CFR - Iran TF

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

1/100

Iran: Time for aNew Approach

Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the

Council on Foreign Relations

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates,Co-Chairs

Suzanne Maloney, Project Director

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

2/100

Founded in 1921, the Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, national membship organization and a nonpartisan center for scholars dedicated to producing and dseminating ideas so that individual and corporate members, as well as policymake journalists, students, and interested citizens in the United States and other countries, cbetter understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States another governments.The Council does this by convening meetings; conducting a wide-raning Studies program; publishingForeign Affairs , the preeminent journal covering inter-national affairs and U.S. foreign policy; maintaining a diverse membership; sponsorIndependent Task Forces; and providing up-to-date information about the world anU.S. foreign policy on the Councils website, www.cfr.org.

THE COUNCIL TAKES NO INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ON POLICY ISSUESAND HAS NO AFFILIATION WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ALL STATE-

MENTS OF FACT AND EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION CONTAINED IN ITS PUB-LICATIONS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHOR OR AUTHORS.

The Council will sponsor an Independent Task Force when (1) an issue of current and cical importance to U.S. foreign policy arises, and (2) it seems that a group diverse in bagrounds and perspectives may, nonetheless, be able to reach a meaningful consensus opolicy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Typically, a Task Force meets betwtwo and five times over a brief period to ensure the relevance of its work.

Upon reaching a conclusion,a Task Force issues a report, and the Council publishes its and posts it on the Councils website. Task Force reports can take three forms: (1) a strand meaningful policy consensus, with Task Force members endorsing the general pothrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and rommendation; (2) a report stating the various policy positions, each as sharply and faas possible; or (3) a Chairmans Report, where Task Force members who agree withchairmans report may associate themselves with it, while those who disagree may subdissenting statements. Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task Force may also ask individu who were not members of the Task Force to associate themselves with the Task Force repto enhance its impact. All Task Force reports benchmark their findings against curradministration policy in order to make explicit areas of agreement and disagreement.T Task Force is solely responsible for its report. The Council takes no institutional positi

For further information about the Council or this Task Force, please write to the Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, or call the DirectoCommunications at 212-434-9400. Visit the Councils website at www.cfr.org.

Copyright 2004 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

All rights reserved.

Printed in the United States of America.

This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form beyond the reprodution permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law Act (17 U.S.C.Sect107 and 108) and excerpts by reviewers for the public press, without express writtenmission from the Council on Foreign Relations.For information, write to the PublicatioOffice, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

3/100

PETER ACKERMAN

DAVIDALBRIGHT

SHAULBAKHASH*ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Co-Chair

F RANK CARLUCCI*

R OBERTEINHORN

R OBERTM. GATESCo-Chair

H.P.GOLDFIELD*

S TEPHENB. HEINTZ

BRUCEHOFFMAN

JOHNH. K ELLY

W ILLIAMH. LUERS

SUZANNEMALONEY Project Director

R ICHARDH. MATZKE*

LOUISPERLMUTTER

JAMESPLACKE

NICHOLASPLATT

DANIELB. PONEMAN*

ELAHSHARIFPOUR -HICKS

S TEPHEN J.SOLARZ

R AY TAKEYH

MORTIMER ZUCKERMAN

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

* The individual has endorsed the report and submitted an additional or a dissenting view.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

4/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

5/100

[v]

CONTENTS

Foreword viiAcknowledgments ixMap of the Islamic Republic of Iran xi

Executive Summary 1 Task Force Report 8Introduction 8 Why Iran Matters 10Irans Domestic Dilemmas 12

Irans Approach to the World 17 Irans Nuclear Programs 20Involvement with Regional Conflicts 26Recent U.S. Policy toward Tehran 38Assessments and Recommendations 40

Additional and Dissenting Views 49 Task Force Members Task Force Observers 59Appendixes 61

Appendix A: Important Dates in U.S.-IranianHistory 63

Appendix B: Iran at a Glance 71Appendix C: Iranian State Institutions and Political

Actors 74

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

6/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

7/100

[vii]

FOREWORD

Over the past quarter century, relations between the United Stateand the Islamic Republic of Iran have been trapped by legacies othe past. The aftermath of the 1979 revolution transformed Iranfrom a staunch ally into one of the most intractable opponents othe United States in the region and beyond. Today, the wars inAfghanistan and Iraq have positioned American troops alongIrans borders, making the United States and Iran wary competitors and neighbors who nonetheless possess some overlapping inteests. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of the problemposed by Irans nuclear program and its involvement with terrorism.Clearly, contending with Iran will constitute one of the moscomplex and pressing challenges facing the next U.S.administratio

The Council on Foreign Relations established this Indepen-dent Task Force to consider both Irans domestic reality and its foeign policy and to examine ways the United States can foster relationship with Iran that better protects and promotes Ameri-can interests in a critical part of the world.

The Task Force reaches the important assessment that despiteconsiderable political flux and popular dissatisfaction, Iran is noon the verge of another revolution.From this finding flows its advcacy of the United States adopting a policy of what it describeas limited or selective engagement with the current Iranian government.

The Council is deeply appreciative of two distinguished pub-lic servants, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Dr. Robert M. Gates,

for chairing this effort. Their intellectual leadership steered thi Task Force toward a consensus on an issue of great internationaimportance. My thanks also go to Dr. Suzanne Maloney, a lead-

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

8/100

Iran:Time for a New Approach

[viii]

ing American expert on Iranian society, who skillfully directed project from its inception. Finally, I wish to thank the membeof this Task Force for this important contribution to the national debate.

Richard N. Haass President

Council on Foreign Relations July 2004

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

9/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

10/100


[x]

All those involved with this project are ultimately grateful Richard N. Haass, president of the Council, who challenged th Task Force to think critically and carefully in examining tissues at stake.

Finally, the Task Force would not have been possible withothe financial support of the Leonard and Evelyn Lauder Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. We deeply appreciatheir generosity.

Suzanne Maloney Project Director

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

11/100

[xi]

Note: Map courtesy of United Nations Cartographic Section: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartogenglish/htmain.htm.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

12/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

13/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

14/100


[2]

lic and the urgency of the concerns surrounding its policies madate that the United States deal with the current regime rather tha wait for it to fall.

U.S. concerns have long focused on Irans activities and intetions toward its neighbors.Over the past decade, Irans foreign picy has gradually acceded to the exigencies of national interest, exin certain crucial areas where ideology remains paramount. Aresult,Tehran has reestablished largely constructive relations wits neighbors and has expanded international trade links. Thchanging regional context has produced new pressures and unctainties for Iran. The Task Force concluded that although Iranleadership is pursuing multiple avenues of influence and is expling Iraqi instability for its own political gain, Iran nevertheless coplay a potentially significant role in promoting a stable, pluratic government in Baghdad. It might be induced to be a constructactor toward both Iraq and Afghanistan,but it retains the capa

ity to create significant difficulties for these regimes if it is aliated from the new post-conflict governments in those twcountries.

The Task Force also reaffirms the proposition that one of thmost urgent issues confronting the United States is Irans nuclambitions.Although Task Force members voiced differing opiions on whether evidence is sufficient to determine that Iran h

fully committed itself to developing nuclear weapons, the Task Fagreed that Iran is likely to continue its pattern of tactical cooeration with the International Atomic Energy Agency whilattempting to conceal the scope of its nuclear program in ordto keep its options open as long as possible.

At the core of the Task Forces conclusions is the recognitiothat it is in the interests of the United States to engage selectiv

with Iran to promote regional stability, dissuade Iran from pusuing nuclear weapons, preserve reliable energy supplies, redthe threat of terror, and address the democracy deficit that pe vades the Middle East as a whole. For these reasons, the members advocate a revised strategic approach to Iran.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

15/100

Executive Summary

[3]

A Revised Approach to Iran The Task Force concluded that the current lack of sustainedengagement with Iran harms U.S. interests in a critical region othe world and that direct dialogue with Tehran on specific areaof mutual concern should be pursued.1.) A political dialogue with Iran should not be deferred unti

such a time as the deep differences over Iranian nuclear ambitions and its invidious involvement with regional conflicts havbeen resolved. Rather, the process of selective political engagement itself represents a potentially effective path foraddressing those differences. Just as the United States main-tains a constructive relationship with China (and earlier didso with the Soviet Union) while strongly opposing certainaspects of its internal and international policies, Washingtonshould approach Iran with a readiness to explore areas ofcommon interests, while continuing to contest objectionablepolicies.Ultimately, any real rapprochement with Tehran canonly occur in the context of meaningful progress on the mosturgent U.S.concerns surrounding nuclear weapons, terrorismand regional stability.

