Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
-
Upload
programa-regional-para-el-manejo-de-recursos-acuaticos-y-alternativas-economicas -
Category
Documents
-
view
220 -
download
0
Transcript of Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
1/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
2/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
3/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
4/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
5/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
6/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
7/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
8/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
9/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
10/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
11/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
12/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
13/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
14/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
15/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
16/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
17/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
18/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
19/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
20/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
21/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
22/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
23/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
24/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
25/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
26/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
27/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
28/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
29/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
30/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
31/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
32/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
33/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
34/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
35/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
36/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
37/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
38/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
39/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
40/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
41/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
42/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
43/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
44/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
45/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
46/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
47/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
48/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
49/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
50/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
51/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
52/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
53/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
54/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
55/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
56/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
57/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
58/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
59/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
60/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
61/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
62/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
63/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
64/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
65/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
66/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
67/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
68/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
69/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
70/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
71/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
72/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
73/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
74/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
75/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
76/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
77/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
78/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
79/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
80/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
81/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
82/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
83/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
84/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
85/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
86/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
87/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
88/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
89/18483
5.5 AUCTIONED
OR GRANTED
5.6 SHARES RECEIVED
5.7 AVAILABLE DATA
Granted 100% catch historybased on the best 5o 7 years (halibut)or 5 o 6 years(sable sh) rom
quali ying period
Reported landingsdata
Granted Various ormulasbased on licensecategory
Catch history andvessel length duringspeci ed time period,catch history only, orequal shares
Reported landingsdata and licensingin ormation
Granted One TURF perapplication
Organizationsdetermine allocationwithin group via equalsharing o catch limit,equal sharing o pro ts,or competition, etc.
Veri cation viaNational Register o
Artisanal Fishermen
Granted Formula based onweighted catchhistory rom 2003,2004, and 2005
Weights used were20%, 30% and 50%,respectively
Vessel catch history
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
90/18484
6 Develop Administrative Systems
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
91/18485
K E Y P R I N C I P L E S
Administrative systems are an important component o a catch share program.
By developing and implementing e ective administrative systems, you will
ensure that participants can success ully participate in the program and are
held accountable or their privileges.
6.1 How will trading occur? | 86
6.2 How will catch accounting work? | 88
6.3 How will shery in ormation required or science, catch accounting and en orcement be collected? | 89
6.4 Who covers the program cost? | 92 S U B - S
T E P S
Fishery In ormation Strategies: Data Collection Techniques | 91
Paying or the Program: Namibian Rights-based Management System | 93
Catch Shares in Practice: Step 6 - Develop Administrative Systems | 94
Encourage cost-e ective, transparent trading that is easy or all participants. | 87
Employ transparent catch accounting completed regularly enough to ensure the catch limit isnot exceeded. | 88
Design and implement a shery in ormation system that keeps costs low and is e ective orconducting catch accounting, collecting scienti c data and en orcing the law. | 90
S E A S A L TAccountable
S P E C I A L F E A T U R E S
At a Glance
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
92/18486
6 As with any shery management system, the catch share program must be implemented and administered. Most jurisdictions
have existing systems in place to track shing participants, monitor and en orce shing activity, conduct science and more.
Managers should determine how a catch share program will work within existing systems and what administrative changes may
be necessary or bene cial or creating an easier, more cost-e ective system.
Because this Design Manual is ocused on the design o catch share programs, it will not provide a ull treatment o shery
administration and en orcement. Instead, this Step will highlight some o the necessary administrative systems or catch
share programs and some o the key issues that arise during catch share program development. The our components
outlined here are integral to the design o a catch share and should be considered during the design phase and prior to system
implementation.
Just like any shery management program, per ormance o catch share programs will depend on good in ormation, compliance
and the ability or the program to be cost-e ective. When participants have a secure, long-term stake in the shery, as in a well-
designed catch share program, the potential or improved in ormation, compliance and cost-e ectiveness is increased. Tracking
the per ormance o a catch share over time, just as managers would or any management approach, will help improve systems.
By developing and implementing e ective administrative systems, you will ensure that participants are Accountable to the
program and their allocations.
Appendix A: Monitoring and Data Collection Approaches has additional in ormation on speci c monitoring approaches.
Monitoring o catch is an important aspect o sheries management and o ten discussed in the creation o a catch share
program. It will be bene cial to develop a monitoring program that can support all the in ormation requirements or the shery
in a cohesive way.
Most catch share sheries allow trading o shares, either
through permanent or temporary trans ers, in order to
achieve biological and economic goals (Anderson andHolliday, 2007). When a catch share is trans erable, there
must be a mechanism or trades to occur. Di erent
approaches may be employed or permanent trans ers than
or temporary trans ers.
The purpose o trading is generally to create a system that
allows participants to adjust to management changes, such
as increases or decreases in the catch limit. There ore, the
success o the management system is inextricably linked
to the success o the trading system. A good trading system will give participants access to reliable in ormation about
availability and prices o shares and will allow shares to be
reely traded. These concepts should in orm the development
o an appropriate trading system.
The trading system must also connect to the catch accounting
system (described in Step 6.2 below) to accurately track catch
Develop Administrative Systems6
HOW WILL TRADING OCCUR?.1
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
93/18487
and landings against share holdings. Note also that it is not
necessary or the government to develop and administer
the system. There may be places that require government
oversight, but o ten third party service providers have ul lled
this unction.
Catch share sheries have used a number o di erent
approaches to acilitate trades:
Sel -identifed
It may be possible or participants to generate their own
methods o identi ying others interested in trades. This may
be a natural extension o a tight-knit community or a shery
in which shermen are continually in contact. The Internet
may provide good opportunities or shermen to converse
as well.
Brokerages
In many instances, communication among shermen
has not been su cient and pro essional share brokers
and brokerages have emerged to provide these services
(Sanchirico and Newell, 2003). Share brokers match up
willing buyers and sellers and conduct trades or a ee.
Trading plat orms
Many sheries have created open trading plat orms, either
government-run or privately-run, or participants to connect.For example, NMFS records, monitors and approves all share
transactions or the Gul o Mexico Red Snapper Individual
Fishing Quota Program. In other sheries, private companies
have stepped into the roles. For example, participants in the
New Zealand Quota Management System use FishServe, which
is owned by the national shing organization, or administrative
trading support. Competition within the private sector has
o ten yielded highly e ective companies that are adding
signi cant value to privilege holders and their businesses(see Catch Shares in Practice: British Columbia Integrated
Groundfsh Program ). In programs with eligibility standards
or participating in the trading o shares, there needs to be some
way to ensure that buyers are eligible to purchase shares.
Trading plat orms help participants know the market price o
shares and may make the system more fexible. This is especially
important or multi-species programs where participants may
need to regularly trade shares to cover their catch.
Additional considerations
Most o the experience with trading systems is in the context
o individually-allocated systems. There ore, these trading
approaches have developed to connect individuals who may
be separated and not know each other. In the case o group-
allocated catch shares, trading may also be desirable, either
between groups or within a group. Groups may be able to more
easily identi y other shareholders or trades, but still may nd it
use ul and bene cial to employ one or more o the approachesdescribed above.
Encourage cost-e ective, transparent trading that is easy or all participants.
P R I N C I P L E
1 0
STEP 6 | DEVELOP ADMINISTRATIVE SYST
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
94/18488
linked to catch accounting to give the holder an accurate
understanding o their holdings.
