“Changing the ‘game’ of criminal justice through the use of Police and Crime Commissioners?”

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Police and Crime Commissioners in Operation PCCs took office in 2013 – what has happened so far ?

Transcript of “Changing the ‘game’ of criminal justice through the use of Police and Crime Commissioners?”

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Police and Crime Commissioners in

OperationPCCs took office in 2013 – what has happened so far ?

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Police authorities• Police & Crime Commissioners replaced police authorities• These were created by the 1964 Police Act• Their initial role was to ‘maintain an adequate and efficient police force’: this role

was amended in the 1996 Police Act to maintain ‘an efficient and effective’ force and the 2006 Police and Justice Act added the responsibility of holding the chief constable to account for the exercise of his/her functions• Police authorities were initially composed of 2/3 Councillors and 1/3 Magistrates:

their composition was reformed in the 1994 Police & Magistrates’ Courts Act with the addition of Independent Members and the 2006 Police & Justice Act which Magistrates ceased to be a specific membership category. 2008 Regulations required most police authorities to be composed of either 17 or 19 members.

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Problems with police authoritiesBy the end of the twentieth century, police authorities were criticised for being:• Non-elected (proposals to elect some members were put forward in

2008 but were not acted upon)• Anonymous• Inadequate vehicles to articulate local concerns onto the policing

agenda – therefore a gap emerged between what the public expected of policing and what services were actually delivered

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Hence reform was needed

• This took the form of directly-elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)

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Rationale of reform• The aim of PCCs was to put power directly in the hands of the public

by• Providing a mechanism whereby somebody, somewhere has to

answer the public and victims very directly about what is happening to tackle crime in the neighbourhood, what the priorities are and how things are done• This reform was incorporated into the 2011 Police Reform and Social

Responsibility Act

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Views of reform• Some views expressed in Parliament were extremely negative towards

this reform…..

• The most lamentable provision about policing that I have ever encountered (Lord Ian Blair, House of Lords,27 April 2011)• Concern was expressed about the potential of police governance being

hijacked by individuals or groups with a sinister agenda (Lord Bishop of Gloucester, House of Lords 27 April 2011)

• Why were these negative views expressed ?

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Role of a PCC• The main roles of a PCC are:• To set the police force budget• To draw up a Police and Crime plan for the duration of their period in

office• To hire and fire chief constables

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Criticisms of PCCsAs the 2011 legislation progressed through Parliament, a number of issues were raised• Was the abolition of police authorities necessary – were the problems over-stated ? Yes –

BUT the roles are different (monitor / agenda setting).• Can one person adequately represent all shades of opinion in a police force area which may

lack any sense of corporate identity ?• Will this reform prioritise low-level crime at the expense of more serious crime ?• Will PCCs interfere with a chief constable’s operational independence?• Will this reform politicise policing ? Some would argue that this is no new development (eg

policing in the 1980s ‘Maggies’s Boot Boys’);• Cronyism • Cost • Accountability of PCCs for their actions…..

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The PCC elections• Elections for PCCs were held in November 2012, using the

Supplementary Vote (as used for the London Mayor elections)• The turnout was abysmal – 14.7% of electors cast valid votes (and

2.7%) wasted their votes: this was the lowest turnout for a (semi) national election since the 23% obtained in the 1999 Euro elections. This undermined the ability of a PCC to claim a mandate to deliver police priorities.• This perhaps suggested that people did not want to be empowered

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And who was elected ?The profile of PCCs was as follows:• Conservative 16: Labour 13: Independents 12• Male 35: Female 6• PCCs from a BME background 0• 6 were current MPs/MEPs/Members of the Welsh Assembly• 19 had a background in local government• 14 were current or former members of police authorities• 8 were former police officers• 7 had a military background• 5 were former magistrates

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What did they pledge to do ?• The top five priorities of candidate (whether elected or not) were:• Tackle anti-social behaviour (99 candidates)• Combat drug-related crime (44)• Tackle alcohol-related crime (29)• Combat domestic violence (28)• Tackle hate crime (16)Non-local crime figured lower in their priorities• Tackling serious and organised crime (13)• Retaining international cooperation (2 candidates)

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Game changers ?

• How has the office of PCC worked out since 2012 ?

