ChallengingReligious

Issues

ISSN 2053-5163Issue 9

Autumn 2015

Supporting A-level Religious Studies. The St Mary’s and St Giles’ Centre

Richard Bartholomewon Approaching NewReligious Movements

Jeff Astleyon John Hick’s

Philosophy of Religion

Peter Wattson The Jesus of Historyand the Christ of Faith

Declan O’Sullivanon The Five Pillars of

Islam and theirSignificance in Modern

Society

Challenging Religious Issues

Supporting Religious Studies at A-level and beyond

Issue 9 Autumn 2015

Contents

Approaching New Religious MovementsRichard Bartholomew

John Hick’s Philosophy of ReligionJeff Astley

The Jesus of History and the Christ of FaithPeter Watts

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern SocietyDeclan O’Sullivan

Editor

3URIHVVRU�-HII�$VWOH\��*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\�Managing Editor

Dr Tania ap Siôn (University of Warwick, The St Mary’s and St Giles’ Centre)Editorial Advisors

Professor Leslie J. Francis (University of Warwick)Libby Jones (The St Giles’ Centre, Wrexham)3URIHVVRU�'DYLG�/DQNVKHDU��*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\�3URIHVVRU�:LOOLDP�.��.D\��*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\�Phil Lord (System leader, GwE)Professor Peter Neil (Bishop Grosseteste University)Dr Stephen Parker (University of Worcester)-HQQ\�5ROSK��*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\�'U�3DXO�5ROSK��*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\�Mary Stallard (The St Giles’ Centre, Wrexham)7KH�5LJKW�5HYG�'U�'DYLG�:DONHU��*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\�Design: Phillip VernonChallenging Religious IssuesThe St Mary’s and St Giles’ CentreLlys OnnenAbergwyngregynGwyneddLL33 0LDTelephone: 01248 680131E-mail: t.apsion@glyndwr.ac.ukWebsite: www.st-marys-centre.org.uk

Sponsored by the Welsh Government

2

8

16

22

St Mary’s and St Giles’ CentreISSN 2053-5163

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 2

Challenging Religious IssuesIssue 9 Autumn 2015© Richard Bartholomew

Approaching New Religious Movements

Richard BartholomewThis article suggests that New Religious Movements should be understood asresponses to the structure and knowledge of the modern world. It explains that‘alternative’ religious beliefs and ideas can be found in individualised contexts as wellas in formal groups, and argues for a balanced approach to whether particular NRMsare socially problematic. It further argues that NRMs should not be ‘exoticised’, andthat they are of interest because of the insights they can offer into religion moregenerally.

Specification link: WJEC/CBAC RS1/2 CS: Introduction to Religion in ContemporarySociety (AS), 3. Religion and Community.

Defining new religious

movements

In popular usage, non-mainstreamreligious groups are often described as‘cults’ or ‘sects’. Sociologists of religionalso use these words, but in a morecircumscribed way, and they are wary ofhow these labels may imply a negativebias: Christian publications sometimesuse ‘cult’ to refer to groups that theybelieve hold ‘unorthodox’ theologicalviews. The term ‘New ReligiousMovement’ is a neutral alternative,although the historical context in which agroup might be defined as ‘New’ may infact now be some time in the past. It is ofcourse possible to refer in a general wayto ‘new religious movements’ in previoushistorical eras (for example, the Catharsof medieval France, or even the

Christians of the first century), but theformal term has not been embraced byhistorians and an ‘NRM’ is usuallyunderstood as meaning a movement thathas emerged in the modern era, and inresponse to the conditions of modernity.These conditions include new patterns ofsocial organisation, globalisingcommunication networks, and increasingindividualism and consumerism.

However, just as no one wouldannounce that they belong to a ‘cult’,adherents do not usually see themselvesas members of ‘New Religions’ but ratheras belonging to organisations with new –or rediscovered – insights on ancienttruths. The Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, for instance, dates to1830, but adherents believe that TheBook of Mormon, which was first

Approaching New Religious Movements

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 3

published in that year, is in fact anancient text that complements the Bible.NRMs assimilate ancient beliefs and/oradapt them to subsequent knowledge:The Book of Mormon connects thehistory of the Israelites and the life ofJesus to the Americas; the Baha’i Faithregards its nineteenth-century founder asthe fulfilment of a revelation from Godthat encompasses Moses, Jesus,Muhammad, and other prophets; theUnification Church (members of whichdislike being called ‘Moonies’) connectsConfucian ideas about the family to thework of Jesus. UFO groups like theRaëlians connect ancient religion withmodern scientific cosmology by re-interpreting Jesus and the Buddha asextra-terrestrials.

The old idea of new religions

Many of the groups that are usually citedwhen the subject of ‘New Religions’comes up have been established in theUK and other countries now for two orthree generations or more. Charismaticfounders have died, and theirorganisations are now run along morebureaucratic lines; members may havebeen raised within the group, rather thanbeing converts. Occasionally, celebrityfads bring new trends to public notice(such as the singer Madonna’sassociation with Michael Berg’sKabbalah Centre), but it is difficult toimagine a group leader capturing thepublic imagination in the same way asReverend Sun Myung Moon (founder ofthe Unification Church) or L. RonHubbard (founder of Scientology) inprevious decades.

This is perhaps because the context inwhich people choose alternative religiousidentities in the UK has changed. In the1950s and 1960s, NRMs in the Westwere part of a ‘counter-culture’ in which

young people rejected social conformityin matters of dress, lifestyle and genderroles, and questioned the assumptionthat the scientific rationalism andreligious heritage of the West offered thebest way to understand the universe andfacilitate personal growth and wellbeing.That historical moment has passed, andthe primacy of personal choice is nowtaken for granted in today’s consumersociety. Identifying with religious ideasthat either emerged or spread to theWest during the twentieth century is nomore counter-cultural than expressing apreference for non-traditional cuisine.

Alternative beliefs and

individuals

However, adhering to non-traditionalideas does not necessarily implymembership of a particular organisation,much less ‘total commitment’ to a cause.Tibetan Buddhism, for instance, is arelatively new set of religious ideas in theWest, but although books by the DalaiLama are bestsellers, his popularity isnot reflected in a flood of new membersof Buddhist organisations. Organisationsand individuals offering spiritual servicesand teachings may attract customersrather than members or followers.

One example of religious individualismis to be found in a recent interview withNoel Edmonds, a popular televisionpresenter. According to Edmonds:

If you want to be happy you need tothink of yourself as a container ofenergy. There is a universal energy,yes of course, it embraces us.

When you appreciate this, lifebecomes a lot more exciting. Youdon’t live life, life lives you. There isn’tsuch a thing as death, it’s justdeparture. You cannot die. It’s beenknown for a very long time.

Approaching New Religious Movements

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 4

The energy leaves your container butit has to go somewhere. You cannotdestroy energy. My energy will returnto where it came from – part of amassive, incomprehensible universalweb of energy.’ (Edmonds, in Jeffriesand Bellfield, 2015)

Such beliefs are instantly recognisableas belonging to a ‘New Age’ milieu inwhich vaguely scientific and spiritualterms are intermixed, although Edmondsdoes not name any specific book orteacher.

Individualised religion has also beennoted in relation to the USA. In 1996,sociologists interviewed a woman whoexplained her religious faith of‘Sheilaism’, named for herself:

I believe in God. I’m not a religiousfanatic. I can’t remember the last timeI went to church. My faith has carriedme a long way. It’s Sheilaism. Just myown little voice... It’s just try to loveyourself and be gentle with yourself.You know, I guess, take care of eachother. I think He would want us to takecare of each other. (in Bellah et al.,2008 [1985], p. 221)

The authors raised the possibility of therebeing ‘over 220 million Americanreligions, one for each of us’.

It is not the case, however, that allreligious beliefs are given the sameamount of respect: Edmonds’ beliefswere reported in the media in a flippanttone, with an undercurrent of mockery.

NRMs and extremism

Despite the individualising trendsdiscussed above, people do still continueas members of religious groups – andlike religious beliefs, not all groups areregarded equally. Consider, for example,

what would happen if a seriouscontender for Prime Minister at the nextnational election were a member of anNRM. Questions would be asked aboutwhether the candidate’s unusualreligious beliefs were a sign of poorjudgement, or perhaps even of mentalinstability. There would also be concernsthat the group’s leadership would havean improper influence in running thecountry.

