Journal of Environmental Management (2001) 62, 221–231doi:10.1006/jema.2001.0426, available online at http://www.idealibrary.com on

Changing environmental strategies overtime: An empirical study of the steelindustry in the United States

B. Clemens

This study investigates how environmental strategies change over time. We submit evidence from the USsteel industry that firms have modified their strategies over time. We offer that US industry passed throughthree stages—cost minimization, cost-effective compliance, and beneficial environmental controls.

We compare typologies of environmental strategies and choose that of C. Oliver as the most appropriate.We investigate how environmental strategies in the steel industry changed over time a 4-year period. We offerthat a further understanding of Oliver’s strategies may increase understanding of the relationship betweenbusiness and government on environmental issues.

One over-arching problem in our field is the need to adequately operationalize how firms change strategiesand pass through different stages. We hope that our study will help future researchers and practitionersbetter articulate the concepts of environmental strategies over time.

Our study focused on the steel industry in the United States. We chose the US steel industry as one ofthe major environmental actors in the United States. The United States Environmental Protection Agencyranks the iron and steel industry as the largest industrial source of toxic environmental contamination. Weencourage researchers to evaluate and test our methodology and findings in other contexts—both in othernations and different industries. 2001 Academic Press

Keywords: environment, strategy, change, management.

Introduction

This study investigates the historical progresson environmental strategies of regulatedorganizations. Environmental strategies arethose strategies that concern the manner afirm addresses issues concerning the environ-ment. The remarkable growth of the Organi-zation and the Natural Environment InterestGroup (ONE) within the Academy of Manage-ment; the proliferation of environmentaldegrees worldwide; and the growth of jour-nals such as the Journal of EnvironmentalManagement, Organization & Environment,and Business Strategy and the Environmentare testament to the growth of the field.

While researchers and practitioners havefound that a firm’s environmental strategieschange, few empirical studies have quanti-tatively documented the fact. We offer that

Email of author: clemenbw@jmu.edu

College of Business,James Madison University,Mail Stop Code 0205,Harrisonburg, VA 22807,USA

Received 23 November1999; accepted 25January 2001

this 4-year study will encourage others toplan similar studies. This study attempts todevelop and document how preferences forenvironmental strategies change over time.We also attempt to define specific stages ofenvironmental responsibility. It is hoped thatthis effort will help future practitioners andresearchers alike to more clearly understandenvironmental progress around the world.

Review of the literature andhypotheses

Environmental strategies:development of the independentvariable

Management scholars have developed exten-sive literature classifying management stra-tegies (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Hart,

0301–4797/01/060221C11 $35.00/0 2001 Academic Press

222 B. Clemens

1992; Huff and Reger, 1987; Lenway andRehbein, 1991; Miles and Snow, 1978;Mintzberg, 1989; Porter, 1980, 1985). Whilethe literature on political strategies is not asdeveloped as that of management strategies,it is growing quickly (Allison, 1971; Alpin andHegarty, 1980; Birnbaum, 1985; Elsbach andSutton, 1992; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Pfef-fer, 1981; Post, 1978; Schwenk, 1988; Suttonand Callahan, 1987).

Several authors have also developed typolo-gies of strategies to address the environment.Logsdon (1985) classified regulatory strate-gies in the refining industry. Klassen andWhybark (1999) classified regulatory strate-gies in manufacturing firms. Prakesh (2000)developed a four-level typology of strategiesaddressing inter-manager conflicts. Sharma(2000) classified environmental strategies inthe Canadian oil and gas industry. Bansaland Roth (2000) performed a qualitativestudy on factors that induce corporate ecolog-ical responsiveness in the United Kingdomand Japan.

We argue that these previous researchersdeveloped typologies for the purposes of theirparticular studies. Hillman and Hitt (1999)provide a more general typology focused onhow firms can proactively engage in polit-ical activity in their industry based onapproach, participation level, and strategy.Approach refers to firm’s responding to polit-ical issues on a case-by-case basis (trans-action) or undertaking general relationalpolitical strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999).Participation can be either on an individual orcollective basis. Strategies for political actioncan include either providing information (e.g.lobbying), financial incentives (e.g. campaigndonations), or building constituencies (Hill-man and Hitt, 1999).

We found Oliver (1991) to be the mostcomprehensive and broadly applicable typol-ogy. Oliver did not develop her typology forany specific industry or situation, as did thepreviously discussed authors. Oliver (1991)developed an expanded typology of 15 tac-tics and five strategies that organizations useto address regulatory interventions. WhileOliver’s typology was not designed to addressenvironmental strategies, we argue that itincorporates the components necessary tounderstand environmental strategies.

