CFR - Homeland TF

8/14/2019 CFR - Homeland TF

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COUNC IL ON FORE IGN RELAT IONS

REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASKFORCESPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

GARYHART ANDWARREN B. RUDMAN,CO-CHAIRS

STEPHEN E. FLYNN,

PROJECT DIRECTOR

AMERICA

STILL UNPREPARED,

STILL IN DANGER


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The Council on Foreign Relations is dedicated to increasin

the world and contributing ideas to U.S. foreign policy. The Cly by promoting constructive debates and discussions, clarifyiForeign Affairs, the leading journal on global issues. The Cosible range of views, but an advocate of none, though its res

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The Council will sponsor an Independent Task Force when ical importance to U.S. foreign policy arises, and (2) it seem

grounds and perspectives may, nonetheless, be able to reacpolicy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Typicatwo and five times over a brief period to ensure the relevan

Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task Force issues a report, anand posts it on the Council website. Task Force reports canand meaningful policy consensus, with Task Force memberthrust and judgments reached by the group, though not nec

ommendation; (2) a report stating the various policy positias possible; or (3) a Chairmans Report, where Task ForceChairmans report may associate themselves with it, while tdissenting statements. Upon reaching a conclusion, a Task

who were not members of the Task Force to associate themseto enhance its impact. All Task Force reports benchmarkadministration policy in order to make explicit areas of agre

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For further information about the Council or this Task ForForeign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 1002munications at (212) 434-9400. Visit our website at www.c


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TASK FORCE MEMBER

CHARLES G. BOYDWARREN CHRISTOPHER

WILLIAM J. CROWESTEPHEN E. FLYNNSTEPHEN FRIEDMAN

GARY HARTJAMES K. KALLSTROMJOSHUA LEDERBERG

DONALD B. MARRONPHILIP A. ODEEN

WARREN B. RUDMANGEORGE P. SHULTZ

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTE


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CONTENTS

ForewordAcknowledgments

Executive Summary

Task Force Report

IntroductionUndertaking the Homeland Security Im

Identifying Homeland Security Imperat

Issues and Recommendations

ConclusionTask Force Members


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FOREWORD

Attacks against Americans on U.S. soil that m

of mass destruction are likely, but the structurespond to this serious threat are fragmented

warned the U.S. Commission on National Sesenators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudmanreleased on March 15, 2001. Hardly anyone in

mainstream media paid any attention. Thethe same mistake twice by overlooking the kreport of this Task Force, again co-chaired byRudman:A year after September 11, America unprepared to prevent and respond to a ca

attack on U.S. soil.This chilling conclusion comes on the eve o

to be a pending war with Iraq to dethrone Sadarrived at by a bipartisan group that includetaries of state, three Nobel laureates, two form

Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former director of the Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Invesome of the nations most distinguished finanical authorities. Of the dozens of Independe


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AmericaStill Unprepared, Stil

governors, and mayors for some time. Thsimply reflects the fact that you cannot turncomplex as this one on a dime.

Still, given the stakespotentially the loscent American lives and the mass disruptioomy and societythere are things we memergency basis to reduce our vulnerabilitme stress that the Task Force report does aing about or placing political blame for whto prepare our nation against terror attackdedicated to creating a necessary sense of u

get the necessary things done.This Task Forecommendations that should help guide th

weeks and months ahead.My deepest appreciation and admiration

man and Hart for agreeing to lead this Tas

and the nation owe a debt to them and all thTask Force members who brought their vasional expertise to this enterprise. They selon very short notice to prepare this report wurgency that our current circumstances clea

sonal note,having served with the two formon their National Security Commission,I canified people to take on this responsibility. My tcil Senior Fellow Stephen E. Flynn, who ser


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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

When Les Gelb approached me in late July w

I serve as project director for an IndependHomeland Security Imperatives, I voiced soaim was for the Task Force to operate essenfootingsomething our home front rightgiven the likelihood of a second catastrophic t

deadly and disruptive than what we suffered onI wondered aloud if we could assemble a blue

with just a couple of weeksnotice and demand bers time and energy in the following sixty-as he told me that Senator Warren Rudman an

had agreed to co-chair the Task Force, my dhad the privilege to serve with them while thof the now famous Hart-Rudman U.S. Comal Security. There could be no better chairs events over the ensuing weeks proved. I coun

my professional career to have again been affnity to work with them.