Timing o accounting
Catch accounting systems can require real-time accounting
o trades and landings, or they can use retrospective
balancing at various set points throughout the season. For
example, under the British Columbia Integrated Ground sh
Program, catch accounting takes place upon the landing o a
vessel and participants must account or any overages prior
to engaging in any urther shing activity. Many shareholders
conduct trades at-sea in order to e ectively balance their
catch against shareholdings. This system ensures that the
catch limit is never exceeded and has proven especially use ul
in multi-species sheries where certain species have low
catch limits. Real-time catch accounting does require more
technologically advanced systems.
Other catch share sheries employ retrospective balancing
in which they must balance their catch and holdings on a
monthly or quarterly basis. Many Australian sheries require
quarterly balancing. The bene t o this approach is that it
requires less technologically advanced systems and provides
a lag time or participants to obtain shares. This fexibility
may be especially help ul or participants in a multi-species
shery where it is di cult to predict the exact species ratio
o the catch. There are also drawbacks. When shareholders
are not required to track their catch in real-time it is more
likely that the feet could exceed catch limits. Also, some
shareholders may choose to manipulate the market by
holding shares or sale or lease until the end o the balancing
period when participants are required to balance their catch,thereby driving up prices.
Accountability o shareholders to their allocated share is one
o the most important aspects o a catch share. Importantly,
catch share sheries consistently stay within their catchlimits and rarely exceed limits (NMFS Southeast Regional
O ce, 2009; NMFS Alaska Regional O ce, 2009a; NMFS
Alaska Regional O ce, 2009b; NMFS Alaska Regional O ce,
2009c). One o the keys to catch share management is to
continually track shermens catch, including landings
and discards, against their share holdings. This is called
catch accounting, catch balancing or share balancing.
Essentially, this requires deducting catch (including landings
and other mortality such as discards) rom the holders
available shares.
Similar to a bank account, catch accounting systems
must track the shareholders initial balance, i.e., their
annual allocation, against their catch and landings, and
in the case o a trans erable system, any increases or
decreases in shares due to trades. Some orm o catch
accounting system is necessary or all catch shares.
Group-allocated catch shares may do the accounting
internally and report back to the government, but
they still need a mechanism to track all participants.
Territorial Use Rights or Fishing (TURFs) may require less
sophisticated systems because they tend to be small.
Catch accounting systems will be linked to shery
in ormation and monitoring systems. Appendix A:
Monitoring and Data Collection Approaches identi es some
o these options in uller detail. Generally, catch accounting
is completed through sel -reporting, reporting by authorized
buyers or processors, or by independent third parties. Inaddition, share sales, leases and purchases must also be
HOW WILL CATCH ACCOUNTING WORK?.2
Employ transparent catch accounting completed regularly enough to ensure
the catch limit is not exceeded.
P R I N C I P L E
1 1
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
95/18489
this and consider whether there are certain stocks, such as
highly vulnerable stocks, that should not employ deemed
values as an approach.
Weight or tags
As discussed in Step 4 Defne the Privilege , it is possible to
create a weight-based system or a tag-based system. I using
a weight-based system, catch must be weighed and veri ed
either on the vessel, at the delivery point, or both. O ten the
sherman and the dealer weigh the catch and these reports
are checked against each other to veri y the correct amount.
Tag-based systems work similarly to hunting tags. A certain
number o tags are allocated in the beginning o the
year based on an individuals holdings and every sh or
standardized delivery weight must be tagged to be accepted
or delivery. For example, the sur clam and ocean quahog
shareholders are allocated a certain number o cage tags
at the beginning o each year, based on the size o the cage
and an individuals holdings. Each cage that is delivered is
required to have one o these tags (McCay, 2001). Tag-based
systems are o ten lower cost, but they may be in easible
depending on how the product is caught and delivered.
Deemed values
Fees may be another component o a catch accounting
system. New Zealand has a system o deemed values in
which shermen who land species or which they do not
have shares pay a ee to the government. The goal is to make
the ee high enough that people are not encouraged to sh
or that species but low enough that they do not dump sh
overboard or otherwise sh illegally. And importantly, the
ee is re unded i they subsequently buy or lease shares to
cover their catch. The deemed values system has proven
particularly use ul or multi-species sheries in which it
has been challenging or shareholders to always have the
right mix o shares or their catch (Newell, 2004). However,
it does require additional administrative work to gather
enough in ormation to set and adjust deemed values and
then collect the ees, especially because deemed value could
vary as much as daily due to changing market conditions. It
can also be di cult to set deemed values at levels that both
discourage shing or that stock by those who do not have
shares and discourage discarding. Furthermore, by allowing
participants to land catch or a ee rather than based on their
annual allocation holdings, it becomes more likely that the
feet will exceed its catch limit. Managers must care ully track
The key to sustainability or any shery is to ensure the catch
does not exceed the appropriate science-based catch limit.
As with all sheries management, catch share programs
also require good in ormation to unction well. In ormation
systems should be designed and used to conduct catch
accounting, collect scienti c data and en orce the laws.
Many jurisdictions use the implementation o a catch share
program as a time to implement more comprehensive
shery in ormation and monitoring approaches. This o ten
leads to the perception that catch shares require more
monitoring. In act, any catch limit-based management
system will require a certain amount o monitoring to
track catch and landings. There are numerous bene ts to a
robust in ormation system, irrespective o the management
approach. Strong in ormation systems build trust among
shery participants and between managers and shermen,
improve science and knowledge o the stocks, and can lead
to a higher level o compliance.
Fishery in ormation is important or both individually-
allocated and group-allocated systems, but the way in which
it is reported or each might be di erent. In an individually-
allocated system, each participant will be required to
report in ormation to the management authority, whereas
a group-allocated system will require each group to report
in ormation to the management authority. The group must
HOW WILL FISHERY INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR SCIENCE, CATCH ACCOUNTING AND
ENFORCEMENT BE COLLECTED?6.3
STEP 6 | DEVELOP ADMINISTRATIVE SYST
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
96/18490
employ a system that will provide an accurate representation
o its members activities. TURFs are likely to employ di erent
approaches o ten ocused on a system o sel -monitoring to
veri y landings and protect their borders rom non-members.
Fishery in ormation can be collected through a broad array
o methods, rom at-sea to dockside data collection and sel -
reported to independently-collected methods. See Figure 6.1
or more detail. The sherys resource, feet, operational andmarket characteristics are important determinants in your
choice o approach or gathering and veri ying in ormation.
Furthermore, the appropriate systems will depend on
your program goals. Some programs will require spatial or
temporal in ormation, while others may require in ormation
on prohibited species or bycatch. In general, the least cost,
most e ective approach should be used or a shery.
Credibility o in ormation systems is important; i the system
is credible, the ocus will be on the meaning o the data,
whereas i the in ormation system is not credible, the ocus
will be on the collection o the data. Many sheries rely
on sel -reported in ormation systems, such as shermen
logbooks and dealer reports. Sel -reported systems are
low cost but may have lower-quality, inconsistent data.
There ore, accuracy and authenticity are o ten a key concern
and additional incentives, such as random checks and
strong penalties or misreporting data, will help improve
data. Independent monitoring systems, such as 100%
observer coverage or non-tamperable camera systems tend
to be more objective and better trusted. They generally
have higher data quality, and are deemed more credible,
especially when the data collection is independent rom the
business operations o the shery and data collectors are
speci cally trained or their role.
