GEORGE FORTY

1

R::ADTBERLI

THE ALLIED DRIVE FROM NORMANDY

ROAD TO BERLIN

1

- -

Below: Mulberry Harbours. Each harbour was aslarge as Gibraltar harbour, with iron breakwatersweighing 3,000 tons and vast conc;rete catssoos,some of them 400ft in length . They were designed tolMKl 12,000 tons of stores and 2,500 vehicles daily.Here , unloading is in full swing, opposite Omaha.(IWM • EA 4 1379)

ROAD TO BERLINThe Allied Drive from Normandy

GEORGE FORTY

,...­C ASSELL

1

Ca~<,{"11 &. Co

wellington House , 125 Strand, London WC2R OBB

C George Forty 1<Jqq

All righh reserved. No part of this !x.l(ll may be reportedo r transmitted in any form or by an)' means etectromc or

mechamcar induding photocopying recording or anyinfonnation storage and retrieval system withoul

perrmssson in writing from the Publisher.Fi"'t published 1999

British library C..ataloguing-in-l'ublication Data:a cata logue record for thh book is available from the

British Library

ISR:-J 0-304-35.'U.)6.X

Dlstrtbuted in the USA by Stirling PubJi§hing Co. Inc ,3M] Pa rk Avenue South.Xew YorL, NY 10016-HMIO,

Designed and edited by IMG Pubuca nons l.td ,Design ed by David Gibbons: layo ut by Anthony A. ham;

edt ted by Mkhael Boxau. punted and bo und In GreatBritain,

ACKr..:OWU I}(;[M[NTS

I mu st thank the following photographic sources forallo wing me to use their evoc ative ima/(t'<; : The [mll••·ria l

War Museum; the Tank Museuru: the Natio na l Arrh i\'l' \ o fCanada; th e Natio na l Archives of Ameoca: IIll' US Army

and US Sign al Corps: Rea l war Photos, Ind ian a; t ill' Patton

Museum of Cavalry and Armor; Mr Bruce kobe rtvon an dother individu al sources J \ shown in the photographic

credits.

Contents

Introduction, 7

1. That First Toehold, 9

2. Building-up the Beach-head, 24

3. Breakout, 4S

4. Operation 'Dragoon', 69

S. From the Seine to the Rhine, 79

6. Arnhem, 99

7. Clearing the Scheldt, 108

8. The 'Lull' before the Storm, 117

9. Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, 133

10. To the Rhine, 148

11. Into Germany, 170

12. Victory, 183

Bibliography, 192

1

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Western Europe

Normandy.

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6

Germany, of t hreatening the Ruhr. The right­fla nk Army Group woul d advance in step,link in g up wi th the forces that it was intendedwo uld invade sout hern France, th en toget herth ey would advance eastwards .4. ·10 build up forces and supplies along th e

western borde rs of Germany, securi ng por ts inBelgium and Britt any to facili tate th is bu ild-up .5. While the build-up was taking place, tom ain tain an unr ele nt in g offe nsive, so as towea r down th e enemy a nd thus gain advan­

tages for the fina l battles.6. To complete the dest ruction of e nemyforces west of th e Rhin e, while constantly

seeking opportunities to seize bridge-headsacross the rive r.7. Having crossed the Rhine in strengt h, tolaunch a fina l offensive in a double envelop­ment of the Ruhr, emp hasising the left prong,and following this up with an im mediate thrustthrough Gen nany (the specific di rection of th isfinal thrust to be determi ned at the time).

8. finall y, to clean out the rest of 'GreaterGerma ny', linkin g up wit h Sov iet forcesadvancing fro m the eas t.

In h is book Eisenhower states th at: 'Thi sgeneral plan . ca refully out lined at staff meet­ings befo re DcDay, was never aba ndoned, even

momen ta rily, t h rou ghout the campaign.' Ingene ra l te rms t his is t rue, except of co urse forone d igress ion whe n t he unexpected Ger ma noffensive in t he Arde nnes had to be dea lt wit h .

This then is wha t I have used as the basicst ructure of Road to Berlin, and [ hope it will

prov ide the reader wit h a n interesti ng and illu­mi na ting reco rd of what was one of the greatmoments in the history of man, cer tainly inthe 20t h century and possibly of all time.

Introduction

George FortyBryan tspudd le, DorsetSeptember 1998

Even a brief glance at t h is book will quicklyshow that it is short on text and long on visua limages and this is in line wit h its mai npurpose, namely to te ll by photographs th estory of the Allied campaign in Nor t h WestEuro pe, in the twe lve months, June 1944 toMay 1945. However, des pite the fact th at thereare more tha n 280 ph o tographs and one map,it was clear ly impossible for me to cover everynotewort hy eve n t, every im portan t action,every m ain town o r city liberated , everyenemy strong hold capt ure d , every enemyar my defeated and thus to te ll the co mpletestory of everyone of t he five m illion plus menwho fought in th e campaigns. ' Why didn 'tyou inclu de ...?' is bound to he th e co mmentfrom some readers, but I hope th at I have done

enough to satis fy the ma jority.In his incom parable histo ry of the Second

Wor ld War, Churchill says that th e invasion ofEurope was what th e Western Powers mightjustly regard as being, ' the supreme climax ofthe war' , and goes on to aver tha t alt hough therood mig ht be long and ha rd, never: '... could wedoubt that dectstve victory would be gained'.

In hi s autobiography of the war years ,Gene ral DWight D. Eisenhower, the Sup reme

Allied Exped it iona ry Force Commander, setsout in a cha pte r co ncerned wit h the pla nn ingof 'Overlord', the ou tline of the proposedAllied opera tions . I wo uld summa rise h iswords as follows:1. To land on the coast of Nor ma ndy.2. To build up the necessary resources to figh tand win t he decisive battle in the Normandy­

Britt an y regio n .3 . To break out from encircli ng ene my posi­tions and pur sue th e enemy o n a broad fro n twith two Army Gro ups. The left-flan k ArmyGroup wo uld have the ma jor tasks of securingports so as to ens ure maintenance of supplies,and then , o n rea ching th e bounda ries of

tPRAGUE •fl'onlline\IApril 45/,,,,,,,,,,,,,

lich

Bolog

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7

INTRODUCTION

8

left: Gen Eise nhowersalutes London ers. TheSupreme Co mmanderwasgiven t he Freedomof the City on 12 June1945. (IW M - FOX(0 111)

Although thts book is prim a rily about theprogress of t he Allied ar m ies across North WestEurope from Nor ma ndy to Ber lin , a shortdescription of the monumen tal even t wh ichpreceded th e mobile batt les is essential. Th is ofcourse was the Allied la nd ings on th e coast ofNor mandy which to ok place on D-Day, 6 Ju ne

1944.

A Second FrontVirtually fro m the ti me whe n Hitler launchedhi s in vasion of Russia, the Soviets had beencont inua lly pressin g first the Brit ish then th eAmerican s and Brit ish , to open up a 'SecondFront' , to ta ke pressure off the USSR. However,firm agreement as to a suitable da te for th ism omen tous unde rtakin g did not co me untilt he Trident Conference, held in Washing ton11- 25 May 1943 , when Ch urc h ill andRoosevel t and t hetr advisers agreed that May1944 wou ld be th e earnest feasible date forsuc h an invasion to be launc hed. Th is wasthen changed to early June, th e chosen daybeing the Sth, in turn po stponed for 24 hours

bec ause of bad weat her.Although the Allies had already planned

the invasion of Sicily (10 Ju ly 19 H ), to befollowed by that of Italy (3 an d 9 Septe m ber1943), and despite Churchill's m isgivin gs thatany invasion of northern Fran ce m igh t wellturn in to a blood bath , it was decided to landthere, wit h just the short ' hop ' across t heEng lish Chan ne l, rat her tha n to rein fo rcesucc ess in the Mediterranean . It has also to besald th at the American s, suspec ting Ch urc hillo f ' Balka n in trigues' , sco tched a ny effo rtproposed there. After m uch delib era tion theNor ma ndy bea ch es between Cherhourg and Le

Havre were chosen , de sp ite th e w ry te m ptingan d m uch shor ter ap proach offe red by t he Pas­de -Carats . Norma ndy d id offer many advan ­tages - the beaches and in land ter rain were

1That First Toehold

suitable, the area was in easy reac h from RA F

a nd USAAF bases in so ut hern England, thed istance by sea was reasonable a nd, becausethe Germ ans were co nv ince d t ha t th e blowwo uld fall in the r'as-de-Calats, the Atla nt icWall defences were not as st rong there. Indeed ,having made t heir decision to go forNorma ndy, the Allies , by mea ns of an e labo­rate a nd many-facet ed cover plan (Operation' Po rut ude'j. d id th eir ve ry bes t to ensure thatt he Germans continued to ex pect th e majorland ing to be in the Pas-de-Calais. Fort u nately,th is co ver plan wor ked brillia ntly .

One ma jor d rawback to the chosen area wasth e absence of any im mediat e po rt facili ties.This was com pensated by the two am az ingprefabricated 'Mu lberr y' harbour s; these werein effect enor mous hollow co ncrete ca issonsthat wo uld be towed across the Cha n nel MIdsunk off two of the selected invasion beachesto form br ea kwaters. Near ly all t he UK'sco nc rete production had ga lle in to makingthese caissons , and in ad dit ion , a num be r ofo ld warshi ps and merc ha n tmen h ad bee nea rmar ked for use as out er breakwaters.'Ano the r revo lutionary means of supp ly wasPLUTO - the Pipelin e Under The Oce an ­wh ich wo uld ena ble fuel to be pu mped fromEngla nd to Fran ce, for m in g a lifeline to m eAllied forces on t he co ntinen t.

By the ea rly spring of 1944 , the Allies hadbu ilt up a m assive a rm y in t he Un itedKingdom, compr tstng m a ny thousands ofAme rican, British , Canadia n an d ot he r Alliedtroops, with an enormous array of up-to-datewea pons , vehi cles and equipment, backed by avast number of naval and air force units, wit han estimated to tal streng t h of more t han threem illion men . For Operat ion 'Overlord ' overalloperat ional co m ma nd of Allied ground forceswould be vested in General Sir Bernard Mont­gomery's HQ 2 1st Army Group, wit h troops

9

THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

from US First Army and British Seco nd Army(the latter conta in ing both Brtu sh and Cana­dian troops). They were of course under the

overa ll comma nd of Genera l Dwight D. Eisen ­hower, Supreme Commander Alljcd Expedi­

tionary Force , and his SHAEFheadquarters. Thesea landings would be made on five carefu llyselected beaches, code-named (from west toeast): ' Utah', 'Omaha', 'Gold ', 'J Uli O', 'Sword'

and would be preceded by an airborne assaultat 0200 hrs (some -1 11'2 hours befor e the firstseabo rne waves hi t th e beaches) by American

and British airborne fo rces. xte ssive air strikesby some 2,500 bombers and 7,000 fighter­bo mbers would soften up the beach -head areas- not rorgetttng to homb the rest of the coast,especially in th e Pas-de-Calais in order to main­tain the illusion that anything happentng inthe Normandy area was merely a fein t attack.The numbing effect of the mass bo mbingwould be thicken ed up by shore bombardment

from 700 warships - including five battleship",2.1 cru isers and mor e than 100 destroyers,which were to escort the landing force s.Backing up all this activity would be a much

10

longer bom bing campngu. spread over some3-t weeks prior to D-Llay and covering the

coas ta l area in depth, atmtng at di srupting allroad and rail communicat ions, so as to make it

as difficult as possible for the enemy to bringup rerntorcemcn ts.

On the ether side of th e Channe l, th eGorman defe nders were dogged by both inde­cision an d over-confide nc e. Field Marsh alErwin Rommel, he ro of North Africa and now

commander of Army Group 8, some of whosetroops had direct responsibility for th eNorm andy beac hes, appreciated more th anan yone how weak the 'Atlantic Wall ' really

was. He had been trying hard to get Hitler tovisit the area , so that he could explain the situ­

ation, make h im realise how short h is ArmyGroup was of both manpo wl.'r and " wtt'Tid , andim press upon his FUhrer the vitai necessity tobe able to control the deployment of th e all ­Important armoured reserve, which Rommelneeded as c10'>(' 10 the coast as possible beca usehe wanted to fight hts main battle on thebeaches before the enem y had lime 10 get afoothold. When it became clear that Hitler

Above: Well bden Brmsh

paratroopen board their

aircnft on the rvzht SoI6

Jtroe 1944 . They and their

~ counterparU wiI

be me f;ru AIhed troops to

bnd in~• . (IWM - CH

I BOl)

THAT FIRST TOE HOLD

Above : CamouI1aged with blac:kened taces, the paratrOOpers takeup their positions in the aircraft. (IWM - C H 1])004)

~: RAF Tarrant Rushton , Dorset. On the runway are theHalifax tugs and HorsaIHamilcar gliders for the second lift on D -

Day_ThiSphotograph was taken from the aerodrome's Tiger Mothat around 1ac:KlI'to on D -Day, the aircraft being part of Operation'Mallard', when 32 Halifax, tOWing 30 Hamilcao and 2 HC035 ,took off between 1928 and 19S9hrs . Only one Halifax was lost .(Broce Roberston)

THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

would never come to France. Rommel decided

to go to see him instead and arranged for a

personal interview o n 6 june. It had been

decided that the Allies would he unli kely to

invade during the period 5-8 j une beca use of

unfavoura b le t ides: mo reo ver no ne o f the Luft­

wa ffe's recen t rcconnatssance reports had indi­

rated any obviou s p re-inv as ion activi ty. Few

amo ng the Ge rman High Co m ma nd approcl­

ated t he fact t hat once the invasion was un der

way. overw helming Allied air supcrtortty would

make Ge rman troop movemen t so diffi cu lt as

to be Virtually impossible. ThO'\(' whose experi­

ence had been on the Eastern Front, where the

Luftwaffe had generally more than held its

own, just d id not believe the picture pa in ted

for them by Rommel who had had to suffe r t he

problem in North Africa.

Determined to wi n the Fuhrer o ver to h isway of thi nking, Rommel set o ff, mt on dtng to

go to scrcht esga rtcn via h is heme in Hcrrnngen

becam e h is wife Lucie's birthd ay was o n 6 june .

Air traw l ha d been banned fo r senior officers.

because o f the threat fro m Allied air activity. so

he left by car on the 5t h and was at ho me on

the fateful night 5/6 june. Th e general

consensus among the Gennan lI igh Commandwas that , while it was agreed that the Allies

would attempt a landing within t he next few

.....eeks , the defences would be sufficient to deal

with such landings, the l'as-de-Calats sti ll being

the most favoured site for suc h an attem pt.Ro mmel arrived ho me safely and was rung u p

by h is ch id of staff (Spl' ilk l) between

0600-0630 h rs who told h im abo ut the land­

ings and the act ion Army Group B had ta ken.

He im mediately cancelled his vis it to Hil ler and

returned posthaste to his headquarters , arrivingat La Roche Guyon by ZOCX> hrs that evening.

A trbarnr 'drlllinx,s. Between m idn ight and0200 hrs Ame rican and Briti sh airborne fo rces

were dropped or air-landed on thei r target

areas. These WNe to secure the flanks o f the

beach- head area, destroy vital bridges. gunposuton s, etc. tn the west , US lO lst Airborne

Divisio n (Ab Div) had the job of takin g and

holding the ca useways wh ich formed the exits

fro m Uta h Beach. across the marsh y grou nd

jus t in land . Th e US 8Znd Ab Div we re to be

12

Top left: Men of SOOth Regt. US 82nd Ab DiY. make a last-minutecheck of their equipment before taking off from an airfield inSaItby. England on 6 June 19+4. (US Army via RealWar Photos ­AS 2022)

~ left: Brrtish Horsa glider's scattered CNef" their landing zone~ Caen. (Bruce Robertson)

Above : Four members of the US 82nd Ab Oiv enter the village ofSte-Mere- Eglise under heavy enemy artillery fire on 6 June 19+4.

(US Army via Real War Photos • AS 2023)

Below: Weymouth. Dorset. American Rangers visit a temporary'doughnut dugout: ' for a cup of coffee and a doughnut. provided asalways by the American Red Cross. before boarding HMS PrinS

LeopokJ. to assault Point du Hoc. (US Natiooal Archives)

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•

THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

landed farther inland to dear the a rea betweenSte-Stere-Egltse and pont-l'Abbe, but the inex­perience of many of the pilots meant that bothdivisions' drops were widely scattered with the

result that the paratroops were wry thi n on theground. Neve rtheless they fought hard an dbravely and had a certa in am ount of luck - fo rexam ple, t111'y attacked the IIQ of German9 1st Air Landing Divis ion a nd killed t heco m m a nde r, t.leut enant -Gen e rut Wilhel mFalley, th e first German ge ne ral to be killedduring the invasion, thus leavi ng his d ivisionleaderless. On the eastern flank, the British 6thAb Div had three main tasks : to take and holdvarious crosstngs over the River Orne and th e

Caen Canal between Cacn and Outstreham: tostorm the Merville battery; to blow up va riousbridges over the River Dives. pespue some of

the troops bei ng landed in th e wrong loca tions,all th ese tasks were achi eved a nd the posi tionswere held unti l relieved from the beaches.

Setrl,,,,m' Il",dj".~s . The Allied z t st ArmyGroup (sec Annex ' A' for outline o rgan isatio n)

14

•

left : ACanadian chap­lain holdsa service onthe top deck of an LST

(Landing Ship TVlk).

belore they head for thebeaches. Note the guitarin lieu of a cnurch organ .(PIbic An:hives CanacD• PA 132899)

lOWff left: A Lmding~lnbnuy~to

beach on 0fNha.bringlna: in more iof;mO"y.

Notethe selection ofanks. twftracks, etcwhich has ~ready been

'"""". (US Anny)

BekJw: Red Beach elut

on Uuh . which was set

~ III the dunes along­side EXIt2. ThiS was then'Wn route o R this beachon D-Dar· (US Army viaIlaI War Phc:M:os • A106)

were to lan d on the five beach areas as detailedbelo w, close armoured suppo rt bei ng provided

by amp h ibious DO tanks and other remarkablea rmoured ttghung ve hicles fro m British 79t h

Armoured Division (t he 'Fun nies') . Thew

inclu ded m ine-clearing vehicles , brtdgelaycrs,flame-throwers, engineer vehicles an d ma nyothers. They would prove to be exceptionallyuseful. Allied naval forces were co mmanded by

Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay an d air fo rces byAir Chief Ma rshal Sir Trafford Leigh- Mallory.

O-Dar was originally scheduled fo r Monday, 5June 1944, but rough seas and high winds

brought a delay of 24 hours.

Ula h Reac h . Situated on the east coast of the

Cotenttn peninsula at les Du nes-de-va rrcvtlle,

this was General). Lawton Collins' US VII

Corps' objective. At 0630 hrs, led by US -lth

In fa n try Division, they landed o n the

southern sector of the beach with little rest s­

ranee, but marshy grou nd delayed the ir

adva nce in land . So me 28 of thei r 32

amphi b ious DD tan ks reached the beach

f iftee n minut es afte r the lead ing wave, so were

THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

ab le to give d ose sup po rt ing fire. By t he end of

t he day more than 23,000 men had bee n

la nded , t hey had ac hieved their set D-Day

object ives, and fewe r than 250 had been killed

or wo unded.Omaha ueach . Some eight mil es east of Utah ,

General Leona rd Gerow's US V Co rps landed

here, led by US 1st In fa n try Divisio n ('The Big

Red One'). They were in troub le from the

o utset . Because o f the exceedingly rough sea ,

the infantry, engineers and artillery were tran ­shipped into landing-craft too fa r o u t, and

many of the amphi bious tan ks were launched

too ea rly and sank before they could make the

beach. Visib ility was poor and as a resul t mostof the bo mbing was too far in land and the

naval covering fire fe ll too short . Enemy return

fire was both heavy a nd accura te. The density

of underwa ter obstacles was cons iderable and

the enemy had recenuy been reinforced. Thein itia l assault was held at the edge of the wa ter,

subseq ue n t waves ma king o nly slow and

painful progress. Towards m id-m o rning theudc of ha tt ie began to cha nge; large landing-

IS

Left: Royal MarineCommandos makingtheir way ashofoe at St­Aubin-sur-Her. Thesmall mot« cycle beingmanhandled over the~ belonged to 4th55 Bde HQ . (IWM • B5218)

Left : Commandos onthe beach. The landingat St-Aubin was direct lyunder heavy enemy fireand No 48 Commandosuffered many casualtiesbefore they could moveinland. (IWM _ MH3354)

...-..Left : An LCT about toground 00 Red Beach(Sword Area). The timeis about 35 minutes afterH hour • Note the

column of AFVSbelonging to 27th ArmdBde also Wlding - theleading tank near thetwO housesappean [ 0

be on fire. (IWM - BSill )

Above : Th is splendidphotograph was takenon the afternoon of 0 ­D~ as the Stonnont,Dw1das and GlengarryHighlanders of Canadian9th Brigade came ashoreon White Beach. NanSector Ouno area) atBemieres-sur-Mer.

(PubliC AtchiVi!s Canada- PA 122765)

craft , des pite the obstacles, forced their way tothe beach, and destroyers risked runningagrou nd to get closer and engage their ta rgetsmore accurately. By n ightfa ll some 3·I,CX)(Jmen had been lan ded , but more tha n I ,{)(X)

Gts had been killed and many more wounded,they had not ach ieved their first ohjl"(-tiVl"~

and were still less tha n a mile in land . But theywere holding the villages of Vlerville-sur-Mcr,St-La uren t and Collev ille ·:!.UT·Mer, whichcon trolled the east-west road, and we re deter­mi ned to resist all coun ter-attacks. To th e westof Oma ha, 2nd Ran ger Batt alion had lan dedthree companies at the foot of th e cliffs atPointe duHoc , whe re the Germans had coastaldefen ce arti llery posn tons. Afte r fierce fightin gthey ma naged to destroy the guns, and holdthe po stt ton agai nst heavy counte r-at tacks.Go ld Beach . Some ten miles east of Omaha .Gt'ne ral G. C. Buckne ll's British XXX Corps,It'd by 50t h In fant ry Division and HIhArmoured Brigade, landed here. Because of Ihetides, t he land ings here and farthe r cast wert'later tha n those on the two US beaches sothere was no surprise. Bad wea lher, fiercecurrent s and high winds, hampe red the

approach . so the landi ng-craft carrying the DI>tanks were brought right up on to the beachrather than run the risk of being swamped inthe heavy surf. The initial advance inland was

fairly rapid , but the D-Day otnecnves of

uaycux and the main road to Ceen were not

reached. By nightfall th e 'toe hold' was somefive :I.<luare mues in area , reserves were ashoreand aggress tve patrolling was nearing Bayeux .Some 25,000 men had been lan ded at a cost of

son dead .Ju no Beach . About 5 mu es cast of Gold. Thiswas allocated to General John Crocker's Britis hI Corps whose Canad ian 3rd Infantry Divisionsu pported by Ca nadian 2nd Armoured Brigadeled the way. Th e beach area was wide enoughto land two brigades side by side. Some of theunderwater ob stacles were especiall y tro uble­some. hut the am phibious DD ta nks werelaunched succe ssfun y on ly 100 yards or sofro m shore and wert' th us available to suppor tt he infantry, effect ively silencing the enemyst rong po ints. Some 21,500 men got ashoreand pushed in land toward s Brett evtlle andCac n. hu t were held up by enemy pressure andthe Inevit able traffic jams. By n ight fall th eirIHogres:!. was roughly leve l with the left na n"of Gold's t roops. but there was still a 2-mile

gap betwee n th em and Sword Beach's troopsto their lett . They were also a few mnes shortof their or iginal objectives. but wert' in astrong postnon from which they were deter­

mined not to be moved .Sword Beach . About 5 miles east of Juno.More elements of Crocker's British I Corpslanded here, led by 3rd Infantry Division ,

17

Abo ve : A tank of the Canadian tsc Hussars , from London, Ontario,coming ashore on the afternoon of D-Day. Note also the RoyalCanadian Engineers busy trying to make the beach passable withthe aid of an armoured bulldozer; Gening off the beach qUickly wasext remely difficult but it was essential if the beach-head was to bepro tected from counter-attacks. (Public Archives Canada - PA128791)

Below: Maj Gen Rod Keller commallding lrd Canadian Division isseen here on the afternoon of D-Day, impressing on his troops thatthey must be ready for the inevitable German counter-attack. Kellerwas one of the best Canadian operational commanders. hence hisbeing the choice for this vital role on D-Day. (Public ArchivesCanada - PA 115544)

18

•or

AboYe: A group of w ounded Canadiansoklien wait to be

tr.tnsferred to a Casualty Clearing Station on 0 + I. On thewhole , casWlkies wen!! light. considering the scaleof the operation.(CanadIan Offteal Photograph • 137S7-N)

Below: An appropriately-named AVREof 77 Anault Sqn R.E is

parked in lion-sur-Mer, whilst the earners passing by belong to the2nd an,The M.dd lese l( Regiment - a machine gun battalion. TheAVRE was based upon the Churchill tank ;md mounted a 290mmspigot mortar, called a Petard. as its main armament. for use againstenemy blockhouses. etc. (IWH - B 5(40)

19

THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

supported by 27th Armou red Brigad e, togetherwith several Co mmando and Marine unitswho immediately pressed in land to link upand relieve th e paratroops. As with Ju no, th erewas conges tio n , but th ey managed to reachBievtlle and to beat off a counte r-attack from2 1st Panzer Division . By n ightfall nearly29,000 troops .....ere ashore and, although theorigina l first day object ives were not reached,till' Orn e bridges had been <;t.-iZl-d.

.\ ",,,,Ild ry. Undoubtedl y Operation 'Overlord 'had bee n a success. Some 155,000 troops werenow ashore and , wit h ti ll' prot ect ton affordedby continuous naval an d air operations, theywere th ere to stay. Omaha had been the mostdifficult beac h to secu re and th e US lst ln f Divin particular had suffered many casua lties.They had no t all reached their I)-Day obtec­tw es, but were firmly estabttshcd everywhe re.In th e British/Canad ian sector. th e leadingtroo ps were no w off the beac hes , the front lin ewas, on ave rage. some six miles in land andth ey had withstood a heavy counte r-att ackfrom 21st Pz Div. Despite the fact that theinla nd penetration .....as on ly halt that hopedfor, the cha nces of th e ene my push ing themquickly off the bea ch -head were now remote.In addition, the casualties had been muchlight er th an expected. The remarkable British' f unn ies' of 79th Armd Iuv had more tha nproved their worth . Now it was vita l to link upthe beac h-heads . get mo re troops, theirwl'apo ns and equipmen t ashore and start topush inland. 'We had ac h ieved sur prise,'Mon tgomery wro te . 'The troops had foughtmagnificently and our lo\,>e\ had bee n muchlowe r than had ever seemed powtble. We hadbreached the Atlantic Wall a long the wholeNeptune frontage and all assaut u ng divisionswere ashore. To sum up, th e result s of n -paywere extremely encouraging , althou gh theweat he r remai ned a grea t anxidy.'2

Notes

I. Part s of the Mulberry harbours can still beseen off the Normandy coas t; two of the cais­sons wert' late r brought back to Portland,Dorset , where th ey remain .2. Montgomery, B. Normandy to the Bettie,

20

THAT FIRST TOEHOLD

Left Tank crews snatcha few minutes rest whi~t

they and their Shennantanks and Breo carTienwart: [ 0 advitnce . Uon­sur·Mef". 6 June 19+4.(IWM - B SOB)

Below: On the day alterD-Day (7 June ). atracked Bofors L.AA gunawaits the luftwaffe.next to a disabledSherman 00 tank onthe Cana dian beach. TheBofors is mounted on aBrit ish C rusader 111 AAMk I chassis - note [heall-round open-to ppedshield. The 'Dup lex­D rive' Sherman has its

flotation screen lowered.(Public Archives Canada• PA I32B97)

NN

Organization of 21st Army Group for Operation 'Overlord' (initial phase)

21st Ar~y Group

r T

71h HQtres

06th IGds HQ GHQUS First Can ad ian British

~First Army Second Tk aee Tps

Armd Div ArmyI HQ GHQ HQ Dutch Polish

74th ,Jth_I. SAS Tps

AA Tps l of C epp rcx 1st Armd2 Can 1st Tk one Bde DillUSV USVII US XIX US VIII AGRA Bd. 5th I

Corps Corps Corps Corps Para Bde

J I I AA ade Can II Corps AA ace 1st Gp French (ze<h Belgianfnd Arm d approx

US79th US83rd I I I Ab Div nems-aoeSh tAA Bd. one adeParaDefence GpInt mv Inf Diy Can 4th Armd Can II Corps

r Div Can 2nd Tps

I cLpsHQ

US 29th US~rd Inf Div XII Corpslnf Dill Armd Div r 1 r 1 1us 30th

VIII Corps XXX CorpsInf Div AGRA AG RA AGRA AGRA AGRA 5th RM AA Bde

UJ4th usL.USL" I .

4thl55

,JthI 75th AA ede

10h t AA Bde6th Ab Dill ht 103rd AA Bde(leu 5 Para Bd. AA Bde Assaul t 105t h AA adelnf Div Dill AbDiv Bdt» Bdt' REUS 90th US 82nd 1st SS l OOth 30th ArmdInf Div Ab ntv ace AA Bde Bd.

162L Inf 11.LUS~nd :lTwo

Sth JOfC 111t h

7 ae se SubInf Diy RangersSecond ace Area

US 2ndBm

Sob l of C ArmyUS 1stInf rnv Armd mv Area Area tps 12l of C 8 Base Sub

Area Area

Sr 3£ Inf ca13rd Sl J Inf1 .r;

BOth AA33rd Armd BdeDiy Inf Diy Diy Bd. Bd.I I I

27th Armd 8de 2nd Can 76th AAArmd Bde Bd.

Gds t md 11t hL, 1Sth Ilnf Diy 31st T Bd. 50th InfI

7t hL49t h ArmdDiv Diy mv Div mv

I I5Jlnf

I I43rd Inf S3t h Inf 34t h Tk 56th Inf 8th Armd

Div Diy mv see Bd, eee

:t1;

~~Io5

Above: 105mm M7 Priest self-propelled guns in action by the side of a field in Lion-sur-Mer. The M7 and M7Bl How itzer Motor Carriagemounted a 105mm howitzer on the M) and M'" med ium tank chassis. They were the standa rd equipment in all American armoured

divisions as well as in many Allied ones. (IWM - B 5032)

23

2Building-up the Beach-head

Ro mmel Th wa rt edNow that th e first toe..hold had been ac hieved it

was neces sary to secu re and expand the beach­head before the defenders could launch a size­able counter-stroke. For a variety of reasons

Rommel was prev en ted from moun tin g anymajor counte r-attacks, foremost among whichbctng th e AlIi{'S' total air supremacy over thebattlefield area which prompted Rommel tomake a formal complaint to th e Luftwaffe for

BUILDIN G-UP T HE BEACH-HEAD 1

A bove: More American reinfon:ements arrive in N orm andy and disembark from their landing craft. All areheavily laden iocluding kitbags. which w ill be put onto unit echelon transport before they head off into action.

(IWM - PIC 27553)

Left : 0 + I and more re inforcemen ts arrive . Men of the 2nd Infant ry D ivision , U 5 Army, climb up the sanddunes off Easy Red sector, O maha Beach. past a captured German bunke r on their w ay to face enemy fire for

the very first time. (Bruce Robertson)

the to tal lack of support hi s hard-pr essedt roo ps were rec etvtng. For examp le, on 7 Junewhen I SS Pa nzer Corps we re trying to assemb lefor th e first ma jor co unter-stroke against th elandings, th ey were severely harassed. d elayedand d tsorgan ised by co ntinual air attacks until

9 June, by which time the Allies ' reinforcementhad been such that a 'sweeping the in vaders

in to the sea ' move by the panzers. was out ofthe question . Furthermore th e unremit tingAllied bo mbing of road and rail co mmuntca­

tfnn s, espectally in northe rn France, was \0

success ful th at the movemen t of retntorce­

merits was Virtually impossib le, especially byda y. These d ifficu lties were co mpounded by

till' stepping-up of subve rsive operations by the

Fren ch .\lallI/h . Thousands of these resistanceItgbters were in the area , many of them armedto 11ll' teeth, ready to assist th e invaders withact s o f sabotage, wh ich severely d isrupted th erail net work. Wors t of a ll, there was co ntinua l

interference wit h Rommel's planning from thevery top - namel y, (rom Adolf Hit ler - who,still co nvinced that t he Allied landings were a

feint and that the real invasion would co me inth e Pas-de-Calais, refused to allow Rommelf ree rein over the reserves . in pa rticu lar, thevuat Panzer Group West .

Despite th e enemy's problems, the co nsoh­dation of t he beach-heads was still not easy.

25

BUILDING-UP T HE BEACH - HEAD

Above : Aoother unloachng scene. this time OIl one o f the Brmshbeacbes. Note the 40mm BofOl'1i Ught AA gun in position topn)Yide additional AA cover. The Swedi5h-designed gun W3S builtunder licence in both UK and USA.. It W3S undoubtedly the bestL.AA gun of the war. (rwM • HU ]022)

Below: US Arrrry vehicles leaving the beach, led by a heavilyladen M] haIf-r;nck. The ubiquitous haIf-r;nck W3S used for rmnyjobs, eg: AS a w eapons platform for a wide: variety of AA. anti -tank,small artillery peces. mortars. etc, also for perwnneI as seen hereand AS a batdefseld stores carrier. (rwM - MH 2S279J

•..

Below: Com mandosnear Caen. Commando(Toops resting in anarrow lane near Caen

on 7June. after takingpart in some very heavy

fighting. (IWM - B 5077)

Once the individ ua l beac hes had been linkedup it was vital to secure a proper workingharbour - the obvious one be ing Cherbourg.Thi s necessitated d earin g the Cote n tin pe ni n­

sul a and cu tting it off fro m t he rest ofNormandy. At t he same tim e, the Mulberryharbour s had to be established off Omaha andGo ld Beaches. a 'belt and braces' move wh ich

would prove doubly fortuitous because Che r­bou rg harbour whe n fin ally ca ptured wasfou nd to be com pletely wrecked. ' I ordered th earmies to proceed with the plan,' wro te Mont­gomery later. 'U n ited States First Arm y was toco m plete th e capt ure of its D-Day ob ject ives,secu re Caren ta n and lsigny so as to [in k up itsbeach-heads, and then th rust across the baseof the peninsula to isolate Cherbo urg as aprelude to its redu ction . British Seco nd Arm ywas to con tinue the batt le for Caen, deve lop

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

t he bridge-head sout hwa rds across t he

Bayeu x-Caen road and lin k up with Un itedStates V Corps at r'ort-en -uesstn .'!

Week 1: 7- 12 June 19442

w ednesd a y 7 J une. In the west , US forces onUta h began to lin k up wit h the parat roops an dmove inla nd towards Montebourg in t henort h and Ca ren tan in t he sout h, while th osefrom Oma ha pushed toward s lstgn y andBayc ux, reach ing Form igny. Gene ral Elsen ­he wer vis ited th e fron t that da y and orde red V

a nd VII Co rps to link up as soon as th ey hadta ken Ca ren ta n (101st Ab Div) and Isigny(29 t h tnt Div). In the far nort h 4th lnf Dtv

adva nced towards t he lin e Out ne vttte (on thecoast) to Monteb ourg, but was held lip by aline of Ge rman fortificati ons in the Crts­becq-A zevtlle area , wh ile 8 RCT went to the

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

suppo rt of 82nd Ab Dtv wh ich was facing adangerous counter-attack in the Ste-Mere­Egli~ area and at the La Here bridge acTOSS theRiver Merde ret . South of Ste-xte re-Egttse para­troopers of lOlst Ab Dtv established a bridge­

head across the River Douve. capturing thegarrisons of Le Port and La Barquet te. Progressout of O maha was slower. and although both29t h and t st Divs p ressed forwa rd towardsIsigny and Bayeux, they had mixed success ­th e ene my held rorrmg ny on the right, bu t theAmericans cap tured Ifuppain un the left . TheGermans man aged to mai n ta in a co rridorast ride the River DrOJ1ll', between th e US andBritish /Can ad ian forces. up to Its confluencewith the River Aure. Reinforcements includ ingUS 2nd Inf Dtv came ashore th at eve ni ng.

In Bnt tsh Second Army's sec to r, 50t h InfDiv captured Baycux and pushed un its downto the Bayeux-Caen rood. as d id Can Srd Inf

Dlv in the eas t. near Cac n.

