Center of Gravity Analysis & Chaos Theory

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A IR W AR C O L L E G EAIR UNIVE R SITY

C E N T E R O FG R AVITY ANALYSIS AN D C H A O ST H E O R Y

byPatA.PentlandLtCol,USAF

ARESEARCH REPORT S U B M TT ED T O T H E FACU LTYIN

F U L F I L L M E N T O FT E:CU T~JCUL M R E Q U I R E M E N T

Advisor:ColonelPhillipMt:'v^ger

M A X W E L LA IR F O R C E SEApril1 9 9 3

9410 034


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A B S T R A C T

TITLE:CenterofGravity Analysisand Chaos TheoryA U T HO R :PatA.Pentiand,Lieutenant Colonel,U S A F

Nearly allmilitaryauthorsan dtheoristat onetimeoranotherreferto th eCenterofGravity(COG) conceptlausewitzwas th efirsttorefertoC O G sand placed them withinamilitarycontextthatlaywithinrsocial-politicalconstructubsequentauthorshavenotexploredC O G stoan ydepthan dhavefailed toprovideawiderframeworkwithwhich to"Jialyzetheirmethodologies.Thispaperexplore:COG analysisfromth econtextohenew scienceof"ChaosTheory."t demonst:esthat social,cultural,economic,political,an dmilitarysystemsar eopen,an dno ;near in nature.tpostulatesasocialconstructbasedenChaosTheory,an dexploresth einteractionsof th eelementsofpower.Lastly,itshow?methodstoidentifyan ddisrupt C O G sbasedu p onth edynamicsof ChaosTheory.

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B I O G R A P H I C A L S K E T C H

LieutenantColone lP atAllenPentland (MA.History,Gonzaga University,Ph-D.History,UniversityofIdaho)w ascommiss ioned v ia A F R O T C in 1975.Fol lowingpilottraining,L tC olPentland has f lown th eA-10 his entirecareerwithover2,400 hours.H e attended the U S A F FighterW eaponsSchool,and w on the OutstandingGraduatetrophy.H ewaslaterassigned asaninstructorattheFighterWeaponsSchool,wherehetaughtA-10tacticand wrotenumeroustextbooksand articles.L t C olPentland served on th eAir Staff workingfighter forcestructurean d fighterplanning issues.H ehasspenttw o toursin U S A F E ,his lastascommanderofthe510thTacticalFighterSquadron.H eserved in Operat ion DesertStorman d Operat ionProvide Comfort .L tC olPentlandhasattended SquadronOfficerSchooland Armed ForcesStaff College.H eisa graduateof th eAir W arCol lege classof1993.

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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

D I S C L A I M E RA B S T R A C TBIOGRAPHICAL S K E TC H

ChapterI . I N TRO D U C TI O N StrategyandCentersofGravityAirpowerand CentersofGravity

T heParadigm ProblemClausewitzRevisitedIL CHA O ST H E O R Y ChaosExplainedChaosmdD e e pSocialStructureHI A S T R U C T U R EB A S E DO N CK A O SBasisofOrganization.ElementsofP owe r

SourcesofP owe rManifestations ofP owe r(Force)LinkagesofP owe rA RecapCenterof GravityImplicationsIVE N T E R SOFG R A V IT YAN DC H A O SD Y N A M I C SLinkages,Connectivity,and BiasUncertaintyPrincipleEntropyandth eSecondLaw ofThermcijT.amics

ScalingStructureswithin ElementsofP owe rInterdependenceandSelf-Compensat ionVO N C L U S I O N

H i

Page11247111 31 61 61 71 82 12 42 526282 8 29303 1343 8

BIBLIOGRAPHY 40


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C H A P T E R I INT ROD UC T ION

Strategy an dCenterso f GravityT he fundamental taskanymilitaryorganization facesisth eproblemof

transforminglimitedforces an dpotentiallyunlimited optionsintostrategiesto achievespecificpoliticalobjectives.Whetherpeacetime plannerorwartimeoperator,th eessentialburdenremains-developastrategy an dselecnoptionthatbalancesresources,restraints,constraints,an dobjectives.Strategiesar ecnstructeduponlargertheoreticalframeworks whichoftenincludemilitarydoctrinea n c dieprinciples ofwar as wellasvarioussocial,political,an deconomic formu lationscr models.Campaignplanningan dcampaigntargeting isth eultimatecruciblewherethesetheoriesmustpassth e testofwartimereality.However,th edecisions thatimplementstrategy arecomplexan d difficultespecially in thecontextoffighting anaircampaign.1Ausefulconceptoftenemployedtosimplify and guideth eairpowertargeting processisth enotionofattacking"centers ofgravity"(COG).TheCO Gconceptisfundamentalto th eprinciplesofwar an dis criticaltoth ecombat planning andemployment o f airpov>er.COGs,however,are widelytalkedabout an donlysuperficiallyunderstood.Theyeasilybecomeblack holes"suckinginresourcesan demittingnothingbutafalsetargetcfglowing energy.

Intheclassicsense,centersofgravityweninitiallyconceptualizedan dpresentedby Carlvon ClausewitzinhismonumentalworkO nWar.hemostcommonlyquoteddefinitionfromC lausewitzis:

flies,it'sairpowerregardlessofit sparentservice.


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A centerofgravityisalwaysfound where th emassis concentratedmostdensely.t presentsth emosteffectivetargetforablow;urthermore,th eheaviestblow is thatstruckbythecenter ofgravity.hesameholdstrueinwar.2Clausewitzlateridentified th ecenterofgravityas"thehubofallpowerand movement ,onwhicheverything depends.hatis th epointagainst which a llourenergiesshould be directed." 3United Statesmilitary doctrine,to include Air Force,incorporates theC O G conceptand definesit as :Thatcharacteristic,capability,orlocalityfrom whicha militaryforce,nation,oralliancederivesit sfreedom ofaction,physicalstrength,orwilltofight" 4ast airstrategistshavecommonlyemployed notionsthatd id notquote Clausewitz verbatim,butused argumentscloselymimickingh islogic.They bel ieved thatdestroyingcertaintargetsetsprovided adisproportionateleverageoreffect thatcould alter an enemy'scapability tocontinueth ewar-in factproducingawarwinningleverage.5Airpowerand Center sofGrav i ty

AfterWorldW ar I ,bothGiulioDouhetan dWilliamMitchelldevelopedan d popularizedtheoriesof strategicairpowcrdesignedtoattack"vitalcer.ters."6Thisinfluenced th eAir CorpsTacticalSchoolduringth e1930sthatdeveloped it sconceptofcollapsingth e"industrialweb"byattacking"vital"systemssuchaselectricity,

2Carlvo nClausewitz,OnWar ,d.an dtrans,byMichaelHowardan dPeterParet,(Princeton:rinceton UniversityPress,1989),p .4S5.3/* ,p .596.4JointPu bI, JointWarfareofttteU S ArmedForces,1 N o v1 9 9 1 ,.3 4.F M1- , BasicAerospaceDoctrine ofth eUnitedStates Air Force,VollDepartmentofth eAir Force,M ar1992,p.9.M00-5,Operations,Departmentofth eArmy,M ay936,pp .I79-1S0.heMarineC orpscrtveatsC O G sas "criticalvulnerabilities."F M F MITWarfightmg.H Q U SMarineCorps ,6M ar1989,op .35-37. 5Anexcellentsynopsisof*hehistoryofstrateg:-air powerthought(andan originaltheoryon a"nationalelementsofvalue" modelofair power)ispresetted by MajorJason3.Barlow,"StrategieParalysis:nAirpowerTheoryfo rthe Present," unpublished Thesis,SchoolofAdvanced Ai;powe-Studies,Ai rUniversity,M ay1992.6GiulioDouhetT f c sCommand ofth eAir,trar^.DinoFerrari,fr'as hD.C.:fficeo* AirForceHistory,1 9 3 3 ) ,p.57 .WilliamMitchell,V/in^edDzfcnst:he Development andpossibilit iesofModern AirPowerEconomicandMtli tary ,reprintedition(New York:overPublications,988),pp .xvi,126-127. 2


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transportation,and oil to create"self-reinforcing shortages." 7Britishexperiencean d capabilities duringth eopeningphaseofWorldW arII caused them to view th eindustrialweb targetsderisivelyas "panaceas."nstead theR AF stressed "commondenominatortargets"whichin actualityle d toanight,city-busting,counter valuecampaign.8U Sentryintothe warwasbased on th eprincipleofdaylightprecision bombing and th eindustrialwebtheorywhich was incorporated in th eAir W ar PlansDivision'sfirstplan(AWFD-1) .9Modif ied laterintoAWPD-42,thisnew approachessentiallyconcentrated onmilitary industrial"chokepoints" and"bottlenecks" tocollapseth eproductionofkey weaponsystems.10Priorityswitchedagainin1944,asth egreat"oil"versus"transportation" debatewassettled bytargeting both.PostW W I Inucleardeterrencewascentered on destroyingaselectiveseriesof"vitaltargets."Whileth etechnologyand targetingemphasis varied overtime,th efundamentalconceptwasto attackeconomicand/ormilitarycentersofgravitywithnuclear weapons.1 nKoreaand againin Vietnam,U S airpowerwasdirected (o rnotdirected,zssomewould argue)against anumber oftargetsystemsthatU Splannersconsidered strategically cr operationally"vital."Recentconventionalcirtheories ,likeColonelJohnWardenIII,havepaid closeattention to centersofgravity.ispublishedbookT heAir Campaign,an dhisunpublishedbriefings an darticlescontainnumerousreferencesto C O G swithprimaryemphasisonenemy leadershipan dcommandandcontrol.17'RobertT.Finney,Kijtoryof th eAirCorpsTact icalSchool1920-1940,(WashD.C.:enterfo rAi r ForceHistory,1992)andWe^jfFrankCravenan dJamesL ea Cate,T heArmyAirForcesinW or ld W ar 77,7 'Vol . reprinted.,(WashD.C. :fficeofAi r ForceH istory ,1983),V o 11,pp .50-52. 8LordArthur Tedder.AirPwmrin War.heLeesKnowles LecturesbyMarshalofth eRoyalAirForce,(London:cddcrmi Stouchton,1947).np.97-93andS: rArthurHarrir,SomberOffensiveLondon:GrcennlB c o ^ s:947),p p .7"-S5.9Kay\voodS.KsraaEJ r.T : c VrstcgicA:?W arAgainstCarnaiy, 'arhD.C:fEccofAi rForceHistory,I9S6).pp .37-41.10CarlKayscn," N e t senSemeI-^cricFrinc-sscfTargetSelection,"R A N D ,R M - 1 8 9 , 1 5July1949.11BenjaminSLambethandKevirN .Lev i s ,"EconomicTargetinginModernWarfare,*R A N D ,P-6735,July1982andT - ' c - * : n K.Lewis ."StrategicBoralrngandth eThermonuclear Breakthrough:n Example ofDisconnectedDefensePlanning,"H A N D ,7-5609,April1981.1 2JohnA.WardenH L77 AirCcvpai]*,(Wash.DC:ationalDefenseUniversity P~ia,1988),pp .9- 10 ,51-58JohnA.WardenH I,EmployingAirTowerinth eTwenty-FirstCentury,";,~FutureofAir 3


