclusive parties than exclusive groups

FF.. CONVERSION IN CONVERSION IN AMERICAN POLITICSAMERICAN POLITICS

Parties & groups are part of mediation or the linking of society with government

What happens as a result of mediation is called conversion or the translating of demands into policy

Political conversion is necessarily a specialization of small groups or oligarchies or elites BECAUSE …..

F. Conversion in Am F. Conversion in Am Pols Pols (cont)(cont) ….. of the the unweldiness of

large bodies in the exact and detailer work of enacting specific and complex policies

SO …. political conversion inherently involves some form of elitism

1. Elitism & Decision 1. Elitism & Decision - - ImplementationImplementation Political elitism = public policy making by oligarchies.

Oligarchies are therefore the central structure in elitism

Some of the fragments in America’s fragmented political situation are elites or combinations of elites

1. Elitism & 1. Elitism & Decision- Decision- Implementation (cont)Implementation (cont) Structure of oligarchies ranges from

very narrow to representative coalitions

As the structure of elites expands so do their functions

At a minimum, oligarchies convert demands into policy or ….

…. articulate interests

1. Elitism & Decision 1. Elitism & Decision - - Implementation (cont)Implementation (cont) In their broadest form - i.e.,

representative coalitions - elites may aggregate and articulate interests as well as convert demands into policies

a. Kinds of Elites: single purpose and multifunctional

elites private and public elites, and ..combinations of these

a. Kinds of Elites a. Kinds of Elites (cont)(cont)

Example of combo: committees and subcommittees often ally with pertinent executive agencies and with private interest groups to form ….

“iron triangles” or, … in more elaborate form, “policy

networks.”

1) Single-1) Single-Purpose Purpose

Oligarchies Oligarchies Very exclusive, composed of only a few powerful individuals

narrowest of all political orgs would be a faction w/i a single-purpose oligarchy

In private sector, 1 purpose elites specialize in interest articulation

w/i public sector, specialize in conversion

1) 1 Purpose 1) 1 Purpose Oligarchies Oligarchies

(cont)(cont)Examples of governmental or public elites or oligarchies:

congressional subcommittees and committees, as well as

executive offices, agencies, bureaus and regulatory commissions

Federal courts are also oligarchies

1) 1 Purpose 1) 1 Purpose

Oligarchies (cont)Oligarchies (cont) 1 purpose elites in private sector stress int art in relating to gov’tal oligarchies

Examples: leadership components of most interest groups, third parties, social movements, etc.

Also some of the actual fragments in America’s fragmented political situation

2) “Per Issue 2) “Per Issue Coalitions” and Iron Coalitions” and Iron TrianglesTriangles Temporary or “per issue” coalitions

are short-lived coalitions of some of these fragments in Am. Politics. Namely, interest groups

“Per issue” coalitions are not single purpose oligarchies

Are a form of multifunctional oligarchies

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) per issue coalitions disband after

an issue resolved and reformulate into other combinations to address subsequent issues

Per issue coalitions aggregate and articulate interests but they must persuade govern’tal elites to convert demands into policy

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Iron triangles (IT’s) and policy

networks (PN’s) endure across issues. “Iron tri’s” and “policy nets” are

unlike per issue coalitions because they last across issues

IT’s and PN’s are unlike 1 purpose oligs because they are multifunctional

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” &&

Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont) (cont)

Broader structure of iron tri’s & policy nets means two specializations - not one

Iron tri’s and policy nets articulate interests (given private group component)

Given their legis. & exec. components iron tri’s and policy networks also perform political conversion

i.e. they enact and implement policy

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Policy nets and iron tri’s are

threesomes since they usually exclude the president

Exception: LBJ - particularly adept at negotiation

LBJ could make it in the trilogy’s self-interest to become a foursome

2)“Per Issue” 2)“Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Mancur Olson felt minority factions

in Congress have advantage re majorities

Iron tri’s, for instance, place group advocates within fragments that specialize in group concerns in the legislature and the executive branches of government

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Grant McConnell felt poor farmers,

conservationists and consumers hurt by iron tris operating w/in decentralized setting created by federalism

e.g., USDA and county agents + AFBF + pertinent members of Congress destroyed Farm Security Agency

set up by New Deal to help rural poor

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) e.g., local business interests + Army

Corp of Engineers + Public Works Committee pushed for dams, etc.

profited local businesses who contributed $ to pertinent congress members who appropriated $ for Corp of Engineers, etc.

BUT … local environ’tal interests not part of the iron triangle

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) McConnell felt stronger national

institutions were needed Agreed with E.E. Schattschneider on

stronger parties but ... also stronger presidency + Supreme Court Stronger national government broadened

scope of conflict counter power of state and local interests

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont) Andrew S. McFarland sees American

gov. as so many interests split into various policy domains controlled by iron triangles

e.g., a “turf” conscious “confederation of oligarchies.”

had several qualifications to fed government as confederation (of oligarchies)

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont)McFarland’s qualifications: Pres’tial elections rise of public interest lobbies social movementsSo majority rule does at times overcome

minority rule according to McFarland. But..

need stronger institutions of aggregation

2) “Per Issue” 2) “Per Issue” & & Iron Tri’s Iron Tri’s (cont)(cont)

Madison worried about the “tyranny of the majority” at state and local levels.