2.) A grand bargain that would settle comprehensively the oustanding conflicts between Iran and the United States is not

a realistic goal, and pursuing such an outcome would be un-likely to produce near-term progress on Washingtons centrainterests. Instead, the Task Force proposes selectively en-gaging Iran on issues where U.S. and Iranian interestsconverge,and building upon incremental progress to tackle thebroader range of concerns that divide the two governments.

3.) U.S.policies toward Tehran should make use of incentives a well as punitive measures. The U.S. reliance on comprehen-sive, unilateral sanctions has not succeeded in its stated objective to alter Iranian conduct and has deprived Washington ofgreater leverage vis--vis the Iranian government apart fromthe threat of force. Given the increasingly important role of

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

16/100


[4]

economic interests in shaping Irans policy options at homand abroad, the prospect of commercial relations with the Uned States could be a powerful tool in Washingtons arsenal

4.) The United States should advocate democracy in Iran witout relying on the rhetoric of regime change, as that would likely to rouse nationalist sentiments in defense of the curreregime even among those who currently oppose it.The U.government should focus its rhetoric and its policies on prmoting political evolution that encourages Iran to develop strondemocratic institutions at home and enhanced diplomatiand economic relations abroad.Engaging with the current goernment to address pressing regional and international issuneed not contradict U.S. support for these objectives; indeeengagement pursued judiciously would enhance the chancof internal change in Iran.

5.) The Task Force is mindful of repeated efforts over the latwenty-five years to engage the regime in Tehran, and that aof these have come to naught for various reasons. Howevthe Task Force believes that the U.S. military intervention aloIrans flanks in both Afghanistan and Iraq has changed the geoplitical landscape in the region.These changes may offer bothe United States and Iran new incentives to open a mutua

ly beneficial dialogue, first on issues of common interesuch as regional stability, and eventually on the tough issuof terrorism and proliferation.We recognize that even the moperspicacious policy toward Iran may be stymied by Iraniobstinacy.

Recommendations for U.S. Policy

In pursuit of the new approach outlined above, the Task Force reommends the following specific steps to address the most urgeissues of concern:1.) The United States should offer Iran a direct dialogue on sp

cific issues of regional stabilization. This should entail

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

17/100

Executive Summary

[5]

resumption and expansion of the Geneva track discussions tha were conducted with Tehran for eighteen months after the 9/11attacks.The dialogue should be structured to encourage con-structive Iranian involvement in the process of consolidatingauthority within the central governments of both Iraq andAfghanistan and in rebuilding their economies.Regular con-tact with Iran would also provide a channel to address concernthat have arisen about its activities and relationships withcompeting power centers in both countries. Instead of aspir-ing to a detailed road map of rapprochement, as previous U.Sadministrations have recommended, the executive branchshould consider outlining a more simple mechanism for framing formal dialogue with Iran.A basic statement of principlesalong the lines of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqu signed bythe United States and China,could be developed to outline theparameters for U.S.-Iranian engagement, establish the over-

arching objectives for dialogue, and reassure relevant domestic political constituencies on both sides.The effort to draft sucha statement would give constructive focus and substance to serious, but also realistic,bilateral dialogue. Should that efforend in stalemate, it should not preclude going forward with thedialogue on specific issues.

2.) The United States should press Iran to clarify the status of alQaeda operatives detained by Tehran and make clear that a security dialogue will be conditional on assurances that its governmeis not facilitating violence against the new Iraqi and Afghangovernments or the coalition forces that are assisting them.Atthe same time,Washington should work with the interim gov-ernment of Iraq to conclusively disband the Iraq-basedMojahideen-e Khalq Organization and ensure that its leadersare brought to justice.

3.) In close coordination with its allies in Europe and with Russia, the United States should implement a more focused strat-egy to deal with the Iranian nuclear program. In the immediatefuture, Iran should be pressed to fulfill its October 2003 com

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

18/100


[6]

mitment to maintain a complete and verified suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. While thisuspension is in effect, the United States and other membeof the international community should pursue a frameworagreement with Iran that would offer a more durable solutioto the nuclear issue.Such an agreement should include an Iraian commitment to permanently renounce uranium enrichment and other fuel-cycle capabilities and to ratify thInternational Atomic Energy Agencys Additional Protocoan expanded set of safeguards intended to verify the peaceintentions of its nuclear program. In return, the United Stateshould remove its objections to an Iranian civil nuclear prgram under stringent safeguards and assent to multilateral assances that Tehran would be able to purchase fuel at reasonabmarket rates for nuclear power reactors as long as it abidedits nonproliferation commitments. The agreement should

also commit both sides to enhancing political and economrelations, through a dialogue that would take place in paral with Irans established talks with the European Union.

In the short term, the United States should press theIAEA to exercise its Additional Protocol verification righ vigorously in order to deter and detect any clandestine nucleactivities.This should serve as a decisive test case for Iran

compliance with its obligations under Article II of the Nonproliferation Treaty and for the credibility and viability of tglobal nuclear nonproliferation regime. Tehran must clearunderstand that unless it demonstrates real,uninterrupted cooperation with the IAEA process, it will face the prospect of mutilateral sanctions imposed by the United Nations SecuritCouncil.Over the longer term, the United States should aim

to convene a dialogue on issues of cooperative security invoing Iran and its nuclear-armed neighbors.4.) The United States should resume an active involvement in t

Middle East peace process and press leading Arab states commit themselves to providing genuine, substantive suppo

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

19/100

Executive Summary

[7]

for both the process and any ultimate agreements. Iranian incitement of virulent anti-Israeli sentiment and activities thrives when there is no progress toward peace. Efforts to curtail theflows of assistance to terrorist groups must be coupled withsteps to offer a meaningful alternative to the continuing cycleof violence.A serious effort on the part of Washington aimedat achieving Arab-Israeli peace is central to eventually stemming the tide of extremism in the region.

5.) The United States should adopt measures to broaden thepolitical, cultural, and economic linkages between the Iran-ian population and the wider world, including authorizing U.Snongovernmental organizations to operate in Iran and con-senting to Irans application to begin accession talks with the World Trade Organization. Irans isolation only impedes itspeoples ongoing struggle for a more democratic governmenand strengthens the hand of hard-liners who preach con-frontation with the rest of the world. Integrating Iran into theinternational community through formal institutional oblig-ations as well as expanded people-to-people contacts willintensify demands for good governance at home and addnew constraints on adventurism abroad.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

20/100

[8]

TASK FORCE REPORT

INTRODUCTION

The past two years have witnessed a series of extraordinachanges across the wider Middle East,a region long characterizby a dangerous status quo. Since the tragic turning point of 9/two governments whose threat to their citizens and their neigbors was well establishedAfghanistan and Iraqhave bedestroyed. In their place, a new set of strategic realities and opptunities has emerged.

To date, however, one U.S. policy problem in the Middle Eahas remained curiously impenetrable to the changes that have bfeted its neighbors: Iran. Nearly a quarter-century after the reolution that replaced a modernizing monarchy with a radicreligious state that has abrogated a close alliance with Washinton, U.S.-Iranian relations remain trapped by the legacies of tpast and the very real differences of the present.These differenprincipally concern Irans apparent efforts to acquire a nuclear weacapability and its continuing support for militant groups involvin a variety of regional conflicts, including the Palestinian-Isradispute. But U.S. interests with respect to Iran go beyond thedifferences, important though they are, to include promotindemocracy and prosperity in the Middle East and ensuring stable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

In a region beset by turbulence and unpredictability, antagnism between Washington and Tehran has a curious constanc The estrangement persists despite considerable internal change win the Islamic Republic since its chaotic postrevolutionary inction and despite the fact that the rift arguably undermines the intereof both states. However, dispassion remains a commodity in shsupply in the Middle East,and Iran today endures as the only cou

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

21/100

Task Force Report

[9]

try in the region to categorically reject formal diplomatic relation with Washington.

Such durable antagonism might be sustainable in another partof the world,or in relations with another kind of state, but whereIran is concerned it is profoundly problematic. First, the riftdefies the realities of this globalized era.As the most populous coutry in the Middle East and one of the worlds leading energy producers, Iran today cannot enjoy the luxury of wholesale recalcitranand isolationism as pursued by rogue states such as North KoreaBy the same token, Irans intrinsic involvement with its neighboand with the global political and financial order limits the efficacof any U.S. policy of outright isolation or simple disinterest.