Institutional theory grounds Oliver’s the-ory and typology. Oliver (1990) theorized

that organizations exhibit a wide range ofstrategic behaviors in response to externalpressures. Oliver’s (1991) typology includes arange of five strategies from passive to active.The strategies, in order from most passiveto most active are acquiesce, compromise,avoid, defy and manipulate. Oliver (1991)further divided each of her five strategiesinto three tactics each. Her acquiesce strat-egy included the tactics of habit, imitate andcomply. The tactics of balance, bargain, andpacify made up the compromise strategy. Shedivided the avoid strategy into conceal, bufferand escape. The tactics of dismiss, confrontand attack were grouped as the defy strategy.The manipulate strategy included the tacticsof co-opt, influence and control. Therefore,her typology, displayed in Table 1, offers arange of up to 15 responses to environmentalregulation.

In addition to the aforementioned polit-ical strategies, strategy scholars have notneglected the social and legal aspects of envi-ronmental issues (Hart, 1995; Starik andRands, 1994). However, we argue that thereare some unique strategic issues for com-peting in environmental markets, as well assome new twists on well-understood strategyconcepts such as first mover advantages.

We recognize that Oliver’s typology ispolitical strategies, rather than environmen-tal strategies. Levy and Egan (2000) foundthat environmental strategies were a sub-set of political strategies. Therefore, we couldexpect that a number of Oliver’s tactics andstrategies may not apply to the environment.

We realize that many feel that an organiza-tion’s tactics and strategies are not stagnant.Indeed, Ansoff and McDonnell (1990), andMintzberg (1989) argue for a more organicapproach, which would recognize that anorganization would follow different tacticsand strategies based on the issue at hand.Mintzberg (1989) also argued that strategieswere a ‘pattern in a stream of decisions’.

Table 1. Oliver’s (1990, 1991) strategies andtactics

Strategies Tactics for each strategy

Acquiesce Habit, Imitate, ComplyCompromise Balance, Bargain, PacifyAvoid Conceal, Buffer, EscapeDefy Dismiss, Confront, AttackManipulate Co-Opt, Influence, Control

Changing environmental strategies over time 223

Indeed Oliver does not preclude an orga-nization’s changing strategies and tacticsover time.

Historical perspective: three phasesof environmental responsibility

Understanding the evolution of corporateenvironmental responsibility could helpstrengthen our quickly growing field. Schaferand Harvey (1998) described phases ofenvironmental responsibility. The authorscritically analyze some of the past modelsand perform an empirical analysis of fourcompanies in the UK water and electricityindustries. They found that the progressionof environmental responsibility in these com-panies fit poorly into the existing models.The authors called for further research onthe stages of environmental responsibility.

We will develop an argument that thetheory and practice of environmental respon-sibility has developed in three interrelatedphases—cost minimization, cost-effectivecompliance and beneficial environmental con-trols.

During the first phase, cost minimization,firms attempted to avoid or reduce compli-ance costs. Managers viewed investment inenvironmental protection as a direct drainon the bottom line. In the second phase,cost-effective compliance, firms learned thatenvironmental regulations would indeed beenforced. Mangers attempted to adopt envi-ronmental controls to avoid liabilities as cost-effectively as possible. In the third phase,beneficial environmental controls, certainfirms found that investments in environ-mental protection could provide a sustainedcompetitive advantage. A description of thethree phases follows:

Cost minimization

Silent Spring, the seminal book by RachelCarson (1962), awoke the United Statescitizenry from a slumber of environmentalneglect. The US Congress responded to pub-lic concerns quickly, passing far reachingenvironmental legislation and creating theEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA). The1960s marked the initiation of the first phaseof managerial response, cost minimization.

The prevailing economic view held that envi-ronmental expenditures negatively affectedfinancial performance (Bragdon and Marlin,1972). Many firms directly challenged EPA’sregulations and enforcement actions in court.

Soon after the first Earth Day in 1970, USscholars first began to investigate the rela-tionship between environmental responsive-ness and corporate performance (Wolozin,1971) The traditional thinking was that envi-ronmental controls decreased profits. Brag-don and Marlin’s (1972) and Day’s (1971)studies of the pulp and paper industry beganto cast doubts on the traditional thinking.

Cost-effective compliance

The second phase began as firms discoveredthat US consumers were willing to adjusttheir consumption habits to reflect their per-ceptions of a firm’s environmental perfor-mance. Many firms heard the message andresponded by developing corporate environ-mental strategies and forming environmentaldepartments.

During this phase, scholars recommendedinvestigating the relationship between envi-ronmental responsiveness and performanceover time (Spicer, 1978). Spicer found that‘. . .associations (between environmental res-ponsibility and corporate performance) maybe relatively short-lived phenomena undercircumstances where public pressure resultsin legislative mandates with respect to pollu-tion abatement’.

Beneficial environmental controls

The late 1980s saw the dawn of the argu-ment that environmental performance couldprovide a competitive advantage. Politicians(Gore, 1992), certain chief executive offi-cer’s of major chemical companies (Reilly,1990) and prominent scholars (Bowers, 1993;Cairncross, 1993; di Norcia et al., 1993;Halvorsen, 1991; Stead et al., 1998) arguedthat improved environmental responsivenessdoes not necessarily detract from a firm’sfinancial performance.

