Caught in the Middle Japanese Attitudes Toward Indonesian Independence in 1945

8/6/2019 Caught in the Middle Japanese Attitudes Toward Indonesian Independence in 1945

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Department of History, National University of Singapore

Caught in the Middle: Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence in 1945Author(s): Ken'Ichi GotoSource: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1, The Japanese Occupation inSoutheast Asia (Mar., 1996), pp. 37-48Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, NationalUniversity of SingaporeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20071756Accessed: 09/04/2010 04:42

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38 Ken'ichi Goto

grave and sorrowful look."1 The shock the general received from the defeat was so greatthat the commander who had stood at the head of 70 thousand Japanese soldiers then inJava lost the mental capacity to take command thereafter, leaving the actual leadershipin the hands of General Yamamoto. Yamamoto, who held the conviction that a commander

must not leave the scene in silence, instructed his staff officers "never to act on impulseand wait for subsequent orders".2 By the phrase "act on impulse" he seems to have

warned against committing suicide under the shock of defeat or calling for radical actionssuch as thorough resistance.

Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, an operations staff officer who was also at the headquarters,recalls that he sensed the "smell of surrender" in strange changes in the Tokyo atmospherestarting around 10 August, immediately after the Soviet Union declared war againstJapan. Miyamoto also recalls the desperation felt on the fatal days as follows:

The enemy against whom we had held up fierce fighting spirit suddenly turned intoa sort of great big rock with our lives at its mercy. Under its heavy weight mythoughts turned immediately to what would happen to Japan, to the 16th Army and

what should be done with the Japanese in Java....3Now what were the reactions of themiddle rankmilitary officers in contrast with those

of the top leadership described above? Captain Yamazaki Hajime, who was the centralfigure at the Education Division of the PETA (Army for the Defence of the Fatherland),

wrote in his diary on 15August 1945: "Listening in to the Emperor's broadcast we allshed bitter tears. At night, First Lieutenant Nishiyama tried to kill himself, which Isucceeded in stopping."4 The younger middle rank officers tended to believe wholeheartedlyin the cause of the Greater East Asia War, and their emotional wavering was much moreimmediate and direct, especially those officers who were in daily touch with the Indonesianofficers and men participating in the PETA.Next let us look at the reactions of the Japanese civilians who were at the core of the

military government. Sait? Shizuo, a civilian Foreign Service official who played animportant part in orienting the military administration as a whole in his capacity as thechief of the planning section of the military government's general affairs department,stated, "Being not in actual combat service as are military officers, we were not in such

psychological strains as to think of death in direct connection with the defeat."5 It isinteresting to note that Sait? and Yamamoto, both part of the elite core of the militarygovernment, were not so emotionally swayed in the immediate aftermath of the defeat.Their thinking immediately turned to practical measures they should take as bureaucratsas a consequence of the defeat.

Yamamoto Moichiro, Watashi-no Indonesia ? Dai Juroku Gun Jidai-no Kaiso [My Indonesia? A Memoir on the Period of My Service in the 16thArmy] (Tokyo: Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai,1979), p. 77.

2Miyamoto Shizuo, Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki [An Account of the Disposition of the End of theWarin Java] (Tokyo: Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki Kanko-Kai, 1973), p. 47.3Ibid.4YamazakiHajime, Kita-ni Minami-ni [To theNorth, to the South] (privately published, 1977],

p. 139.5Sait? Shizuo, Watashi-no Gunsei-Ki [My Recollections of Military Administration] (Tokyo:

Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai, 1977), p. 221.