I have drawn added inspiration from thelect, wisdom, and time of all our distinguishe


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Council resource available to support me. Hsharpening the focus, structure, and langucept paper that got us launched. Most impocolleague, Colonel (P) Sal Cambria, to serve dinator. Colonel (P) Cambria has flawlessmerable details to get the Task Force from i

finish line. Finally, I have received extraordfrom two of the Councils brightest and massociates, Rob Knake and Uday Ram. In sreport misses the mark in contributing substal conversation on this vital issue, the re

pletely with me, since no project director hingredients for potential success. And, underpI am grateful for the Arthur Ross FoundaForces that gave us the ability to move forurgency of the issues demanded.


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EXECUTIVE SUMMAR

When you see the multiple attacks that youve seenfrom Bali to Kuwait, the number of failed attacks ed, the various messages that have been issueleaders, you must make the assumption that al-Q

phase and intends to strike us both here and oveous as far as I am concerned.

George Tenet, Director Testimony before the Senate Select Com

A year after September 11, 2001, America r

unprepared to prevent and respond to a caattack on U.S. soil. In all likelihood, the nexteven greater casualties and widespread disruptiand the economy. The need for immediate aurgent by the prospect of the United States

Iraq and the possibility that Saddam Husseinuse of weapons of mass destruction (WMDThe Task Force recognizes that impor

salutary measures have been undertaken since Se


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Among the risks that the United States

following: Some 650,000 local and state police offi

ate in a virtual intelligence vacuum, witist watch lists provided by the U.S. Dimmigration and consular officials.

While 50,000 federal screeners are beinairports to check passengers, only the tintainers, ships, trucks, and trains that eneach day are subject to examinationadestruction could well be hidden among

maritime or surface elements of Amerition system be used as a weapon-deliverright now would almost certainly be to at an enormous cost to the economies ofits trade partners.

First responderspolice,fire,and emergenare not prepared for a chemical or biradios cannot communicate with one athe training and gear to protect themsean emergency. The consequence of thi

essary loss of thousands of American li Americas own ill-prepared response co

a much greater extent than any single attaica is a powerful and resilient nation, and


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Executive Summary

potential antitrust conflicts, concerns abo

of sensitive security information by way of thmation Act (FOIA), and liability exposu

Domestic security measures must be pursnational context. The critical infrastructudaily lives of Americans are linked to glob

to protect these systems will fail unless theyas well as at home.

The National Guard is currently equipped for carrying out its role in supporting conveoverseas. The homeland security mission

of these capabilities but it requires added emthe capacity of National Guard units to reattacks; acquiring protection, detection, athat is tailored for complex urban envirotraining to provide civil support in the after

catastrophic attack.

Key Recommendations Empower front-line agents to intercept terr

a twenty-four-hour operations center in eac

vide access to terrorist watch list informintergovernmental links between locenforcement agencies.

Make first responders ready to respon


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Fund energy distribution vulnerability apleted in no more than six months, funular backup components to quickly restoenergy grid should it be targeted, and woin place adequate security measures for c

Strengthen the capacity of local, state, an

and agricultural agencies to detect and coinvestigations.The key to mitigating casa biological attack against people or the tify the source of infection as early as po

Enact an Omnibus AntiRed Tape

sunset clause for approved private-public forces to include (1) a fast-track secuthat permits the sharing of secret-level

with non-federal and industry leaders;tion in instances when leaders in critica

tries agree to share information about theiwith federal agencies; (3) an exemption in these task forces from antitrust rulesty appropriations to be managed undergoverning research and development pr

ment of Defense rather than the normal fand (5) liability safeguards and limits.

Fund, equip, and train National Gucountry to ensure they can support the


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TASK FORCE REPO

INTRODUCTION

A year after September 11, 2001, America remapared to prevent and respond to a catastropU.S. soil. In all likelihood, the next attagreater casualties and widespread disruption

the economy.The need for immediate actioby the prospect of the United Statess gointhe possibility that Saddam Hussein might threof mass destruction (WMD) in America.