It may be possible to combine sel -reported and independent
in ormation systems via a veri cation approach based on
sampling, in which only a percentage o in ormation is
collected, veri ed, or both. A sampling approach will provide
less robust data (Babcock et al., 2003), but it can be designed to
have a high level o con dence or monitoring, veri cation and
scienti c purposes. One such method is to pair sel -reporting
with partial observer coverage or electronic monitoring with
audits. I inaccuracy is detected or speci c shareholders, then you can increase auditing and/or onboard observer requency.
Importantly, you can charge shareholders or the cost o
additional monitoring as an incentive to increase accuracy o
sel -reporting.
The British Columbia Integrated Ground sh Program has
achieved a good balance between ull coverage and the time
and cost savings o random sampling. Each vessel has 100%
electronic monitoring and ootage is randomly sampled rom
each vessel trip or review against participants logbooks. I
cheating behavior is detected all the ootage is reviewed. In any
system, when a high degree o uncertainty around data exists,
then a more precautionary approach to setting caps should
be employed. See Catch Shares in Practice: British Columbia
Integrated Groundfsh Program or more in ormation.
Furthermore, developing a good chain o custody system so
that products can be tracked rom vessel through processing
and wholesaling should be a key part o the overall compliance
system and can reduce costs o at-sea and dockside
monitoring. This will not work as well or products that are
sold into local markets.
For a urther discussion o speci c monitoring and
in ormation approaches and how they might work or
your shery, please see Appendix A: Monitoring and Data
Collection Approaches .
Design and implement a shery in ormation system that keeps costs low and
is e ective or conducting catch accounting, collecting scienti c data and
en orcing the law. P R I N C I P L E
1 2
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
97/18491
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES
AT-SEA DATA COLLECTION
Sel -Reported Independent Collection Sel -Reported Independent Collection
In ormation about:
All catch
Discard amounts and conditions
Protected species interactions
Fishing location and e ort
Unsorted catch samples
Hails
Fishing Logs
Industry collected samples
Technology Options:
Electronic Hails
Electronic Logs
Aerial Surveys
At-sea Observers
Fishing Log Audit
Technology Options:
Electronic Monitoring
Vessel Monitoring System
(VMS)
Hails
Fish Tickets
Technology Options:
Electronic Hails
Electronic Fish Tickets
Credit Card System
Dockside Monitors
Port Samplers
Plant Audits
Technology Options:
Electronic Landing Reports
DOCKSIDE DATA COLLECTION
In ormation about:
Landings only
Veri ed weights
Collected samples
FIGURE 6.1 | Fishery In ormation Strategies
STEP 6 | DEVELOP ADMINISTRATIVE SYST
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
98/18492
Financing the transition
Some governments have made the public policy decision
to provide nancial aid to shing feets in order to undthe transition to catch shares. Catch shares are o ten
implemented in sheries that are overcapitalized and
over shed, generally as a result o ine ective management.
Providing some transition unding can help move a shery
more easily toward a catch share program. For example,
New Zealand nanced the transition by buying back catch
history (which was the basis or share allocation) and by
injecting capital and ongoing operating money into the
management authority. The rationale or this investment
was based on the expected long-term stock and nancial
bene ts o the catch share program (Sissenwine and Mace,
1992). In act, most New Zealand sheries now cover their
own management costs.
Cost recovery
Cost recovery re ers to a variety o mechanisms by which
shing participants pay or some or all o the costs o
management. Costs may include science or setting catch
limits, monitoring costs, administrative costs and more.Cost recovery ees can be collected in a variety o di erent
ways including direct payment to the government through a
ee or tax on the annual landings and/or direct contracting
by shareholders with service providers.
Fishery participants and the government will o ten split
costs according to which are traditional government
services and which are better suited or industry to pay.
For example, the government may pay or maintenance o
administrative systems, while participants may cover the
costs o monitoring systems.
Catch share sheries have taken a variety o di erent
approaches to this. For example, all Australian sheries
are required (or are transitioning) to pay 100% o the
Fish are public resources held in common by all citizens and
managed on their behal by the government. By accessing
and selling sh, shermen are inherently bene tting roma public good. There are management costs to this activity
that must be paid or somehow. This is true or any shery,
whether it is open access, limited access or a catch share
program. O ten, governments have underwritten the
costs o management, essentially providing a subsidy to
shing feets. Governments are increasingly interested in
limiting subsidies and shi ting the cost o management
to the participants who bene t. When participants
and government share the costs, there is an incentive
or participants to work with the regulators to improve
management and cut costs (Gislason, 1999; Yandle, 2003).
Fisheries under catch shares are generally more pro table
than traditionally managed sheries (Fujita et al., 2004;
World Bank and FAO, 2008) and thus better able to a ord at
least some cost o management. Furthermore, even though
all shery management programs should achieve robust
monitoring or compliance, management authorities o ten
use the transition to catch shares as an opportunity toimplement more sophisticated, and potentially more costly,
monitoring and/or scienti c approaches. The bene ts o this
investment include more accurate in ormation and a level
playing eld or participants. However, there is a question
o how to pay or science, monitoring and compliance.
Fishermen under catch share programs have an increased
incentive to invest in monitoring and science in order to
have better in ormation that may lead to more sustainable
stocks and higher catch limits (Festa et al., 2008).
There are two general cost-related issues to consider: how
the transition will be paid or and whether the ongoing cost
will be recovered rom industry. In addition, you should
consider whether to collect rents rom industry or their use
o a public resource.
WHO COVERS THE PROGRAM COST?.4
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
99/18493
rents are not as common as cost-recovery ees, some
governments do collect rents on behal o the public.
It is possible to collect resource rents rom a shery either
via auctioning o the allocation or through charging
royalties. In some countries, rent recovery is o prime
importance to national economies, and the opportunity
cost o ailing to extract rent is very high. For example,
income rom shing royalties accounts or over 40% o the
Falkland Islands gross domestic product, and provides the
government with over hal its annual income (Harte and
Barton, 2007). A resource rent will impact the catch share.
I it is set too high, then it may hamper the fexibility o
the system or reduce participants conservation incentives
(Libecap and Anderson, 2009). On the other hand, setting
a low ee may not return as much value to the public.
Appropriate analysis will help determine the best level.
Catch share sheries tend to be more pro table than tra-
ditionally managed sheries and better equipped to cover
all or a portion o the costs o management. Achieving the
transition to catch shares may require an up- ront invest-
ment by the government, but as the shery becomes more
e cient under a catch share program and as stocks recover,
those costs can com ortably be shi ted to industry.
attributable costs o the shery. Shareholders pay a yearly
levy based on each years budget and each individual
shermans share holdings. New Zealand recovers costs
rom participants to pay or research and compliance.
In addition, New Zealand shareholders have purchased
additional science services directly rom third party vendors
to improve the understanding o their stocks and the
accuracy o the catch limits (Lock and Leslie, 2007).
In the U.S., the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act requires that catch share participants
pay up to 3% o the ex-vessel value o the shery to cover
additional management costs incurred as a result o shi ting
rom conventional management to catch shares (16 U.S.C.
1854). While some U.S. catch share programs use revenues
rom cost recovery ees to pay or monitoring, it is not
required or programs to do so. Monitoring costs generally
all outside o the 3% cost recovery ee and have historically
been paid or by the government or by industry.
Resource rents
Resource rent is the value o extracting the resource in
excess o the costs o extraction (including management).