Th und a y KJ Ulie. The Allied second wave was

now almost co m pletely ashore and US -Ith InfDiv (VII Corps! plus units of K2nd Ab Dtv

began to push towards the port of Chc rbourg,but were again held up by t he fort ifications inthe Crtsbecq-Azevtne a rea . Fierce fightingfollowed. while units of US V Corps tookIsgny, but failed to lin k up with VII Co rps whowere fighting for Carentan . Furt her east. Tour­en-ncssr n and Ste-Anne were taken, but theetWIIlY could no t be rut off as he evacuatedl'ort -cn-ucsstn . Nevertheless 47 th Rl'gt RMent ered the village in the ea rly hours of th emorning an d the link bet ween O ma ha and

Go ld was achieved.I-'riday 9 JUlie . US 4t h In f Drv made a ma jo rbreakt hrough in its ad van ce towa rds Cher­

bo urg whe n th ey bro ke t hrough the Azevlllefortificatio ns (found to be massive rei nfo rcedcase mates d isguised as ordinary houses, lin kedby t renches with overhead cover and

Be low: It is 9 June andthese Gis are shelt eringfrom heavy ene my shell­fire on Omaha, whichhindered unloading untilthe batte ries at StMarcouf and Azevillecould be captured.(lWM • EA 25902)

28

~ Link-up. Men ofee Bntish 12th f'M<I Bn

enioY a cuppa, h<lvinginked up WIth the main

gmund forces on 10tune, ~ftef" fighting virtu­., ~ guerrilla warbehindenemy lines.(I'NM - B 5319)

contatru ng ISOmm guns and many mach ine­guns) , Quinevtlle was the next ob jective. Intill' cent re of the peninsula, K2nd Ab Dtvattacked towards the River Merderet , wh ileIOls l Ab went for Ca rentan again. In V Cor ps'a rea, 2nd Inf Div t roops entered Trevteres andpushed on towards Rubercy: in the east US lsi

Inf tuv reached Agy and Dodtgny. US 2ndArmd Div began to land. British and Canadian

forces .....ere in action against increasing enemyrese rves around Caen. Allied ai rcraft were nowoperating from strips in Normandy. It is alsorelevant to note that on the Italian Frontcertain US troops, mostly from VI Corps, .....erepu lled ou t of action in preparation for thecoming invasion of southern France (see later),Salurday 10 j u ne. US9th Inf Div came ashoreand by the end of the day the Allies had some325 ,000 men in the beach-head. The link-upbetween Utah and Omaha beac hes was at lastachieved. than ks to an advance by 2nd Armd

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

tuv, but the Ge rmans were st ill holdingCarentan despit e IOls l Ab Div's effo rts tosurround th e tow n. In V Corps' area US 1st InfDiv reached the Bayeux-St-Lo road. In BritishSecond Army's sector the first major offensive(Opt-ration 'Perch') was launch ed; the inten­tion being to make a wide outflankingmanoeuvre west of Ceen. cross the River Odonand lake the h igh ground around Evrecy. Theattack made little progress, mainly because theopposition consisted of the crack Panzer Lehr

Division and Ihe equally formidable 12th SSPanzer Division around Tllly-sur-Seules. Thisvillage changed hands twice, the British even­tually heing driven out by a fierce counter­attack. East of Caen the opposition facing ICorps wa.. equally ..trong, element..of German

l.XXXVI Corps bringing the advance to a halt.General Mon tgomery estabtt..hed his HQ inFrance that day. As more panze~ came in toaction, the supe riority of the Tiger's 8.8cm gun

1

•

29

I

I

..

and the l'aut her's long-barrelled 7.Scm gu nbecame more a nd more ap parent , especially asthe clos e bocage countryside favoured theddl'm·l' .3

Sund ay I I J u ne . Units of US 90th Inf Div

contin ued their advance west of t he Merderet,

whil e If} l st Ab pUI in a fierce attack onCarcn ta n which the Germ a ns evacuatedduring till' night to escape the heavy Americanartille ry fire. The Gis oc cu pied the town , butin the morning th ey ca me under hea vy enemypressure 10 r('-<x 'cupy it. In the British sector,British a rmour encou n te red heavy resistancearound Ttlly-sur-Seulles . They took the vtltagebut were co unter-attacked and forced out.Farthe r east, resistance was equally st rong

around Caen.

30

Momju y 12Julle . /\lt hougb US Vil Corps hadsti ll not co rnplvtely reach ed its D-Day ob jec­ti ves, they wert' st il l advancing u p t heCotenti n peninsul a towards Cherho urg andsout hwa rds towa rds St-Lo. On Ihe ea sterncoast of the peninsula first Crtsbccq thenAzevt fte were taken , bUI Mon tebourgremained. in enemy hands . Other VII Co rpsunits wer e fighting their wa y we stwardsacross the peninsula and so uth- wes twa rdsfrom Ca ren ta n. V Co rps was support ing th emand , on it s left flank , 1st Inf Div wereadvancing towards the St- l.o-Cae n road,taking Ca umont. By the end of t he first weeksome 326,fXlO men we re ashore, togetherwith l().l ,OOO tons of supplies and 5 4,000

vehicles.

Above: MulberryHarbo urs . Two pr e­fabricat ed harbourswere towed across theChannel andconstructed. Mulberry:AI - seen here - wasopposite Omaha andalthough ncr scheduledto be fully operationaluntil 0 + 18 (1" June ). itW3$ in use earlier. Thephotograph shows oneof the two loebnitzpierheads. (BruceROOemon)

Sm ,w /tl'Y, It can be fairly stated that by theen d of th e first week all four Allied Cor pswh ich had taken part in the assault werefirm ly ashore, had joined up all five beach­heads and lin ked up with the airbo rne forces,Th ey had thus established a sizeab le lodge­ment area with a cont in uous pe rimeter withinwhi ch were secure logistic area s. The entirebeach-head was under the protection of analmos t impenetrable air and sea 'umbrella ', Allthat was lacking was port faciliti es and thesewould soon be available as the various compo­

nents of the Mulberry Harbours were brought

~'ow: Gooseberry Shelt.ers. The first and Simplestform of breakwater to protect the invasion bexhesfrom rough seas , were bIock5hips - known as the'Cofncob Fleet' , which were deliberately sunk . Forexample, there were 59 elderiy merchantmen andwarships. which sailed down from Scotland to Pooleharbour prior to D-Day. ready for thei r final journeyto Normandy. where they were sunk . Beh ind thisIme of bIock$hips can be seen it Whale Pierhead.(IWM - C-4S46)

BUILDING-UP T HE BEACH-HEAD

acros s. Assembly, however, took longer th an

anticipated and neit her Mulberry wasanywhere near completion by the end of thefirst week.

Wloek 2: 13-1 9 June 19-1-1The seco nd week began with an embarrassingreverse for one of the most ren owned Briti sharmoured divisions - 7th Armd Dtv (TheDesert Rat s) - which had bee n switched to theright o f XXX Cor ps and was advancing SWiftlysouthwards , taking vtuers-socage. On quit­ung the village, however , the division's 22 ndArmd Bde encou nte red panzer ace Obersturm­

fuh rer ~lichael w ittmann and his four Tigertanks, who knocked out almost the entiredi visional advance gua rd, destroying 23 tanksand numerous othe r vehicles and bringingthe advance to a sh uddering halt. Elsewhere17th Pz tuv almost succeeded in retakingCa renta n, so pressur e to restrict the en la rge­ment of the beach-head was considerable.However. on the 14th US XIX Corps became

~ ---- -- • --.- ..... ....

31

I

BUILDING·UP THE BEACH-HEAD

operational in the area between US V and VII

Corps, and next da y US VIII Corps abobecame operational. By the end of week 2. USter ces had pu shed forward up the Cote n unpenmsut a to the general lim' Q uine vlllc ­va togncs- Lcs Pieux . Trapped Germ.111 troopswere re fused pemussio n to a tt empt 10breakout - in fact lIitler refused to allow anywithdrawals h o m any area . From O ma ha. USV and XIX Corps had pushed forward toCaumont, but movement was still difficult inthe Brit ish/canad ian area. At a meeting withRom me l and vo n Rundstedt (ov era llco mma nde r in the west ] at Sotssons on 17

june. lI itler raged a t t111'm, accusi ng th em andall th eir troops of cow ardice. Th e Allies werealso ha ving their sha re of mi sfortunes. Afte r

asscmbnng the two Mulberry harbours andgett ing the m close to readine...... hour... oflabour were broug ht to nou ght by seve rega les, which wo uld la..t unt il the 22 n d .

irreparab ly damaging Mulber ry A (off Omaha)

and 'Severely da mag ing ~fu l hl'rry B (at Am).mancheq . The Mulberries had been expectedto handle some 15,<XX) tons of ca rgo daily,

rising to 46.(KK) tons by D+90. so the damagewas very worrying,

week 3: 20-26 june 19·HBy 20 june, Ame rican troops were on ly somefive miles h om Chc rbourg and by the end ofthe week after ha rd fighti ng by the threeat tacking d ivisions agai ns t fanatical oppost­lion , and accompani ed by more tha n I ,(MJO

Ions of bo mbs, plus gunfire from the battle­ship HMS RCIf{IIt'y, the mo nitor HMS RO/lI.'rh

and other naval vessels. the pori was almostentirely in th eir hands. apa rt from the actualdock area which was ruined. Th e Germa nnaval commander, Adm iral Hcnnecke, and th egarrison commander. General von Schheben,were both cap tured o n the 26th . Off the

Bel ow: Mulbe rryHarbours. No one couldhave ant icipated thefef"ocity o f the greatstorm which began atOBOhrs 19 June andblew fOf' three days andth ree nights - the worstsummef"gale fOf' 80years. The photographshows the storm-twistedpiers of the wreckedOmaha Mulbe rry.Eventua lly, enough wassalvaged to restoreMulberry 'B' off theBritish beAchesatArromanches. (US Army• SC 198165 )

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

Above: At low tide some vesseb _ like the Norwegian SS Vest­lfIGfI(od seen bere. were beached. so duit unloading intoDUKWsltruekswas made much easier. (Bruce Robertsofl)

Below: Scene at the Regimental Aid Post of 6 DU. SOth Inf Div.after the battle of Lingevres, showing both Brrash and Germancasualnes being treated. I .. June 19.... , (IWM . B SS270 )

33

BUILD1NG·UP THE BEACH-HEAD

left: Prisonen taken byAmerican troops in thedose boage country arequizzed by an offICer­before being sen t to therear. Doe has beenbandaged for a headwound . (IWM • AP28446)

Betow: This hut has

been tumed into a regi­mental <lid post forAmerican casualt ies nearMortain, south of Vire inNormandy. (IW M - EA] ] 190)

Right: American soldiersbrtak through a smoke­

ween to surround awrecked building in theviIage SaJntenyinwestern Normandy,(lWM- KY ]0]09)

Below; ThIs young GI is

tr)'Wla to draw enemyin", I'Ils patroliIlMnces through thelines ;wi hedgerows ofNon'naI"Idy. He and his

_",onnedw<h the HI carbines,

Note also the wreckedGerman machine gu n byhis Itg. (JINM • KY27S40)

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-H EAD

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

landing tx..aches re pai rs to the Mulberry

harbou rs had be gun a s soo n a.. the sto rm s

abated o n the 22 nd; it wa s dectded to combine

what was le ft o f them as o ne com ple te

Mulberry at Arromanc hes. The storms ha d

bee n so severe that t he y destroyed almost five

times as many land ing-craft as had Ge rman

fire on D-Da y! Mean whil e , In British Second

Army's sector, reg rouping was taking place in

o rde r fo r XXX, VIII and I Corps to be launched

in a p incer movement o n Cacn (Opera tion

'Epso m'). The ma in in itial thrust was in XXX

Corps' sector . hold ing firm o n the right and

ce n tral sectors o f the corp s front , whil e

ad vancing on till' left to secu re Ne yer..·BIX'ag(',

This wou ld protect the righ t flank o f VIII

Corps which would be launched through Ca n

3rd Dtv, wit h the ai m of se izing crossings over

t he Rj\'{'(1 Odon and Orne, to gain a position

36

on the hi gh gro und NE of Brettevllle-sur -Latzc

which dominated the sout hern ex its fro m

Caen . The bad weat her delayed operations andthe attack had to be put o ff until 25 june,

Some progress was made, but the e m..m y was

well concealed in d ifficult country, wit h ex ten­

sive m lnefields covering h is positions, so by

the end of 26 j une lead ing troops had only

reached Gramvtlte-sur-Odon. Colleville and

xtoucn.

Week 4 : 27 june-3 Jul y 1944

Th e week began wit h the Brit ish /Canadian

forces co n t in u ing Operation Epsom , t fu-tr

attempt to encircle Cacn with VIII Cor ps,

toget he r with e lemen ts of I a nd XXX Corps,

the first o b jecti ve being the hi gh ground

around Hill 112, to the sou th-west o f Caen. In

a seco nd phase the AlIle d forces wo uld

Abo ve : At 0730hrs on26 June, an attack wasput in by VIII Corps (15Scottish , 4] Wessex andI I Armd Divs]. with "'4Bde of 15 ON openingthe attack to capture StMauvieu and La Gaule.two small villages southof Norrey-en-Beuin.Here. a section of 6RoyaJ Scccs fusilier'S fireonto enemy positIOnS

from a sunken lane.(IWM • B 5959)

,c

•1

•I

•bCA

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

Above: A Canadian7.2inch gun is preparedfor action by its crew.Heavy guns like thiswere used mainly incounter-battery workagainst enemy artillery,28/une 1944. (PublicArchives Canada - PA132925)

Right: Shermansbelonging to Gen LeCere's 2nd FrenchNmoured Division leaveanl5T on Utah Beach.The 2eme DivisionBlindee was then part ofPatton'sThird Army.wtlich landed in earlyJufy 1944. (IWM - HU73789)

J7

BUllOI NG·UP THE BEACH-HEAD

advance eas twards across t he River Orne. Once

again the stre ngth and fighting ability of the

ene my proved too stro ng, and although a

bridge-head over the Odon was secured , the

road so u th-ea stwa rds (kno wn as ' Sco tch

Co rr idor' ) co uld not be held and Hill 112 wa s

soon under heavy attack. By t he 29t h elementsof seve n pa nzc r di v isions we re deplo yed

against t he bridge-head and Hill 112 , resul ti ng

in the inevitable dectston to ca nce l the second

phase and wit hd raw. Never theless Mont­

gomery ordered Seco nd Army to ma intai n

maximum pressu re 0 11 the enem y, so as to

ensu re that t he eas t f lank remained firm . Itwa s vital that the British/Canadia n sector

hol d , so t hat ene my progress there would not

he allowed to affect th e overall Allied p lan.

On the o the r flan k, US t roops completed

the capt ure of Cherbo u rg on the 27 th . Theport wa s almost co m ple tely des troyed and it

wo uld take so me time to be made o peratio nal.

By the end of june, US 9t h Div ision in the far

west of the Co tenti n peninsula had eliminatedall ('n('my resistance - the en ti re pe n insula was

now virtua lly dear. By J O june the Al1 ies had

38

landed more than 6:~0,(X)O t roops, 6<X),O(X)

tons of stores and 170,000 veh icles o f all types.

Allied casualt y figures were about I in 10 killed

or wo unded. The wee" ended with US forc es

maki ng a determined drive sou thwards(know n as the ' Battle of the Hedgero ws' from

the na tur e of the thi ck bocage coun t ry with its

sun "en roads a nd h igh he d ge s) ai ming

towards the line Coutances-St -Lo . The weatherwa s no t good and litt le progress was made

towards St-jcan-de-Daye and La-Haye -du­Putt s. US First Army had just und ergone a re­

orga nisation , wit h VII Cor ps (4 , 9 and 13 Divs)

being moved to the sector between VIlJ and

XIX Corps. As the wee" ended blinding rai n

co n tin ued to m ake progress slo w.

Wee" 5: 4-lOJuly 1944

The slow advance continued on both flank s,

both US VII and VIlJ Co rps making som e

progress, whil e Can 1st Inf Div (part of Brit ish

I Corps) ca ptured Ca rptquet to the west of

Caen , hu t fa iled to take the nearby airfield in

heavy fighting against 12th SS Pz Div. On 7

july Montgomery launched Opera tion 'Cha m-

Above: Gen OmaeBradley celebrating the4th of July. Promptly atnoon on the 4th of July194<1, every Americangun sent a shellscreaming into Gennanlines to celebrate Inde­pendence Day. GenBradley, then CG Ist USArmy fired a ISSm 'longTom' in the barrage.(IW M - EA 28821)

Right: Can~ian soldiershrilng their breakrast inaskt-trenCh on theCaen-Carpiquet front. 9JIJy 19+1. (Public

Archives Canada - PA1)1 )991

8e'ow: Canadian troopshouse-dear'wlginthe0I.C5kiru of Caen. 10July19+4. ctunng hand -to­hind f.ghtiog. (Public.'l'chives Canada _PA

mn7)

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

39

BUILDING- UP THE BEACH-HEAD

wood', an attempt to take Cacn fro m threesides, suppo rted by massive bombing (someZ,ono tons of bombs were dropped and manycivilians kutcd). The bombing created so muchrubble that the adva nc ing British and Cana­dian t roops found their progress badlyimpeded. but by th e 9th th ey had taken mostof th e city north of th e O rne ; th e Germans stillheld the indu strial a rea east of the river.Mopping-up cont inued o n the 10th. In thecity th e bndges over th e river were eithe rdes troyed or completely blocked by rubble.During the period 10-18 July, Second Armywould deliver a sencs of thrusts. a imed atmaking progress sout hwards towards Thury­Harcourt on as broad a front as possible. Thesebegan on th e 10th , with -Brd Dtv attackingth e h igh ground at Point liZ and th e villagesof Feuguerolles-sur-O rne and Malter in theOrne valley. All were secu red , but a st rongene my counter-att ack then retook vtaltot.

Wt't'k 6: 11-1 7 Ju ly 1944Throughout th e week US First Army batt led tocapture 51-to, whic h was the key 10 furt heradv ances sout hwards an d an essentia l prelimi­na ry to their decisive breakout attack _ code­na med Operauon 'Cobra', which would followonce St· lil was 1.1 ken. In the Britis h sectorthere were adva nces towards uou ot-lcs-uaguesand Evrecv. In preparat ion fur the forthcomingOpera tion 'Good wood' considerable re­group ing took plan .' , namely: d uring 1Z-13July XII Corps loo k ove r fro m VIII Corps, andCan II Corp' (Can 2nd and Srd Inf Dtvs}became operational and took statio n betweenXII and I Corps. On IS July XXX and XIICorps resumed th e attack, the latt er (a nigh tattack o n the 15th ) bcmg successfu llysupported for th e first time by 'MovementLight ' (searchlights directed at the clouds andthen reflect ed downwa rds 10 give a degree ofvisibilily), Some progress was made and, asmention ed al ready, Evrecy was taken, butfighting was severe and confused with manyenemy armoured counte r-att ach taking place.On th e 17th , Ihe Germans suffered a majorreverse. in Ihat Rommel was serious lywounded when tns car was strafed while hewas return ing from a visit to SS Panzer General

40

'Sepp ' Diet rich 's IIQ at St-l'terre-sur -Dtves. Hewould play no further pari in proccedtngs, hiscomma nd rcsponstbthttes bl.'ing taken ove r byField Marsha l Gunther von Kluge, who hadalready take n over as Cine west from vonRundstedt.

week 7: H~..24 July18 July 1944. In the Co teutt n peninsula, SI­LO was reached by US XIX Corps' troops. Inth e British sector Operation 'Good wood' waslaunched. Thi s was a massive tank attack byVIII Co rps ' a rmoured divisions to pu nch a

Above: Gennan minespresented an ever­present hazard to tbeAllied soldier. Here aCanadian sapper uses hismagnetic mine-detectorwhiCh will sound a tell­tale 'beep' when itdiscovers somethingmetal - a mine or justsome scrap metal? NearCaen, IOJuly 1944.(PubliC Archives Canada- PA 132856)

Above: Troops of USFim Army auaultenemy po$itions near St­Lo. Note the pronesoldier about to fire hisnfle grenade in support01 their charge. (IW M •KY 30970)

Right: Tanks andinfantr)' crossing theOdon River on the

London Bailey Bridge.IIW"Uen. 18 July 1944.(Public Archives - PA13 1392)

LD~

I

BUILDING-UP THE BEACH-HEAD

way through the st rong German defences. Itwas preced ed by a massive aer ial bombard­ment by so me 2,()nn plus Allied aircra ft drop.ping mo re than 7,uno tons o f bo mbs.Montgom er y considered th at , even if theattack failed, it woul d take pressur e off the

Ame rican sect or, in lin e with th e overall plan;he was also under prMo5ure to ach ieve somespectacular SUCCMoS on the British /Canadianfront . The bombing, a lt hough it ini tiallystun ned the German defenders. d id notdestroy them, and ti ll' Allied tan ks suffe redheavily whe n they advanced towa rds the well­placed Ger man anti-tank weapons . By the endof th e day more than 200 Allied tanks hadbee n destroyed . for a gain of tess than sixmues. The attack co nti nued and by last lighton the 19th th e British had made someprogfl"SS towards Bourguebus, while the Ca na-

42

dians had tak en the Cae n suburbs ofva uce lles, Louv tgn y and Hcury-sur -Omc.Then the heavens opened, thi s time withtorrential ra in , and Goodwood ended o n th e20t h in a sea o f mud and burning tanks. Th eweather also dela yed the sta rt of the US Oper­ati on 'Cobra', just west o f St-LO, air operatio nsbe ing impossible until th e 25t h when US VIICorps, supported by VIII Corps on its righ tand XIII Co rps on its left , began its assault .The plan was for US First Arm y to pivot whenit reach ed th e haw of the Cot cnn n pen ins ulaand swing so uthwards, wh ile VIII Corpsswung west towards Rennes and St-Malu ,General Patton's US Thi rd Army, which bynow was arri ving in France and would be

ope ra tio nal by 1 August , would th en follow

up , read y to take co mmand of th e breakoutwhen o rdered . Patt on had made his usua l

Abo ve : Gen Mont­gomery holds his firstpress conference inNonnandy. at which heexplains the situationand progress of thelandings to wai t ing

journal ists . (IWH - B5339)

BUILDING-UP TH E BEACH-HEAD

Aboye: General

Montgome ry tog et herwIth US Generals OmarBradley and George

PilttOll, enlOY a joke ,~ations betweenMonty ar'ld Patton werenever part iCularlycordial , especially aseach constantly strove tooutdothe other. Note~ Patton is wearing hisbmous ivory-handledplStOIs - not pearl­handled (he is reputedto~ said that: '... onlya pmp II'l a New Orleanswtlorehouse would havepearl gnps ~l (IWM • B655 1)

spectacula r a rr iva l o n th e battle scene (o n 6

July) at a n ai rstr ip near Oma ha Beach a nd

annou nced to wa iti ng re porters tha t Ill' was

goi ng to : ' ... cu t t he guts out o f those Krauts

a nd get t he hell o n to Ber lin .' ! 'Co bra' wo u ld

have a bad sta rt when bo m bs dropping short

ca used ma n y Allied cas ua lt ies, but bot h VII

a nd VIII Co rps wo uld m ake good pro gress,vind ica ting the Brit ish a nd Ca nadian att ac ks

a t the o t her e nd of the fro n t , which had

undoubtedl y drawn off m an y German tankun its and o ther reserves.

Th e Hrst 50 Da ysDespite ha rd fighting, bad weathe r and o the r

problems, the bea ch-head had been ex pa nded

a nd strengt hened sufficiently for the next

phase o f o pe ra tions to be launched , namely

the breakout through France a nd o n across the

Seine. ' \\fl' were no w o n t he t h resho ld of gre at

even ts.' Montgomery says in h is me moirs. 'w ewere ready to break o ut of the brid ge-head .'

Notes

1. Montgo mer y, H. Notmandv to tile nt/ltie.

2. The numbering of the weeks ha s beenchosen pu rely arhitrarily in order to d ivide th etext up into a logical pa ttern of se....en-da y

periods. The original O-Day was to ha w been

Monday 5 June, but wa s postponed untilTuesday 6 June, Th erefore I haw taken my

seven -day 'weeks' as sta rt ing o n a Tuesday and

end ing o n a Monday - and of co urse Week Ibegan with O-Da y,

3. Th e Allied tank with the best firepower was

the She rman 'Hrcfly' a rmed with the British

17pdr. but o n ly a small n umber was available

at the time.

43

BUILDING-UP TH E BEACH -HEAD

Left: 'Karnerad'! ThisGerman sniper was onlyfourteen yean; old~was captured by the

Americans in Normandy.For him the fighting isover. (US Army )

Below: CapturedGerman troops werebrought down to thebeaches and shipped offin retuming LSL.s toPOW camps in UK and

elsewhere. stagingthrough temporaryPOW cages at places likePortiand in Dorset.(IWM - HH 9102)

l

Be&ow: o:cellent photo­~ taken dlrilgWnton Ow.rchiU's visit

m !he Uen arelI on 22).jy I ~_ He droYe overtwo bridgesacross theRMr Orne built: by theIl& _ WII'ISlOO Bridge'

nl 'Oud1iI Bridge' ­nt ailed with both8nash Mld~iM1lI"1XJP5.. Here, accompa­MIdbyGenSir Beman:IHOI qomer-,n GenSirf'iIes Dempsey. he looksII: ~ mapon which 11Gen

""""'"<"'"""""'"2nd Unadian Corps) isporltJng out enemy pose­DOllS. (IWM - B 7879)

Resume of the PlanHavtng established a secure beac h-head on theNo rmandy coast an d co nsolidated their troopswithin it , it was now time for the Allie-; tomove on to the ne xt phase of operations .

namely to break out from the confines of theCotenttn peninsula, gain control of Brittanyand then swing wide to the east aero..... france.On the left flank, t he British and Canadianarmies would continue to mount attacks withthe aim of containing as many German forces

as possible and masking the mai n etten.which would be ma de by the Americans o nthe riKltt. The latter wo uld pivot on the Jeftflank and swing sou t h on the rig h t. thussecurtng the whole of the Cotenttn pe ninsula.

On reach in g the base of the penin sula , VIII

3Breakout

Co rps would turn west into Brittany. makingfor Rennes and St-Malo. US Th ird Army wouldfollow on t hei r extreme righ t , ready to takeco m mand ot the breakout when ordered. USFirst Army's operation was known as 'Cobra'and If-Hour had been set for 1300 hrs on 24

July, but then postponed for 24 hours becauseof bad flying weather. Heavy satu rationbomhing and artillery barrages preceded the

attack.

Wloe"- H: 25-3 1 J uly 1944US Hrst Army's O pe ration 'Cobra' began onthe 25th. The massive air and artillery prepa­ration included so me 1,500 heavy bo mbers ofUS Eigh th Army Air Force. Bombs la nd ingshort caused ma ny casualt ies, wh ich included

4S

Lieutenant General Lcstcv 1. Mr-Nalr, CG US

Army Ground force:'>, who was vtslting the

front. Despite thi s in itial setback both VII and

VIII Corps made good progress. wh ich t hey

co ntin ued o n the Zot h , US VII Corps ta king

Mangny and St-Gllles, a nd west o f them VIII

Corps was across ti ll' Le ssay-Perters road . By

the 29 th, XIX Corps o n the far left of t he

asvault was "dva nrin/o: to wards To rtgny and

Tessy, while VII Co rps ha d reached Percy and

0 11 the ri/o:ht VIII Co rps was across the River

Sten ne and pushtng to wards Granv ille. They

entered Avrancbcs the next day, seiz ing vital

br idges o ver t he River See. On the left flank of

the ad vance the enem y counte r-a tt acked

strong ly around Percy and Villedieu. This was

the paucm for the next day's fighting; o n the

right US 41h Armd Div striking o u t fro m

Avranc hes and cap tu ring cro ssings over the

River Selune near Pontaubault, while on the

left flank determined resistance continued.

Fa rthe r east, in the British/Canadian sector,

British Second Army regrouped and, towards

the end of the week , began a thrust south­

wa rds fro m the Caum o n t a rea . The main

weight of the attack wa s to be on a narrow

46

fro nt in VIII and XXX Co rps' a rea , wheeling

sout h-west then developing eastwards towards

the O rne, The attack began o n XXX Corps'front at DonO hrs o f 30 ju ly, 4:i rd Inf Dtv 's tas k

being 10 secure the hi ll Ieatur e l'o in t 36 1 10 the

wes t o f [urqucs. wh ile 50l h Div aim ed to

secu re the h igh ground west o f v tlle rs-Bocage.

The VIII Corps a tta ck was t un ed to sta rt an

hour later, wit h 11th Armd and l St h lnf Dlvs

being o rdered to es tablish themselves in the

area of xt-Ma ru n-dcs-nesaces. protectin g t heright fla nk of XXX Cor ps. progress in VIll

Corps' a rea proved easier than o n XXX Co rps '

fron t and the attacks were continued on :nJuly, gains bei ng made althoug h o p position

was by now suttcnrng. In Ca n II Corps' area

sou th of Cacu. good proRres:<. was a lso made

towards Tttty-ta-Ca mpagne and Bourguebus.

Allied casualty figures to the end of jul y

we re some 122,non killed and wounded; the

Ge rmans had lost about 154,000 (induding

-10.000 taken prtscncn. The week closed with

Patto n 's US Thi rd Army, now assembled and

poised to become operational and take overthe Allied right flank . US forces were re-o rgan ­

ised into 12th Army Group (under General

Abo ve : Cromwell tanksand MIOtank destroyenof 2200 Armd Bde . linedup before an attac k eastof the River O rne , tateJuly 1944. (TankMuseum)

Above: 1st (US) Armylaunch Operaucn'Cobra', All Americanpalrol makes its wayarefullythrough theruin$ of St-L6 toward sNotre Dame Cathedral,2S July 19H , (US Armyvia RealWar Photos A­

329)

Right : With Br it ish

fortes south ofCaumont, 31 July 1944,They even had tra lllcjam5 In the front line!1M lane ls verycongested wit h infantry­

filled arrierS, alltrymgto get forward . (IWM •BBlO8)

Bradl ey ! co nta ini ng first Army (Ge nera lHod ges) and Th ird Army (Patton); t he

Brit i ~h /Canadlan 21s t Army Group ccm pr tscdCanadian First Army (General Crerar) andBritish Second Army (Ge neral Dempsey), st illund er Montgomer y's comma nd wh o alsoretained overall command of all ground forces.

\\'l'l,.'k 9 : 1- 7 August 1944

Whe n US Th ird Army became operationa l - at1200 Iu s, Tuesday, I AugU',t - it a....u med oper­ational control ove r all troops in US VIIICo rps' zone, so Patton now had under hiscommand four co rps: VIII Co rps (Gene ralMiddleton ), XV Corps (General Hal..lip) , XXCo rps (General Walk er) and XII Corps(General Cook). The plan for the co mingmonth's operations wo uld be developed In fivephases: the conquest of Britt any; the enctr­dement o f Germa n Seventh Army in theArgenta n- Falaise-Mortat n area ; the adva nce to

th e River Seine, to include the enveloping of

48

all ene my forces from Mantes Ga..slcourt toElbeu f: forcin g the enemy to evacua te sout h­weste rn France ; routing the ene my across theRivers Marne, Atsne and Meuse. Patt on wa.. ofcourse th e ideal co mmande r for suc h adynam ic, fast-movin g sertcs of operations.On e of t be co rne rstones of the Allil'd coverplan (Operation 'For t itude ') had been tope rsuade the ene my that he was commandi nga myth ical ar my grou p locat ed in Sf. England,which would form the ma jor a..sault force Inthe Pav-de-Calals.J Unce rtain what to expectand riven by command problems, theGermans were unable to presen t a cohesivefront line although they did manage to estab­lish some solid defensive localit ies with well­emplaced arti llery support . But Third Army'sarmoured spea rhead.. burst out of Avranchesand made con..iderabl e progress to the south,tak ing Ren nes on 3 August and, In the south­cast , cap turing Maycnne on th e 5th. To the

west a specia l armoured Task Force made for

Abo ve : Seaforth High­landers, supported byhalf-tracks, carriers andtanks on the road toVassy. north of Hers. 2August 1944. (IW M - B8603)

Right: A typical BritishsectIOO. led by its section

commander (w ith StenSMG). Brengunnel'" and""""'". They be_to 9 Platoon, A Coy. 115linWelch Regiment .(lWM - 88W )

Below: The advancerowards Aunay·sor.Odon. Men of theWorcntershire Regi­ment search for snipenIlll'\lined houses nearBenneville. 2 August19+i. (IWM - 8 8501) •

. '.

49

BREAKOUT

I.tft: Atuck on theCOon 'hI1ey. Brit ish

SSa;!lmedium guns

n.g J Nght barrage....t.ch beganthe attackenthenver valley"rea .'IWM - B 7413)

Ritht:Oneof theUfnI~dM.

lIOI'ISolP'mon's 3rdhmf_M"iGen'Tifti'"p:x' Woo(fs "th

Armel Orv. AJw..ys "..-."""""",,",

'Tifti'"p:x. is seen hereIII .. M8 Greyhound

~ar"t

~. (US Army via

PmOll Museum)

Left; Acasualtyenjoys"

cpette "nd a cuppa.whilst waiting to betaken to a field hospitalfrom an ad hoc casevacpoint. (IWM . B 6838)

Right: Exceltent shot ofasell-propelledhowitzer, belonging to

'S' Battery, 22nd ArmdField Artillery Bn. "thArmd DIV, 3rd (US)Amry seen here movingthrough Coutances. TheHMC M7 mounted a

IOSmm MIA2 nowitzer~ W"5 known as thePriest in Sntish Armyse-ece. (US Army via

F'xton Museum)

BREAKOUT

Brest, capturing vannes on the 5th, with VIIICo rps following UI}. Brest was reached on the7th but the garri son refused to surrender (theywould hold out until 19 Septemberl). Patton 'sspearheads had excellent, dow air protectionfrom General Weyland's XIX Tact ical AirCommand. Durin g August and on int oSeptember 1944, th ey inflicted devastatingdam age on the ene my by, fo r example,attacking gro und ta rgets in dir ect support ofarmour an d infantry, providing air cove r forco lumns and assa ults , area patrols and armedrecce. pre-planned po in t target attacks (dive­bombing) in much the same way as the Luft­waffe had suppo rted the panzer divisions inthe heady Rlitziri( ( days of th e ' France 1940 'assault. The hoot was now very firmly on theother toot! By n ightfall on the 6th Patton'stroops had already liberated some Jllz millionpeo ple in 119 tow ns and villages.