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Thusfrom it sconception,airpower liasbeenviewed asatooltoatteckstrategicC O G sdirectly.13nactualpractice,however,th eidentificationan d targetingofC Q Q h > by airpowerhas been dismalat worstan d elus iveat bestOften,w e haveexperienced political-militaiydisconnectspresentingpoliticalobjectivest h a t ,could notbetranslated intomilitarilyachievableobjectives. 14BecauseC O G sin turn,flow from an d must bein harmonywith thepolitical-military objectives,theywereseldom accurately identified.W ehave typicallystumbledacrossC O G sbytrialan derrororbyaccident,and w ehavecharacteristicallyusedsuchoverwhelmingforcethatth eidentificationofth eC O G sbecame militarilyirrelevant.15nasimilarmanner,ou rapplicationofC O G analysisatth eoperationallevelhasusuallyresulted in inconclusivetheatertferdictioncampaigns. 16W hydoesafundamentalfailureexistwhen it comestcapp';gth econceptofidentifyingan d neutralizingC O G sasan inherentpartofstrr"*gy? T heParad igmProblem

Thereareseveralreasonsfor this.irst,Iwillattenr':to show thatou rnationalsecuritydecision processisbased uponth ewrongconcepts -rameworkto dealwith th eissuesat hand.hiscreatesth epolitical-military discorjnec verachievableobjectives.O urmechanisticpoliticalsciencemodelsan d nationalsecu:'' ytheoriesar emostly based

Pcr.verinth eAftermathoftheGulf War ,ed RichardH .ShultzJ r an dR cvtL .Pfidtzgraff J r ,(MaxwellA* *:ir UniversityPress,1992),pp.57-S2.oh nA.WardenEl" S t r ;icWarfare,The Enemyasa System," draftmanuscript,1993.13Adifficultyfo rairmenha sbeentheirinsistenceon th euniquea V r,ity ;- irpower toproducedirectpolitical,social,an deconomiceffects.Whi:eth etraditionaldsffcfr' : - * ' . ' :-ccessfo rarmiesan dnavies is theirnbitytodestroymilitarymeans(enemyarmiesan dnavies)th=r r ireofmeritfo rairpowerisoften directpoliticalefTxtsratherthan: : r " ; t a r ymeasuresofmerit.MMark C l cd f c ter,7k*UnitscfAirPwer,VtcAmericanBcr:* \ ~-rthVietnam, e wY ork :heFreePress ,193.0)andAndrew F.Xrepinev^hJ r ,TheAmyan*'alt imore:ohnsHopkins University Press,I9S5).7 5Aclassicexamplecfthisin W W I Iw as th eshiftin 8t hAi rTcrc- - 1 3 priorityfromoil,to ballbearings,to th eLiAvaSe. totransportation,an dto oil.1 6IdwardMark,CaseStudiesin Air Interdiction,unpublished Crz\r ofAirF~-3History ,n.d.ee alsoF . M.Sallagar,"Operation" S TRA N G L E" (Italy.Spring1944): 'zStudyofTacticalAirInterdiction,"R A N D ,R-S5I -PR,9?2. 4


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upon Newtonianideasand principles.rT b ^yassumedaninternationalstatesystem thatwaspartially"c lo sed /nearly linearin nature,vndbordering on equilihr'ian.O ur very terminology reflectsit sNewtonianorigin:powerpolitics,"balanceofpower," "multi-polar," "centersofgravity," "mass,""friction," adnauseam.heNewtonian approach is tbieufold:irst,with known initialconditions and (second)an understanding ofnaturallawsan d principles,oneca n(three)calculateth errent and probable futurebehavior ofasystem.Newtoniansciencereliesheavily on''nearcausean deffect relationships;nfactit dependsonsinglecauses.

Unfortunately,ournationalsecurity decisionprocessoftenmirrored this methodology andhasstagnated uponit sNewtonianfoundatioaocialscience hasnotkeptpacewith hardsciencein attemptingto explair.cr moreaccuratelydescribe th erealworld.W eseenoequivalent nationalsecurityframeworkthatncorporatesth einsightsto begained by using relativity,quantumtheory,system dynamics ,or "chaos" theory.18O ur Newtonianapproachis fundamentallyinappropriatefo rdescribingcomplexsocialsystems.nitialconditionscon neverbeknown,onlyestimated.Even"identical" initial17HansJ.Morgenthau, Poli t ics AmongNation?,(New York:Knopf; 9 7 3 )sadKeimcthN Waltz,TheoryofInternat ional Politics,(Mcnio Park:ddisoivWeslcyPu bCo,1979) .M o s tpoliticalscience methodologies forstudying"systems"derivefron thesociologistAlfredKuhn,ee hi sT heStudyofSociety,AUnified Approach,(Homewood,Illinois:DorseyPress ,19C1)an dT heLogicofSocialSystems,(SanFrancisco:ossey-Bass Pub,19*4).hese worksanalyze systemsby definingth eindependentvariablesan dcontroingeachinturn ratherthananalyzingpatternswithintheentire systemwith th eindependentvariable."unccrtllcdan dinteracting witheachother.A goodsummaryoftheory is presented by JohnL ew i sGaicisin"InternationalRelationsTheoryan dt>E ndofth eColdWar,"International Security,W inter 9 ? 2 / 9 3 ,V o 1 7No3 ,pp .5-53.18Volume?of~~-r-shhawrecentlybenrju:-' -edinth ehr..?eir*-* : :to dto chaostheory.T hepopuiarworks?~:amesG'ctck,Chaos,}JMl,:*aNewScicrcz,(XcwYork:enguinBooks ,1987),PeterCoveney-.-ogerKgfcfHd,T he Arr? rfime (Ner- r 'ork:FawccttColumbine,1990), GregotreNicclisan dSy a?-' :oginc, xploringComplex' AnIntrodzztirm.( N e w Y o r k :W .H .Freeman,1989X M .MitchellWaidror,Complexity:he Eme*g :Scienceat:h z~?geofOrder andChaos ,(NewYork:Simonan dSchuster.1992) ,PcgerLewir,Corr/txity:ciencecrth eEdgeofChaos,(New York:M a c m i P A1992),tuartA.Kauffnan,Origrrr-fOrd lf j sati^ardSekctioninEvoh(th {London:CrfbrcUniversity Pre? s,1 9 9 2 XM.F.I:irns eyL:*S.C^crnkc,editors,Chaot icDynamics andFractal?,(New York:CK:r.icPress,T?35),"MT.Thcmpsc-"~dl3.Stewart, NonlinearDynamfcsandOzos,(New York:W- cyTress, 9?5), ?;? ^goginean d*Stengers,OrderOutof Chaos,(Ixirdon:Her.;c~ann, 1984) ,an d3encitMancchrot, 77:-FractalGeovzTyofNature,i^NewYork:W.RFrecrnan,19S3) .ro mth em id1 9 3 < XsscicnoT.cjoum ^3 havehed agrowingnumber ofarticlespata imng to cr-?c**':eory.ec fn.3 itc c^.


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conditions canbifurcateor diverge,an d selforganizeintototallydifferentresultsbecausecausalityis normallyinfinitenots ingular.Natureand humanorganizationsareroughand abrasivenotsmooth and simple.ocial,cultural,an d politicalsystems ar egenerallyopenan d interactive with theirenvironment an d each otherratherthanclosedTheyar ecomplex,syriergistic,nonlinear,and dynamic.Applyingtheories thatignoreand areantitheticalto theseconditionsrendersou rnationalsecurityprocessinefficientinternally an dineffectiveexternally.19Thisdisconnectin"causean d effect"theorywithincomplex socialsystems,by definition,makesth eidentificationofC O G sb ytraditionallinear methodsnearlyimpossible.heastutem ayquestionthisstatement,based onth eassumptionthatClausewitz'sentireC O G theoryw asNewtonianin origin.willexploreth eimplicationsand potentialsolutionstothislater,butth esimpleansweris thatClausewitzused N ewtonian" " t e r m s , " butwasfundamentally nonlinearin approach.20

T hesecondreasonw ehaveinadequately dealtwithC O G sis becausew e donotcompletely understand th eairpower"tool"thateffectsan dinteractswithC O G s .W edonot haveaco-nprshensive theoryofairpowerexplaining th enatureofwar,discussing airpowerasapoliticalinstrumentwithinwar oranalyzingth erolecf airpowerin combined,joint,strategic,theater,andtacticaloperations.W ehaveoverwhelmingly concentrated onstrategictheoryaidtacticalapplicationat th eexpenseofoperationalartW ehavenotexploredth edynetricsofairpowerapplication acrossth espectrumofconflict,or assessed th e"relationshipsc-nongth ephysical,cognitive,an dmoraldomains ofairpower."21 Importantly, * e constantlydwel lonth ecapabilitiescf airpowerwhilefailingto acknowledgeth efundamentall imitationsofthisinstrumentcfpower.Lastly,19An excellents:.x cexploringtheseimplicationsis:tevenR .Mann,"ChaosTheory an dStrategicThought," Parameters,VolXXTIN o2,Autumn1992,pp .54-68.20AlanBeyerchen,"Clausewitz,Nonlir.caritv,arcth eUnpredicabSityofWar,"Interrationed Security,Vol17 N o3,Winter?SM3,pp .59-90.*lKrcldR.. :yi,A3 ?b & Kc'cin th eWi'u3 u cYonder:~;Need fo r.Cornj-rehensive Theory ofAirPower,"ArPower Histcr^Vo 39No4,Wnter1992,pp.32-42.