This reports recommendations are intend

on what must be done on an emergency band to limit the consequences of these attvention efforts fail.The Bush administrationand mayors around the country have takensince September 11 to respond to the risk o

ism. Legislation creating the Department ty should be enacted on an urgent basis, andU.S. intelligence operations must go forward

will not see the full effect of these fundam


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Task Force Report

Set critical infrastructure-protection prior

targets pose a graver risk for mass disrup Enhance Americas public health system

quickly detect and respond to biological Move quickly to clear federal obstacles

private-public security partnerships by

concerns with respect to potential antitrust cof sensitive security information by way of thmation Act (FOIA), and liability exposu

Fund, train, and equip the National Guardsecurity a primary mission.

UNDERTAKING THE HOMELAND SECUR

The nation must accept three facts of life after

America is in a war against terrorists whohomeland, and it must act urgently to reducenerabilities.Second, bolstering Americas emein the near term is essential to minimizing casdent occurs on U.S. soil. Third, America

response can do more damage to its citizeattack by a terrorist. America is a powerful aand terrorists are not supermen. But the rharm to Americas liberties and way of life is


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Task Force Report

extremely efficient and low-cost land, sea, an

system. Efforts to protect these systems will faisued abroad as well as at home.The State Desury Department, the Commerce Departmenthe U.S.Trade Representative all have a criticaing sure that our allies and trade partners wo

a collective approach to protecting critical infrwith the year 2000 (Y2K) computer challeng

Proceed with caution when embracing tecfixes.Technology can often serve as an e

belong to a layered and dynamic system of derates the contribution of human intuition andposed technological solution must be evaluaand consequences if it should be compromiserity is not just about protecting American lives

taining systems that support our way of life into exploit or target those systems.This means ttocol must be able to manage any suspected or

without imposing costs so high as to comprwork it is designed to secure. Ultimately, the

continue to live and prosper as an open, globnot to become a nation trapped behind the modand castles.

Emergency preparedness can save livespot


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seasoned firefighters, emergency technician

personnel can easily compromise a community to provide for public health and safety.

A proactive mindset is key.The federal going an extraordinary amount of energy and

to the specific character of the September 11quick to rush into law the Aviation and TrAct of 2001, which had the result of focusship in the U.S. Department of Transportaly on hiring federal aviation passenger screen

X-ray machines to the nations airports.This kinis understandable given the collective horrhijacked commercial airliners used as mimindset is inevitably wasteful in terms of rtract agencies from anticipating more probab

from undertaking protective measures.Homeland security measures will almost alwaefits for other public and private goods.Te

weapon of mass destruction, but they will noto these weapons. Consequently, they hav

where, when, and how they will carry out aindustry leader will want to be caught unpreor critical infrastructure is targeted. But maing in security safeguards for low probabil


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Task Force Report

ments will inevitably provide the United Sta

tive tools to manage the rising incidence of globdemics. In short, sustaining support for actionssecurity environment may not be as difficult as itmany of these measures can tangibly improvin our society as well.

IDENTIFYING HOMELAND SECURITY

The Task Force recognizes that many useful initi

way that will advance homeland security. Thing a new Department of Homeland Securityand legislation to create this department shouout delay.The National Strategy for Homelaby the White House on July 16, 2002, make

frame this complex mission and to sketch oucommendable is the extent to which the straimportance of bolstering intelligence and warning border and transportation security, enhanterterrorism, protecting critical infrastruct

defending against catastrophic threats, and impreparedness and response.