Such worries would reflect oldconcerns about NRMs: that groups havea dysfunctional relationship with widersociety, and that members are in thrall toauthoritarian leaders and irrationaldoctrines. Talk of ‘cults’ immediatelybrings to mind a roll-call of tragedies,such as the Sarin gas attack on theTokyo subway 20 years ago, or the masssuicide in Jonestown, Guyana, in 1978.Sociologists of religion, by attempting topresent NRMs sympathetically, havebeen accused of ignoring abuses and ofacting as ‘cult apologists’. One scholar,writing a few years after the attack inTokyo, observed that:

In recent years, the NRM researchcommunity displayed a generalagreement on a hierarchy of credibility. . . according to which self-presentation by NRMs wasepistemologically and logicallysuperior to all outside accounts andobservations. . . . Recent historical-behavioral autopsies enable us torealize that in every single caseallegations by hostile outsiders, critics,and detractors have sometimes beencloser to reality than any otheraccounts . . . Ever since Jonestown,statements by ex-members turned outto be just as accurate or more so thanthose of apologists and NRM

Approaching New Religious Movements

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 5

researchers. (Beit-Hallahmi 2001,pp. 39, 62)

NRMs face persecution or strict controlsin a number of countries. In some casesthis is simply because an authoritariangovernment does not want there to benew social movements of any kind overwhich it does not have control;alternatively, there may be close linksbetween a government and a particularreligion. However, there may also begenuine concerns: in China, for instance,a Christian-based NRM in the mid-nineteenth century called the TaipingHeavenly Kingdom sparked a civil war inthe south of the country.

If we focus less on the novel doctrinesof New Religions – a tendency that canbe seen as a form of exoticisation – andmore on religious behaviour in general,we can sum up the broader concern inone phrase that is currently popular inthe UK: religious extremism. For‘mainstream’ members of a religion,‘extreme’ means ‘distorted’ or‘unbalanced’, and this is how religiousgroups tend to regard breakaway sects.For the adherent, however, ‘extreme’signifies ‘purity’ and ‘total commitment’,in contrast to the comfortable butcompromised religious mainstream.Some NRMs may thus provide insightsinto the allure of Islamic State for someyoung Muslims in the UK.

Normalising NRMs

In some ways, interest in NRMs isdisproportionate to numbers andinfluence: the Unification Church, forinstance, has just a few hundredmembers in the UK. Most groups goabout their business without conflict withthe authorities. Even the ‘New Age’appeals to just a minority of (mainlymiddle-class) individuals, and there is

little evidence of such beliefs having anoticeable impact on how people livetheir lives. However, NRMs are worthstudying for what they tell us aboutreligion in general.

A famous example here is WhenProphecy Fails, which was published in1956. The authors studied a group in theUSA which believed that on a certaindate in the near future aliens wouldarrive and rescue them from a worldwidedisaster. The researchers were interestedin finding out how members of the groupwould react when the day came and theworld continued as usual (controversially,they gathered their data by pretending toshare the group’s beliefs, rather thanasking the group’s consent; this kind ofinfiltration was later criticised asunethical).

Fortunately for the purposes of thestudy, the aliens did not arrive, and theresearchers were in a position to explorehow the adherents coped with theresulting ‘cognitive dissonance’, a mentaldiscomfort caused by holdingcontradictory beliefs:

There is a way in which the remainingdissonance can be reduced. If moreand more people can be persuadedthat the system of belief is correct,then clearly it must, after all, becorrect. Consider the extreme case: ifeveryone in the whole world believedsomething there would be no questionat all as to the validity of this belief. Itis for this reason that we observe theincrease in proselytizing followingdisconfirmation. (Festinger et al., 2008[1956], p. 30)

The authors drew parallels with othersituations, and also tentatively suggestedthat their finding may help to explain therise of Christianity following the

Approaching New Religious Movements

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 6

crucifixion of Jesus. Like all other classicstudies, When Prophecy Fails has beensubjected to criticism in the light offurther research and analysis, but itremains a starting point for thinkingabout a particular dynamic within religion,and social psychology more broadly.

Further, if NRMs can tells us aboutreligious extremism, they can also tell usabout developments within mainstreamreligion. For example, Pentecostalism isseen as a new movement withinEvangelical Christianity, but not as anNRM. Like an NRM, however, thePentecostal movement is oftencharacterised by new churches withcharismatic leaders. Some of theseleaders claim to receive messages fromGod, and to be empowered to performsupernatural healings; in some cases ofstrict leadership, there are accusationsfrom ex-members and outsiders of ‘cult-like behaviour’.

One study of Pentecostalism in theUSA is famously entitled Vision of theDisinherited. According to the author:

I would hazard the hypothesis thatstatus deprivation and an anti-rationalist, anti-bureaucratic – i.e.,

anti-modern – temper has combinedto predispose most of the recruits tothe neo-Pentecostal movement.Pentecostals, old and new, havetypically testified that before theirconversion to Pentecostalism they feltempty and hungry for God or forsomething they could not articulate. Inshort, they felt deprived. (Anderson,1979, p. 229)

‘Deprivation’ usually means ‘poverty’, butit can also be a relative concept thatapplies to middle-class people who maybe materially comfortable but dissatisfiedwith their circumstances. The factorscited here fit very well with the attractionof NRMs.

Conclusion

Social scientists often see their role as tomake ‘the strange familiar and thefamiliar strange’. It may be tempting toregard NRM beliefs and adherents as‘weird’, but this kind of ‘Othering’ meansthat continuities with ‘mainstream’religion are overlooked. In either context,you can find healthy functions, as well asproblematic dysfunctions.

Link

http://www.cesnur.org (Center forStudies on New Religions)

http://www.icsahome.com(International Cultic StudiesAssociation)

http://www.inform.ac (TheInformation Network on ReligiousMovements)

http://www.religioustolerance.org(Ontario Consultants on ReligiousTolerance)

Approaching New Religious Movements

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 7

1. Is there prejudice against NRMs inthe UK? If so, what form does ittake?

2. Given the secularisation of Britishsociety, can we still contrast NRMswith a ‘religious mainstream’?

3. Why might NRM researcherssometimes be accused of being‘cult apologists’?

Discussion points

Anderson, R.M. (1979). Vision of thedisinherited: The making ofAmerican Pentecostalism. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Beit-Hallahmi, B. (2001). ‘O truantmuse’: Collaborationism andresearch integrity. InMisunderstanding cults: Searchingfor objectivity in a controversialfield. Ed. T. Robbins & B. Zablocki(pp. 35–70), Toronto: TorontoUniversity Press.

Bellah, R., Sullican, W.M., Swidler, A.& Tipton, S.M. (2008 [1985]).Habits of the heart: Individualismand commitment in American life.Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

Festinger, L., H. Riecken, &Schachter, S. (2008 [1956]). Whenprophecy fails. London: Pinter andMartin.

Jefferies, M. (2015). Noel Edmonds:Death doesn’t exist - the planet’sbiggest problem is electrosmog. Inthe Daily Mirror, 4 August.http://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebrity-news/noel-edmonds-death-doesnt-exist-6194153

References

Dr Richard Bartholomew has a PhD in the Study of Religion. His thesis was on theChristian publishing and bookselling industry in the UK, in the contexts of religiousconsumerism and mediated community. His publications include contributions to aguide to new religions entitled 30-Second Religion (ed. Russell Re Manning, 2011).

St Mary’s and St Giles’ CentreISSN 2053-5163

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 8

Faith and religious experience

For ‘the great primary religious figures’,Hick argues, belief in God is ‘not anexplanatory hypothesis . . . but aperceptual belief . . . [not] an inferredentity but an experienced personalpresence’ (Hick, 1970, p. 116). Religiousfaith is not, therefore, to be regarded asa ‘propositional attitude’, a matter ofbelieving revealed propositions(transcendent truths), but as ‘a form ofcognition by acquaintance or cognition inpresence’ (1973, p. 38) – and thus of‘non-propositional revelation’ of theTranscendent itself (1967; 1983, ch. 5).

Hick understands religious faith ‘as theinterpretative element within religiousexperience, arising from an act ofcognitive choice’ (1974, p. v). He drawson Ludwig Wittgenstein’s identification of

the role of ‘seeing as’ in seeing a puzzlepicture, such as Jastrow’s duck-rabbit,as either a duck or a rabbit (Wittgenstein,1968, pp. 193-214).

Unlike Wittgenstein, Hick extends thiscategory of seeing as to the act ofrecognising something as (say) a fork,arguing that someone from the StoneAge would not see cutlery in this way‘because they would not have theseconcepts or other surrounding cultural

Challenging Religious IssuesIssue 9 Autumn 2015© Jeff Astley

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

Jeff AstleyThe article critically surveys some elements of John Hick’s thought.