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w e havenotMyexamined th edynamicinfluence ofvariousvaluesystems,cultures,and socialorganizationson th eapplication ofairpower.

T hethird reason fo rour poor trackrecord ofidentifying C O G sisw e haveno unifying C O G theorythatincorporatesor compensatesfo r thetwoshortfallslisted above.A workableC O G theorymus texplain th enonlineardynamicprocessesthateffectsociety and culturesas a wholeto includeth emilitary,political,economic ,social,cultural,and ideologicalelementsofpower.AworkableC O G theorymustdiscloseh ow theairpowertoolis a partofthisvery process,and h ow it interactswith thisopenly"chaotic"system.22Inshort,it mustbeapplicabletootherformsofpower besides militarypowerorairpower,an d thusit should providepracticalguidancefo rth edevelopmentan d executionofnationalstrategy.Clausewi t zRevis i ted

BeforeIoffer aconstructfo rtheseideas,w eneed toreexploreClausewitzan d fullyexaminehis notionofC O G s .lausewitzexpanded hinitialdiscussionsin avery instructivemanner an d stated:

T hefightingforcesofeach belligerent,.haveacertnunityan d thereforesomecohesionherethereiscohesion,th eanalog:* ofth ecenter ofgravityca nbeapplied. ..[In]war asin th eworld of inanimate matter th eeffectproducedon acenterofgravityis determined an dl imited by thecohesionofth eparts.neithercase ,a blow m aywel lbestrongerthantheresistancerequires,an din thatcaseit maystrikenothingbutair,an dsobe awasteofenergy. ..I tisthereforeamajoract ofstrategic judgmentto 22Surprisingly,verylittlewriting hasbeendevotedtoth esubjectof C O G theory otherthanin Clausewitz;some paragraphsindoctrinalmanuals,an dsomecampaign planninghandbooks. lo thas beenwrittenabout th epracticalapplicationofairpower against"vitalcenters,"which ar esynonymous withC O G sHowever,very fe wdefine,catagorize,orexplainth einterconnected mechanismsthattransformcrisesintoeffects.N o n eprovideatheoryof COGs.oradditionalreference topureC O Garticlessee:ajor EvanJ .Hoapiii,Tar vonClausewitz:H o p e c:.Fear,"unpublishedpaper,NfcHW ar College,13February1 9 9 2 ,JamesJ.Schneideran dLawrenceL .Izzo,"Clausewitz's ElusiveCenter :* Gravity,"Parameters ,Se p1987,pp .46-57,Lawrence L. Izzo,"TheCenterofGravity is NotanAchillesH asl,"Military Review,Ja n1988,pp .72-77.hebestdiscussion ofC O G sisin: StevenM e t zan dFrederic-;M .Downey ,"CentersofGravity an dStrategicPlanning,"Military Review,A pr1 9 8 ? ,so .2 3 - 3 3 .7


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distinguishthesecentersofgravityin the enemy'sforcesand toidentify their spheresofeffectiveness.23Clausewitz alsopointed outho/C O G sar edependentuponobjectivesaswel lasdecisions.F orexample,in explaining defenseofa theater hestated:

Defenseconsists oftwodifferente lements- thedecisionan d th e periodofwaiting... [The]truerelationshipbetweenth estateofwaitingaod th ewhole,is valid onlyifa decision is reallyintended,an d is regarded asinevitable byboth sides.tis thedecis ion thatchangesthecentersofgravityon each side,an d th eoperationaltheatersthey create,intoactiveagents.fonedropsth eideaofa decis ion,th ecentersofgravity are neutralized,and so,indeed,in a certain sense,areall theforces.24M ylastquotationfrom Clausewitz concentrateson identifyingC O G s .H e stated:

T hefirstprincipleis thatth eultimate substance ofenemystrengthmust betraced backto th efewestpossiblesources,and ideallytoonealone.T heattackonthesesourcesmustbecompressed intothefewest possibleact ions-again,ideally,intoone...Thetaskofreducing th esourcesofenemystrength to a sieglecenterofgravitywil ldepend on :.T hedistribution ofth eenemy'spoliticalpower..hesituationin th etheaterofwarwherethe variovsarmiesar eoperating. ..From thisit followsthatth econceptof separatean d connected enemypowerrunsthrough everylevelofoperations,an d thusth eeffectsthateventsin a given theaterwil lhaveelsewherecanonly be judged in each particular case.Onlythen can it beseen how farth eenemy'svariouscentersofgravity canbereduced toone.25

ClausewitzalsoillustratedseveralexamplesofC O G sthatwerevalid forhis historicalcontextThesewere:nemyfightingforces;heenemycapitalif there,wasdomest icstrife;heprotectorateofasmallercountry;he"communityof interest"ofanalliance; an dtheleadersofpopularuprisings.26

Atthispoint,it isusefti tosummarizesomeimportantobservationsaboutClausewitz'sviewofC O G s .First,C O G sexisted on eithersideofa conflict in adynamicmanner.econd,th eC O G isastrengthnotavulnerability,an d th estrongestblow comes23Clausewitz.O nWar ,pp .485-86.24Ibid.,p.488.15Ibid.,pp.617-18.Ibid.,p.596.


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from aC O G .Third,C O G sinvolvecomplexity,cohesion,mass ,and freedomofaction.Fourth,C O G sexistatalllevels ofwar and ar eintimately tied to politicalobjectives.T heenemy'spoliticalaimsand decis ionsmustb econsidered in d etermininghis C O G .Last ,strategyrequirestheidentificationandprotectionofC O G sas wel las theprioritized decision to attack,threatenoravoid C O G s .

Part ofth etraditionalattractivenessofClausewitz stemsfrom th ementalappealofhis dynamicnonlinearview ofth erealworld,and his presentationofa comprehensivetheoryof landwarfarewithin hisculturalcontextthatincorporatedthisprinciple.Clausewitz in essencew asachaostheorist/practitioner, buthelacked th emodernscienceor th evoca^aryto expresshimself assuch.27ThusClausewitz 'stheoryofC O G sis fairly completebecausehepresented acoherent"setting"in which toidentifyC O G s ,an d anoverarchinganalysisofth etoolsthatcould affectC O G s .Any modern daysynthesisortheoryofC O G smustaccomplishthesesamebasictasks.

27Beyerchen,"Clausewitz, Nonimearity,an dth eUnpredictr.b : > it vofWar." 9


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C H A P T E R nC H A O S T H E O R Y

C h a o sExplained T hekey to C O G analysis,therefore,is to incorporate therealand dynamic

complexitiesofthe naturalworldexplained bychaostheory.havealreadynoted thegrowthinscientificliteraturepertaining to thisn ewhileall theliteraturepointsto th eobviousapplicabilityofchaos theory to socialstructures,nonehaveproposed asuitableoverarchingconstructwillattemptto doso ,b utspacepermitsonly abareoutline.will notrecite th etenetsofchaos theoryeasilyavailableand containedin extantliterature.Rather,Iwillhighlightseveralkey pointsan d then proposea structureconsistent withth etheory an d it sfunctions.F orth euninitiated,th ebasicsofchaos wil lhopefully becomeself-evidentthenproposetoanswerseveralimportantquestions. H ow doeschaostheoryhelpto identifyand prioritizeC O G s ?Whatis th enatureoftheforcesor "tools" thatinfluence C O G s?Whatareth edynamicsinvolved when thesetoolsinteractwith C O G s ?Hopefully thiswillalsoanswer th e" sowhat 1 1question:doeschaostheory helpu sto better understand our world and,in the process, become betterairpower strategists?

Somekey propositionsforchaos theory need tobe understood.T hetheory appliestoallnonlinear,dynamicsystemsan d"predicts"certainfeaturesthatar eindependentofth esystem'sdetailed stricture.haostheorypredictionsar ethemselves generalin nature,an d describesystem interactions ratherthanspecificen d states.haoscan beeither"deterministic" (exhibiting regularities)or"stochastic" (exhibiting erraticrandomness) .282 8 T he "degree"ofchaosisoftenmeasuredbyth eaverage rate at whichinformationabo u tth esystem is producedan dby th enumberoffunctionaldimensions withinth esystem.1 0


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Manyofthesepatternsorstructures ofregularityan drandomness ar euniversalin naturean dapply to physics,mathematics,geometry,biology,meteorology,ecology, andpresumablysocialsystems.Anextremelyimportantpointis thatth einitialconditionsan dthe dynamicfactors thatgovernsystemdynamicsca nseldombe absolutelyknownordefinedThisoccursbecausesystems,particularlyth efunctionsthatdefinethem,arecomplexan d"fractal"in nature-thefurther you attemptto investigatean drefinethemth emore intricatean ddetailed they become.Theyar eoftenself-repeating,exhibiting scaledstructures.This wouldno tbe importantexceptthatminutedif^rences over timeca nproduce surprisinglydiverseresults,thuschaos theorydoesnotlenditself togrosssimplificationsortolongterm predictions.tdoesallow you,however, to anticipatecertain functionsan dprocesses withindynamicsystemsthatareconsistentwith th etheory.This"doublespeak"meansyou ca nusuallypredicthowto makesome generaleventhappen,an dwhy dynamic processesinteractas theydo ,b utyou cannotpredictspecificallywhathappensafterth eevent orwhen theeventwilloccur.

Chaos principlesareextremely straightforward.First,patternrwithinadynamicsystemwillform around functionsknownas"strangeattractors."