In addition to reviewing the presidents neForce reviewed other recent contributions to


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The six critical mandates summarized ab

following sections represent only a portion rity agenda for our nation. There are otherined and judged to be very important, but wto address them were adequate. For examplical Infrastructure Protection Boardcreat

recently released a draft National Strategy for public comment.This plandeveloped bnership involving representatives of cogovernmental organizationsoutlines a coto protect against the disruption of the com

network of critical-infrastructure informessential to Americas national and econom

Other issues require much more studactions should be taken on an expedited ba

ventive vaccinations of the general populatio

as smallpox may be harmful and even fatal of healthy people and are not presently an oof Americans with weakened immune systeForces list is inevitably an incomplete one.Force believes that acting on the critical issue

with the kind of urgency our wartime footingtribute significantly to U.S. security in tahead. The nations leaders in Washingtonties,city halls, and boardrooms should be work


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Task Force Report

here at home. And to date, its where weve seen

Yet we have insufficient equipment, too little intelligence sharing with federal authorities.

Martin OMalley, Mayor of B

An estimated 8.5 million illegal aliens are living

including nearly 300,000 who have opted rather than submitting to a final order of aways arrive in U.S. ports and jump ship illegal migrants find it easy to blend in amongof foreigners who arrive legally in the United

travel, study, or work. Compounding the protrafficking in forged or fraudulently obtainedand other identification documents. BaselineSocial Security cards, birth certificates, and driticularly subject to abuse.

With just fifty-six field offices around theof identifying and intercepting terrorists in oubeyond the scope of the Federal Bureau of I

This burden could and should be shared withlocal, county, and state law enforcement offi

ly cannot lend a hand in a counterterrorism When it comes to combating terrorism, tthe beat are effectively operating deaf, dumbist watch lists provided by the U.S. Departme


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79 percent of mayors reported a funding

threat detection equipment, 77 percent foequipment, and 69 percent for persona

86 percent said they did not have adequapparel and only 10 percent were satisfiequipment they had in the event of a b

CommunicationsIn virtually every major city and county ininteroperable communications system existdepartments, and county, state, regional,

personnel during a major emergency. Radavailable to support the post-incident comthat will be placed on them, and most citisystems to use as backups. Portable radios wrise buildings unless the buildings are eq

systems.Most U.S. cities have separate commtions for their police and fire departmentsdination exists between the two organizatiofew exceptions, first-responder commandeto secure radios, telephones, or video confere

can support communications with county, sgency preparedness officials or National G

Protective gear


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Task Force Report

Detection equipment

Portable and hand-held detection equipment chemical, biological, and radiological materiaand notoriously unreliable in urban environmDefense and Department of Energy sensors dresponders have been issued without adequat

on use and maintenance of the equipment, oto do should the detection equipment regist

TrainingMajor field exercises are important tools for

cy of contingency plans, equipment, commancedures, and training. In all but Americas larpaucity of resources and expertise to organizlarge-scale exercises. For example, from 1996government was able to provide WMD respo

134,000 of the nations estimated 9 million fithermore, only 2 percent of these 134,000 hands-on training with live chemical agenDomestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabamity in the nation where first responders can train

hand knowledge of chemical agents. At peakonly 10,000 responders per year.

Recommendations


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Step up efforts to rein in identity fraud by

counterfeiting safeguards in state driverspassing state laws criminalizing identity120-day joint local, state, and federal investigate and target phony-identificat

Provide grants for states and cities to hire

on ninety-day renewable contracts to conduments on the status of urban emergencying the state of protective gear, the adequplans and equipment, and the availability

Fund the backlog of protective equipmen

by urban fire departments.This is a casinfusion of resources can make an immediing the risks to first responders and thtality of incident victims.

Fund and deploy commercial off-the-scan integrate multiple radio platforms tble communications, including the abilityof voice, image, and electronic informaing agencies.

Provide the national research labs with adeop, field test, and widely distribute new p

sensor equipment suitable for urban en Ensure that the distribution of new

responders is supported by training and locontracts


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Task Force Report

be profound. If terrorists used a sea container

mass destruction and detonated it on arrival atglobal trade and the global economy could be imme

all nations would be affected. No container ships wo

at U.S. ports after such an event.Robert Bonner, Commissioner,

Immediately following the September 11 attaities ordered the closing of U.S. airspace to eign and domestic, shut down the nations majortruck, automobile, and pedestrian traffic acro

with Canada and Mexico to a trickle. Nineteecutters forced America to do to itself what no accomplish: a successful blockade of the Unprise terrorist attack were to happen tomorrorail, or truck transportation systems that carrtrade to the United States each day, the respothe samea self-imposed global embargo.