US First Army was also making progresssouthwards, taking Villedieu on th e 2nd andMortatn on the .Ird . As they pressed steadilybeyo nd Mort ain, th e Germans mounted acounter-attack with 2nd and 116th I'z Dtvs

52

just to the east , and on the 7th they retook thetown. It rapidly became clear that this was amajor enemy assault (code-named Operation'UirtidO. The Ge rman lIigh Command hadrealised that the most critical momen t in thebatt le tor Norma ndy had now bee n reached :indeed they considered that this was now suchan important batt le that it could well deci deth e outcome of the struggle for weste rn Europeand po ssibly of th e enti re war. Hitler hadpersona lly ordered tha t the panzer d ivisionsshould be formed up outside Mortain , tactngwestwards and then launched in an attackwhich was to dnve down the Rivers see andSelun e to reach the sea at Avrancbes. However,despite the costly battles which had occurredalong the River Odon in july, Hitler and hisstaff did no t realise that armoured operationsof this magn itu de could not be successfulwitho ut complete air superior ity. The Germanfield co mmande rs fu lly ap preciat ed th edan ger, hut were un able to persuade vo n Klugeto rescind Hitler's orders. Despite heavy enemypressure, the Tactical Air Forces and Americancoun ter-measures repulsed the attacks in the

Above: The Battle forSt-LO. Utter bearersbring wounded Gis to aI sr Army regtmental aidstation. (US Army viaReal War Photos A •] S] )

I•

Rizht:: The B.att le fOf" St­to 1stArmy traflklIIOYing through [heruns of St-LO. 2 August19+1. (US Army via RealWar Photos A- 3 14)

Below: 3rd Armyb!'eak0U[. Main 'player'inthe breakout was o rrcerse the CG 3rd Army-uGen George S.Pnton, Jr. seen hereltUdying ill battle mapWIlt1 Maj GenHughGalfey. his Chief or Staff.wxched by Maj M. C.HeIrers. Speciallntelli­renee OffICer on opera­DOllSof the German

forces opposing [heMleric.an thrust (US/vmyl

S3

BREAKOUT

left: Monty vislts the

1$t PoIi$h ArmouredDivi$ion . 6 Augu$t 1944,Here he meets anumber of Polish offlcer1and is introduced tothem by Maj Genr-taczek. the GOC.(I'NM 88762)

Below: Bntl$h troopsadvance sooth of leBeny Bccage . Movingthrough typical bocagehedgerows. where anambush can lurk aroundevery comer. 6 August:

1944_(Bruce Robertson)

BREAKOUT

Above: Nice to meet you !. Amencan and British troops meet fortilefam time as the twO armies link up on the Argentan road,Aug.Jst 19·H. (IWM - HU '1]955)

Belo w: Hea vy fighting in progress in the area between Caen andFalaise. August 19.... . (IWM • HU ] 02 1)

BREAKOUT

56

Above : This massive R.oy1ITIger tank was knocked 0lA

on 7 August 19+4, near lePlosis Grimault. Fortunatelythe Germans only built 489of there 68 ton heavy tanh.whose 88mm gun couldeasily deal with its 0ppo­

ne nts at ranges where therown armour was virtuallyimpe ne trable. (TankMuseum)

left: Wi nnie visits Monty.Pr ime Minister WinstonChu rchill paid numerousnying visits to Normarldy,

this time on 7 Augus t 19+4.He re he meets one ofMonty 's new puppies called'Rommel'! (IWM • B 8766)

Right : Vehicles belongingto the ]rt! Canadian DIVi­sion, photographed duringthe 'mad dash' period of0pet'ation 'Tractable', asthey pour forward Ileal'

Breneville-Ie-Rabet, 14August 19+4 . (NationalArchives of Canada - PA1165]6)

Above: Canadiansold iers move past aburning ammunitiontn.d:. during OperationloQIize', the Canadiant:re*(U, whieh alsoWJYOIved Bntrsh andPcbh troops. 8 August19«. (tQtionaI Archives

ofUnada - PA 13 137 5)

xtorta tn area. During the nlght of the 7th,Canad ian forces south-west o f Cae n alsoadva nced, assts tcd by more tha n I ,()(X) IV\ Fho mhers wntch dropped some :\,000 plus tonsof bombs on the enemy pushing towardsFalatse. The German defences here were formi­dabl e, so the plan was to assault under cover ofdarkness, with the infantry in heavy armounedcar riers (these were gutted 'Sexton' SP guncarriages whic h came to he known as 'Kanga ­roos'). In itially t ill" attack went well and bymidd ay on the xrh th e villages of May-sur­Orne, Fontenay and Tilly-la-Campagne had

be en take n. The Ca nadians then came upagainst ,Iwry strong Jay-back posit ion astridethe high ground.

Week 10: K-14 AugU',t 194-1

The on ly remaining aggressive enemy resis­tance in US Third Army's area was against VIIICorps at St-Malo which had been heavily forti­fied and the harbour locks mined, but by thel -tth only the anc ient citadel in the po rt arearcrnatned in ene my hands. The leadi ngcleme nts o f XV Corps were no w on ly twelvemiles from Le Mans , the enemy offe ring o nly

••

Left : A vital task dUrillgthe advance - and at allether OI'Tle5 for thatmatter - was tha t ofartillery ~tion offi­cers, who directed the

fire of the field artilleryonto enemy posItIOnS

from their often exposedOPS. This coe wasopen.ting roear Bareetco.Praoce on 10August1944. (IWM - EA 511)85)

Below: BntJShand e-­dWl tanks form up forOper.ltion "Tractable'" 14August I 'M4. Nearest

the carne-a~ tobe an MIO tankdestroyer. This open­topped TO mounted alill gull on the Shermanchassis. Another verSIOl'I

was the M I0 Achilles.which moun ted theBritish 17pdr. Behind theMIO is a Churchill flame­

thrower. toWiog its

trailer full of flame fluid.(Nat ional Archives ofCanada - PA 116525)

Wee k I I : 15- 2 1 Augu\t 1944

[See Cha pter -I for t he Operation ' Dragoon 'la nd ings on 16 August and th e subseq uen tadv ance northwards up the Rhone valley.)

five m iles fro m ratatsc. and sti ll gett ing

massive air support from til l' RAE On theadm ini strati ve front , th e first PLUTO was

brought in to c pcranon on 12 August, carryi ngfuel fro m the Isle of Wigh t to Che rbou rg.

Eve ntua lly no less than 20 suc h pipelines we relaid unde r th e Cha nne l from the Isle of Wight

and Dungcn ess to Che rbourg a nd Boulognerespectively.

58

token resistance: XII and XX Corps wereadvancing o n O rlean s and Cha rtres.

The maim trouble spot for the Allies wassti ll ar ound Mo rta tu , where t he st rugg lecontinued . The Germans were still trying toma ke th eir major breakthrough . but they wereheld, then grad ua lly worn do wn, so that by

th e l lth even von Kluge was more thananxious to wit hd raw hi s forces while they weresti ll reasonabl y intact ; he was prevented fromdoing so by Hitler who would only allow apartial withdrawal . Farther south, US forces

had crossed th e River Lo ire. To th e north-east.by the l-Ith, th e Cana dia ns were on ly about

- - - ----=---=-"~

Right : Bonjour Ameri·ans! French citizens of~ crowd into thenarrow streets of Ang~

to welcome XX COfPSlfOOIl'S, who entered thetawn on 12 August.(1'M1 EA - ]]10])

\.owff right: The'hrnes' of 79thAnnoured Division,

t*I"I p¥t in Operation·hcubIe', 1-4 August

1944. ne¥ Brettev.lle--Ie-

--~~ AYREs; the one

on me left is QIT)'lng abrushwood fucine"I!1Idl _ dropped into

ITttlChesJdrtrnes to assistee Wlk in crosSlng_ The290mm Petard spigOt

mortar demolition gunan beclearly seen ontheocher AVRE,(NaoonalArchives ofC2lada.PA 11 652 ])

I

11

I

BREAKOUT

On the 15th , SHAH announced that US Third

Army was now operating in France and 12thArm y Group ordered Patt on to hold the

sou the rn ~OJ of the Argcntan -Patatse gapwith XV Co rps, to gether wit h VII Corps (FirstArmy), whil e stmcna ncousty making a rapidmovem ent eastwards to harass and con fusethe enemy. The objective of XX Co rps was

changed from Dreux to Chartres. By now th earea south of th e Seine from Paris to Orleanswas under US Third Army's co ntro l. nrcux was

captu red by X V Corps on th e 16th and XIICor ps took Orleans on the same day. Pattonth en o rde red XII Corps to hol d Orlea ns with asma ll force, move th e bulk of t he co rps sout hof j anvtne and press on eastwards. 8y the 18th

Below: 8mish tanks and

ami-tank guns movingforward in the ArgenunMea, during August19044. (Bruce R.obernon)

Left: Canadian tan ksIl'lClVe up for the ir role inOperation'Tota lize' .Note the e xtra prctec­DOnafforded to the~ in the nght of!he traCk. by the track~es welded to the

"'" gb<d. The~. despite betng agood all-round medi umrio was known as theRonson Lighter ' by ItS

crews as I[ was: .... guar.need to light firstlJne!' (National Archives

oIC1nada - PA 1329(1)

Right: Street fighting inFabise. Infantry-tan k co­operatioo had to be of a'IfJrf high order. Herenbntry of Les Fusilier'SMont-Royal get su pportrom a Sherman of theShefbrooke fusil ier'S6.nng a snipe r hunt on17 August 1911 .l~tionaJ Archives ofUnada- PA I ISS68 )

th ey had secured bridge-heads ove r the Riverf url' at Dreu x and Cha rtres and were closin gup on the Seine. On th e 20th, XX Corps estab­livhed bridge-heads across t he rive r andlaunc hed a ttacks cast of the Seine at Mcllunand Fontai nebleau. On zrst Arm y Group'sfront , Brit ish VIII C..o rps en tered l 1nchebray o nthe 15t h, wh ile other British an d Canadia n

BREAKOUT

u nns were a ttacking towards Falalse, Can 2ndIn f Div capt uring th e town on the 17t h. Totheir sout h , US VII and V Co rps were push in g

northwa rd:'> in a n endeavour to trap unit:'> ofFifth Panze r Army an d Sevent h Army bet weenthem . th e enemy tryin g desperately to t";cape­the pin cers. The ' Patatse Gap' was closed onthe 181h by a co n junc tion of Poli sh and US

Right : Gis of 8JrdInfantry Division dealingWIth enemy snipe rs inwe-to- ho use fighting... St-Malo, 17 August194-4. (US Army)

BREAKOUT

.,"~

~" -- -~ .-.- -

62

Above: The top~ atwork in mnce , Auglm:1944.l to R: Geo SirMiles Dempsey (2nd BrArmy), Gen Courtney

Hodges ( Ist US Army).Gen He nry Cre rar (CanIst Arm y), Gen Sir

Be m ard Montgomery(2 1st Army Group) andGen O mar Bradley ( 12thUS Army Group). (IWM

- 8967" )

left:: Convnander of the

151: Polish Armoured0Msi0n, MajGetlStanislaw Mac:zek, t.aIkingwith CanadWl warcOlTeSpClOdents. followingthe Poles' t1eroic defeoceof position 'Maczuga'

(mace), plugging the gapto bottle up Germanarmoor in the Falaise

Pocket . (NatlOflalArchives of Canada • PA1291 40)

BREAKOUT

Above: Polish tankcrewmen talk with SgtMcVay of the BlackWatch, sou th of Caen. Itwas men like this whoplugged the Falaise Ga pmel prevented largenumbers or Germantanksfrom escaping,(I'NM - B 8829)

a rmoured units at Charnbois. Th ere were still

co nsrdc rabte Ge rm an forces west uf the Gap

ami Allied fighter -bombers ha d a field -day,

kn ocking o ut many tan ks and ot her AFVs.

Neve rtheless a number of th e r emai n i n ~

panzer un its d id man age to esca pe during the

ntgnt o f the 20 th . (In a ll fro m 19to 29 August .so me J OO,OOO enemy so ldiers and 25, 000 vch t­

ctes managed to esca pe , bu t they lef t behind

50, 00 0 dead, 200, 00 0 prt souers a nd the

wreckage of p recio us ve h icles and equi pmentwhich ha d o nce equipped t wo a rmi es. One

es ttmate o f total Ge rman ta nk losses d u ring

t ilt' Norma ndy ca m pa ign wa.. 1,3OU-pl us ;

/ 'i1/U t" Lrhr, 9t h Pz Div and so me fifteen

in fant ry divtstons virtua lly ceased to exist .

Another 'casua lty' of the d isas trous Mo rta tn

counter-attack was t he German commander

f~1 von Kluge. He had been vis iting the Fatai sc

a rea on 12 August when h is veh tcle was hit by

artillery fire and he was pinned down in a

ditch for some twelve hours . Hitler, assuming

that he had deserted, sent H I x todel to replace

him, and when Kluge re-appeared he was

ordered back to Germany 'fo r a rest '. Von

Kluge, rcartng the wors t, took poison and d iednca r Metz o n the 19th , lea ving a me ssage

which prorcs-cd undyin g pe rsonal lo yalty 10his Fuhr er. Afte r a short time it becam e dear

that run ning hoth OB We..t and Arm y Group 1\

wav beyond Mod el's ahllities, so Hitler recalled

vo n Rundvt edt tscc later ), leaving Mod el to re·

or/o\.lllhl' till' sha tte red Army Group, w htch he

di d most effectively.

week 12: 22-2K AUj.;ust 19-1-1

All Alhed armies began a rapid ad vance nort h­eas twards in pursuit of the disorga nised

German forces. At 0700 hrs on 25 August ,

Fre nch 2ml Arrnd Dtv, which had been

released from all other duties (on Eisenhower's

di rect o rders: so that it could have the honour

of Iilx'ratin/<:: france 's capital, entered Parisfro m till' sout h-west. Half an hour la ter, US -nh

Int Div d id likewise from the south . Fortu­

nately the German Garrison commander,

Genera! von Choltitz, ignored Hitle r's order to

blow up the main public buildings, bridges

63

Abo...e: American

engineen dropping thelast sectiOn of a pontoontreadway bndge intoposition, across theRiver Seine, west ofPans . (Tank MU5eUfTl)

left: Half-traCks,fo llowed by trucks of3rd Annd Oi... of 1st(US) Army. crossing theSeine on 26 August1944. (U S Army via RealWar Phcros , A 66 1A)

8dow: A3. [he A111e$raced across Fr.inc:e, the

frerda inwrgent forceslFfl = Forces~sesde11nteneur) came out

«0 the open. (Author's

"""""l

and monume nts, and at ISIS hrs su rrenderedt he city to Gene ral Leclerc. relatively undam­aged and with little fightin g. General deGaulle ret urn ed to Paris the follow ing day andlook pa rt in a large cere mo nial pa rade. To the

north of Pans , British -I3rd In f Dtv establisheda bridge-head over the Seine at Vernon, anddownriver at Louviers near Rouen British XII

Corps did likewise. On the same day threedivisions of US VIII Corps {Znd, 80th and90th) began a major assault against Brest afteranother aerial bombardment . By the 26thmost of the Allied armies had units across theSeine with US Thi rd Army lead ing the charge,taking Chateau-Th ierry on t he Marne on the27th , as well as reach ing Troyes. farther south011 the Seine. On the 28th US First Army hadunits across the Marne at Mea ux. and US Th irdArmy was approaching Rheims. In the north,having crossed the lower Seine o n the 26th,Canadian First Army moved towards Calais,while British Second Army u nits ma de for

-

•

BREAKOUT

nelgtum. On t he 27t h British I Corps reach ed

t he mouth of th e Seine a nd th e followin g dayCa n II Corps ex pa nded. its bridge- head towards

Rouen.

Note s1. Patt o n had apparently 'disappeared.' afterSicily and, because the Germans rated. him asthe ht.·st Allied a rmoured commander, it

see med to them only logical that he had beengiv en thi s important role - t hey hadn 'trealised that the notorious 'slapping incident 'in Sicily had been taken so seriously by 'the

powers that be '. ' I'm not supposed. to becommanding this Army: he would. gleefullytell his troops during his 'pe p-talks' in the UKprior to the invasion. ' I'm not eve n supposedto be in England. Let the first bastards to findout be the Godda mn Ge rmans. I want t hem to

loo k up and howl: "Ach, it's the GoddamnThi rd. Army and that son-of-a-bitch Patton

agamt"

•-•

..

BREAKOUT

•-

Leh: Gen PhiippeLeclerc. CG 2nd FrenchArmd [);Y, whose divi­sion was rightly given thehonour of being the firstAllied troops to enterParis_(~'s CoIIec·tion)

Be low: Thousands 01Parisians encircle theChamps Elysees towitness the victoryparade on 26 Augusl1944. Ge n Charl es deGaulle. president of theFrench Comminee ofNat ional liberatIOn. ledthe parade,fol~ byunits of l eClerc's 2ndFrench Armd [);y.

(Author's CoIleetIOO)

,Right: RAF rocket.flringTyphoons were respcn­SIble for knocking outINs Genmn armourSI)Ut/'I..east of Couunces,l-awlg beet! 'mvrted ' toDkt IW1: by AmeriCan.-myehlefs, By the end01 theday they haddeKroyed )2 enemyQ'lks~wellas

IUTlerOUS other AFVs... ........, """P<>'</>i MlI'llStry PhotographQUI XPJ

Ript: Alter the capture01'A~, A.mer1un~lorces

l;Ol'lOI'Ued to push SOl.IthnI ust. as Patton's

"""""­tIrough mnce. TheseGermin POWs wereP¥1 of 20.000 capturedIItheDatde lorA-nnches. (US Army)

Right; CapturedGerman troops in ParisHe marched through thestreets . much to theOeIlgt1t of crowds ofdenslve Parisians,(Author's Collection)

Above: Members of the FFI(ForcesF~ises de I'Inteneur) havelinked up with friendly forces during the Allied race across France .These two young Frenchmen wear the FFI arm band , bearing theCross of l o rraine . The young man in the he lme t is certainly wellarmed - he has a British Ste rrgun and a Ge rman P38 pisto l in aType I holster as well as his rifle! The other wears a Germanleather belt with the 55 buckle (upside down) adorned with aspread eagle clutching a swast ika. (IWM • BU 2 17)

Above : 'vve jes Anglais!~ Mde Scarlette of les Ande lys on theRiver Seine proudly wears her Union Jack blouse as she waves totroops passing by he r Hote l des Hea rs. 31 August 1944 . (IWM. 89869)

Be lo.....: Not only did they get rid of the enemy. some Gis alsohelped to bring in the harvest. These American sold.ers are helping'down on the farm ' near 5t-Malo soon after its capture. (IWM . EA365(4)

68

4Operation 'Dragoon'

A seco nd 'Sec o nd Front'

As has bee n mentioned, a long-..tanding argu­ment had conti n ually affected American­British relati ons, concern ing where the'Sec o nd Front ' should be mounted. Chu rch ill,worried about a possible takeover of centraland eastern Europe by th e Commun ists, wasvery much in favour of reinforcing Allied oper­ations in Italy and striking up through theBalkans, into Austria and Hungary, to takeVienna and Budapest, then o n across theDanube into sou thern Germany, thusthwart ing Stalin 's now rampant Red Army ofmany of tts spo ils of Victor y. Unfortunatdy,the Americans d id not agree; they dislikedChurch ill's 'Balkan int rigues ' and did not wantto sacrifice American uves for the sake of what

they saw as merely securing the st il l m ./uo inEurope . They would of course live to regretthctr dcctston post-war, but having won theircaw that 'Overlo rd' should take place innorthern Prance, th ey now opted for a second'Sec ond Front' in the South of Prance. Stalinwas delighted and continued to support whatsome American /Briti sh cynics called 'TheSta lin Plan '; as far as he was concerned it couldtake place an ywh ere, preferably as far west asposstble but certai nly not in th e Balkans! Even­tuall y Church ill Rave in and 'Anvil', as it wasth en called (la ter changed to 'Dragoo n'), wasscheduled to take place at the same tim e as'Overlord', so as 10 draw enemy troops awayfrom th e main Allied assau lt. This proposalwas thwarted beca use there just weren 't

Right: Preceding theamphibious assaul t wasee paradrop by men or!tlt us 1st ProvisionalAirtIome Division. Hereparauoopeno in [he ir(.47 airc~ft try to relax

on their way to the dropzone, Nearly 400 C -47sfrom ten differentlIIi.elds took part . (IW M.EA H703)

69

- ', ••-, , • •• •• a •• .. .

~ ..• • .•

• •

enough landing-craft to mount both opera­

nons sim ultaneously; after various postpone­ments it was agreed that Operation 'Dragoon'would take place o n 15 August 1944 . Th e

ch o sen location was 10 be in Proven ce , ea st of

Marseilles, between Toulon and Ca n nes. The

assaulting force would be under th e commandof Major General Alexander M. Patch's US

Seventh Arm y, whose HQ wa s then at Naples.

Its amphibious landing force was to heco mposed of ~Iaior General Lucian K.Truscott 's US VI Corps (US 3rd, 36th and 45th

lil t Divs). This would land fint and befollowed by Gene ral de Lau re de Tassigny'sFrench Armel' B (to be ren amed French FirstArm y a month later) , a force of SOIUt' 256,{X)()

me n, co m prisin g sev en Fre nch di visions,

including troops from the French Expedi­

tionary Corps and their Amity d'Atrique,I Th e

amphibious assault would be preceded by aparadrop by US t st Provisional Atrbome Divi­

sio n. Th e landings wou ld be watched by

70

Ch urch ill and Ge nera l Mait la nd 'Ju m bo '

Wilson, who was Cine Mediterranean and

thus nominally in charge of the ope-ano na lthough he had passed responstbtli ty down 10

h is depu ty, US Ge neral j acob Devers.

o pposing th e landmg WNl' elemen ts o fGe ne ral Blaskow ltz's Army Grou p G, althoug h

only three o f h is ten divisions were located

near the chose n beaches. As with 'Overlord ',

the Allies would ha ve massive air and na val

su pe riority, atthough there was a sho rtage o f

landing-craft , and no spectaltscd armour suc h

as had been so successfu l on n ·nay would take

par t.

Th e Landing..

Su pported by so m e 880 wa rshi ps of the

Western Na val Task Force , which Inc luded

five ba ttleshi ps , 21 crui sers and 100

destroyers , more than 1,400 landing-cr aft

too k pa ri in the a m phi b ious land in gs o n 15

August 19·H , Ih e fleet co m ing fro m five ports

Above: Wrth text-boolcprecision. the par.Klropwas completed WCCE$$­

fully near Oragutgan andLe Muy, the first stickjumping at ~]Ohrs.

There was onlyoneserious elT04". w hen, dueto low-lying fog , onebattaliOn was droppedsome 20 miles from rts

n5igned Oz. (IWH - EA]3702)

,•,,,"

e

Above: Watching theIn:Iings in scutbernFrance was tbe Brit ishPrime Ministe r WinstonChurchill, on board the

destroyer Kimberley, nag.ship ofAdmiral Sir John

Cunllingham. Churchi llwould coerce thedestroyer's skipper to get

fM dcsee to the beacheslhar1 he should (due to the~ from hundreds offtoatmg mines) . (IWM • A

2525"')

Right: Landing craftapproaching the beaches .Most Gis seem to bewuring the issue inllat·aI* Iifebelts. but cebee­WIStappear to be casually_dwlg the shorethrough blnoculars - no'lIICOITIing' by the look ofl!wlgs. (IWM - IA ])990)

I

OPERATION 'DRAGOON'

of emba rkation in Italy, Sicily and Nor thAfrica , to rendezvous op posite thei rappoin ted beaches, between h e ju s andCan nes, ha vin g first head ed toward snorth ern Ita ly, to di sguise thei r tr ue desn na­tion . Overh ead t here were con tin ual so rtiesby the 2,{)OO aircra ft wh ich th e ,\ lIies had

co ncen t rated on ai rfie lds in Co rsica andSard in ia, and o n ni n e aircr aft carriers ­outnumbering the l uft waffe by at least 10 toI ! While the invasion fleet was assembling.the airbo rne eleme n t, t ransported in almost400 C-47s from ten airfields in Italy, had beensuccess fully dropped near Dragu tgnan and leMuy, ti ll' first stick jumping at 04 :Ul Iu s. Atthe sam e time, a Iew aircra ft had droppedhundred s o f sma ll d um my parachu tists in th eToulon area to co n fuse the enemy. Lo w-lying

fog hampered some of the parat roop dropsand o ne batta lion was dropped so me 20 milesaway from the assigned drop zo nes. But th iswas th e on ly serious error, the remainder ofl st Airborne Task Force landing accord ing to

plan . The follow-up glid e r force landed nearle M uy some five hours lat er, more than 70gliders br inging in artille ry, anti-tan k gu nsand small vehicles. Tow ard s last light afurther 330 plus gliders arri ved , so that by th eend of the day some 9 ,000 Allied airbornetr oops had been landed. with more than 200artillery pteccs and an eq uiva lent number o fvehicles. Losses had been slight - 434 kllh-dand 292 in jured. They were no w ready toassault the ene my at le Muy.

Despite conside rable quant it ies of minesand ot he r beac h obstacles, whic h had to be

Below: Un~lng fromthis landing cra ft on I5August is .11 Multiple Gt,.,Motor Carnage M I 5A I ,

which bad a l7mmcannon and two .50 calmachine guns in acombination mount. Thehalf-track belonged toJrd Inf Div. (US Army yQ

Real War Pho tos A­2512 )

-- - - - -------- - - - - - - - - - ----------,

OPERATION 'DRAGOON'

Above : Allied troops advancing thr ough ill smokescreen. having debarked from landing craft. whi~( a fairnumbel" of German prisone rs (in the centre of the photograph) are being corral led together. (IWM - NYF

37IS")

Below: Follow-up troops of 45th lnf D iv wade ashore 0f1 Camel Beach. The leading Gis are carrying adisassembled 81mm mortar. (IWM - NYF 40] I0)

73

Left: A column of Arrt«.

icMt infantrymefllTlOV'tpast two DUKW - Of' togive thei r full designa­[ion: 2too 6x6Amphibian Truck GMCDUKW 353. Theymount 57mm anti-tankguns and were often soemployed during beacha5$0Wlts. (IWM - lAP])982)

l e ft : U5 engineen;crossing [he bridge at Si·Raphael after its capture.The seaside town, whichwas near Camel RedBeach, had some of Its

waterfroot bars . kioslc.sand bathing cabir15disguising coastal gunpositions. (IW M • IA

35339)

l eft: Men o f 3rd

Infantry Divisioo UOUIflIthe River Doubs in

Besanr;on. during thepush~.8

September 19..... (USArmy via Real WarPho[OS A-2..95)

OPERATION 'DRAGOON'

Above: Gisor l-4lrdRegt 36 Inf Div ride onone of their tank~~ion Shermanslhrougtl this French10Wll. whilst the people

dleer them on, 16September 19-4-4 . (USIvmy via Real Wa r

Photos - A 3297)

clea red by underwat er demolition tea ms, theamph ibious tandr ngs were also achi eved with

u n ly minim al casualt ies Hewe r tha n 200killed) , tha nks to the prelimi nary heavy airand sea bomba rd me nt an d the lack of tmme­diate heavy ene my opposition. Th ree beacharea s had been chosen - fro m west to eas t: J rdInf tuv lan ding on 'Alpha', 45th Inf Dtv on' Delt a' an d 36th Inf Div an 'Camel', with 011th e left Fren ch Co mmandos whose job it was

to cut the road to Tou lon . The 1st SpecialService fo rce (US and Can Co mman dos) was

sent to silence heavy German guns on tile liesd 'Hyeres. whic h cri tica lly overlooke d AlphaKeach, but on arrival. the guns were fou nd tobe dummies. Th e stiffest fighting was on

Camel. against heavy and accurate fire whichco uld not be silenced by the sea bombard­ment . Eventually, however, the troops made itashore and consolidated their beach-head.

As planned, on the 16th, Genera l deTassigny's (I Corps (which landed from IJ+I to1J+25) passed through th e Amer icans and tooknve r the coas tal advance , making for th e mainini tia l targets, namely the ports of Toul on and

Marseilles, hoth o f which were heavilydefended. The Americans advanced inland onth e righ t flank , with .t e th Inf Div heading forthe valtcy of the Dura nce and 3rd and 45th InfDtvs go ing for Atx-en-Provence (taken 21t\ ugus t ) and Avignon (25 August ). Th e

Ger ma n garrisons at Toul on and Marseillesfought stubbornly an d it took the Frenc h colo­nial forces some twelve days to capture ho thth e key ports wh ich had been desig nated as'fo rtresses of no surrender' hy Hit ler. Nearly4x ,Uno prisoner s we re taken in the twofortresses. Frenc h I Cor ps, whic h had lan ded

be hind II Corps, had crossed the Rhone andturned northwards on 2X August . Th e race was1I0W on to lin k up with Patto n's Th ird Armywell to the north. Operation ' Dragoo n' hadbeen an unqualified success . In to tal some3XO,()O() men , 69,(X)() veh icles and 306,000

tons of supplies were landed between 16August and 2 Septe mber.

With th e Germans withdrawing in front ofth em , th e US and French forces pressed north­wards. On the right, Grenoble was ta ken on 24

August and on th e left Lyons on 3 September.

7S

IiI

O PERATION 'D RAGOO N '

Above: Historic meeting of US Third and Seventh Armies. 12September 19+4, in Autun, France . The two M8 Greyhoundannoured cars were driven by Dvr Jean QUigon (left) who hadadvanced northwards from Toulon andCpI Carl Newman, 86thRecon Sqn of the US Sixt h Armd Di..., o ne of Partoo's hard-d rivingarmoured divisions. Here. Sgt louis Basil, the Greyh oundcommander, shakes hands with the French driver. (4115 is IWM ·EA 37766 . 4/ 16 is Author's Co llection)

Be~ Remnants of the German First Army endeavoured. withsome success. to get through the Betfort Gap to escape intOGermany. whilst the Seventh US and First Frenc h Armies tried toprevent them. Here a Shennan tank belonging to a Frencharmoured unit opens up onto an enemy position on the outskirtsof Selfort . (IWM - EA 4.04782)

OPERATION ' DRAGOON'

AboYe: A machinecunner of the 1st Frenchkmy turns his .30Browning MG. on it s

ground mounting. o nto

an enemy position in

Belfort as they liberatedthi~ keytown. (IWM ­EA +l813)

Right: Two Frenchsoldiers of a signal teamofthe Jrd AlgerianWlIltry Division. plustheir wire-laden mule.IT10Ye up In the foo thillsoftheVosgl!!$ Mountains.IIIa new Allied drivetoWards the GermanIrontter. (twM • EA~29 S 1 )

77

OPERATION 'DRAGOON'

.

Towa rds the end, the Germans chow 10 fight

one fin al del aying action at Besan con in o rder

to try to ga in a breatfung-space to wit hd rawth e bu lk of what was left o f their fo rces

through the Belfort Gap. Some 3,(XX) enemy

were in position there and a fierce fight devel­

oped for control of Besancon. On the left ,

French 11 Corps advanced northwards from

Lyons, nberanng Dijon on to September and

taking man y tho usan ds 01 pnsoncrs.z On 12

September the fi rst contacts were made

be tween units of Gen era l Leclerc's Prce French

2 nd Armd Div, si.' rving wit h Patton's Th ird

Army, which had foug h t Its way from

Normandy, via Paris, with the advance

elements of French II Corps, in the a rea of

Chatillon-sur-Seme. A fair number of German

troops had managed to escape at various

places along the route and they were able

78

eventually to join up wit h Army Group B, but

they had taken heavy lo sses, t han ks to Allied

artfllery and ai r str ikes, in part icu lar aga ins tGeneral vo n wtctcrshe tm's 11th i'z Div. In

addition, so me HO,OOO prisoners were taken .

German First Army, under General von der

Chevatlene, had also now withdrawn from

south-west France. The Allied aim had been

achieved and the front was now conttnuouv

from t he Eng ltsh Channel in the north 10

Switzerland in thi.' sou th.

No tes

l. General de Laure de Tassigny ha d made a

strong case for the French to la nd first, but wa s

overruled.

2. A large proportion of these were East Euro­

pean 'volunteer' units, who killed their officers

and went over to t he Allied side .

Above : Residents ofBelfort march along With

the Secon d Moroc c:an

Infant ry Division w ild as

they celebrate their

liberation . 20 November1944. (IWM - EA -iSBO)

5From the Seine to the Rhine

Below: Spoils of war.Men of the 7Hth USOrlNnce Ibtulion, of

s-nm Anny. d~ng..~tfy undiun­.,edPzKpfw III Ausf L011 theboItt\erteld in late

~ 19+4. using thelr'll'l"Kker. wtNchbears

ee sundard natIOnalodentJfat ion symbol onc door. Note the heavyIIIiChtne gun cal .SO on ams-rT1OUflt over the cab .(Tn Museum)

A Strategic Dile m maPoised astride th e Seine, with th e new ' pus h '

fro m th e 'Dragoon ' landings making goodprog ress up the Rhone valley, it was now time

to libe rate t he rest of France and take th e ba ttlein to th e Low Countries. However, an tncrea s­

tngty acrimon ious argument had bee n tagingfor so me time between the Allied sen io rco m ma nders as to how best to proceed withthe overal l ...«aregtc battle. Th e two main

oppos ing arguments po...ited e ithe r a broodadva nce with all the armies sharing supplies(and gloryt), or a bolder, swift ad vance on a

mu ch narrower front , with a mu ch ...malletforce . Eisenhower, ever the careful diplomat,

favoured th e broad approach . reason ing thatthe more ca ut ious advan ce, with all armies

keeping roughly in line. would be safer, easterto handle and a m uch be tter way of keepingIh e pl'ace betwee n such fiery charact ers asPatt on and Montgom ery. They of course. espe­cia lly Montgomery, who was promoted toField Marshal on 3 1 August, favoured thenarrow thrust. His plan was for a bold advanceby some 20 divtstons whi ch wou ld smash their

way into Germany, encircle the Ruhr and endth e war a t a stroke. They would of course getthe lion's share of fuel and materiel wh ile

l' Vl'ryOIlt' else waited for more supplies 10

bec ome available. While he was happy that it

FROM THE SEIN E TO TH E RH INE

Left: Fre nch childrenand the ir mothe rs W,1~

to the crews o f a columnof Polish tan ks as theyenter the village ofPommeroy. (Author' sCollection)

l eft: Polish tan kcrewmen are picturedhere on their appropri­ately named Sherman.Gen r-tazcek's~division fought valiantlythroughout the Noeth­West Euro peancampaign. (Author'sCollection)

-

should ht· a mixed Allied stri ke force, it was

quite clea r who was to comma nd it! ' My own

view, wh ich I pr esen ted to the Supreme

Commander.' he wrote in h is m em oirs, 'was

that one po.....c rful full-blooded th rust across

the Rhine and in to the heart of Ge rmany,

backed hy the hole of t he reso u rces of the

Allied armies, ould he likely to ach ieve deci-

sive result s.' Monty outlined two ro utes for

suc h an advance : the northernmost th ro ug h

Bdgium to the Rhine, crossmg no rt h o f the

80

Ruhr in dustria l regio n and in to the open

plain s of northern Germany. alternatively,

th ro ugh Metz, the Saa r a nd into cen t ra l

Ge rma ny. He na turally favou red the northernroute !

Eisenhower did not wa nt to rock the boat,

but he fea red , with some justification , t hat the

narrow a pproach was just too vulne rable and

m igh t well he rut off . The Ge rm a n a rm ies we re

not co m ptc tety beaten and st ill p rese nted a

considerab le threat , especially as they were

Right: A large DnadianlOkIier chan to a smallmembef of the FFI. whocradles hisSten - fortu­naely with the cockingIMr in mesafetyposi­DOll! (I'NM • HU 28887)

Below: Members of theFR W3Yf! a greeting to acok.mn of Bnti~ tanks.led bya Sherman Fire fly(mountlng the Briti~

17pc1r guninstead of the

normal 7Smm). (IWM­HU 73114)

FRO M THE SEIN E TO THE RHINE

81

.

FROM THE SEINE TO TH E RHIN E

bctng driven hack into their home territory,

and wo u ld figh t ever more fierce ly to protect

11ll" Fat herland . With hlnd slght, a nd especially

taking in to co ns idera tio n the overw helm ing

Allied air supcncnry, he was probably being

ov ercaunous. though ev e ryone wo u ld be

caugh t o ff balance w hen t he Ger m a ns

mount ed their Ardennes opcranon juvt threemonths later. fie eventually decided o n the

broad fro nt a pproach. h ut Montgomery as w 1..'

shall see, d id not come a.....ay enti rely empty­handed.

T he Seed of a 1'011

By no w it had become very clear that the Allfesdesperately needed a large worklng port near

t he front line, so as to avoid the 3on- m ile haul

bar-k to Norma ndy for replenishment . Main­tain ing su pp lies was a co n ti n ua l pro blemdcsptte em ploying such innovative uses of

transport as the 'Red Ball Express ' which intro­

duced a one-.....ay loop system between St-Lo

and Chartres, with eve ry available truck

running non-stop day and night . For exam ple,

from 25 to 29 August 19 44 , just under 6,000

trucks delivere d 12,500 tons of supplies . Th e

ideal so lution wou ld be th e ca pt ure o f

Antwerp, '>0 instead of going a ll the way with

t he ' n a rrow front' proposal . Eisen howerallowed Bnt ivh Second Arm y a major sha re of

t he nard-pressed fuel sup p lies at the expe nse

o f US First and Third Armies , so that they

co uld ma ke a swift advance o n the lett fla nk,

enabling them to dest roy t he l'nl' my in nor th­

eas tern Prance . clear th e v-bomb sill'S in the

I'av-de-Ca lats. ca pture airfields in Belgium and.

most importantly. cap tu re and open the po rt

of Antwerp.