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Are the public more empowered ?• Empowerment was the key reason for introducing this reform• The election turnout suggested that people were disinterested in

becoming empowered with regard to policing: could this reflect a British distrust of a presidential-type figure ?• A key function of PCCs, therefore, is to gather public views on local

crime issues: they may do this through convening meetings or commissioning / organising surveys

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Police and Crime Plans• Their first task was to draw up a local police and crime plan for their 4-year

tenure in office• Chief Constables are then held accountable for delivering on the PCC’s

objectives – often targets (associated with the ancien regime) are used to measure this: this reform is a key change in the balance of power within the tripartite system of police governance• This task had to be completed quickly and there was considerable variation

regarding their content (Nottinghamshire at the top end with 66 objectives)• PCCs can – and do – make demands on policing in response to specific

incidents which they observe or which are reported to them whether in this plan or not

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More money into local policing ?• During the elections, some PCC candidates promised to lobby for more resources

for their police forces• Has this happened ?• PCCs have access to the CSP budgets• One way to augment the declining central government grant to police forces is to

increase the size of the Council Tax contribution towards policing – but (outside of Wales) any increase of 2% over the previous year required a referendum.• Few have been held – in Bedfordshire in 2015, the PCCs plan to fund an additional

100 police officers was soundly rejected by voters which would have triggered a 15.8% rise in the police precept from the previous year• But spending cuts post the 2015 election may lead to this being re-visited

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A catalyst for criminal justice reform• PCCs have the ability to lobby for reforms affecting criminal justice

policy• There are examples where this has occurred, especially in relation to

drug policy where some PCCs (Ron Hogg in Durham and Alan Charles in Derbyshire) have lobbied for a reform to the law

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From partnership to integration• Financial cuts have underpinned drives towards inter-agency

collaboration moving beyond partnership and towards integration: PCCs can help to drive this • In Greater Manchester, the appointment of the PCC as interim mayor

is likely to further influence this style of working• Crime prevention is a key underpinning of new forms of partnership

and integration of services

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Other Issues Affecting PCCs

What other issues have emerged concerning the way in which the office of PCC has developed ?

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Accountability• The actions of a PCC are scrutinized by a Police & Crime Panel (PCP) whose role is to support the

effective exercise of the functions of the PCC in that area and to promote transparency in the Commissioner’s decision making

• The PCP was not an initial aspect of the Conservative government’s reform plans• Their powers include the ability to veto the PCCs proposal to increase the budget precept or proposal

for a new appointee as chief constable – provided a two-thirds majority support this• The key issue is the extent to which PCPs can exercise this scrutiny role effectively • In areas where the PCP is dominated by a political party of which the PCC is also a member, effective

scrutiny may not apply• There are ways to avoid scrutiny of decisions: ignore the PCP (as in Lincolnshire in 2013 when the PCC

suspended the chief constable) or bypass it (as events in Gwent showed relating to the resignation of the Chief Constable, Carmel Napier in 2013).

• There is no mechanism to get rid of a PCC (Shaun Wright did resign, however, in 2014 connection with his previous role in child services in Rotherham)

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Operational Independence• In theory, PCCs set strategy and chief officers were left with the

responsibility for delivering it• Operational independence at its crudest level means that the Chief

Constable determines the tasking and resourcing of police officers• However, the dividing line between strategy and delivery methods are

vague – has the ‘line been crossed’ by PCCs ?• It has been observed that PCCs who were formerly police officers are

more likely to seek to intervene in operational issues• This issue is tied up with the more general relationships struck between

PCCs and Chief Constables

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Relationships with Chief Constables• Chief Constables ‘direct and control’ their police forces• Traditionally the police service was not keen on outside bodies

exercising responsibility for police work• The PCC-Chief Constable relationship varies (as it inevitably would)• One catalyst for a better relationship is financial austerity• PCCs who derive from a political (especially local government)

background are used to working in an environment of budget cutting and Chief Constables may be willing to accept advice from PCCs about how to cope with budget cuts

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Appointments• PCCs can appoint deputy PCC and also Assistant PCCs• There are examples of (seemingly) political preference influencing

such decisions• Unwise choices relating to PCC appointment have also been made

such as the subsequent appointment of a 17-year old Youth PCC in Kent by Ann Barnes)