Scholars have theorized that the processof thinking green can benefit a firm inthree ways. First, consumers are becom-ing more environmentally aware and favor

224 B. Clemens

products from environmentally responsivefirms (Groenewegen and Vergragt, 1991;Porter, 1991; Prince and Denison, 1993;Reilly, 1990). Second, by thinking green, afirm becomes more efficient at exploitinginputs and minimizing wastes (Barrett, 1993;Kolluru, 1994). This philosophy could spillover into all production areas and improvefinancial performance. Finally, a firm hasseveral stakeholders, ranging from regula-tors to shareholders to customers, manywhom have environmental concerns. Orga-nizations recognize that a firm must addressstakeholder concerns to compete effectively(Buchholz, 1993; Cardskadden and Lober,1998; Martin et al., 1999).

Others have hypothesized that the prefer-able alternative is to convert the threat(environmental liability) into an opportunity(Marcus, 1988). Advocates of Total QualityEnvironmental Management (Sharfman andDean, 1991; Shrivastava, 1995:944) arguethat focusing on the environment ‘will opti-mize the ecological performance of the entirecorporate system’. King (1995) argued thatorganizing and managing natural resourcescan play a central role in avoiding surprises.Purser et al. (1995) argue that ecocentricorganizations will improve society. Clarkeand Roome (1999) identified the critical rolefor learning—action networks in the tran-sition to more sustainable business organi-zations and the need for these networks tobe supported by appropriate organizationalculture and processes. Steger (1996) arguedthat changing consumer behavior or a moreincentive and innovation oriented regulatoryapproach could be important toward benefi-cial environmental controls.

One example of a successful beneficial envi-ronmental control strategy is the Ernestand Julio Gallo Company. Facing potentiallystringent environmental regulations from theState of California, Gallo adopted an envi-ronmentally sensitive approach. Before lawrequired it, Gallo embraced organic farmingin the 1980s. According to Coleman Gallo,grandson of the founder, the approach haspaid off for Gallo but has also helped therest of the wine industry. Today, approxi-mately 25% of the California wine industryuses organic farming.

Even cotton farming, the showcase forthe benefits of chemical biocides, is experi-menting with organic farming. Information

indicates that the 100% increase in pricesfor naturally grown cotton products swampthe 10 to 15% increase in costs of organicproduction (National Public Radio, 1993).

The present

Results are mixed concerning the circum-stances under which environmental invest-ments can be beneficial (Turner et al., 1998).In 1994, the ‘Republican revolution’ swept theparty into majorities in both the US Houseand Senate for the first time in decades. Manyattribute the success of the Republicans andthe presence of other anti-federal governmentsentiments in the US to an overuse of thefederal regulatory mechanism. Even environ-mentalists view portions of the Superfundregulations as overly cumbersome and pre-scriptive. The US House of Representativesis considering legislation that would allowthe US EPA to waive regulation for thosethat can provide a more efficient way to pro-tect the environment. (Bureau of NationalAffairs, 1996).

The Washington Legal Foundation allegesthat EPA investigators violate the rightsof companies. The Foundation argues thatEPA should provide facilities with a writ-ten statement of rights before they enterpremises. The Foundation feels that overzeal-ous EPA investigators often violate the rightsof individuals as well as organizations. TheFoundation alleges that EPA ‘is increasinglyforegoing administrative and civil remediesfor environmental infractions and is arbitrar-ily seeking felony (emphasis added) criminalindictment even for minor offenses’ (Bureauof National Affairs, 1996:1580).

A case cited in the petition was filed in1994 against Benjamin Lacy, who owns asmall business that bottles apple juice. ‘TheJustice Department is seeking to incarcerateMr Lacy, a first offender, for a term of 27 to33 months for a minor infraction that couldhave easily been addressed by administrativeor civil penalties’ (p. 1582).

Although the evidence is growing thatan environmentally sound approach canenhance financial performance, the resultsare still mixed (Cordeiro and Sarkis, 1997).The debate continues past the 30th anniver-sary of the first Earth Day. In many ways,the current state of the debate on cor-porate and environmental performance is

Changing environmental strategies over time 225

similar to the early stages of the debateon strategic management. Both debates arefundamentally compilations of case-studies.Representatives of firms and environmen-tal organizations are accumulating excellentexamples of approaches (Smart, 1993). Aswas the case for strategic management inthe early years, the debate on environmen-tal and corporate performance must entera new stage to mature. It is importantto recognize the historical perspectives ofa firm’s attempts to address environmentalinitiatives. Theory on the interrelationshipbetween the private and public sector andthe further understanding of environmentalmanagement needs to be based on an under-standing of the past.