Resource rents are a ee charged to shareholders or the
bene t o accessing a public resource. While resource
The Namibian government provides an interesting case o both categories o ees in catch shares: cost recovery and
rent capture (i.e., resource rents). Cost recovery re ers to the cost o managing the shery, while resource rents attempt
to capture some o the value shermen receive rom using the public shery resource. Namibia recovers all the manage-ment costs by charging catch share holders cost recovery ees, which are established by taking into account the value
o landings, operating costs and the pro tability o industry. On average, these ees total 5% 15% o the total landed
value in Namibia (Namibian Ministry o Fisheries and Marine Resources [MFMR], 2004). In addition, the government col-
lects a portion o economic rents through charging resource rents.
SNAPSHOT 6.1 | Paying or the Program
Namibian Rights-based Management System
STEP 6 | DEVELOP ADMINISTRATIVE SYST
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
100/18494
catch shares in practice
6.1TRADING MECHANISM
6.2 CATCH ACCOUNTING
6.3 FISHERY
INFORMATION
6.4 WHO PAYS
ALASKA HALIBUT &SABLEFISH FIXEDGEAR INDIVIDUALFISHING QUOTAPROGRAM
Government-maintained, web-based tradingplat orm
Independent brokers
Shareholders anddealers reportlandings or eachtrip via web-basedsystem maintained bygovernment
Logbooks
Dockside monitoring:100% at main ports,random checks atsmaller ports
Onboard observercoverage: 30% orcertain vessel classes,100% or certain vesselclasses
Participants payincremental costso catch sharemanagement via costrecovery
~1% - 2% o ex-vesselrevenues
BRITISH COLUMBIAINTEGRATEDGROUNDFISHPROGRAM
Mostly throughindependent brokers
Catch and landingsreported or every tripand deducted romIVQ pounds
Any overage must be
covered by next trip
Logbooks
100% at-seamonitoring (onboardobservers orelectronic monitoring)
100% docksidemonitoring
Participants payall direct costs omonitoring
~5% o shery value
CHILEAN NATIONALBENTHIC RESOURCESTERRITORIALUSE RIGHTS FORFISHING PROGRAMME
Trading not authorized Each group collects,aggregates andreports landings datato government
Veri ed with samplingdata
Landings datareported togovernment bygroups
For some species,also record harvestername and depth o
harvest
Groups pay orapplication ees,baseline studies,stock assessmentand some monitoringand en orcement
Also pay tax based on
hectares
DANISH PELAGIC &DEMERSAL INDIVIDUALTRANSFERABLEQUOTA PROGRAMS
Primarily via voluntarycooperatives that usean online trans ersystem
Independent brokers
All landings arereported andmanaged via onlinetrans er system
Pilot program onreporting all catch
Dockside monitoring
At-sea monitoringusing EM
Participants pay orat-sea monitoring(currently a voluntaryprogram)
This chart provides a brie summary o the Step 6 design decisions or the our case studies eatured in this Design Manual. For an
in-depth discussion o each shery, please see the ull case studies in the Catch Shares in Practice section starting on page 103.
Step 6 Develop Administrative Systems
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
101/18495
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
102/18496
7 Assess Per ormanceand Innovate
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
103/18497
K E Y P R I N C I P L E S
The nal Step o catch share design is to ensure the program is unctioning well and achieving
the identi ed program goals. You should conduct regular assessments and modi y the
program as necessary to meet existing and new goals. In addition to ormal program changes,
participants should also be encouraged to innovate in order to improve the program.
7.1 Conduct regular program reviews. | 98
7.2 Assess per ormance against goals. | 98
7.3 Encourage innovation. | 99
Innovations to Enhance Per ormance: Japans Community-based Cooperatives | 99
Combinations o Catch Share Design Features: In Order o Most Commonly Used Worldwide | 101
S P E C I A L F E A T U R E S
Assess per ormance against goals and encourage innovation to improve the programover time. | 100
S E A S A L TSecureAll sourcesScaled
LimitedAccountable
S U B - S T
E P S
At a Glance
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
104/18498
As you will recall, the purpose o Step 1 Defne Program
Goals was to identi y the biological/ecological, economicand social goals or the catch share program. Steps 2 6
ocused on designing the program to meet those goals.
Once the catch share is underway, it is important to assess
program per ormance against the originally de ned goals.
Some goals may be easier to assess than others due to
available data. As you plan the program, you may needto collect baseline data, especially economic and social
data, in order to provide a meaning ul re erence point.
Assessing per ormance is a regular practice o most catch
share sheries. Program design should be modi ed as
needed based on per ormance against goals and changing
conditions in the shery.
As with any shery management program, regular
reviews o the catch share program will provide important
in ormation. It may be help ul during the design process to
identi y a review schedule, as well as the speci c topics to
include in a regular review. In the U.S., the LAPP provision
o the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act requires new programs to be reviewed ve
years a ter implementation and then at least every seven
years therea ter.
Reviews should include an assessment o biological
conditions, especially in regard to ending over shing and
restoring and maintaining healthy stocks. Assessing other
conditions, such as the economic status o the shery may
also be important. Remember that it may take a ew years
or the ull e ects o the catch share program to be evident.
7
The nal Step o catch share design and implementation is to assess program per ormance and innovate to address emerging
opportunities and challenges. Flexibility is a key aspect o catch shares and programs must be dynamic in order to meet the
changing needs and conditions o the shery.
Completing this Step is a key part o ensuring all key attributes o the catch share program are being met. In particular,
program assessment can determine whether privileges are Secure enough to realize bene ts and i the Scale o the program
is working well biologically and socially. In addition, in ormation and eedback over time can help track whether All sources
o mortality are included in the program and i catch is appropriately Limited . Finally, regular review can assess whether the
program is Accountable .
6 Assess Per ormance and Innovate7
CONDUCT REGULAR PROGRAM REVIEWS
ASSESS PERFORMANCE AGAINST GOALS
.1
.2
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
105/18499
Flexibility and innovation are key aspects o catch share
programs. Under catch shares, shermen are allowed
fexibility while being held accountable or their share o the catch, which o ten leads to new, innovative solutions to
challenges that may arise. For example, shermen in many
catch share programs have substantially reduced bycatch
and habitat impacts by reducing and modi ying the gear
used, care ully planning shing activities, cooperating with
other shermen and more.
Many catch share programs have also undergone expansion
or integration o existing programs. The British Columbia
Integrated Ground sh Program began as separate gear
and species-speci c catch share programs and is now
Community-based Cooperative catch share programs are the oundation o nearshore coastal sheries in Japan and
have evolved rom traditional organizations dating back to the eudal era. These exclusive shing rights are available
only to community members, and there are over 1,600 cooperatives in Japan with exclusive shing rights recognized
by the Japanese government (Uchida and Makino, 2008).
The sheries are co-managed by two types o organizations: Fishery Cooperative Associations (FCAs) and Fishery
Management Organizations (FMOs). FCAs are comprised o all the communities that partake in shing in the coastal
sheries and have been granted exclusive access by the government. The FCA management areas are de ned by
geo-political backgrounds rather than stock boundaries (Uchida and Makino, 2008). An FCA is comprised o speci c
communities and all o the sheries within those boundaries; there ore FCAs manage multiple species, gears and
sectors at once (Uchida and Makino, 2008). Additionally, FCAs are required to maintain catch records o all members.
Fishery management organizations (FMOs) are an innovative program organized by shermen. They are speci c to
a single shery and/or species and are comprised o shermen who sh at the same shing grounds, sh the same
species stocks and/or employ the same type o shing gear (Uchida and Makino, 2008). Fishermen have ormed
FMOs in order to coordinate harvest and manage resources on mutually agreed rules. The responsibilities o a
FMO can include shery resource management, shing ground management, and shing e ort control. FMOs are
legitimately recognized by the FCAs, and together they help manage Japans coastal shing grounds.
