Certification of HUMS as primary mean for continuing ... Airbus Cert... · Card TGB accelerometers...

AHS HUMS/CBM

Certification of HUMS as primary

mean for continuing airworthiness

process: EC225 lessons learned and

present key topics

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AHS HUMS/CBM – Airbus Helicopter HUMS/FDM

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CONTENT

• “Lessons learned from EC225 in-flight monitoring – 1st time experience for the certification of

HUMS as primary mean for continuing airworthiness process”

– lessons learned from EC225 bevel gear in-flight monitoring :

- how it was certified with EASA

- lessons learned for « in-flight » monitoring functionality (advantages vs drawbacks)

- lessons learned for HUMS performance demonstration (how to, limits and difficulties)

• Some key points with regard to Airbus Helicopters function policy:

– consideration of operators processes and organizations for CBM set-up

– regulation for maintenance credit : main difficulties

February 2015

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Presentation Title runs here (go to Header & Footer to edit this text)

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Lessons learned from EC225 in-

flight monitoring

February 2015

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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: certification objectives

- Justify performance and robustness/reliability of the Health Indicator (MOD45) for the crack

detection of the bevel gear of the EC225

- Demonstrate the safe remaining flight time after MOD45 alert in order to comply with CS29

safety objectives

apply and comply with CS29.1465

Define the process and design solution to comply with safety objectives using existing HUMS

(MARMS system)


4 February 2015

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HUMS-CP

Control Panel

MFDAUs

System

management

Ground Tool

Result

Card

TGB accelerometers

(Tail Gear Box)

Tail Drive Shaft

accelerometers MGB

accelerometers

(Main Gear Box) Engine

accelerometers

Accelerometers on the floor

(Rotor Tuning) VPU

Vibration Process Unit

connected with all

accelerometers

DTU

Data Transfer

Unit

EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: HUMS used

February 2015

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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: design objectives

• From time of detection using indicator MOD45 (modulation indicator of the 45 teeth bevel gear)

define the remaining time before rupture

set-up the optimum threshold allowing to insure a Probability of no detection of 10-4 and this

whatever the scattering of the measure

Ensure the highest possible time to failure to allow to reach a safe landing area


6 February 2015

Assess errors to be included

Define distribution of slope

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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: variability & distribution

• Three causes of variability on MOD45 have been identified

– Accelerometer sensitivity

– Torque

– Transfer function between the excitation and the accelerometer, including the bevel shaft and

the gearbox casing

Tests were performed with different torques, different gearboxes/accelerometers to assess and

prove the variability

• Assess the distribution on the crack propagation time

– Compute mean and standard deviation, identify the most appropriate distribution model

Tests were performed on bench and confirmed in flight with different crack types


7 February 2015

9 bevel gears were broken on bench

+ 1 in flight test + 2 real in-flight cases

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Indicator MOD45 – bench and flight tests at MCP-15%


8 February 2015

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Indicator MOD45 – bench and flight tests at MCP


9 February 2015

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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: results obtained

In-Flight MOD45 monitoring was certified based on following results :

- Real time MOD45 monitoring with fixed threshold

- 2FH ensured for safe flight until safe landing area after detection

- False alert rate demonstrated at the required level (based on statistical fleet analysis - 46

aircrafts during two years / 59360 flight hours)

- Detection rate in due time demonstrated with a probability of 10-4

- MARMS is a DAL C system

And necessary following design changes:

- Increase the frequency of MOD45 computation on-board (every 5 minutes)

- Install warning lights in the cockpit

- Define the appropriate MMI to be provided to the crew in case of HUMS lights switch-ON

- Implement degraded modes (in case of no MOD45 computation…)

- Define means to reduce accelerometers dormant failures (set-up of dedicated checks on

indicators)


10 February 2015

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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: solution


11 February 2015

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EC225 HUMS In-flight alerting: lessons learned

• In order to perform In-flight alerting, for flight safety, using HUMS following rules should

be applied:

- this is mainly applicable to degradation cases that are detectable late or fast degradations, for

which on-ground analysis frequency does not allow to insure safe margin for the flight

- This can be activated only if the emergency procedure can be defined and certified (this means

that « time to failure » is known and mastered)

- This should be activated only if the emergency procedure consequence is at worst MAJor

(system not compatible with procedure « land immediatly ») false alert is not worse than

MAJor


12 February 2015

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Some key points with regard to

Airbus Helicopters function policy

February 2015

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Objective with HUMS: Maintenance & Operation Optimization

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Optimization

Operate H/C Maintain H/C

Monitor H/C

Health & Usage

February 2015

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Maintenance, Operation and Monitoring Processes

Integration

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Mission

Planning

Maintenance

Planning

Health &

Usage

Monitoring

Maintenance

Control

(CMMS)

Maintenance

Execution

Mission

Execution

Decision

Support

Mission

control

Prognostic

Diagnostic

Level H/C

Immediate : 1 sec. to 1

day

Level Work Center

Operational

Short-term: 1 to 30 days

Level Area Fleet

Tactical

Mid-term: 1 to 12 months

February 2015

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16 February 2015

AIRBUS

HELICOPTERS

Operator structure

SMS

OPS

… Customer

ERP

Embedded

analysis

Data analysis, internal &

external restitutions H/C Local analysis

Data collection

and storage

CUSTOMER

GROUND

STATION

HUMS

management

HUMS

data

PART M

Operator management

Restitution

Aircraft data

HUMS

remote

application

Maintenance

data

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HUMS integration in the Maintenance & Operation

new processes have to be defined

• In order to get credit from HUMS/FDM it is mandatory that HUMS integrates fully the

operator processes and organizations

– The solution need to adapt as much as possible to the different processes and organizations :

for e.g. not all operators have a HUMS manager, many operators delegate PART M and

PART145 activities to another entity…

– The OEM need to understand the operator processes and organization in order to bring relevant

solutions - until now HC manufacturers were very focused on flight phase of the HC, providing

« passive products » like documents for maintenance and continuing airworthiness… this is

changing and in order to provide « active products » for maintenance and continuing

airworthiness users we need also to connect processes and systems (HUMS integrated with

MIS for e.g.)

– This will impact operators existing processes and means

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18 February 2015

AIRBUS

HELICOPTERS

Aircraft data

HUMS

data

HUMS

remote

application

PART M

Operator structure

SMS

OPS

…

GROUND

STATION

Restitution

Maintenance

data

Customer

ERP

Embedded

analysis

Data analysis, internal &

external restitutions H/C Local analysis Operator management

Data collection

and storage

CUSTOMER

HUMS

management

COMPLIANCE PART M/ PART 145 / OPS

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HUMS integration in the Maintenance & operation

impact on airworthiness approval

• Getting maintenance credit using HUMS implies to address data integrity assurance all along

the functional chain: from sensors until results displayed through PC, tablette, Web applications

• Embedded part is covered by CS/FAR 29

• …but the rest of the system concerns functions and processes today covered by PART M /

PART 145 regulations when AC29-MG15 intends also to address those parts when HUMS is

used

As a consequence many topics are key:

Links and clear frontiers between regulation have to be defined: CS should address the

function/system until data on the ground and PARTM/145 adresses requirement for use on

ground (typically other means of compliance than DO178 should be acceptable)

Web applications have to be considered as possible solutions

adequate performance of the system has to be demonstrated but correct integration in the PART

M process is also crucial and has to be demonstrated as well

Such demonstration need to master the design from the monitored part until the ground segment

applications

19

Certification of HUMS as primary mean for continuing ... Airbus Cert... · Card TGB accelerometers...

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