Moreover, the official enmity between Washington and Tehranbelies the convergence of their interests in specific areas. Thstrategic imperatives of the United States and Iran are by nomeans identical, nor are they often even congruent, but they do

intersect in significant ways, particularly with respect to the stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan. In regard to both these coun-tries, the short-term needs and long-term visions of Washingtonand Tehran are surprisingly similar. Although they may differ profoundly on specifics, both the United States and Iran want post-conflict governments in Iraq and Afghanistan that respect the rightof their diverse citizenries and live in peace with their neighbor

The hostility that characterizes U.S.-Iranian relations under-mines these shared interests and squanders the potential benefitof even limited cooperation. As tenuous new governments inBaghdad and Kabul embark on precarious post-conflict futuresthe United States and the region cannot afford to spurn any prospective contributions to the regions stability.

Finally, the estrangement has tended to further entrench some

of the very policies that are sources of conflict between the UniteStates and Iran.The frustrating but familiar interplay between Tehranand Washington has generated a self-perpetuating cycle whereby mutual distrust begets uncompromising assertiveness andunyielding negotiating positions. Tehrans nuclear programs are

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

22/100


[10]

driven in part by aspirations for an ultimate deterrent againany threat to its national security; these efforts, in turn, stiffen Uresolve to mobilize an international consensus in opposition to Irpolicies.Overcoming the absence of any U.S.-Iranian contacts mbe the only alternative to utilizing force in mitigating Washintons major concerns about Irans behavior.

The Task Force was challenged to examine the issues at sta with respect to Iran and to propose a future course to best addrU.S. concerns and advance U.S. interests. At the core of theffort is an overarching conviction that Iran poses a complex acompelling set of concerns for many important U.S. securiinterests, particularly curbing terrorism and checking the proleration of weapons of mass destruction. The report begins wian overview of these interests, offers an assessment of the geral trends shaping Iranian internal politics and internationrelations, and analyzes the critical areas of proliferation a

regional conflict.Finally, it offers the assessments and recommendaof the Task Force for dealing with these challenges.

W HY IRANMATTERS

The United States is currently engaged in a vast region encom

passing the Middle East and Central Asia to an extent unprecdented in its history. This region is complicated, volatile, an vitally important to an array of U.S.geostrategic interests. Iran ocpies a central positionliterally and symbolicallyin the Mdle East, and as such its internal and international conduct ha wide-ranging repercussions for the region as a whole and U.S. interests within it.

Consider Irans environs.To the east is a fractious Afghanistthat is the fountainhead of chaos fueled by religion and drugs.the southeast is Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state that may be othe verge of another ethno-religious explosion.To the northeais Turkmenistan, whose erratic communist ruler has isolated h

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

23/100

Task Force Report

[11]

country from the world. Across Irans northwest border is Azerbaijan, with a government still navigating the challenges of postSoviet transition. Also to the northwest is Turkey, the singlesuccessful democracy in the Muslim Middle East and, if it jointhe European Union,a potential border with the West.To the westis Irans historic adversary, Iraq, occupied by 140,000 U.S. troopand currently in turmoil. Finally, to Irans south and southeast lithe vulnerable Gulf sheikhdoms, its regional rival Saudi Arabiaand the passageways through which 40 percent of the worlds omust flow.

Iran thus lies at the heart of the arc of crisis in the Middle East.Its intricate political, cultural, and economic ties to Afghanistanand Iraqincluding long-standing involvement with oppositionmovements that have worked with Washington to establish suc-cessor governments in each countrymake Iran a critical actoin the postwar evolution of both countries. Its large endowmen

of natural resourcesapproximately 11 percent of the worldoil reserves and the second-largest deposits of natural gaspositions Iran as an indispensable player in the world economyIts status as the largest Shia state and heir to the first religiousrevolution in modern times means it heavily influences widedoctrinal debates surrounding Islamic governance and jurisprudence. Finally, Irans long history as a cohesive state with a trad

tion of constitutionalism and experience in representative governmemeans that its political experience may prove a valuable model fany regional transition to a more democratic order.

Two recent developments highlight the most urgent prioritiesfor U.S.policy toward Iran.The first was the decision by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at its June 1416, 200board of governors meeting to rebuke Iran for failing to cooper

ate adequately with the organizations investigation into its nucleprogram.The latest IAEA report, based on an inquiry launchedmore than two years ago and intensified by a series of revelationconcerning Irans clandestine nuclear activities, illustrates thcomplexities that the international community faces in contend

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

24/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

25/100

Task Force Report

[13]

tic politics today. Still, certain broad conclusions can be drawn froa careful consideration of the recent patterns of politics in IranMost important, the Islamic Republic appears to be solidlyentrenched and the country is not on the brink of revolutionaryupheaval. Iran is experiencing a gradual process of internal chanthat will slowly but surely produce a government more responsitoward its citizens wishes and more responsible in its approacto the international community. In contrast to all of its neighborsand to the prevailing stereotypes inculcated by its own vitriolirhetoricIran is home to vigorous, albeit restricted, politicacompetition and a literate, liberalizing society. Even after therecent political setbacks, Iran today remains a state in whichpolitical factions compete with one another within an organizedsystem, restrictions on civil rights and social life are activelcontested, and the principles of authority and power are debatedenergetically.

Although Irans political competition and debate are robust,however, they nevertheless exist within the narrowly defined constraints imposed on the country by its unique governing framewor which accords ultimate power to unelected and unaccountable Islamic clerics, culminating in the Supreme Leader Ayatollah AKhamenei. Under this regime, the Iranian government enforcessevere restrictions on all aspects of political, cultural, and econom

life, and routinely violates even those limited protections enacted in its own constitution and laws.The restricted scope of Iranelectoral politics was made only too clear in recent parliamentaelections,held in February 2004, in which a clerical oversight bodisqualified more than 3,000 candidates from competing, including eighty then members of the parliament.

Irans theocratic system is deeply unpopular with its citizenry

In their own media as well as in dialogue with external interlocutomany Iraniansacross a wide spectrum of age, class, and ethniand religious backgroundsare candid and scathing in their criticism of their government and its policies. Iranians also expressethis criticism through a series of surprising electoral outcomes i

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

26/100


[14]

the late 1990s that, even within the narrow limits of permissipolitics, indicated resounding support for progressive reform ofgoverning system. Large-scale demonstrations are rare due fear of repression, but they have surfaced intermittently and wgreat intensity in various parts of the country. Most notable wethe July 1999 and June 2003 student protests, both of which w violently crushed by government security forces.

A central factor in Irans political agitation is the coming of aof a new generation of Iranians whose expectations and sensepolitical entitlement has been framed by their rearing under threvolution. Young people comprise as much as 70 percent of population and are positioned to serve as arbiters of the countrpolitical order in the near future. Generally speaking, young Irnians are highly literate,well educated, and supportive of expaed social and cultural liberties and political participation. Givthat approximately one-third of young job-seekers are unem

ployed, economic interests rank high on their list of political porities. With the disqualification of liberal-minded candidates from Ira

2004 parliamentary elections, the countrys reform movemehas effectively been sidelined as a significant actor in formuladomestic or international policy.Reformist leaders were largely uning to challenge the basic parameters of Islamic politics and th

organization, which includes nascent political parties such as Islamic Iran Participation Front, and proved unable to mount aeffective bid for change.As a result, the reform movements ctral strategygradual change brought about from within thexisting governing systemhas been discredited by Iranian czens as a viable pathway to reform. As a June 2004 report by HumRights Watch details, Irans conservative forces quashed effort

promote peaceful political change with a deft strategy of sileing public debate and eliminating potential opposition leadersStill, the influence of reformersboth as individuals an

through the articulation of their ideasremains notable,albeit inrect. The reform movement has had an important role in shap

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

27/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

28/100


[16]

on oil rentsseverely undermine the strength of the Iraniaeconomy. Irans economic woes pose direct,daily hardships fopopulation,whose income measured on a per capita basis has fen by approximately one-third since the revolution.With as maas one million new job-seekers coming into the market each yethe single greatest challenge for any government in Iran willgenerating conditions for job growth. Iran needs a substantial asustained expansion of private investment sufficient for its pductive capacity, including as much as $18 billion per year in eign direct investment, in order to meet these demands.