\\h 'k 13: 29 Augus t-4 September 1944

w eek 13 began as WCl'''- 12 had ended with

mnre Allied pfOKre,>s eas twards, US VII Cor ps.for exa m ple, taking Sotssons and crossing the

Aisne. Farther eas t US Th ird Arm y un its took

Rht' ims and C ha fons-su r-Mame. Although

fur ther p rog rt'Ss would be made lor a few more

days. the grave shortage of fuel wa s now begin­

n ing to affect o pe ratio ns , av was the argumen t

between the wntor commanders. explainedalready , o n ho w best to p roceed with the

82

o ve ral l st rategic batik. Om' can imagi ne

General Patton's feelings, for exa mple, whe nhe realised that h is fue l suppttes would be

endange red by suc h a p lan! The debate would

cont in ue , wit h Eisenho wer endeavouring to

maintain harmony between the Allies , which

in evitably res ul ted in hi s leani ng m ore

towards the British . On ]O August . 12th Arm y

Gro up Informed US Third Arm y that there

would Ill' no m ore fuel available unti l :i

Above: 'Kamerad" TIllsunkempt German soldierwith his ad hoc whiteflag. was in f~ amedical corpsman. oneof a group picked up bypassIng tank colu mn.Wit h other med ics hewas trying to help somewounded comrades.(IW M - EA 4877447)

FRO M THE SEIN E TO THE RHINE

Abowe: Back to Sr-VW'y. In 1940. Sc-Valery.....,J;Sthe scene of aV,lj,ant rearguard actionbytheSin Highlandl),V1s,on who were even­wally forced tosurrender, Now the

tables are turned as IS2Bde of the division liber·rles the [own. Here MajGen G T. Rennie . OSO ,OBE. the GOe, lightsM pope andwatches hISso!dieoenter St-Valery.(1V'IM- 8U 1518)

Right: A good jcb done,I medic of 5 Ist High land0Msi0nrepacks h iS firstad~k beforeITlOWl& on . (IWM - B

"""

83

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

TOcrn•

Ltft: En route for Brus­IeIl. l Septembe r 19<H,Bnosh tanks movinglirough AiltOing passltlder a welcomingbnlef. (IWM • BU 392)

Below: Same VIllage but............ "'"...... snenn.n.Arcolng. 3 September19+1. (IWM - BU 382)

- ..,.,.., troops~ Brussels. Crowds

• """'" wekome!I'ft' libemors - thesesolcIoers wereespeciallywelcome as they were

8eIpn . (IWM 8U 579)

Septem ber, By the end of August Pillion hadarmou red spearheads in Verdun - where theyestablished a bridge-head across the MetISI.', atEix and St-Mlhtcl. His ord ers to h is troops wereto co nt inue advanc ing no matte r wha thappened - at the lowest level one ta nk wouldd rain fuel from the rest of th e platoo n andkeep the ad vance going. When the fuel fina llyran out th ey would cont inue o n foot! By :iSeptember. US XII Corps ha d conso lidated itspos u tons east of the Meuse. XV Co rps wereconce n trated in the vicin ity of Nangis, an d XXCorps had secured the Verdu n bridge-headand pushed pa t rols farther east towardsGermany; far away. on the nort h-west coast ofFrance . US VIII Corps was cont inu ing its attackon th e stu bbo rn German garrison at Brevt. Totheir north, US First Army advanced to thegen eral line Namur-Tirlemont, taking some

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

25,IXXI pncouers in a pocket cen tred on th eForet de Com ptegne.

ln 2 1\t Army Group's sector, Oil 29 August,11th Armd Div, rein fo rced by Sth Armd Bde,hurst out of XXX Cor ps' br idge-head over theSctnv on two main axes. Amtens was reachedon the :H st and a bridge-head across th eSomme secured. Just outside th e town Gen eralHctnr tch Rberba ch , who h ad taken overco mman d of Germa n Seventh Army whenGe ne ra l t'aut Hausser was wounded, wascaptured with h is Tactica l IIQ. The advancefrom XII Corps' bridge-head ha d begun on 30August . th eir a rmour movin g some 25 miles aday, and by midd ay on I Septe mber the)' hadsecured a crossing over the Somme at Ila ngest,midway between Amtens and Abbeville. Therapid advances continued ; on 2 SeptemberGuards Armd Div captured Do uai and Tournai,

85

Above : Montgomery in

Louvain. Monty talkswith a crowd of civilians,who surrounded hiscaroutside the Town Hall.Lo uvain, some 20 milesbeyOfld Brusse ls, wascap tured by the Britishin September 19..... Fouryears earlier whenMonty had beencommanding 3rd Inf OIV,it had been the frontlinefOf" his division in theiratt e mpt to nail theGerman 'Blitzkrieg' ­now the situatIOn wasvery different! (IWM • B9976 )

l eft: Tired infantrymenof the KSLIcatch a f_minutes rest by the SIde

of a 3 RTRShermanafter another <by ofbattle on the road toGhent. September 1944(Tank Museum)

Above: Maj Gen Vemey. GOC 7th Armd Div, arriving at Ghent Town Hall. a)eptember 1944. after its liberation by his division. (IWM. au 771)

Btlow: Infantry of 9S Inf Div. US Thir d Army. cross a railway line below a bullet­pocked bridge suppo rt on the ir way towards the Mose lle nea r Men, aSeptember 1941. The leading GI is carrying a .30 Browning mach ine gun . (US

~ via RealWar Photos - A 760)

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

and I t th Armd Div reached the outskirts of

l .llh- , wh ich th ey by-passed , while 7th ArmdIl iv on the left , reac hed St-I'o l and crossed t henetuune-Lmers road . The next targets fo r th efast-movin g ar moured co lumns woul d be: forGuards Armd - Brussels; for 11th Armd Div ­Ant wer p: for 7t h Annd Drv - Ghe n t. In th el'ar ly hours of 3 Septembe r, Guards Annd DtvcrOSSl'U l il t.' sclgtan frontier a nd by ni ghtfallhad reach ed the capital. its recce units fann ingo ut a ro und the c ity to cont ro l a ll ma in

approaches. Strong resistance briefly delayedII til Armd Div between Tourna i and Lille, butthey reach Alost th at eveni ng. Co nsiderablymo rt' re..tstance was encountered o n XIICor ps ' fro n t, the e ne my having moved twofnosh divisions in to re inforce the Channelpo rts. :'-:everthelt.'ss, while 53rd Inf Div an d -tthArmd Bdc dealt with th ese formations, 7t h

Armd lnv swung east around Lille and headed

swift ly for Ghent .On ~ September l Ith Armd Div entered

Antwe rp and quicklj- dtsposcd of the garrisonsave in the dock areas to the north, which took

87

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

some days to clear. The docks were secu redVirtually in tact. Bntt sh Second Army had goodreason 10 be pleased with their ach ieveme n tsthai week. They had advanced some 250 milesin six days, the armo ur leading, wh ile behindth em the infantry di visions, supported byarmoured brigades, had taken over th e groundand mopped-up any st rong points still hold ingout. The Allied fro nt now ran from th e mou thof th e Somme in the north, 10 Troves in th esout h. foll owing the line: t.tue-uru sse ts­~lons-St.'dan-Verdun-Commercy.

W('ek 14: 5- 11 Septe mbe r 1944

On 5 September a ma jor German commandchange too k place, F\l von Rund stedt beingreinstated as DB west . He was charged withho ldin g th e Allied advance whi le complcnng a

new 'West Wall ' on th e line Albert Canal- Riverxteuse- Upper \foselle, a tall orde r give n thatby the time he took over th e Allies a lready hadbridge-heads across ho th the Alhert Canal andth e Meuse! This was yet again, an exampl e, ifone were needed, of Hitler's lack of up-to-da te

knowledge of th e true situation. Von Rund­stedt told his Fuhre r that he would need at

least six weeks to prepa re ti ll' West Wall andasked for all ava ilable armour to reinforce hishard-p ressed fro nt-line troops. Ama zingly,Hit ler agreed, and altho ug h nowhere near asmany tanks were availab le as were needed (theAllies st ill outnumbering th em by 20 to I ),sufficient were prod uced 10 enable him tostabilise the front by mtd-Septcmber.

The Allied adva nce had once aga in sta rtedin earnes t with success all along the front lim' .In the nor th un its of Ca n II Corps advancedrapid ly nort h of the Som me: Polish Armd Divcrossed th e canal at St-Oni er on 6 September,while nearer the coast, Ca n J rd Inf Div closed

up to th e ports of Bculog ne and Calais whe reit soon became clear that th e enemy garrisonswo uld not su rrende r without a fight. Can 2ndInf Dtv, which was follow in g up, passedth rough and closed on Dunkirk whe re asim ilar situa tion obta ined. Stro ng det ach ­mc n ts pushed on , reachi ng Nieuport andOstcn d on 9 Septe mber. Canadian 4th M Old

Below: Antwerp dUringits liberat ion. A nurse ofthe Belgian Und er­ground Army twKb:ges J

wouoded BrItish soldierin the fron t 1II'Ie oeM

Antwerp doc ks. IISeptembet' I ffi. Shewas impri~ by dlt

Gennans fOl' 11/2 yeAn

fOl' underground act ivi­

ties . (IW M • BU 833)

a

Below: GIs moving:!rough the I'\IbbIe off\orId.-cy in the Brest......... They pandose bya KOed enemyIri; - a PzKpfw IV Ausf

H. I'1tn of this modelwn produced than Anyeee- Mk IV (US Armyl'IllWI War Photos · A}161)

Div th en came up on th e left of the Poles,sccun ng a crossing over the Ghent-Brugescanal sout h-east of Bruges. Mopping-up in th etown a nd su rround ing area t hen took place .The Pol ish Armd Div then m oved in to the

Ghe nt area to relieve XII G np s.Late on 10 september Bn rtsh I Corps began

its attack on Le Havre afte r a heavy bombard ­mcnt from sea and ai r (5,000 tons of bombswere d ropped in the 90 minutes before H·HOUr). The defences were penetrated by 49thand Sf st Jot Divs , but the port was notcaptured until 1145 hrs on the 12t h; 12,noopnsonerv were taken. It is said that Le Havrewas one of the strongest fort resses on the

Atlantic Wall.Brithh Second Army's intention was 10

advance with XXX Corps leading, XII Corpsprotecting its left flan k and US First Army onits nght. As a first stage in the advance on theRhine , XXX Corps planned to get 11th Armdtuv into the area Tumhout-TIlburg and (idsArmd Iuv int o the Eindhoven area. Thismeant crossing numerous water obstacles,

FROM THE SEINE TO T HE RHINE

Incl udi ng bot h the Albe rt Ca nal and the»tcu sc-rscaut Ca na l. Reece reported th at allbridges were blown, hut on 8 September GdsArmd crossed the Albert canal at Beertngenand established a bridge-head there despiteconside rable opposition. The advance nowtu rned no rth-eastwa rds, ai med at the De Grootbridge over the Esceut canal near Neerpelt. Bylast light, 50th ln f Dtv had secured a small

bridge-head over the canal to the SW of Ght'C1.After gradually extending the bridge-heads.Gds Armd broke through, then reached and

captured the De Groot bridge on the 10th,extending the tntdge-head the following day.The etrccts of the arrival of German reinforce­ments was now being felt, with the enemy, asvtontgomery puts it: .... developing more spiritagainst ou r bridge-heads over the EscautCanal, and had clearly received reinforcements

of better calibre.'South of British Secon d Army, Hod ge's US

First Army pushed towards Liege with US VIICorps and crossed the Meuse at Sedan. On IISeptember patrols crossed the Germa n border

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHIN E

near Aachen , creating pamc a mong the civil­

tans, but the actton was not followed up ,

Patton 's US Th ird Army 10 , 1 VII Corp'which was transferred to US Nint h Army

(Gen eral Simpson] w hic h was now preparingfor ac tio n, bUI 83rd Inf and 6th Armd Din

we re transferred to XV Corps, thus remaining

as 'Georgie's Boys', XX Corps wa s o rdered 10

setze Met z, advance cast of the ~lo\l' lI e, seize

Mainz and secure a b ridge-head across t he

Rhin e. XII Corp' was to seize Nancy and

sec u re a budge-head over t he Mose lle .

protecting the southern flank unti l relieved by

XV Corps , Th ey were also told to be ready to

move SWiftly to tak e xtannherm and se ize aRhine bridge-head. Fuel su pp lies co n tin ued to

im prove (011 7 September, for the first l ime inseveral days, mo re fue l was available than was

rcq ot redu, bu t a new crts!s loomed - .1 severe

shor tage of arti llery amm unition . h ut this was

fortunately alleviated by the end of the weekfor all calibres exce pt 105mm howitzer .

week 15: 12-1 K September 19-1-1(Sl,'t' Ch apter 6 for Opc ruuon ' Market Ga rden '

- the Amhem o peratio n whic h began o n 17

Septembe r and ended o n 26 Sept em bc r.)

In mid-September Ca n First Army was

com ma nd ing Brit ish I Corps, wh ich wa s

reue vrng Briti sh XII Co rps in the Antwerp area,

and Ca n II Corps which was opera t ing in thecoastal belt . Th e intention was for Brit ish I

Co rp s to advance north across the Antwerp­Iurnhout Ca na l, while Can II Corps cleared the

area to the w("S1 of the port and up 10 th e

..outbem sho res of me Scheidt c..luary. AI the

same time the Ca na dians invested Dunk irk an d

stormed Ih l' garr iso ns of Boulognc and Ca lais.Wit hi n these three ports we re some :lO,OO(j

troops who had been left behind 10 hold them

as fort resses . Boulogne had a garrison of more

Ihan 9,000 men , with e xtre mely st rong

de fen ces a long the high ground which formed

a crescent around the port ; the ma in features

had been ma de in to indiv idua l strongpctn ts.

wit h concrete bunkers. wire and mt nefteld s.

The assa ult was delayed by bad weather andIhis meant that SOffit' K,(MJ(} civilians could he

evacu ated before Ca n .lrd Inf Div launched its

attack, on 17 Sept ember, with two brigades .

heavily supported by artillery and from the air.

It took six days to rapture all the Isol ated

stro ngpo in ts . Coas ta l ar ti llery in England

helped in the assault - o n 17 September the

Below: Trucks of the USFirst Ivrny crossmg theAlbert Canal via ~

pontoon treadwaybridge near Maastricht.12 Septembe r 1944.(Tank Museum )

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

•

,• .... .

;-t: :"; '

Above: Closing in on

ilrest. Troopsof USThird Army set up their

S7mm MI anti-tank gunon tileoutskirts ofjeccvrance. on the way

toBrest, the secondlargest naval port inFrante. The MI was atopyof the Brit ish 6pdri/Ili-u,nk gun. (IWM - EA

)8S~ 1

Right: Dramatic pict ureof¥l M18 Hellcat f,ringItS 76mm gun at point ­blank~ into a

pIIbo~. dunrog street:fighong in Brest. TheHtIcat was fIOfTllally alri. destroyer; bowevee;a .-mout"-pten:.I"i~1Ofl 00 doubtmide a hell of a mes s ofthepillbox! (IWM EA171136}

/

Left: Men of 1-.1 st InfRegt, 36th Inf D iv, USSeventh Army, slogthrough the rain intoLuxeuil, 17 September19« . (US Army via RealWar Pbotcs . A 3203)

Below: Gis of FCompany. 2nd an t-4 lscInf Regt. 36th Inf o.v.ride on the back of atank and a half-tracktowards their objectNotnear Soultz. 18September 1944 . Notethe Brow mng .50 aIhe<lvy machine gun on I

sk,ate-rlng mount andthe attentive gunnerwatching the skies (ishe- like Rommel --...Brit ish anti-gas goggles').(US Army via Real W¥

i

Sout h for eland Battery near Dover sco red adirect h it on a battery near Ca lais, at a remark­

ahle range of 42,000 yards!On the 12th the German garr ison of Lc

Havre su rrende red as has been men tioned . Onthe 15th Briti..h Second Army secured a second

cro.....tng-potnt over the vt euse-Escaut Canal.To the south, mo re units of US Fir'>! Armyreached the German border between Aachenand Trier on the 12th, and took Maast richtand Etsdcn on the 15th. In US Third Army 'sarea , both XII and XX Corps were fighting tomaintain their bridge-heads over the \{osellt',

with XII Corps enlarging and expanding theirsnorth and south of Nancy, while XX Corps onthctr left , pushed infantry aero.... north ofBayon. In me south XV Corps' infantryreached xeutcnareau. xn recoun and Charmcs.There were still some fuel shortages, but with

PI.UTO reaching Chartres these would soon beobviated . XV Corps continued to push east­wards, 79 th tnt Div reac hing Ramecourt onthe ].Ith, while French 2nd Armd Dtv took

xtatralncourt and made contact with elements

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

of US Sevent h Army adva ncing from th eMediter run can . There we re heavy ene mycounter-attacks against 80th tn t Dtv's bridge­head over the Moselle, but they were dealtwith o n the 15th. On t he 17t h XV Corps waso rdered to take xta nnnetm and secure a

bridge-head over the Rhine. On the same dayXX Corps launched a co-ordinated attack onthe heavily fortified city of xtetz. with 5th Inf

Dtv assaulting from the south and 90th lnf Divhom th e west. XV Corps' attack began on theHUh, 79 th Inf Div crossmg the Moselle ncarRayon and advancing to Gerbe\iller.

Wee k 16: 19- 25 September 19-1--1-On the 19th back in Brittany, the Germangarrison of Brest finally surrendered to US VIICorps 8th In f Div. Taken prisoner with 12,(X)(lothers wa s the redoubtable paratroopcommander Major General Her mann Ramcke,who had famously commanded t he RamckcPara Me in North Africa. Hitler had orderedt hat the Diamond.. to his Knight 's Cro .... be

parachuted in to the beleaguered port. In 21st

Right: American engi­neenat work inGenTw1y ena bling the.&merican columns to by­~ a mined road byr»<1OI to the fields o neeedge of the Siegfriedtr.edelences. 19September 1944, The~ tr acked vehiclewith the crane is a Tankfl«overy Vehicle T2(H11). an adaptation ofee M) medium Gra nttrl;. (US Army)

93

IIII

II

FROM THE SEINE TO THE RHINE

Arm y Grou p 's area . 10 the west o f XXX Co rps'

ad va nce towa rds Arnhcm twc Ch apt er 6).

Canadia n un its cros sed t he Escaut Ca nal and

began tbctr offensive to clear the north bank

of t he Scheidt es tua ry so as to open up the

vital port of Antwerp to the sea . Ge neral Eisen ­

hower had Kj..:l' ll top p riori t y to these ojX'ra­

nons.. On the Z2nd . also in Can fi rst Army'ssect or , Boulogne surre ndered 10 Ca n II Corps'

3Td Inf Div (9,5 35 prisoners), wh ile by the

24 lh Can I Corps ' 2nd luf Div ha d establishe d

a hridge-h ca d o VN the An twerp-Iumho utca nal. On the 25t h , :\rd ln f Div attacked the

defen ces of Calais after an inten sive arti llerybombardmen t. The 1'11l'my po sit io ns here Wl' re

similar to those at Le Havre and Boulogn e. and

there were addit ional bat teries at Cap Gns-Xez

and Sangane.

Above: A sectio n ofmen or the King's OwnSccttrsh Borderen of 3rdlnf Div move on to new

te rrit ory on 19September 1 9~ - theyare clearly expealllg todo some d,gglllg In ,

(IWM· B 10 120,

Left: Brest apfured .Some 35.000 enemysurTer'ldered in Brest on

20 Septembe r 19+t, ThIsgroup. wa,t lllg to betaken off for interroga­tion and PO W camp .includes bo th Army(Heer) and Navy (Kriegs­rrnJ(ine) offrcers. 23September 19~ (IWM·KY ~B3596)

Abo~ right : AlwaysCJll! more river to cross!tntvehicles over this

-'Y coostl'\lCted bridgeiC'OSS the RIverVirebtlonged to 35th Inf D IY

clUS ThIrd Army, (US

!tm'f 'o'Q ReaJ WarPhoto!. - A 3162)

p

- ",',r• ,

•~ ....~ ~-, - . .. • • -z: • ' .

StIow:A good initiative

tor Shermans of the USrth Tank BattaliOn, ..th.lrmored DivisiOn,indIng ~ crouing overtheSIlted-UP, but still...,.,. muddy and treach­erous. National Canal1'IW Bayon, 20September 19..... (USAm>y)

In US Thi rd Army's sector XX Corps

conti nued to pound St et z bu t made little

progress. On the 2"th leading pat rol s wereprobing the outer d efences o f the Siegfried

Line, but were mel with st rong resistance from

pillboxes and o the r fortificatio ns . There was

extcns tvc flood ing in all sectors other than to

l il t' west of the ci ty.

Wt'e'" 17: 26 Septc m bcr-z Ocrohcr 19....US Hrvt Anny be gan a new offensive a~ain~1

tI ll' Stcg fr tcd Line between Aac hen and

ncttcnktrchcn 10 t he north .

In US Third Army's sector the assault on

!l.ll'tz con ti nued all week, heavy a rtillery fire

be ing directed o n the fort s (t wo casemen ts and

an ammuni tion d ump were blown up in Fo rt

jeanne d 'Arc but it d id not fall ). On the 27 th

XX Corps put in a major attack o n Fo rt Drian t

hut was forced to wit hd raw. At Ihe end of the

wee k, o n 2 October. XX Co rps, suppo rted by

XIX Tactical Air Com ma nd, launched a heavy~roulld and ai r attack o n Fo rt Drtant o n the

we st ban k o f the Moselle, hut sti ll encoun te red

heavy resi stance when they en tered the fort

next day. Heavy fin' wa s ab o directed on Forts

....,...,

Jeanne d 'Arc and Verdun, al so BattenesMo selle a nd Manvatl. bu t despite continual

bom ba rd me n t, the y all held o ut. Fuel

rationin g had to be re-in st ituted as su pplieswere down to 50 per cent, wh ich ham pered allThird Army's advances.

Th e Ca nadians had more success wit h the

capture of till' Chan nel ports, the citadel .11

Ca lais falling on the 2Hlh and the town bei ng

en tered on the same day. An armistice was thengra n ted to allo w (or the ev acuation o f civilians,

the attack no t resummg until midday on the]()t h. By 1.1'01 light all organised oppositio n had

ceased, some 10,000 prtsoners having beenta ken during the attacks. Th is would he the last

of the 'for tress' ports to he cleared. Dun kirkwould merely be 'bottled up' and wo uld remain

so for the remainder o f the war, becoming the

last French town to be liberated . Th e respons t­

h ility fo r Du nkirk would be handed over to the

Czech Independent Armoured Brigade, thus

leavi ng the Ca nad ians free to concen trate on

clearin g the Scheid t which Montgomeryordered Genera l Crera r to accomplish •,., wit h

all possible speed'. An account of th is o pe ration

is given in a later chapter.

Wttk IR: 3-9 October 19H

British Seco nd Arm y o pe rat ions towa rds the

end of September we re designedto widen and

A bove le ft : Crossingthe Moselle River, 20September 194<4.Infantry plus a jeep widla trai ler bden witham munitiOn boxes,crossing a pontoonbridge over the river.

(US AnnyI

96

Left: A Shermanbelonging to 3 RTR ofI I th Armd Div movesup to the frondine, 26September 19+4. The

5igns on the front of the

Sherman are : '52' - IM'IIt

serial number, the ttnearmd regts in the anndbde were numbered 51,S2 and 53; the 'triangle'with a '3' inside shows «

belongs to 3 TP of 'A'Sqn : the running buI(black 00 a yellow bad ·ground ) was the divi­sional sign of I I th ArmlDiY. (Tank Museum)

Above: US Third /4nnyengI~ completing apontoon bridge acrossthe~le. The ModelC66 mobile crane which5 Hung one of thepontoons could lift up toS5001b 00 its full 25ftutension ilIlCl 13,OOOlbon Its shorter IOftradius. (IWM • EA

SB281 )

Above right: Troops ofUS Third Army w adingx ross a stream in theMoselle River valley,whilsta medical jeep,carrying stretcher cases.makes its way back totileother bank. (IWM­EA ]8139)

•

stre ngthen the Nijmegen salient, in prepa ra­tion for the coming battle of the Rhineland,which Montgo mery hoped to start on about10 October. l ie t herefo re Issued ins t ruct ions toregroup, hut towards t he end of the first wee kof Octobe r it became very dear that any suc hassa ult would have to be delayed in view ofother co m mi tmen ts. The st rength of co unte r­attacks around the Nijmege n bridge-h ead areashowed the need for co nside rable reinforce­rn en t the re, to make certain it was held . 011the First Ca nadian Army Front there wascons iderable st iffening of en emy rcststa nce - it

was estim ated, for exam ple, t ha t th ere wen'some 20 enemy divisions/st ro ng battlegroups,in clud ing four pa nzer d ivisions in till' a reafrom Roermond to Breske ns. In addition , thenatu re of the co untry, cris s-crowed by waterobstacles. favoured the defence, \0 Mont ­

gomery relu ctantly had to IJOSIPOlll' his o ttc u­stvc and co nce n tra te on Ca ll First Army'sen de avour to dea r t he Sche idt , while BritishSecond Army deal t with th e enemy bridge­head west of t he Meuse.

US First Army co nt inued its attacks north ofAachen a nd had some success in breakingt hrough th e Siegfr ied Line in so me areas .

In US Th ird Army's sect or Metz was stillbetng pounded, but it was clear th at th e

enemy was determi ned to hold out as tong asIlll..sihle, Elsewhere, Patton's t roops had more

..access. XII Corps en largi ng their bridge-headby attacking to the north-east , capturing

Fowtcux (35th Inf Iliv), Motvrons (6th AnndIl iv) and l Jxte res (HOth Inf Iliv).

\\'l~k 19: 10--16 October 194-1

In British Second Army'.. sector. VIII Corps hadbeen o rde red to assa ult from Boxmeer towardsVenrai j, wit h US 7t h Armd Div (u nderco m ma nd) mak in g an attack from Deurne.

Th en l lth Armd Div would pa ss th rou gh andmake for Ven lo, wh ile another attack wo uld bemade towa rds th e Maas, to ca pt ure Rocrmo nd .Th is operat ion was planned to sta rt on 12October, and , desp ite dogged resistan ce ,Vl'nraij was taken all the 17t h, but operationswere then concluded for a time.

In US First Army 's sector, attacks aroundA'Khl'n conti nued to make ground; t he d ty'sgarriso n comma nder declined an invitation tosu rrender a nd house-to-h ouse fightingco nt inued am id th e ruins.

On US Thi rd Arm y's front , 6th Armd Iu vclea red Cheutcourt and pushed o n to Aulnols­su r-Seine. At Metz, Task Force Warnock(Brigadier Alva C. Warnock), took over fromTavk Force Drlant and assaults co nt inued onthe tu n nels a nd for ts, but without success. On9-10 Octobe r 90th In f Div was engaged infierce house-to-house figh ting in Maiztc res-les­Metz. During th is wee k 12t h Army Group d ras­tica lly reduced the issue of fie ld arti lleryam munit ion by 95 per cent (fro m 12 Octoberto 7 November), so that the troops had tomake do with tanks, TDs, AA guns and even

97

captured enemy weapons . Cons ide rable

l'nemy troop movements wert' noted in XII

Co rps' area. and hea vy rail and road move­

me n t was a lso ob served in XX Corps sector. USThi rd Army was virt ua lly on th e defensive as

req uired by 12th Army Group. Bad weather

put a stop to ai r acti vit y, and lack o f fuel

prevent ed ground movement (Th ird Armyasked for :n o,OO() ga llons plus of POL on 16October - a nd received nant'!).

In me far so u th, in Ge ne ral Devers' 6t h

Army Group, French Hrst Arm y's Srd Algerian

Div reach ed Co rn imo n t by the end of the

week, then, accompanied by French l st Armd

Div, launched an attack in the Vosges . In US

Seventh Arm y's sector. VI Co rps units began to

move from the norm-west so u t h wa rds,

towards Bruyeres, but were heavily engagedwhen they reached there.

.'111m"",'}'. Ene my resistance was clearly hard­

en ing eve rywhere and the Atues had much to

do to consondatc their cu rre n t positions - in

98

the Scheldt estuary and at Metz for exa mple ­

so by mid-October the Allied drive to the

Rhine had virtually come to a halt. Th e nnushand Canadia ns were futt y occupied in the

north ; in th e central sectors US First and Third

Ar rntes were fi/o\ h ti llg ha rd alo ng the Siegf ried

Line fro m Aachen down to Trier and sou th­wards in to th e area of the sout he rn Mose lle. To

their sout h , US 6t h Army Group was no w

de ployed on the right of US 12th Army Group,

so tha t the a rea o f operations continued righ t

down to t he Swiss frontier. At a con ference in

Brussels on 18 Octobe r. Eisenhower reitera ted

his plans: 21st Army Group must concent rat e

on the opening up of Antwerp . Hriti sh Seco nd

Army wa s then to advance south-eastwa rds

between the Meu se and the Rhine, on or ahout

10 Nove mber, in suppo rt o f US HT'St Arm y

which would attempt to cross the Rhine in the

Co log ne area (planned for 1- 5 Novem ber).

Their right flank would be protected by US

Ninth Army, which would then advance and

assist in capturing the Ruhr.

A bove : Gen MantonEddy. CG XII Corps.uses the bonnet 01aJeep as a map table .w hilst he briefs three ofhis commanders. Left to

right they are : Brig GenHolmes Dage r (Cd rCC B), Maj Gen Wi(lardS. Paul (CG 26 Inl Div),Maj Gen 'Tiger Jack'Wood (CG 4th ArmdDrv]. MAj Gen MantonEddy. and an unidefltJl'oedcotonel of 4th Armd .

(US Army via PanonMuseum)

Bftow: us 101 StA.rtlome 0Msi0n . TheIr

-~ ...~ and defiles onthe Bntrsh XXX Corpslll$ berNeen Grave andEtllhoven. They weresoon esublished at SonnI secured the Veghelbndge intaCt. ThephoCograph~ menofthe 10Ist JUSt afterIn:hng as they diSperseto thelr obrectrves. The!HP was brought in bygIidef. (USArmy via RealW¥Photos · A 3768)

Taki nK a Ga m bleDespite ~lontgomery's determination to fini ..h

the war as quickly as possible and he nce hi ..

support for the narrow front approach. he wa..still ba ..ically a cautious com mander, not given

to rash dectstons, preferring to have 'belt and

braces' - as his refusal to attack Rommel in

North Africa until his forces were completely

ready, dearly indicated. So his Amhem gamble

was totally uncha racteristic Yet it was an

extremely bo ld stroke whu-h, had it succeeded,

would undoubtedly haw considerably short­

enco the war.Having liberated Belgium. xtontgomc ry's

21st Army Group now faced no fewer than five

water obstacles which could be crossed at: the

Nede r Ri jn at Amnern. the waal at Nijmegen ,

the Maas at Grave and the two main transverse

cana ls runnin g be tween Grave a nd ur tu sn

second Army's b ridge- he ads over the Es cau t

Canal (t he wtjhetm tna Ca nal, north of f-ind-

6Arnhem

hoven; the Zuid \Villemsvaart which ran

pa rallel to the River xtaas , lin king t he towns of

Helmond and 's Hertogen boscn ). There were

road and railway bridges at both Amhem and

:\ijml'!o:en and a road bridge at Grave. all of

which were still intact . The plan was to lay a

corridor of airborne troops (three airbornedivisions _ two US and one British. plus the

I'oli ..h Parachute Brigade, all flown out from

England I across the waterways. taking thebndgcs at veghel, Grave, Ntjmegen and

Amhem: then for British Second Anny to

advance along the corridor, with General

Horrocks' XXX Corps leading.

TIlt" n c tatlcd I' lan

Ai,lJoml ' tmt.ll"~ ' Allocatio n of I Airborne Corps'

targets wav as fo llows.

Anthem bridge;1 Hrtt tsh Ab tuv, wil h Polish Pa ra Bde under

com mand (52 Airportable lu v was to be

.

flo wn in north of Arnh em as soon as

ai rst rips cou ld be made ava ilable, to

strengt hen the h ridge- he ad j

Nijm egen a nd Grave bridges, p lus h igh ground

between Goe sbcck and Nijmcgen:US H2nd Ail Div

The bridges and defiles o n Hrit ish XXX Co rps '

ax is between Grave a nd Eindho ven :

US 10 Ist Ab Div

It wo uld be tmposs tble to fl y in t he entire

Airborne Corps in ouc lift , because there

weren 't enough t rans port aircraft ; in fact it

would take fo ur days to fly in everyth ing that

was required . Tilt' air lift p rog ram me was

sched uled as:

n a y I : 17 Septem be rUS 82nd and IOIsI Ab Din would each d rop

th ree pa rachute Regimental Co m bat Teams(Reh)

100

British rst Ah Dtv wo uld drop a pa ra bd e, and

land two-thirds o f t he air- landi ng b rigadl'

na y 2:Furt her clement s o f US xz nd and tut st Ab

tnvs and rem ainder o f IIr t st AI> l j tv

Da y 3:Remainder o f US 82nd and lOlst Ail Divs

Po lish Para I\de

(irmlll,1 rm(lp,~ , Th e Intention was that Briti sh

XXX Co rps' adva nce would be co-ordinated

wi th t he a irborne d ro ps so as to ga in

max imu m surpnse and d islocation. They

would thrust northwa rds as Iast as possibl e

from t he Meu..e-rscaut Ca nal bridge-head

along the a irborne corridor to secure t he area

Amhem-xunspcot . the advance being "pear­headed by Gds Armd Inv, whilst 43rd and

50th Inf Divs followed up. Should any of the

bridges be destroyed the armour wa s to fan out

Abo ve : US 101stAirborne Division. Panof the crew of a gliderpose beside the ir craftbefore take -off from anaerodrome in UK. Therewere various models ofthe Waco glider; forexam ple. the CG 4Acou ld carry IS fullyarmed and equ ippedmen; the CG lOAdou ble tha t number;whilst the I]A couldmanage a jeep and guncrew or ] 0 men. (USArmy via Real WarPhotos - A ] 7M)

Above: US 82ndAtbome Division. Theirobtectives were [hebridges at N ijmegen andGm-e. Here someghder-borne trccpsorientate them selvesbefore moving off fromthe landing l one. (IWM •EA 37782).

along the river ban k and , assisted by the

alrbc m e t roop", co ver b ridging o pc rattonv

wh ich were to be carr ied out by 43rd Inf Div,

Thi .. dlvi..io n was also gtven the ultimate ta..k

o f w ru rtng t he area fro m Apeldoorn so ut h to

po ints o f co ntact wit h Is t Ab Iuv and to securecross ings over th e River Ijsscl at Dcvc nt cr and

z ct phcn. The Corps reserve wo uld co n..ist o f

50t h In f Drv w h ic-h wo uld ult ima tely Ol T Upy

the hi gh ground north of Arnhem, pu..lungelement s eastwa rd.. to secure a crossi ng over

the Ijssel at Doc sburg. The task of o pe n ing the

main road axis to the north was allotted to the

two US Ab Dtvs: 8 th Annd Bde would join

IOht Ab Div and assist in ho ld in g the corridor

th rough Eindhoven, Veghel and Grave.

The Hartte: 17- 26 Sep te mber 1944

The mo rn in g of the 17th dawned fair and

generally favou rable for airborne operations.

Th e aircraft converged on t he dropping and

landing zones at 1300 hrs as planned. Surpr ise

was generally achieved and enemy o ppositio n

ARNHEM

was light. Paratroo p" o f US IOIst Ab luv we re

soon es tabn ..hed at Son , between Eindhoven

and St-Oco en rode. They secured the br idge at

Vt.'gh{'l Intact . but that over th e Wilhelmina

Ca na l was h lown as they app roa ched . US 82 nd

Ab Dlv also lan ded acc ord ing to p lan, ..ctzcdti ll' brtdg e o ver the Maas at Grave in tac t and ,

late r, secu red t he t wo brid ges over the

Maas- w aal Ca na l between Grave a nd

Nijlllegl'n . Th ey fa iled to msh t he Numcgcnbridge but repor ted t hat it was sti ll in tact . Their

main problem wa.. co ntact ing British t st Ab

Div at Ant he m who, it seemed, were ho ld ing

thv no rt hern end of t he b ridge, and air rt'CIT

sho wed that ~ I iders had landed in its Vicinit y.

Briti sh XXX Corps ordered Gds Armd Dtv to

ht'gin thei r advance at 1-l2S hrs. It was covered

by a ro lling barrage and moved ast ride the

Eindhoven road, in conjunction with a 'cab

rank ' of rocket -firin g Typhoons on call .