Vulnerable seaportsNinety-five percent of all nonNorth Ammoves by sea and arrives in 361 ports aroundthe vital role seaports play in linking Amboth economically and militarily, port vulnera

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days. The American Association of Port

the cost of adequate physical security at thseaports to be $2 billion. So far only $92.3 mhas been authorized and approved. Even thbeen awarded on the basis of a ports relatnation. The ports of Los Angeles and L

$70 million in postSeptember 11 grants a$6.175 million. The adequacy of such granreexamination.

Trade Dependence on the Intermodal Con

There are an estimated eleven million contare loaded and unloaded ten times per year.

worlds general cargo moves in these boxesintermodal revolution in transportation nety as a criterionlower transport costs and

efficiency were the driving forces. For examcontainer costs on average $2,500 to build tons of freight. The cost of the ocean voyafrom Europe or Asia is approximately required security standards governing the l

an intermodal container. Most are sealedtag that costs fifty cents.

If an explosive device were loaded in a ca port, it would almost automatically rai


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Task Force Report

Trade Dependence on a Small Number of Bo

The five major bridges and one tunnel thMichigan and New York account for 70 perbetween the United States and CanadaAming partner.The Ambassador Bridge betweenand Windsor, Ontario, alone carries $250 mi

is 27 percent of the total U.S.-Canada daily trWhen these border crossings were effectively September 11 attacks, many of the big threebly plants went idle within two days (the aveproduces $1 million worth of automobiles per h

and retailers depend on the unimpeded cross-to respond to just-in-timedelivery imperativesdence, the U.S. and Canadian governmentsto these structures because they are either controlled by binational bridge authorities. S

tions are done after vehicles cross the bridgetunnel, these inspections provide no protectivetrade lines.

Recommendations

The Task Force makes the following recomm Develop a layered security system that focus

tics and intermodal transportation netwounintegrated series of tactics aimed at ad


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Improve the accuracy, timing, and for

and sharing data about the contents, locatody involving a container shipment.

Accelerate the timetable for the action U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico smart

Work with Canada to implement adequ

for cross-border bridges and the Detro Task the U.S. Department of State, th

Commerce, and the Office of the U.S.with actively promoting rapid adoptiongoverning surface and maritime trans

and multilateral arrangements with AmeWork to advance these standards withintional organizations such as the Internatnization, the International Maritime OrgaCustoms Organization. Retrofitting secur

system is not only about mitigating exploiting these systems to target the Uabout sustaining the system that underp

3. SET CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTEC

We are convinced that our vulnerabilities are inmeans to exploit those weaknesses are readily aassociated with an effective attack continue to dropments required to improve the situation now s


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Task Force Report

life remain as vulnerable to attack today as t

In some instances, the U.S.government is just bof undertaking an initial inventory of these vuattention has been paid to physical securitygunsbut few resources are focused on preparestore critical systems should these protectiv

Task Force reviewed the June 30, 2002, findindations contained within the National Acading the Nation Safer. The areas that the Ta

worrisome include the following:

Vulnerable Energy Distribution SystemsCrude oil must be refined and distributed ifingful source of energy. Power generation plthe electricity cannot be transmitted to the faings, and households that need it to power e

vide lighting and climate control. An adversaryAmericas reliance on energy need not targMiddle East. The infrastructure for providusers is concentrated, sophisticated, and largethermore, some infrastructure lies offshore i

ico,on the continental shelf, and within the terAmerican neighbors.

Sixty percent of the Northeasts refined oifrom refineries in Texas and Louisiana. A co


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mandate rolling blackouts for as long as sev

for critical components of the power grid many cases they must be shipped from ove

Vulnerable Food and Water SuppliesThe nations food and agriculture industry

tial sector of our economy and presents anfor biological attacks. As the recent foot-anbreak among livestock in the United Kinga diagnosis of a contagious disease is madetic and export markets can be devastating. S

numbers of pathogens that have the potencrops. Public anxieties over food contaminatdemand for major foodstuffs for years. Yetto the Centers for Disease Control and Prcould provide a shared communications netw

the U.S.Department of Agriculture (USDAtive means to communicate and coordinatefusion over reporting obligations, who has juextent they can provide adequate response to a es to seriously compromise Americas abili

sequences of attacks on U.S. crops and livesrecent exercise found that by the time the Agforeign-disease laboratory on Plum Islanconfirmed the first case of foot-and-mout

T k


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Task Force Report

anxious public across America that their drinki

a highly publicized incident takes place.

