CBSA’s Radiation Detection Program (RADNET)

Khalil BoudjemlineCBSA Science and Engineering Directorate

Magic Maggiore: Technical Reach-Back Workshop

Joint Research Centre, Ispra, Italy

March 28, 2017

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Overview• Building a Radiation Detection Architecture

- Challenge and Approach- Equipment- Concept of Operations

• Scientific Reach-back- Cases, CBSA Team

• Alarm Statistics and Notable Cases

• Sustaining a Radiation Detection Architecture- Monitoring, maintenance, replacement, R&D

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Radiation Detection Challenge

• Objective- Scan 100% of imported commercial marine containers forradiological threats

• Operational Requirements- Large number of containers ~3 M Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU)annually

- Geographically distributed marine ports-of-entry- Large variation in imported goods - Environmental extremes- Facilitate the free flow of legitimate goods

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Canadian Approach - RADNET

• Radiation Detection Network (RADNET)• Strategic placement of Radiation Portal

Monitors (RPMs)• Networked equipment• Remote alarm annunciation • Live monitoring • Triaged response• Established radiation profiles of

common commodities

Radiation Portal Monitor

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Situational Awareness - Instrumentation Gateway (IGW)

• IGW provides real-time status of all RPMs nationwide

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Radiation Detection Equipment

Radiation Portal Monitors (RSI & SAIC)

Large-Scale Imaging Systems (Smiths HCV-M)

Car-borne Detectors (RSI)

Handheld Detectors (Smiths RadSeeker)

Personal Radiation Detectors (ThermoScientific RadEye)

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0:00:00 Start Unload0:00:30 Scan/Alarm0:10:00 Assess

0:15:00 Reach-back

1:00:00 Car-borne

12:00:00 X-ray Imaging

RADNET: Concept of Operations

Radiation Portal Monitor in a Marine Terminal

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CBSA Scientific Reach-back

• Gamma alarms- Commodity not listed

- Dose rate exceeds the limit set by the Science and EngineeringDirectorate (SED)

- Identified isotope(s) not associated with the commodity

- Man-made isotopes

- Uranium cylinders

- Radioactive materials

- Mixed commodities

- Other: container number not visible, no image, cab alarms…

• Neutron alarms

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CBSA Scientific Reach-back Team

• Provided by the CBSA Science and Engineering Directorate (SED)

• Scientific team- Research scientists

- Research engineers

- Technologists

• Trained Radiation Safety Officers (RSOs)• Advanced training in gamma spectroscopy • Expertise in non-intrusive inspection and radiation measurement• 24/7 availability

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Alarm Statistics• ~ 2.5 million scans• Over 25,000 alarms annually• Database of commodities versus measured dose• ~ 1-1.5% of containers alarm from naturally occurring radioactive

material (NORM)- Ceramics, stoneware, abrasives, chemicals, welding rods

• ~ 0.1% of all scans require scientific reach-back (SED)• ~ 0.015% of all scans require Car-borne exam (Local Ops + SED)• Better understanding of radiation signatures with new RSI RPMs

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• Canada Border Services Agency (SED + National Targeting Centre)- 24/7 RSO, Targeting and Risk Assessment, Preliminary

• Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission- 24/7 RSO, Licensing and transport, Disposal Sub-Contractors

• Health Canada Radiation Protection Bureau- Regulator of consumer goods, holders of Federal Nuclear

Emergency Plan (FNEP), health sciences reach-back

• Royal Canadian Mounted Police/Department of National Defence - Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU) for all CBRNE

terrorism related

• Canada Food Inspection Agency- Administration and enforcement of agricultural and food acts

Organisations Involved in Response

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• Following the detection of RMORC- CBSA provides comprehensive information package to the

CNSC (manifest, dose and spectral information, x-ray images)

- CBSA works with the national regulator (CNSC) to determine interim safety precautions (e.g., isolation, safety zone)

- CBSA holds container under customs control pending admissibility decision

• Importer generally has two options for shipments deemed to be non-compliant:

- Return material to point of origin (with placards if necessary)

- Hire a CNSC licensee to dispose of contaminated material

Radioactive Material Out of Regulatory Control (RMORC)

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• New RSI RPMs have higher sensitivity to low level contamination

• Containers from Europe (food products and consumer goods)• Cs-137 isotope identified (Chernobyl + weapons testing)• Workshop organised to standardize response

- Canada Nuclear Safety Commission

- Health Canada

- Canada Food Inspection Agency

Low-Level Contamination

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Notable Radioactive Contamination CasesContainer/Good /Food Origin Isotopes Admissible

to CanadaContaminated container

Containers(rusted spots)

Fukushima Cs-134Cs-137

Yes

Surfacecontamination of goods

Used vehicle parts Fukushima Cs-134Cs-137

Most (low level) shipments

Contaminated goods

Steel / Melted source during recycling process

Asia Co-60 No

Manufactured goods containing NORM

Mattresses / Pillows Asia Th-232 No

Selectiveabsorbers of uranium

Mono Ammonium Phosphate / Tri-sodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate

Asia U-235 Yes

Foodcontamination

Blueberries / Strawberries

Europe(Chernobyl)

Cs-137 Yes

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• Of the 87 containers that have been referred to other government departments- 38 were deemed inadmissible to Canada and returned to the country of origin,

- 46 were allowed entry because the detected levels were below the allowable threshold,

- 2 importers decided to have the contents of their container sorted and return the contaminated goods to the country of origin, and

- 1 container had its goods disposed of in Canada

Case Study Summary

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• Calibrated and tested twice yearly- Ensure continuing adherence to N42.35 standard- Newer model calibrated on background

• PVT panels (gamma-ray detection) replaced on average every 5 years due to decay

• Complete system currently being upgraded• Ongoing R&D• Monte-Carlo Simulations

Sustaining a Radiation Detection Architecture

New Old

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Radiation Portal Monitor Replacement• Currently in the process of updating SAIC RPMs to RSI units

- 9 of 11 terminals completed• Same detectors:

- Large-volume PVTs for gamma-ray detection- He-3 for neutron detection

• Higher light collection for RSI systems (better energy resolution)• Key differences between both systems:

Old System (SAIC) New System (RSI)PVT energycalibration

On-site using test source

Automatic with natural background

PVT spectralanalysis

Energy windowing Isotope identification

Data reanalysis No Yes

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Summary

• Radiation Detection Network (RADNET)- Operations / Technology / Expertise

• Screening Marine Cargo- Mass screening for everything

- Secondary screening based on risk assessment

• Leverage small staff to support extensive program• Leverage commodity database to improve alarm adjudication • Real-time system monitoring for situational awareness

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Questions and Discussion