2 9Thesepatternswillresembleeachotherby exhibitingsimilarproperties,butwillneverexactlyrepeatthemselves.Second,nature feversorderalongfe w ratherthanmanypathways.Strangeattractors(i.e.functions)thenrrnifyinitialrandomness,smalluncertainties,an d thesefe wpathwaysintolarger scalepatterns.Third,simplicity thusgrowsintocomplexity,an dtheinnerunderlyingpatterns ultimatelyinfluence theoutwardforrr.sastructure.Thesescalingstructures,orself-similarorganizations,withinasystemru ncp an dexhibit

29 Att^acto^s,,ar eofthreetypes:xed-point,limit-cycle,an drtrange.hey are sir; ply termsused to describe physicalan dmathematicalfunctionsassociated withsteady-state,periodic-;ie ,an ddynamicsystems.Properties withindynamicsystemswhichca n eusedtocharacterizer^r&ngeattractorsare:herateofdecay ofpredictability,th erate of informationflow,an dth e tendencytocreatemixing.1 1


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universalconsistencywithth elaws ofnatureat all levels.30 Fourth,systemsopen totheirenvironmentwillself-organizeintosimilar patternsin accordancewith their fundamentalstructures.Nc^ethatth eact,or process,ofself-organizationis different from th echaracteristicofself-similarity.Fifth,nonlinearityca n stabilizesystemsaswel lasdestabilize them.Systemsusefeedback todetect,alter,and minimizeor accentuate perturbations.ixth,open systemscanbe driven tocrisespoints wherethey wil leitherbifurcatean d self-organizeagain,or gointoa period ofstochasticchaos.Seventh,crisespointscanbe precipitated by:.closing th esystem off from it senvironmentand propelling it toequilibrium;b.eliminatingfeedbackwithin th esystem;.drivingairyoneofth edimensionaldynamics tosingularitybyoverloadingordestroying it ;rd.applying quantum amountsofbroadexternalenergy toth eentiresystem.Eighth ,somesystemsconcreatedisorderinonedirection whileremainingtrim and methodicalin another.Thisdependsonth econnectivity ofth esystem'sl inkagesand potentialbiaseswithin it sfunctions.31Lastly,chaos theoryis nott imereversible.32T hearrow oft imemovesonedirection,becauset imeis required torevealth epatternsofa system.30T he "universality"ofchaosprinciplesin dynamicsys temsisacriticalpoint.tindicatesthatsimilarprocesses,mcchanisisms,an d lawsexistfrom th emicrototh emacrolevel,which presentsa considerabletaskfo r theoristsproposinggrand-unified systemstructures.31Theseviewshavebeensummarizedfrom th e works listed inf.n.18above an dfrom th efollowingarticles:JamesP .Crutchfield,J .DoyneFarmer,NormanH .Packard,an dR obertShaw,"Chaos," ScientificAmerican,D ec1986,pp .46-57,StuartA.Kaufiman,"AntichaosandAdaptation,1 'Scientific American,August1991,pp.78-84,Ar y L .Goldberger,David R .Rigney,an dBruce J .West ,H Ch aosan dFractals in H um anPhysiology,"Scientific American,F eb1990,pp .43-49,AlanWol$"Simplicity an d Universality in the Transitionto Chaos," Nature,V ol305,Sep1983,pp .182-183,ArunH o lden ,"ChaosinComplicated Systems," Nature,Vol305,Se p1983,p.83 ,LarryL .Smarr,"AnApproachto Complexi ty :NumericalComputations,"Science,V ol228No4698,26Ap r1985,pp .403^08,P er B akan d Kan Chen,"Self-Organized Crit ice%," ScientificAmerican,Ja n1991,pp .46-53, NormanJ .Zabusky,"Grapplingwith Complex i ty / Physics Today,O ct1987,pp .25-27,W .Brianr t h u r ,"Positive Feedbacksin th e Economy," ScientificAmerican,F eb1990,pp .92-99,Leonard M .Sander,"FractalGrowth Processes ," Nature,V ol322,28 Au g1986,pp .789-793,Cel soGrebogi ,EdwardOtt,andJamesA.Yorke,"Chaos,StrangeAttraetors,andFractalBasinBoundariesin N onlinearDynamics," Science,V ol238,30O ct1987,pp .632-638,Benctt Mandelbrot," H o wLong isth eCoas tofBritian?tatistic? Self-Similarityan dFractionalDimension,"Science,V ol156,5 M ay1967,pp .636-638,Robert M .Ma y ,"BiologicalPopulations with Nonoverlapping Generations:tablePoints,StableCycles ,an dChao3,"Science,V ol186,15Nov1974,pp .645-647,andResellRuthen,"Adaptingto Complexity," Scientific American,Ja n1993,pp .130-140.32Thismay seem obvious,but Newtonianscienceistheoretically t ime reversible.cknowledging timeas an irreversiblefunction)meansyouca nneverreturnto th e statusqu oanteinadynamicsystem.1 2


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Let'stakea momenttoquickly restatethethreemos timportantaspectsofchaostheory.tinstructsushow toexaminedynamicsystems- lookfo rdeepstructures an d patterns.tshowsush owdynamicsystems canself-organize,how they are closely interrelated,an d how thsyusefeedbackto regulatethemse lvesLast ly,it tellsushow to disruptdynamicsystems.tdoesnotallow usto predictaccmteiyth especificend statesthatm ay developalterdisruptionoccurs.N or doesit permitluiterm predictionofdetailed end statesofdynamicsystemsthatar enotsubjected * ?sruption.dentifying thedeep structuresan d processes,and predicting th ehow and th ofdisruptingdynamicsystemscloselycorrespondstoth eprocessesw emustuseto :.IvzeC O G s .submitit is th esame process.Itshould b eevident,however,thatapplyingchaosft. .o humansocialsystems requiresboth inductiveand deductiveapproaches.Furthenr. heinherentfundamentalstructures of systems,combined with th eultimateunpredict 7ofend resultsbychaost h e o r y - should makeitintriguing,ifnotacceptable,to both sc cienceand historicalmethodologies.T heclassicNewtonianmethod used to test< &an d effect relationshipsis to beabletorepeat:h etesthis is intrinsically impcssib" withchaoticsystems.T o testthesesystems,cntcScn hastorelyonidentifyingunderlying dimensions,functionalvariables,andstatisticpatternsor propertiesratherthanbeingableto makedetailed predictions.Furtherrr: re ,chaosdirectlychallenges th ereductionistm ethodofbreaking systemsdownand studying each componentorfactorin isolationasa solemethod to determineoutcomes.Whiletherearesomeclosed,non-dynamicsystemsin which th esu mofth ewholeequalsth esum of it sparts,chaosshowsthatsystemscan havecomplicated behav ioruiat transcendth esum ofailparts 'Chaosprovidesa mechanism thztallowsfor freevr;/ ;withinaworld governed bydeterministiclaws/'33Ciaosan dDeepSock;Structure33Crutchfidd,Farmer,Pfec-: andShaw,"Chaos,"Scientific American,p.5? .13


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In many ways ,th e justificationtoapplychaostheorytoculturalsystemsresemblesth eargumentsused by othersw hohavelooked fo rdeepstructureswithin society.Forexample,Iwould echo thereasoning presented b yJoshuaGoldste inin h is work LongCycles,estated:

M y approachacknowledges th eimportance ofboth repetitiveand evolutionary change . ..Longcyclesar enota mechanicalprocess but a repetitionofthemes,processes,and relationshipsalong th epathofan evolvingsocialsystem....Theyd onotallow us topredictth efuture,b u tthey ca nhelp usto understand th edynamics of internationalpoliticsin i tsdeep context...I tis notclear thatscientificallymeaningfulstatements can bemadeaboutmacrohistoricalprocesses thatarehistoricallyunique ,especiallyif onebelieves, asId o,thatth efutureis indeterminate.34An obviousmethod onemightusetobegin toapplychaostheory tocultural

structures,would beto review th eliteratureofth emajorsocialdisciplines pertainingto deepunderlying processesan d theories.hisshould include history,politicalscience,economics ,sociology,anthropology,militarystudies,and even religion.35However ,adeepstructurecomparison could easilybecome*thesubjectfanentire paperor bootThuswithoutdwell ingonthistopictoolong,pointoutthatnosinglesocial-culturaltheoristspecificallytiesh is methodologies to chaos.O nealsoneedsto realizethatth ebulkofcontemporarysocialsciencehasfocusedon th epolitical, military,social,and economicmanifestations ofrelativelymodernadvanced societies.haos* H o r y arguesthesevisible formsofsocietystem frominner culturalstructuresthatareless studied or understood.

34JoshuaS.Goldstein,Long Cycles,ProsperityandW arin th eModemAge ,(New Haven:ale University Press,1988),pp .6,8,&12 .nphasis inoriginal.here has beena new emphasison statisticalstudies ofwar ofwhichGoldstein is a part.therimportantscholarsinthisfieldar eJackLev y ,ImmanuelWaDerstem,J .DavidSinger,KaleviHols t i ,PaulDiehl,an dJohnVasquez351havealreadymentioned th eworks ofMorgenthau,Waltz,Kuhn,Goldstein,and Clausewitz .O ne would need to review th efollowingauthors:KarlMarx,Adam Smith,M ax Weber,Thomas Hobbes ,David H u me ,GeorgeModelski ,Claude Levi-Strauss,StanleyH oh an n ,BenjaminWard,JohnGaddis , MortonKaplan,Robert M erton,GrahamAllison,Rober tJcrvis,PaulKennedy,Raymond Aron,Marion Le vy Jr.,IS.Slotkin,PitirimSorokin,JamesMarch,Nei lSmelser,ArthurStinchcombe,an d Reinhold Niebuhr.14


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Persistent indicationsofhumanpatternsar eas evidentasth edisciplines w e s t u d t y : militaryart,politics,economics ,sociology,culturalanthropology,and value systems.O necould alsoview dialecticorcyclicaleconomicand politicalprocesses asessentially th edynamicsofastrangeattractor.heinteractionsbetweenmajorsubsystems,fo rexamplemility,political,an d etc.,illustrateconnectivity l inkages evident in chaossystems.Likewise,majorwarscould b einterpreted ascrisespointsor bifurcations,and periodsofstability underbalanceofpowersystemsca n b eseec.t speriodsofselforganization.ommand,control,an dcommunicationstheoriesin manywaysresemble th efeedback loopsand controlmechanismsthat areprevalentwitliindynamicsystems.Analysisofcollectivebehaviorpatternsan d decision makingprocessesoftenimitatethedescriptionsofnonlinearopensystems.Lastly,studiesthatexploredynamicinterdependencewithin political,economic ,and socialystemsoften close ly m inor the scientificand mathematicaldiscussions onefindsoffractalboundaries .nshort,chaosessentialshavebeen therea longt imewithinsocialscience,butvshavefailed to synthesize them.36

3 6 Pioneering workinsystemdynamicsw asmadeby Jay W .Forresterinth e1960s.managementspecialistat M I T ,his primary worksare:ndustrialDynamics,(New York:oh n Wiley & Sons,1961)an d PrinciplescfSystems,(Cambridge:Wright-AllenPress,1968).A closeattemptto applysystem dynamics,but withamilitarypisspectrve,ha sbeentw o R A N Dproposals:David AShlapak,"Exploring Paralysis: AnIntroductionto *eStudy," R A N D ,P M -1 0 7 -A F ,D ec1992;an d M egCecchine an d Mark Hoyer ,"ApplyingSystemDynamics to EffectiveAirCampaigns,"R A N D ,PM-106-AF,Ja n1993.owever ,al tthesestudiesar econfined to th eeconomic,political,an d militarylevelan ddonotexamineorexplore th e underlyingsocial,cultural,or valuesys tem base.Neither R A N Ds tudy attemptstou sechaos theory.15


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C H A P T E R mA S T R U C T U R E B A S E D O N C H A O S

Basi s ofOrganizat ion T hefundamentalconstant within social-culturalconstructsis humanfree will.