Combining strategies and phases

The previous section made the case thatthe private sector in the US passed throughthree stages phases of environmental respon-sibility. We offer that individual firms passthrough similar stages. Strannegard (2000)found a similar situation in Swedish multi-national manufacturing. Ghobadian et al.(1998) described how UK corporate strategieschanged over time. Above, we argued that afirm’s environmental strategies could be clas-sified using Oliver’s (1990, 1991) typology.Our hypotheses will combine these two con-cepts—environmental strategies and phasesof environmental responsibility.

We offer that preferences for acquiesce(most passive) and manipulate (most active)strategies will vary over time. The literaturerecognizes the degree to which strategieschange over time (Chandler, 1962; Romanelliand Tushman, 1994). We suggest that duringearly stages of environmental responsibility,many firms favor tentative, passive andacquiescent managerial strategies. As theirconfidence and experience increase, theybecome more comfortable with bolder, attimes risky, strategies such as manipulation.

We understand that others may argue thecontrary. These ‘contrarians’ could reasonthat experienced firms may be more conser-vative and risk averse due to earlier setbacksthey experienced. Further less experiencedfirms may tend to be bold and risk seekingas they are still naıve about environmentalrealities. Our study will investigate thisintriguing paradox.

One additional issue is the impact of theUS political process on businesses during thetime frame of our study. Perhaps the mostdraconian political change in the US over thepast century was the Republican revolutionthat swept the US House and Senate in1994. The Republican Party is known as thebusiness friendly alternative in US politics.We offer that US firms would be more willingto try active strategies, such as manipulationunder Republican oversight.

The preceding would lead one to arguethat in earlier stages, Cost Minimization,firms prefer to acquiesce rather than manip-ulate. In the later stages, Beneficial Environ-mental Controls, firms opt for manipulationrather than acquiesce strategies. We offerthat the early stages of a firm’s develop-ment, the formative years, managers havea lower preference for active strategies suchas manipulation and a higher preferencefor passive strategies such as acquiesce. Inthe later years, when firms could be consid-ered ‘senior citizens’, managers have a lowerpreference for passive strategies such asacquiesce and a higher preference for activestrategies such as manipulate. Figure 1 pro-vides a graphical description of these pointsand our hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: over time, firms will modifyenvironmental strategies.Hypothesis 1A: over time, firms will be lesslikely to prefer acquiescence strategies,typical of the first phase of environmentalresponsibility—cost-effective controls.Hypothesis 1B: over time, firms will bemore likely to prefer manipulation strate-gies, more typical of the third phase ofenvironmental responsibility—beneficialenvironmental controls.

Data analysis

The majority of our data flow from two sur-veys of the US steel industry in 1993 and1997. We followed the methods describedby Dillman (1978) and Salant and Dillman(1995) to maximize our response rate. Wereceived 417 responses to our 1993 surveyand 172 responses to our 1997 survey—aresponse rate of 31%. Of our respondents,51% were owners, 17% were operationsmanagers and 14% were environmentalmanagers. The remainder included technicalmanagers and other representatives. The

226 B. Clemens

Highpreferences

Preferencefor

strategies

Lowpreferences

Formativeyears

MANIPULATE

Seniorcitizens

ACQUIESCE

Organizational and strategicpuberty

Beneficial environmental controlsCost-effective complianceCost minimization

Time

Figure 1. The evolution of an organizational environmental consciousness.

Table 2. Means, standard deviations, correlations and sample sizes

Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4

1Ð001. Acquiesce 1997 5Ð19 0Ð83 170

0Ð38ŁŁ 1Ð002. Manipulate 1997 4Ð21 0Ð96 168 168

0Ð18Ł 0Ð025 1Ð003. Acquiesce 1993 3Ð37 0Ð98 127 127 394

0Ð15 0Ð27ŁŁ 0Ð63ŁŁ 1Ð004. Manipulate 1993 3Ð20 1Ð08 127 127 394 394

The top number in each cell in columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 is the Pearson Correlation Coefficient, the bottom numberis the number of relevant observations.ŁCorrelation is significant at the 0Ð05 level.ŁŁCorrelation is significant at the 0Ð01 level.

1993 and 1997 surveys are available fromthe author. Table 2 provides the descriptivestatistics. We confirmed normality, calcu-lated DF Betas, and checked for multi-collinearity. All diagnostics were withintolerances (Neter et al., 1990).

Measures

Table 3 displays how we measured thestrategies acquiesce and manipulate. Thespecific survey wording of the items that weused to measure each tactic are listed in thedescription column in Table 3. For example,to measure preference for the tactic ‘habit’ weasked respondents to rate the effectiveness ofthe following tactics: (1) follow the approachmost commonly used in the past by ourorganization; and (2) speak with others in ourfirm and adopt the most effective approachused in the past.

Hypothesis 1A predicted that the mean ofthe preference for acquiesce strategies woulddecrease from 1993 to 1997. Oliver theorizedthat the tactics habit, imitate and complycombined to describe a acquiesce strategy.The measure for acquiesce in the surveyswas the mean of the respondent’s preferencesfor habit, imitate and comply. SubstantiatingOliver’s theory, the Cronbach’s alpha forhabit, imitate and comply in 1993 was 0Ð78.In the 1997 survey the Cronbach’s alpha forthe items corresponding to the similar tacticswas 0Ð69.