Specification links: WJEC/CBAC RS1/2 CHR: Introduction to Christianity (AS), 1. Keybeliefs; RS1/2 PHIL: Introduction to Philosophy of Religion (AS), 3. Evil and suffering;4. An introduction to religious experience; RS3 PHIL: Studies in Philosophy of Religion(A2), all sections; RS4 HE: Studies in Religion and Human Experience (A2), Religiousexperience and Life, death and life after death [in Philosophy of religion].

John Hick (1922-2012) was an influential philosopher of religion and liberal Christiantheologian who taught in Britain and the United States (see Badham, 1990, 2009;Cheetham, 2009).

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

9

concepts’. For Hick, ‘all seeing is seeing-as’ or (more broadly) ‘experiencing as’,because ‘all conscious experiencinginvolves recognitions which go beyondwhat is given to the senses’ (Hick, 1974,p. 142; 1985, ch. 2; 2010, p. 65).

This recognition-interpretation is not aseparate inference that is applied to theexperience, ‘a theory imposedretrospectively upon remembered facts’,but the way in which things are actuallyexperienced at the time (Hick, 1974,p. 143). In religion, too, it is not thatpeople see the world, other people orhistorical events, and then argue to atranscendent presence and purposefrom these observable facts, as anexplanation of them. They see (forexample) the world as God’s creation,other people as God’s children and theExodus as God’s saving act. Hence‘ordinary secular perceiving shares acommon epistemological character withreligious experiencing’ (1973, p. 42).

Hick defines distinctively religiousexperiences (or ‘mystical’ experiences:2008, p. 15) very broadly, as‘modifications of consciousnessstructured by religious concepts’, andrejects the view that there is somecommon raw experience that isinterpreted differently according toculturally-bound ways (1999, p. 110).The religious interpretation is alreadypart of the experience.

There are different levels of freedom ina human being’s interpretation of theirexperience. This is minimal in sensoryexperience, but is at its greatest inreligious (or atheistic) interpretation(1974, p. 128; 1989, pp. 160-162; 1999,pp. 167-170). ‘The more value laden themeaning the greater our cognitivefreedom in relation to it’ (2000, p. 272).Thus people adopt ‘the religious mode ofapperception’ by an ‘act of will’ or a ‘stateof willingness or consent’ (1973, p. 143).

But Hick also holds that great religiousleaders were subject to such powerfulreligious experiences that their freedomof belief was in practice much morelimited, and even possessed an‘involuntary and compelling quality’ akinto that enjoyed by most people only withsense experience. ‘They could no morehelp believing in the reality of God thanin the reality of the material world’ (1970,p. 112).

This raises a problem. If these peoplecannot help having the religiousexperiences (experiences interpretedreligiously) that they have, in what senseare these interpretations open to thehuman will? Hick frequently claims thatthe world is religiously ambiguous (ratherlike a puzzle picture) and can rationallybe interpreted in either religious ornaturalistic ways. Hick distinguishesbetween (a) coming to an awareness ofGod, and (b) (afterwards) enjoying thatexperience: once people have allowedthemselves freely to become consciousof God, ‘that experience is, at its toplevels of intensity, coercive. It creates thesituation of the person who cannot helpbelieving in the reality of God’ (1970,p. 114). Even so, we might argue thatindividuals only have indirect control overtheir religious experiences, presumablyby freely opening themselves up to theinitial religious interpretation.

Religious diversity and truth

Reacting to his experience of religiousdiversity, Hick came to embrace apluralist(ic) theology of religions. Thisviews all great faiths ‘as authentic andvalid contexts of salvation/liberation’.Each constitutes a ‘uniquely different(though overlapping) awareness of theultimately transcendent Reality, asperceived through the “lens” of aparticular religious tradition’ (Hick, 1993b,p. 143) by ‘the fifth dimension of our

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

10

nature, the transcendent within us’ (ourspiritual nature), which answers and‘inclines us to respond’ to thetranscendent dimension that lies outsideus (1999, pp. 2, 8-9, 167, 247, 253-254;cf. 1985, 1995, 2007).

Hick treats all religious experience as aparticular reception and reaction to ageneral revelation. This is universally ‘onoffer’ from the transcendent, which in theend Hick preferred simply to label ‘theReal’, which is active rather than passivein its relationship to human ‘experience’.For Hick, the various religions are each‘a mix of culturally conditioned responsesto a higher reality and the universalimpingement of the Real’ (Cheetham,2009, p. 307).

Hick argues that religious beliefs andpractices, while obviously different,deserve equal respect as ways ofsalvation and accounts of divine truth.Each is marred by human failings, butequally capable of leading people to theirspiritual fulfilment of dying to self andexperiencing transcendence. Hickemploys the analogies of the sun’s whitelight refracted into the different colours ofthe rainbow (‘the spectrum of thedifferent world faiths’); and of religions as‘human maps of the infinite divine realitymade in different projections’ (differentconceptual systems) – although thesemaps all distort this reality, ‘all may beequally useful in guiding our journeythrough life’ (Hick, 2008, p. 12).

Critical realism

Hick rejected the view that God wasmerely a symbol or projectedpersonification of spiritual ideals (Hick,2010, p. 31). Rather, he held a ‘realist’view, affirming that descriptions of Godrefer to an ultimate reality that actuallyexists outside human consciousness andlanguage. While religious metaphorssuch as Father may ‘picture’ God and

are often ‘fairly close to analogy’ (1993a,pp. 42, 100 n. 2), they should not betreated as literal descriptions – a viewassociated with a ‘naïve realism’ thatthinks of God as directly perceived orrevealed. The critical realism that Hickadopts (Hick, 1993b, pp. 5-7) is theepistemological claim that we do notknow things (even physical things)directly, but only through some mediumof perception and thought, conditional onhuman categories of understanding andhuman language. Our humanconsciousness serves as aninterpretative filter, and it continues toexercise that role in our experience andknowledge of God (Hick, 1989, pp. 133,172-175, 240-249), even ‘filtering out theTranscendent and reducing it to formswith which we can cope’ (2008, p. 24).Nevertheless, Hick gives priority toreligious language’s non-descriptivefunction of transforming human beings:‘different mythologies may each be validas ways of evoking, within the life of aparticular faith community, human self-transcendence in relation to the Real’(Hick, 1989, p. 375).

Hick’s critical realism is more radicalthan most. He takes up Immanuel Kant’sdistinction between an essentiallyunknowable ‘noumenal’ reality and itsknowable ‘phenomenal’ reality –distinguishing what something is ‘in itself’from ‘how it appears to us’ through ourconceptual apparatus. Hick applies thisview (as Kant did not) beyond ourexperience of the world to religiousexperience, calling the noumenal realitythat lies beyond this experience, thetranscendent, the Ultimate or the Real.This is ‘transcategorial’: it transcends ourcategories of understanding anddescription, including our analogies(1995, pp. 61-71). The personal godsand impersonal absolutes of religion arephenomenal manifestations of this

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

11

ultimate mystery. But in denying that thenotion of the Real can have any content(can it even be said ‘to impinge’ on us?),has Hick undermined the critical realistview of God (Cheetham, 2009, p. 310;see Hick, 1995, ch. 3)?

Trusting religious experience

Hick defines a rational belief as ‘a beliefwhich it is rational for the one who holdsit to hold, given the data available to him’(1970, p. 115; cf. 109). He endorses thegeneral epistemological principle of‘critical trust’ in our experiences, unlesswe have some reason to doubt them(2010, p. 57). So Hick insists thatindividuals may rationally trust theveridicality of their own religiousexperiences, at least if these arepowerful: ‘a sufficiently vivid religiousexperience’ would entitle a person ‘toclaim to know that God is real’ (1974, p.210; cf. Swinburne, 2004, pp. 303-322).

But this only applies to first-handreligious experience. In the case ofsense experience (which is universal andpublic, because ‘forced upon us’ ratherthan a resistible option) we may also relyon the ‘mutually reinforcing effects of theaccumulated reports of others both nowand in the past’ (Goulder and Hick, 1983,pp. 37-38). But this can’t apply inreligious experience, at least forsomeone who ‘does not participate at allin the field of religious experience’,having no first-hand knowledge of it,however slight. Such a person should‘remain agnostic’ and ‘reserve judgment’(p. 44; contrast Swinburne, 2004, p. 322).So ‘for the absolutely un-mystical – ifsuch there are – there can be no goodgrounds for religious belief’ (2008, p. 29).