Freewil lis analogous tothespace-time conceptin relativistic physics,defining thedimensions ofhumansociety.Freewil lis alwayspresent,it permeates decis ions ,"structuresan dcultureprovidinga vehiclefo r randomnessto b eintroduced intoth esystem.H u m f n w i l loccursin variousforms,bu t th eprimaryonesfo r ourpurposesare:th ewil ltosurvive,th ewil ltopower,an dthe wil lto truth.37T hehighestreaches ofindividualor personalwil laredependentupon thesocialsubstancefrom which they arisean dcanonly befulfilledin thecontextofa community .Ma n ,likeal lprimates,is a communalanimalfirstand foremostCommuna lrelationshipsexist within all levelsofhuman societyin endlesselaboration.T henecessity to define man'srelationshipto other individuals,h i r > relationshipto thecommunity, thecommunity'srelationship to nature,an d th ecommunity'srelationshipto other communities giverisetovaluesystems.Thesevaluesystems reflectthewil lto truthan d the willto power ,an d they comprisewhat many would callnorns ,mores,and laws.C o m m o n expressions ofvaluesystems arereligion,eiics, philosophy,politicalideologies ,and doctrine.T hevaluesystemsthatarisefrom himan will an d communityare theunderlying e lementofpowerand organizationwithin humansocietyfrom th emos tprimitive tribeto modem nationstates.Valuesareth e

57Iborrcnvtl^nstnKlfit)mRaiiddNicbuhr,T heChildemctfLightedth eChildtmcfDarkness,(New York:harles S'ribnex'sSO UK,1944),pp .48-49.nsom e waysthis corresponds toMasJoVshierarchyofneeds. 16


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gravitythatrulesth ehumanuniverse.Valuer arethefirstdementofpower.Theydefinetheorganizationan d dynamicsoftheotherelementsofpower.ElementsofPower

Power isnotwellunderstoodPoweristh eabilitytodo whatyouwant,an dth eabilityto influenceothers to conform to yourdesires.Powerisstrength thatpermitsfreedomofactionBecausepowerisexercisedby humansandisapplied to humansocieties,itisbothrealan dperceivedin nature.Poweris amoral.tis neither"good*nor"bad,"butit canhave positiveornegativeeffectsonsocialoiganization-sometimesbothsimultaneously.Thismeansitcanincreaseordecreasecohesion in society.Theeffectiveness ofpoweris alwayssituations in termsofwhois usingit, whichelementofpower isbeingused,whereitisbeingused,an dwho or whatisth eobjectofinfluence.Poweris dynamic over timean dits fullforceisrarelymustered withoutcrossingfractalboundariesan dconnectingintoothersources an dtypesofpower.Theeffectofa singletypeofpowerisrarelypersuasiveifusedindependentofothertypes ofpower,an dinfluenceis magnifiedwhen th e various elements ofpowerar eusedin combinationratherthan isolationForexample,militaryaction,diplomatic pressure,an deconomicsanctionsshould becoordinatedto achievemaximumeffect

Poweressentially supports,defends, orimplementsthegoalsan d valuesofsociety.Eachelemento f poweristhreedimensional.tconsistsofa"source,"a manifestation (o r"force"),an da"linkage."helinkageassistsin transformingth esource intoa force, an ditprovidesconnectivity withinand betweenth eelementsofpower.Eachcompleteelementofpowerisacenterofgravity,an deachelementofpoweris astrangeattractor.The dimensionsthatdefineit vary,butth eessentialonesare:hemassofth esource, th eintensity oftheforce,interconnect^ity withinth esystem,an dth erateoferxhangeflowwithin the linkage.Thesesystems:snihenbeclinracterizedbytheirpredictability, theirrate of information flow,an dtheirtendency to' * e a t e mixing.

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SourcesofP o w e r Therear erelatively fe w truesourcesofpowerin human society,n Einstein's

termsthey would constituteth emassor M rest-eneigy" ofsociety.hesesources ar ethebasicsubstanceofsocietiesan d nations,an dconsistofvaluesystems,culture,economicresources,an d socialorganization.mportantfeatures of socialorganizationin themodern world ar egovernment and securityormilitary organizations. Havingalreadydiscussed valuesystems,lets examineth eothersin turn.

Cultureis th elearned bodyofcustomsand knowledgewithin humancommunit ies .Culturesexistfo rextended periodsoft imean d m ayincorporateseveraltypesofsocieties. Culturearisesfrom values,and is th emeansbywhich valuesar edefinedorexpressed.Culturedetermineshow m anadjuststo h iscommunity,and how ixietiesadjust to their environmenthemostcommon approachestoth eenvironment e:naturalism,supernatural ; estheticism,an d mysticism.38Tieseapproachesoftenexistin mixed form,although they can existinsocietiesin prevalentorpureforr? .

Econc Ji icresourcesincludepopulations,naturalresource% and territory.M an and primateswerenotoriginallyterritorial,buthumancultureand societydeveloped sedentaryexpression?"~rsusnomadicforms.Whenthisoccurred territory becameclosely identified (ifnotinseperable)withdefinitionsofcomraur* * yand thusw asincorporated intofundamental valuesystems.

Socialorganizationsca nbecategorized intothreefundarrntaltypes:olidary,contractual,and antagonistic.39Solidary societies ar etypified by/-unilistic,tribaland ethnicaffiiia:,butcan alsoexistin economicend religiousfors.Normally ,solidarygroupsdefine...attemptto encompassallvaluesfo rsocialorgas l i ion,and thusare intense and rnufrnLontractualtypesoforganizationsar cccrmily associated with 38J.S.Slotkin,SocialAnthropology,TheSciencofHtanarSociety andCM- ,( N e w York:MtcMi l lanCompany ,1950),pp .143-145.Alsose e n.41be. ,* v .39Pitirim A. Scrolcn.Society,Culture,andPersonty :h:irStntctertend'.'namics,( N e w Yak:Harper an dBrothers Publishers,1947)pp .69-150. IS


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cooperative groups,where rights,privileges,and obligations areclearly definedOnly a fe w valuesar eencompassed,projected,or monitoredbyth econtractualgroup.Modern democratic,bureaucraticnationstatesarethe archetypalcontractualorganization.Antagonisticsocialorganizations ar ecoercive in natureand usually involvedominationofonegroupbyanother.Antagonistic typesoforganizations ar enormally one-sided and involve theimposition ofvaluesystemseitherinternally or externally.Antagonistic groupsoftenassumeapseudo-solidary or pseudo-contractualguise,and axe typified by ideologicaltotalitarianstates.Thesethreetypesofsocialorganizationcan existin "mixed"varieties,an d theyar enotpermanentbecausesocieties develop and chan -\F orexample,solidarysocietiesca n slowly evolveintocontractualor antagonisticforrLikewise ,revo^itionsca n occurwhenmajordisconnectsdevelopbetweenfundanta lvaluesystemsan dth eoutwardlyapparentsocialorganizations.

Thesebroad categoriescan be furtherclassified by the prevalenttype of functional interdependence between th egroup'smembers .Thi sincludes th eabilityto organize"unibonded"groupsand "multibonded" groups.40Unibonded gr cip shaveonesetofmeaningfulnormsor valuesas th eveli icleormagnc*for organization,while mult ibondedgroupscollatearoundtw oormoresets(o rpotentially largenumbers)ofnormsor values.The method fbondinghelpsdetermine the connectivity withinsociety ,b u tmoreimportantlyuelpstoindicateth epotential"biases" orpredisposition toward decis ionsthatmayoccurwithingroups.

Solidarysocieties wil ltend to horizontallyorgacizethemselvesaround unbonded groups,and willuse reinforcingunibondedgroupsto organizevertically.F or example,th etribeor th eclanbecomesth edefining factor thatdeterminesstatusthroughout social,economic,political,an dm ilitaryorganizations.Thesescsisliescznormallyfocused 40Ibid.,pp .171-178.mportantumbonded gr c arc:erceivedrace,sex,zz?: :*Bshap,territorialproximity,language,occupation,economic,rci tecr s ,political,scientiSc,an d/ **rhipelites.mpo ten trauhifcocdedgroupsare:lan,tribe,nation,cart-.r? dsoda ldsf&ft. 1 9


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inwardupon theirdefining c l ementContractualsociet ieswil lbehorizontallyand vertically orgamzedaroundmultibonded groupswhilepermitting th eexistenceofumbonded groups.A multitudeofcompetingand complementarypluralistic groupsexistatall levels ofcontractualsocieties.Antagonistic societies wil lorganize vertically along unbonded groups,using thesegroupsto suppressotherunbonded groupsan d to controlmultibondedgroups.Antagonisticsocietiescanbefocusedeither internally orexternally.

Thesefundamentalclassificationsand characteristics,whichderivefrom values,help determine theoutward formsofeconomicorganization,governmentalfunction,and militarycapability.Thisis especially evidentwhen onestudiessocialand culturalhistorybackto antiquity,an dexamines diversecivilizationsotherthanm o d em Europe.Values ,culture,an d socialgroupsinteractin many permutationsand combinations .heyform th ebasisfo rbeginning asystematic centerofgravity analysis.Thi sis especially truewhenlooking at theentirespectrum ofconflict r a t h e *than justconventionaloperations.Checklis t centercf gravity methodologiess implyw inot work,nor willmethodssolely focused onanalyzingth eexternalvestiges ofsocietysuchasgovernment leadership.41 Reinhold Neibuhrpointsout:

Governmentm ay beth ehead of th ebody ,wi" e h withoutrsinglehead could not beorbecome,asinglebody;butitisnotpossiblefora head to createabody . ..[Itis]axiomatic that thelessacommuni tyis held together bycohesiveforcesin th etextureof it sl ife themoremustit be held together bypower.42T heobviouscorollaryofthisstatementis that cohesivegovernmentsan d societ iesdonotrequirestrong leadership to bind theirsocialfabrictogetheran d maintainpower.