Irans conservatives tout their capabilities to address these enomic challenges,but in fact neither they nor their rivals can boa successful track record on the economy. This is due, in part,the political sensitivities that are invoked by the prospect of soueconomic development. Real reform would effectively undmine the power of the state and the monopoly enjoyed by Iran

elites.Creating a secure climate for foreign investment,meanwh would necessitate a more accommodating international postuUltimately, economic reform in Iran would promote more resposible governance at home and abroad.Unfortunately, however, hoil prices have enabled Tehran to defer these politically painful st

Following a brief period of increased political ferment in tlate 1990s, Irans public has become intensely disillusioned with

the status quo and available political alternatives and has becomanifestly disengaged from the political process itself.They hshunned the reform movement (most recently by delivering isurprising defeat in 2003 municipal elections) and are increasinfrank in their outright rejection of any political formula thretains the current theocratic system.

Despite this widespread alienation from the prevailing polit

cal order, Iran does not now appear to be in a prerevolutionary uation. Iranians are protesting the political system by withholditheir participation from any form of organized politics, includiinvolvement with the opposition. People are frustrated with thIslamic Republic, but they have also demonstrated that they a

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

29/100

Task Force Report

[17]

not yet prepared to take that frustration to the streets. This dis-engagement from politics is a direct product of Irans recent history. Having endured the disappointment of their last democraticexperiment gone awry, Iranians are weary of political turmoiand skeptical that they can positively change their political circumstances through mass mobilization.

Moreover, to date, no organization or potential leader hasemerged with the apparent discipline or stamina to sustain amajor confrontation with the governments conservative forces.Seeral national student organizations, such as the Office for the Consolidation of Unity (Daftar-e Takhim-e Vahdat ), are vocalproponents of democratic change, but government repressionhas muted their effectiveness.

As a result of these factors, the current Iranian government appeato be durable and likely to persist in power for the short and evemedium term. However, Irans generational shift and prevailin

popular frustration with the government portend the eventual transformation to a more democratic political order in the long term That process is too deeply entrenched in Irans political history ansocial structure to be derailed or even long delayed.

IRANS APPROACH TO THE W ORLD

Throughout the history of the Islamic Republic, Irans domesticdynamics have had a direct impact on its foreign policy agenda anapproach. In the past, factional infighting has precipitated someof the most provocative elements of its foreign policy, such as th1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy, the 1989 promulgation of fatwa condemning writer Salman Rushdie to death, and the more

recent Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative.Today, internarivalries continue to infiltrate Irans external activities,and,as a resIrans many official institutions often pursue policies in direccontradiction with one another.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

30/100


[18]

Over the course of the past twenty-five years, Irans foreign picy has moderated in significant and meaningful ways. Wherethe Islamic Republic initially repudiated the prevailing normsthe international system, today its government has largely abadoned its efforts to topple the regions existing political ordand approaches interstate relations primarily on the basis national interest rather than ideology. In seeking to project its infence and protect its interests, the Islamic Republic has increasin yielded to realist principles. Today, Irans foreign policy exhistriking extremes of accommodation and antagonism.

Commercial considerations figure prominently in the realigment of Iranian foreign policy. Irans interests in maintaining aexpanding international trade,attracting foreign direct investmeand coordinating oil policy with other leading producers to pr vent a future price collapse have shaped its approach to the woand conditioned its partial abandonment of confrontational ta

tics in favor of a more accommodating stance. These broad contours of Iranian foreign policy are evident its successful implementation of detente with its neighbors in tsouthern Persian Gulf, in its pragmatic approach to its northerneighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in its cultivatiof close ties with a range of regional actors, including IndRussia, China, Japan, and the European Union. This last effor

is designed to offset Irans persistent official antagonism with United States. Tehrans approach to Washington remains one of several de

sive exceptions to the general trend toward moderation and reism in Iranian foreign policy. In formulating Iranian policy towthe United States, ideological imperatives continue to outweidispassionate calculations of national interest. Irans strident op

sition to Israel is also the product of self-defeating dogma.Theexceptions may be slowly abated by the erosion of Irans revotionary orthodoxies, the growing importance of public supporta component of regime legitimacy, and the increasing difficultyinternational integration. Nonetheless, for the immediate futur

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

31/100

Task Force Report

[19]

Iranian foreign policy remains a captive of the regimes official enshriment of anti-American and anti-Israeli ideology.

The general framework for Iranian foreign policy has remainerelatively consistent over the past several years, and is likely to cotinue to do so in the near future.Moreover, there is a growing consensus within Irans foreign policy elite around the principal pillaof its strategic interests. Steps that heretofore were ideologicalltaboosuch as the still-incomplete normalization of relations witEgypt, whose government sheltered the deposed shah and signeda peace treaty with Israeltoday command broad-based sup-port among most factions in Iranian politics.

Recent shifts in Irans domestic political fortunes may facilitatenhanced flexibility and coherence in its foreign policy.The recensetbacks for Iranian reformers have reconsolidated the officiaorgans in the hands of a single ideological faction. Although thehave historically pandered to anti-American sentiments, Irans con

servatives have also demonstrated a track record of success icrafting compromise approaches and following through withtheir implementation. The pragmatists who appear to be ascen-dant in Tehran have described dialogue with the United States aa course that is neither wine, nor prayerin other words, neither prohibited nor obligatory.

The prospects for additional moderation of Irans internation-

al approach remain highly uncertain,however.The strengthenedposition of Iranian conservatives at home may inspire some to restoideological fires abroad in order to reinvigorate their domestic costituencies and justify extremist policies. An inflated sense otheir own bargaining power may constrain the conservatives wiingness to moderate their own international conduct and could welead them to anticipate disproportionate rewards for any cooper

ation.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

32/100


[20]

IRANSNUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Over the past two years, Irans construction of extensive uraniuenrichment facilities was made evident through the work of Iraian opposition groups and follow-up inquiries by the InternationAtomic Energy Agency. The disclosures of the hitherto undeclared research facilities in Natanz and Tehran together with a hea water production plant in Arak, and the acknowledgement significant imports of uranium from China, transformed thurgency of intelligence estimates surrounding Irans nuclear cabilities and reduced the time remaining before it may reach a nucthreshold.These discoveries, and the string of alarming revelatithat have emerged through subsequent IAEA inspectionshave also given rise to new doubts about the credibility of tIranian commitment to abide by the terms of the NucleaNonproliferation Treaty (NPT).The revelations about the extenof Irans nuclear program have confirmed U.S.suspicions and htransformed the assessments of others. According to the IAEAIran has achieved a practically complete front end of a nuclearcycle,1and considerable evidence suggests that this is part of multipronged effort to acquire and/or produce fissile material.Exerbating concern about Irans nuclear activities is its long-estlished and sophisticated missile development program, whi

has successfully produced medium-range missiles capable of geting regional states such as Israel.Tehran also has plans for incontinental ballistic missiles.

The Bush administration responded to these developments wia combination of tough rhetoric and concerted international presure.The alarming nature of the disclosures helped to generatrare multilateral consensus aligned to admonish Iran, as did t

coincidental emergence of new irritants in Irans previously smorelations with Canada and Argentinawhose governments ea

1Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of IranReport by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, November 10, 2003.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

33/100

Task Force Report

[21]

currently serve on the board of the IAEA. The outcome was anunprecedented effort by the international community to exert increasepressure on Iran concerning its nuclear activities,an effort underlined by the implicit threat of United Nations Security Councilaction and the potential for international economic sanctions.

This multilateral pressure generated noteworthy short-termprogress, with an October 2003 Iranian agreement to sign theAdditional Protocol mandating enhanced verification of bothdeclared and undeclared materials and activities.The Iranians alsagreed to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities The agreement was negotiated by the United Kingdom, Franceand Germany, whose foreign ministers committed their govern-ments to providing Iran access to peaceful nuclear technology.Thagreement represented a limited but meaningful concession by Iraone that reportedly evoked contentious debates among its senioleadership.At the time, it also offered a compromise that met the

immediate interests of both the United States and its allies whenneither side wished to repeat the acrimony that had emergedonly a year earlier over Iraq. Subsequent Iranian statements anactions have significantly diminished confidence regarding Iranintentions to abide by the terms of this deal, however.The Octo-ber accord and Irans subsequent interaction with the IAEA represent an inherently ephemeral victory in what must be, by

definition, an open-ended relationship between the Iranian gov-ernment and the international community on nuclear issues.Since that time, Irans interaction with the IAEA has been char-acterized by continued friction, obfuscation, and a steady flow onew revelations about the true extent of Iranian nuclear activitie The recent diversion of nuclear materials to Iran has raised expectations of further confrontations in the future.