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Japanese Attitudes toward Indonesian Independence 39

For example, although Yamamoto's initial reaction was that of a typical military officerwhen he felt that he had no words to apologize to the Emperor or to the war-dead, hesoon reflected that his work did not end with the defeat in the war. He realized that theJapanese military administration would be terminated only when the orders of the AlliedForces were executed, the Japanese forces disarmed and repatriated together with all theJapanese residents, and adjustments of relationships with the Indonesian people completed.6Sait?, who claimed to have known of the deteriorating military situation through monitoringforeign broadcasts,7 recalled that when it became certain that thewar would be terminated,his mind was swirling with speculations and thoughts concerning the attitude the Allieswould assume and measures the Japanese forces should take thereafter, especially withregard to winding up the Japanese military administration in Indonesia.8The top leaders of the Japanese military administration, both military and civilian,

were all concerned with the three major questions: (1) How to execute orders of theAllied Forces; (2) Repatriation of Japanese military forces, of civilians who worked forthe armed forces, and of Japanese residents in Indonesia; (3) How to deal with the pastpromise of independence that the Japanese side had given to the Indonesians. Examiningtheir thoughts and attitudes, we note that they were not so much concerned with the oldpromise or the question of "face", and gave more attention to how to protect nationalinterests by adjusting to the new developments.

Next, in order to illustrate in specific terms the behavior of those Japanese who fallunder the "allegiance" pattern, we shall examine the stance of themilitary administrationleadership toward the question of Indonesian independence.

For a long time the central government of Japan was adamant about the policy of notgiving independence to Indonesia, but it at last declared by means of Premier KoisoKuniaki's pronouncement on 7 September 1944 that it "would give independence to theEast Indies in the near future" (emphasis added). About one year prior to this statement,the government had proclaimed "Defend to the last the Absolute Defence Sphere".9 Thewar situation, however, rapidly became unfavourable to the Japanese side, especially afterthe fall of Saipan in June 1944. Premier andWar Minister T?j? Hideki had been corneredand stepped down, to be succeeded by Koiso Kuniaki who also was a retired armygeneral. Subsequently in late October the naval battle at Leyte was lost, marking thevirtual first step toward Japan's defeat.

Facing an imminent crisis the Government of Japan moved toward giving"independence" to Indonesia. In reality, however, the Japanese Government had neitherthe interest nor the mental composure to put into effect the process for grantingindependence to the southernmost region of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".In contrast to Japan's stagnant attitude, nationalism and the move toward independencehad grown rapidly in Indonesia after the Koiso statement, when themilitary government

permitted use of the red-and-white Indonesian flag and the national anthem, forbiddensince the start of the Japanese military administration. Especially noteworthy was the risein strength of the politically conscious youth who received military and spiritual training

6Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], p. 78.7Sait?, [My Recollections], p. 222.8Ibid., p. 174.9See Tanemura Sako, Daihonei Kimitsu Nitshi [Secret Diary of the Imperial headquarters]

(Tokyo: Daiamondo, 1952), p. 153.


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40 Ken'ichi Goto

during the occupation, and their emergence added an important new dimension to thesubsequent independence movement in Indonesia.10The Japanese military government authorities were in need of more vigorous cooperationfrom the Indonesian leadership in conducting the administration of Java, a place regardedas the "sole supply base in the South", where there was no significant fighting.11 TheInvestigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence inaugurated inMarch 1945 was a reflection of this attitude on the part of the administration authorities:they had no concrete instructions from Tokyo, but progressed toward its establishmentunder the shock of PETA's anti-Japanese uprising in Blitar, East Java which demonstratedthe Indonesian zeal for independence.This was the politico-military situation when Field Marshal Terauchi Hisakazu, SupremeCommander of the Southern General Army and representing the Government of Japan,formally delivered themessage "granting independence" to Sukarno and Hatta atDa Lat,in southern Vietnam, on 11August.12 It was during the very last stage before granting"independence", which was Japan's final card for winning Indonesian cooperation andsupport in her war efforts, that theGovernment of Japan accepted the Potsdam Declarationon 14 August.So itwas natural that the first thing that crossed the mind of themilitary administrationleadership in Java upon hearing about Japan's surrender was how to reconcile theAllies'orders and the pre-surrender promise of "independence" given to the Indonesians. Thesolution of this delicate problem would be closely related to successfully overcominganother major problem, that is, smooth and early repatriation of the Japanese in Indonesia.One question that greatly troubled the leadership of themilitary administration was whatcourse of action would spare Japan from being accused by the Allies of non-obedienceto their orders. To be so accused would jeopardize the "preservation of national polity"(i.e., the Emperor institution), a situation thatmust be avoided by all means. And this wasthe tacit understanding shared by all those concerned.On 19August, the 16th Army received a telegram from Commander Itagaki Seishir?of the Seventh Area Army who was posted at Singapore, notifying them officially thatthe Southern General Army would cease hostilities, "abiding by the Imperial mandate",and that they would no longer support the concept of granting independence to Indonesia.13The decision coincided with the course of action taken by the 16thArmy since 15August.