SNAPSHOT 7.1 | Innovations to Enhance Per ormance
Japans Community-based Cooperatives
ENCOURAGE INNOVATION7.3
STEP 7 | ASSESS PERFORMANCE AND INNOVA
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
106/184
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
107/184101
TransferableIndividually-allocated
Transferable
Non-transferableIndividually-allocated
Non-transferable
Non-transferableIndividually-allocated
Individually-allocated
Individually-allocated
Non-transferableIndividually-allocated
Non-transferableGroup-allocated
Group-allocated
TransferableGroup-allocated
TransferableGroup-allocated
TransferableIndividually-allocated
TransferableIndividually-allocated
TransferableGroup-allocated
Non-transferableGroup-allocated
Transferable
Non-transferable
Non-transferableGroup-allocated
Group-allocated
Individually-allocated
Non-transferable
Transferable
Group-allocated
Single-species
Multi-species
Multi-species
Single-species
Single-species
Multi-species
Multi-species
Single-species
Multi-species
Single-species
Multi-species
Multi-species
Multi-species
Single-species
Single-species
Single-species
Multi-species
Single-species
FIGURE 7.1 | Combinations of Catch Share Design Features
IN ORDER OF MOST COMMONLY USED WORLDWIDE
SCALE OF MOST COMMON
Most Common Least Common
Species-based
Species-based
Species & area-based
Species-based
Species & area-based
Species & area-based
Species & area-based
Species & area-based
Species & area-based
Species & area-based
Species & area-based
Species-based
Species-based
Species-based
Species-based
Species-based
Species & area-based
Species-based
STEP 7 | ASSESS PERFORMANCE AND INNOVA
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
108/184102
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
109/184103
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
110/184104
Keith Bell and Buck Laukitis pull aboard a paci c
halibut while commercial longline shing in the
Aleutian Islands, Alaska. PHOTO: SCOTT DICKERSON
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
111/184105
Alaska Halibut and Sablefsh Fixed GearIndividual Fishing Quota Program
catch shares in practice
The Alaska Halibut and Sable sh Fixed Gear Individual Fishing Quota Program (IFQ Program) was one
o the rst to include a variety o design elements to meet key social goals while also contributing to
decreasing overcapitalization and increasing the value o the shery. Some o the key design elements
include low concentration limits, restrictions on trading, strict shareholder eligibility requirements and
more. The program also allocates a percentage o the shares to the Community Development Quota
(CDQ) program, which includes 65 eligible communities organized into six groups and was designed to
ensure shing access, support economic development, alleviate poverty, and provide economic and social
bene ts to residents o western Alaska communities (North Paci c Fishery Management Council, n.d, A).
S Y N OP S I S
S P E C I A L D E S I G N
F E A T U R E S
MULTI-SPECIES, INDIVIDUALLY-ALLOCATED AND GROUP-ALLOCATED,
SPECIES-BASED, TRANSFERABLE
S E A S A L TSecureExclusive
AccountableLimited
Scaled
Trans erable
In 1995, managers implemented an IFQ Program or the Alaska halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and
sable sh (Anoplopoma mbria) xed gear shery. The IFQ Program has received signi cant attention as
it was among the rst catch share programs to design or explicit social goals in addition to biological and
economic goals. Fi teen years a ter implementation, the catch share program is meeting its goals.
The shery occurs in ederal waters o Alaska in the Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands and Gul o Alaska.
Fishermen use xed gear vessels ranging in length rom less than 35 eet to over 60 eet, including longline
catcher vessels and catcher-processor vessels. In 2008, shermen landed approximately 74 million
pounds worth U.S. $245 million (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ).
The shery is managed by the National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS), with consultation by the North
Paci c Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), and the International Paci c Halibut Commission (IPHC),
which sets the catch limit and coordinates the management o the Paci c halibut sh stocks or Canada
and the U.S. (Hartley and Fina, 2001).
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
112/184106
Road to a Catch Share
The commercial hook and line shery or halibut began on a small scale in the 1880s. It grew greatly in the 1920s
with the introduction o diesel-powered engines and mechanical longline equipment (Hartley and Fina, 2001),
and soon a ter landings increased and stocks began to decline. From the 1920s through the 1980s, more andmore vessels entered the shery (many vessels entering part-time due to declining crab and salmon stocks)
and e ort continued to increase. Managers responded with various regulations and Canada and the U.S.
coordinated e orts through the International Paci c Halibut Commission.
By the 1980s, overcapitalization had hit an extreme. The high number o vessels in the shery led managers
to implement stricter and stricter regulations causing an Olympic race or sh. In the nal years be ore the
catch share program, the halibut season was only open or a ew days out o the calendar year, in which the
commercial sector landed their entire catch limit, approximately 43 million pounds o sh (Pautzke and Oliver,
1997). While the stocks were not over shed, shermen consistently exceeded the catch limits. Gear conficts,
ghost shing (due to gear that is cut loose during the race or sh and le t in the water continuing to kill sh),
concerns regarding sa ety including deaths at-sea, low catch per unit o e ort, declining product quality, and
low ex-vessel prices were the norm (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ). In addition, regulations prohibited sable sh
shermen rom landing halibut and vice versa, leading to signi cant discards o marketable sh.
In response to the severe ailures o traditional management, managers and shermen implemented a catch
share program. The British Columbia halibut and sable sh sheries had recently implemented a success ul
IVQ Program that provided a model or Alaska (see Catch Shares in Practice: British Columbia Integrated
Groundfsh Program ). Alaska shermen and managers identi ed a variety o goals that were important or
their shery, including biological goals outlined in the National Standards o the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act and additional economic and social goals.
Per ormance
Fi teen years later, the program is success ully meeting its goals. Since shing under the IFQ Program, shermen
rarely exceed their catch limits: No stocks are over shed and over shing is not occurring. Bycatch has declined
and ghost shing has decreased substantially. Due to longline gear, seabird bycatch (including short-tailed
albatross, Laysan albatross, northern ulmars, and shearwaters) had historically been a big problem in the
shery. However, with the slower seasons shermen have been able to innovate, and the introduction o seabird
excluder devices, such as streamer lines, has signi cantly improved the rate o seabird bycatch.
Dockside revenues have also increased under the IFQ Program. Under race conditions, shermen would deliver
the entire years catch in very short windows o time, creating a glut and requiring processors to reeze most
o the sh. Under the IFQ Program, sh are now landed over eight months and processors can deliver a resh
product to customers. By avoiding a glut and delivering a higher quality product, shermens dockside revenues
have increased. In combination with decreased costs, shermen now have more stable, pro table jobs.
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
113/184107
Sa ety has also improved substantially since shermen have more fexibility around when to go shing. Just
prior to the catch share program, search and rescue cases numbered in the 20s and 30s. By 2007, there were only
ve search and rescue cases, and in 2008, only three cases occurred (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ).
While some shermen and crew have le t the shery ollowing the IFQ Program, this outcome was expected
due to the extreme overcapitalization under traditional management. Importantly, overcapitalization has been
reduced while still meeting the programs goals in regard to maintaining historic feet and participant structure
(NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ). Low concentration limits have prevented corporate ownership o the feet and
owner-on-board provisions or new participants have encouraged owner-operators (NOAA Fisheries Service,
2009 ). Short-term, unstable, o ten low-paying jobs have been replaced with more stable, long-term, better-
paying jobs. And, i the shery had not transitioned to a catch share, it would have continued to ace shorter and
shorter seasons and potentially closures.