The IAEA has continued to walk a fine line, maintainingpressure on Tehran while avoiding provoking either further Iranian intransigence or a breakdown in the hard-won consensusamong its own members.During a March 2004 visit to WashingtonIAEA Director General Mohammad ElBaradei reiterated frankly

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

34/100


[22]

that the jury is still out on the status of Irans nuclear prgramas well as on the extent of the clerical regimes preparness to abide fully by its agreements to disclose all aspects of program.2In June 2004, the IAEA board of governors passed itmost strongly worded resolution to date, drawing attention to Irafailure to cooperate in a timely manner, the omissions in its dclosures to the international community,and the urgency surroundthe most problematic elements of Irans nuclear program.The IAEand the international community appear to be converging arouthe conclusion articulated by the Bush administration more tha year ago that Iran has not complied with its obligations undthe NPT. In response,Tehran announced that it would resume construction of centrifuges in contravention of its earlier pledgesthe October accord.

Irans Nuclear Imperatives

Given its history and its turbulent neighborhood, Irans nucleambitions do not reflect a wholly irrational set of strategic callations.Arguments for enhancing Irans nuclear capabilities are nessarily pursued in private more often than in public forumalthough the recent diplomatic activities vis--vis the IAEA hato some extent provoked a more freely available debate.Nonetless, the rationale behind Irans pursuit of a nuclear option can

elucidated from the rich literature on security issues that is prsent in Iranian academic journals and the press. Despite the cleics frequent rhetorical invocations referencing the Israeli nuccapability, this is not one of the primary drivers for Irans own pgram.Rather, in addition to the prodigious sense of insecurity inccated by the Iraqi invasion and the experience of the war itself, thappears to be widespread consensus surrounding two other imp

tant consequences of weapons of mass destruction: prestige aleverage. The former reflects the deeply held national pride this a distinctly Iranian characteristic; it is simply inconceivabl

2 Transcript, CNN,March 18, 2004.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

35/100

Task Force Report

[23]

Iranians across the political spectrum that neighboring Pakistana country considered to be exponentially inferior in terms of iteconomy, society, and political maturity, should have access to moadvanced military technology.The second factor that pervades Iranian consideration of its nuclear options, leverage, further exposes the fundamental strategic deficiencies of Irans continuinestrangement from the United States. For many in Tehran, main-taining some sort of viable nuclear program offers the single mo valuable enhancement of the countrys bargaining position wit Washington.

The elimination of Saddam Husseins regime has unequivocallmitigated one of Irans most serious security concerns. Yet regimchange in Iraq has left Tehran with potential chaos along its vulnerable western borders, as well as with an ever more proximaU.S. capability for projecting power in the region. By contributing to heightened tensions between the Bush administration and

Iran, the elimination of Saddams rule has not yet generated substantial strategic dividends for Tehran. In fact, together with U.Sstatements on regime change, rogue states, and preemptive actionrecent changes in the regional balance of power have only enhancthe potential deterrent value of a strategic weapon.

Unlike Irans other provocative policies, which have provokeintrafactional debate and thereby played into the internal powe

struggle in the country, the nuclear temptation is widely sharedacross the Iranian political spectrum. It dates back to the prerevolutionary period, when the monarchy began developing a nucleaprogram that was ostensibly for power generation purposes but undestood to be intended as a launch pad for an ongoing weapons researceffort. Opponents of crossing the nuclear threshold remain vocaand influential. Still, it is clear that the nuclear potential res-

onates with a collective set of interests that do not neatly correspond with Irans political factions.The prestige factor and the apparedeterrent that a nuclear capability represents will offer powerfuincentives for an Iranian regime of any political character.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

36/100


[24]

As has become increasingly evident in the more public debof the past several months, however, Irans political elites divided by a subordinate (but still critical) issue: the prospectconfrontation with the international community over a nascent nuc weapons capability. Although reformers emphasize the beneof Irans regional detente and its commercial relations with Euroand Asia,hard-liners are not deterred by the prospect of internatiosanctions and isolation and would welcome a crisis as a meanrekindling Irans waning revolutionary fires and deflecting atttion from the domestic deficiencies of Islamic rule.

Irans Nuclear Future A number of uncertainties surrounding Irans nuclear program remoutstanding.First, the viability of the October agreement betweIran and the three European foreign ministers remains in consideradoubt,particularly given Irans recent decision to resume centrif

construction.This defiant step by Tehran is the latest bid to erothe original terms of the agreement, as well as to undermine tnarrow consensus that was attained between Europe and thUnited States on the issue. Irans leadership appears to be tryito maintain momentum in its nuclear program while avoidingmajor confrontation with the international community. Irancommitments in the October accord were in fact quite expansi

entailing a complete suspension of all enrichment-related and repcessing activitiesoriginally understood to include productioncentrifuge parts, assembly and testing of centrifuges,and productof uranium hexaflouride feedstockand of the construction oheavy-water reactor. The primary challenge for the internatioal community today is formulating an effective response to Iraefforts to flout its October 2003 promises.

In addition, there are a number of outstanding subordinate issuRatification of the Additional Protocol by the Iranian parliament has still not happened (the issue was expected to be takup some time after the May 2004 inauguration of representativ who won their seats in the extremely flawed February ballot

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

37/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

38/100


[26]

This may extend to maintaining a clandestine nuclear program military aims in parallel with its declared civilian activities,as allby an exiled Iranian opposition group. At a minimum, Irans ptern of concealment and the sophisticated and extensive natureits disclosed activities indicate that its leadership is committedretaining all available nuclear options.As a result, the real impative for the United States will be to maintain consensus aroua continuing effort to check Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapcapability within the broad international coalition erected over last year.

INVOLVEMENT WITHR EGIONALCONFLICTS

Three regional issues have emerged as the centerpiece of tBush administrations Middle East policy: stabilizing Iraq a

Afghanistan and resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Iran hmajor influence in all three arenas and can potentially play an imptant role in assisting or retarding Washingtons objectives.U.S.picy pronouncements concerning Iranian involvement in eacsphere tend to reduce its role to generalized allegations of terrism;however, the reality is more complex, particularly with resto post-conflict Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran has arguably benefited more than any other country froU.S. policies toward the Middle East since September 11, 20By removing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from power Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has eliminated two of Tehranmost bitter enemies and most serious threats. What has replacthem,however, is not unambiguously preferable from Irans poof view,as the new regional landscape entails profound uncertain

new geographic proximity with the United States, and the thre(and, to some extent, reality) of chaos. The Iranian government has often played a constructive an

unheralded role in U.S.-led efforts to establish effective instittions of central government authority in Iraq and Afghanistan. A

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

39/100

Task Force Report

[27]

the same time, Iranians have cultivated ties with a wide range opolitical actors in both countries, including extremists, as a meanof maximizing their potential leverage.This cultivation has takeplace via both official and informal mechanisms and ranges fromthe direct recognition and assistance provided to the central government in each country to financial and material support fun-neled to bad actors bent on subverting the nascent democratic procesunder way. As a result of its compelling strategic interest in retaining influence over the dramatic evolution of its immediate neighbors, Irans multilevel approach to Iraq and Afghanistan is certaito continue.

Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda Enmity between the Taliban and Iran long predated the events ofSeptember 11, 2001, that precipitated the U.S. military campaigin Afghanistan. Iranian suspicions of the Taliban movement wer

present from the outset, engendered by its origins in the radicaSunni seminaries of Pakistan and its close association with Islamabads military and intelligence services. Ever concerned witthe countrys stature as an Islamic state and vulnerable to a distinctive Persian pride, Iranian officials viewed the Taliban as reationary peasants sullying the image of Islam. Their animosity was exacerbated by the rising tide of drugs and instability from Ta

iban-controlled Afghanistan that too frequently spilled acrossthe Iranian border. For the Talibans part, their extreme ascetic doctrine reviled Shia Muslims as apostates, and its militants menaceAfghanistans Shia minority. Tensions between the neighborsnearly escalated to direct conflict in August 1998, after eleven Iraian diplomats were murdered in the Taliban takeover of a Shia citAs a result, Iran cultivated close ties to the opposition militias tha

were battling the Taliban, including the Northern Alliance. This history positioned Iran as an unlikely ally in the post-9/1campaign by the United States to unseat the Taliban and deny safhaven in Afghanistan to al-Qaeda. Irans early track record was etremely promising:Tehran continued to work in tandem with the

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

40/100


[28]

U.S.military effort in Afghanistan through the Northern Alliancand it played an active and constructive role in the Bonn procthat produced a new central government in post-conflict KabIranian officials also point to Irans extensive logistical effortfacilitate the U.S.victory over the Taliban, and its considerableto,and early recognition of, the post-conflict administration orgnized under President Hamid Karzai.