There are still tests that we may applyto those who claim religious experience,such as whether we regard them ‘as fullysane, sober and rational persons’,including whether their claims are

‘consistent with our other knowledge’based on ‘the rest of our experience’(2008, p. 28). But Hick came to regardthe key criterion for distinguishing‘between veridical and delusory religiousexperiences’ (1999, p. 163) to be theireffects in human life. ‘Thesalvation/liberation which it is thefunction of religion to facilitate is ahuman transformation which . . . consists,as one of its aspects, in moral goodness’(1989, p. 309) or spiritual character(1995, p. 77); religions can only bejudged, therefore, by ‘their human fruits’.Hick’s (Christian) critics are scathing thatthis does not ‘settle the truth question’, inthat ‘one goal of true religion’ has beenmistaken ‘for a criterion of truth inreligion’. But he responds that ‘savingtruth’ is not comparable to other forms oftruth, and maintains that a religion’struthfulness ‘does consist in its power tobring people to the ultimate reality wecall God, and thereby . . . to produce inthem the kind of fruit’ esteemed by thereligions, in this present life (Okholm andPhillips, 1996, pp. 61, 78, 87, 185).

Problem of evil

Hick’s response to the challenge that evilposes to belief in an all loving, almightycreator contains many elements,including a ‘vale of soul-making’ theodicy.This argues that growth in moral andspiritual virtues requires an environmentwhere there are real difficulties, dangersand suffering, rather than a safe cage fora pampered pet, or a God who intervenesto protect his creatures from harmsinflicted by Nature and others (see Astley,2013). This risky world forms part of whathe labels the ‘Irenaean’ theodicy, incontrast to the ‘Augustinian’ tradition.This chart summarises Hick’s account oftheir contrasts and agreements (cf. Hick,1968, ch. XII).

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

12

‘AUGUSTINIAN’

(e.g. Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Leibniz,and many traditional Catholic andProtestant accounts)

Responsibility for evil rests on created

beings (angels and/or human beings)who have misused their freedom. Moralevil is their fault, and natural evil is theinevitable consequence (punishment)for that moral evil.

This tradition appeals to certain

metaphysical views:

• evil is ‘non-being’ (God only creates good; evil is a going-wrong of good or is to be found where things are at the limits of existence);

• while some of the parts may be ugly, the whole picture is more beautiful as a result of the contrast;

• ‘the principle of plenitude’ (it is better for God to create at all the levels of existence, so that the universe is as full as it can be of beings - including those that suffer evil or cause it).

God’s relationship with the universe

is impersonal. Humans are created tocomplete the list of types of being.

Looks to the past (the Fall) for anexplanation of the origin of evil.

The Fall is central to this theodicy:Adam (Man) was created perfect in aperfect world, but sinned deliberately.

‘IRENAEAN’

(e.g. Irenaeus, Schleiermacher, Tennant,and many modern liberal accounts)

It is explicitly recognised that God is

ultimately responsible for the evil in

the universe. Moral evil is the fault offree human beings that God has createdand permits to sin. God has deliberatelyput natural evil in the world to create thebest environment for soul-making.

This tradition holds no such

metaphysical views.

God’s relationship with the universe is

essentially personal. Humans arecreated for fellowship with God.

Looks to the future (heaven) for thejustifying end, as God brings good out ofevil.

The Fall is less important, or is denied

altogether. Some argue that the Fall ofAdam was like the sin of a child; othersthat mankind was created or evolved as‘fallen’. (Down here in the mud of theworld, we might say, we are free to growtowards God without being overwhelmedby any direct knowledge of the divinenature.)

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

13

Epistemology is the theory ofknowledge.

Moral evil: pain and suffering causedby human agents.

Natural evil: pain and sufferingcaused by Nature.

Naturalistic: excluding spiritual orsupranaturalistic explanations.

Theodicy: a justification of God’sjustice in light of the evil of theworld.

Transcendent: that which goesbeyond the limitations of our beingand experience.

Glossary

The present world is not how God

intends it to be. It should be a paradisewithout suffering, and human beingsneed to be saved from it by God’s grace.

Our behaviour in this world will determineour ultimate destination in heaven or

hell.

The world is more-or-less how God

intends it. It is a world with realtemptations and risks: the only sort ofworld in which we can freely develop faithand virtue, and learn obedience throughsuffering, in co-operation with God’sgrace.

This tradition is more likely to reject the

notion of hell. In the end all will be saved,perhaps through a continuing process ofsoul-making after death.

(Astley, 2000, pp. 65-66)

For criticisms of the Irenaean theodicyand Hick’s responses, see Hick 1973, chs4 and 5; 1977, pp. 372-384; Hick et al.,2001.

Because we have real human freedom(1983, pp. 41-42; 2006, ch. 10), our rightactions cannot be guaranteed; but divinepatience will await our ‘progressivesanctification after death’ (1968, pp. 383-384) through a series of rebirths/resurrectedafter-lives in physical environments

(perhaps in other universes), until weeach fulfil our spiritual potential oftranscending selfishness, and (in a non-embodied state) are somehow united withthe Real (1976, part V; 2006, ch. 18).Although hell is a real threat for any whowould be finally lost, in the end no one willenter it: ‘hell exists, but is empty’ (1973,p. 72).

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

14

Links

http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/bce/mwt_themes_875_hick.htm (The BostonCollaborative Encyclopedia ofModern Western Theology)

http://www.iep.utm.edu/hick (InternetEncyclopedia of Philosophy)

http://www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite(John Hick: The Official Website)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C79JmHZ4QB8 (David Cheethamon John Hick)

Discussion points

1. Is Hick’s defence of the rationality ofreligious belief successful?

2. How does Hick explain the diversityof religious belief?

3. What are the strengths andweaknesses of the ‘Irenaeantheodicy’?

4. How do Hick’s views challengetraditional Christian belief?

References

Astley, J. (2013). Evil and suffering.Challenging Religious Issues, 2, 2-8http://www.st-marys-centre.org.uk/resources/Aleveljournal.html

Badham, P. (1990). The philosophicaltheology of John Hick. In A JohnHick reader (pp. 1-14). Ed. P.Badham, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Badham, P. (2009). John Hick. InTwentieth-century philosophy ofreligion (pp. 233-244). Eds. G. Oppy& N.N. Trakakis, Durham: Acumen.

Cheetham, D. (2009). John Hick. InBlackwell Encyclopaedia of

Theologians Vol. 2 (pp. 294-311).Ed. I. Markham, Oxford:Blackwell.

Goulder, M. & Hick, J. (1983). Whybelieve in God? London: SCMPress.

Hick, J. (1967). Revelation. In TheEncyclopedia of philosophy, vol.7 (pp. 189-191). Ed. P. Edwards,London: Collier Macmillan.

Hick, J. (1968, 1977). Evil and theGod of love. London: Collins.

Hick, J. (1970). Arguments for theexistence of God. London:Macmillan.

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015

John Hick’s Philosophy of Religion

15

Hick, J. (1973). God and the universeof faiths: Essays in the philosophyof religion. London: Macmillan.

Hick, J. (1974). Faith and knowledge.London: Collins.

Hick, J. (1976). Death and eternal life.London: Collins.

Hick, J. (1983). Philosophy of Religion.Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Hick, J. (1985). Problems of religiouspluralism. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Hick, J. (1989). An interpretation ofreligion: Human responses to thetranscendent. Basingstoke:Macmillan.

Hick, J. (1993a). The metaphor of Godincarnate. London: SCM Press.

Hick, J. (1993b). Disputed questions intheology and the philosophy ofreligion. New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press.

Hick, J. (1995). The rainbow of faiths:Critical dialogues on religiouspluralism. London: SCM Press.

Hick, J. (1999). The fifth dimension: Anexploration of the spiritual realm.Oxford: Oneworld.

Hick, J. (2000). The religious meaningof life. In The meaning of life in theworld religions (pp. 269-286). Eds. J.Runzo & N.M. Martin, Oxford:Oneworld.

Hick, J. (2006). The new frontier ofreligion and science: Religiousexperience, neuroscience and thetranscendent. Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan.

Hick, J. (2007). Religious pluralism.In The Routledge companion tophilosophy of religion (pp. 216-225). Eds. C. Meister & P. Copan,London: Routledge.

Hick, J. (2008). Who or what isGod? And other investigations.London: SCM Press.

Hick, J. (2010). Between faith anddoubt: Dialogues on religion andreason. Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan.

Hick, J. et al. (2001). An Irenaeantheodicy. In Encountering evil:Live options in theodicy (pp. 38-72). Eds. S.T. Davis, Louisville,KT: Westminster John KnoxPress.

Okholm, D.L. & Phillips, T.R. (Eds.)(1996). Four views on salvation ina pluralistic world. Grand Rapids,MI: Zondervan.

Swinburne, R. (2004). The existenceof God. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1968).Philosophical investigations.Oxford: Blackwell.