Receiving this telegram the 16th Army reconfirmed the policy already set down, andissued the instruction to itsmen stating, "You must perform the final obligations involvedin the surrender. Never cause any trouble to His Majesty the Great Marshal. Show thediscipline in perfect order of the proud Japanese Army."14

Concerning the question of "independence" the 16th Army authorities made it theirbasic policy to "freeze themilitary administration as of the date of the termination of war,

10The most representative study on this theme is Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Timeof Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).11Jawa Shinbun-sha (ed.), Jawa Nenkan [Almanac of Jawa] (reprinted Tokyo: Biblio Shuppan,1973), p. 25.

12About the meeting between Terauchi and Sukarno accompanied by other leader, see thememoir of Miyoshi Shunkichir? who served as the interpreter, "Jawa Senryo Gunsei Kaiko-roku(14)" [MyRecollections of theMilitary Occupation in Java],Kokusai Mondai 80 (Nov. 1966): 67.

13Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], pp. 90-91.14Ibid., pp. 91-92.


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maintain the status quo and transfer it to the Allied Forces".15 That indicated a stance onthe part of Japan that was tantamount to stating that Japan had nothing to do withIndonesian independence, and that itwas an issue between Indonesia and theNetherlands.16

(2) The Allied Power's Orders to the 16th ArmyAfter the military administration authorities had set up the basic policy of distancingitself from Indonesian "independence", the next tough question was how to prevent

Japanese arms and ammunitions from flowing into Indonesian hands, and to guard againstemergence of Japanese men who would disobey orders and join the independencemovement. Should errors be committed in handling these two problems, it would enragetheAllies and might hinder the smooth "repatriation in perfect order" of the three millionJapanese men overseas.

Looking at the situation from the Indonesian side, the advance of the Allied Forceswould certainly mean the return of Dutch colonialism. It was, therefore, imperative fortheir independence movement to reassemble men of the PETA and Heiho (AuxiliaryForces) that had been disbanded by the Japanese orders, and to obtain arms and ammunitionfrom the Japanese military. Otherwise, the Japanese arms and ammunition would bedelivered to the Allied Forces and would certainly be used against them.As was pointed out earlier, the Japanese side did not want weapons and ammunitionto flow into the hands of the Indonesians. The Allies would accuse Japan of non-obedienceto their orders, and worse still, these arms might be used against Japanese themselves.Extremely wary of such a situation, the 16th Army authorities, following instructionsfrom the Seventh Area Army, took two steps on 29 August to avoid troubles with theIndonesians concerning weaponry. First, they concentrated arms and ammunition notcurrently in use, and second, in the case of those arms retained as necessary, only fivebullets were allocated for each weapon.17