The Bush administration has acknowledged these efforts bhas also consistently pointed to the more nefarious elements of Irian actions in Afghanistan.As early as January 2002,President Bissued a thinly veiled warning to Iran against any interferenceAfghanistan,stating,If they, in any way, shape,or form,try to debilize the government, the coalition will deal with them . . . in dipmatic ways, initially. 3Senior administration officials have oftencriticized Irans involvement with Afghan warlords whose inpendent power bases contribute to the lack of stability and te

uous nature of central government authority today.It is critical to consider recent allegations of collusion betweIranian hard-liners and al-Qaeda.These allegations contravene bothe Islamic Republics accommodating stance toward the 2001 Umilitary campaign in Afghanistan and the well-established trarecord of hostility between Iran and al-Qaedas ascetic strandSunni militancy.Al-Qaedas ideology and worldview are unrelent

opposed to the Shia branch of Islam, which its theologians braas a heretical sect. Nonetheless,both al-Qaedas operational leership and the radical hard-liners who dominate the senior ranof Irans security bureaucracy have demonstrated in the past a tain degree of doctrinal flexibility that has facilitated functioalliances, irrespective of apparent ideological incompatibility

The allegations of cooperation between al-Qaeda and Ira

are shrouded by the lack of much verifiable public evidenSome reports suggest that militants associated with al-Qaed

3U.S.Department of State, International Information Programs,Bush Says Iran MuContribute to War against Terror,Expresses Hope Iran Will Help Stabilize Afghanistan January 10, 2002.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

41/100

Task Force Report

[29]

have had direct contacts with Iranian officials since the mid-1990s;however, no serious reports demonstrate substantive cooperation prior to the 9/11 attacks. More disturbing is evidence thasince the attacks Iran has served as a transit route for, and has possibly offered safe harbor to,al-Qaeda operatives fleeing Afghanistaincluding several prominent leaders such as spokesman SuleimaAbu Ghaith and security chief Saif Al Adel.Related to these allegations are reports that Imad Mughniyeh, the head of Hezbol-lahs special operations directorate and one of Washingtons mo wanted terrorist suspects, has also found sanctuary in Iran.

When public criticism by the U.S.government on this issue intensified after early 2002, Iran confirmed that it had detained an unspeified number of individuals connected with al-Qaeda and lateracknowledged that these operatives included both small- andbig-time elements.The circumstances of their entry into Iran arnot publicly known, nor are any details of their status beyond th

announced Iranian intention to put the al-Qaeda representativeson trial. Iran also claims to have deported at least 500 individuals who fled Afghanistan on the heels of the U.S. military campaign. Although Iran has trumpeted these actions as evidence oits vigilance in countering al-Qaedas domestic and international threat, U.S. concerns about Irans posture intensified after thMay 2003 attacks on expatriate housing complexes in Saudi Ara

bia that were attributed to al-Qaeda operatives, possibly workinfrom Iran. As a result, Washington suspended the quiet con-structive dialogue between the two governments that had developed after 9/11 on a limited range of regional issues.

The nature of Irans relationship with al-Qaeda is subject to innuendo and interpretation. Its eastern borders are notoriously porousas Iranian officials are prone to noting in its defense.However, eve

if this is true, Irans opaque handling of its unwelcome guests straicredulity. One plausible, although as yet unverified, explanatiois that Irans reluctance to turn over captured al-Qaeda operativestems from concerns that such cooperation could produce evidencof complicity between Iranian hard-liners and individual terror

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

42/100


[30]

ists. Behind the scenes, Iranian officials have suggested exchaing its al-Qaeda detainees for members of the Mojahideen-Khalq Organization,who are currently interned by U.S. occuping forces in Iraq. Like many other episodes in the history of turbulent relationship with Washington, Irans insistence on clining to what it perceives to be a valuable bargaining chip may lto an overestimation of its potential leverage and an ultima weakening of its own security.

Iraq As with the Taliban, Irans long track record of conflict with Sadam Hussein is well established.The eight-year Iran-Iraq War wso bitter and exhausting that it did not end in a formal peace treaand relations between the two countries did not fully resume the ensuing sixteen years of Saddams rule. Here, too, Tehraand Washington found themselves improbably united by a com

mon enemy, although the problematic history of U.S. polictoward Iraq and the implicit threat of Irans affiliation with its Smajority added considerable layers of complexity and warinesthe lead-up to the 2003 campaign by the U.S.-led coalition to remSaddam Hussein, Iranian officials opposed the War was in the mrobust terms,mindful of the precedent that would be set and thfact that the U.S. military would be parked on Irans weste

border. In private conversations, Iranians offered their own traic experience in Iraq as an admonition against any optimisabout the prospects for a positive post-conflict scenario.

In the immediate aftermath of the coalition victory, howeveIran also recognized an unprecedented opportunity to extend own influence and encourage the ascension of a friendly fellow government. As a result, Iran sanctioned cooperation with the U

occupation via one of its primary instruments for projectinpower in Iraq: the Shia opposition groups. In particular, thSupreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which hlong-standing and intricate ties to Irans governing clergy, emeras a central and constructive actor in the nascent politics of po

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

43/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

44/100


[32]

the Sunni center of the country. One Iranian newspaper deridethe violence that has beset Iraq as neither guerrilla warfare nor peoples resistance, but rather a horrible blind terror. Inconniencing the United States is one thing; sowing turmoil in Iranown environs is quite another. In fact, at the height of recent tesions in Najaf, Iran dispatched a team of diplomats to mediabetween U.S. forces and the insurgent al Sadr forces.

Moreover, the Iranian clerics, who have resisted the expansiof popular political participation at home, are proving ardechampions of pluralism in Iraq. Again, this position,paradoxicasuits their interestsa democratic Iraqi polity is likely to featstrong Shia representation, providing Iran valuable avenuthrough which to exert its influence.In addition, such a state woube prone to internecine political squabbling and would therebyan implausible rival for regional hegemony. For these reasons, very clerics who undermined Irans recent parliamentary p

have welcomed Iraqs new interim government and encouragthe early organization of free elections.One of the central uncertainties about Iraqs evolution is the imp

it may have on Irans internal affairs.Many U.S.proponents of regchange suggested that Saddam Husseins removal and the estalishment of representative government and rule of law in Iraq wohave a domino effect throughout the region, first and foremost

Iran.Undoubtedly, a stable, pluralistic Iraq that enjoys cordial retions with its neighbors may have ripple effects on the evolutiof Irans domestic political contention. And interaction betweIranian seminaries and the historic seats of religious scholarshin Iraq will intensify the debate among Shia clerics about the mappropriate relationship between religion and politics. GranAyatollah Ali Sistani commands a considerable following acr

the regionwider than that of any of Irans ruling clergy. His quapproach to clerical involvement in politics and his reported avsion to Irans theocratic system could create new Iranian adhents to the notion of separating religion from politics. In th

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

45/100

Task Force Report

[33]

short term, however, instability in Iraq is only fueling the fires oextremism throughout the region.

Middle East Peace Process Among the most troublesome practices of the Islamic Republiis its sustained and prolonged support for militant anti-Israeli groupand terrorists. Among these, Irans sponsorship of Hezbollahremains the most significant. Iranian officials founded the groupand continue to provide training, intelligence, arms, and financ-ing twenty years later. An outgrowth of the intricate religious anfamilial ties among the regions Shia clerical establishmentHezbollah today has both military and political arms but remainclosely associated with Irans clerical leadership.

Hezbollahs track record as one of the worlds foremost terroriorganizations is indisputable:until 9/11, its 1983 attack on barrachousing U.S.Marines held the record for causing the largest los

of U.S. lives as a result of a terrorist attack. As a consequence othis attack and several other suicide bombings carried out byHezbollah operatives during that period, Deputy Secretary of StatRichard Armitage characterized the U.S. stance toward Hezbol-lah in late 2002 as a blood debt.In the 1980s,Hezbollah was resposible for aircraft hijackings as well as kidnappings of U.S.citizeand other Westerners who were then held as hostages. In addi-

tion, Hezbollah operatives, along with four Iranian officials, havbeen indicted by Argentina in connection with the 1994 bomb-ing of a Jewish community center that killed eighty-five people

Despite this history, many within the region emphasize Hezbol-lahs political participationits party members hold twelve seain the Lebanese parliamentand openly supported its role in pressuring Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000. In this

regard,even U.S. allies are split to some extent.These reservationreflect Hezbollahs evolution into something beyond a complianIranian surrogate. Its organization and its history reflect the complicated rivalries within the Lebanese Shia community, as well athe formative role Syria has had in shaping the groups operation

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

46/100


[34]

imperatives. Iranian material support, channeled via Damascuremains significant, but reliable reports suggest that only a retively small number of Irans Revolutionary Guards remainsouthern Lebanon today to help coordinate that assistance.