The Revd Professor Jeff Astley is Alister Hardy Professor of Religious and Spiritual([SHULHQFH�DW�*O\QGǒU�8QLYHUVLW\��DQG�DQ�KRQRUDU\�SURIHVVRU�DW�'XUKDP�DQG�<RUN�6WJohn Universities. His latest book is What do we believe? Why does it matter? (SCMPress, forthcoming).

St Mary’s and St Giles’ CentreISSN 2053-5163

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 16

Challenging Religious IssuesIssue 9 Autumn 2015© Peter Watts

The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith

Peter WattsThis article explores how much we can know about the historical figure of Jesus andoutlines the way that a ‘Jesus of history’ arose as distinct from the church’s ‘Christ offaith’ at the time of the Enlightenment. After discussing the implications of this divisionfor Christianity, the article looks at whether it is possible to bring the Jesus of historyand the Christ of faith back together within our typical twenty-first centuryunderstanding of what is historical and what is not.

Specification links: WJEC/CBAC RS3 CHR: Studies in Christianity (A2), 2.Contemporary Christological Debates; RS3 BS: Studies in Biblical Studies (A2),SECTION B: Studies in the New Testament, 2. The Significance of the Resurrectionfor the Early Church.

Introduction

In the New Testament Jesus asks hisdisciples, ‘who do you say I am?’ (Mark8:29; Matthew 16:15; Luke 9:20) and thequestion ‘who was Jesus?’ stands at theheart of Christianity. In fact, for martyrsfrom the disciples onwards the answerhas been a matter of life and death.

The issue has also generated muchcontroversy elsewhere, not least throughvarious conspiracy theories aboutwhether Jesus had a wife and children.But for some the question ‘who wasJesus?’ is a non-starter: the Jesus of theGospels simply did not exist. So-called‘Jesus mythicists’ who hold this positioninclude Robert M. Price and G. A. Wells,but it finds little support among historians.This is largely because of the range ofsources that refer to Jesus within arelatively short time after his death – not

only the New Testament, but also theRoman historian Tacitus and the Jewishhistorian Josephus. The best-sellingAmerican biblical scholar Bart Ehrman,an agnostic who disputes the historicalvalue of much of the Gospels, puts it thisway: ‘whatever else you may think aboutJesus, he certainly did exist’ (Ehrman,2013, p. 4). Instead, the controversysurrounding the question ‘who wasJesus?’ is about whether the JesusChrist worshipped by Christians acrosstwo millennia and throughout the worldtoday is a historically accuratedescription of the Jesus that walked theearth in the first century. Or, to use theterms introduced by the Germantheologian Martin Kähler in 1892 andadopted by scholars ever since: to whatextent does the ‘Jesus of history’correspond to the ‘Christ of faith’?

The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 17

Who is the Christ of faith?

A representative description of the Christof faith can be found in the Apostles’Creed, which has been used in someform since at least the fourth century andis still recited regularly in churches today:‘I believe in Jesus Christ, God's only Son,our Lord, who was conceived by the HolySpirit, born of the Virgin Mary, sufferedunder Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died,and was buried; he descended into hell.On the third day he rose again; heascended into heaven, he is seated atthe right hand of the Father, and he willcome to judge the living and the dead.’Statements of belief like this wereformulated through painstakingdiscussion and heated debate amongstthe leading theologians of the day andthey provide a neat answer to thequestion ‘who was Jesus?’ preciselybecause this is a key aspect of Christianfaith. The source material was found inthe New Testament and especially theGospels but the effort needed to producethe creeds illustrates how matters ofChristology – most importantly, how isJesus to be understood in relation toGod the Father? – were not necessarilyself-evident in the Bible. The issue atstake for the early generations ofChristians was not whether the NewTestament texts were historicallyaccurate, but how a true and coherentunderstanding of Jesus could beestablished from the various Gospelsand epistles.

The birth of the Jesus of

history

This situation changed dramatically withthe dawning of the Enlightenment. Fromthe seventeenth century the widespreadassumption that the Gospels wereaccurate biographies of Jesus wasstrongly disputed. As well as a suspicion

of tradition – especially of the Church –the Enlightenment brought a desire tore-examine history in strictly-definedrational and scientific terms. And therewas clearly much for the Enlightenmenthistorian to take issue with in the Gospelstories of Jesus, which are full of‘unnatural’ things such as miracles andexorcisms. Consequently, Geza Vermesargues, ‘blind faith in the literal truth ofthe Gospels ended . . . in the late 1800s’(Vermes, 2007); by then the scriptureshad become a legitimate object of thesame historical scrutiny (known ashistorical criticism) that was applied toother texts and the traditional Christianview of Jesus Christ had come underintense attack.

In the Enlightenment way of looking atthings the Christ of faith came to beunderstood as a misguided projectiononto the historical figure of Jesus thatresulted from the irrational emotionalexperiences of the disciples and earlyfollowers of Jesus after his death. Thetask was to get beyond the Gospelnarratives to reconstruct a definitivehistorical biography of Jesus; only thisJesus could be considered as ‘real’ or‘true’. The implications of this soonbecame clear: When Reimarus, ateacher from Germany, producedalternative explanations of variousepisodes in Jesus’ life in the mid-eighteenth century, he intended not onlyto present the truth about the historicalJesus but to demonstrate that traditionalChristianity was misguided (which is whyReimarus chose not to publish hisessays on this topic during his lifetime).In the wake of Reimarus came otherbold attempts to proclaim what couldreally be known about Jesus. D. F.Strauss (1808-74), for example, focusedon challenging the historicity of themiracles in the Gospels, while Ernest

The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 18

Renan (1823-92) painted a picture ofJesus as a great moral teacher but littleelse. On the one hand, if Jesus was notthe person the Gospels and the churchsay he was, then traditional Christianfaith could not stand, and yet each ofthese three scholars also had a morepositive agenda: they hoped that thattheir portraits of the historical Jesuswould help the church to reinvent itselffor the modern age.

It is not just Christians who have amotive to proclaim who Jesus really is,however. This is apparent all the waythrough to Richard Dawkins who hasmore enthusiasm than many Christiansto set the record straight about Jesus –at least from his perspective. This is notjust about re-evaluating an individual’slegacy, as was the case recently when itemerged that Lance Armstrong’ssporting glory was reliant on chemicalhelp and a huge cover-up operation.Instead, the re-writing of Jesus’biography means reconsidering thehistory of billions of people shaped bythe Christian belief that Jesus was bornof the Virgin Mary, died for the sins of theworld, rose again and will judge the livingand the dead. Is the faith of all theseChristians deluded and are their livesmisguided if historians can establish thatJesus was not whom the Gospels say heis? Or, as those such as Reimarussuggested, have generations ofChristians been unwitting victims of adeliberate manipulation of the truth aboutthe historical Jesus, a deception thatcame about in order to help the Christianreligion grow in influence and power?

It may come as a surprise that thetheologian who dealt most influentiallywith the question of the historical Jesuswent on to be one of the most notableChristian missionaries of the twentiethcentury, despite concluding that Jesus

was not the perfect human and divinefigure portrayed by the church. Stepforward Albert Schweitzer – theologian,medical doctor, philosopher, musicologistand owner of a truly impressivemoustache. In particular, Schweitzersuggested that Jesus was mistaken inhis view about the imminent end of theworld and died a failure because he hadnot brought about the kingdom of God onearth. Once more, however, this is notentirely negative in its implications forChristianity. In light of Schweitzer’sresearch and his own biography, somescholars have seen it as positive toseparate the Jesus of history and theChrist of faith: arguing that centralaspects of the Christian faith, such as theresurrection, are to be understood notthrough historical investigation butthrough faith, and therefore Christianity isprotected from the various attempts toredefine the Jesus of history. AsSchweitzer wrote: ‘Jesus meanssomething to our world because a mightyspiritual force streams forth from him andflows through our time also. This fact canneither be shaken nor confirmed by anyhistorical discovery’ (Schweitzer, 2000,p. 479).

As well as presenting his own view ofJesus, Schweitzer evaluated thoseearlier attempts to discover the historicalJesus that had resulted in such adiversity of ‘Jesuses’. Schweitzerconcluded that the ‘mistake’ of thoseinvolved was ‘to suppose that Jesuscould come to mean more to our time byentering into it as a man like ourselves.’(Schweitzer, 2000, p. 479), an idea thatis more vividly known to us throughGeorge Tyrrell’s elegant description of abiblical scholar who looks into a well tofind the historical Jesus and ends updescribing a pale reflection of himself(Tyrrell, 1963, p. 49). In other words,

The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 19

supposedly rational and objectiveattempts to describe the historical Jesuswere biased by the particular culture andcontext in which they arose. Or, as DaleAllison has suggested more recently, ‘wewield our own criteria to get what wewant’ (Allison, 2009, p. 59).