Despite these precautions, there were active Indonesian attempts in various parts of thecountry to acquire Japanese weapons, and in some cases, they led to conflicts betweenthe two sides. The Japanese side had "anticipated the situation where they might have touse force when all other means have been exhausted", but they stressed that they "shouldrefrain from it unless it is considered as actual looting".18 This guideline reflected acomplex stand taken by the Japanese Army which, following Allied orders, had tomakean about-face and take steps to suppress the independence movement in Indonesia.The 16th Army staff held an operations conference on 21 September, being wedgedbetween the Allies' orders and Indonesian nationalist pressure surrounding the weaponsdisposal. This conference was of particular importance for its reconfirmation of the basicpolicy of "absolute avoidance of any steps thatmight jeopardize national polity".19 Themembers unanimously concluded that the best policy was to leave thematter of Indonesianindependence to Indonesia and the Netherlands, and that Japanese and British forcesshould withdraw as soon as possible. Their conclusion was based upon the judgement

15Saito, [My Recollections], p. 175.16Miyamoto, [The End of theWar in Java], p. 75.17Ibid., p. 36.18Sait?, [My Recollections], p. 226.19Ibid., p. 42.


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42 Ken'ichi Goto

that as long as the Japanese army remained in Indonesia, there would be endless difficultiesin connection with the weapons and Japanese "deserters" cooperating with the Indonesiannationalists, thus inviting reprisals from the Allies.The Japanese side decided to deal with the Indonesian demand for transfer of Japaneseweapons without using force, although they were extremely wary of doing anythingto "jeopardize national polity".20 In practice, however, the manner of dealing with thisproblem differed from unit to unit scattered throughout the area, depending on the localcommander's personality, outlook on the war and view of Indonesia. In the opinion ofSait? Shizuo there were at least three distinct approaches. The first may be observed inthe case of themilitary police in Surabaya where the Japanese complies with the Indonesiandemand and delivered the weapons without use of armed force, seeing that refusal wouldendanger themselves; the second is illustrated in the case of the Kido unit in Semarang,

whose refusal of the Indonesian demand led to serious fighting, and the third is found inthemajority of cases where the Japanese side gave up theweapons after limited fighting.21About half of the weapons of the Japanese forces had come into the possession of theIndonesians in Central and Eastern Java by the end of 1945.22During their encounters with the Indonesians over the weapons, the Japanese sidesuffered casualties of 402 men dead, 239 wounded and 88 missing by the beginning of

November.23 This figure was very high when we recall that the Japanese only lost 957men during their offensive in Java against the Dutch forces. Despite these casualties theJapanese force were rebuked by the Allies for failing to carry out orders and the Japanesedilemma grew all the more serious.

It was not only concerning the weapons thatAllied Forces pressed Japan to exercisefirmer control. When the war ended, not a few Japanese identified themselves with thenewly-born "Republic of Indonesia" for various reasons of their own, disregarding theArmy's order. Many of these Japanese joined Indonesian military or paramilitaryorganizations and played significant parts in obtaining weapons from the Japanese armyor in fighting against the Allied Forces.The Allied side was greatly displeased with these Japanese who cooperated with theIndonesians in their struggle for independence, and on 22 October demanded that theGeneral Army issue a statement that "those Japanese who desert their military units andfight on the Indonesian side are traitors to the Emperor".24 The British army in Java, inparticular, observed Japanese guidance behind the Indonesian armed force, and wasespecially afraid of participation of senior officers who were well-versed in the handlingof weapons or who had extensive experience in combat operations.25

20See Kinoshita Hajime, Murdeka ? Indonesia Dokuritsu Hishi [Merdeka ? A Secret Historyof Indonesian Independence] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1958), p. 112.21Sait?, [My Recollections], p. 227.22Miyamoto, [The End of the War in Java], p. 204. On the "Semarang Incident", see Ken'ichi

Goto, "Sengo Nippon-Indonesia Kankeishi Kenky? Josetsu" [A Preliminary Study on the PostwarJapanese-Indonesian Relations], Shakai Kagaku Tokyu 117 (1994): 3-32.23Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], p. 165.

24Miyamoto, [The End of the War in Java], p. 187.25Ibid., p. 267. See also Ian Nish, "Britain and the End of the War in Asia and the Termination

of Empire", a paper presented at the International Conference on "1945 in Europe and Japan",Berlin, 6-9 Apr. 1995.