STEP 1 IN PRACTICEDefne Program Goals
Alaska shermen and managers identi ed a variety o catch share program goals. These included meeting
legal requirements o the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act regarding stock
sustainability and additional ecological, economic and social goals.
Biological goals prescribed in the National Standards (NS) One, Three and Nine o the Magnuson Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1851):
1. Conservation and management measures shall prevent over shing while achieving, on a continuing
basis, the optimum yield rom each shery or the United States shing industry.
2. To the extent practicable, an individual stock o sh shall be managed as a unit throughout its range,
and interrelated stocks o sh shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination.
3. Conservation and management measures shall, to the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B)
to the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality o such bycatch.
The nal ruling on the program said The IFQ program is intended to resolve various conservation and
management problems that stem rom the current open access regulatory regime, which allows ree access tothe common property shery resources and has resulted in excess capital investment in the sheries (National
Marine Fisheries Service, 1992). Additional goals o the IFQ Program were to keep the historic feet structure
o the shery, limit and discourage corporate ownership, limit wind all pro ts to participants granted quota,
discourage speculative entry, and reward participants who invested in the shery (long-time participants and
active participants) (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Furthermore, the NPFMC wanted to prevent quota rom being
owned strictly by large vessels that could possibly harm the smaller communities dominated by small boats
(Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).
NS1 -
NS3 -
NS9 -
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
114/184108
STEP 2 IN PRACTICE
Defne and Quanti y the Available Resource
De ning and quanti ying the available resource was largely driven by pre-existing management structures, as laid
out by the International Paci c Halibut Commission and the previously established Fishery Management Plan.
Halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) and sable sh (Anoplopoma mbria) are the target species o this multi-species
program. Both o the species are long lived (50 years or halibut and 90 years or sable sh), demersal species that
live near the seafoor. Fishermen tend to target either halibut or sable sh in a trip, but can requently encounter
both species. Prior to the IFQ Program, shermen targeting halibut were not allowed to land sable sh and vice
versa. Since the species habitats do overlap, shermen were discarding signi cant amounts o each species. In
particular, halibut was the main discard species or sable sh shermen. Grenadier, spiny dog sh and skates are
also caught as bycatch in the sable sh shery (Danner, 2008). What little bycatch there is in the halibut shery consists mostly o ground sh species.
Managers designed the multi-species IFQ Program with an eye toward reducing bycatch. Most importantly,
sable sh shermen are permitted to hold halibut shares and keep the halibut they encounter; halibut discards
have been substantially reduced under the IFQ Program (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). In both sheries, participants
are allowed to retain certain amounts o ground sh species as bycatch (Smith, 2004). Community Development
Quota (CDQ) shermen are required to keep all sable sh and legal-sized halibut that they catch. Catcher-
processor vessels may discard halibut i they do not have quota shares or it, however the proportion o halibut
discarded to sable sh quota shares caught is relatively small and there ore bycatch rates have not been a concern.
The Fishery Management Plan identi es eight halibut zones and six sable sh zones based on biological stocks.
Managers set a separate catch limit or each zone based on scienti c advice, and the IFQ Program identi ed
and allocated shares based on each zone. Fishermen are only allowed to use stock-speci c shares to cover their
landed catch in that area (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).
STEP 3 IN PRACTICE
Defne Eligible ParticipantsDe ning eligible participants was an important part o meeting the program goals, including retaining the
historical character o the feet. There are many detailed provisions about who is permitted to participate in
the program, and these stipulations in ormed initial allocation (discussed in more detail below), as well as
requirements or new participants.
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
115/184109
The program allocates privileges to both individuals and groups. The majority o shares are individually-
allocated, but a portion o both halibut and sable sh shares were allocated to groups via the CDQ program, which
was established in 1992 to provide western Alaska communities the opportunity to participate in the Bering Sea
and Aleutian Islands sheries. There are six regional organizations o CDQs comprising 65 communities. Every
ederal catch share program in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands is required to allocate shares to the CDQs.
One hallmark o the IFQ Program is the owner-on-board provision that requires shareholders to be aboard the
vessel during shing operations. It was designed to promote the owner-operator model prevalent in the shery
prior to the IFQ Program. Recognizing the di erent business models that existed at the time o implementation,
initial shareholders are exempted rom the provision and exempted owners may hire skippers to sh the IFQ
shares i the skipper owns 20% o the vessel. Individual share owners are also required to be a U.S. citizen and sign
the sh ticket (documentation o landings) upon landing (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).
There are speci c rules pertaining to corporations and partnerships. Notably, they can purchase catcher vessel
shares only i they received shares during the initial allocation (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). I new owners join acorporation or partnership, the entity must separate rom its catcher vessel quota shares and sell those shares to a
eligible individual (Smith, 2004).
Concentration limits are also an important design eature o this program. Many catch share sheries use
concentration limits, but the IFQ Program has identi ed particularly low caps. Vessels are subject to two di erent
caps: the vessel IFQ cap, which limits how many pounds a vessel may land in a season, and the quota share use
cap, which limits how many long-term shares a participant may hold. Some shares are designated as blocked,
meaning they cannot be subdivided or trading. Participants are not permitted to hold more than two blocked
quota shares in a single management area (Smith, 2004).
Each management zone has limits on how much quota an individual is permitted to own, ranging rom 0.5%
1.5% o the total quota shares. Participants who exceeded the concentration cap at the time o implementation
were grand athered in at the levels indicated by their landing history during the eligible years (Pautzke and
Oliver, 1997).
New participants can enter the shery by buying or leasing shares. To be eligible to purchase shares, new
participants must apply or and obtain a Trans erable Eligibility Certi cate issued by the North Paci c Region o
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). An applicant must be a U.S. citizen and show documentation o 150
days o commercial shing experience in the U.S.
There are currently two special programs in support o new entrants: The North Paci c Loan Program, which
helps nance new participants and shareholders with low quota holdings (Hartley and Fina, 2001, NOAA
Fisheries Service, 2009 ), and the Community Quota Entity (CQE) program, which helps select communities
acquire shares.
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
116/184110
STEP 4 IN PRACTICE
Defne the Privilege
The privilege was de ned largely to maintain the relative structure o the feet at the time o program
implementation. The program includes numerous classes o shares, each with speci ed uses. The privilege is
species-based, meaning participants are allocated secure shares o the catch limit or halibut and sable sh.
The long-term privileges, quota shares, were granted inde nitely to initial shareholders and can be sold to
eligible participants. Quota shares may be revoked as a penalty or non-compliance with regulations, and as with
any management program, managers may change or end the program through the normal processes set out or
management changes. I this occurs, shareholders will receive no compensation.
Participants annual allocations are calculated at the beginning o each season. For each zone, the catch limit
is multiplied by the participants quota shares (both permanent and temporary holdings) and then divided by the total amount o quota shares held by all participants (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). From this, shareholders are
alerted o the IFQ permit weight, the annual allocation unit, that they are allowed to land during the season.
There are two main types o vessels in the shery: catcher-processor vessels (also called reezer longliners) and
catcher vessels, each with speci ed quota share categories (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997). Catcher vessels are urther
divided into size categories.