Despite this problem, the quest of thehistorical Jesus continues in the 21st

century without any signs of eitherrunning out of steam or reaching aconsensus. There is a loose agreementon the bare minimum that can beconsidered as historically accurate withinthe canonical Gospels, usually thatJesus lived in the small Galilean town ofNazareth at some point in his life, wasbaptised and crucified. Beyond this, thepicture of Jesus of Nazareth thatemerges is remarkably diverse - rangingfrom a wandering wise man or apreacher of social reform to a prophet ofimpending destruction. The quest for thedefinitive account of the historical life andteaching of Jesus is, therefore, verymuch still on.

Can the Jesus of history and

the Christ of faith be

reconciled?

Where does all this leave the Christ offaith – other than showing that manybelieve the reality of the Jesus of historywas radically different? Here we need tofollow Schweitzer and take a critical viewof the various studies of the historicalJesus. For in the diversity of the portraitsof the historical Jesus today there issomething that many share in common: Itis not only that the incarnation (i.e. Godbecoming man through a miraculousvirgin birth), miracles and resurrectionare not considered to be part of the life ofthe historical Jesus but that they cannotbe historical. In sticking to anEnlightenment understanding of history it

seems that there must always be anunbridgeable gap between the Jesus ofhistory and the Christ of faith from theoutset. This is how Roland Deinesdescribes the situation: ‘History and faithcan live peacefully together so long asthey are divorced from each other, aslong as faith-based claims about certainoccurrences are clearly demarcated asconfessional statements only’ (Deines,2013, p. 18). But the relationshipbetween the Jesus of history and theChrist of faith will always remain a criticalquestion for Christianity because it is areligion centred on the conviction thatGod acts in history. Faith in God relatesto faith in his actions and these centre onthe first century figure of Jesus ofNazareth. For most Christians, forexample, it is of vital importance that theresurrection was a historical event, anidea which was expressed by the apostlePaul to first century Christians in Corinth:‘If Christ has not been raised, your faith isfutile and you are still in your sins. Thenthose also who have died in Christ haveperished. If for this life only we havehoped in Christ, we are of all people mostto be pitied (1 Corinthians 15:17-19).’

One scholar who has been willing totackle the relationship between the Jesusof history and the Christ of faith isJoseph Ratzinger. The fact thatRatzinger is better known as Pope (nowEmeritus) Benedict XVI means it isunsurprising that he wants to holdtogether the Jesus of history and Christof faith. Nevertheless, his approach issignificant for the debate as a whole.Ratzinger argues that if ‘Jesus [was] afailed religious leader . . . he wouldremain purely human, and his authoritywould extend only so far as his messageis of interest to us’ (Ratzinger, 2011, pp.241-242). In other words, if Jesus doesnot somehow relate to God and is limited

The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 20

to our commonly accepted Enlightenmentstandards of history and objectivity thenthere is no way that this Jesus can reallymatter. (You might recognise a certainsimilarity here with C.S. Lewis’ famousapologetic claim that Jesus is either mad,bad or God.) Instead, Ratzingersuggests that to understand the historicalJesus it is important to understand whatit meant for Jesus, in his own lifetime, tobe utterly shaped by his closerelationship with God. And since it is thebelief that God raised Jesus from thedead that means he is as important ashe is in the world today, then any historyof Jesus must attempt to deal with this –even if the resurrection needs to be seenas ‘an event of an entirely new kind’(Ratzinger, 2011, p. 275) within history.In this way, Ratzinger urges that God issomehow allowed back into the picturewhen it comes to considering history andtherefore the historical Jesus.

Conclusion

Perhaps this article has raised as manyquestions as it addresses: How do weassess what is historical and what is real,meaningful and true? Does Christianfaith have a reasonable historical basis?To explore big issues such as these iswhat makes biblical research exciting,and it is why the question of the Jesus ofhistory and the Christ of faith hasremained a hot topic for 300 years. But Ihope it has become clear that inapproaching this issue we need to becritically aware of how we understandwhat is historical and what is not: whatwe discover about Jesus very muchdepends on the unexpressed and oftenunacknowledged limits with which webegin the quest.

The Enlightenment was a period fromthe early seventeenth century tothe late eighteenth century inwhich there was great upheaval inWestern thought and culture due to

the re-evaluation of religion,philosophy, science and politics inline with a new emphasis on thesupremacy of human reason.

Glossary

http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/theories.html (Early ChristianWritings: Historical Jesus Theories)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_Jesus (Wikipedia)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lELzek1FWgk&list=PL46F46C0CECF1364B&index=54 (Department ofTheology and Religious Studies,University of Nottingham, ‘WhyStudy…?’ Video Series: JesusChrist)

Links

The Jesus of History and the Christ of Faith

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 21

1. Do you think it matters if the Christof faith and the Jesus of history arefound to be different? If so why; ifnot why not?

2. To what extent are the Gospelshistorically reliable? It might help tothink through related questionssuch as ‘when were they written?’,‘who wrote them?’ and ‘what wastheir purpose?’

3. Does allowing for the possibilitythat God was active in and throughJesus change the way we shouldunderstand the Jesus of history?

Discussion points

Allison Jr, D.C. (2009). The historicalChrist and the theological Jesus.Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.

Deines, R. (2013). Acts of God inhistory: Studies towards recoveringa theological historiography.Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Ehrman, B. (2013). Did Jesus exist?The historical argument for Jesus ofNazareth. New York: Harper Collins.

Ratzinger, J. [Pope Benedict XVI](2011). Jesus of Nazareth: HolyWeek: From the entrance intoJerusalem to the resurrection. SanFrancisco: Ignatius Press.

Schweitzer, A. (2000 [1906]). Thequest of the historical Jesus.London: SCM Press.

Tyrrell, G. (1963 [1909]). Christianityat the crossroads. London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin.

Vermes, G. (2007) ‘Review of PopeBenedict XVI’s Jesus of Nazareth:From the baptism in the Jordan tothe transfiguration.’ The Times,May 19, 2007.

References

Dr Peter Watts is Teaching Associate in Biblical Studies in the Department ofTheology and Religious Studies at the University of Nottingham. He has taught biblicalmodules ranging from the Life and Teaching of Jesus to the Bible in Music, Art andLiterature.

St Mary’s and St Giles’ CentreISSN 2053-5163

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 22

The Five Pillars of Islam (DUNƗQ�DO�,VOƗP)

The word for creed in Arabic is µDTƯGDK,which represents the articles of faith inthe Qur’anic teachings, including belief inone God, angels, prophets, scripturesand the final day of judgement. Althoughthere is an obvious division between6KƯµD�DQG�6XQQƯ�EHOLHIV��ERWKdenominations of Islam follow the samecreed and five pillars of faith. In Arabic,the terms used are the DUNƗQ�DO�,VOƗP –‘pillars of Islam’, and also DUNƗQ�DG�GƯQ –‘pillars of the religion’.

The five pillars are often referred to inthe order of VKDKƗGDK, VDOƗW, ]DNƗW,DZP andܘ hajj, as portrayed in asignificant KDGƯWK (tradition) referred to asHadith Jibril (The Gabriel Narration). Thisprovides a very succinct summary oftheir meaning, used to enable both

Muslims and non-Muslims to understandwhat faith (ƯPƗQ) means in Islam. Thetruly first and most fundamental isenunciated in this +DGƯWK:

A man dressed in white came and satdown so close to the Prophet while hewas with his Companions that hisknees touched the knees of the Proph-et, and said: ‘O Messenger of God,what is Islam?’ The Prophet answered,‘To bear witness that there is no godbut God and that I am the Messengerof God [VKDKƗGDK]; that one shouldperform the prayers [VDOƗW] and paythe legal alms []DNƗW] and fast in thePRQWK�RI�5DPDGƗQ�>ܘDZP] and makepilgrimage to the House [in Makkah,hajj] if that is possible for one.’(Hadith Jibril)

Challenging Religious IssuesIssue 9 Autumn 2015© Declan O’Sullivan

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in

Modern Society

Declan O’SullivanThis article defines the five pillars of Islam, indicating when there are legitimateexceptions for a devout Muslim to postpone undertaking them based on specificcircumstances arising in the context of the modern secular world within which Muslimsalso live.

Specification links: RS1/2 WR: Western Religions (AS): SECTION A: Introduction toIslam, 3. Beliefs and practices.