T hesources ofpower arenotcentersofgravityin and ofthemselves .Th e yar eth erawmaterialthatgetsmolded intoanotherdimensionofth eelementofpower thatw e call41Me t zand Downey ,"CentersofGravityan dSirategic Planning,"p.30-31.his iscontrary to th eideasespoused byWardenan dothers.F or example,see:BruceA Ross ,"TheCasefo rTargeting Leadershipin War,Na va lW ar CollegeKevin,Vo X L V I ,No1,Winter1993,pp .73-93.42Neibuhr,OltkrnofLight andOtemofDarkness ,pp .165&168.20


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magnetism.n addition,al lmatterexchanges gravitonsto createth eforceweknow asgravity.43

The forceswithinhumansociety exhibitsimilarbehavioralcharacteristics.Theyarcnotal lofth esamestrength.Th^canbebothdestnictiveandccmstroctive.Theirinfluence orpower variesin itsprojectabilityover variousdistances.Furthermore,humansocialforcesarecreated in th esamemanneras theforcesofnature-the constantexchange ofmass-energy in th eformof "things"and/or"ideas."Neither th e forcesofnature,no rth eforcesofhumansociety,canbevisiblytouched,althoughtheireffectscanbefellTheydo nothavemassbecausetheyareaformofenergyderived frommechanisms ofexchange.Forceisthereforean event,aprocess,oran action thatisalwayscovertlypresentan d overtly felt

Let'sexaminethespecificforcecreationprocessforth eimportantmanifestationsofpowerin society.Militaryforcearisesfromth econsumptionan dexpenditureoflogisticsto conducttrainingoroperations.Politicalforcearisesfrom th econstantredistribution ofwealtlian dpowerin society.Diplomaticforcesimply representsth eredistribution ofwealthan dpoweroutsideth eboundariesofasociety.Economicforceisth eproduction an d exchangeofgoodsan dservices.Culturalforceis th eexchangeofknowledge an dcustoms.deologicalforceisth etransmissionorexchangeofvalues.Theseforcesconstituteth eprimary"strangeattractors"in humanculturean d th eboundariesbetweeneacho f themarecloselyinterwoven.Thisblurringmakesitsometimesdifficultto distinguishbetween th eelementsofpureforce.ndeed,th efighteraircraftflownby th eroilitary,procured bythegovernment,manufacturedby th eeconomy,43JohnGribbin,InSearchofSchrodinger'sCat,QuantumPhysicsandReality,(New Yoik :Bantam Books,198 4. ls osee:R o gerPenrose,TheEmperor's N ew Mind,QiewYork:enguinBooks ,1989),StephenW .Hawking, v 4 BYifHistory of Time,Fromth eBigBangtoBlackHoles,( N e w York:Bantam Books,1988) ,AlbertEinst'?,Relativity,T h e > SpecviandtheGeneralTheory,trans.RobertW .Lawson ,(New York:BonaraaB o o k s ,1961),NigelCalder,Einstein'sUniverse,(New York:enguin Books ,1979). 22


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organized b y society,sadconce ived bya cniltureisa f H X x t u r tofmany intcnwtmgsystems.44

A s I previously stated,ideologicalforceor values constituteth e"gravhyofhumansociety.deologyprojectsrapidlybutweakly over long distances,however,in concentrated massesi: dominatesall other forces .n relativistic terms,values m ayactually b e the"restenargy" thatdistortsthespace time^ntinuumofhumanwill ,becoming th ;fabricon which theotherforcesofsociety play.t createsbiasesand predispositions which influence th econnectivity within systemsdeterminingtheirsusceptibilityto chaos.T hemoresolidary thesystem,with many unibonded groups,th emoreislandsofstabilityit wil lexhib itTheseareasar etriggeredintolocked states thatoecomeisofc te d from &back.Thi sprovidestemporarystability thatcan only b e disruptedbyquantum : : . /*& ofenergy.

T hendarner/: Iorganizationofeach societydeterminesthestrength ofth emilitary,polcal /dipl :natic,economic ,an d culturalforcesatit sdisposal.This "strength" is3nlym eaningfulwhencompared to anothersociety.However ,aruleofthumb fo r md em nat;nstateswould categorize theirstrengthsin decreasing order as :cultural,economic,pcl'tical,diplomatic ,an d military.his m ayseem surprisingand therem ay besomeexcoptions,butit explainsthehistoricdifficult:'oftargetingmilitaryforceagainstdeeplyreed political,economic ,an d culturalsystems B y contrast,theprojectablerangean d e t ime responseisinversely proportionaltothestrength.Mili taryforceprojectsfast an dverlongdistances.Economicforceprojectsslower,over shorterdistances,an d require:alongerperiod toproduceeffects.

44A good arguientcould.3 made thaimilitaryforceis just th eexternalmanifea t i o n ofa morecomprehensive'securityfb;je."T he internalmanifestationofthis force provie internalsecurityan d policefunctionswithirsociety.23


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LinkagesofPowerWe havediscussed th efirsttw odimensionsofpower,sourcesandmaniftatioDs,

solet'smoveon to thethirddimensionwe calllinkage.Thelinkagesofpowerar e th ehuman,cultural, an d materialnetworksan d capabilitiesthatassistin tiansfiiiming4sourcesofpowerintoforces,andthatprovideconnectivitywithin an d between th eelementsofpower.T heprimarylinkagesconsistof :ommunications,logistics,transportation,leadership,science, technology, education,an dtraining.Linkagesdetermine ho wefficiently powerisorganized,an dultimatelyhoweffectively it isappliedConnectivityf acilitatesor hindersth e transmissionofdata an dfeedbackwithinth evarioussystems.This,alongwith bias,helpsdeterminesystemdynamicsan ditssusceptibilityorresistanceto chaos.

The linkagesofpowerareoftenmistaken forCOGswhenin actualitytheypossess* i o forcein a:?dofthemselves.45owever,a linkage ofpowerca n possesseitherstrengthsor* , durabilitieswhichca n beexploitedtcdisruptaCOG system.Somelinkagesma yhaveto beavoided,dependingonth eparticularsociety.Forexample,transportation systemsare oftenidentifiedas"vulnerableCOGs,w despitesometransportationsystemsbeingso redundanttheyarealmostimpervious to targeting.T henatureofth elinkagesofpowerultimatelyderivefroma culture'sapproachto itsenvironment(naturalistic,supernatural,esthetic,ormystic).Thisdeterminesa society'stechnologyc:itsmethodofalteringtheenvironmentto suititsculture.Naturalistic orscientific approachesseekanduse technologyat alllevels ofsociety.Thustheyar emorecapable ofcreatinglinkages thatorganize,orchestrate,an dtransformsources ofpowerintoforce.46 4 5rpower th :oristsin particularhaveconsidered transportationan d communications as"vitalcerrc."ns o *'c casesthe-/were indeed vital"linkages,"andthusth eappropriate target 46ctkin,SodtfAnthropology,pp .156-181.lotfan goes on to catagorizesupernaturalism asth su se ofsyibolsand be" c f e to transform th eenvironment(p .182).n estheticapproachessentially definesth ec r .ronmenta ? somethingthatis pleasingvrd.ofvaluein an dof i tself thereforeonly minorattemptsar er'c tochangeit(p.270).mysticalapproachachievesadjustment toth eenvironmentby changingan 24


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The linkagesofpowercreate theenergy whichdrivesopendynamicsocialsystems.Thisenergyca n becreated b ylessefficient"chemical*means.n naturechemicalreactionsreleaseenergy byexchanging electrons betweenatoms.nsociety,tins isanalogousto th etrack,exchange,and service industries.However ,naturealso createsenergy by "nuclear"methodsinvolving f ission and fus ion.T heproduction ofindustrialgoodsfromraw source materialsis thesocialequivalentChemical" linkages and "nuclear"linkagesrepresentdistinctlydifferent targetingchoices bothin termsofth eenergy required to effect th elinkage,an d th eexpectedresults.Similar distinctions existastowhich"level"of l inkageis being attacked within thestructure.trategic and tacticall inkagesproducedifferent dynamics,and thusrequiredifferenttargetingstrategies.47A Recap

It m aybehelpfulto graphicallydepictth eelements ofpower an d thecorrespondingsocialstructurethatIhave justpresented.

S O U R C E L I N K A G E F O R C E ArmedForces C o m m a n d & Contro l

Train ing& Logist ics Mil i tary

GovernmentBureaucracy Leadersh ip& Communica t i on Political*Diplomat icIndustry & Natura lResource s Transportat ion& Techno logy Economic

Society& Cul ture Fam i ly , E ducat ion& Socialization Socia l -Cul tural

ValueSystem Religion & Phi losophy Indoctrination Ideolog ical

individuafs internalexperience or perceptionrather thanproducing outwardchangeto th e environment (p.309).helastthrcsapproacheshavea commondemonintorhthaithey pro\ fid eonlya partialadjustment to th eenvironment. 47Mancur OlsonJ r .T he EconomicsofTargetSelectionfo r th eCombinedBomber Offensive,"Jc^rmdofth eRoyalUnited S&Ac eInstitution,V olC V H ,No628,Nov1962,pp.308-314.25


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Let'sbrieflyaccessthisconstructof society.First,individualhuman willpermeates everything,introduceschance,and establishesthearenafo r aU socialacth^Second,theinteractionsofindividuals an d communi tygive risetovalue systems,culture,an d higher levelsoforganizationalactivity.Third,thishuman activity,or elements ofpower,consist ofsources,linkages,an d forces.Higher levelsofactivityar e more"particle 1 * in natureand theirsmall mass-energycan b erapidlydirectedagainstspecific points.T heunderlyinglevelsofsocialorganizationresemble "fields."Theseforces surround their sourcewith energy thatin effectmakesit moredifficult to distinguish force from source.T hearena joins in the veryaction taking placewithin itself." 48Fourth,themorecomplexareasof socialactivityself-organizefrom s implestructures.heseactivitiesareclosely interwoven with each otherand clearlyfunctionasopen nonlinear systems.Fifth,deep structuralpatternsin human society clearlyexhibitcharacteristicsofstrangeattractorsand aresubjecttothe processesgoverningchaostheory.Ce n t e r ofGrav i tyImplicat ions

Theseareasofactivity,the elements ofpower,are truecenters ofgravitywithinhumansociety.They existat alllevels oforganization,an dthey representcentersofpowerand strength.They changedynamical lywithinand betweensocieties,andthey providefreedom ofactionto exercisepower.They involvecomplexity ,cohesion,energy and mass,and it requiresdeepanalysisto determinewhere they la y and toprioritizethem.Lastly,they areintimatelytied tohumanwil land value systems,an d thusby default,to politicalobjectives.