There are our vessel categories or halibut, including:
1. Catcher vessels less than 35 eet in length
2. Catcher vessels between 35 and 60 eet in length
3. Catcher vessels greater than 60 eet in length
4. Catcher-processor vessels
There are three vessel categories or sable sh, including:
1. Catcher vessels less than 60 eet in length
2. Catcher vessels greater than 60 eet in length
3. Catcher-processor vessels
The catch share program allows both permanent and temporary trans er o shares, but leasing in the shery has
been very restricted (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ). Quota shares can only be traded within their respective
vessel class size, vessel operation mode and region. Each vessel class has particular rules on trading:
Catcher vessels can only permanently trans er (i.e., sell) quota to eligible buyers, which includes
participants who received quota shares during initial allocation or people who obtain a Trans erable
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
117/184111
Eligibility Certi cate by documentation o 150 days o commercial shing experience in the U.S. Temporary
leasing is not allowed in the catcher vessel class. Corporations and partnerships can buy catcher boat shares
only i they received shares during the initial allocation (Pautzke and Oliver, 1997).
Catcher-processor vessel quota shares can be temporarily leased and permanently trans erred to any U.S.
citizen. CDQ quota is not trans erable; however CDQ quota holders can hire shermen to sh their quota.
All quota can be inherited by heirs upon the passing o the owner.
Furthermore, some shares are blocked, meaning they cannot be subdivided during trans ers. Blocked quota
was developed, in part, to keep the price lower and more a ordable or smaller shareholders and new entrants,
and 15 years a ter the program, price per unit o blocked quota is slightly lower than unblocked quota (Dock
Street Brokers, 2010).
Minimal inter-season trading is also permitted. Participants are not allowed to carry over unused quota, but in
the event o overage, they are allowed to borrow up to 10% o the ollowing years share.
During the rst three years o the program, catcher vessel shareholders were only allowed to lease 10% o
their shares per year, and were not allowed to permanently sell shares (Pautzke and Oliver 1997). This was
intended to prevent major changes to the feet characteristics while participants began to understand how
the program worked.
STEP 5 IN PRACTICE
Assign the Privilege
Initial allocation is o ten one o the most contentious parts o the catch share design process and requires care ul
attention. Following a thought ul design process, in 1991 the North Paci c Fishery Management Council voted
to implement the IFQ Program or the Alaska halibut and sable sh shery. Upon approval, NMFS created the
Restricted Access Management Division (RAM), comprised o approximately nine sta members, to determine
the initial allocations or eligible participants and to administer the IFQ Program (Hartley and Fina, 2001). The al-
location process took about one year to complete and occurred in 1994, a year prior to program implementation.
Vessel owners or leaseholders who made at least one commercial landing in 1988, 1989 or 1990 were eligible
to receive initial share allocations (multiple years were chosen to accommodate disruption due to the Exxon
Valdez oil spill). Eligible participants were granted shares based on catch history. Halibut share allocations
were calculated based on participants highest landings in ve o seven years rom 1984 to 1990; sable sh share
allocations were calculated based on the best ve o six years rom 1985 to 1990.
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
118/184112
RAM used landings data rom existing NMFS records to calculate each eligible participants share and mailed
eligible recipients his/her estimated initial allocation and a quota application. The eligible participants were
required to con rm the recorded data, complete the application, and send it back to RAM.
Eligible participants were allowed to appeal their estimated quota allocations by supplying RAM with proper
documentation o the data in question. Acceptable documentation included sh tickets, leases or ownershippapers (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Once RAM received the documentation, it went under technical review and
the owner would be alerted o any changes in quota allocation within 45 days. I the RAM technical review did
not result in any changes, participants could request a hearing with a NOAA o cer in which they presented
documentation in support o their cause. I the participant was still dissatis ed with the NOAA decision, they had
the option to appeal to the ederal court within 30 days.
Out o 9,000 applications or quota, about 8,000 were allocated shares (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Six hundred and
ty appealed their allocation calculation citing errors such as improper vessel category determination, basic
eligibility to receive quota, size o allocation, etc. (Hartley and Fina, 2001). Following the technical review by RAM,
179 urther appealed their cases and ultimately only 10 cases went to the ederal court system or a nal decision.
STEP 6 IN PRACTICE
Develop Administrative Systems
The RAM Division o NMFS administers the IFQ Program. RAM responsibilities include: determining eligibility
and issuing permits, processing trans ers, collecting landing ees and related activities. The systems used to
administer the catch share program have evolved over time, especially as technology and access to the internethave improved.
Participants are held accountable or their landings and shery in ormation is largely collected via dockside
monitoring. Shareholders are required to hail in/out and complete logbooks or each trip. At 16 main ports,
NMFS agents per orm comprehensive dockside monitoring o all landings, checking the actual landings against
the shareholders logbooks. At smaller ports, NMFS agents per orm random checks. Fish buyers are required to
have a permit and to report all purchases made rom IFQ and CDQ vessels.
On average, the monitoring program requires 30% onboard observer coverage. Vessels smaller than 60 eet and
halibut vessels do not require observer coverage. Coverage levels or other vessels vary by vessel size, type and
gear. Vessels larger than 125 eet are required to have observer coverage 100% o the time (North Paci c Fishery
Management Council, n.d., B.)
Participants use eLandings (landings.alaska.gov), an interagency electronic reporting system or all commercial
shery landings in Alaska, to record and track halibut and sable sh landings. The website is the pre erred system
or administration and will soon replace the landing reporting unction on the NMFS web application. The
website is managed by Alaska Department o Fish and Game, the International Paci c Halibut Commission
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
119/184113
and NOAA sheries. Access to both o the systems is ree and available to any vessel owner with an IFQ permit.
Websites are housed in the NMFS Alaska Regional O ce website.
Throughout the year, participants enter in ormation on the NMFS web application, which deducts the trip
landings rom their annual quota pounds. The system is also used to track vessel quota balances, print receipts
or past landings, create an ex-vessel value and volume report, renew buyer permits, check permit balances, pay cost recovery ees, review IFQ landing ledger reports, review registered buyer landing ledger reports, and produce
a quota share holdings report (NMFS Alaska Regional O ce, n.d.B).
I a participant exceeds his/her shares by 10% or less, they may borrow shares rom the ollowing year to cover
their overage. I a shareholder exceeds his/her quota by more than 10% on the last trip o the season, they may be
subject to nes and suspensions. In severe cases, the government may revoke a participants shares.
Design and implementation o the IFQ Program cost approximately $2 million and was paid or by the NMFS
budget (Hartley and Fina, 2001). In 2001, a cost recovery ee program was implemented as authorized by the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. The program requires shareholders to pay a
maximum o 3% o the ex-vessel value o IFQ landings to cover the incremental administrative management costs
due to the catch share program, such as acilitating trans ers, enhanced en orcement, etc. Cost recovery ees are
calculated annually, and shermen have never paid more than 2% o the ex-vessel value o the landings. En orce-
ment or the shery costs about $2.3 million per year and in 2008, $1.1 million was spent on administration o
the shery (NOAA Fisheries Service, 2009 ; Hartley and Fina 2001). When the cost recovery program was initially
implemented, some collected revenues unded the North Paci c Loan Program; however, all collected ees now
pay or management costs. Fishermen who are required to have an onboard observer pay those costs directly.
STEP 7 IN PRACTICE
Assess Per ormance and Innovate
The program has gone through numerous innovations over the years. In act, the program has been o cially
modi ed 39 times since initial implementation (NMFS Alaska Regional O ce, 2010b). These have included
modi cations to trading restrictions, eligibility rules, administrative catch accounting systems and more.
One notable innovation occurred in 2004, 13 years a ter program implementation. The Council created the
Community Quota Entity (CQE) program, which authorizes non-pro t organizations to purchase and use annual
IFQ or a council-approved list o 42 communities, including Old Harbor, Craig, and Sand Point (Smith, 2004).
