C A U S E S A N D C A U S A L E X P L A N A T I O N S : D A V I D S O N

A N D H I S C R I T I C S

NEIL CAMPBELL

Davidson and his Critics Donald Davidson's anomalous monism has long been accused of entailing type-epiphenomenalism. His critics have objected that because only the physical properties of events can figure in strict l aws- due to the anomaly of the mental - events have the causal powers they do solely because of their physical properties. The implication of this observation is that the mental properties of any event do not contribute to what the event causes. Since this runs contrary to the common sense view that we perform the

actions we do because we have the mental properties (beliefs, desires, and reasons, etc.) we do, the objection is a serious one, especially in light of Davidson's endorsement of the common sense view.l However, this form of the objection is dependent on the acceptance of a model of

causation that has come to be called "qua-causation," or "quausation, ''2

a model Davidson does not endorse. In his recent reply to his critics? Davidson insists that in advocating quausation his critics have confused causation with causal explanation. Jaegwon Kim 4 has seemed singularly

unimpressed with this response, which might suggest that Davidson has not succeeded in rendering the nature of the problem entirely clear. My

aim in this paper is to clarify and enhance Davidson's response to his critics. I think such a response is (on certain reasonable assumptions) decisive, but, as I will show, it comes with a price Davidson has not yet recognized.

Among the first to accuse anomalous monism of epiphenomenalism was Ted Honderich. In a series of articles 5 he claims that any account of causation requires the assumption that events cause what they do in virtue

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of certain causally relevant properties. For instance, the fact that pears

are green and French does not contribute to their having a certain effect

on a scale, and the fact that someone's slippers are mauve makes no

causal contribution to their keeping his feet warm. In either case, it is

due to other properties of the objects and events in question that they

produce the mentioned effects and enter into the relevant nomological

relationships. Similarly, if mental events are physical events, it is only

as physical events that they cause anything, for it is in virtue of their

physical properties that events can instantiate strict causal laws.

Anomalous monism, then, entails type-epiphenomenalism.

Much of Davidson's response to this kind of criticism has been to

point out that causation is an extensional relation, in which case the way

we describe an event makes no difference to what it causes.

If causality is a relation between events, it holds between

them no matter how they are described. So there can be

descriptions of two events (physical descriptions) which

allow us to deduce from a law that if the first event occurred

the second would occur, and other descriptions (mental

descriptions) of the same events which invite no such

inference. We can say, if we please (though I do not think

this is a happy way of putting the point), that events

instantiate a law only as described in one way rather than

another, but we cannot say that an event caused another

only as described. Redescribing an event cannot change

what it causes, or change the event's causal efficacy. 6

Jaegwon Kim has responded to Davidson's defence of anomalous

monism by saying that even though causation might be an extensional relation, we still need room for the idea that what it is about an event that

enables it to cause what it does are its various properties:

The issue has always been the causal efficacy o f properties

o f even t s - no matter how they, the events or the properties,

are described. What the critics have argued is perfectly

consistent with causation itself being a two-termed

extensional relation over concrete events; their point is that

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such a relation isn't enough: we also need a way of talking

about the causal role of properties, the role of properties of

events in generating, or grounding, these two-termed causal

relations between concrete events]

Obviously, Kim and Honderich accept similar models of causation,

and these models play a crucial role in their objections to anomalous

monism. Only if one thought that an event derives its causal efficacy

from its various properties can one make sense of the idea that some

properties contribute to what an event causes while others do not. This,

of course, is needed in order for the charge of epiphenomenalism to

w o r k :

Davidson finds remarks like Kim's curious. In his view, critics like

Kim and Honderich have confused causation with causal explanation. 9

Unfortunately, Davidson is not entirely clear about the nature of this

confusion. I suggest we understand it as follows. Causal explanations

require that events be picked out under a description, and so invoke the

notion of event types or properties. Causation itself does not. Davidson

is urging us to distinguish between the causal relation itself as an

unanalysed (and, given his nominalism, unanalyzable) metaphysical

relation, R, and the explanatory relation, E, which is an epistemic

relationship holding between the ways events are described. To be sure,

underlying any correct explanation there must be an appropriate

corresponding metaphysical relationship between the identified events,

but this relationship should not be confused with the explanatory relation.

It would be helpful if we could look in more detail at the nature of

the above explanatory relation. In a recent article on Kim's principle of

explanatory exclusion, Ausonio Marras ~~ elaborates on the nature of this relation as follows:

... [T]he explanatory relation, properly speaking, holds

between events as of a type, or insofar as they exemplify

this or that property. What displays the canonical form of a

singular explanation statement is not 'c explains e ' , but 'c ' s

being F (or qua F) explains e's being G' , where F and G

type identify the cause and the effect respectively. The

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explana t ion re la t ion thus holds be tween facts (or propositions), and facts implicate properties or event types .... "

This seems quite plausible. When we offer explanations we think of the related events as falling under certain kinds. For instance, when I

explain my getting up by appealing to my desire to soothe a cramp, I am characterizing the event being explained as a sort of intentional action.