Olson, Schattschneider, McConnell & McFarland worry about minority factions

Madison: fed’lism thwarted tyranny Modern pluralists: too many divisions -

fragmentation - needed majoritarian national institutions

b. Leadership b. Leadership Networks Networks & the & the

“New Machines”“New Machines” Multipurpose oligs e.g., party leadership

networks in Congress may perform aggregation, articulation and conversion

network members may informally represent organized publics or interest groups

Results in a broader - more representative - outlook

b. Lead. Nets & b. Lead. Nets & “New “New Machines”(cont)Machines”(cont)Examples of voting blocs or caucuses demographic (women, blacks,

Hispanics or Sunbelt) ideological (conservative Southern

Demos or right-wing Republican freshpersons)

economic (“steel” or “cotton” caucus)

may be bi-partisan

b. Lead. Nets. b. Lead. Nets. &“New &“New Machines” (cont)Machines” (cont) Some governmental oligarchies created

by Constitution: e.g., Supreme Court or pres. and “principle Officer(s) in each of the executive Departments”

Usually occurred on their own over time:

e.g., committee system, White House entourage, various individual & allied Departments, ad hoc policy “czars”, etc.

b. Lead. Nets. b. Lead. Nets. &“New &“New Machines” (cont)Machines” (cont) Multipurpose oligarchies such as party

leadership networks may evolve into the “new machines.” (discuss)

new machines redress balance between interest aggregation and articulation toward former

If party leadership in government enacted a promised public agenda, a majority …..

b. Lead. Nets. & b. Lead. Nets. & “New “New Machines” Machines” (cont)(cont) … of the electorate could “buy”

into the party that delivered on an agenda

that would realign party loyalties in the electorate for at least as long as public support lasted for furthering that agenda

2. Elitism2. Elitism

Thomas Dye in Who’s Running America Corporate Directors, the Money Elite,

Governing Circles, the Media Moguls, the Civic Establishment

Gov policy-makers are proximate d/m ultimate oligarchies = CFR, Trilateral

Com., Business Roundtable, Committee on Eco Development, Brookings, Am. Enterprise Institute and Heritage Foundation, etc.

2. Elitism (cont)2. Elitism (cont)

Beginning place for Dye’s oligarchic decision-making is the corporate elite – funnel $ into?

Elites in wealth, government, media and civic establishment build an agenda that is representative - even includes poor at times

Policy planning oligarchies such as CFR, Business Roundtable and Brookings reduce consensus to specific policy recommenda’s.

Pluralism occurs when??


So private elites are the actual

decision makers in Dye’s model Government agencies - e.g.,

committees - are “proximate decision-makers” - only carry out decisions made by private elites


Difference in Dye and Davis: Davis: Dye’s proximate decision makers

are actually the decision makers private elites in Dye are actually

involved in interest articulation when they decide what recommendations to make to government

To the extent Dye’s elites reflect broad concerns they also aggregate interests


Dye’s elites, like other multipurp. elites, do help drive the agg/art/con cycle

Dye’s private elites are oligarchies able to recommend (articulate) policies w/in an agenda given their broad societal concerns (aggregation)

Dye’s governing elites are actually involved in conversion according to Davis

2. Elitsm (cont)2. Elitsm (cont)

Other oligarchies go further in completing the aggregation/ articulation/conversion cycle because they are involved in all 3

Examples: party structures such as caucuses or conferences or leadership networks

G.G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, INTERPLAY OF DEMO, PLURALISM & PLURALISM &

ELITISMELITISM 3 structures central to democracy (party), pluralism (group) and elitism (oligarchy)

interaction of these three drives the interplay of democracy, pluralism and elites

is a negative relationship between interest aggregation and articulation, both affect conversion so will affect structure and functioning of governmental elites or oligs

G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO, PLURAL & ELITISMPLURAL & ELITISM (cont) (cont)

Should there be another realigning election or

…the production of a promised public agenda through party leadership networks in government (i.e., the new machines) …

new life would be breathed back into parties, the aggregative function and American democracy

G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO., G. INTERPLAY OF DEMO., PLURAL. & ELITISM PLURAL. & ELITISM (cont)(cont) Oddly enough, it is the evolution of

oligarchies that may invigorate parties.

In that case, elitism will reinvigorate majoritarianism and democracy in America

CHAP I. THE PROBLEM W/ AMERICAN DEMOCRACY CHAP I. THE PROBLEM W/ AMERICAN DEMOCRACY A. FAITH -...

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