Hypothesis 1B addressed the preferencefor manipulation strategies. Oliver theorizedthat the tactics co-opt, influence and controlcombined to describe a manipulate strat-egy. Again we found support for Oliver inthat the Cronbach’s alpha for these threemanipulation tactics from the 1993 data was0Ð89. Cronbach’s alpha for the items that

Changing environmental strategies over time 227

Table 3. Survey measures for acquiesce and manipulate—Oliver (1990, 1991)

Strategy Tactics Description

Acquiesce Habit 1. Follow the approach most commonly used in the past by ourorganization

2. Speak with others in our firm and adopt the most effective approachused in the past

Imitate 1. Speak with other successful associates in our firm and adopt a similarposition

2. Follow the approach used by successful managers in other steel firms

Comply 1. Communicate with the relevant regulators to determine the best way tocomply with the spirit and intent of the requirements

2. Make a conscious evaluation of the specific regulatory requirementsand choose to comply with them

Manipulate Co-opt 1. Attempt to form an alliance with the regulators2. Attempt to include a member of the regulators on an advisory board to

oversee operations

Influence 1. Attempt to influence public perceptions on the need for cost-effectiverequirements to avoid radioactive contamination

2. Organize our suppliers and customers to attempt to influence therequirements

Control 1. Meet with elected legislatures to attempt to control the regulators2. Attempt to deal with federal regulators to control the state or local

government

Table 4. t-tests for paired samples

Variable Mean Paired differences

t-value Degrees of freedom Significance

Acquiesce 1997 5Ð2 21Ð44 145 0Ð000Acquiesce 1993 3Ð4Manipulate 1997 4Ð2 10Ð05 143 0Ð000Manipulate 1993 3Ð2

comprise these tactics was 0Ð62 in the 1997survey.

In Table 4, ‘Acquiesce 1997’ is the mean ofthe tactics habit, imitate and comply in the1997 survey. ‘Acquiesce 1993’ is the meanof the corresponding tactics from our 1993survey. In the Table, ‘Manipulate 1997’ isthe mean of the respondents preferences forthe co-opt, influence and control tactics in the1997 survey. ‘Manipulate 1993’ is the mean ofthe preference for the corresponding tacticsin the 1993 survey.

Results

We found support for Hypothesis 1 and 1B.Our analysis did not support Hypotheses 1A.Our paired sample t-tests in Table 4 founda significant relationship between prefer-ences for manipulation and acquiescence. As

hypothesized, we found our respondents pre-ferred manipulation strategies to a greaterdegree in 1997 than in 1993 (4Ð2 vs. 3Ð2).

We found a similarly strong relationshipbetween preferences for acquiescence strate-gies in 1993 and 1997. We had hypothesizedthat our respondents would find acquies-cence less attractive. It is surprising that ourrespondents viewed acquiescence more favor-ably in 1997 (5Ð2 vs. 3Ð4). One possible expla-nation is the greater uncertainty facing thesteel industry in environmental regulationsin 1997 than in 1993. The US EPA and theUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)tried unsuccessfully to promulgate rules toaddress the steel firms from 1993 to 1997.The inability of EPA and NRC could haveadded to the steel industry’s uncertainty.

The impact of uncertainty on decision-making is a well-studied phenomenon. Formore than a half of a century, management

228 B. Clemens

theorists have argued that external condi-tions such as uncertainty are highly relatedto an organization’s strategies (Barnard,1938; Chandler, 1962; Ridgely and Lumpkin,2000). Indeed Oliver (1991) theorized that inhighly uncertain business environment, man-agers will favor passive strategies. Thus theincreased uncertainty could have confoundedor drowned out other factors. The uncer-tainty in the environmental regulations couldhave caused managers to prefer acquiesce(more passive) strategies more than would beexpected in a less uncertain business envi-ronment.

Limitations

Ghobadian et al. (1998) posit and interest-ing model in which external factors (envi-ronmental interventions, market behaviorand social expectation) determine environ-mental strategies. The authors argue thatthe relationship is mediated and moder-ated by several factors in a firm’s decision-making process. Mediating influences includeleadership, corporate tradition, and corpo-rate ethics. Further, they offer that techno-logy, human resource availability, capital,and organizational adaptability moderate therelationship. Our proposed model is inten-tionally simple. In particular our modelis weak in international legal and macro-economic issues, which are highly county-specific. Many potentially additional factorscome into play. Indeed our constructs aremulti-dimensional concepts. We encourageresearchers to investigate these issues froman international legal and macro-economicperspective. We also encourage researchersto investigate if the same mediating and mod-erating variables, as described by Ghobadianet al. (1998) would better explain the rela-tionships that we have studied.