Ofth ethreedimensionsofpower(source,force,an d linkages),only force&projectable-butin varying degrees.However ,forceca n beapplied against anyofth eotherdimensionsofpower.Generally,applying forceagainst a sourceis difficult,an d can becounterproductivebecauseitalwaysthreatensvitalnationalinterests.tca ncreatea * * Penrose,T heEmperor'sNew Mind,p.217. 26


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"dangerousparadox,"whereby astrategyforunlimited war,ifsystematicallypursuedin a war oflimited aims,can lead to escalation an d transfonningthewarmtosomeminginconsistentwith the politicalobjectives.49Thisis alsooften associated with attritiontypewarfare.Forceagainstforceinvolvesclashesbetweenclassiccentosofgravity,and canequate to battlesofannihilation.Lastly,employingforceagainst powerlinkagesis an" i n d i r e c t " approach.

49Hoapfli ,"Cartyon Clsuscwitz''p.22.ls ose eClauscwitz* OrW a r ,p.4S6.27


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CHAFFER I VCE N T E R S O F GRAVITY AN D CHAOS DY NAM ICS

Linkages ,Connect iv i ty ,and BiasT hel inkagesofpowerfulfillkeydynamic functions within C O G analysisand

chaos theory.They helpdetermineth eopennessand/orclosureofasystem in termsofhow energyis produced,used,and expendedThey help determineth econnectivity ofasystem both internallyand betweenth eotherelementsofpower.A highly connected system rapidlyspreadsinformation,energy,and perturbationsthroughouta system.L ow connectivity can hinderth espread ofdisturbance,butit ca n alsoresultin concentrated localeffects.Linkages fundamentally definethefeedbackwithin asystem.Valuebiases and humanfreewil lar ecruciaJtodeterminingth eprobablecoursesofactionan d ^ effectiveimplementation ofopuonsthatarisefrom feedb ack.

Whether w eassume thrt"rationalactors," "bureaucraticorganizations," or"politicalprocess" msicekeyccialdecis ionsbased on information feedback,itisimportanttourrstand thatwhatis "rational" wil lberelativeto theculturalvalue biasesofthatsociety.50atentbiasca nbeindicated by:heculturesapproach to it senvironment(naturalistic,supernatural,esthetic,or mystic);tshistoricalvaluesystem and ideology; zfundamentaltypeofsocialorganization(solidary,contractual, orantagonistic);irdtheprevalenceofunibonded an d multibonded groups.Vulnerablel inkages reprcs* avenues whebysocialsystemscanb edriven to critical points toprecipitatestocS t i cchaos.Cheotherhand,stronglinkages canreduce themagnitudeand durationofynamicdisruptions.^A gr o undbr ea k i workonth enaturean dimportance ofrelativeculturalbiasis:en Booth ,StrategyandEthnocentnsz"New York:Ho l mesan d M eier,1979)28


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Uncer ta in ly Principle An interestingaspectofeffortsto investigate or"measure"apotentialsystems

structureisth epossibilityofproducinganeffect comparableto th e HeisenbergUncertainty Principleofquantumphysics.T heHeisenberg uncertaintyprincipleresultswhen attemptsaremadetomeasureeitherth eposition or momentum ofa subatomicparticle.ttellsusthat th emoreaccuratelyaposition is measured,th elessaccurately w e ca ndeterminethemomentum or vice versa.Th i soccurs becauseth eenergyrequired to effect or record the measurementexceedsth eenergy oftheforceorparticlebeingmeasured.51

A similarcircumstanceoccurswhenever a strongexternalforceinteracts withanothersystem.The mereact ofmeasuring,investigating,orprojecting powercan skew the position oroutcomeofa system.T heprobabilityofinterferenceincreaseswhen th eforceis equaltoorexceedsth estrengthoftheforcesin th eothersystemThisisparticularly truewhena "superpower" becomesinvolved.F or example,thes impleinterestoftheUnited StetesCongresstoinvestigate theBosnian Crises in 1992caused thepositionsofthevariousethnicgroupstoaltertheirdiplomaticbargaining positions.52T heprobability of interferencedecreaseswhen th eforcerelationshipis smal ler-butit is alwayspossible.hisplainlyindicatesthedynamics of forcesin complexsystems.tshowsthatth eapplication ofanyform ofeconomic ,social,diplomatic,orideologicalinvolvementmust beapproached asaconstant ongoing processin which theprocessitselfcan impactth eexpectedresults

51Werner Heisenberg, PhysicsandPhihsophy,(New Yofk:HarperTorchbocks,1 9 6 2 ) ,nphysicaltennait alsocausesth ew s v cfunctionto resolve itself frommanypotentialpossibilitiesinto o nestate.52S eetestimony ofGeneralLewisMacKenzie,CommanderofUnited Nations PeacekeepingForces inSarajevo.UnitedStatesCongress,Senate,CommitteeonArv^Service^SitatkmmBosnia andAppropriateU.S.andW esternResponses,Hearing before theCommittee on ArmedServices,Senate,102ndCongress,2 nd sess.,?"August1 9 9 2 ,pp.50-61. 29


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Entropy and th eSecond LawofThermodynamics Someamong you wil ltry to equateth eeffectsofchaosto entropyassociated with

th esecond la w ofthermodynamics.Thisisparticularlytempting since someauthors directly attributeattackson centersofgravity toprecipitatingentropywithinsocial,economic,political,and militarysystemsd ueto thesecond la w ofthermodynamics.53However ,therearesomesignificantdifferences that mus t b eclarified.T hesecond la w ofthermodynamicsstatesthat"heathaclosed system can never travelfrom a lo w temperatureregion to oneofhighertemperaturein a self-sustainingprocess.* 154T hedirectimplication ofthesecond la w is thatentropy,or disorder,in a closed system alwaysincreases.Loventropy represent?th ecapacitytochangeor organize,an d th isconceptunderth esecond la w hasoften been misapplied toall measureofphenomenon including socialsystems.55

According toth esecond law,th emarch toentropyis inescapablewithinclosedsystems.A: th emacrolevel,th eclosed system isth euniverseitself.However atsmallerscales,othersystems can self-organizefo r"temporal}" periods aslongasthey draw upon energyfrontheirenvironmentand follow th efirstla w ofthermodynamics (i .e.th eenergy goingin mrs t v~ ualtheenergygoing out,which is alsoNewtorf? lawoftheconservationofenergy).neffect thesemicrosystemsar emaintaining or decreasingentropyfo rthemselvesbyincreasing entropywithin th emacrosystem.Dynamicnonlinear open systemscan organize to higherand higherlevelsask\igasthey maintainthisenergy balance ancth eoverallmacrosystem supportsth edecreased entropywithin themicro system.naddition,non-dynamicsystemsca nalsor e Tiainfunctioning in equil ibriumas53See Warden,"Strategic Warferc,"manuscript,1993.54JohnW .Wright x i .T heUniversal Almanac,1993,(New Y:rV:niversalPre,1992Xp.545.55Pcnrose,T heErgvorir N ew Mind,pp .302-347.eealsoOrrosyan d Kghfield,T heArrowcfTime,pp.147-1S1,:$m1&% ABriefHistory ofTtme,pp.108-112,:: simportanttoclarifythatiflexcess energy(o rloventropy),includingheat,inth e universeis ultima:iythe resultofgravity.ravityorganizesmassan dcre^th*nuclear firesthatprovide th e thermodynarc^ energy ofth e unwerte.T heeventualstate


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Thisscaling effect manifestsitselftoproduceoutwr" y recognizableandpersistentpatternswithin humansociety.B y inference,sc>cjttMshouldexistwMiineach oftheelements ofpower that demonstrate self-similar ~ th e patternasa whole.They should exhibitsolidary,contractual,and antagonist ic; with umbonded and muhibondedcharacteristics.W eshould also see evidence c omicfunctionssuch as security,political,economic,cultural,an dideologicalactiv -eated at theselesser scales.Analysisoftheseshould assistin identifyingoperat" :nd tacticalcenters ofgravity.L etusexploreth emilitary element ofpoweras an erple.

At thevaluesystem level,military organizationsnormyreflect d ie conservative valuesofsocieties.ust asoften,theydisplay aninternalcoc :fmilitary ethicsand ca n possesstheirow n just icesystem.E a : hservicean dsmaller i sh ofservicewillcommonly internalize theirow n sens:ofvaluesand traditkrightdown to theunitlevel.Thesecollectivevaluesar einfilledintoth epsycholc ofnew members to develop a wil ltocohesionan d wil lto esprit


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Soireesofpower within thesescaled stnictuiâretbeaniicdfimîhemsdvcsaswellasthegisticalsupplies.T hel inkagesofpoweraretransportation,C 3I,and othercombatse oesupporthemanifestation ofpower,or force,is theconsumption oflogisticstroducemilitarypoweritself.Political"forcewithinthemilitaiy,actsto redistribr vealth and power,an d thisis evidenced inth emilitaiy rankand command structures.