Ho wever, stro ng opposition was encountered

almost Immediately and only some six mi les

was achieved on the first day. It soon became

101

ARNHEM

- - l e ft : The Nilmege nbridge was not captureduntil 20 Sep tember. thenby a ;o int artack by US

paratrooper-s and XXXCorps. Here, one of thewounded Genn>noereooees awaits meddauemion on the bndgtroadway. (IWM • 38561)

Betow: AJhed unks roI

~"'oewly

captured N ijmegenbridge, on their ~ytowards 'the bndge toofar ' at Amhe m. (M'M ­EA+453 I)

Right: Maj GenMitthew BunkerRdgw~y, then CG ofXVIII AIrborne Corps,tJblg with Maj GenJone$ H. Canin, CG82nd Ab Div, It is easy tolee why Ridgway wask.oown as 'Old Iron Tits'!(US Armyvia Real WarPhotCl5 AS 201] )

clea r that more infan try WNe needed, so abrigade fro m 50t h In f Div was brought forwa rda nd the adva nce con tinued at first light on t he18t h. The arm oured spea rhea d brushed astdeene my opposition at Aatst , hut could not breakin to Eind hoven, which was strongly defe nded .The tanks then t ried to bypass to the eas t , bu twere again held up by strong enemy positions.t he bridges to t he west of the town were notstrong enough to take tanks, but armouredca rs d id get acrow and I1Mde co ntact withl u t st Ah Div to till' north -west of Eindhoven,who reported that th e Son bridge had bee nblown. The assault on th e town conti nuedfrom all sides and eventually, at about 1700h rs. the Guards broke through . Bridging workat Son was immediately put in hand, wh ileSut b Inf Iuv mopped -up and secu red th e DeGroot bridge. Atte r an ene my co unter-attackhad been held, the responsibility for th isbr idge-head was transferred to VIII Corps whotook over command of 50th tn t Div,

ARNHEH

To t he north of Eindhoven, US lOht Ab Divst rengthened it s grip on the vita l po ints alongthe axis all the way up to th e Grave bridge ,while 82nd Ab Il iv co ntinued its unsuccessful

att em pt to reach th e Nttmc gcn bridge. Atahout th is tim e the ene my la un ch ed th e fir..tof a senes of coun ter-attacks from t he d irec­lion of th e Reichswald Forest , which initiallyreac hed one of the landing zones before being

repulsed . ' ....h ile th is was ta kin g place , a glide rlift o f re tu to rccmcn ts lan ded, having been

delayed some four hour s by bad weather. Newsfro m Arn he m was still sca rce. The main bodyof ai rborne troops was established west of thetown , and elements of the para bdc wereholding out at the road bridge which was

a ppa ren tly still intact . But the enl'lIlY washolding Arn hem town in stren gth with tanksand 51' guns. The rctnfo rcemcnt s w hi ch ha t!arri ved late now found t hemselves surroundedand held up at th e western end of town. By la..tlight th e situatio n had no t improved, l st Ab

103

•-J-••....•.-

•

• •.- .•

••

• ••

•-d- • ,... -. •• - ,,

• • •-¥ -.- --.' .- ••

_.. • •• •e •• •

•

. ,

Div beinK sp llt in th ree locatio ns and runningshort o f su pp lies; re-supply ha d fa iled ht;''(....ause

of bad weather and heavy en emy AA.Element s o f Gds Armd tnv cro ssed the Son

bridge at 061 5 h rs 0 11 the 19th and It' SS thanthree hours later hat! advanced so me 2S m iles

to lin k up with 82nd Ab Div at the Gravebridge. Farther north , the bridge OW'[ thextaas-waat Canal was found to be unsuitablefor tanh and a detou r had to be found - via a

crossing just north of Heu me n . leadingarmoured cars reached the ban ks of t he waa l

by l'a rly afte rn oon, wh ile th e fo rward

armoured brigade was co nce ntra ted somethree miles south of Nrtmcgen. Heavy cou nter­attacks delayed the assau lt on the Numegenbridge; the town was entered at ahout 184 5

hrs, hut the bridge could not be reached and

t he attack had to be called off. At Arnhem the

situation was now becoming critical. On ly

104

troops of the pa rac h ute brigade were at t he

bridge. ho lding a small are a in its Im mediate

vicin ity, while the rest o f the division was

tryin g: to concent rate some four m iles to the

west. Ene my ta n ks and ar til lery were reduci ng

the build ings to rubble. food and ammunition

was running out. In lOht Ab Dlv's area ,

fighting had been heavy all day, a series of

counter-attacks being launched against thertndhoven-xrjmcgen section of the axis, It

was later d iscovered that these attacks were

put in by 107th Panzer Brigade whic h had

amvcd 'un expectedly', and undetected, in th ea rea . Th ey mounted a st rong a ttac k on the Sonbridge, but were bea ten o ff. The weather was

had a ll day. which se riously d islocated t he ai r­

lift program me, affecting bot h re in fo rceme n t

and re-supply. It also meant that air to ground

support was limited. and enemy movement

could not be preven ted. especially around the

Above: British IstAirborne Division . Theirobjective was theArnhem bridge , thefarth e st north of the 1stAllied Airborne Army'sairborne corridOl'". Here.four-englned Stirlings ofthe RAF drop supplies to

the airborne tJ"OOPS.Unfortunately most

scpphes landed in enemyhand s. wh ilst many

aircraft were damagedor lost . (IWM - BU1092)

~ Bnt lsh para­lrOOpe!'S moving

"""'" <owv<l,Arnhem from their OZ.aryJng much of theirIut and ammunition inlightweight. two -wheellJOj~. (IWM - BU1090)

Arn hem bridge -head. Those transport airc raftwhich d id manage to fly, dropped th eir loadson DZs which were now in enemy hands,because fau lty co m m unications had preven tedthem bei ng alt ered. It was a simila r di smal

picture in both other d ivisional a reas : IOl st AbDiv receiving on ly 66 pe r ce nt of its req uire­mcnts. aznd Ab Iuv just 25 pe r cent. Mostimporta n tly, bad weather had preve nted th ePoli sh Para Bde h om taking o tt from England;

they were to ha ve been dropped south ofArnhem to reinforce the be league red 1st AbDiv, so th e situation was critical.

And it now began to go from bad to wOT~.

Enemy fire, espec talty AA, tn creased. so thata ny a ircraft that managed to get to th e Dband IZs ca me under w ry heavy fire . Access tothe main Ein d hoven road was becoming hope ­lessly co ngested and effo rts to widen thecorrido r met wit h ..tiff reststance. Pro gress onboth flanks wa.. described a.. be ing 'depress­ingly slow', the nature of the terrain , whi chwas crtss-crossed with waterways, m ad e widermovement ex t rem ely difficult , and the'co rrido r' was ex treme ly vu lnerab le to elwmyattack. Three major tas ks now faced t he Alltcs:to capture th e Ntjmegen bridge as quickly aspo svtbte: to st rengt hen Slnd Ab Div becausethe enemy was building up forces in the Retch­swa td Forest area ; to relieve the hard -pr essed

ARNHEM

l st Ah luv at Arn he m. Dur in g the morning of

20 Sep tember, combined US/Britis h forcescleared Nijm ege n up to th e sout hernapproaches to the bridge. In the town thede fende rs ha d been re in fo rced and bitte rfigh ting ens ued. Th at afternoon, fol lowin gso me swift instruction on t he use of Brtttshassault boats, men of 504 RCf began to rowaCTOSS th e Waal, in full view of t he e ne my andwith only suffic ien t boats to ca rry o nebattalion at a time. On the northern bank, thegro und was ex t rem ely open and flat , firesuppo rt was limited , and the sm oke-scree n laiddown to co ver the operatio n proved tne ttec ­nve. Ignor ing a ll these problems, th e US para­

troopers ca rried out a magn ificen t operation .Despttc heavy casualt ies, th ey had ca pturedthe northern e nd of th e bridge by 184 5 hrsa nd. coupled with a head -on attack by GdsArmd tnv's tanks o n th e sout he rn e nd, thebridge was taken, th e demolition cha rgesremoved and the last defenders eliminated .While Brd Inf Div was closing up from thesout h . plans were made to resume the advancethe following da y.

In th e Arnhem area , howeve r, th e situation

had become desperate. It had sti ll provedtmposstblc to bring in th e Poles . so t he link -upbetween Nljmegen and Arn hem had not beenm ade , a nd more a nd more enemy forces were

lOS

ARNHEM

conccn tra n ng arou nd t st Ah Div wh ich had

now wit hd raw n to a small perim eter aroundt he Heveadrop ferry a nd th e Oo sterbeekwoods. Hemmed in o n eve ry side, they werebein~ sub jected to co ncent rated artillery andmortar fire. Amhe m town was now completelyin enemy hands and not hi ng was known oft he fate of the survivors o f the para bde. In t hesouthern sector. t he IOlst still held its posi­tions in the face of continued attacks agai nstthe corridor. TIlt" enemy did reach the mainroad at one point near Son, but were driven offby an armou red counter-attack which hadrestored Ihe situation by m idda y. littleprogress was made on either flank.

From 2 1 September onwards a ll efforts wereconcent rated on reli eving the Arnhem bridge­head forces. The weather, except on the 23 rd,

rem ained very d ifficult for flying, and groundmovement was eq ually slow. The Gds ArmdDtv spea rhead resumed operations in anattempt 10 get northwards, hut was hailed by astrong anti-ta nk-gun screen, south of Bessem.It was well-nigh Impossible for tan ks to get offthe roads wh ich ge ne rally ran on banks so me

six feel above Ih e fields, wit h deep drainaged itc hes on bot h sides. O n t he 2 1st, two-th irdsof t he Polish Para Ikie was d ropped Nand NW

of Elvt, between Arn hem a nd Nt unegen. Th eysustai ned m any cas ual ties in Elst, wh ichdelayed t11l'1Tl in Ih eir mai n tas k whic h was 10get across t he Neder Rijn a nd rei nfo rce theBritish pa ratroops who were now cut off from

the river beca use the Ger mans had captu redthe Heveadrop fer ry termi nal .

On the 22nd, Hrd Int Div resumed theattack northwards from the :-.lijmegen bridge­head, but were held up at Hst . However. amixed force of tanks and infantry did manageto detour to the WMI and join up wit h the

Poles at Driel ; together they reached the NederRijn. Under close, concentrated fire they triedto get supplies across, but the amphibioustrucks were unable 10 negotiate the steepbank.'>, so very few stores got across that n igh t.Further south, between Uden and veghet.t he re was more t rouble, strong panzer andpanzcrgrenad ter forces tem porar ily cuttingXXX Corps' axis. By the afternoon of the 23 rdthe road had been re-ope ned and t heremainder of Polish Pa ra Me. pl us 82nd AbDlv's Glider Rcgt . WNe flown in a nd some 250Polish troops Wt' re ferried across th e NederRijn th at night 10 rein force lsi Ah Dtv. Nex tni ght infant ry detachmen ts crossed the riverbut fa iled 10 make contact wit h th e pa ras, AI

106

left: OC 'C' Coy of 5thBorder Regt , Maj 'Jock'Ne ill, seen he re in a 5littrench with his machinegun officer. LtMcCartney. had beenwounded twice in botharms and legs when thi5photograph was takenon the 20th, butco ntinued fighting. (IWM- BU 1102)

Right: The HartensteinHotel. 23 SeptemberI*" Troopstake~ofalull in thefJ&tmng to clean theirwtapOIlS and brew up .Inthe background arethe tennis courtS wheretheGennan~

-..e-e kepi: . (IWM - BU1114)

ARNH EM

Below: One of the tw o­IIWl slitsin the shrinking.-borne penmeter.(I'NM- BU I II )

Inst light, Intense lire from the high groundoverlooking the river put a stop to these oper­auons.. To the south, heavy fighting flared upagain in and around Elst and Remmel, andduring the afternoon of 24 September themain axis was again rut south of Veghel.Fighting continued and the ax ts was not re­

opened until the 26th.On the night of 25 Septem ber Field Marshal

Montgomery reluct an tly decided to withdrawth e Arn hem bridge-head. Th e troops hadsuffered grievous cas ualt ies and were short of

ammunition and suppltes: their situation wasno longer tenable. In all about 2,200 survivorsmanaged to escape. leaving some 7,000 killed ,wounded or captured. Mo ntgomery laterwrote: 'We had undertaken a d iffirult opera­tion, attended by considerable risks. It wasjuslif il'<1 because. had good wea the r obtained,th ere was no doubt that we should haveattained full success. The battle of Arnhe mwas ninet y pt'r cen t successfu l. We were left inpossession of crossings over fou r major waterobst acles including the Maas and th e waal.'

7Clearing the Scheidt

Opening-up AntwerpTh e cap tu re of Antwerp o n 4 September 19....

with its port facilit ies in good con di t io n, did

not solve the Allie-; ' supply problems becauset he enemy still held the Scheidt es tua ry in

st rength and coul d th us preven t sh tpptngfro m using the por t. Ge nera l Elscnhoworconsidered th e open ing o f Antwerp to be ofvital importance prior to th e conquest ofGermany and on 22 S~..ptember gave absolute

priority to opc reuons 10 liberate the area. Th etask was passed to the Can Fint Army by Held

Marshal Montgomery a few days lat er as the irpri mary ta rget wh ich had to be achieved asquickly as possible. Alt ho ug h in sca le it was a

sma ll operation by co mpar ison wit h ot hers,such as the breakout fro m Normandy, or th ebattle for France , or even the Anthem opera­tio n, it was of vital importa nce and deservesto be loo ked at in tsota non. Indeed, Mont-

gomery wrote later: ' It had bec ome nt'Cl':'>:<.aryto devote the who le o f o u r resources into

getting Antwerp working a t o nce, and I had to

shut down all o ther offensive operations in

2 h t Army Group u ntil ttus ob ject wa s

achieved.'!Thi s did not mean ho wever t hat t he

Ger man gerrt son in the rem atn tng stubho rn'fort ress' of Dunkirk would be let off the hook.In stead, as already m en tioned, while the

Ca nad ia ns concent rated o n clea rin g the

Sche id t, responstbtlny for the stcge o f Dunkirkwa s pa ssed to the Czech IndependentArmoured Bri gade Group, commanded byMajor-Gene ral Atots Lishka . l-or part of this

stcge th e Ch urchlfls o f 7th RTR would also be

u nd er co m ma nd of t he Czechs. Dunkirkwould remain 'bo ttled up' for the remainder o f

the war, being the last French to wn to be libe r­

ated -on 10 xt ay 194 5.

.

108

Left : Whilst theCanadians conc entratedon clearing the ScheIdt.the stubborn garrisoninDunkirk had to be'bottled up', This wasdone by the CzechIndep Armel Bde, which

had both French andBritish troops uodef

comnund. Here sapper1

of the bde pilt rol theflooded areas aroundDunkirk from their baseat Bulscamp near Fuma,.(IW M - B 15132)

Right: French infantryIII'tl'" also kold ing theft~ Dunkirk.

3lorIf: the De LaClomeroo 8ercues. This teamm.l a capt1Jred GermanHG 42machine gun ­eeeof the best MGs ofWW2. Its nigh rate ofh made ill noise likenedtoltalTlg linoleum!tfNH · B 15 11 6)

CLEARING THE SCHELDT

Ope rati ons in the SCheid t estuary were notma de any easier by the fact that much of th earea co ns isted of recl aimed land - flat , mu dd yam i in SOIll(' p laces flooded , a trul y horrih lt.'place in which to have to fight . But, a~ 011 D­Day, the Allies had a number of 'aces' up thei rslee ves. two important ones being the RoyalNaval Su pport Squa dron, which wou ldprovide d ose fire support for the requireda rnph lbious operations. and yet more of therema rkable ' Fu nn ies', the stra nge ;\FVs of 79t hArmd Div. These factors, combined with t hebrave ry of the Canadian and British troopsand th eir sea and a ir cover, mea nt th at v ictorywas assured, th ough not without a di fficultca mp a ign which lasted from 2 October until HNovember, by wh ich time th e mineswee perswere a lready d ea rin g the river ahead of th efirst co nvoy which reached the port on th e

26 th .

Til t.' PlanThe dearing of th e SChe id t estua ry involvedthe captu re of three separate yet related a reas:

the coastal plai n be tween Ternuezen and

Knokk c (known locally as ' Breskens Island ')wh ere Ge rma n heavy coasta l ba tteries atureskcn s and Cadzand covered th e ap proachesto th e estu ary ; the ist hm us and penin sula ofSouth ncvctanu, which stuc k out into th eSchcldt : finall y, watcn crcn Island . wheresome 25 heavy ba ttenes covered sh ipping in

t ill' estua ry. The area was gar riso ned by tough ,seaso ned t roops who had fo ught on th eEaste rn Fron t - the ma inla nd sout h of th eestuary was held by Ger man 64th lnt Iuvwhich had been left isolat ed when FifteenthArm y had withdrawn eastwards. walcherenwas ga rriso ned by German 70t h Inf Div,known cu riou sly as the 'W hitebread Division 'bec au se m ost of its 71t.!: thou sand troops hadstomac h problem s and required specia l di ets ­th ou gh this would not affect th eir lightingah ility ! On Sout h Bcveland were elements of adivisional battlegroup, a nd be tween t heest ua ry and Turnho ut we re troops fromGerma n 346 t h, 71 lth and 719t h In t Iuvs.

The AIIi~ plan ned to clear the estuary in

th ree phasee-I. Clear ' Breskens Islan d ', while at the same

109

time seali ng off the Sout h Beveland peni nsulaby a thrust from Ant werp,2, Clea r South Bevcland by ad vanci ng alo ngt he isthmus in co n juncti on with an

amphibious assault ar row the estuary fro m thesouth ,3, Capture warcnerc n hy a series o f concentricassault s fro m cast, south and west (whichwoul d ent ail a seco nd crossing of the est uaryto ta ke Flushing), together with a seaborne

assault by a force com ing from o ne theChan ne l ports,

Exec ut io n

"/'11\(' I. On I October. Can 2nd Inf Divcrossed til l' Antwer p-Turnhout ca na l andadvanced westwa rds towards the north ernsuburbs of Antwerp , Resistance was scatteredand by the evening o f 4 October the Cana­dians ha d clea red the Merxem-Eekercn area

and the ir leading t roops had reac hed Putte,about halfway to the peninsula. Theycontin ued to make steady progress, hut as they

11 0

approached xortevcn. resistance increased andthey were unable to captu re the village, The

ent'my laun ched nu mero us coun ter-attacks.hut on 16 October th e village of woensd rccnt

was occupied . Meanwhile on the right flank o fCan First Arm y, I Cor ps advanced on the lineof tilt' Antwerp-Tutn hout canal. The PolishArmd Dtv crossed th e Dutch fron tier north of

Merksplas on I October. 49th In f Dtv at this

nme being engaged in fighting nor th of St.Lenaart s. By 5 October leading troops were inAlphen . and about fou r miles fro m 11lburg,and were ab le 10 hold their pc smons des pitecon tin ual counter-attacks over th e next fewda ys, In the thi rd wee k of Octobe r. Can 4thArmd tnv was switched from th e Leopold

Canal sector to join I Corps, and US 104t l1 InfDiv was also mo ved into the sec tor. From 2UOctobe r good progress was made north wardsso Ihat by the even ing of th e 23rd, Can 4th

Armd Div had crossed the Dutch frontier nea rEssen and was swinging westward s toward s

Bergen-cp-Zoo m. This manoeuvre, together

Above : The newamphibian - to theBntish Army mat _ ­

to be used in consider­able numbeni wMstclearing the Sche idt wasthe American 'Buffalo'landing Vehicle Tracked

- two main ve~ions ofwhich we re used by79th Armd DIV, the lVT2 and the lVT 04. thelatter having a hingedstern~p which meanl:

mat the eng.rte had tobe re pcstocoed. Th isBuffalo , belonging to IIRTR, was man oeuvringoff Beveland, just beforethe assault took placethere on ]0 Octcoer19+4. (IWM HU 71712)

•

••.,

coun te r-attacks and co n tinuo us mo rta rin g. On

the 7t h , rein forcem en ts were ferr ied across,

hut it was still touch-and-go un til a Hailey

bndgc had been co m pleted four da ys later. Th e

amphibious force landed at about 0200 Iu s on

Ii October, with mi n imum opposition and

ma xi m um sur p rise. But at daybr eak t he

batt ery at Hushing rvnsstngen) and the gum

in the Btervltet area began to bombard the

beach and the approa ches. But by 0500 hrs the

UuffaloesZ used by the ass au lt fo rce ha d

returned to e mba rk the fo llow -up echelon

wh ich began to arr ive at abo ut 0900 hrs. Rests­

ranee nucnstncd as t he day progressed , but the

advance conti nued westw a rds along the coast .

wh ile ot he r elemen ts pushed inland . By last

ligh t the bea ch-head was 2-3 m iles deep.

Because o pposit ion had been so strong o n the

Leopold Ca nal, it was dectded to reinfo rce t he

beach- head and push do.....n sout h wa rds along

t he wes tern ba nk o f the Savot aa rds Plaat inlet,

so as to o pen a n inland ro ute via the vi llage of

Isabella ; this was ach ieved by last ligh t o n 14

wit h con ti nued pressur e at wocn sdr ccbt .successfu lly sea led o ff the So u th Bcveland

pcntnsuta and opened the wa y for an adv a nc e

a long the isth m us.

In the Leopold Canal area so u t h o f

' nres kens Isla nd ', Ca n J rd lnf Div pla n ned a n

assault across the ca na l, d ue nor th from

Matdegcm , while a br igade-sized a m phibious

landing would ta ke p lace o n the NE corne r o f

th e 'isla nd '. Enemy positions on the north

ha nk of the Leo pol d Ca nal were extremely

di fficu lt to d islodge because t hey were o n thereverse slope o f the ca na l d ike, so It was

decid ed to use the C h urch ill Crocodile flame­

th ro wers o f 10l h t Regimen t RAC agains t them

pr ior to the assault. II -Hour wa s in the ea rly

ho urs o f 6 October and the attackin g cnm pa ­

rues launched their assault bo ats as won as the

fla ming had stopped. On the righ t all .....cnt

we ll, bu t o n the left there we re heavy cas ual­

ti es from machine-gun fire. How ever , the

attackers managed to ga in a foothold o n t he

ta r bank and to ho ld it all that day desp ite

Above : Buffaloe s of SARRE. 79th Annd 0 1v.¥e loaded onto LCTs atOstend for the West­kapelle operat io n. Therewere 102 Buffaloes

manned by S ARRE andI I RTR in the assault ,together with 2 Shermangun tanks and 10 Flailsfrom 1st Lothians . plusother ·Funnie s' .

(Author 's Collection)

"'

ClEARING THE SCHELDT

October. The 52 nd Lowla nd In t Div was no w

arr iv ing in the thea tre under command of Can

First Army, and took over the Leo pol d Ca na l

br idge-head. The add it ional t roo ps . p lus excel­

lent ai r su ppo rt soon quickened the pace ofo peratio ns, Breskcns bei ng cap tu red on t he

22nd. More t ha n ha lf the 'Isla nd' was no w in

Brtt tsh /Cauadtan hands: t he remainder was

left to Ca n 3rd Inf Dtv, while 52 nd Lowland

prepared to cross the Scheidt es tuary.

I'hIHt' 2 . Early o n 24 October Can 2nd InfDiv began its advance a long the Beveland

ist hmus, lead in g to the peninsu la , t heir

progress slowed by the d iffiOlIt goi ng. The re

was considerable floodin g, especially o n the

approaches to the uevetand Cana l, and all

unflood ed roads we re cra te red a nd mi ned.

Slowly the Canadians forced their way to the

west. sometimes waist-dee p in water, By 25

October they had reached Rilland and the

fo llowi ng da y were o n ly six mi les from the

Beveland Ca na l. Meanwhile, o n t he night o f

25 /26 Octobe r a brigade o f t he Lowland Dtv

sa iled fro m Temeuzen in Buffaloes a nd I.CAs to

make an assa u lt land ing ncar Baartand . On the

left-ha nd beach the land in g was uno pposed,

hut o n till' righ t there wa s some she lling . A

sq uad ron of DD Sherman am phibio us tanks o f

the Staffords h ire Yeo manry had go t across t he

estuary withoul di fficult y but we re then

stopped by m udfla ts and di kes . Desp it e

coun ter-a ttacks. the beach-head wa s being

ex tended beyond Oudelande in the wes t . On27-28 Octobe r, while this wa s ht'ing done ,

leading troops o f Ca n 2nd Inf Iuv reached theBeveland Ca na l; all the brt dgcs we re b lown, bUI

they managed to force a crcssmg and by 1200

hrs next day a Class 9 brid ge was across and

o perating near Vlake. By this t im e Ca n 41h

Armd tuv had ca ptured uergcn-op-zoom. The

deari ng o f Sou th newland connnue d q uickly

a nd o n 30 October they reached the eas te rnend of the causeway over to watchercn Island.

A force was then d ispatched to ens u re t hatNorth Beveland wa s a lso clear of enemy.

Wh ile Phase 2 was ta king place operat ionso n ' u rcs kc ns 1s1,1lHI' had a lso con tt nued

successfu lly, so Ihat by ni ghtfal l o n I

Nove mbe r, Cadzand and Knokke had been

liberated and only the are a between the canal

11 2

Right: One of the LCTs on its way to Walcheren.These were the same landing cra ft as had carriedmen of the Jrd British Inf Div ontOQueen Beach onD-Day. (Authol-'s COllection ).

and Zeebrugge remained to be cleared. and

was accomplished by 3 November. The whole

sout he rn bank of the Sche id t estua ry was now

in Allil'd hands, after SOIl1l' of the fiercest

fightin /o: eve r exper ienced by 2 1st Army Group.II now remained to clear the island of

walcberen.l'IIlIW .1. w alcheren had a ga rr ison of some

6-7,000 man ning the heavy coas ta l batte ries,

man y of wh ich were housed in m assive

co ncrete emp lace men ts a nd covered theentrance to the Wes t Sche idt. West a nd south

o f the isla nd we re ex tensive underwater obsta­

cles, a nd there were m asses of wire and mines

o n the bea ches and beach exits. Fluvhlng had

a pe rim et er defence system with a double lim'of a nti-tan k d itc hes. As in the res t of the area,

the terrain was difficult - dikes and steep

banks - which ruled out an ai rborne landing .But if the sea dikes we re b reached the en ti re

island could be 'sunk', render ing m any of the

artillery po sitions untenable and restricting

troop movement except in a m ph ttnous ve hi­

cles - so an a ssau lt force t h us eq uipped wo uld

be abl e to take the defences in rear. Early in

October, Bomber Command ca rried out a

h igh ly accu rate str ike, breaching the sea d ikes

in four places. Th ese /o\a ps we re gradually

wide ned by further bomhing duri ng th e

mo nth, so that by t he end of October the

island hall been gradua lly flooded . The most

im porta n t ga p was near w estkapene and was

some 110 yards wide by about 10 fee t h ighabove the low wate r ma rk.

It was p lanned 10 make tw o seabo rne land ­

ings o n w atche ren by troo ps ca nted and

supported by Force 'T' (Royal Nary). One forcewould move from a reskens to take Hushing;

the other, sa iling from Ostend, would pass

t hrough t he breach in the di ke at w est kapc llc

Right : Approaching Westkapelle . which has justbeen attacked by rocket-firing Typhoons. The Wes t­kapelle Tower can be seen to the left of the smoke.(AuthoI-'s Collection)

.'I

•

.

CLEARING THE SCHELDT

114

•

Above:West~beach. In the foregroundis iii Weasel - iI small

amphibious load carrier,

wh ilst behind it is abogged AVRE, INovember 1944.(Aut ho r's Collection)

Left: German prisonerstaken in the fighting onWalcheren Island beinghoused in A bam on theirW.ly to iii POW cage.The enemy were~~from 70 Inf Div, knownas the 'Wh ite bread OM­sion' because many of lt$

~iers had stOfNChproblems And neededspecial dieu! Neverthe­less they fought~_

(IWM - BU 1267)

•

Right : Dut chcommandos who tookIW'tin the attack on

Flushing march along themterfront as the y takeover the port. (IW M ­HU 59803)

to get in to t he island and lin k-up wit h t he

Flushing attack. In conjunct ion wit h the two

seaborne la nd ings, a t h ird attack would be

made ove r the Sout h Beveland ca useway, TIlt"

assa ult began o n 1 November. Early in themorni ng troops of ~ Commando landed nearHu",hing withou t suffering many casualties.Luck was o n their side because they hi t the

only sectio n of the shore line ncar the townwhich was not mined. Th ey were follow ed bytroops of 52nd Lowland In f Dtv in Buffaloes ,

whic h came under heavy and accurate firefrom xxmm guns an d los t some 15 per cent ofth eir st reng th . The rem aind er go t ashoresuccessf ully and the attack pressed on in to thetown. Ferrying continued t h roughout the rest

of the day, bringing over the leadtn g infantry

bngade.In th e mea ntime , th e w estkapene force was

to a pp roac h the coast. acco m panied by naval

fo rce.... with -I Commando Brigade, less -I

CLEARING THE SCHELOT

Commando, in the lead . They assaulted the

Germ an positions in westkapetle and on the

sand dum's each side of the town. d earing

them as fa r north as Domburg. and south­

wa rds until they joi ned- u p with the force

attacking Hu shing . They were ca rried in 102Buffalos manned by 5 ARRE and II RTR. C10~

behind we re a mi xture o f ' Fun n ies'. includi ng

IwO Sherma n gun tanks. ten She n nan flails

tmtncc tea rtng tanks) from l st Loth ians. eig h tAVRb from 6 ARRE with SBGs (small box

Il; irdl' rs) and tasctnes . and four bull dozers, all

earned in LCTs which were to beach o n t he

northern side o f the b reach in the stone -fared

di ke. The R.'\J Force 'T' included 25 close..

..upport cra ft (Land ing Craft GUllS, Land ing

Craft AA and Land ing Craft Rockets ], In addi­

tion t here was a bom ba rd men t force

conn..ting o f the battle..h ip H~{S Wan pitt', and

two 1Sin-gun m onitors. Air cover wa s

p rovided by rocket -fmng Typhoons from 85

115

•

Cl EARJNG THE SCHElDT

Group RAE The force sailed from Oste nd at0100 hr s on 1 November a nd by 0800 hr s(Quid see wesrkapene Towe r shro uded in lowrain clouds. The wa rshi ps o pened fire on w est ­kapeue and Homburg at 08 30 Iu s, but were

hampered by pom visibility and Ihe absence ofaircraft spotters. Eventually RA Air 0 1' Austerswere used a nd proved highl y sucn..ssful. TheBuffaloes ran ashore protected by the close­suppo rt craft of the RN Inshore Squadronwhich en~a~t'd th e defences at ranges of lessIhan 1,000 ya rds , despite heavy and accuratereturn fire wh ich ca used many cas ua lt iesamong the na val craft and th e Buffaloes.

The t O s carryi ng breaching teams from79 t h Armd Div came as hore wit h th eCom mandos. Despite heavy fire and manycasualt ies so me of th e AFVs m an aged 10 getashore and asststcd me Com m a ndos in

capt uring westkapeue and in ope ra tionsagainst the German ba tteries. Tilt' tiny forcewas not helped by th e ve ry h igh tide whichswam ped those flails that had landed and lettjust two Sher ma ns and three AVREs available

for further ope rations. By 8 November. ope ra­tions had bee n ex te nded 10 cover Ih e northern

end of the island, where the Domhurg batt erywas knocked out. pa rt ly by tank she lls firedvery accurat ely throu gh em placeme nt slits.The assa ult on watch eren ended when xnddle­burg was captu red on the 8t h, what was left ofth e ga rrison (some 2,000 men ) surrenderingwit h their commander, Lieutena nt -Ge neralWilhelm Dascr. Roya l Naval mt neswce pcrsbegan to clear the seaway 10 Antwerp almostimmediate ly, but it look th ree weeks o funremitting work by 100 vessels befo re th e 75­mil e cha nne l was safe for use, the first convoybe rt h ing at Antwerp on 28 November. The

Germans lost many troops in the battle andsome 10,000 were taken prisoner. But the

Canadia ns and British had pa id a high price ­the casualty figu re was 27,633, in what Eisen ­hower described in his memoirs as ht.'ing •... a

spectacul ar and grati fying opcrauon'.

Administrative gcorgantsatrcn

Now th at Antwerp was open, il was po ssible toshut down th e cxt sung Rear Main tenance Areaa nd some of th e Cha nnel ports and use thei r

116

resources in th e new Advan ced Base. II was

plan ned that Ant wl'rp would receive 40,000tom of sto res a day (exclus ive of petrol . oil andlubricants (1'01.)); 22 ,500 Ions of this total was

to be alloc ated to US forces. There was a lsoplen ty of capacity for th e handling of bulkfuel , so a ll would soon IX'wen in that vital areaalso. But there was sti ll dan ger to be faced fromenemy V-ho mb a nd rock et att ach - the firsl v,Is and V-2s had landed In Antwerp on lJ

Octobe r and the pori would re main thepriority v -bomb target aft er Lo ndo n, unti l thelaunching sit es were cleared.

Sutl-\

1. xtontgom ery, B. S"mll/tltly to rile B./Uk2. Of US origin, the ' Buffalo' was a tra cked

amphibious craft which could ca rry 28 men or4 tom of stores at som e 7m ph in t he wat er. liSarmour could wit hsla nd small-arm s fire.

Be ktw: Meanwhile. onthe mainland, 00 meroad from TIlburg toBreda. Dutch machinegunnen keep watchWIth their Bntrsh ¥ lCken

.l Olin MG at the ready.to engage any enemyforces Withdrawing.(IWM . HU 73791)

8The 'Lull' before the Storm

Below: MOlj Gen UndseyMcDonald Silvester(left). CG US 7th Armd[)yooutlining the IXticaI~ notth of oYer­loon. Hobnd. to somehJSh offlCen who~~toQ.ke

IM!r the Mea. It~11th Armd Div tNt"I'OlAd take over theru between DeumelJId the M;us. whilst 7thUS Annd Div wouldhold a se<tioo on thei rf'Iht from Deume toHeijeI. 7 October 1944,(US Amry via ReAl WarPhotos- A 94OA)

Although many of the soldiers who werefiRhting in most of the armies on the Alliedfront in North w est Europe might not agree ,there was definitely something of a lullbet ween the succes sfu l opening of th e Scheidtestua ry to the port of Antwerp , and the start ofth e Germans ' totally un expected 'last gamble'

in th e Ardennes. Strictl y spea king, thi s perioddid not begin until mid-Novembe r, and itwo uld last until mid-Decem ber , but for th esake of co ntinui ty I beg in where I e nded

Cha pte r 5 (week 191. because the Scheidt oper­ati on only concerned Ca nadia n First Army in

particul ar and 21st Army Group in general;now we mu st cover activities in the remaining

sectors.

\\'et.' k 20: 17-23 October 1944

In uru sscts o n th e 18th, General Eisenhowerheld a co nference with Montgomery andBradley to plan future operations. Th e ma in

ronc lus tons drawn were: that 2ht ArmyGroup should con tin ue its ope ra tions to openthe port of Antwerp as quickly as possible ,th en launch an attack south -westwa rds fromtill' Nljm egen brid ge-head tow ards Krefcld .Meanwhile, sta rt ing ea rly in November, USfirst Army wou ld advan ce to the Rhine nearCologne and gain a bridge-head over th eriver, w ith US Nlrit h Army o perati ng on theirleft flank. The latter wo uld then att ack north­ward s between th e Rhine and th e Meu se, soas to lin k up with British Second Army's

117

TH E 'LUll.' BEFORE THE STORM

Above: Engineers of 23rd Annd Engr Bn, Jrd Armd Div, US FirstArmy, planting explosive charges in or der to blow a gap in th iS'Dragons Teeth ' anti-tan k barrier w hich was part of t he Siegfriedline. 7 October 19+4 . (US Army via Real War Photos - A 66 18)

Be low: Tank commander, C pl Eugene McKay of II lillOis, spca anene my position th rough his binoc ul,," during the lighting inAachen. To the left of his Sherman is an MI0 tank desU'Oye. (l'NH- EA1 11 36)

,•,,

~: Street blottle in~.Glshelp~

IIIOI.rIded comrade tontter as they follow upQnks mopping up theenemy opposition inhouse-to-house fightingin the streets of Aachen.16 October 19.... . (IWM• KY -4(961)

Right: Infantrymenclamber on beard a 1RTR Sherm.an, of 11thArmd Div, to Advancetowards r-tee-seic andHaag on I7 October1941. The back decks ofJ Sberman tank provideda welcome chAnge fromfoot slogging, butinfantry thus carriedwere more vulnerable toenemy fire than when onthe ground. (TankHuseom)

THE ' LUll.' BEFORE THE STORM

southwa rds d rive . During this pa rt of theoperation , US Nint h Army wou ld pa , s under

command of Brlt tsh 21st Army G roup. US12th Arm y Group wav to be responsible fo r a lloperat ions couccm tng the ca pture of th eRuin, while 2 1st Arm y Gro up wou ld dete r­m ine the tea stbttny of a north ward t hr us tover the Neder Rijn and o n towa rd ' th eZutder Zee .