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II. A Dilemma between the "Promise" and the New "Role"(1) Behaviours of "Renunciation" Type

The Allies probably ordered the Japanese army to stigmatize those Japanese men whojoined the Indonesian independence force as "Traitors of the Emperor" for political andpsychological reasons. The Allied side was fully aware that the Japanese were in extremefear of "jeopardizing national polity", and they used this fear to put pressure on theJapanese army to provide stricter surveillance on deserters. They assumed, in all likelihood,that the appeal would have a powerful spiritual influence on those Japanese who hadchosen to join the Indonesian forces.In this section the writer wishes to examine the conduct of the type of Japanese whoidentified with the Indonesians, and of the "allegiance" type, in the overall picture ofJapanese responses or reactions in the post-surrender Indonesia.Then what were the responses of the "renunciation" type Japanese who chose to stayin Indonesia? These people may be divided into two groups: (1) Those who killedthemselves, and (2) those who sought to identify themselves with the newly-born "Republicof Indonesia" or the Indonesian community.The first group can be subdivided based on their motives: (A) At the defeat of the

Great Japanese Empire that had been alleged to be imperishable and everlasting, some"wanted to atone for the disloyalty to the Emperor" by committing suicide; (B) otherskilled themselves out of shame or guilt because Japan had pledged to share a commondestiny with the Indonesians and support their independence, but betrayed themunabashedly after the defeat.Men in the second group, who sought identification with Indonesia, may also besubdivided into (A) men who for various personal reasons decided to remain in Indonesiato live and to die as Indonesians in the kampung community, and (B) men who wereenraged at the complete about-face in Japan's policy and opted to take positive actionby getting involved in the Indonesian independence movement in one way or another,disobeying orders both of the Japanese and Allied Forces.26When we look closer at the subsequent way of life of the latter, we find that (i) somewere killed in the Independence War as "combatants"; (ii) some others survived the warand continued to stay in the "Japindo" (Japanese Indonesians), opening up a new horizonin their newly independent second homeland, regardless of whether they succeeded ornot; and (iii) still some others who decided to return to Japan after Indonesian independencein December 1949. The chart below shows the groups and sub-groups:

Conduct of the Japanese in Indonesia after 15 August 1945I. "Allegiance" typeII. "Renunciation" type1. Those who chose to die

(A) Apologies to the Emperor(B) Sense of responsibility and shame toward the Indonesians

26Motivations of persons belonging to this type of "renunciation" are categorized as follows: (1)sympathy for the Indonesian independence movement, (2) affection for the land of Indonesia, (3)feeling of repulsion against the Allies, (4) fear of being arrested as a war criminal, (5) marriage

with an Indonesian woman, and (6) ambition to make a success in Indonesia. See Oku Genzo,Dasso Nihon-hei ? Indonesia Dokuritsu Senso-no Kageni [Japanese Deserters ? Behind the

Indonesian Independence War] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun-shya, 1980), p. 224.


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2. Those who identified themselves with Indonesians(A) Immersion into the Indonesian community(B) Participation in the independence war

(i) Killed in the war(ii) "Japindo"(iii) Return to Japan

Since one of the main themes of the present paper is Japanese involvement in theindependence war of Indonesia, the writer would like to take up for further discussion themen who got involved in one way or another in the Indonesian independence war againstthe Dutch troops.

The number of Japanese in Java under the jurisdiction of the 16th Army who fell intothis category is shown in the table below. We may observe

someoutstanding tendenciesfrom the data in the table.