Vulnerable Clearinghouse Infrastructure to SMarketsOver the past two decades, the securities and

have moved toward relying on a small numbtions for their post-trade clearing and settthese systems were targeted by terrorists, the of these essential services could translate into of daily economic life, both inside the United

For example, clearing and settlement activfunctioning of the government securities mamanaged by just two banks, JP Morgan ChNew York.These two banks each extend apprin 24-hour credit to their dealer and clearing

The sudden loss of these services could creatproblem and likely damage public confidencecial institutions and the systems upon whichspend, and save.

RecommendationsThe Task Force makes the following recomm

Set critical infrastructure priorities by moing of vulnerabilities within each sector Inst

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managing human disease. Task the US

ly bringing online a shared communicait with states and U.S. trade partners.

Provide adequate funding to significantltraining in identifying foreign diseaseleadership in devising a robust internat

itoring the outbreak of animal and plan Identify and remove legal liability const

ing of public water supplies for dangAccelerate the development of adequatserve local water companies and comm

Create common integrated communirealtime data and software backup reclearing banks, the Depository Trust antion,dealers, and other key participants inrities market. Routinely test for reco

operations.The goal is to ensure that thand securities available to market-makstress so as to support the high level oftrading.

4. BOLSTER PUBLIC HEALTH SYSTEMS.

Our concern is that bioterrorism preparedness flasting, and reliable to enable local public health

i i i h i bili

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Task Force Report

this determination.There are simply not eno

able within existing state and local budgets ttion in a timely way. Most local public health dfunded and staffed to run during a normal 9

week. Medical professionals often lack the trainnose and treat diseases spawned by biological

states public health reporting systems are antiqmoded. It can routinely take up to three weekdepartment to register a disease incident reportbase. And there is no consensus on which langcoding system should be used for a national

safeguard that information.Recent efforts in the federal government to r

rorism threat may only add to confusion oveaccountability. Responsibility for direction and lic health efforts should rest with a substanti

with clear lines of communication to otheagencies such as the National Institutes of Hethe nations research and most of its treatmenprivate sector, outreach is essential.

Chemical Versus Biological Attacks Have DiIn chemical terrorism, detecting an attack is glem. People will show symptoms immediateing from seizures, experiencing respiratory d

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pounded when physicians are unfamiliar

treating such diseases and, in any event, laprescribe.

Little To No Capacity to Conduct OutbreMedical care providers who come in conta

first line of defense. Few of these profestraining on how to diagnose, treat, and repassociated with a biological attack.

Most city and county public health agthe resources to support emergency hotline

day. The National Association of City andcials estimates that localities need 10,000 tees to work in public health preparedness fshortages, few localities have the ability to asduct an outbreak investigation.

Public health laboratories cannot suppober of tests to verify the existence of a biologicafter the anthrax mailings, there was a backloamined specimens suspected of being contapowder around the United States.

RecommendationsThe Task Force makes the following recom

Ensure that major cities and counties p

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Task Force Report

can be mobilized in an emergency. Provid

these nonpracticing professionals and creavating a good Samaritan clause to overrid

Identify and maintain call lists of knowledcan authoritatively speak to the media abcal, or biological agents, symptoms of exp

mended safeguards. Develop communicaprepare educational materials and media

TV on survival fundamentals for attacks Recruit major corporations and schools to

ications during an emergency. While the

will soon have the capability to ship antifrom the twelve national pharmaceuticalareas within six hours, there are currently plans to get these medicines to the gener

Provide funding to hospitals to pre-wire an

mon areas such as lobbies, cafeterias, anda surge in patients. Negotiate arrangementsference centers to provide bed space for s

5. REMOVE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OBSTACL

PARTNERING.Obstacles for using our most potent resources foric terrorism must be identified and overcome.