Secstructureswithin th emilitary elementofpowerfunctionwith nonlineardynamics j tlikcth elargermilitary organizationsofwhichtheyar eapartHere inlay the operationalan d tacticalcentersofgravity.W h e nanalyzed,theirlinkagemechanisms willreveal D th strengthsan d vulnerabilities.ubstructureswil ldemonstratebias,in termsofprdisposed values ,traditions,"commander'sintent," orstandard operatingprocedures.onnectivityis just asimportantin thefeedbackprocessatth emicroscaleasatth ecur-cale.Withinmilitaryorganizations,in particular,decis ionprocesseshavebeen closestudied.T heobservation,orientation,decis ion,action( O O D A )loop exists for allievcofcombat from th eindividualup to strategiccommard and control.60Operationcnd tacticalmilitaryorganizations canexhibitself-organizingregularities,and they canbriven tocrisespointsand stochasticchaos.Crisespo :it sca nstillbe precipitateyclosing th esystem down,byoverbading oneofth edimensionaldynamics ,by apply) :broad forceagainstth eentiresystem,orbyeliminatingfeedback processes

Ju:sscalingstructures ar eevidentwithin th emilitaryelementofpower,it is apparentcy existaswel lwithin thepolitical,economic ,social,and ideologicalelements ofpower.heframeworkcould beeasilyfilled in toil luminatethe basicstructures.Spaceforem e,however,topostponethintaskand proceedwith an analysis ofhigher levels};^dynamics .60JohnR.3i"ADiscouiônWinnLândlxwiog,0acoi lecônofunpubl i sbcdbr ief ingladcai tys , Ai r Univ?rs>ibrary,Document NoM U 43947,August1987.uch ofBoycTs work w asdevelopedin thcnwH-r H is essay on Deatrurtcnm d Creation"isparticularîraightfiii.tanticipated manyofth etenetsofr Jtheory,an di* consistentv . - * 't 33


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Interdependence and Sel f-Compensat ionT heelementsofpowerdo notexistinrigidstructures orfixed relationships.A n

importantfeaturethatemergesfrom chaos theoryis th einterdependenceand self-compensatingcharacteristics ofsystems.T heinterdependenceexis3vertically throughscalingstructuresand horizontallyacrossthe elementsofpower.elfcompensation existsbecause ofthedynamicself-referential natureofstrangeattractorsthatusefeedback loopsto keepsystemsfunctioning.61haveconstantlystressed th edynamic,evolving natureofpatternswithin th eelementsofpower.Arising fromvaluesystems and culture,these patterns ar euniqueto each individualsociety.Notonlyar ethe elementsofpower workingwithan d reactingto eachother,but th eentiresocialsystem adjusts when subjected to externalforces.

Inwartimesituations,th eelementsofpowerfunctiondifferentlythanin peacet ime.Iftargeted,an elementofpoweradjustsfrom within tocompensate,and drawsuponresourcesfrom th eotherelementsofpower through interconnected l inkagemechanisms.Thisisveryevidentwithin militarysystems.F orexample,th emilitarycan draw upon wartimereserves,rolesan dmissionsC ? b eadjusted, j ttaskforces can b e created,weightofeffortca nbereapportioned,ancsiftscan b ereass ignednad dition,theother facetsofsociety (elementscfpower)can bemobil ized to support th emilitaryeffort becausetheyar einterconnected.nterconnecteddynamicscancontinue untilth eentiresocietyis reorientedto awartimefooting in situationsof totalwar.62All thiswil loccurin adynamicmanner thatresponds totheactic: oftheopponent-who is experiencing th esameprocess.tisalsot imedepen:tor t imesensitive.Self-compensation an dintercennectedness ar ealsoevident within th eeconomic elementofpower.hisareahasbeen particularlystudied because oftraditionalairpower 61Barlow inhi sthesis,"StrategicParalysis,"(pp.89-95)recognized thesehistoricalcharacteristics,but w as 1 nableto theoretically explainthem.eapproachedinterdependence an d self-compensationas "assumptions." 62F orexample se c RaymondAron,T heCcr yofTotal War ,(Boston:Beacon Press ,1955).34


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targeting methodsagainsteconomies.6 3Theabilityofrobustindustrialeconomicsystemstointerconnectwithpoliticalan dmilitaryrequirements,an dto a^usttoiswelldocumented.64Theprimarymeansofself-compensationare:use ofeconomicslack,substitution,reallocation,reengineering, ieconstitution,an dincreased productivity.Otherwork aronndsincludestockpiling,rationing, importing,smuggling,disposing,andhardeningassetsaswellas activelydefendingthem.

Whileitis theoretically possibletodestroyan entireelementofpower(source,linkage,an dforce)through rapidparallelorsimultaneous campaigns,itis unlikelythiscouldoccurexceptin scenarios ofmassiveforcedisparities.Themostlikelycircumstancewherethiscouldhappenwouldbein acondition oftrialwar.Otherpotentialsituationswouldbe to targetaspecificdimensionofonecmoreelementsofpower-forexampleall politicaland/orallmilitary linkagesofpo v -inan attempt todrive aspecificelementofpower to dysfunction.Whileitis possib3 to accomplishthisobjective,itis importantto realizethatitis extremelydifficultTb-;morefundamentalth eelementofpowerthatisselected fortargeting,th emoredifficv it becomesto effectcorechanges.Forexample,whilemilitaryan dpoliticalresultsarc :hievable,economicpowerca n beveryresiliert, an d deepculturalan dideologicalpowersare almostimmuneto military force,shortof'.otalprolonged occupation.

Thelevelofeffortorenergyexpended againstan adversary?m only beachievedbyoffsetting amountsofenergyfrom yourownsystem.Evenif itis"only"afe wstealthplatformswithprecisionweapons,th emilitary,political,an deconomicsunkcostsin these63T he UnitedStateStrategicBombingSurveys(US S BS ) prrwide a wealthofdsL.onth e European an d PacifictheatersduringWWII .nexcellentoverviewofWW33airpower effectsis found in R.IOvery,7 *AirW ar1939-1945,(New York:tein an d Day,1981).64CarlKaysen,"N ot eonSome Hfctorie PrinciplesofTargetSdccon, ' 'R A N D ,7 .M-189,15 Jury1949,MancurOlson J r ,T heEconomies ofWartimeShortage,reprint(AnnArborUrrsrsity Microfi lmsInternational,1991).lanS.MHward,War,EconomyandSociety 1939-1945,(Berkeley:niversity ofCalifornia Press ,1979),an dAlfred C .Mierzejc-ski ,T heCollapse ofth eGermanW ar Economy,1944-1945,AlliedAirPower a nd th eGerman Nation:?lRailway,(Chapel H S U :n fe*n v ofNorthCarolina Press,19S8). 3 5


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Systemswil lb efound to bequitef c i g j b .Furthermore,because th eelementsofpower ar einterconnected w emust realizedimpacts them all to someex tentDependingon th esociety,onemust defineobjectivesand attempttodecide whetheryou want to confinedisruptionsolely to one e lement ofpo w e r ( CO G ) ,to inducechaosthroughout severalC O G s , or thewholesociety.Alikelyresult is to precipitatelocalized,temporaryperiodsofstochasticchaosfol lowed b yselforganizationat alesser energylevel(i.e. ,bifurcation).

Lastly,thestrength,interconnectedness, and natureofself-compensat ionwithin th eelements ofpowerpartly determinethe coursesofactionavailabletoagiven socialgroup.ocietieswil lemploycertainelementsofpower,orcombinationsthereof, based on their perceived e stages vis-a-visa potentialadversary.During th ecourseofa dynamicconflict,sc:ieswillconstantlyappraise,innovate,and adopt new combinationsofp c ~ o achievedifferentresults.Thisi s w hysomesocieties alwaysuse ideologicalweapon.oneuseculturalan d economicelementsofpower,and othershabituallyadopt militaryan d political/diplomaticoptions.U nd e rconditions oftotalwar,all mus tbe focused to g other.However ,groupscan resortto lo w intensity confl ictif they areat asignificantdisadvantage.Thi sis often thestrategyofchoice fo rsociet iesincapableoforganizing cremployingsophisticated militaryforces.tcan alsob eadopted if societies havesuffer-d stochasticdestruction ofmilitaryand economic power,but haveselforganized toward iow intensify war becausetheirideologicalan d culturalelementsofpowerremain intact

T hepermutationsofthislineofdiscussionar eendless ,an d Ihaveso farorJy explored th egeneralorganizationofmodern industrializednationstates.U s in g th esamebasicapproachofse aohingfo runderlying structuresan d basicvalues,onewould haveto develop potentiallydiTerentconstructsfo rotherformsofsociety.F orexample,cu e should expect tosee distinctlydifferentsocialstructuresfo r theological,ideological ,and

36


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ethnicorientedstates.ikewise ,sub-stateactors,multi-nationaloi^anizationsandalliancesystemswould an havedifferentforms,functions,and C O G s becausethwunderlyingvaluesystemsaiedissimilar.Essentially eachsocialentityis unique,thereforeC O G analysisand strategydevelopmentbegins byfollowing Su nTzu'simperativeto know th e enemy.65

6 5 Su nTza ,TheAr.ofWer ,o& & trans.JamesClavell,( N e w York:Delacorte Press,1983Xp.I? .37


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C H A P T E R V

C O N C L U S I O N I haveattempted toprovidean overarching intellectualam i philosophicalba^

analyzingthecenterofgravityconceptntracingthepreviously used historicalapproachesto center ofgravity theory, I haveMghlighted somestrengtbut moreoften I haveshown their weaknesses .Thesetheoreticalshortcomingsultimately derived f i r c a n th eunconnected,inidirectional assumptionsemployedn turnthesewere usually based upon faulty Newtoniancauseand effectlogic.ncombination,thesetw oproblemshavemadepreviouscenter ofgravity theories,and their application,verytenuousat best

Incontrast,I endeavored tou sea multidisciplined approachin thisarena.attemptedtoincorporatescientific,socialsdence ,and historicalmethodologies*began

th the obviousfeet thatwarfareitself,an d theentirenotionofcentersofgravityar ebased uponunderlying socialprocesses.Ifthesocialan d culturalbasisofcenters ofgravitycould notb eexplained,thenonecould nothopeto develop anadequatetheory.Sucha theoiy would remain suspended from realityand offernoconfidencein usefulapplication.

Indevelopingasocialundeipinning,I primarilyemployed the new field ofchaostheoiyto show th esystem dynamicsinvolvedOnly thisapproachs eemsto demonstrate th einterconnected an d complexrelationshipsassociated with socialstructures.thaiproposed anintegrated technique,examining thecomplexit iesofsociety and layingth ebasisforsystematicallyidentifying and disrupting centosofgravity.m portantly,it

38


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showsth enecessityofunderstanding an dsynthesiziiigieelementsofpowifcho to achievesuccess.

M yconstructis broadenoughto applyto alltypes ofsocieties,inchidingalliancesan dno nstateactors.ti ssufficientlyrelevantan dflexibleto encompassth eentirespectrumofconflict-not justconventional military operations.Thisis a tremendousadvantageover traditionalcenterofgravitymethodologies,Thenexttaskto builduponthisinitialfoundation,mdto exploremorefullyth estrategyapplications offtistheory.

3 9


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B I B L I O G R A P H Y Book

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Center of Gravity Analysis & Chaos Theory

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