West Java

I03

OWOO

?Dac

U W

?o

ES Remarks

(Officer)Captain

1st Lieutenant2nd Lieutenant

(N.C.O.)Warrant Officer

Sergeant MajorSergeant

Corporal(Soldier)Lance CorporalSuperior PrivatePrivate 1st ClassPrivate 2nd Class

(1)33 11158126

2315149

66132Civilian worked

for armyCivilian in generalSub-totalTotal

33

1924

4646

1325

127166

12

3131

(1)122715353634132631

233277

(i) ( ) indicatesthe Navy.(ii) Excludes men

who rejoinedtheir unit or

were dead.

Source: Miyamoto Shizuo, op. cit., p. 375.

First, no officers with the rank of major or above are found among the deserters, while43 per cent of them (119) were ordinary soldiers, and when the figure for non-commissionedofficers (70) is added, the figure reaches 68.2 per cent of the total. One reason for thisdifference may be that whereas those in upper ranks, the elite in the military hierarchy,


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had stronger military discipline and loyalty to the organization, and a very keen sense ofbelonging

to the fatherland, the rank and file were relatively young and free from suchlimitations.

Secondly, non-military civilians working for the army and other civilians in generalamounted to about 30 per cent of the total (84). Incidentally, out of some 68,000 Japanesestaying in Java at the time of termination of war, approximately 18,000 were estimatedto fall under those categories, and their "renunciation" ratio stood at 0.47 per cent. The"renunciation" ratio on the part of the military who were estimated to be about 50,000was 0.39 per cent, and there is no significant difference between the figure for the

military and for the non-military.Thirdly, there was much difference depending on the locality. The figure was highestfor West Java with 85.2 per cent (236). In particular, Bandung alone accounted for59.9 per cent of the total number (166). This was partly because Bandung was a major

concentration centre for the Japanese forces, but in addition to that, this area as a wholewas the fiercest battleground of the struggles for independence, culminating in the"Bandung Sea of Fire" incident of March 1946.27

(2) Ichiki Tatsuo alias Abdul RachmanAmong those fluctuating minds there was a small minority of men who chose totake the "renunciation" course with a lucid mentality ? criticizing Japan and identifyingwith the Indonesian desire for independence. Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegor?

were typical of these Japanese, and the mention of these two names would be supportedunanimously by those who knew the actual circumstances of the time.28At the termination of war, 15 August 1945, Ichiki and Yoshizumi were respectivelyworking at the Education Division of the PETA and the Naval Office as non-regular staffmembers.29 They did not participate directly in themilitary administration, but their jobsput them in close touch with PETA officers and soldiers, and with young Indonesiannationalists in general. Through their daily contact with these people the two men cameto feel their nationalistic desires in both spiritual and physical terms. And this probablyaccounts, at least in part, for their conducts after 15August 1945.

Moreover, both Ichiki and Yoshizumi had long prewar experiences of living in Indonesia(Ichiki had married a Sundanese woman), and of particular importance in this connectionis the fact that they worked as reporters for the T?indo Nipp? (the East Indies Times),the only Japanese language newspaper in Indonesia during the latter part of the 1930s,thus developing a deep interest in the affairs of Indonesia. Furthermore, they shared aninclination toward the ideology of Asian solidarity and both had been expelled anddeclared "persona non grata" by theDutch for their connection with the southern advance

27The classical study on the independence struggle around the Bandung area is John Smail,Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the IndonesianRevolution (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1964).28Ichiki and Yoshizumi are usually referred side by side. This is not only due to their strong

comradeship, but also to the fact that Ichiki and Yoshizumi "represent" the Army side and Navyside respectively.29For the life of Ichiki written in English, see Ken'ichi Goto, "Life and Death of Abdul Rachman,

1906-1949: One Aspect of Japanese-Indonesian Relationships", Indonesia 22 (Oct. 1976): 57-68.