This program is designed to provide these communities with secure access to the shery and a valuable asset
(North Paci c Fishery Management Council, 2010). CQEs must comply with speci c rules including restrictions
on concentration. For example, CQE is not subject to vessel class sizes, but there are limitations on how much
quota they can hold. Each CQE is responsible or determining the use o their quota shares including eligible
shing participants. It is still too early to assess the per ormance o this special program, but it shows how
managers and shermen were able to innovate over time.
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
120/184114
PHOTO: WES ERIKSON
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
121/184115
British Columbia IntegratedGroundfsh Program
catch shares in practice
The British Columbia Integrated Ground sh Program (Integrated Program) is one o the most
comprehensive catch share programs in the world. The multi-species program includes over 70 species,
30 o which are managed via quota, and includes all commercial shermen targeting ground sh,
regardless o gear type. The program includes a number o innovative design eatures such as quota
set-asides, which are meant to encourage community development and incentivize positive treatment
o crew. Additionally, the program requires 100% individual accountability o all catch and uses an
innovative monitoring and catch accounting system to support accountability.
The British Columbia ground sh shery has a 20-year history with catch shares: The rst catch share
program was implemented in 1990 or the sable sh (Anoplopoma mbria) shery, ollowed one year later
by the halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) shery. In 1997, the ground sh trawl shery implemented an IVQ
Program, and in 2006, managers implemented the Integrated Ground sh Pilot Program that combined
the halibut, sable sh and ground sh trawl programs and incorporated all commercial hook and line
caught rock sh, lingcod (Ophiodon elongates) and dog sh (Squalus acanthias) into one overarching
program. The overarching program was made permanent at the start o the 2010/2011 season and is what
we re er to in this case study as the Integrated Program.
The shery occurs o Canadas west coast and is managed by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), with
joint management o halibut stocks by the International Paci c Fisheries Commission. Fishermen use
hook and line, traps and trawls to harvest over 60 stocks o ground sh. The total value o ground sh
landings was $124 million in 2007 (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2009a).
S Y N OP S I S
S P E C I A L D E S I G N
F E A T U R E S
MULTI-SPECIES, INDIVIDUALLY-ALLOCATED, SPECIES-BASED, TRANSFERABLE
S E A S A L TSecureExclusive
Accountable
Trans erable
All sourcesScaled
Limited
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
122/184116
Road to a Catch Share
Until the late 1970s, there was little management o marine resources in the waters o British Columbia. The
ground sh shery was open to domestic and oreign feets, and by the mid-70s, stocks had started to decline
(e.g., in 1974 halibut landings were just one third o the averages in the 1960s). In response, managers beganimplementing a variety o traditional management measures including limited entry licensing, annual catch
limits, shery closures, and gear and vessel restrictions.
Fishing licenses were largely based on the vessels target species. For example, shermen targeting halibut
were required to have a halibut license while shermen targeting sable sh were required to have a sable sh
license. Fishermen who did not hold the appropriate license were not permitted to land those species. In
actuality, shermen were encountering multiple species and were there ore required to discard large amounts o
marketable species.
From 1980 to the early 1990s, the capacity and ability o the feet to catch sh increased dramatically. In 1980,
the commercial halibut feet harvested 5.7 million pounds o halibut in 65 days; in 1990, shermen harvested
8.5 million pounds in six days (Sporer, 2001). In every year rom 1979 to 1990 (except 1980), the halibut catch
limit was exceeded and a race or sh resulted in shorter seasons, unsa e shing conditions, large quantities o
discards, poor quality o sh and inconsistent supply o resh sh (and corresponding low dockside prices).
The experience was similar in the sable sh and ground sh trawl sheries. In act, the ground sh trawl shery
was closed in 1995 due to severe overharvesting o the catch limit and the inability o managers to ensure
compliance with catch limits (Sporer, 2001). The system ailed to ensure sustainability leading to depletion o
sh stocks, and the economic viability o the feets and communities that depended upon them was decreasing.
The 1990s marked a time o widespread change. In response to the ailures o traditional management,
and o ten upon request o the shermen, catch share programs were implemented in the sable sh, halibut
and ground sh sheries in 1990, 1991 and 1997, respectively. The halibut and sable sh programs were
initially implemented as trial programs, but they were ormalized shortly therea ter, upon meeting identi ed
conservation and economic goals (Sporer, 2001). In 2006, the remaining ground sh feet (mostly hook and line
vessels) were introduced into the program and all commercial sherman targeting ground sh (including halibut
and sable sh) were integrated into a single catch share program.
Conservation and protection o sh and sh habitat is the rst goal o Canadas shery management. Following this mandate, additional goals include compliance with regulations, secure and stable access or shermen,
airness to individuals and groups, promotion o historical participation, economic viability, best use o the sh
or economics, social and cultural needs, and assuring public access.
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
123/184117
Per ormance
The catch share program is success ully meeting its goals. Fleet-wide catch limits are rarely exceeded, bycatch
rates have been substantially reduced, revenues and pro ts have increased, season length has increased and
jobs are more stable (Munro et al., 2009; GSGislason and Associates, Ltd., 2008). The catch share program has arobust system o individual accountability which has ensured catch limits are not exceeded and stocks are doing
well. No species in the ground sh complex are designated under the Species at Risk Act, meaning no species
require special management attention (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2009a).
Bycatch had previously been a substantial problem in the ground sh shery, especially because shermen
were o ten required to discard per ectly marketable species that were caught as bycatch, i.e., directed
sable sh shermen discarded halibut due to regulations. One primary impetus or integrating all ground sh
species under one management plan was to reduce discards, and the system has been largely success ul in
accomplishing this goal.
As o 2007, there were over 300 active licenses in the British Columbia Ground sh sheries. Close to 200 o these
were used to operate in the halibut shery with the remainder spread out airly evenly over the other sheries
(Turris, 2009). Most vessels are multi-licensed and can participate in several sheries (i.e., a vessel will have all
the necessary licenses to sh halibut, sable sh, rock sh, lingcod and dog sh by hook and line gear).
STEP 1 IN PRACTICE
Defne Program GoalsGeneral objectives o management or the ground sh shery are to ensure sustainability, economic
development and equity. More speci c objectives have been outlined or the management o some ground sh
species in each management plan.
Overarching goals or the Integrated Program included conservation o sh stocks, increased bene ts rom
the ground sh shery, and a air distribution o bene ts arising rom the Integrated Program. Speci cally, the
management objectives outlined prior to development o the Integrated Program are:
Maintain the existing processing capacity
Stabilize employment in the shery
Encourage economic development in coastal communities
Ensure the air treatment o crew
Allow or controlled rationalization o the feet
Minimize the negative consequences associated with the leasing and concentration o quota shares
(Sporer, 2001)
-
8/7/2019 Catch Share Design Manual A Guide for Managers and Fishermen
124/184118
DFO developed ve additional objectives prior to the integration o all stocks into IVQs in 2006 (Fraser, 2008):
1. Account or all rock sh catch
2. Manage rock sh catch according to established rock sh management areas
3. Require sh harvesters to be individually accountable or their catch
4. Implement new monitoring to ensure above objectives
5. Examine species and stocks o concern and take action or precautionary management
STEP 2 IN PRACTICE
Defne and Quanti y the Available Resource
One important design eature o the Integrated Program is the coordinated management o all species and
shermen. There are over 70 marine species under management in the ground