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specific information as possible to key decision

of the threat.

Engaging the Private SectorThe barriers to greater information-sharinand private sectors are not simply bureaucr

vate-sector leaders have legal concerns with ralso worry about violating antitrust laws andsensitive security information may be publiFOIA. For their part, government agenciessible to discuss matters that may involve cla

mation. Protecting the publics right to knand competitive markets are cornerstones oguarding classified material is essential to pmethods. As a practical matter, however, the the ability of the private sector to share inf

authorities on vulnerabilities within critical iclude the ability of federal government othing but the most generic security and th

The real value of sharing information isefforts to develop innovative security measu

relevant stakeholders. But innovation also infusion of federal resources to support reseaHere the sense of urgency required by thmission collides with the lethargic and arc

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Task Force Report

Tap International Expertise

While terrorism may be a new and painful Americans, regrettably many American allieKingdom, France, Spain, and Israel have beechallenge for some time. Countries such as Sa model for how civil defense efforts can b

largely resourced at the national level and adat the local level.The United States does not insight and ingenuity. It should be keen to learrience by sending research teams abroad to idtices that could be implemented quickly here i

RecommendationsThe Task Force makes the following recomm

Draw on private-sector experts who are inand operations of critical infrastructures

power grid, telecommunications, gas anfinance, transportation,water supply, publiemergency services. Enlist their participaternment-sponsored vulnerability assessmpate in red-team activities.

Enact an Omnibus AntiRed Tape lasunset clause for approved private-publictask forces to include (1) a fast-track securthat permits the sharing of secret-level

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terrorism, evaluating European airline se

examining private-public intelligence-s

6. FUND,TRAIN, AND EQUIP THE NATIONALHOMELAND SECURITY A PRIMARY MISSIO

The National Guard will play a critical rolstrophic terrorist attack happens on Americwell trained and equipped. Governors will eunits in their states to help with detectingical agents, treating the victims, managi

quences, and maintaining civil order.The Natdisciplined personnel spread throughout thThe men and women who make up its ranklocal community in which their unit is basegovernors, the National Guard can be used

unlike regular military forces which are botus restrictions on performing law enfoNational Guards medical units, engineer uniand ground and air transport units will likein helping to manage the consequences of

Adapting to the New Homeland and SecurGovernors, charged with developing staplans, will look to their National Guard

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The National Guard is currently equipped a

for carrying out its role in supporting convenoverseas.The homeland security mission can drcapabilities but requires added emphasis on

Responding to a biological attackthefocus in recent years has been primaril

fighting in a battlefield where chemical deployed.

Acquiring protection, detection, and othetailored for complex urban environments

Training to provide civil support in the a

scale catastrophic attack.

RecommendationsAn aggressive approach to revamping tNational Guard units designated to respond

ist attacks can in the short term provide a mcapability while states and localities work to ual response mechanisms up to par. In order forto fulfill this mission, the Task Force recomm

Congress should authorize and fund add

National Guard units to work with state to conduct exercises with local first respothe new homeland security plans beinggovernor.

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p p

are limited in the functions they can perfo

cies with the mandate in these areas necessary resources to perform their misal Guard help.

Redress the pay and job-protection dwhen National Guard units are called

and when they are called up by a goverorder an activation, guardsmen receivallows them to return to their civilian jothe Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Actstate active duty they may be paid as lit

CONCLUSION

Quickly mobilizing the nation to prepare

of prudence, not fatalism. In the twenty-firsliberty are inseparable. The absence of adethe risk that laws passed immediately in throrist attacks will be reactive, not deliberativsequence will be to compound the initia

tragic event with measures that overreach in tly new security mandates and the assumptioauthorities that may erode our freedoms. Acpursuing Americas homeland security im


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TASK FORCE MEMBER

CHARLES G. BOYD is Chief Executive Of

of Business Executives for National Securretiring from the U.S. Air Force in AuBoyd served as Deputy Commander in European Command.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER is a Senior PartneMyers.He served as Secretary of State fromuary 1997 under President Bill Clinton.