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policy of the Japanese military.30 Itwas natural perhaps that they had strong anti-Dutchfeelings.Of the two men Yoshizumi was active and jovial whereas Ichiki was more or less ameditative introvert, and his disappointment in and anger against the Japanese militaryadministration, that now undertook to suppress the Indonesian desire for independence inoutright contrast to their former slogans, became increasingly deep-rooted in his heart.He was convinced that the Indonesians had a solid base for independence and were readyfor it, and he openly asserted his belief through his writings. In particular, he was secondto none among the Japanese on the spot in understanding the firmness of Indonesiannationalism that had grown up through the medium of the Indonesian language. Hisinsight is well revealed in his article written during the later stage of the wartime periodentitled "Independence and Language ? Future Course for the Indonesian Language".In this article Ichiki asserted that in the future the "Indonesian language will be thestandard tongue not only in the so-called East Indies but also in the whole southernIndonesian area defined by both geography and racial distribution". He was vehementlyopposed to the views held by some in themilitary administration who "refused to recognizeexistence of the Indonesian language" saying "it should be termed theMalay language",or who said "the so-called Indonesian language should be eradicated". He wrote, "I havepersistently protested against such views and made representations tomy superiors aboutsuch arguments being erroneous. Moreover, I have pertinaciously stuck to using thewords 'the Indonesian nation' or 'the Indonesian language' in my articles or reportswritten in the Malay language."31At any rate, Ichiki had a firm conviction supported by his personal experiences aboutthe "growth of the Indonesian nation and the accompanying development of the Indonesianlanguage during the past 30 years".32In view of the close relationship Ichiki had with Indonesia, it would be easy tounderstand the great shock he had when he learned that the promise of "independence"? indeed, the word meant only a qualified independence ? that seemed close to realizationwas suddenly repealed completely. Ichiki must have felt indignant against the armyauthorities who in the name of maintaining the status quo unilaterally disbanded PETAand took away arms from them, as he had poured his heart and energy in the training of"fighters", stressing the need for military force and spiritual power

thatmust accompanyefforts toward independence.33

30Concerning the Netherlands Indies Government's anxiety and fear of the Japanese propagandaactivities in Java, see the Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in theNetherlands East Indies (published in the United States in Feb. 1942).3ichiki Tatsuo, "Dokuritsu to Gengo ? Indonesia-go no Susumubeki Michi" ["Independenceand Language ? The Direction which Indonesian Language Should Take"], Shin Jawa 1,2 (Nov.1944): 50.

32Ibid., p. 51.33Ichiki highly evaluates the Bushido spirit (Japanese chivalry) in the true sense of the word.This is clear from the editing policy of the Pradjurit magazine for Heiho which he himself was an

editor. Furthermore, Ichiki's strong wish to transplant Bushido spirit in Indonesia is suggested fromthe following words: "Not only words of command but also names of weapons as well as operationterms should be in Japanese. The military terms used in the Peta at present should be permanentlycontinued." Ichiki Tatsuo ["Independence and Language"], p. 53.


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Soon after 15 August 1945 Ichiki, following an irrepressible urge, disobeyed the"Imperial mandate" and "renounced" his fatherland. Logically he had no other alternativeif he wanted to express his sympathy toward Indonesian nationalism and support theindependence which Japan (and Ichiki personally) had promised. As of this date, hechanged his name toAbdul Rachman.34Ichiki's activities after he joined the Indonesian independence forces are described indetail in a booklet entitled Sekitar Perdjuangan Sumeru Selatan [Struggles for Independencein the Southern Area of the Mt. Sumeru], edited by Captain Sukardi of the Indonesian

National Army.35 In this booklet, Ichiki is described as an instructor at the MadiunMilitary Academy where his main task was to write papers on subjects necessary forbuilding up a national army. After April 1946 Ichiki began to lead guerilla troops basedat a stronghold inWest Java. InAugust, he was leading a "special scouting unit" composedof "runaway" Japanese soldiers, first in the vicinity of Bandung, and later, after theconclusion of Linggadjati Agreement, in Central Java where they engaged in hit-and-runoperations.36The group moved to Malang district in East Java in August 1948, still fighting aresistance war against the Dutch forces. On 9 January 1949 Ichiki was killed in battle ata small village called Dampit to the east of Malang. He was 42 years of age. About halfa year prior to Ichiki's death, Yoshizumi Tomegor?, his bosom friend who had alwaysbeen with him, died of lung ailment on 10August 1948 in the Segon mountains near

Blitar, East Java.