On th e 17th , in their d rive for vente. theleading elements of British Second Army's VIICorps took th e Dutch town of venratt - only10 miles from the German border, and by theZ3rd , XII Corps was attacking towards TIlbu rg.By the end of the wee k, 15th Inf Div hadreach ed Tllb urg, a nd 7th Arrnd and 53 rd InfDivs. followed by 5 1st In! Div, were head in gfor 's Hertogcnbosch. Ope rations were im­

peded by wld csprcad mincftcld s.In t he ad jo in ing US First Army sector, th e

Ger man garrison at Aach en was th warted in its

attem pts to break out and th eir res istance

steadily weakened. On t he 19th, US tst In! and3rd Armd tuvs began a stro ng assa ult , taking

suc h vilal features as the Lo usberg Heigh ts andSalvator Hill, wh ile cu tt ing the Aachen­La urcn sburg road. ny t he znm . l st tn t tuv hadpushed th e Germans back in to th e sout he rnsub ur bs. At m idday on t he 2 1st ca r ne t heinevitable sur rende r of wha t rem ained of the

garrtson of the now almost completely rui nedcity .

In Patton 's US Thi rd Army sector badweat her, plus fue l and ammunition sho rtages,

affected operations du ring this week . US 90thInf Dtv was engaged in hand-to-hand fighting

in Maizieres-les-Mt'tz. Elsewhe re fron t lim'srem ain ed unaltered throu ghout th e wee k.

Sout h of th em , in US Seventh Army 's sector.XV Corps troops nea red t.unevme. some 10

m iles sou th-cast of Na ncy, wh ile VI Corps ­sti ll heavily opposed - reac hed s ruyeres a ndca ptured part of th e town on the 18th , and th eremainde r on the 19th. A follow-up divis ion

Above: Bloody Aachen.Crouching behind aknocked-out enemy hghl:Anti-aircraft gunmo unting in Aachen, PteWilliam Zukerbrcwdraws a bead on a Nazisniper. 19 October 19+4(US Army via RealWarPbeecs • A "'65)

120

~ -,l....._

(:lrd Inf Div) took over th e advance towards

the next objective - St-Dte - but we re sooneffectively sto pped by st rong opposition fromGerman Nineteen th Army. Also in US Sevent hArm y's sec tor. two more US divisions (l O()thand 103rd In f Dt vsj la nded at ~1alWi1Ies on th e

20 th .In th eir drive towards the Vosges. troops of

Fren ch First Arm)' had paused . havingsustained heavy casualties.

Wt.'1.'i.> 2 1: 24-30 October 1944

In Braba nt . leading ele me nts of Brit ish SecondArmy had reached 's Hert ogenboscf by the24 th . then pushed on beyond , but t heGermans launched a co unte r-offensive . w estof Venia, a sudden. vio lent attack against US7th Armd Div (still part of British VIII Corps)

forced them out of various positions on theDeume and No rd Cana ls.

Sou th of them throughout US 12th Arm)'Grou p, there was an unexpected lull on allthree US Army fro nts (First , Nint h. Third ). On22 October. HQ 12th Army Grou p issued aletter of instruct ion to all Armies: ' 12th ArmyGroup will regroup and prepare fo r an advanceb)' all thr ee Armies to th e Rhine River ..: Th e

sta rt date would depend a ll the wea t he r.On the 24t h, in Third Arm y, Patt on's

personal quart ers wer e narrowly m issed bythree 2HOm m shells. Also on that date he

infor med SHAEF that his Army had receivedmore than 2. 1 million ga llons of fue l below

th eir requests and that he now had less thantwo o pc rat toual days' fuel left . The 29 th sawMatz jeres-les-Met z captured, except fo r the

town hall which held out fo r anothe r day. Tomake up for his fuel sho rtages. Patton hadinstitu ted agg resstve foot patrolling.

Farther sout h, in US VI Co rps ' sector o f USSevent h Army, 3rd Inf Div had now take n overthe push for St-Die, while units of 45th Inf Divtook St-Bcnott on th e 30t h .

Sti ll farther south, on t he 24t h, General de

La ttre de Tassign y prepa red his orders forOperation ' Inde pen dence', an assault byFrench First Arm y on t he importa nt Belfn rtGap, not far from the Swiss border, which was

to be carried out in ea rly xovember. The attackwould take place in conjunction wit h a

THE ' lULL.' BEFORE THE STORM

general cttenstve wh ich had three m ain obj ec­tives: to elim inate all Germa n strc ng potn tswest of th e Rhine; to esta blis h bridge-h eadseas t of th e river; fina lly, to mount an assa ult

dee p in to the heart of the Fatherland.

W t.'t'k 22: 3 1 Octobe r-s November 19....

On the 3 1st, Bnttsh Second Army 's XII Corpsove rcame ent' my resistan ce in t he Raamsdonkarea . At the end of th e wee k. in British I Corps'sector, Polis h 1st Armd Div, supported by unitsof US to-nh In f mv, began an offensive to ta keMoc rdqk.

In 12th Army Group's a rea , t he long­awai ted attack had not yet materialised,having bee n delayed by bad wea ther, but allth ree Army Groups we re by now ' rann' to go!'

In US Third Army's a rea , us XX Corpstroops of 5th In f Div occupied the Arnavillebridge-head south of Metz . rel ieving men of95th In f Div. US XII Co rps crossed the RiverSeille and capt ured Abaucourt and Letrt­

co ur t .In US Seventh Army's sector, US XV Corps'

Frenc h 2nd Armd Di v ente red Bertricham psOil I November, US IlXlth Inf Div arrived in VICo rps' sector to rep lace 45t h Inf Div, wh ile Srd

In f Div occupied la Bourgonce, north-west ofSt· Die. tht' ll con tin ue d to adva nce throu gh the

M ortagne Fo rest.

Wt.'t.'i.> 2 :'1: 7-13 Novem ber 1944TIl(' ' Battk' for Ger many' officially began at0600 In s on 7 November. There was nopreparatory aortal bo mbardment, so ta cti calsurprise was co mplet e . The Germa n HighCo m mand had reckoned th at th e ex tremeflooding in many areas would prevent anyAllied offensi ve.

In US Th ird Army 's are a XII Co rps launch edtheir attack wit h 26t h, 35 t h and 80th lnf luvsadvanci ng sim ulta neous ly to the south .ce nt re a nd north respectively. betwee nMo ncourt in the south and Clemery in th enorth . Wit h ex cellent coun ter-batte ry fi refrom heavy art ille ry, they ca ptured jallau­cou rt , Malaucourt and Rouves on t he first da y,as the divisions a ll raced for the Rhine. At thesame time XX Co rps launched a massiveassault un Metz on the 8th, but this was

121

THE 'LUu.' BEFORE THE STORM

Abo ve : US tankers advance into Gennany. The crew of an Amer­ican tank destroyer halt on the road to Vossenach, to check theirroute. Vossenach is in the Hurtgen Forest. south-east of Aachen,

which was recaptured by US First Army troops on 7 Novemberafter earlier being forced to evacuate it by a strong Gennancounter-attack. (IWM. EA46076)

THE 'tuu' BEFORE THE STORM \

Above: Gen OnurIlradIey (left) CG 12thHmy Group. visiting USThrd Ivmy. I3NcJ,oember 1944. In thevoup are Gen GeorgeS, Panon, Jr (CG 3rdNmy), H.lj Gen P.ilul(CG 26th InfDiy) andM~ GenManton Eddy(CG XII Corps on farnght). (US Army)

Lrft : Hiirtgen Forest.Men of 3rd an, 8th Inf~ 3th US InfDiv.move across a smallbrldge to follow up anM 10tank destroyel" onthetrxk. 18 November19+1. (US Army via Real'NlI' Photos - A 232)

hampered by severe flooding in the a rea o f

th e Mosett e . US 5t h Inf Drv reached

Chemtnot . so u t h o f M etz. 90t h Int Di vcrossed the river in DUKW\l and established a

bridge-h ea d nea r Th fonvtlle. On the same dayUS 6t h Armd Dtv crosse d t he Settle a nd

prepared for a fu rther advance, as d id 10th

Armd Dtv. Th e weather had improved cons td­

cra bly and US Arm y Eigh t h Air Force s('111 in

near ly 1,500 heavy bo m bers 10 hn-a k the Met zdead lock, hn mmc rtng away at a ll the fortifi ed

to wns east o f the bridge-head area: Met z,

vcmy, Orny, l'omrnerteux and Saa rb ruc ken.

wtth XIX TAC fly ing in support . Pro gresscontinued o n the 10th and 11th, with the

enemy ti~hting delaying actio ns in t he

villages and fo rest s. Engineers began buildingthe longest Railey bri dge to date (200ft ) at

Th tonvtlle and two o t he rs at Malling, over

which po ur ed 10t h Annd ntv. O n II

Novem ber. O il Bradley's ve rbal orders, 83 rd In f

Div rever ted to US First Army a nd this move

prevented Saar bruc ke n from bctng taken ­

t his . in Patto n's opinion , was o ne of the direc t

causes of the Germans ea rly succ'ess in t he

Ardennes Ottenstve .z

Wl....k 24 : 14-20 Novem ber 1944

In 2 1\ t Arm y Group's sector o n the l-it h ,Brit ish Second Arm y's. XII Corps opened an

one nstve to deal with the Ge rman bridge-h ead

over the Maas, be tween vente a nd Roermond .

By the 201h they had made good progress,pushin g o n towards the river with 49th and

5 1st Inf Dtvs.

On the 16th, US Nin t h and First Armies

launched a co-o rd inated offensive (Ope ratio n

'QUt't>ll') to seize the a rea no rth o f Aachen,

be tween the Rivers Wurm and Ruh r. Nin th

Army's XIX Corps advanced to wards the Ruhr

with 2nd Annd Div on the left making for

juhch: 29 th In f Div in the cent re for Alden­

hoven which they ca ptu red on the 20t h; .m t h

Inf Div o n the nght flank for wurselen whkh

they reached on the 17th . A determined

coun ter -attack by Ge rman Seventh Arm y o n

the 19th was repelled by 2nd Armd Div,

Fu rther sout h, US First Army's VII Corps

advanced 0 11 Duren [tow ards Corogner, east of

Aachen.On 1M November US f irst Arm y began n s

advance and bitter ca m pa ign in the Hurtgcn

Forest , penetrating the o u ter defences of

123

THE 'LUu.' BEFORE THE STORM

Duren. This wo uld prove to be o ne of the mostbitterly con tes ted batt les of the enti recampaign in North West Europe. Th e Ger manshad all th e advantage s of strong defensivete rrai n; the att acking Gt s ha d to dependalmost excl usively o n in fan tr y weapons

because of the density of the forest and thete rrible weath er (whenever vete rans of the US

-I th , 91h and 2Hlh Inf tuvs later referred toha rd ughtmg. they d id so in terms of compar­ison with ti ll' Battl e of the Hurtgcn Forest

which th ey put at th e to p of Iheir list !).In US Third Arm y's secto r slow and steady

progress was made, despite ex te ns ive mine­fields, road-blocks and all ma nner of otherobstacles. On the I-Ith , leading ele ments of XIICor ps took Haraucourt and Mar val, andfurther north 6tb Armd Div seized Landroff. InXX Cor ps' area , 95t h Inf Dtv took Ouve-St­Hubert, Feves and fort d 'Illan ge, wh ile 10th

Armd Drv crossed th e Moselle beh ind a smo ke­scree n nea r Th ton ville and Mailing. Furthersouth, on till' 15th , 51h Inf Iu v too k Moctcuvesin a flan king dri ve towa rds Metz, wh ich was

no w enti rely surrounded - six major strong­points were still holding out. On 19 Novem ber

5th and 95 1h Inf Dtvs fina lly ente red the cityand by the 20t h it was reported clear of enem y,although certain for lS around Ml'IZ were st illho lding out.

In US Seventh Army's sector, XV Cor psadvanced towards Avricourt and Halloville,wh ile VI Corps broke through ene my post­nons a t Raon-l'Etape, north-west of St-Dle,whic h other tr oops were pre paring to attackfrom the south-west . By the end of the wee kVI Corps ' 3rd Int Dtv ha d crosse d the Meunhcbetween Cta treton ta tne and St-Mtcnet-sur ­Meurthe an d Iheir large br idge-head incl udednumerous villages .

Below: Geilenkirchencaptured. A soldier ofUS Ninth Anny watdles

Shermans rumblingth roogh the town whichwas deared on 19November, only th~

days after the US N,nthArmy had opened itsassault . (IWM • KY44S75)

Below: The ~rtle forI1ett- Men of the 95thWDrv. US Third Army.lllIi:5h down the door ofI house in Mea. dUring

SIJ"eel fighting. 22Noooember 1944, (US

~ via Real WarPhol:O$ - A 755)

In the far south. French First Army's I Co rpsbe gan its offensive towards th e Bello n Ga p onthe 1-Ith, reach ing Hencourt. Montbelta rd andHertmoncourt o n the 17th. Nex t day, theleadi ng units were throu gh the Gap and somesix mnes beyond between the Rhine Ca nal an dDelle on the Swiss bo rde r. They reac hed theou tskirts of Beltort on the 19t h and by lastlight were at Rosenau, near Basel, on th eRhine. Fighting continued in Belfort . butmeanwhile on the 20t h, units of l st French

Armd Div reached Mulhouse.

\\'l't:k 25 : 21-27 November 1944British Second Army's 49t h and Stst Inf Divswere continuing their advance on vente.whi le on 22 November, VIII Corps' 15th InfDiv took the villages of Sevenum and Horst tothe north-west of the town . On 26 NovemberV·]'s and V-2's hit Antwerp for the first time.

THE ' LULL BEFORE THE STORM

In US Nin th Army's secto r. XIX Co rps bega nthe fina l pha-,cof Operation 'Queen'.

In US Hrst Army's sector, VII Co rps' 104th

Inf Dtv took Frenz on the 26t h, w hil e units of-lrh Inf tnv consolidated th eir gains in theHa n gen Forest area. Mopping-up co nti nuedthroughout the rest of the week , whi le 29thIn f tuv were sim ilarly occupied on their way tothe River Ruhr,

The Germans were sti ll causi ng US Thi rdArmy considerable delay on XII Corps' front ,but at vtetz, 'The Bastion of the East', the two­month siege ended on 22 November when XXCorps reported it subdued. This openedanother route to the German fron tier and theSiegfried Line. Despite bad weather, which washampering ai r and ground movement, US XIIand XX Corps made steady progress east andnorth-east, -nh Armd Div crossing the saar on24 November and 10th Armd Dtv crossing the

•

­, -Right: Engineef1; of 24ttl ..,Engineer,; , 4th Armd ..

oiv, US Th ird Arm y. ~

carrying out the UI!efM-

able task of clearing adirt road of mines. Oneman has already beenkilled. I December19+4. (US Army vQ P.eJIWar Photos - A S04)

Right : The St1ermans ofUS Fi~t Army haveCertainly batteredHi.irtgen to pieces. Itwas at an importantroad junction on theroad to Cologne, in themtddle of the Hi.irtgenForest vlCI _ c:aptUI't(I

28 November 19+1.(IWM EA 4607])

lek: Infantrymen of XIICorps, US Third Ivmy ,pass a sign to Saar ­brucken as they advancethrough St Avoid, whichwas liberated on 27November 19+4. (IINM­EA 456+4)

THE 'LUu' BEFORE THE STORM

Ge rma n borde r on t he 25 t h to ca p t u re

Bethtugen.In US Seventh Arm y's secto r, 2nd Armd Div

was adva nct ng to wards Saveme from

Bouxw tl ler and Hirkenwald, while 1000h lilt

Div took Sencncs o n the 22nd and pushed o n

to wards St. B1aiw; on the same d ay 3 rd ln f Dtv

too k St·Die. O n the 27t h 100th Inf mv a rrived

in the Saarebourg area, and General Eise n­

hower ordered General Patch 's Arm y to swing

north to assist Ge neral Patton 's troops to

ca pt ure the Saar ba sin . On that day too, VI

Corps' 3 rd lnf Iuv rep laced French 2nd Arm d

tuv in Strasbourg.

On t he 22 nd l st In f Dtv of French First

Arm y's II Corps, look Gtro magny, o pe n ing up

a gap a long the River Savoreuse, and I Corps

entered Mulho use, close to the German

border. On t he 24t h, t roops of both US I and II

Corps .....ere ordered to converge o n Burnhaupt

as q u ickl y as possible so as to force an enemy

wit hdrawal Into Alsuce.

\\'l"t'k 26: 28 :".:()vemher~ Decem ber 1944

By 30 Novem ber, in so u th-eas t Ho lland ,

Briti sh Second Army's VIII a nd XIX Corps had

clea red t he enemy's bridge-head o ve r the

Maas, o n ly a small pocket remaining ncar

Hl erlck. On 2 December the Germans ble w a

di ke on till' lower Rhine nea r Amhem , caustng

severe flooding and forcing can First Arm y 's II

Co rps to withdraw over the \Vaal. Brit ish

Second Arm y's XII Corps cap tu red Blenck

(o pposite vente o n the !\.faas) o n .l l:k"'Cember,

thus dearing the en ti re region wes t o f the

river.

In US Nin t h Army's sec tor, XIII Corps

co n tin ued to advance to wards Linnich wh ich

126

102ml lnt Div too k 0 11 t st December; they

reached the River Ruh r two days later. On the

4t h t hl'y bro ke o ff t he ir off ens ive, havtn g

ta ken al l thei r obj ec tives wes t of the River

Ru h r except the vi llages of Wii rm and

Mullendorf.US First Army 's VII and V Corps continued

thei r dlfftcult operations in the Hurrgen Fort'S!

and in t he River tnde sector, VII Corps reachingthe Vicinity of Lam me rsdort and Inden on the

30t h. On :i De~..-embcr troops of 5th Arrnd tnv

reached Brandenberg and rein forced their

bridge-head 0\,('[ the river next day.US Third Army's XII and XX Corps made

stead y prugr~s in their attacks against the'Wes t Wall ', despite continuing bad weather

whtcb restr icted armoured vehicles to theroads. The enemy made full use of obstacles,including, for example, old xtagt not Line post-

127

• 1

THE 'lULL BEFORE TH E STORM

nons. On the 29th XII Co rps regrouped , an dits .tth and 6th Armd Dtvs probed in to the Saarand took high ground in the co rps area , whileXX Corps troo ps continued to make progresswithin Ger many. US III Corps remained non­opcreuona t at Etatn. 011 ] 0 Nove mber, 6th

Cava lry Group was formed - soo n to be knownas ' Patton's Hou sehold Cavalry'! At th e end ofthe week III Corps ' 87 th Inf Div took overfrom 51h Inf Div in th e xtetz area, with thetavk of con ta tnmg th ose forts thai were still

holding out, including Fort Jeanne d 'Arc.Sarre-Uruon was clea red on the -ttb .

Farther south in US Seventh Army's area ,Fren ch 2nd Armd Div tVI Corps) reachedErste in, about 10 miles SW of Sirasbourg, onthe 281h, but was h alted by det ermined rests­la nce . US XV Corps ' 79th ln f Iuv capturedSchwetgcnhause in Alsace on I December,wh ile Hlh and -15th Inf tuvs were engaged inheavy fighting near Tiffenbach and Zinswiller,managing 10 take th e latt er u n th e 3rd .

In th e far so uth, Fren ch First Army, rein ­forced by th e ar rival of US 76th Inf Div on 2December, began an operation 10 squeeze outthe Colmar pocket by co nverging attacks fro mnorth and sout h .

Above: Maj Gen Maurice Rose, dynamic CG of]rd Armd Div from August I~until] I March 1945. when he was killed in aetioo, is seen here beside hisJeep ill

Zweifall, ]0 November 1944. (US Army via Patten Museum)

Right: A massive 240mmMI howitz erbelonging to US NinthMny is seen in actioncblngthe drive onGermany, 12December194-4. The l 60lb shellcoukl be delivered out

to 2l J'OO metres. (USMny VI3. ReAl WarPhotos .A3167)

Below: A platoon oftine HMC MBs of USFnt /4nny, in action in

the Hiirtgeo Forest areaon 7 December 19+4.The HMC M8 mountedJ 75mm howiuer on the

cNssisof an M5 light

ttnk. to make a veryeffecti¥e small HMC;ne¥iy 1.780 were builtnl used in HQ Compa­IlleS of mediu m tankbmaIionsuntil replacedby I05mm howItzef"S.(US /4nny via Real WarPhotos • A 209)

Wl'l'k 27: 5-11 Decembe r 1944O n 10 December US First Army's VII Cor pslaunch ed a ll attack between the Rivers lndeand Ruin to ta ke Duren, using 9th, 83 rd and104th Inf Iu vs. plus 3rd Armd Div,

In US Third Army's sector, XII Corps ' 4thAnn d Div seized an intact br idge over theRiver Eich el at Vollerd ingen and establis hed asmall br idge-head. In X X Corps's area 95th lnfDiv encountered heavy stree t lighting in Saar­laute n, but m anaged to esta blish a bridge-h ead

at l.isdorf. On th e 8th, 35 t h Inf Dtv crossed th eSaar in four places. Bad wea ther rest rictedflying, but, significa n tly, air reoce reports in di­cated a build-up of enemy forces in th e Eifel

area. On the 9t h G·2 sent a report to SHAHthat a major enemy assa ult in the Ardenneswa.. probable, but this was ignored .3

US Seven th Army deployed two corps in a nadva nce towards the Mag tnot and Stcgfrtcd

Lines.In th e far south , on 6 Decem ber French Hr st

Army's I Corp.. began an att ack on th e Co lma rpocket, whi le II Corps was facing heavy

co un ter-a ttacks in the a rea of Os t he tm.Gncma r a nd Mtttctwrhr: the latter was ta kenon th e 9 th afte r heavy lighting. By 10Dec ember, I Corps' 2nd Moroccan Div hadtaken Than n and 9t h Colon ial Dtv had e1 imi­nated all enemy wes t of the Rhine between

Kl'm lx a nd t he Swiss border.

Wlock 28 : 12-1 8 Dec em ber 194-1(See Cha pter 9 for a n account of the Battle ofthe Bulgl' - 16 December 194-4-20 January194 51

129

130

Above: A mortar crewin action near the

Hurtgerl Forest . I]December 1944. (USArmy via~ WarPhotos - A 203)

Left : Men of a heavy

w eapons platoon set Ull

their .JOeal M I917AIBrow ning machine eun

in Saarlauten, duringhe avy fighting there. TheMI9 17AI was the dras·lic:aJ1y revised model oft he original M 191 7machine gun.~ _

the standard support

MG of the US Armythroughout ¥.WII. (I'NM- EA 53 IS3)

•

IeIow: This hNYy!IIiChine gun crew areanying their .SOcalIlrownlng machioe gunrto ~ shell-pocked~ in Saartauten.l.i:.e the .30 calSrowning. [he .50 is stillI'lseMce worldwide.(1NH - EA53096)

US First Arm y began the wee k by taking Pier

and forcing the ene my to wit hd raw over t he

Ruh r. Having taken most of the area between

the lnde a nd the kuhr, VII Corps o pe rat ions

were concluded. while l 04th In f Div reac hed

t he Ruhr o n a ·I'll-mile front. Buth US First

and Third Arm ies' operations ceased o n the

14th a nd t he re was a lu ll.On 12 December US Third Army's (j -2 sent

yet anot her wa rning to SHAEF about a

dangerous enemy bui ld-up opposite US l-'i rst

Arm y and the like lihood of a major German

offe ns ive in the Ardennes. I'atton quiet ly

began hi s own planning so that he would be

ready if and ......hen the balloon ......ent up ­

which of COUN' it did on the 16th.US Seventh Army wa s halted at

Hottviller-Bitche o n the ~Iaginot Lrne, while to

it s south, French First Army was attacking post­

lions west of the Rhine in the Colmar pocket.

Operations virtually ca me to a halt along

the ent ire front as attention focu sed on t he

posstbtnty of a Ge rman assault in the

Ardennes.

THE 'tuu' BEFO RE THE STORM

No tesl. DUKW = Truck, Amphibious z va-t on 6)(6,whic h used its normal d rive o n land and had a

rudder and propeller for use in wate r.

2. Patton was to reco rd t ha t he considered this

to be o ne of the major errors of the entire

ca mpaign . ' If Brad ley ha d not wels hed on his

ag ree me nt ,' he wrote in his d iary. ' ......e would

have taken Saa rbrucken with in 48 h rs after we

got Kocn tgsmacker, Once we had (Koenigs­

mackcrl they couldn't have stopped us from

taking Trier . and if ......e'd had Trie r it would

have been impossib le for the Ge rmans to

launch their Arde nnes offensive.'3 . US Third Arm y's G-2 Section reported on a

significant enemy build-up. and it s after­

action report for the period 3-10 December19 44 included the statement (written at the

ti me ): 'Overal l the initiative rests with the

Atnes . but the massive Armored force the

enemy has bu ilt u p in reserve gives h im the

deftntte capability of launching a spoiling

(d ive rsio nary) offensive to d isrupt the Allies'

dri ve .' It was ignored by SHAEF.

13 1

f

THE ' LULL' BEFORE THE STORM

132

Left: Wintet" mod . A'Jimmy' (GMC 2ton)struggles through thtdtwin tet" mud,~in Belgium, before thewmtet" snow came in

late 19-41, (TankMuseum)

Left: Men. Germanprisoners march out ofFort Jeanne d'An::: atMea. . following its aprt.

ulation to USThirdIvTrry on I) December19-41. (IWM - EA47S06;

Left: Metz. Maj GenWal ton Walker. CG XXCorps. leaving the townhall in Mea after

formally handing backthe hberated city to its

citizens. (IWM - EA<4S037)

•

9Hitler's Ardennes Offensive

Right: Ovenll Com ­mander of the Germante-ces for the assaultW3$ Field Marshal Gerdvon Rundstedt , who hadbeen reinsta ted as DBWest in September1944, When he firstheard of H it ler 'sproposals. he was stag­gered by the scale of theoperation . had gravemisgivings. but wasforced to go along withIt. (IWM • AP "'7832)

(Wt"t.·k 28 (12-18 December 19.... ) to W t"" k

:n ( 16-22 January 19-15)

1\1"'" d m Rhein'Sold iers of t he West Front! Your grea t ho ur has

a rrived. Large attacking armies have sta rted to

ad vance aga ins t the Anglo-Americans, I do

not have to tell you anyth ing more than that.

You feel it yo urselves. We are gmt/bUns ('l't'l}"­

t/l;n,(! You carry with yo u the hol y o b ligation

10 give everyt hing to ach ieve Ihings beyond

h um an possib ilities fo r o ur Father land and our

f uhrer!' Held Marshal Ge rd vo n Rundstedr's

me-ssag e 10 h is troops.It was as ea rly as rntd- September that Adolf

Hitler had first astounded hi s generals wh en,

afte r a normal ' Fuh rer conference ', he had

in vited Held Ma rsh al Keitel and Generals jodl,

Gude rian and Kretpe (represent ing Gori ng)into an inner cha mber where, 3S the yd iscussed the current position o f the wa r. the

na me 'Ardennes' had been mentioned andHitl er had come to life. ' Raising h is hand, he

had exclaimed: "Sto p!" There was a dead

pause. fi nally Hitler spo ke: "I have made amom entous decision. I am ta king the offen ­stve. Here - out of th e Ardennes! " He smashedh is fis t o n t he unroll ed map before him ...Across the Meuse an d on to Antwerp!" Theo t he rs sta red in wo nder. His shoulders

squa red , h is eyes lum inous, the signs o f carea nd sickness go ne. This wa s the dynam ic

Hitle r o f 19..0 .' 1

The plan for this daring o pe ration was

undoubtedly Hitler 's brainchild. It was C1"K1e·

named ' l VI/elit 1lt1l Rhein twatcn o n the

Rhine), so as to m islead Allied in telligence,

and when he sen t co p ies to vo n Rundvtedt

tre tnsta tcd as on West in September) andModel (Comma nder Army Group B] he is

sup posed to ha ve persona lly ma rked the cover:

'N OT TO BE ALTERED'! In esse nc e, the p lan

co ns isted of an ea rly morn in g (05.'\0 Ius)

assau lt by th ree a rm ies, striking through the

Ardennes between Monschau in the north and

rchtcmach in the south - a frontage of some

H5 mi les . After crossing the Rive r Meu se

bet ween Ui'!o:l' and Nam ur, the assau lt would

byp ass Brussels and aim at ca pturing Antwerp

wit hi n a wee k. The America n and Brit ish

forces, now cu t in two , wo uld never be able to

recover fro m the shoc k and would have to

make a sepa ra te peace, leaving Ge rmany free

to deal with the Soviet Un ion. The German

High Co m mand (O KW) we re secretly appalled

by the p lan. but, in t he afte rmath of the

unsuccessful atte mpt o n the Fuh rer's life, no

one ua red 10 argue. Hit ler chose tough SS

General 'Sepp' Dietrich to p lay a leading ro le.

133

HITUR'S ARDENNES O FFENSIVE

•

Hts Sixt h 5S Panzer Army wo uld be in the

nort h of the assa u lt force, to its le ft was to be

General Baron Basso von Manteutfel's Fifth

Panzer Army, wit h Ge neral der PanzenruppenErich Bradenberger's weaker Seventh Anny,

prot ect in g the sout he rn flank of the o pe ra tion ,

Field Marshal Model wo uld he in overall o pe r­

anoual co n trol. When vo n Rundstedt heard

about the scale of the o pt-ra tion he was stag­

gc red by it s Sill' and scopt.', and, cons idenng it

far too ambitious, proposed a more lim ited

auack to take out the Allied salie nt around

Aachen, hu t this was d ismissed by Hitl er and

the O K\\'. Post -war he commented: ' It was

the n o n ly up to m e to o bey, It was a

no nsensical opera tio n a nd the m ost stu pid

pa rt was sett ing Antwerp as the target . If wereac hed the Meuse we should have got down

o n o ur kn ees and thanked God - Jet alone triedto have reached Antwerp.'2 There wa s also

opposit ion to the p lan fro m Dietrich , who

took his complain ts to Jodi, Chief o f Staff

O KW, but got no where. His .'iS pa nzcr divisions

were to make the mai n effort, while the Arm y

134

panzer d ivisio ns would only p lay a su pporti ng

role - a de liberate slap in the eye for the Arm y,

whose o ffice rs had tr ied to kill Hit ler.

Vo n Manteu ffe! was a tough . lo yal

commander, but like von Runds tedt and Diet­

rich he d id not hol d out much hope of getting

be yo nd th e Me use . He wo uld show hi s

personal bravery early o n in t he operattou.

going out d tsgulsed as an intelligence colone l

a nd perso nally d irec emg t he tn tenstve

patrolling that took place before the attack.

Erich Brade n bergcr, desp ite his 'u nheroic

appearance' - he looked more like a school­

m aster - had already proved hi mself a compe­

tent co m m ander whe n he took over as

Seven t h Arm y comma nder fro m Gc n Heinrich

Eberbach whe n the la tter was captured (28

August 1944), but he wa s nevertheless worried

ahout his role on the southern flank , being

sho rt o f tan ks and facing Patton's Th ird Army

for whom the Germans had devel o ped a

hea lt h y respec t . In round figures the Ge rma nshad assembled some 250,000 1111' I1 , nea rly

2,nOO gum and 1,000 tan ks, m aking it th e

Above left: Playingamajor role in the a.uauItwas the rough , tough 55Geoenl J.... "$epp'Dietrictl, HrtIet'deIiber"atety ga.ve his SixthPanzer Army the map'

role in the anault. asasnub to the Armyforfailing to protect himproperly in the unsuc­cessful bomb plot: to kIhim. (Tank Musetm)

Above : Field MarVIaIWalter Modelcommanded Heers­gruppe B du ring theArdennes Offensive,and, with voo Rundstedt.was sent a copy ofHider "s 'Wxht amRhein'Sl.l~

"""''''' penon>J~byHitle r. "Not to be

altered '! (IWM MH12850)

Above: CG of 12thArmy Group was GenOmar Bradley (herephotographed in Londonjust after VE.Day), GenHodges' First Army waspart of his Army Groupaswas Gen Patton'sThird Army to the sout haod GenSimpson'sNinth to the north.(Author' s Collection)

most formidable fighting force eve r to face the

British and Americans in o ne sing le o pe ration,

Th ey were 10 he su p po rted by so me 1,500a ircraft o f the Luftwaffe's /(ISl/k(l'p.~ /I - about

ha lf the n umber Goring had or ig inally

p romised.

racing them in the Arde n nes sector were

iust six divisions o f V and VIII Corps in

General Co urtney Hodges' US First Arm y, On

til e lef t flank was V Co rps ' 2nd lnf Div,

veterans who were preparing for an assault on

the da ms of the Rivers Roer and Urft. Th ey had

been holding the St . Vit h are a , but were

relieved o n II December by V III Co rps' 106th

Inf Div, so that they could tak e part in the

att ack o n the da ms. The o the r d ivision in V

Corps was 99t h Inf Div a recen tly arrived

for mation (en tered the line 9 Novem be r),

wh ich bega n the assa u lt o n the dams o n 13

Dec ember aga ins t heavy o pposit io n . Th ey

would bo t h be h it hard by the totally unex­

peered German assau lt. Sou th of them was

Ge ne ral Troy Middl eton's VIII Corps with the

'green ' l06th In f Div now in the line and

HITLE R'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

shortly to receive it s first tast e of battle; sout ho f them wa s 28t h Inf Dtv which was recov­

er ing fro m the fightinR in the Hiirtgen fo rest

where it had sustained hea vy casua lties. Th e

o ther two di visions in VIII Co rps were the

'gree n' 9t h Arm d Dtv, which was to suppo rt

the Roer dams operation and for whom the

co m ing battle would be their first major oper·

arto n . and 4th Inf Div, also recover in g in

Lu xe m bour g after t he Hurtgen Forest

ca mpa ign .

The PtanIn the north, the first wa ve of Dietrich 's SS

Sixth Panzer Army, comprising fou r infantry

(12 th , 277th, 326th vot ksgrenadre r utvs(VGD) a nd 3rd Parachute Div) and tw o SS PzDivs (1st (uihst,m,I,Irtt' Allol( Hi tler) and 12t h

Cllitln 11I,( t"II I} were concentrated o n a narrowfront between \1 0nschau and the Loshetm

Ga p. In this gro up was a lso Otto Sko rzeny's 11/1

Iwe Co m ma ndo bngade (I5Oth Pz Bde]. Th e

infantry wa s to lead in itially, stri king into thespa rse road netwo rk o f t he Ardennes,

adv ancing so me 3-5 rnt les o n the fir st

mo rning and thus o pe n ing the way for the

tanks to pass th roug h and head with all speedfor the Meuse. Th e arm our would be led by t st

S5 I'z Dtv whose 140+ AFVs (ind ud ing maIl YPanthers a nd Tigers) made it the most

po werfu l German un it in the Ardennes, It was

conftdentl y assu med that the lead in g tanks

would reach till' Meuse and seize a crossing by

the end of the fourt h day. South of this ma jor

assau lt , vo n Maureuffel's fifth Pz Army had

two prim a ry cbtccnves: to e nci rcle t he fo rwa rd

elements of US 106th Inf Div in the Sch nee­

Eifd and ad vance to captu re the key town of

St. Vith . This would he the main ta sk for two

o f th e infantry di visions. Second ly, two

infan try a nd three panzer d ivisions wo uld

secu re crosstngv over the River Our furthersou th, then go like hell, parallel with Dietrich 's

leading elemen ts, all the way to Antwerp! As

t he first problem concern ed bri dging the Our,

the in fantry would lead, es ta blis h its bri dge­

heads and protect the engineers while they

erected suitable tank bridges across the river .

Hnatly, to the sout h o f the two pa nzer Arm ies,

Sevent h Arm y, the weakest o f the t hree a rm ies,

1)5

I

HITlER'S ARDENNES O FFENSM

would captu re a bridge-head, aga in over the

Ou r, between vtanden and tctrtemach. thenadvance westwards, kee..ping statio n, so as toprotect von Manteu f fvl's left flan k aga ins tpos siblt' attacks from US Third Arm y.