WILLIAMJ.CROWE is a Senior Adviser at Glously, Admiral Crowe served as the Ch

Chiefs of Staff under Ronald Reagan.

STEPHEN E. FLYNN, who directed the Task Forcpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security cil on Foreign Relations and recently retir

in the U.S. Coast Guard. He served in theitary Office during the first Bush administrtor for Global Issues on the National Securitythe Clinton administration.

AmericaStill Unprepared, Still


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p p

JAMES K.KALLSTROM is Senior Executive Vi

America Bank. After September 11, 2001leave of absence from MBNA Amthe Director of the Office of Public SeNew York.

JOSHUA

LEDERBERG

is a Nobel laureate and seitus and Sackler Foundation Scholar at R

DONALD B. MARRON is Chairman of UBSing General Partner of Lightyear Capitafor twenty years as Chairman and CE

Group, Inc., until its merger with UBS i

PHILIP A.ODEEN is Chairman of TRW IncInc., Mr. Odeen was President of BDMand a Vice Chairman at Coopers & Lyb

WARREN B. RUDMAN, who co-chaired the ly a Partner in the international law firm

Wharton and Garrison and formerly ChaiForeign Intelligence Advisory Board unHe represented New Hampshire in the to 1992.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ is the Thomas W. and i h d F ll h H I i i

Task Force Members


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JOHNW.VESSEYis Chairman of the Center f

at the Council on Foreign Relations and previman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well asof the U.S. Army.

WILLIAM H.WEBSTERis a Partner at the law firm

Hadley & McCloy. He served as Director ofrom 1987 to 1991 and as Director of theInvestigation from 1978 to 1987.

STEVENWEINBERG is Director of the Theorversity of Texas. He is a Nobel laureate in

ent of the National Medal of Science.


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OTHERREPORTS OFINDEPENDENSPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FO


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SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FO

*Threats to Democracy(2002)

Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, CHalperin, Project Director; Elizabeth Frawley Bag*Balkans 2010(2002)

Edward C. Meyer, Chair; William L. Nash, Proje*Terrorist Financing(2002)

Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. WechslProject Co-Directors

*Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations

David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; LKaratnycky, Project Co-Directors; Cosponsored w

*Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-CProject Director

*The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy AgAdministration (2001)

J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Proj*Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st CeEdward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Proje

*State Department Reform (2001)Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, ProjeCosponsored with the Center for Strategic and In

*U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A FolloBernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Co

Walter Mead, Project Directors*A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on

(2001)Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Projec

*Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia(Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs; MDirector; Cosponsored with the Inter-American D

Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy TowaLaura DAndrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg*Promoting Sustainable Economies in the Balkans

Steven Rattner, Chair; Michael B.G. Froman, Pro*Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects(1

Ri h d L G i Ch i W M Wi fi

americastill unprepared,still in danger


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REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE

SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

America remains dangerously unprepared to prevent andrespond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

This chilling conclusion is the core finding of a 17-memberindependent, bipartisan Task Force, sponsored by the Councilon Foreign Relations, that included two former secretaries ofstate, two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a for-mer director of the CIA and FBI, and three Nobel laureates. It

was led by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman,who chaired the U.S. Commission on National Security that sopresciently warned prior to September 11, 2001, of the seriousterrorist risk to the U.S. homeland and the inadequacy ofAmericas national capacity to respond.

This report is a call to action. The Task Force fears that thenation is returning to complacency at a time of especially gravedanger. Each day, the risk of a second, potentially more dead-ly and disruptive attack on the citizens and critical infrastruc-tures of the United States grows as al-Qaeda regroups and asAmerica prepares to take on a ruthless adversary in Iraqacountry that may well have access to weapons of mass destruc-tion. The Task Force participants unanimously concluded thatthe United States should be acting at home with the kind ofurgency that a nation under attack warrants. The reports key

findings and recommendations make clear that there is muchto do, right now, to safeguard the American homeland and wayof life.

COUNCIL

ON FOREIGN

RELATIONS

PRESS

CFR - Homeland TF

Documents

Transcript of CFR - Homeland TF