Treating the explanatory relation as one that holds between events as of a type, or under a description, accounts for the well-known "opacity" of explanations. Alternative descriptions of an event (or events) lead to different explanatory relations because different properties or propositions

are invoked and give rise to different epistemic relations. The above canonical form of the explanatory relation corresponds

exactly with the analysis that Honderich and Kim offer of causation. It

seems, assuming the above remarks are correct, that they are guilty of confusing causal explanations with causation itself, as Davidson suggests. After all, Kim and Honderich's reason for insisting on invoking properties

is to serve an explanatory function: to help us understand why a certain kind of event occurred.

I think this is an effective way for Davidson to respond to his critics.

Explanations, as he says, are always explanations of events under a

description. The way events are described (or the properties they are said to token) are the determining factor in how the explanation functions, for it is in virtue of the properties identified that an appropriate epistemic connection is made between explanans and explanandum. However,

treating the explanatory relation as an epistemic one has important implications Davidson seems to have overlooked. If explanations are individuated by the way the explanatory relation functions, then there must be different kinds of explanations corresponding to the kind of explanatory relations they invoke.

Quausation would seem to represent one such species of explanation. Since, if Davidson is correct, this is the pattern of explanation that has

been confused with causation itself, it is natural to call such explanations causal explanations. We have already seen something of the nature of the epistemic relation between explanans and explanandum in causal

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explanations. The form of the explanatory relation is that it makes use of the concept of "causally relevant properties." Consider Davidson's

example of the hurricane causing the catastrophe (say, the collapse of a bridge). We would expect a causal explanation to declare that it was in

virtue of the physical forces of the hurricane that the former caused the

latter, and not because of the fact both events were reported in the newspaper. In other words, the point of quausal explanations is to bring to the fore certain causally relevant properties of the events in question. 12

What shall we say about the epistemic relation between explanans and explanandum in explanations of human behaviour that refer to mental states (folk-psychological explanations)? It is clearly unlike the relation

described above in causal explanations, for such explanations do not appeal to anything like causally relevant properties. Davidson himself has pointed out that one significant feature of folk-psychological

explanation is that it involves the rationalization of the explanandum. 13 This seems to be the appropriate way to characterize the epistemic relation in such explanations. Understanding is created when we show how an

agent's action is rational in the light of his or her mental states, such as beliefs, desires, fears, and wishes.

Consider an example. Joe's insistence that the surgeon operate on

his skull despite the fact that his x-rays reveal no problems of any kind is inexplicable at first. When he tells us that he believes the CIA has

implanted listening devices in his cranium, is afraid that they are reading his thoughts, and wants the devices removed, his request becomes something we can understand, no matter how misguided or deluded Joe

is. The source of this understanding is that we can now discern a certain degree of rationality in his request when it is held up against the backdrop of his other mental states, regardless of their veracity. Hence, the understanding created by the epistemic relation between explanans and

explanandum is derived from the rationality of the action. Davidson, of course, argued adamantly that we should not regard

rationalization as the "pattern of explanation" that gives reason-giving its explanatory force. In his view, this feature is insufficient to account for the force of the "because" of folk-psychological explanation.

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... [I]t is an error to think that, because placing the action in

a larger pattern explains it, therefore we now understand

the sort of explanation involved. Talk of patterns and

contexts does not answer the question of how reasons

explain actions, since the relevant pattern or context contains

both reason and action. One way we can explain an event is

by placing it in the context of its cause; cause and effect

form the sort of pattern that explains the effect, in a sense

of 'explain' that we understand as well as any. If reason and

action illustrate a different pattern of explanation, that pattern must be identified.14

Furthermore, he points out, since one can have a reason for acting and yet fail to act, there must be more to reason-giving than rationalizing

the action.

Both of these concerns would seem to be misguided in light of the

observations made earlier. Explaining is an epistemic activity. Showing

that an action is rational provides an epistemic link between reasons and

actions. Quausation is also an epistemic activity. It explains the occurrence

of an event, but does so by describing the events in terms of "causally

relevant" properties. This is doing a good deal more than placing an

event in the context of its cause. Saying that the event on page five of

Tuesday's Times caused the event reported on page ten of Wednesday's

Tribune places an event in the context of its cause, but fails to be

explanatory at all.