Discussion

Extension of Oliver’s theories

We join Hass (1996) in calling for more empir-ically derived environmental managementmodels. We feel the evaluation of Oliver’stheories from the institutional field could fur-ther strengthen theories on environmentalmanagement strategies. We also believe that

increased understanding of the relationshipbetween business and government on envi-ronmental issues can contribute to sustain-able development. In the words of Gladwinet al. (1995:900), ‘transforming managementtheory and practice so that they positivelycontribute to sustainable development is, inour view, the greatest challenge . . .’ It ishoped that our research will help facilitatethe transformation.

Our hypotheses addressed two of Oliver’sstrategies at the ends of the continuum—acquiesce and manipulate. We felt this wasthe best way to test the theory. We encour-age researchers to test and refine our theoryon environmental strategies and test Oliver’sstrategies in other contexts. We offer that thiseffort will help address Fuchs and Mazma-nian’s (1998) concerns that our understand-ing of greening has be hampered by a lack oftheoretical and methodological rigor.

The historical perspective

The debate on environmental, industry andfirm strategy continues. We join Welford(1998) and recommend that future resear-chers go beyond the current efforts to compileindividual firm case-studies. Industry levelstudies, such as ours, can also increase theunderstanding of this complex debate. Brownand Harris (1999) wrote that studies overtime, such as ours, may add new dimensionsto such debates. Further, Starik and Mar-cus (2000) argued that few researchers haveattempted longitudinal analyses in the envi-ronmental field. Many environmental issuesare best viewed over time. A meta-analysis ofthe existing case and industry studies wouldalso be beneficial.

We hope that other researchers will be ableto demonstrate and document how firms passthrough different stages. Our study focusedon the steel industry in the United States.We chose the US steel industry as the majorenvironmental actor in the United States(EPA, 1995). We hope that future studies willtest our methodology and findings in othercontexts.

Management implications

We add to the preponderance of the evidence(Schaefer and Harvey, 1998) that firms pass

Changing environmental strategies over time 229

through stages of environmental responsibil-ity. Management, especially owners, boardsof directors and high level managers shouldrecognize potential implications of the envi-ronment. We argue that upper level man-agement should provide sufficient flexibilityto environmental professionals to tailor themost effective environmental strategies. Wealso offer that corporate strategies shouldinclude issues dealing with potential changesin environmental strategies. In the wordsof Jørgensen (2000:60) ‘The organizations’ability to change is crucial in order to estab-lish a dynamic environmental managementsystem and to achieve continuous environ-mental improvements’. Finally, our effortshave led us to understand and support Wolff’s(1998) recommendation that building uponmanagement literature and research willsignificantly improve future environmentalresearch.

Management should continue to recognizethat macro-economic and legal issues affectenvironmental strategies. Governments canhave a significant impact on environmentalmanagement strategies (Starik and Rands,1994; Yao, 1999). The Republican revolutionin the US in 1994 is an example of suchgovernment impact. Good management willrealize the importance of addressing govern-mental issues relating to the environment.Our study argues that the US steel industryrecognized the importance of such govern-ment policies and modified their strategiesaccordingly.

Acknowledgements

This effort was partially funded by the UnitedStates Environmental Protection Agency but doesnot constitute an endorsement. Two blind review-ers and Professor E. F. Bruenig provided sub-stantial advice and assistance. We also thankScott Gallagher, Christine Oliver, Michael Stahl,Michael Feldman, Philip DuBose, Paul Bierly,Louise Clemens, Deborah Juhasz and Rachel Gell-man for advice and support.

References

Allison, G. T. (1971). The Essence of Decision.Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Alpin, J. C. and Hegarty, W. H. (1980). Politicalinfluence: strategies employed by organizationsto impact legislation in business and economic

matters. Academy of Management Journal. 23,438–450.

Ansoff, I. and McDonnell, E. (1990). Implant-ing Strategic Management. Prentice Hall: NewYork.

Bansal, P and Roth, K. (2000). Why companiesgo green: a model of ecological responsiveness.Academy of Management Journal 43, 717–76.

Barnard, C. I. and Andrew, K. R. (1968). TheFunctions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.

Barrett, S. (1993). Strategy and the environ-ment. The Columbia Journal of World BusinessFall/Winter, 203–208.

Birnbaum, P. H. (1985). Political strategies ofregulated organizations as functions of contextand fear. Strategic Management Journal 6,135–150.

Bowers, B. (1993). Pollution Control and PollutionPrevention: Relationships to Financial Perfor-mance. PhD Thesis. Louisiana Tech University.

Bragdon, J. H. J. and Marlin, J. A. T. (1972). Ispollution profitable? Risk Management April,9–18.

Brown, G. and Harris, C. C. (1999). The US ForestService: whither the new resource managementparadigm? Journal of Environmental Manage-ment 58, 1–19.

Buchholz, R. A. (1993). Principles of Environ-mental Management: The Greening of Business.Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Bureau of National Affairs (1996). The Environ-mental Reporter, pp. 1580–1158.