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern Society

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 23

6KDKƗGDKThe Islamic creed as the declaration offaith is called VKDKƗGDK. It is consideredthe first pillar, due to its obvioussignificance for any devout Muslim todeclare the core beliefs of Islam. It ismade up of two separate statements,known as the ‘two testifications’ (ash-VKDKƗGDWƗQ) or the dual VKDKƗGDK. TheVKDKƗGDWƗQ reads: ‘There is no God but$OOƗK�DQG�0XKDPPDG�LV�KLV�3URSKHW¶(Doull, 2006, p. 46).

When a person converts to Islam, theonly requirement to confirm their newfaith is for the convert to recite theVKDKƗGDK three times, with true beliefand unconditional honest acceptance, inthe presence of at least one otherMuslim witness. This repeateddeclaration proves the convert’s genuinesincerity. The VKDKƗGDK is also known asthe kalimah (‘the word’).

6DOƗWThe second pillar of Islam isܘ�DOƗW(prayer), sometimes spelt VDOƗK. Fiveritual prayers, each preceded by clean-ing the body through ablutions (ZXۂnjӄ),are observed daily: ,DOƗW�DO�IDMU (dawn)ܘD݂�݂XKU (midday), DO�ӅDܘU (afternoon), al-maghrib (sunset), and DO�ӅLVKƗӄ (evening).To perform these prayers, Muslims standup straight with their head down, handsat their sides and the feet evenly spaced.At the end of the prayers the Muslimrests in a kneeling position, offering ablessing of peace to the angels that siton the left and right shoulders. A Muslimwill look over the right shoulder at theangel that records good deeds, givingthe blessing DV�VDOƗPX�µDOD\NXP�ZD�UDK�matulaah – ‘Peace and blessings of Godbe upon you’, then look over the leftshoulder at the angel that records theirbad deeds and offer the same blessing.

The IƗWLKDK means ‘The Opening’ and isthe title of the first VnjUDK (chapter) of theQur’an. It is revered by Muslims by recit-ing it in each standing (rak‘ah) of the fiveset prayers each day. It is repeated sev-enteen times a day and always con-cludes with amin (amen). The IƗWLKDK isoften recited as part of the�GXµƗ¶, or indi-vidual and unprompted prayer. The GXµƗ¶is a separate prayer, which may be saidspontaneously during any time of the dayrather than being part of the set prayersof the VDOƗW. There is no set age limit forpractising the daily prayers, and ‘Muslimchildren as young as seven are encour-aged to pray’ (BBC, 2009).

=DNƗWThe next pillar is ]DNƗW, which can also betransliterated as ]DNƗK. This form of charity,provided by those capable of doing so, isextremely important in Islam. The wordtranslates to mean ‘purification’ andderives from the verb ]DNƗ which means‘to thrive’, ‘to be wholesome’ and ‘to bepure’. As ]DNƗW is based on each adultwillingly providing a certain proportion oftheir wealth beyond their basicsustenance and personal needs, it isseen as a form of obligatory taxation onone’s possessions. These alms do notnecessarily involve money; an alternativecontribution for rural farmers can be anamount of their crops or a specifiednumber of livestock. The minimumcontribution that each Muslim is requiredto provide is known as nisbah, and is2.5% of each Muslim’s annual net wealth.=DNƗW is used for people in society whoare in need, and also promotes the faithof the one who gives. It is used to relievepeople in debt, and to help travellers whoare without adequate funds for food,clothing or accommodation. Traditionallyit was also a way of freeing slaves.

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern Society

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 24

Essentially, the primary forms of wealththat are subject to ]DNƗW include gold,silver, livestock, agricultural products,and shares and bonds, together withother liquid assets.

There is also an alternative form ofvoluntary aid towards charity, referred toas VDGDTƗK. The term VDGDTƗK derivesfrom the root-word VDGDTƗ which means‘to speak truth’ or ‘to be true’. This word isused frequently in the Qur’an, in its pluralform as VDGDTƗW – ‘deeds of kindnessand generosity’. One specific form ofVDGDTƗK occurs during the celebration ofµƮG�DO�)LWU, the celebration at the end of the5DPDGƗQ when Muslims offer a certainquota of grain for distribution to the poor.

(A similarity may be noted herebetween Judaism and Islam, becausethe word in Hebrew related to charity isTzedakah and both translate into Englishto mean ‘righteousness’: Woodberry,1996, p. 180.)

Sawm

The term used for fasting in Islam is,DZP. In the early days of IslamܘMuhammad recommended believers tofast in order to establish a form of strictdiscipline. The most important ceremonyinvolving fasting in the Islamic calendaris the month of 5DPDGƗQ, where there isfasting from dawn to sunset every dayfor four weeks. During 5DPDGƗQ thebreaking of the fast occurs each eveningwhen the family sit together to eat, orlarge gatherings of many members of thecommunity meet to eat and celebratetogether. This part of the day is callediftar. Based on the example of theProphet Muhammad, the fast istraditionally broken each evening aftersunset by eating dates or salt. Once thenew moon becomes visible, thisindicates the start of the µƮG�DO�)LWU festivalat the end of 5DPDGƗQ.

The fasting does not just focus only onfood and drink, but also includesabstaining from sexual intercourse withone’s spouse and from tobacco. Beyondthe denial of physical activities, thefaithful ‘are also expected to do their bestto avoid evil thoughts and deeds as well’(BBC, 2009). There are several otheroccasions throughout the year whichalso involve fasting. However, as theseother celebrations and ceremonies arebased on the sunnah or hadith (tradition)they are not obligatory for every Muslim.

Hajj

The word Hajj represents the annualpilgrimage to Makkah (Mecca). Thisoccurs during the month of 'Knj�O�+LMMDK,the twelfth and final month of the IslamicCalendar. It is known as ‘the greaterpilgrimage’ or the ‘canonical pilgrimage’.

There is an obligation for every adultMuslim to undertake the Hajj on at leastone occasion during their life, shouldthey be healthy enough and bothfinancially and physically able. Thosewho attend wear a white linen garmentmade of two pieces of seamless andunstitched cloth called the LKUƗP.¹Thepilgrims tend to dress modestly, thusproclaiming the equality and humility ofall believers before God, regardless ofworldly differences in race, nationality,class, age, gender or culture. This wasclearly expressed in a letter sent fromMakkah by Malcolm X, who later becameknown as El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz,during his own Hajj experience in April,1964. He declared that he had witnessedthe unity of the ummah, realising thatMuslims are of every colour of skin andevery level of wealth.

¹ In the last stages of the Hajj the pilgrims replace this with theirnational or traditional local dress, as a symbol of their inevitablereturn to the profane and secular world.

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern Society

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 25

There were tens of thousands ofpilgrims, from all over the world. Theywere of all colours, from blue-eyedblonds to black-skinned Africans. Butwe were all participating in the sameritual, displaying a spirit of unity andbrotherhood that my experiences inAmerica had led me to believe nevercould exist between the white andnon-white . . .

Never have I been so highly honoured.Never have I been made to feel morehumble and unworthy. Who wouldbelieve the blessings that have beenheaped upon an American Negro? Afew nights ago, a man who would becalled in America a ‘white’ man, aUnited Nations diplomat, anambassador, a companion of kings,gave me his hotel suite, his bed.

(Malcolm X, 1964)

During the Hajj pilgrims symbolicallyre-enact several events that occurred inthe lives of Abraham (,EUƗKƯP), hisEgyptian partner Hagar, and their sonIshmael (,VPƗµƯO). The first event is theWDZƗI, when each pilgrim walks seventimes counter-clockwise around the Ka’aba.

When it is fully and correctlyundertaken, the hajj absolves thepilgrims from all their previous sins; thusattending the hajj is a personal act ofrepentance for a Muslim. (The word forrepentance in Arabic is WDZEƗK and it is amajor theme throughout the Qur’an.) Asattending the hajj is held in such highesteem within the Islamic community, aMuslim may choose to add the prefix al-Hajj (pilgrim) to their name. This is both aformal title and a public recognition oftheir dedicated achievement of the finalpillar of their faith in Islam.

There is another form of pilgrimagewhich can be performed at any time ofthe year. This ‘Umrah or ‘lesser

pilgrimage’ is also undertaken by pilgrimsgoing to Makkah and undertaking similarsymbolic acts and rituals, but it is not anobligation.