ConclusionThe Japanese sense of values made a 180 degree turnabout on 15 August 1945.

Overnight, Japan's "sacred war" became an "unjust war of aggression", and the AlliedForces, "Devilish and beastly Americans and Britishers", abruptly changed into symbolsof peace and democracy. The song "Fire at the Nimitz andMacArthur" was now replacedby a letter of praise entreating "Dear General MacArthur" to "please stay in Japan forever and ever".37 Moreover, when the use of the term the "Greater East Asia War", whichhad connotations of "self-sustenance and self-defence" and the "liberation of Asia", wasbanned by GHQ, the Japanese people came to talk about the "Pacific War" with littlepsychological or mental resistance.Let us now turn over our eyes to Indonesia in 1945. From the start of the militaryadministration, the Japanese authorities told the Indonesians that Japan and Indonesiawere "bound by the same destiny", and promised independence in the framework of theGreater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, thus seeking their loyalty and submission toJapan in her efforts to carry through the "sacred war".

34Japanese who joined the Indonesian side usually changed their names into Indonesian ones.Ichiki's name, Abdul Rachman, was given him by the elderly Sutan Perang Bustami, a formerjournalist, whom Ichiki respected as a colleague in the Education Division of PETA. Interview,Colonel Kamal, Jakarta, 26 May 1977.

35Sukardi (ed.), Sekitar Perdjuangan Sumeru Selatan (Jakarta, 1950).36Concerning the general political situation of Indonesia during this period, see George McT.

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), ch. 6.37HataDcuhiko and Sodei Rinjiro,Ninon SenryoHishi (II) [SecretHistory of theAllied Occupationof Japan] (Tokyo:Asahi Shimbun-shya, 1977), p. 170.


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48 Ken'ichi Goto

In the old Japan there was a saying, "A samurai's word is final". The Japanese army,however, was not true to the samurai spirit and reversed its attitude completely after 15August 1945, saying "Japan has nothing to do with the Indonesian independence".According to their logic, involvement in the Indonesian independence meant going againstthe orders of theAllied Forces that ordered "maintenance of status quo", and, at the sametime, a step that might jeopardize national polity.In order to explain the sudden about-face to the Indonesians, the Japanese said thatJapan's assistance in their independence would be detrimental to them as it would hurttheir prestige, and that it would weaken the position of nationalist leaders who werealready being labeled pro-Japanese cooperators.The military authorities who stood at the summit of 70,000 Japanese in Java gave toppriority to the task of repatriating the Japanese in "perfect order" in faithful observanceof the Imperial mandate. Many Japanese were puzzled by this sudden change in values,and some were deeply troubled, remembering the pledge Japan had made concerning"independence", but altogether 98 per cent of the Japanese returned docilely to theirnative country.

On the other hand, there were a number of non-elite class Japanese who did notwant to follow the "allegiance" type way of life. They took it upon themselves to putinto effect the promise Japan had once made. Although their motives and methodsdiffered, they wanted to accomplish something on the individual level. Putting aside thequestion of whether or not they really believed in the Asian solidarity principle, wemay say that they chose to identity with the Indonesian people rather than follow thewill of the state.

From the point of view of the "allegiance" type logic ? which was the starting pointof the postwar Japan ? it was inexcusable to deviate from the course set by "HisMajesty" as did the "renunciation" type men. The fact that until 1991 those men werelabeled "deserters" or "men who fled and remained on the spot", suggests psychologicaldiscrimination on the part of "allegiance" type men against the "renunciation" type.

Caught in the Middle Japanese Attitudes Toward Indonesian Independence in 1945

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