Th e Germa ns wen.' hoping that til t' weatherwo uld remain bad enough to gro und Alliedaircraft, although they had assembled moreLuftwaffe support than for any previous oper­ation on the Allied front.

Deceptton

Following th e Allied example after th e successof the Operation ' fortitude' dcccpnon plan ,th e Germa ns too k many precauti ons to conc ea lthe nature of ' lVi/eli! lI/11 Rlteln' - even the code­na me was deliberately chosen so as 10 so unddefensive. Troo ps, weapons and equip mentwere only moved by nigh t . Troop posl ttonswere carefully camouflaged, and only smo ke­less charcoal fi res we re pe rm itted in the

Left: CG of the US FirstIvmywas I t GenCourtneyHodges - seenhere with Ge n Eisen­howef, Al~ in the frontraN are Panon andBradley on Ike 's rightnI Simpsonon the farleftof Hodges. Thephlxograph was taken inBelgium on 10October19+4. (IWM - At> 44557)

Right: AttKk! AAhoughthis~ definitety aposed photograph, itdoe!. have dramatic~ as an 55 Rotten·Uref" orders his men to

atXk. The phot~_ one of a sequence

!aken aftel'" an aetuaIbattle between men ofKimpfgruppe Hansen o f155 Pz DiY and 14thCav Group, US 7thArmd D(\'. north o fPoteau. DestroyedAmerican vehicles formthe backdrop. (IWM •EA 47959)

Left: Bastogne beforethe siege began. Thephotograp h shows veh i­cles and men o f Com batCommand B (no rmallyjustcalled 'CCB') of 10thArmd Div arriving in themain st reet o f Bastogneon 18December 1944.It was then sp lit intothree combat groupsand sent to help closethe main routes towardsthe town from thel"lOrttt-east . (IWM - EA48295) forward areas which wert" st rict ly policed by

specia l sccnruy detachments. Even the leadingt«XlI'S were kepi unaware of wha t was actuallyplanned unlil the night before the attack. TheGermans had great faith in their ENIG~IA

cipher machine , unaware that it had beenbroken by the Allies years ago . Believing thatthe Allies were obtaining information from

sp ies and traitors, extra precautions wen.' takenand most of th e planning orders were de liveredby hand so that for this operation f1'iIG\ IAhad few secrets 10 yield. The Germans alsoIntended to use groups of specially trainedtngttsh -spcakrng Commandos dressed andequipped in American uniforms and drivingcaptu red American vehicles. to infiltrate

137

HITlER'S ARDENNES Of fENSM

behind AlIil"d line s, blow up dumps, attackheadqua rters, kill troops and civilians, cut tele­pho ne tines. and generally spread pan ic. Th iswas the primary tack of Otto Skorzenys 150thPanzer Brigade. It was etso intended to dropparatroops in depth. so as to block the move­men t of American reinforcem ent s southwa rds.

The Assault

As planned. a barrage of she lls and rocketslanded on the American positions just beforefirst light on 16 December, heralding theopening of the largest and mos t importa ntbattle of the Allied campaign In Europe . In thenorth. the two VGDs of I SS I'z Corps moun teda heavy attad.. against the green troops of 99thlnt Div, but instead of caving in , the Gls

fought with great bravery and, despite heavy

138

casualties, held their posit ions all day andthroughout th e nigh t. To th eir south. vonManteuffel's chose n location for crossi ng theOur was directly opposite the veteran 28th InfDiv, which had suffered heavy casualties in theHurtgen Forest. In places the Germans had anu merical adva ntage of more than 10 to I ,and den w fog an d the delfberate absence of along, preparatory barrage (although when itcame it was ext remely heavy), allowed theassault force to get within yards of the US posi­t ions, in some places before they weredetected. Nevert heless, jmt as in the 99th InfDiv sector, the Americans fought braw ly, thekey villages of Mamach and Hostngen hold ingout all day. But many Ger man troops werebypassing the US posi tions and disappearingwestwards, moving deeper into the forests .

left: Pnotographedfrom underneat h aKOed M8 Greyhoundarmoured car. more SSsimulate M1 advance.The foremost of thenow cigarette-smokingNaz is (presumablylooted cigarettes (romthe Ame rican vehicles) ~armed with a c.apturedM I carbine . The strut

near him is is an eec­triaty pole WIth foot­holes in iL (IWM• EA"'8012 )

..

~ Gis stnIgg\e to~their MI

57mm~ti-W1k gun in af<lno,wd area on theGonnony/Belg,"",border in order to try to

helpstem the German_ .!IWM.EA....,)

Fur the rmore, the pioneers had managed 10complete ta n k bridges a t Dasburg andGemund. \0 that the panzers could Ret acrossthe Our and debouc h westwa rds. US VIlICo rps' commander, Gene ral Middleto n, had

been planning to conduct a fighti ng with­drawal in the event of an enemy ottenstve. bu tchanged his plan once the ha tt ie had begunand Instead, ordered his beleaguered t roops 10defend their positions for as long as possible.

A BreakthroughAgainst this determined defence. the Germanassault was soon falli ng seriously behind

schedule. everywhere that is except in the areaof the Loshetm Gap. on almost exactly thesame route which the Germans had used whenthey invaded France and Belgium in 19-10. Theapproximately seven-mile gap was the most

lightly held section of the enti re fronl line. It

HITLER'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

also was close 10 th e Inte r-corps bounda rybetween US V Corps in the north and VIIICor ps in the south. Nevertheless, the ou tn um­bered Amer ican'> did their bes t 10 hold the

pa nzer'> bac k and did so un til first light thefollowi ng day (17th), when Tiger tanks made abreakthrough. To the immediate sou th of theLosbet m Ga p, the Gls in the Schnee-Ei tel areawere also now under heavy attack and very ­vulnerable, and a two-pronged attack alsoth reatened the key road centre of 51. Vith.Thus, by the morning of the 17th. it was dearthat the Germans had torn two gaps throughthe US line - one on l06th lnf Dtv's front(Schnce-Elfeh, the other on 28th Int Div'strent. Reports were confusing, but it was

apparent that enemy armour was nowprogressing rapidl y westwards. In addition,German Seventh Army had made some

progress, crossing the Sauer and establishing a

HITLER'S ARDENNES O FFENSIVE

l eft: Men of the belea ­

guered Bastogne gani­sion (paratroopers fromI Ol stPb Div,~

the 'Screami ng E~)

collect medical wppliadropped to them.Unfortunately, during theearly part of the Siege.

the w eather" was too badfor flying. (IWM • FRIo.200 218)

Below: When theyheard that Patton's ThirdArmy was on its way torelieve the m one of thebe leaguered garrisonsaid: ' If Georgie's comingwe have got it made! ' ­such was the reputation

of the clurismaliC GenGeorge S. Patton. Jr.(Author 's CoIIectlon)

number of bridge-heads. Hitler was reportedlydelighted with the results to date, the wea therwas still ' Hitler weat her' - fog, d rizzle andha ze, and it was forecast to co ntinue, whi le h isground forces appea red to be advancing as perplan : ' Everyt h ing h as ch anged in the West!' heexclai med. 'Success - co mplete sucCt'Ss - isnow in our grasp!'

All il'd React ion

whe n Ge ne ra l Hodges fi rst hea rd of theGe rma n attacks (at about 0 7lJO hr s o n the16t h ), he h ad put a reserve Regimenta lCo mba t Tea m on full alert and a few hou rslat er o rde red 9 th Armd Dlv to re lease thei rCCA (rom the Roe r dams attack and send itto suppo rt VIII Corps. Apart from th is he didlittle, not rea lising that this was a majorenemy assau lt and not just a spoili ng attackto co un te r the goer dams assa u lt. Middleton ,however, was in no doubt that this was amaj or o u ens tve and requested re in fo rce ­ments. There wa s co nsidera ble delay inreleasing anything: for a numbe r o f reaso ns :th e Allied High Com mand did not wa nt toput 0 (( the Roe r dams assa ul t o r postpone

future planned operations ; the re were only

140

Below: The skies clear,23 December" 1944_GenPatton's pn.yef" for fine

weather was ceruinlynwered and the skiesde¥ed on the 21n:l for

somesix days. givlng USThirdATmy plenty ofdear weather for battle.Pmon presented hispd'e with a 8I'onleStar. telling him: •.., You5ln stand in good W ith

the Lord and thesoId.en! ' Here GisWltch an aenaI dogfight0Yel" the mowcoveredArdennes.. (IWM • EA

49742)

fo u r uncom mitted US d ivisio ns , two of

which were airborne; the y were notco n vinced that this wa s a majo r assault.Eisenhowe r, however, sensed that so m et hi ngbig wa s tak ing place: ' I was im med ia telyco nv inced that this was no local att ack ,' hewrote in his memoirs. ' It was not logi cal forth e e!le my to att empt merely a minor offen­sive in th e Ardennes ... we had alwa ys bee nco n vinc ed that before the Germans acknowl­edged final defeat in the west they wouldattem pt one desperate co unte r-o ffermve."!He recommended that Bradley send in two

a rmoured di vi sions - 7t h from the north and10th from th e sout h and ea rma rk US 82ndand lOist Ab Dtvs (resti ng and rehabilitatingaft er the Amhem o pe ra tions) as tmmcdtaterein forcements. They would be o n their wa yto th e Ardennes ne xt day: 82nd to the H ouf­

fahze sector at the very centre o f vonManteuffet's assault , Iu t st to Bastogn e, th e

most im port an t road junction in the region .On Sixth SS Pz Army's front the Ge rman

HITLER'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

attack wa s being conta ined in the area of th eMouvc h au -Elsenbom Ridge by thoseelemen ts of 2nd and 99th Inf Dtvs that hadpulled hac" and jo in ed with the veteran t stInf Iuv to form a tough defensive position,fortunately with plenty of artillery on call.On Hitl er 's direct orders th e Germans wouldco nt inue 10 att ack here without success untilCh rist m as Eve. Farther so ut h, in the Lovheim

Gap, the Germans had m ore su ccess,

rea ching Tro tv-Potnt s o n the River Am hleveby the 19th, then adva nc ing northwardstoward s Spa. But they were held, a nd acoun te r-a ttack by 82nd Ab tnv pushed th emhack o ve r the river where they dug in. O ne ofthe leading elemen ts of t st SS Pz Dtv wasOber sturmbanntuhrer Joa chim perper's

battlegroup wh ich com prise d some 100

tanks (Pa n thers and Mk IVs) plus a fullymotorised panzergrenadter unit. Petp erwould gain in fam ous notoriety, by shooti ng8 S American prisoners just sou t h o fMalmedy - an act which he thought was in

,.,

keepin g wit h h is role of spreading alarm andde spondency among the Americans, In fact

it had the dir ectly opposue effect of stiff­eni ng the Gt s' resolve everywhere. By 25Decembe r, th e attack by Dietrich 's muchvaunted 55 Army had virt ua lly ground to ahalt and they had gone on 10 the defensive.

In the central sector. von Mantc uffcl's FifthPanzer Army was still advancing, a majorobjective bein g St. Vith . Here, Co lonel BruceClarke, then command ing CCH of 7th ArmdDiv, took over command of a hodgepodge ofunits in the area and rapidly welded them intoa co hes ive fighting force, capable of ho lding

off all enemy thrusts un til 23 December. usingmo bile ' hit and rcu re tacucs', dela yin g th eenemy's advance so that thctr ca refu lly timed

142

programme was soo n in tatters. After the war

von Manteuffcl said tha i he had Ihought hewas being opposed by a far larger force, while'Clarke of 51. Vith ', as he came to be called.said: 'As the co mmande r of CC H, I analysedthe situation and decided that the probableobjective of the Ger man attack was not just 51.Vith or a bridge-head over the Salm River, butrat her a decisive objective far to my rear, prob­abl y toward the English Channel. I could wellafford to be forced hack slowly, surrendering afew kilometres of terrain at a time to theGerman forces while preventing the destruc­

tio n of my command and giving other units tomy rea r th e time to prepare a defe nce and acounter-attack. Th erefore by ret iring a kilo­met re a day, I was winning, and the Ge rmans,

Above: The relief of

Bastogne. Jeeps and tWf·tracks belongiog to 25thCa.... Regt. US "th AnndOiv, pass deiKl Gis OIl

the read near Chau­lT1OIlt, Lullembourg,where they were killedin the desperate race toreach Bastogne andrelieve the garriSOll

there. 27 December1944. (US Anny via RealWar Photos - A SOl)

Above: Men of 137thRegt. 3S Inf Div,advancing towards theluxembourg borderfrom Tintange inBelgium, in the ir drive tocut off the Germanadvance. 27 December19-4-4 (US Arm y via RealWarPhotos - A 3179 )

hy hel n~ preven ted fro m ad vancing many

kilo metres or so a day, were l o ~i ng .' 4

Whil e Cla rke was perfo rm in g mi racl es at St.

Vith, fart her south ot he r panzer spea rhead swere clostng u p on the equally vi tal road bub

o f Bastogne . It too wo uld bt'CO!TIl' a foca l po into f the American defence in the Ardennes. But

whe n rr senhowe r held an emergency mee t ing

o n the evening of the 19th, it loo ked as

though t he enemy we re going hell fo r leather

between Bastogne and St. Vith, across the

Ourthe a nd o n towards the xteusc. At the

meet ing Patton alone was all for letting the

e ne my outreach h imself and the n 'chewinghi m up' ,5 Bradley and Eisenho wer we re

adamant that the enemy must not be allowed

to en.....'> the Meuse: indeed , it was at th is june-

turc thai Eisen hower inst ructed Mon tgomery

to take command of US First a nd Nin t h Arm ies

no rth o f the salient, and to halt the ene my

and o ppose h im with a firm front in con junc ­

tion with 12th Arm y Group to the south ,

Mon ty immediately deployed XXX Co rps in a

b locking position on the Meuse, while

deploying Hod ges to contain the northern

shoulder o f the enemy thrust .

No t co n te n t wit h calling a ha lt to the

Germ an thrust s, Eisenho wer wan ted a t the

same time to launc h a major coun te r-att ac k,

idea lly fro m the south. Il l' asked Patton when

he could a ttack and with .....hat force. He didn't

know that GSr had been looking at t he situa­

t ion for some days and preparing for just such

an emergency, so his con fiden t reply: 'On

1.3

HiTlER'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

Germ an Order of Battle for 'Wacht Am Rein'

1LXXX Corps

Pz l ehror,

I ISixth Panzer Fifth Panzer

Army Arm yo;. r,ic.h I'OfI M..nr~ffH

1- - --,1 '---1--1------,ISS p, Corps ~::~:= I XlVII T O'''' l~" ' p, Corps IlXVl i ' cO''''1

2nd pz 26t h 18th 62ndDiy VGD VGD VGD

rst S5 Pz Diyaior'bst.nd.trt~

Adolf Hitkr)

'2thVolksgrenadier

mv (VGD)

3rd ParaDiy

116thPz Div

_hVGO

212ndVGO

276thVGO

3401hVGO

12t h SS Pz mv(Hi rler Jugend)

277 t h VGD 1501h pzace

5t h Paramv

352 ndVGO

199th Inf Diy

12nd Inf Div

IVII' !"'P'

28th Inf Diy

American Ord er of Battle in Ardennes Sector, 16 December 1944

First US Army

r-t- Hi_'~ _,

14th Inf Diy

9th Armd Diy l06th Inf mv

December 22 , wit h three divisions, the -uh

Armored, the 26 th and the BOth: came as acomplete shock and was as Martin Blumensonsays in the ' Patt on ra pers': ' t he sublimemoment of his IGSI"s) career'. The assault wasalso aimed a t rcncvtng uastogn e, where IOlstAtrbornc was now under stcge. Their epicdefence lasted un t il th e equally eprc adva nceof CCR, -uh Armd Div, broke t hrough o n 26

Decembe r.Meanwhile, the main body of the German

armies were pushing on towa rds the Meuse . In

the north 116th l'z Div crossed the Oun he atHotton . but were th en halt ed by US 8 4th InfDiv. To their south th e crack Panzer IA" Divi ­

sion reached as far as Clergnon. some twelve

m iles fro m Dinant and th e Meuse. wh ile 2ndl'z Div occupied Fe y-Notre-Dame, only a ta nta­lis ing fou r m iles from t he river on 24December. Thts was the limit of the Germanadvance after which ' \Vacllt lim RIJej,, '

co llapsed. The leadi ng pan zefs were now some60 m tles fro m th eir star t lines, shor t of eW fy­th ing, Clews ex hausted , a nd sur ro unded by

the ir ene mies who were not only sta rt ing tomo unt counter-attacks but were alsounleashing the full weight of their devastating

a ir attacks from the rap id ly clea ring skies.Th ere was no thing to do but retreat and theyWNe harried all th e way. Req uests to he allowedto ma ke an orderly withdrawal WN l' den ied byHitler; in fact , as von Manteuffel wrote later:

'44

Below: ArmouredInfaotry of 5Jrd ArmdInf Bn. US Third Anrry.move forward to atuekthe Germans who areSUITOUnding Bastogne.Together with 37th Tankan.abo of ..th ArmdDiv. the 53rd spear ­headed the relief ofBastogne. (IWM EA~751 )

' Ins tead of ordering a timel y withdrawa l. we

were forced to reti re ya rd by yard. under th eprc u re of t he attack ing Allies, mfferin/olu ...ere lo ...scs.' On 16 January, US Third Armylinked up with Hodges' US First Army nort h­east of uastogne. and the ba ttle was over.

' The battle of t he Ardenne... was wonprima rily by th e staunch fight ing qualities ofthe American soldier.' That test imoni a l camefrom one of th eir severest critic; - Mont ­gomery. And it was not idle praise . Neverthe­less victory had been won at great expense on

both sides - the Americans 10000t more than10.000 men killed. nearly 018,000 woundedand 23.(x)() mi ...sing. German losses were evenhigher _ so me sources put the figure a'lo high as

120.000. There was also a high loss of AFVs o nboth ... ides. but whereas the Allies couldquickly re place their los ses. th e 60() plus

HITLER'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

pa nzers wh ich bad been destroyed could notbe so easily replaced . The Arde n nes offensive

had de layed the Allied advance in to Germanyby some th ree weeks. but had undoub tedlybrought the end of the war much nearer.

Notes

I. Toland. J. Al lilif Hilla .2. Bret t-Smit h, R. Hitler's Generals ,

3. Elwnhnwer, D. Cr usade ill Europe.01 . Cla rke. Gene ral Bruce. 111(' Batt le for Stvtth', in Annor MilX'lZille. xovember-Deccmbcr

197015. At the meeting Patton sald: ' Hell let'... ha vethe gut ... 10 lei th e sons of bitches go all th eway to Pari.... Then we'll really cut 'em up andch ew 'e m up!' Needless to say Ike went for amore ca utious approach which did not allow

th e enemy to cross the ~IeUM'.

145

•

•

Top left: New Y~r's Day melvehi­cles belonging to II Armd DIYprepare for an atuck on theoutskirts of 8a5togne. Closest to theamera is. an Ml half-track. (IWM •EA -481-42)

Lek: Covering the Bastognecorridor. A Bro wn ing machine guncrew of l Ot:h Infantry, 4th Armd Divlook out o f the ir fc xhcte. ove r thesnow-cove red fie lds o f theArdennes near Bastcg ne , coveringan advancing Sherman in the8astogne corridor. 3 January 194 5.(US Army)

Above: Bazookamen of 3rd Armd0 w, US First Army, in a snow­covered foxhole near the Ardennesforest. await enemy armour. 1-4January 19-4S , probabty in vain. Withamaximum range of 700yds. theHI Bazooka could penetrate -4 .7inof armour. Nearly half a mi llIOn

were produced during the war, (USArmy via Real War Photos • A 66OB)

Right: Neville. near 8a5togne. 16January 19-45. Gen MuwenT~.

commander of IOlst Ab Div.confers WIth senior offICers of thedivision. (IWM • EA 50507)

HITLER'S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

147

I

I

10To the Rhine

Into t he Rh ineland

The ca mpaig n whic h began as soon as th eGer ma n Arde nnes o ffensive had been effec­

tively dea lt w irh was to prove a very va ried

one which, as the US officia l htstory says.had: •... gathered its momentum in thesnows of the Ardennes and the mud and pill ­boxes of the west Wall'. The fighting would

be eve ry bit as h ard as any th ai had gonebefore, a.. th e Germans tri ed desperately ­

but with little rea l chance of success - todefend the ir f-uh rer an d their Patherfan d ,wh ile t he Ameri can , Briti sh , Ca nad ia n andFren ch armies co nunued to pu vh them bac kfrom the Siegfrie d Line defences, taking

every ad vantage o f the heavy losses theenemy had suffered. The Allies would have

'':411

>

to fan ' ..cveraI mor t' mon th s of fighting,which wou ld include not only t he captu re o f

tho usands o f priso ners, the ta king of ac res

a nd ac res o f enemy territory and t he occupa­tion of h und reds of ruined towns and cities,

but such major events as t he crossing o f t he

Rhine; the release of Allied PO\"'s and t he

full realisa t io n of t he horrors of the Nazi

concen t ranon camps; the successful lin k-u ps

wit h the Red Army o n the Elbe : and the final

sha mbles in Ber lin wit h t he death o f Adolf

Hit te r and th e end of the Thi rd Reich . On the

oth er side o f Ger ma n y, the Red Arm y was

con u n umg Its vic torio us winter drive to the

Od er - lau nch ed in m id-Ja nuary 19 45 ­

whic h wou ld lead to eve n t ua l vic tory in t he

east as we ll.

~..•

Below: Men of XIICorps advance furtherinto Germarty. At dawnon 15 January 1945. 4f5RoyalScots Fusilieo, t56Bde of 52 Inf Div, put inan attack towards Steinfrom Tuddem. He remen of I I PI. B Coy, arefiring at the withd rawingenemy from trenChes inStein. (IWM • B 13793)

•

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----

•

Above: Xli Corps attack continues. Infantrymen of 6th Camero­nians advancing from Tuddem. north of Sinard. Note the group o fAfVs to thei r right ; the nearest is a Sherman Crab. mine flail. usedto gap mineflelds. 18 January 1945. (IWM B 1378 2)

Below: XII Corps attack. Near Echt . troops of 5 KOSB. 131 Bdeof 7th Armd Drv, move past a group of German PQ Ws - they areluftw affe persoonel. behind whom are some British armouredcars. (IWM • B 1375 1)

•

149

left: Xli Corps attack.Troops of the 6t hCameronians, advancingtoward s the village o fHAvert from Tuddern.pass a column ofShemIan tanks, Bren gunaniers ilIld other"AFVsin Tuddem. All the MVsIqvoebeen whitewashedto blend wrth the snow.The second Sherman is a

MrefIy. as can be seen bytile shape of in muzzlebreak just sticking abovethe rear of the leadingank. 18 January I9<4S.(1WM • B 13767)

Right: Men of 9 DU inSchilberg. together wrthI column of Churchill

ron tanks . 20 JanuaryI9-4S. (Author's ceaee­- )

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•

left: XII Corps attack.Troops of t he 1st BnGlasgow Highlandersbeing carried by tanks o f8th Armd Bde throughthe damaged Village o fHengen . They must bewell out of enemyartillery ra nge t o betravelling so ex posed.19 January 1945.(IWM - B 1]924 )

Wloek 34 : 23--29 j anuary 194 5The Imm ediate Allied plan in the northern ,2 1st Army Gro up , sector was for a two­pro nged attack to clear th e area betwee n theRhi ne and th e Maas from Dusseldor f toNttmegen. esta blishi ng a bridge-head nort h ofthe Ruh r. To the sou th of Briti sh Second Army,US Nint h Army would carry out th e southe rnprong of th e offensive, but only after US FirstArmy had taken the Roer dams. The Hritishand Canad ian att ack was code-named Opera­tion ' Veritable', t he American , Ope rat ion'Grenade' . The comb ined assa ult was plannedto star t on 8 February.

Befo re these operat ions could be launched,however, the area known as th e Roermond

tr iangle had to be clea red. This was ach ievedby 26 january, units o f British second Army'sXII Corps in Operation 'Blackcock' pus hingthe enemy back east of the River Roer ewry­where except for a small bridge-head in thearea of Vlodrop.

South of 21st Army Gro up in the Ardennessector, 12th Army Gro up 'US First and Th irdArmies) conti nued their offensive to win hack

all the gro und taken during the Germanassa ult , capturing the area south and south­east of St. Vith and finally eliminating theentire Ger man salient by 28 janu ary, when USFirst Army troops began their fina l advance toth e Slegfrted Line. In itia lly at least the coun­tryside was lust as inh osp itable as in theArde nnes, hut by att acking through the Eifelthe rugged co untry around Monschau, inwhich the Roe r da ms were located, wasavoided. Gene ral Bradley's forces were able tobypass and outflank th e da ms, yet were still ina pos ition 10 support the main effort furtherno rth . Bradley in tended to att ack north -east­wards along the German frontier betweenMonschau and St. Vith , and to seize the townof Eusktrc hen, thereby putting US t roopsbehind th e main enemy defences. The firstphase of the offensive was to be a frontalattack to pen et rate the West Wall betweenxton schau and Leutzkampen, the main effortbeing made by XVIII Ab Corps on the rightwin g, fighting th rough the Losheim Gap (asthe Germans had done - albeit in the otherdir ect ion - in 1914 , 19010 and 19H). To their

151

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152

Above : The crew of tt.sShennan are hoIving toreplace both tr.Jdu ontheir Sherman - not I

pleasant job at :my time.but one can imagine tbedifficulties in the depthsof winter! Near Wilt.l uxembourg. 26January1945. (US Army viaRnIWar Pbotos . A887B)

l eft : Battle of me Retchs­wald Forest. British¥IllCanadian trOOpS . massedto enter the flbchswaldForest. part of ()penDlln'Veritable·. the thrustfrom the Nirnqenbridgehead, whichwasthe beginning of the

battle of the Rhneland.Note the Ieadmg~covered ShernwlIS I

17pdr Firefly, PICtIfttaken early~1945. (IWM . /4P 5357)

nor th . US V Co rps would aim 10 penet rat e th ewestern arm of th e \ Vest Wall in th e Mo nschauForest. In reserve was US VII Corps, ready toex p lo it enhcr attack . Ridgwa y's airborne

t roo ps opened th eir attack o n 28 January. VCorps' th e follo wing da y.

On their righ t. Patto n 's Th ird Army would .in the first phase of operations. p rotect FirstArmy's right fla nk . openi ng its ow n otfennveon 29 January which was also designed toforce a way th rough th e Siegfr ied Line . US VIIICorps on the right flank a lso began thei rattack o n the 29 t h. The terrain an d foul

wea the r proved every bit as hosti le as t heenemy; snow everyw he re up to 2 feet deep a ndin places up to wais t leve l not o nly choked t heroads bUI also h id the enemy's mines, whichmade progress d ifficult and dangerous.

Much farther sou th. French First Army's 11Co rps launched a new offens ive across th eRive r Ill. .....hile, on the 29t h , US XXI Corpscrossed th e Colma r Ca nal.

Wl~'k 35 : 30 Jan uary--6 Feb rua ry 1945Roosevelt and Churchill m et in Malt a o n th e:iOlh . prior to the Yalta Co nference wit h Sta lin.which began o n .. Februa ry. All th e Allted

a rm ies .....ere ma king progress o n all fronts. On.. February it was an nounc ed t hat Belgtum wasnow clear o r e nem y.

In US 121h Arm y Group 's area, t he d ifficultwinter conditi ons slowed XVIII Ab Corps'

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progress and it was no t until th e firth da y ofthe attack (1 February) that th ey reached the

w est Wall. To t heir nort h , US V Co rps hadentered Ge rma ny o n :i I January as theyadvanced to ta ke the Schwammenauet dam .:-low, however, Eisenhower decided to ha lt121h Army Group's dri ve o n Euskinhen andmove troops north to Ntnth Army's secto r. OnJO Ja nuary, 78th Inf Div (XIX Corps. US Ninth

Army) opened thei r offensive to wards theRive r Ruhr along the northern edge of the

xronsch eu Forest .On J February, Pat ton ordered Third Arm y's

XII Co rps to initiate a night attack on Bitbu rgon 6/7 February, wh ile VIII Corps co ntinuedit .. d rive towa rd.. Pru m . It appeared tha t th eGe rma ns were withdr awing pa nzer un its fro mtil t' We..tern Fron t (or deployment in the eas t .leav ing th eir west ern defences in the hands oflo w-grade infantry, th ousands of whom wou ld

eventually surre nde r or desert.To the so ut h. US Seven th Army crossed th e

Rive r MOON o n I February a nd ad vanced

to wards Obc rhotcn. while French First Armyin Alsace co n tinued to make progress near

Co lmar, co m pleting it s capture by 3 Februa ry.

Wl'l'k :\6: 7-13 February 1945On K February ncar Nijmegen, th e Briti sh !Ca nad ian offenstvc (Ope ra tio n ' Ve ritab le')tX'/o:an as planned, and the Rhine was reached

OI l Millill/o:l'll . By 10 February they had reached

Right : The Canadians inGermany. Up at thenorthern end of thefront lines, in the Cana­dian sector. vehicles ofthe Jrd CanadianInfantry Brigade travelaloog the flooded MSR(Main Supply Route)near Cleve. I] February1915. (National Archivesof Canada - PA 1"'] 916)

153

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Kleve and xtatcrtom. capturing Kleve on the11th.

In US First Army's sector. Schmidt was takenon 7 Februa ry. The Ge rmans opened theSchwammenauct dam in a n attempt to de laythe American advance.

US Third Army co ntinued. its attacks nearPrum in t he north , wh ile XII Corps troops keptup the press ure in th e sout h . In III Corps' areaa limited attack took place across t he River Ourand the bridge-h ead was enlarged durin g the

week . In VIII Corps 11th Armd Div capturedHabsc he id, -I t h In f Div took Brandscheid andSchlausenbach, and 87th Inf Iuv attacked th eSiegfried Lrne . The armoured divisions inlhird Army, and elsewhere, had now begun toreceive the new M2-1 Chaffee light tan ks fortheir cavalry rec ce squadrons which greatly

im pro ved thei r capabtnttes. Also , fla me­throwers were received by -Ith and 6th Arm d

Divs to fit in to their medium tanks. Theseproved. idea l for m e aga inst pillbo xes. Un its ofXX Corps lau nc hed th e ni ght a tt ack asplan ned , using a rtif icial moonlight (fro m

154

sea rchlights) on Saa rtautern . Roden andFraulautcrn.

Everywhere a sudden thaw had given theengineers even more almost impossible prob­

terns wnh streams becoming raging to rrent sW(}..ZOO teet wide, the ch urni ng water over­

t urnin g assa ult boat s and floats, d ro wn ingma ny Gls. Another problem was th at much of

th e stacked reserve ammunition toppled <IIHIhad to he to-stac ked . Desp ite th ese added. diffi ­cu lt ies, th e assaults co ntinued.

Wt't' ''- 37: I4-Z0 February 194 5Montgomery's 21st Army Group had reachedthe so uth bank of the Rhine oppositeEm merich by the l-rrh, and in the north th reedays later the Canadians reached the Rhi ne ona to-rune fron t . British XXX Co rps at tacked

Goch .US Nint h Army began Ope rauon 'Grenade

on 16 Februa ry.1'.11101l'S US Th ird Army launch ed new

att acks from southe rn Luxembourg (XII Corps)and Saar louis (XX Corps), and by t he 18th VIII

Left: Warning sign onthe GermanlOutchborder, I ~ February1 9~5 " (IWM - PL390102)

Above : Near Bellendorl,Germany, men of Co 'B'91 st Chemical Bn, 5 USIllf Div, lay down asmoke barrage withtheir 4.2ill mortar, [ 0

cover other troops ofthe division whilst [heyare crossing tbe RiverSauer. (US Arm y via RealWar Pho[ OS - A 2621)

Corps had broken through t he Siegfri ed Line

north o f rch tem ach . Th ese advances ha d

created a 'bu lge' in th e front line nne 'v taudenBulgc' ), wh ich then ha d to be clea red . I'rum

wa s fina lly taken and t he Am erican s

co n tin ued to clear pillbo xes and strongpo tn ts

along the Siegfried Line . US Seven th Arm y

att acked near Saarbrucken.

\\'t.'ek 3M: 2 1- 26 Fehruary 1945

Goch was taken by xx Corps' 5lst High land

Div an the zt st, a nd two days later US Nin th

Arm y crossed the Roer.

On 23 February, US First and 9 th Armt es

launched a new offensive along the Roer, most

pa rticula rly in the area o f junch and Duren.

The river was crossed in several places and

Du ren was ta ken on the 25 th by First Army's

VII Corps. Soon more bridge-heads had been

secured, in the north and sou th, and thew

were rap id ly expanded.

US Th ird Arm y fina lly st ra igh te ne d out the

' Vianden Bulge' thi s week, tha n ks 10 the

combi n ed efforts of US VIII and XII Co rps. The

scale of th e p roble m which they had faced G ill

be gaugt'd by the fact that fro m 29 Jan ua ry tn

2 \ Febru ary, VIII Co rps uni ts dest royed a stag­

gt' ring 'n o enemy-held pill boxes. O n the 2 1st,when 10th Armd Dtv had reached a po int jus t

six mi ll's fro m Trie r, Patton orde red XX Cor ps

to a tt ac k and ca p t ure this key Ge rman

co m m u nica tions cen t re,

Wt.'ck 39: 27 Pebru a ry -S March 1945

In 2 1s1 Army Group's sector, Udem and Kalkar

fell at the beg in n ing of the week, a nd by 3

March US Nin th Army had lin ked-up with the

Canadians at Geldern .

In US First Army's sector, VII Corps unitsCTQS>;t.'d the River Erft at Modrarh and had ta ken

Ccoicnz. Bonn and Co logne by the 5th; two

days later they linked -up with the Canadians.

155

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156

Above : 00 the Cleve­Calcar road, Canad,ansprepare to follow upretreating Germans.Before resuming theadvance th ese'Kangaroo' crews have aquick 'wash and brush

up' in a sea of mud.Their Kangaroo APC5(de-turret ed Canadian­built RAM tanks] held IIinfantry soldiers in fullbattle order, plus a crewof two, 22 February1945. (Author'sCollection)

Le ft : Infant rymen of9QInf Div and AFVs of 6mAnn<! Div, US ThirdArmy, move through medragons ' teeth of theSiegfried Line , near

Heckuschied, Germany.Fe bruary /9<45. (IWM­EA 54147)

Above: A hair-track and

trailer, be looging to 10thArmd D iv, crosses apontoon bridge over theSaar River, at Taben, inthe U5 Third Armysector 00 25 February1945. (U5 Army via RealWar Phc tos v A 985)

Right: Men o r theQueen's Own Cameronsof Winnipeg open aparcel fro m ho me in apup tent-coveredGerman dugout in theHochwald Forest .Gennany.5 March 1945 .(Nat ional Archives of

Canada - PA '37458)

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In US Third Army's \{'(.10r. all corps were

making rapid gatns: on the 5t h t hey took their

200. 000 t h prisoner.

e rm,d ng the Rhine

Although by ea rly 194 5, the Allied armies had

reached the Rh ine in both the north

(Nijmegenl a nd the sout h tStra\bourgl, in thecen t re the German Ardennes offensive had

delayed t heir advance, so it was not unt il early

Ma rch that they approached this last grea t

symbonc de fensive line along its entire len gth .Th e SHAH ma ster plan called for the crossing

to take p lace in 2 1st Arm y Grou p's area . with

a....rstan ce h om US Nin t h Army, p lus airborne

troops. Th e assault wa s planned o n a -t-dtvt­

ston frontage - two on 2 1st Arm y Group's

f ro nt and two in the attached 9t h Army a rea ­

t he whole supported by an airborne attack

mounted by US 17th Ab and Briti sh 6th Ab

Dtvs. Th e area chosen wa s just to the north o f

t he Ruh r. Detailed. methodical planning was

necessa ry, beca use it was known that the

Germans had some of their best rema in ing

••

•

troops hulding the line in this area , induding

pa ratroops. In prepa ration for the coming

battles, a n entire Ca na dian corps had been

broug h t fro m Ital y, plus a Briti sh division from

t he Middle East. The airbo rn e troops were to

he used in a novel wa y. namely as follow-up

forces rather than in advance o f a ny

a mphib ious crossing attempt. The river would

he crossed by night . and the airborne troops

would be d ro pped near by th e fo llow in g

mo m tng. to par ticipate in the close tact ical

hatt ie. In all Montgomery had some 29 di vi­

sions under hi s command. but not all o f them

would be used in the o pe ration because theAllies' 'long left flank ' had st ill to be defended.