The nature of the explanatory relation is clearly different in folk-

psychological explanation and quausation. What they must share,

however, is the same kind of underlying metaphysical relation. If the

force of the hurricane explains the collapse of the bridge, the hurricane

must have actually caused the collapse of the bridge. Similarly, for a

reason to explain an action the reason must have actually caused the

action. The fact that both explanations are grounded in the same kind of

metaphysical relation (i.e., a causal relation) does not mean that folk-

psychological explanation, like quausation, is a causal explanation. If it

did, then all explanations would be causal explanations. Besides, to insist otherwise is to demand that explanations be individuated on the basis of

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the underlying causal relation R, instead of the epistemic relation E, in

which case a reason-giving explanation and a quausal explanation of the

same events would have to be treated as equivalent explanations. This

has the implication of forcing us to surrender the non-extensionality of explanation, something Davidson himself is reluctant to give up. is

The observat ion that reason-giving is not a species o f causal

explanation does little damage to Davidson's overall views. As far as I

can see it has no implication for his anomalous monism. It also leaves

untouched the claims he defends in "Actions, Reasons, and Causes,"

C 1 R is a primary reason why an agent performed the

action A under the description d only if R consists of a pro

attitude of the agent towards actions with a certain property,

and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property. 16

C2 A primary reason for an action is its cause. 17

If the above conclusion were that reasons are not causes, then

Davidson would have something to worry about, but to say that reason-

giving is not a causal explanation is not equivalent to the claim that

reasons are not causes. In light of all this, it is unclear why Davidson

insists on treating folk-psychological explanation as a species of causal explanation.

Although the distinction between reason-giving and quausation has

little impact on the integrity of Davidson's philosophy, it is illuminating

when we look at the criticisms of anomalous monism. Perhaps what

Davidson's critics really meant to say (or should have said) is not that

mental properties are causally impotent, but that explanations that appeal

to mental properties are not causal explanations. While the critics had

the details of the objection to anomalous monism wrong, they were

looking in the right direction for problems in Davidson's philosophy.

In conclusion, we have seen that the worry that anomalous monism

leads to some form of epiphenomenalism is misguided. The objection,

in its traditional form, stems from confusing causal relations and causal

explanations. This is not to say that Davidson's critics aren't on to

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something. In light of considerations about the way explanations function

and are individuated, I argued that Davidson ought to have denied that

reason-giving is a species of causal explanation. This is not to say that

reasons are not causes. Reasons (or better, having reasons) are events

that enter into causal relationships, but the fact that reasons cause actions

and explain them does not mean that reasons causally explain actions.

WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY W A T E R L O O , O N TA RI O N2L 3C5

CANADA

NOTES

1 Donald Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963).

2 For example, see Terence Horgan, "Mental Quausation," Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989), Jaegwon Kim, "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strcit Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?" in Mental Causation, ed. John Hell and .Alfred Mele (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).

3 Donald Davidson, "Thinking Causes," in Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

4 Kim (1993).

Ted Honderich, "The Argument for Anomalous Monism," Analysis 42 (1982), Ted Honderich, "Anomalous Monism: Reply to Smith," Analysis 43 (1983), Ted Honderich, "Smith and the Champion of Mauve," Analysis 44 (1984).

6 Davidson, "Thinking Causes," pp. 6-7. v Kim(1993) p. 21. s I have pointed out elsewhere, Neil Campbell, "The Standard Objection to

Anomalous Monism," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 3 (1997), that this objection also assumes that an event is ontologically constituted by a variety of properties. In light of his nominalism, Davidson rejects such an assumption. This is something his critics seem not to recognize.

9 See Davidson, "Thinking Causes," p. 16. ~0 Ausonio Marras, "Kim's Principle of Explanatory Exclusion," Australasian

Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 3 (1998). II Ibid. p. 445.

~2 For a clear discussion of this idea, see Louise Antony, "Anomalous Monism

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and the Problem of Explanatory Force," Philosophical Review XCVIII (1989)�9

~3 Davidson, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes�9 ~4 Davidson (1963) p. 10. ~5 See his brief discussion of Kim's principle of explanatory exclusion in

Davidson, "Thinking Causes." 16 Davidson (1963) p. 5�9 17 Ibid. p. 12.

REFERENCES

Antony, Louise�9 "Anomalous Monism and the Problem of Explanatory Force." Philosophical Review XCVIII (1989), pp. 153-187.

Campbell, Neil. "The Standard Objection to Anomalous Monism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73, no. 3 (1997), pp. 373-382.

Davidson, Donald. "Actions, Reasons, and Causes�9 Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963)�9 Reprinted in Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events�9 Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980. �9 "Thinking Causes�9 In Mental Causation, ed�9 John Heil and Alfred Mele. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Honderich, Ted. "The Argument for Anomalous Monism." Analysis 42 (1982), pp. 59-64.

. "Anomalous Monism: Reply to Smith�9 Analysis 43 (1983), pp. 147- 149. �9 "Smith and the Champion of Mauve�9 Analysis 44 (1984), pp. 86-89.

Horgan, Terence�9 "Mental Quausation." Philosophical Perspectives 3 (1989), pp. 47-76�9

Kim, Jaegwon. "Can Supervenience and 'Non-Strict Laws' Save Anomalous Monism?" In Mental Causation, ed. John Heil and Alfred Mele. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Marras, Ausonio. "Kim's Principle of Explanatory Exclusion." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76, no. 3 (1998), pp. 439-451.

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