Cairncross, F. (1993). Costing the Earth. Cam-bridge: Harvard Business School Press.

Cardskadden, H. and Lober, D.J. (1998). Environ-mental stakeholder management as businessstrategy: the case of the corporate wildlife habi-tat enhancement programme. Journal of Envi-ronmental Management 52, 183–202

Carson, R. (1962). Silent Spring. New York: MilesStone.

Chandler, A. D. J. (1962). Strategy and Struc-ture: Chapters in the History of the AmericanIndustrial Enterprise. Cambridge, MA: The MITPress.

Clarke, S. and Roome, N. (1999). Sustainablebusiness: learning-action networks as organi-zational assets. Business Strategy and the Envi-ronment 8, 296–310.

Cordeiro, J. J. and Sarkis, J. (1997). Environmen-tal pro-activism and firm performance. BusinessStrategy and the Environment 6, 104–114.

Day, J. (1971). Do ecology and profits mix? TheExchange November, 13–15.

Dillman, D. A. (1978). Mail and Telephone Sur-veys: The Total Design Method. New York: JohnWiley and Sons.

di Norcia, V., Cotton, B. and Dodge, J. (1993).Environmental performance and competitiveadvantage in Canada’s paper industry. BusinessStrategy and the Environment 2, 1–9.

Eisenhardt, K. M. and Zbaracki, M. J. (1992).Strategic decision making. Strategic Manage-ment Journal 13, 17–37.

230 B. Clemens

Elsbach, K. D. and Sutton, R. I. (1992). Acquir-ing organizational legitimacy through illegiti-mate actions: a marriage of institutional andimpression management theories. Academy ofManagement Journal 35, 699–738.

EPA (1995). Source Sector Notebook—Iron andSteel Industry. Washington DC: EPA.

Fuchs, D. A. and Mazmanian, D. A. (1998). Thegreening of industry: needs of the field. BusinessStrategy and the Environment 7, 193–203.

Ghobadian, A., Viney, H., Liu, J. and James, P.(1998). Extending linear approaches to mappingcorporate environmental behaviour. BusinessStrategy and the Environment 7, 13–23.

Gladwin, T. N., Kennelly, J. J. and Krause, T. S.(1995). Shifting paradigms for sustainabledevelopment: Implications for management the-ory and research. Academy of ManagementReview 20, 874–907.

Gore, A. (1992). Earth in the Balance: Ecology andthe Human Spirit. New York: Houghton MifflinCompany.

Groenewegen, P. and Vergragt, P. (1991). Environ-mental issues as threats and opportunities fortechnological innovation. Technology Analysisand Strategic Management 3, 43–55.

Halvorsen, R. and Smith, T. R. (1991). A test of thetheory of exhaustible resources. The QuarterlyJournal of Economics 106, 123–140.

Hart, S. L. (1992). An integrative framework forstrategy-making processes. Academy of Man-agement Review 17, 327–351.

Hass, J. L. (1996). Environmental (‘green’) man-agement typologies: an evaluation, operational-ization and empirical development. BusinessStrategy and the Environment 5, 59–68.

Hillman, A. and Hitt, M. (1999). Corporate polit-ical strategy formulation: a model of approach,participation, and strategy decisions. Academyof Management Review 24, 825–842.

Huff, A. S. and Reger, R. K. (1987). A review ofstrategic process research. Journal of Manage-ment 13, 211–236.

Jørgensen, T. H. (2000). Environmental manage-ment systems and organizational change. Eco-Management and Auditing 7, 60–66.

King, A. (1995). Avoiding ecological surpri-ses: lessons from long-standing communities.Academy of Management Review 20, 961–985.

Klassen, R. D. and Whybark, D. C. (1999). Envi-ronmental management in operations: the selec-tion of environmental technologies. DecisionSciences 30, 601–631.

Kolluru, R. V. (1994). Environmental StrategiesHandbook. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Lenway, S. A. and Rehbein, K. (1991). Leaders,followers and free riders: an empirical testof variation in corporate political involvement.Academy of Management Journal 34, 893–905.

Levy, D. L. and Egan, D. (2000). A Neo-GramscianApproach to Business—Society Relations: Con-flict and Accommodation in the Climate ChangeNegotiations. Academy of Management AnnualMeeting: Toronto, August 2000.

Logsdon, J. (1985). Organizational responses toenvironmental issues. In Research in Corporate

Social Performance and Policy (Preston, L., ed.),pp. 25–46. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Marcus, A. A. (1988). Responses to externallyinduced innovation: their effects on organi-zational performance. Strategic ManagementJournal 9, 387–402.

Martin, W. E., Wise Bender, H. and Shields, D. J.(1999). Stakeholder objectives for public lands:rankings of forest management alternatives.Journal of Environmental Management 58,21–32.

Miles, R. E. and Snow, C. C. (1978). OrganizationalStrategy, Structure, and Process. New York:McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.