The Five Pillars and the

Ummah

All five pillars are significant andmeaningful to the ummah, the entireworldwide community of Muslims. Forexample, every Muslim is aware thattheir brothers and sisters are alsopraying at the same time, while alsoimplementing the qiblah – i.e. facing theKa’aba in Makkah. This expresses afeeling of complete unity amongst allMuslims: men, women and children,praying at the same time with everyonefacing in the same direction. Anotherunifying factor is that all the prayers andrecitations are delivered in Arabic,irrespective of the native language of thelocal Muslim community. Offering ]DNƗWalso gives people the feeling of offeringsomething practical to those in need inthe wider ummah, both the Muslim andnon-Muslim community, instead of justoffering prayers or thoughts.

‘It should be noted that MLKƗG is not oneof the five pillars, although some havegiven it an unofficial status of being the

“sixth” pillar’ (DeLong-Bas, 2009; see alsoO’Sullivan, 2014).

Conclusion

Fulfilling these obligations provides theframework of a Muslim’s life, byintertwining the practical routines andduties they must undertake with theirdaily activities, while also maintainingtheir deeply revered inner beliefs. ‘Nomatter how sincerely a person maybelieve, Islam regards it as pointless tolive a life without putting that faith intoaction and practice’ on a daily basis.These factors connect in a smooth flowof religious commitment, dedication and

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern Society

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 26

unconditional devotion while Muslimsundertake the more mundane practicalitiesof modern-day life. ‘Carrying out the FivePillars demonstrates that the Muslim isputting their faith first, and not just tryingto fit it in around their secular lives’ (BBC,2009).

It is clear that, ideally, all the five pillarsVKRXOG�EH�IROORZHG�E\�DOO�0XVOLPV��6KƯµDDQG�6XQQƯ��DV�DQ�REOLJDWLRQ��2I�WKH�ILYH�the VKDKƗGDK is clearly an absoluteobligation at all times of day, so as toconsistently and repeatedly witness thesincere and unquestionable belief in$OOƗK�DQG�WKH�3URSKHW�0RKDPPDG��)RUVDOƗW, the five daily prayer times can bepostponed under specific circumstances

– including serious illness, a very longjourney, being a member of the militarywhile at war or an employee or studentcoping with a heavy workload, or othersunder similar pressures. In such cases,a reduction or a suitable delay of theseprayer times is allowed, although theprayers must be made up at a later date,when circumstances are moreappropriate.

Certain situations allow legitimateexceptions for the other pillars. Forexample, a Muslim is allowed to avoidDZP (fasting) if they are ill or travellingܘa long distance; or if a woman is in hermenstruation period, pregnant or afterthe birth of her child. However, this isunder the condition that the Muslim is stillrequired to fulfil the full amount of therequired DZP by making up the periodܘof fasting at a later date when they areable to do so. This is particularly relevantfor those who suffer from any seriouseating disorder, including anorexia orbulimia. A female teenager fromBirmingham interviewed by the BBCexplained how she coped with being aMuslim while suffering from an eatingdisorder (Kadri, 2015). Focusing on her

health needs during her recovery meantthat she avoided fasting, especiallyGXULQJ�5DPDGƗQ��µ/DVW�\HDU�,�GLGQ¶W�IDVWat all, and that was a difficult decision tocome to because my faith is important tome.’ She realised that this ‘was the rightdecision’, however, because fastingmight be detrimental to her recovery.,'XULQJ�5DPDGƗQ�LQ�WKH�IROORZLQJ�\HDU�she decided to fast on just some days toovercome the side effects of her illness,completing the full amount at a later date,when she could cope. She wassupported in this perspective by an imamfrom the Birmingham Central Mosque,who argued that in any sort of worship‘where health becomes an issue, thatworship has to stop.’ He added, ‘Insteadof fasting, people can pay Fidyah wherethey pay over the month for a poorperson to eat’, which is a charitablealternative that directly links in with theother pillar of ]DNƗW. This supports theidea that all the five pillars are inter-connected and can be used asalternatives to support one another.

The teenager reinforced theacceptance of alternative ways ofexpressing one’s faith physically, bystrengthening her healthy lifestyle, whenshe declared: ‘Religion shouldn’t stand inthe way of recovery, it should aid it.’ ‘Ittook me a while to realise that not fastinglast year doesn’t make me a bad person,it makes me a good one. I made achoice to look after my body and mind’(Kadri, 2015).

In the case of the hajj, the generalobligation for all Muslims to undertakethe pilgrimage during at least one point intheir life is restricted to those who arephysically fit enough to endure itsactivities, are able to afford the travel andaccommodation costs, and are ‘saneadults’ (BBC, 2009). Clearly the ]DNƗW isonly possible for those who have some

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern Society

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 27

savings and can afford to pay 2.5% oftheir extra wealth. The devout faith ofthose who are extremely poor orhomeless is not doubted, although theycan only be the recipients of the ]DNƗWand not donors. It is possible, therefore,for most Muslims in modern secular,

multi-faith or multi-cultural society toundertake the VKDKƗGDK and the VDOƗW,and still be an entirely committed Muslim,even if the charity donations (]DNƗW), thefull engagement of fasting (ܘDZP), andthe ability to attend the hajj is far out oftheir reach.

Links

http://amf.net.au/library/uploads/files/Religion_Cultural_Diversity_Resource_Manual.pdf (Abdullah Saeed.Muslim Australians: Their beliefs,practices and institutions.Department of Immigration andMulticultural and Indigenous Affairsand Australian MulticulturalFoundation, 2004, pp. 21-25)

http://islamicpamphlets.com/the-five-pillars-of-islam (Islamic Pamphlets:Five Pillars of Islam)

http://lumina.hnu.edu.ph/articles/adeniyiOct09.pdf (M. O. Adeniyi. The FivePillars of Islam and nationaldevelopment in Nigeria. LUMINA 20(2), 2009)

http://pages.uoregon.edu/aweiss/IslamGlobalForces/Esposito%20Week%201.pdf (J. Esposito. Islam: Thestraight path. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1998)

http://www.astudyofquran.org/web/index.php?id=60,0,0,1,0,0 (FivePillars of Islam in the Hadith andthe Qur’an)

http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/practices/fivepillars.shtml(BBC. The Five Pillars of Islam,2009)

http://www.ijfm.org/PDFs_IJFM/13_4_PDFs/04_Larson.pdf (W. F.Larson. Critical contextualizationand Muslim conversion.International Journal of FrontierMissions 13(4), 1996, 189-191)

http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/HIST351-2.2-Five-Pillars-of-Islam.pdf (FivePillars of Islam)

1. If a Muslim can never attend a hajjin their entire lifetime, how couldthey still be considered a devout,committed and dedicated Muslim?

2. What are the exemptions a Muslimmay consider as being legitimate toavoid undertaking VDOƗW and ?DZPܘAre such exceptions consistent withtheir religious commitment?

Discussion points

The Five Pillars of Islam and their Significance in Modern Society

Challenging Religious Issues, Issue 9, Autumn 2015 28

DeLong-Bas, N. (2009). The FivePillars of Islam. OxfordBibliographieshttp://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0062.xml

Doull, F.E. (2006). Islam and theprinciple of freedom. Animus 11,29-48.http://www2.swgc.mun.ca/animus/Articles/Volume%2011/Doull.pdf

Hadith Jibril (The Gabriel Narration)http://taqwa.sg/v/articles/hadith-jibril-the-gabriel-narration

Kadri, A. (2015). Eating disorders atRamadan: One teenager'sexperience. BBC News, 13 July2015http://www.bbc.com/news/health-33479309

Malcolm X (1964). Letter from Meccahttp://www.malcolm-x.org/docs/let_mecca.htm

O’Sullivan, D. (2014). The concept ofMLKƗG�LQ�,VODP� ChallengingReligious Issues 6, 20-26http://www.st-marys-centre.org.uk/resources/challengingreligiousissues/Issue%206%20Challenging%20Religious%20Issues.pdf

Woodberry, J. D. (1996).Contextualization among Muslimsreusing common pillars.International Journal of FrontierMissions 13(4), 171-186http://www.ijfm.org/PDFs_IJFM/13_4_PDFs/03_Woodberry.pdf

References

3. Under what circumstances might itbe justifiable for a person to live asa devout Muslim by only professingthe VKDKƗGDK and following noother pillar of faith?

4. What arguments might be used forand against the claim that MLKƗGmay be regarded as a sixth pillar ofIslam?

Dr Declan O’Sullivan researched his PhD at Durham University’s Centre for MiddleEastern and Islamic Studies on ‘Punishing apostasy: The case of Islam and shari’a lawre-considered’. In 2006-7 he was a researcher on the Abrahamic Religions Project atManchester University to promote Religious Studies for students in secondaryeducation. He is currently Head of the Department of General Education in the Facultyof Liberal Arts at Stamford International University, Bangkok campus, Thailand. Hehas published over twenty five articles in academic journals.