Iranian support for Hezbollah clearly transcends any factioal differences among the Islamic Republics political elite; bIrans reformers and Irans hard-liners are equally committed to Lebanese organization. In fact, it is one of the leaders of threformist faction of the 20002004 parliamentHojjatoleslam Akbar Mohtashamipurwho is credited with founding Hezbolah. President Khatami has met with its secretary general,SheiHassan Nasrallah, several times in Lebanon and in Tehran, commenting recently that the group has a a natural right, even a sacnational duty to defend Palestinians against Israel.5

As a result, it is highly improbable that Iran can be persuador compelled to completely renounce its proxy. Still, som

measure of Iranian flexibility may be possible even with respto Hezbollah.Since 9/11, Iranian leaders have repeatedly advocthat Hezbollah exhibit restraint in its armed struggle againIsrael, and have also hinted that a resolution to the Shebaa Farmterritorial dispute could set the stage for Hezbollah to abandoits paramilitary activities.

Irans long cultivation of Hezbollah, together with its extrem

antagonism toward Israel, has paved the way for expanding retions with (Sunni) Palestinian militant groups, including thPopular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. The connectionamong these groups, Hezbollah, and Iran have intensified steadly over the past fifteen years, as shared ideological views have itated operational linkages and alliances. Some reports estim

that Irans support for individual organizations has been as hias $100 million, but Palestinian militants dispute these assetions, claiming that Iranian aid is philanthropic in nature and

5Rob Synovitz,Iran:Despite U.S. Pressure,Khatami Says Tehran Supports Hizbalah, RFE/RL, May 14, 2003.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

47/100

Task Force Report

[35]

a much lesser magnitude.Tehrans support to these groups has complemented its long-standing antipathy toward Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, whose Fatah movement aligned with Iraq during it war with Iran and who further alienated the Islamic Republic throughis participation in the Madrid peace process that Tehran reviled

Iran rejects U.S.criticism of its stance toward Israel and its support of Hezbollah and Palestinian militants; its official justifications differentiate between terrorist activities and what Tehrancharacterizes as legitimate resistance against occupation. Thiparadoxical position has generated occasional evidence that Iracould be persuaded to countenance an eventual peace agreemenbetween the Palestinians and Israel.The foreign ministry declaredas recently as October 2002, that Iran would not stand in the waof a final two-state solution and accepted (at least in its official dilogue with Saudi Arabia) Crown Prince Abdullahs peace plan.Equaly important, Iranian policymakers have recognized the risk tha

Irans assistance to militants opposing the Middle East peaceprocess could drag the country directly into conflict, particularlin the post-9/11 environment,where preemption is a tool of counterterrorism.

Still, the Iranian leaderships adherence to extremist rhetoric anits close association with rejectionist groups ultimately limits thgovernments flexibility on this issue. Having entrenched its oppo

sition to Israel so prominently and absolutely, Tehran has founditself in the awkward position of being progressively more unyieling than the Palestinians themselves. Since the outset of the second Palestinian intifada in September 2000, the few official voiceof moderation have been increasingly drowned out by radicalismAs a result, in spite of select and very modest improvementsIrans involvement with terrorist groups and activities remains con

siderable according to U.S. and European intelligence. Mostnotably, in January 2002, a ship laden with fifty tons of Irania weapons and explosives destined for the Palestinian Authority wdiscovered off the coast of Israel, with its captain claiming that icargo was loaded in Iran. Iran has also continued to host an

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

48/100


[36]

annual conclave on the intifada,which draws a veritable pantheof terrorist leaders. As the U.S. war on terrorism begins to maheadway against alternative sources of funding, these groureliance on Tehran may only be enhanced, which in turn wouincrease the incentives for Iranian hard-liners to seek low-cost pries.

Although it is substantial, Iranian assistance does not consttute the primary factor in the existence or operations of Palestinterrorism, however. Absent a return to discernible progress towa peace settlement between Palestinians and Israelis and/ormeaningful commitment by the Palestinians to abandon violenagainst civilians as their primary means of confronting Israoccupation, these groups and their abhorrent activities are likto persist.

The Legacies of Iranian Support for Terrorism

It is important to highlight the fact that the international efforto curb Irans terrorist associations has witnessed a few notable cesses. Iran is credited with efforts to bring about the release Western hostages held by Hezbollah in the early 1990s, for exaple, after rapprochement with the Gulf states dictated an abandonment of the proxy movements among their Shia populationFurthermore, European efforts to prosecute Iranian officials f

their involvement in extraterritorial assassinations of dissidentnotably, the German indictment of Irans then intelligence minister in the 1997 Mykonos caseappears to have halted tonce-prevalent practice.Most recently, Iranians internally have foreforms (albeit very modest ones) of the intelligence ministry,organization most closely identified with the practice of terroism, as a result of popular outrage over the ministrys role in

1998 murders of Iranian writers and political activists at homUnfortunately, each of these steps forward has occurred in tcontext of worrisome reversals on other issues. For example,release of Western hostages in the early 1990s coincided witrenewed onslaught against Iranian dissidents abroad. The pos

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

49/100

Task Force Report

[37]

9/11 dialogue with Washington on Afghanistan, meanwhile, tooplace even as support to militant Palestinian groups intensified anal-Qaeda operatives were found to have operated from Iranian territory. As a result of its tendency to subsume its foreign policy witin its fierce domestic political competition, Iran has failed toachieve substantial diplomatic recompense for its limited bouts ocooperation.

As a result, the periods of progress in Irans domestic politicasituation have not led to the sort of progress on the issue of ter-rorism that many once hoped for. Also complicating the situationis the fact that many Iranian reformers, although generally arguing for a less confrontational foreign policy, have also maintainesteady ties with Lebanese and Palestinian militants, whose causresonates with their own ideological roots in the Islamic left wing. Popular pressure is unlikely to prove a potent force for miigating Irans international adventurism,simply because of the ex

tremely limited role of Iranian public opinion in shaping foreigpolicy.Thanks to the steady diet of propaganda, sympathy for thPalestiniansplight is more widely felt among Iranians today thaprior to the revolution. Beyond a vocal minority, however, publisympathy does not extend to militancy, and anecdotal evidence sugests that Iranians are more concerned with expanding their ownopportunities than those of a distant population.

Moreover, even if Irans terrorist ties were fully severed todatheir legacy would still be extremely problematic for the countrAs a result of a 1996 U.S. law permitting lawsuits against state sposors of terrorism, the Iranian government has been held liable fodamages to families of Americans killed or wounded in terrorisbombings in Israel and kidnappings in Lebanondamages thattoday total more than $1 billion.At the same time, criminal inves

tigations into some of Irans more far-flung alleged activitiessuch as the bombing of the Jewish community center in Argentina, have just begun to produce legal actions against former Iranian officials.Accountability and expectations of restitution will rema serious dilemma for Iran if it is to move forward and one dafully reintegrate itself into the international community.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

50/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

51/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

52/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

53/100

Task Force Report

[41]

toward a satisfactory resolution of key U.S. concerns.Political aneconomic relations with Iran cannot be normalized unless and untthe Iranian government demonstrates a commitment to abandoningits nuclear weapons programs and its support for terrorist groupHowever, these demands should not constitute preconditions fordialogue.