Mintzberg, H. (1989). Mintzberg on Management:Inside Our Strange World of Organizations. NewYork: Free Press.

National Public Radio (1993). All Things Consid-ered. November 1–2.

Neter, J., Wasserman, W. and Kutner, M. H.(1990). Applied Linear Statistical Models. Home-wood, IL: Irwin.

Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorgani-zational relationships: integrations and futuredirections. Academy of Management Review 15,241–265.

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to insti-tutional processes. Academy of ManagementReview 16, 145–179.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). Political Strategies and Tactics.London: Pitman.

Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy: Tech-niques for Analyzing Industries and Competi-tors. New York: The Free Press.

Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive Advantage:Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance.New York: The Free Press.

Porter, M. E. (1991). Essay: America’s greenstrategy. Scientific American April, 168.

Post, J. E. (1978). Research on patterns of corpo-rate response to social change. In Research inCorporate Social Performance and Policy (Pre-ston L. E., ed.), pp. 55–77. Greenwich, CT: JAIPress Inc.

Prakesh, A. (1999). A new institutionalist perspec-tive on ISO 14000 and Responsible Care. Busi-ness Strategy and the Environment 8, 336–357.

Prince, J. and Denison, R. A. (1993). McWastereduction pattern for business. EPA Journal239–260.

Purser, R. E., Park, C. and Alfonso, M. (1995). Lim-its to anthroprocentrisim: toward an ecocentricorganization paradigm? Academy of Manage-ment Review 20, 1053–1089.

Reilly, W. K. (1990). The green thumb of capital-ism. Policy Review Fall, 16–21.

Ridgley, M. and Lumpkin, C. A. (2000). The bi-polar resource-allocation model problem underuncertainty and conflict: a general methodol-ogy for the public decision-maker. Journal ofEnvironmental Management 59, 89–105.

Romanelli, E. and Tushman, M. L. (1994). Orga-nizational transformation as punctuated equi-librium: an empirical test. Academy of Manage-ment Journal 37, 1141–1166.

Changing environmental strategies over time 231

Salant, P. and Dillman, D. A. (1994). ConductingSurveys: A Step-by-Step Guide to Getting theInformation. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Schaefer, A. and Harvey, B. (1998). Stage modelsof corporate greening: a critical evaluation. Busi-ness Strategy and the Environment 7, 109–123.

Schwenk, C. R. (1988). The Essence of StrategicDecision Making. New York: Lexington Books.

Sharfman, M. P. and Dean, J. W. J. (1991). Con-ceptualizing and measuring the organizationalenvironment: a multidimensional approach.Journal of Management 17, 681–700.

Sharma, S. (2000). Managerial interpretationsand organizational context as predictors ofcorporate choice of environmental strategy.Academy of Management Journal 43, 681–697.

Shrivastava, P. (1995). The role of corporations inachieving ecological sustainability. Academy ofManagement Review 20, 936–960.

Smart, B. (1992). Beyond Compliance: A NewIndustry View of the Environment. Washington:World Resources Institute.

Spicer, B. H. (1978). Investors, corporate socialperformance and information disclosure: anempirical study. The Accounting Review 53,94–111.

Starik, M. and Marcus, A. (2000). Special researchforum on the management of organizations inthe natural environment: a field emerging frommultiple paths, with many challenges ahead.Academy of Management Journal 43, 539–547.

Starik, M. and Rands, G. P. (1994). Weaving anintegrated web: multilevel and multisystem per-spective of ecologically sustainable corporations.Academy of Management Review 20, 908–935.

Stead, E., McKinney, M. M. and Stead, J. G.(1998). Institutionalizing environmental perfor-mance in US industry: is it happening and whatif it does not. Business Strategy and the Envi-ronment 7, 261–270.

Steger, U. (1996). Managerial issues in closing theloop. Business Strategy and the Environment 5,252–268.

Strannegard, L. (2000). Flexible couplings: com-bining business goals and environmental con-cern. Business Strategy and the Environment 9,163–174.

Sutton, R. I. and Callahan, A. L. (1987). The stigmaof bankruptcy: spoiled organizational imageand its management. Academy of ManagementJournal 30, 405–436.

Turner, R.K., Salmons, R., Powell, J. andCraighill, A. (1998). Green taxes, waste man-agement and political economy. Journal of Envi-ronmental Management 53, 121–136.

Welford, R. J. (1998). Editorial: corporate environ-mental management, technology and sustain-able development: postmodern perspectives andthe need for a critical research agenda. BusinessStrategy and the Environment 7, 1–12.

Wolff, R. (1998). Beyond environmental manage-ment: perspectives on environmental and man-agement research. Business Strategy and theEnvironment 7, 297–308.

Wolozin, H. (1971). Environmental control at thecrossroads. Journal of Economic Issues 5, 26–41.

Yao, S. (1999). Efficiency impacts of governmentpolicy on agricultural production in the pres-ence of externalities. Journal of EnvironmentalManagement 55, 57–67.