In launching any new relationship with Iran, it is important thatexpectations on both sides are realistic and that U.S.ones are clealy communicated to the Iranians as well as between the variouplayers in the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy. A grand bargaibetween Iran and the United States is not a realistic or achievablgoal. A quarter century of enmity and estrangement are not easily overcome, the issues at stake are too numerous and compleand the domestic political contexts of both countries are too difficult to allow the current breach to be settled comprehensivelovernight.Moreover, even the most far-reaching rapprochemen

between the United States and Iran could not re-create the closealliance that existed prior to the revolution in 1979. Were themost serious U.S. concerns about Iranian behavior to be resolvesignificant differences between worldviews and strategic priorties would remain.Instead,we envision a relationship through whicthe two countries pragmatically explore areas of common conceand potential cooperation, while continuing to pursue other

incompatible objectives at the same time.For these reasons, we advocate that Washington propose acompartmentalized process of dialogue, confidence building, anincremental engagement. The United States should identify thediscrete set of issues on which critical U.S.and Iranian interests co verge and must be prepared to try to make progress along separatracks, even while considerable differences remain in other area

Instead of aspiring to a detailed road map of rapprochement,as previous U.S. administrations have recommended, the executive branch should consider outlining a more simple mechanismfor framing formal dialogue with Iran. A basic statement of principles, along the lines of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqu signeby the United States and China,could be developed to outline the

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

54/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

55/100

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

56/100


[44]

the prospect of multilateral sanctions imposed by the SecurCouncil.

Further, the Task Force recommends that the United States wor with its allies and the IAEA to outline a detailed framewoagreement that would seek to outline a more durable solutionthe nuclear issue.The basic parameters of such an agreement woinstitute ongoing rigorous constraints on Irans nuclear prograin exchange for continued access to peaceful technology ainternational markets. Iran would be asked to commit to permnently ceasing all its enrichment and reprocessing activities, s ject to international verification. In return, the internationacommunity would guarantee access to adequate nuclear fuel splies, with assurances that all spent fuel would be returned to tcountry of origin, and to advanced power generation technolo(whose export to Iran is currently restricted). These commiments would permit the continuing development of a peaceful Ir

ian nuclear power program and provide multilateral guaranteeaccess to nuclear technology, as long as Iran abides by its noproliferation obligations defined broadly to include cessationuranium enrichment.

Iran will inevitably resist such a proposal, as it has vocally pclaimed its sovereign rights to nuclear technology and to all thactivities not specifically prohibited by the Nonproliferatio

Treaty. For this reason, the framework agreement should incoporate a new combination of carrots and sticks to persuade Tehto reconsider its course. In particular, the United States should prepared to commit to opening a bilateral dialogue with Iran enhancing political and economic relations that would take plain parallel with the Islamic Republics established negotiations wthe European Union on trade, terrorism, proliferation, the Mid

dle East peace process, and human rights.A viable framework agreement with Iran on the nuclear iss would demand more effective cooperation between Washingtand its allies to make clear to Iran both the potential rewards fits cooperation as well as the possible costs of its continui

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

57/100

Task Force Report

[45]

obstructionism. Although the United States must take a leader-ship role, the involvement of its allies and multilateral institution will be essential to provide leverage vis--vis Iran.The United Statshould carefully calibrate any approach to garner the widest consensus and a firm commitment to a coordinated set of steps. Foexample, the United States should focus its dialogue with Russinot on pressuring Moscow to abandon its involvement with theconstruction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant,but on persuadinit to intensify its efforts to reach an agreement on the return of spenfuel from that facility. For its part, the European Union must be willing to consider curtailing economic relations with Tehranshould Iran be unwilling to adopt greater controls on its nucleaprograms.

Given the potential threat that Irans acquisition of nuclear weaponcould pose, the full range of alternativesincluding militaryoptionsfor confronting Tehran must be examined. Yet the use

of military force would be extremely problematic, given the dipersal of Irans program at sites throughout the country and theiproximity to urban centers. Since Washington would be blamedfor any unilateral Israeli military strike, the United States shoulmake it quite clear to Israel that U.S. interests would be adversely affected by such a move.In addition, any military effort to eliminate Iranian weapons capabilities would run the significant ris

of reinforcing Tehrans desire to acquire a nuclear deterrent andof provoking nationalist passions in defense of that very coursIt would most likely also generate hostile Iranian initiatives in Iraand Afghanistan.

Regional Conflicts From the perspective of U.S.interests,one particular issue area appe

particularly ripe for U.S.-Iranian engagement: the future of Iraqand Afghanistan.The United States has a direct and compellinginterest in ensuring both countries security and the success of thepost-conflict governments. Iran has demonstrated its ability andreadiness to use its influence constructively in these two countrie

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

58/100


[46]

but also its capacity for making trouble.The United States shou work with Tehran to capitalize on Irans influence to advance stability and consolidation of its neighbors. This could commence via a resumption and expansion of the Geneva track dcussions with Tehran on post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq.

Such a dialogue should be structured to obtain constructive Iraian involvement in the process of consolidating authority withthe central governments and rebuilding the economies of both Irand Afghanistan. Regular contact with Iran would also providchannel to address concerns that have arisen about its activities relationships with competing power centers in both countries.Thdiscussions should incorporate other regional power brokers,as as Europe and Russiamuch like the Six Plus Twonegotiation Afghanistan that took place in the years before the Taliban wousted.A multilateral forum on the future of Iraq and Afghanist would help cultivate confidence and would build political and e

nomic relationships essential to the long-term durability of the ngovernments in Baghdad and Kabul.Critics have argued that Iran should be denied any forma

role in the reconstruction of Iraq due to the propensity of somIranian factions to pursue destabilizing policies there. In thaftermath of the June 28, 2004, handover of sovereignty to tinterim Iraqi administration,however, the United States is no lon

in a position to implement such a veto, nor should it endeavordo so. Convincing Iran that it has a direct stake in the successtransition of its former adversary represents the most effective meof thwarting any attempts by hard-line elements in Iran to undemine Iraq.

Over the longer term,U.S. interests in achieving peace and stbility in the Persian Gulf would be best served by engaging Ir

and each of its neighbors in a dialogue aimed at establishing effective organization to promote regional security and coopetion. Such an organization could be structured to provide a forufor regional dialogue, confidence-building measures, economcooperation, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

59/100

Task Force Report

[47]

Settling the al-Qaeda issue must remain a high priority for theUnited States.Through direct dialogue with Afghanistan via a reneweGeneva track, the outlines of a reciprocal arrangement should bnegotiated. In private discussions, the Iranian government has alreadsuggested the outlines of an agreement that would trade al-Qaeddetainees for members of an Iraqi-based opposition group, theMojahideen-e Khalq, which has long perpetrated terrorist activ-ities against Iran. Such an explicit trade is not possible, howevedue to the impossibility of ensuring fair adjudication in the Iranian system. Rather, the Task Force recommends that the UnitedStates press Iran to clarify the status of all al-Qaedarelateddetainees and to extradite those who can be identified as personpursued by other governments.At the same time, the United Stateshould work with the interim Iraqi government to ensure thatMojahideen facilities are conclusively disbanded and that its leaders are brought to justice for their role in violence against both Iraq

and Iranians under Saddams regime.Irans involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a per-nicious factor in an already debilitating conflict. Ultimately, thmost effective strategy for extracting Iran from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would be resuming a robust peace process buttresseby a sustained U.S.commitment to lead the effort and a broad regional consensus in support of the negotiating parties and the ultimat

agreements. Should leading Arab states such as Saudi Arabiaand Egypt actively support and facilitate a peace process betweeIsraelis and Palestinians, Iran would be likely to acquiesce to thprocess. Iranian hostility toward the peace process is not immutablea lonely struggle against an emerging regional consensus on behaof radical Palestinian forces is not likely to be the path chosen b Tehran.

Long-Term Relations with Iran Washington should work to ensure that its rhetoric and policiestarget Irans objectionable policies rather than its populationAttempting to isolate the Iranian people does not serve the caus

8/14/2019 CFR - Iran TF

60/100


[48]

of democracy in Iran or the region.The most appropriate and efftive mechanism for contributing to Irans slow process of chan would be to intensify the political, cultural, and economic linages between its population and the wider world.Specifically,should entail gradually incorporating Iran into the activities of U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative and other regional reforprograms and issuing a blanket license to authorize the activitof U.S. nongovernmental organizations in Iran.The administrtion should also take care to ensure that its messagethat thUnited States desires a dialogue on mutual interests and that tresumption of relations will require a positive response from Iregarding U.S. concernsis crystal clear to both the governmand the people of Iran.

Successive U.S. administrations have centered their politoward Iran on the persuasive power of economic sanctions to chathe countrys positions and conduct.The comprehensive and u

lateral nature of the U.S. embargo, however, ultimately depriv Washington of leverage: both the influence that comes with a goernments ability to make trade ties conditional on improvepolitical relations and the more diffuse impact business relatiocan have on changing political culture. The Task Force ultimatly concludes that economic relations between the United Statand Iran must be conditioned upon improvements in the diplo

matic relationship between the

CFR - Iran TF

Documents

Transcript of CFR - Iran TF