Before this setpfece assault could tak e place .

how ever. the Allies were fortunate eno ugh to

'bo unce' crowtngs over the river elsewhere.

Remagen

Th e honour of betng the first unit to captu re a

r ross tng over the grea t rive r fell to a detach­

ment o f US Nin th Armd Div - o f III Co rps in

Ge neral f1od~es' US Firsl Arm y. TIley rea ched

--

Belo w: Into Cologne.Tanks o r the us FirstArmy moving intoGermany's third City, on7 Man:.h 19<15. Theycaptured over 3.600prlsonen in the battle totake the city. (IWM - EA55822)

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Above : Men of the I Ith Inf Regt, 5 Inf Div. US Third Ivmyboarding truek s that will take them even closer to the Rhine inpursuit of the enemy. The pho togra ph also gives an excellent viewof the ubquitous litt le Jeep. over 630.000 of which we re built

dUring the war. One of the Jeeps mounts a cal .30 Ml9 17AlBrowning machine gun on its tripod moun ting. It was the standardsupport machine gun in the US Army. 7 March 19-45. (US Army viaReal War Photos • A 26-4 1)

Right: A VIeW of theRemagen Bridge, takingin the quad ~vy .50 c.aJ~tllne guns of aMultiple .5Cin MGUrriage MSI , whtchbelonged to 6J 9th AAABn. US FIl"St Anrty. (TankH~)

159

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the river opposite the sma ll town of Remagenin the late morning of 7 M arch and wereamazed to find that the double t rack railwaybridge was still intact . Led by Lieutenant KarlTImmerman , a sm all de tachment rushed thebridge. The bridge garrison set off the demoli­tion charges, but amazingly the br idgerema ined almost completely in tact and t heGts q uickly d1a\1..'<1 off the rem nant of t hedefenders, discon nec ted the cha rges that had

not detona ted a nd proudly reported t hei ra maz ing succe ss. They were swift ly reinforceda nd by even ing a firm br idge-h ead had beenestablished. Hitler , who had orde red th at nobridges over th e Rhine were to be ca ptured on

160

pa in of de a th, was fur ious a nd his tmmcd tatereaction was to sack f~( von Rundsted t (yetagai n!), rep lac ing him with Bo( Kesselring

fro m the Ita lian front . Of course this !>inglecrosst ng would dea rly not suffice for the enti reAllied forces , so ot he r, more substantial CTO!>!>­tngs we re needed bot h above and be lowxcmagcn.

US Third Arm y Cro....Ings

In ea rly March kem ag en was the o n lycrosstng-potnt in Allied hands, and it loo ked as

th ough th e next one would be tilt' setptcccassault .....hi ch Montgomery had bee n planningso met hodically. Patton , however, had o ther

left: Exce llent close-upof~ 8 1mm morurcrew of I04 I In' R.egt.36th Inf Dfv. US SeventhArmy. firing ill mission. 9March 19-45. (US Arrrryvia RealWar Photos _ A

3197)

Righ t : Winterberg ,Germany. Men of the11th Inf Regt, 5 Inf Diy.move along ill cou ntryroad. Note the various

half-tracks aod jeeps one ither side. plus 00 theright: of the phot~.two HMC MSs, whichmounted ill 75mmhowitzer 00 ill M5 lighttan k chassis. (US Arrrryvia Real War Photos ­A26043)

Right: Men of HQ Co.2nd Bn, II th Inf Regt. 5Inf Div. move iII\ong thebank o f the MoselleRiver, ccccene Maden,

Gennany, as theyadvance on Lutz, I5March 19045. (US Armyvia RealWar Photos _A26042)

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Ideas! Bradley had already given h im pcrmts­

ston to cross the nver. and he ha d beenloo king in to an ingenious plan to get a smanbody of troops over th e river in a rtillery obser­vancn and army liaiso n aircraft (his a rmy hadsome ZOO of these and each coul d take a

passenger. so in t heory an infant ry batt alioncould be got acros s in abo ut 11/2 hou rstj.However, Ihe ligh t aircraft were never used .because they .....ere not need ed . ,\I 21nO hrs on

22 \farch , th e lead ing assault boats of CO K,J rd Bn, 11th tn t gegt . 51h lnt Dtv, crossed a tNterstern without a sbot being fired . Fur the rupstrea m at Oppenheim , Cos ,\ and B, of theh i Bn of the regtment . crossed at the sametunc and engaged in a short mach ine-gunbattle , The enti re cros sing had been achievedwit h just 20 casualti es and Patton wasdeligh ted at hav ing put one over on Mo nty!li e informed Brad ley immed iately, but asked

left:~for

crossing the Rhine .Troops of USN inthArmy paddle smallstormboats across the Riverr-taas. w hilst largerassault craft await their

tum. during amphibiouscrossing rehearsals.(Author's Collection)

Below: Tucked up a

ssdestreet. fairly close to

the Remage n bridge. themachine gunner on thisMl hair-track gets readyto e ngage any enemyaircraft trying to bombthe bridge. Not e alsothe Browning AutonutICRifle Iylngbessde him.The Gemw1 engineer

comrnandeo atRemagen were e xecutedfor not blowing thebr idge in time , despite

the fact that it was real~

a fault with the demoli.

tion equipment . (USArmy via Real WarPhotos - A 281)

Right : Dense clouds ofwhite smoke - fromwhite phosphorussmoke shells fired by USThird Army amllery -.bursting on the steepeast bank of the Rhine .26 Marc h 19"'5. (IWM ­EA 5(960)

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him not to make any official announcement

\0 as to avoid po ssibl e coun ter-att acks. Durin gth e next momrng tanks and tank destroyers

were ferried across and by late afternoon o n

the 23rd, a Class 40 treadway bridge had been

com pleted at Niervteln. Patton was unable to

co n ta in himself fo r very lo ng a nd just hours

before the main 2 1st Army Group cTOssinK wa s

due to begin he 'pho ned Bradley aga in: ' Brad:he sho u ted. " Fo r Goo 's sake tell the world

we're across ... I want the world to kn ow that

Third Arm y made it before Monty starts

across!'!

Opcrauon 'Ptunder:

Despite US Third Arm y's success , the main

assault. by 21st Army Group, was launched o n

a zs- rnnc front between Emmerich and Rhei n­

berg. Troo ps, veh icles and equipment were

concent rated be hind an almost continuous

Right: CrosSi ng at StGoar. Infantrymen of35'" Inf Regt . 89th Div.U5 Third Army, crossingthe Rhine in their assaultboats towards StGoarhausen on the eastbank. (IWM • EA 6"'607)

163

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smoke-screen which la..ted th roughout the

23rd. The smoke-dischargers were switched off

at about 1730 hrs and ha lf an hou r la ter the

en ti re a rt ille ry of Briti ..h Seco nd and US Nin th

Armies opened fire am i continued to pour in

shells a mi roc kets un ti l 0945 hrs next day. H­Ho ur for the lead ing am phibia n-ho rne troopswas 2100 h rs on 23 ~farch , four battalions o f

XXX Corps (5 1 Highland Div plus a CanadianBde) cro....ing the river in seven minutes, using

150 Buffalo tracked amphibians. The ('nemy

contested the landing and there was a fierce

battle in the area a rou nd Ret's, whe re the cas u­

al ties incl uded t he CDC, Ma jor-Genera lThomas Rcunte, who was killed . TIl(' riverside

town was not clea red until the monung of 26

March, by troo ps of Srd Canadian Inf Div, and

it took four more days to dear Emmerich .

Everyone was su rprised by the tenacity of theGermans, who were fighting marl' uercetythan at any time since Normandy. ' It says a lot

for the morale of those German parachute and

pa nzt.'r t roop" : commented XXX Corps

commande r, Lieute nant-Genera l Sir Bria n

Horroc ks, 'that with ch aos. drso rgantsanonand disillusion a ll around them they should

still be resisting so stubbornly,' On the far rightof XII Corps' sector, t st Cdo Bde crossed

almost undetected and infiltrated into theoutskirts of weset . just before some 200 RAfLancasrers ' neu t ralised' the town . Around

Xanteu, 15th (Scottish) Div spearheaded XII

Co rps' assa u lt o f the eastern ha nk.

Meauwhlle, at Rhe tn bc rg, sout h o f wesct a t

0200 hrs on 24 March, .lOt h a nd 79 th US Inf

Divs of US Ninth Army's XVI Corps, crossed

with minimal opposition, achieving all thei r

objectives without any major problems.

Indeed by dusk that day they had constructeda 1,150-foot ' treadway' bridge. Altogether,

twelve bridges we re in service across the Rhine

by the eve ni ng of 26 Marc h.

Operatton 'Va rs ity'

The airborne assault we nt in at llMMI h rs 24

March , the d rop zone being a roundHarnminkeln, some seven miles east of the

Rhine. One of the tasks allocated to t he

airborne troops was to capture In tact some of

the bridges over the lis~e1 which flows pa ralle l

164

to the Rhine betw een weset and Emmerich.

There w ere connderable casualties from

enemy AA fire , despite pre-drop atrstnkes and

softening up by accompanying fighter ­bo mbers. 'v arsity' was dest ined to be the la..t

eve r ac tion by glider-bo rne troops.Brit ish Prime Minister Winston Churc h ill

had be en prese nt thro ugho ut t he cross tng

operations and later crossed in a Buffalo to t he

West.'! bridgehead.

Field Marshal Montgomery. who consideredoperation ' Plunder' to be one of his best­

organised operations. summed it up later in

just sixteen wo rds: 'Our at tack across the

Above: CrOSSIng at StGoar. Troops of USThird Army~ theStars and Stripes at thelor'elei Rock~the Rhine Gorge, doseto St Goar, where 354Inf Regt had made theircrossing. (US Army)

~t

--

--

.~

-Above: Operancn 'Varsity ',

This photograph snows tbegreat air armada on Its waytowards the Rhine . Dakotas ofthe British airborne fleet arethe ones flying in Jcrmancn.after meeting the Americanfleet over Wavre in Belgium.whilst high above them areStirlings towing gliders - anaerial crossroads but not atraffic jam! The photo wastaken on 24 Marc h, H hour onthe DZ was IOOOhrs, the DZbeing some miles east of themer. It was the first phase ofOperation 'Plunde r' and wascompletely soccessrct (Bruce

Roberston)

Right: US paratroopers of17th US Ab Diy take cover inthe orchard in whICh theyhave dropped. Their initi,)1obfectl\le is the farm buildingin the rear of the photograph,<II German st rongpoin t. whichmust be taken quickly. In allthe 17th Ab DIY took 2,000pnsonen aod the Br 6th AbDiv. <II further 1,500. (IWM -

165

166

Above: Amerian para­troopers dig in WIthinthei r Oz, some mileseast of the Rhine ne¥

Hammink eln . Allairborne t roops Wef"e onthe ground by 1230hrsand in it matter orhoursbo th American andBrit ish had seized allthe ir ob jectives assignedfor Day I . Link-up wasmade with Britishground troops by night­fall. (IWM • KY 6(486)

l e ft : Follow-up to thecrOSSing at WeseI.Llndlng t~ires onthe .ahemoon of 14March, to support 1stCdo Bde of 2nd BrArmy, at weser. Photo-­graph shows two

BuffAloes dropping thetrcargoes on the eulbank . The damagedrailway bridge can beseen behind them. (IWM• BU 2]]5)

Above : Cnnsing atFrankenthal. It was at0230hn on the 26th thatmen of the 3rd Inf Dw,US Seventh Army.crossed in assault boatswith outboard motors asseen here on the westbank. (IWM - EA 59875 )

Right: U5 Third Armyengineen of 80th Inf Divbuilt this 1.865ft long'Sunday Punch' pontoontreadway bridge atMainz. (IW M • EA

80873 )

•

167

TO THE RHINE

Rhine, suppo rted by a very large-scale airborneoperation, was a n o u tstanding success.'

In all th ere were 23 assault crossi ngs o f the

River Rhi ne , the last nve bl'inK well 10 th esout h in Fren ch FirSI Army's sec tor:

I. 7 March , 1600 hr s: Rcrnagcn . US First Army,27 Armd Iu f lin

2. 22 March, 2200 Ius: Oppen heim, US ThirdArmy, 11th Inf Regl

3. 22 March , 2200 Iu s: Nicr stcin, US ThirdArmy, l Ith Inf Re~t

4. 23 March , 2 100 Iu s: aces, British SecondArmy,S l st Highland tuv

5. 23 March , 2200 hrv wcse t. Briti sh SecondArmy, l st Cdc ud c

6. 24 March , 0200 hrs: uadertch . US Nin thArmy, 119th In f Regt

7. 24 Marc h, U2nn hr s: Wallach , US Nint hArm y, 117th Inf Regl

8. 24 March, 02Un h rs: Rhctnberg. US NinthArm y, 1201h Inf Regt

9. 24 ~farch , 02UU hrs: x a nt en. Britis h SecondArmy, 15th Scottish Inv

10. 24 March . O](X) h rs: watsum. US Nin thArmy, 3151h Inf Regt

168

II. 24 March , O;\no hr s: Orsoy, US Nint h Arm y,31]t h Inf Regt

12. 25 March , rxxn hrs: Boppa rd, US ThirdArmy, 345th Inf Rl'gt

13. 25 March , IX)(II hr s: Rhcn s, US Thi rdArmy, 34 7th In f Regt

14. 26 March , 02()(llu s: St G O,H , US ThirdArmy, :\54Ih In f Rl'g t

15. 26 March, 02(XI hr s: Obcrwcscl, US Thir dArmy, 3S:lrd In f Rl'gt

16. 26 March. 02(X) Iu s: Hamm, US Sevent hArm y, 45th Inf Div

17. 26 March, 023U hrs: Frankcnthal, USSeven th Army, l rd Inf tuv

18. 28 March , m ouhrs: Matnz, US Th ird Army,3 17th Inf Rl'gt

19. 3 1 M3Kh, U2]O Iu s; Speyer, Fren ch FirstArm y, Srd Regt Tua tllvur s Algt-riem

20. 3 1 March . 060() Iu s; Gcrmcrshet rn. Frenc hFirst Arm y, -ttn Regt Ttratlleurs Afgenc ns

2 1. 3 1 March , 0600 hrs: Mechtersh eirn, Frenchfi rst Army, l Shtlnf mv

22 . 2 April; Leimershelm, French First Arm y,9th Colo nia l Inf Div·

23 . l S April, 1100 hrs, Fren c h First Army, 23rdInf Regt

Above: This t riO ofBntish soIdien inGe ilenkirchen nearMunchengladbachprovide good shots oftwo varieties of StenGuns - the shiny Sten onthe left is a Mk 5, whilstthe other carried by themiddle soldier isprobably a Mk 2. Inaddition, the mainweapon of the trio is thePlAT (Projector InfantryAnti-Tank) hanging overhis shoulder. The PLAThad a combat range ofon ly 100 yard s. butcould fire WlOke and HErounds to far greaterranges. (IWM - BU1))5)

Abo ve: Machinegunners of 303rd InfRegt. 97th Inf Oiv, USf irst Army. cove r animportant intersect ion inSiegburg - east of theRhine and north-east orBonn. with their ,3OcalMI917AI BrowningMachine Gun . 10 April1945, (US Army via RealWar Photos - A 4 185)

Right: Sherman crewsbelonging to A Sqn SHQI st lothian and BorderHorse. relaxing after theeventual capture ofAm hem. on 12 April1945. Note how bothShermans have addi­toonal track plates on thessdes of the ir hulls andturrets. in c-oer to give'The Ron$OO Ughter ' (asthe Shennan was called

because it was : 'ruar­teed to light first t ime')extra J)'"otectJOn.

(Author's Collection)

With this last major obstacle behi nd th em.

the Allied a rm ies could now press on into th eenemy heartla nd.

~utt'"

I . Third Army's offidal announcement read :

'Wit ho ut th e benc tn of ae rial bomba rd me nt ,

gro und smo ke. a rtillery prepar a tion o rairborne a.... tsta nce [al l digs at 21st ArmyGroup!] , th e Th ird Arm y a t 22 00 hrs ,Thu rsda y even ing, 22 March , crossed th eRhtne River.'

169

11Into Germany

The La st Few w eeksOn 26 March 19~5. General Miles Dempsey,

Cine British Second Army told his troops:'Thls is collapse! The German line is broken.The enemy no longer has a coherent system ofdefence be tween till' Rhine and the Elbe . It is

difficu lt to sec what there is to stop us now.'His enthusiasm was undoubtedly shared by allthe Allit"d co m ma nders, but there were still

some 45 days to go before the Germans surren­dered , so there was still plenty of fighting to be

done.

Ge ne ral Eisenhower was about to modify

his plans, in line with what had been ag reed

with the Soviets, namely thai the main attackfrom th e west would be directed from theKassel area . directly eas twards towa rds Leipzig,through what rem ained o f the Ge rma ns '

in du str ial hea rt land , rather than at Berlin

w hich the Russians were rapid ly approaching.At th e same time, 21st Army Group. suppo rtedby US Ninth Army. .....ould clear out till' w hol earea from Kid and Lubeck westwa rds. In thesouth he would also endeavour to link-up withthe Russian s in the Danube va lley, bythrusting south-eastwards, so as to prevent th eestablishing of a Nazi redoubt in southernGermany. This plan did not have entire imm e­diate Allied app rova l; Churchill. for example.was still advocating that a ma jor attempt be

made to reach Berlin before the Russian s.Etscnho wer had at his command nea rly" V2

million men. including ninety act ive divisions(twentv-ttve of which were arm oured and fiveairborne: sixty-one American. twelve British.eleven Fren ch , five Canadia n and one Polish I.

170

Below: Exce llentphotograph of a USThird Army 40mmBafon L.AA gunoutside the OperaHouse ill Frankfurt. 27March 19" 5. (US Armyvia Re al War Phcr c s .A 262)

Below-: 7th Armd Oiv.

Br Second Army. Acolumn of Armoured

"""'""'" c.rne..(APes) containing menof 9 OLl , near Borken ,wait before movingnortn to take w eseke.28 H20rcn 19"'5. (IWH .au 28-46)

w hen the drive began Montgom ery's 21stArmy Gro up co ntrolled th irty divis ions, whichincluded the twelve US divis ions in US Ninth

Army, together with the new ly arrived Ca na­dian corps from Italy. Bradley had thirty-fourd ivisions, includ ing six in his new army,General Gerow's Fifteenth Army, which wasinte nded to be a mainly ocrupying force,in itia lly with rear echelon assignmentsalthough they we re made respo nsfble for 66thInf Dtv which were currently containing the

besieged Brittany ports of lorient and St­Nazaire. General Deve rs' 6t h Army Group hadtwelve US and eleven French dtvtst ons, two ofthe latter being employed in other area s - oneon the Alpine front facing Italy, the other onth e Gtronde estuary in south-west France.

Week 43: 27 \lan;:h- 2 April 1945To the north of 215.t Army Group's area , Carra­dian First Army 's main tasks were to open asupply route through Amhe m, advance no rth ­wards to dear the rest of the coastal area ofHolland , then to co ntinue on across the Emstoward s wt lhelmshave n and O ldenburg.

Canadian II Cor ps in itially met strong rests-

INTO GERMANY

ran ee in its adva nce towards Emmerich butcaptured th e tow n on the 29th, then extendedtheir brid ge-head, wh ile on th eir left, Can ICorps bega n its adva nce on Arnhem. In Brit ish

Second Army's area , leadi ng troops of XXXCor ps reac hed hssclburg on the River ljssel on27 March, and XVIII Ab Corps advancedthrough the weset Forest. On 30 March th isfor mation ceased to be operational, prior tocoming under co mmand of US Ninth Army,and British 6th Ab Div passed to VIII Corps.The main intended advances of the three corpsin General Dempsey's army were to be : in th enorth, XXX Corps, targeted on Enschede,Bremen and Hamburg; in the cent re, XII

Corps on Rhome. Nienburg and Luneburg. onth e right VIII Co rps on Osnabrock. Celie andUlzen . By 2 April, XII Corps had reached theDortmund-Ems Canal at Rheine, and VIIICo rps was continuing its advance on

Ovnabruck.South of the British , in US Nint h Army 's

sector. XVI Co rps was advancing into the Ruhrwhere a ma jor pocket of resistance was beingestablished. By I April, US Nin th an d FirstArmies had joined-up at lippstadt the reby

1

171

INTO GERMANY

172

,

•

Le ft : A 7th Armel Div Crom we ll passing through thebadly damaged small town of Borken , in the ir driveeast of the Rhine. 30 March 19"'5. (IWM • BU 2895)

closing a ring around the Ruhr and t rappmg

the whole o f Field ~la rshal Model'.. Army

Gro up R plus part of Army Group H. The{'(wmy poc ket was some 70 miles long and SOmil es wide. XIX Corps units rea ched the

Cologne- Bcrun autobahn, while XVI Corpsadvanced in th e sector south of Hattem. Onthe 2nd , XIII Cor ps took Munster and pushedon toward s th e weser. whil e XIX Corps was

fiRhtinR in th e Teutoburger wald and XVICorps reached the Dortmund-Ems cana l.

On 2S Starch in US First Arm y's sector, VII,

III and V Corps reached t he River Lah n , a nd

US Fir..' and Th ird Armies linked-up o n the

Cologne-Frankfurt autobahn north o f rdstetn.trapping many enemy troops in th e wres­ba den-Bingen area , On the 29 th 111 Corps

started their o ffens ive to wa rds the Eder whtch

they reached next day, as did V Corps, By 3 1

March VII Co rps ' 3rd Armd Div we re fighting

for I'aderbom wh ich they captured o n I April.

At the bcgtnnmg of the week, VIII Corps of

Patton 's Third Army widened and stren gt h­eued it s bridge-head across t he Rhine, in tilt'

area of wtcsbsccn, wh ile farthe r so u th XX

Corps prepared to cros s hoth the Rhine and

the Main in the Mainz area - they had estab­

ushed a secure b ridg e-head at Ma inz on t ilt'

2Hth . The enemy could d o little to halt

Patt on 's a rmoured co lu m ns. Frankfu rt wa..

captured o n 29 Ma rch a nd XX Corps pushe d

north wards in the directio n o f Kassel, reuch tng

the Edcr o n the 301h, while XII Corps was

advancing in th e Hcrsfcld sector. nca r Ha nau.

Enem y resista nce appeared 10 be harden ing in

the area between Fulda and the line o f theRis'NS werra and weser.

Sou th o f t he m , US Seventh Arm y had also

reached the vta tn by the 28th , in the area of

Obemau wh ere XV Co rps established a b ridg e­

head, while Hth In f Div o f the same corps

Left : A mixture of tarlks and other vehicles belong ingto 7th Armd DiY are seen here in the relativelyundamaged village of Ahaus . north-west of Mumter,Westphalia. 30 March 1945 . (IWM - BU 3135)

INTO GERMANY

crossed t he Nec ka r tha t day, ma king for

Mannhclm whic h they entered. nn the 29th.

US XV Corps was then held u p around Aschaf­

Ienburg, but XXI Co rps conti nued o n north­

ea stwards towa rd s wurzburg and Komgs­

hoten. wh ile VI Co rps advanced along the

Neckar va lley to make co n tact with Fren ch Hst

Arm y on I April .

In the south, French Ftrst Army made fina l

preparati ons for its o ffens ive across the Rhine

in the Germershetm area , which it o pe ned o n

3 1 March and soo n widened to reach Linken­

hetm. havin g cut the Karlsruhe-Frankfurt road

near ~lingolsheim and Bruchsat.

Surrend erOn 3 1 ~tarch , Ge ne ral Etsenho .....er issued a

proda m ation to the Ge rma n troops and

people. u rg ing the former to su rrender a nd the

latter to begin planting crops. He describedtheir hope less sit uation and exp la ined how

further resistance wo u ld only add to their

nu sencs in the futu re . ' \ Iy purpose wa s to

b ring the .....hol e b loody bu siness to an e nd,' he

wro te lat er. Sadly, however, suc h wa s the hold

th at Hitler and h is gang had on t he German

people, via the Gestapo and S5, that they stu b­

boml y co ntinued to fight.

Wl'1.'k ·H; :i-9 Ap ril 19-1 5

On ti ll' northern flank Ca nadia n II Cor ps,

wh ich had been advancing no rt h-eastwards

towards Olden burg. crossed the River Ems in

til l' Muppcn- Lamc u a rea on 8 Apr il

On :i Apri l ti ll' 1t'ading elements o f Briti sh

Second Army rea ched the Do rt mund- Ems

Ca nal around Lmgen a nd established a bridge­

head the re (XXX Co rps) a nd also at Rhetne

(XII Co rps) on -I ApriL Lead ing elements o f

VIlI Co rps en tered Osnabruck the same day,

wh ile o the rs pushed o n to wa rds xnnden.eSlah lish hlg a br idge. head over the weser in

the Mmden-Stotzenau a rea o n the 7th , then

pu shing o n south-eastwards fro m xrenburg

towards the River Leine which they reached o n

~ ApriL Meanw hil e to their north, XXX Corps

had taken e ne my defensive po sitions eas t o f

Ling en a nd was p ress ing o n towards Bremen.

In US Nin th Arm y's sect or , ha ving completed

the captu re o f Munst er XIII Co rps moved u p to

173

• •-••

the weser and establis hed a bridge-bead on th e7th, wh ile farther south XIX Co rps began toexert pressure on th e Germ ans trapped in th eRuhr pocket. US First Army also began its oper­ation against th e Ruhr pocket on 3 April with IIICorps and XVIII Ab Corps. the forme r be tweenthe Rivers Letnv and Ruhr, the latu- betweenthe Ruhr and the Rhine . !'re 'Osun.' wascontinued. XVIII Ab Co rps opening an offen­sive at the confluence of the Ruhr and Rhine onthe 6th. That same da y, V Co rps reach ed theweser, as did VII Corps on the 7th, but theyfound tha t all the bridges 0\'('1 the river in th eir

sector had bee n des troyed.On 8 April. XIII Corps' Sth Armd Dlv was

orde red to cros s the Leine, south of Han over.On the 9 th, units of XIII Corps launchedassau lts on Han over fro m th e north, north­west and west.

In US First Army's sect or, XVIII Corps t roopscrossed th e River Steg in th e Ruhr pocket,while VII Co rps e...tabli ...hed a ... trong bridge­head over th e Wewr; V Corp', a lready acros...

by the Sth , was ad vancing eastwa rds. All corpscontin ued to advance towards the Elbe , VIICo rp... making for No rd ha usen and th e RiverLctnc in the Gontngcn area.

On 2 April , in US Third Arm y area , -tthArmd Div established a crossing over till' Riverwcrru, th en adva nced to Stregda and Go ld­bach , while lIth Armd Div did t he same atRitschenhausen, th en ad vanced fifteen m iles.In XX Co rps' zo ne , Kassel was captu red o n -lApril by HOth Inf Div, while 6t h Arm d Dtvcrossed the wehre and advanced 20 mill'S

closely followed by 65 th Inf Div. US ThirdArmy co ntinued to advance rapidly with XXCo rps north, VIII Corp.. ce n tre a nd XII south .Only around Kassel in the north d id theene my make a determined stand, eve n after

th e city had fallen .On :\ April, in US Seventh Army's sector

A\Cllilffl'nburg surr endered to XV Corps' -l5thInf Div afte r three da ys of savage figh ting. USXXI Corp... attacked Wiirzburg and estabtt sh cda bridge-head over th e River Mam in th e

A bove: Soklieo of 44thArmd Inf Bn, 6th Armd

Div, US Third Army.

dodge enemy fire during

street fighting in Ober­doria. Germany. -4thAp ril 1945. (US Army )

17.

INTO GERMANY

Above : Ohrdurf. '" April19"'5. Gen Eisenhowerand a party of high­ranking US Army office rslook ing at the bodie s ofRussian and Polish pris­oners. sho t by their 55guards. before theyretreated in front of "'thArmd Div. US ThirdArmy. Gens Bradley andPatt on can also be seenin the group . (US Army)

western end of the town. By 7 April XV Co rpshad taken Neustad t on t he River Saal. Theycon ti nued the attack, wit h XV Co rp..adv ancing on the Hohe Rhon hills, while XXIand V Corps adva nce d towards Schwclnturt

and Hotlnronn.

To th eir south, French First Army extendedits bridge-head and captu red Karl sruhe on the3rd, then prepared to occu py the Black Forest.moving south-westwards toward s fr{'iburg andso uth-eastwa rds towards Tubmgen. Leadingelements of French II Corps reached till' RtverNecka r in th e vicinity of Lauten . the Rtver Enza t Muhlackcr. th e outskirts of Pforzheim andcaptured Stein and K6nig..bach. On 8 AprilFrenc h l st lnf Div took Pfo rzh l'im , tu etcn­ha nsen and Ineu ngen. and establis hed abridge -h ead o n the River Enz near

Muhlhausen .

Wl'1.'k 45; 10-16 April 1945In the north, Ca nad ian II Corps had ad vancedtowards Groni ngen and Oldenburg, taking the

former town 011 t he 16th; Canadian I Corpshad attacked Amhem on the 12t h and ta ken iton t he ISth .

Sou th of them. Second Army 's XXX Co rpswas pmh in g on toward.. Bremen w hile XII

Corps ma de for Soltau and VIJI Cor ps for

e d it" crm sin g the Lctn c near Weste n an d th eAller at Cc tte o n the IlIh, th en pressing o ntowards Uelzcn . By the end of th e wed; XXX

Co rps wa.. close to Bremen, and VIII Corps was

cncou nten ng strong resista nce at Uelzcn.On 10 April in US Ninth Army's sector, XIII

Corps took Han over and pushed on sout h ofth e city to Patrensen o n th e River Leme: XVICorps rea ch ed Essen , Bochum a nd(iel\C nkirchc n on the same day. In US XIX

Corps' sector, 2n d Armd Dtv, ..... h ich .....avproviding advance gua rds for XIX Corps, mad ea spectacula r leap forward to reach th e Elbenear Magdebu rg on the 11th. On t he 12t h XIIICorps also reached t he river furthe r north nea rWitt en be rg, whilst XIX Corps established abridge-head over the river near Randau, south

175

INTO GERMANY

176

o f ~tagdl·burg . Mea nwhile XVI Corps ha d

adv a nced in to the Ruh r pocket. reach ing t he

River Ruin o ppo site wtneu o n t he 111h, then

taking th e northe rn sector between Willen

and westho tcn and complcn ng the cap ture o fDortmund o n the tJth . Un the l Sth, XIII

Corps launched an ottenstve along the River

Saale, aim ing to take the h igh ground betweenthe Saalc a nd t he Rhtue. In US First Army's

area. XVIII Ab Co rp.. crossed the River Steg

in to the Ruin pocket , in pur..u it o f the enemy

who w cre bc gtnnmg to ret ire fro m th eir defen ­

..Ive pos itio ns . By 14 April XVIII All Corp.. had

begun till' final phase o f therr operatio n; o p po­

sition was cru mbling and by the l ot h Ihey hadtaken more t ha n 20, (XX) pnsoner.... US III Corpsha d been attac king the same objective and bythe 14th had secured the a rea between the

Rive r.. Ruhr a nd He n ne. US VII Corp..

advanced towards Nordhausen ...... hich they

• •

too k o n the 11th , a.. well as Osterode. Teuen­ho rn a nd Neu hof Own co nti nued nort h -east­

wa rds to ward s till' Rivers Elbe a nd Mul de. US V

Co rps reac hed till' bridg es over the River

M ulde between Co ld ttz and Lastau on Ihe

151h, and by the 16t h bo t h VII and V Corps

had bndge-headv across the river and 9th

Arm d luv (v Corps} had entered Co lditz.

US Third Army was also pushing the enemyto ward s the Rive r M ulde. ,\I Coburg the

a rmour cu t loose o n t he 11th, by passing

Erfurt , Weim ar, jena and Gera . crossing t he

M ulde a nd co n tin u ing o n for so me flO mi les,

halting at Che mnilz. The byp assed towns fell

10 the fo llo w-up in fantry. O n the l -ith Pa tton

opened the Roosevelt xt emona t Rail wa y

Bridgl' over the Rhine. two days after the l'res­tdent '... death. On the l Sth, 1201h EvacuationHc spt ral m o ved to Ett ersburg 10 pro vide

med ica l services for Buche nwald where

I •

f'-JIll

I

lek: The commander o fa M5A I light tan kbelong,ng to the 5thArmd Div. US N inthArm y. uses a portableloudspeaker to tell thecitizens o f Peine , thattheir Burgenneister(Mayoi'") has surrenderedthe town, and tha t theymust hand in allweapons and stay off thestreets . 10 April 1945 .

(US Army vQ Real WarPhotos- A 88I B)

Below: A column ofunks aod half-tracksbelonging to 5th ArmdOiv. US Ninth Army.stops for a short breakin open countrybetween wooch . duringtheir advance toBIsmarck, north ofMagdeburg . I I April19"'5. (US Army via RealWar Photos - A 88 IA)

120 ,000 of th e Nazis' vict ims needed tm me­

dtatc ca re.In US Sevent h Army's secto r, XXI Co rps was

ad vancing towards Schwei nfurt and alo ng th e

east bank of th e Rhine . XV Co rps had been

presstng o n rapid ly sout h o f tcure m bu rg.reaching Bamberg on th e 12th a nd en teringthe tow n th e Ioltowt ng day, th ough it was no tclea red of e ne my until the l-tth. After nrncdays of hard figh ting VI Corp' troops tookHeilbronn , and XV Co rps reac hed Nuremberg

on th e 16th.By 12 Apr il, French First Army had estab­

lish ed a bridge-head across the River F.nz , andI Corps crossed t he Rhi ne north of Kehl on t he15th, wh ile II Corps occupied th e Black Forest

area .

\\'N.'k -l6: 17- 23 Ap ril 194 5On the 18th . Canadian I Corps reached theZutder Zt--e, isolating enemy forces and virtu­ally ending their offensi ve operations. Theyevent ually closed along th e line of the RiversGrcbbc and rem wh ere they remained for th e

INTO GERMANY

remainder of th e war. Canadia n II Corps areawas also virtually clea r except fo r some oppo­sit ion south-west of Olde nburg.

On 17 April British Second Army's XXXCor ps we re still ugh nng in t he suburbs of

Brem en: XII Corps too k Soltau t he same day,th en adva nced swiftly northwards to cu t theBremen-Hamburg autobahn the following

day. VIII Corps reach ed t he Elbe in th e Lauen­burg area th e same day, taking Uelzen andLuncburg on the 18th; 11th Armd Dtv and 5thInf tuv were concentrati ng jus t east ofOsna bruck, ready to ad vance to the Balt ic. Bythe za rd. XII Co rps had reached the Elbe,

opposite Hamburg.In US Nint h Army 's area, XIX Corps began

a n assa ult on Magdeburg on the 17th .In US fir<>t Army's area . XVIII Corps in the

Ruhr poc ket took Dutsbu rg, Sottngcn. Dussel­dor f and Werden, By the 18t h they werefinishin~ off the remnants of organised resis­ta nce, Estimates of priso ners ta ken in t hepocket were a staggering 325,lKXl, more thantwice as many as had bee n expected. Thei r

178

A bove : Keppel . Austr ia.A large amount of f,re ­pow er from carb ines.mach ine guns and maintank guns is directed atthe town of Keppel bymen 01 I I tn Armd Diy,

US Third Army. (USArmy via Real WarPhotos -A6 14)

left: Ferrying a Carnl­dian tank across theIjessel River, nearDeveruer, Holland. 11April 1945. This wasduring the F,rst CanadianArmy's clearance ofwestern Holland. as they

pressed forwardtowards teecwaroeeMId Groningefl.(Nat ional Archives of

Canada - PA '''HOT)

-

Right: Mo pping upoperanons along theOranje Can al, 12Apnl1945. Men of the SouthSas.katchewan Regimentdeal WIth scatteredenemy f"e$i$unce frompo$ition$ along the canalbank. (Nauooal Archive5of Canada· PA 145977 )

Righ t : Advancingtowards Gronmgen tocomplete the clearanceof the west of Holland.A Shermao FireflybelongIng to B SquadronFort Garry Horw came5infantrymen of the RoyalHami lton Light Infantry.dUring the advance. 13April 1945 . (Nat iorWArchive5 of Canada - PA13093 5)

Right: Anot he r Shermanbelonging to the FortGarry Horse passes acolumn of German pos­cners. on the waytowards Groningen.(Nat ion al Archive5 ofCanada . PA 130923)

commander, Field Marvhal ~lodt.'!, committed

suicide on the 21\1.111 Corps was .....arned that it

was 10 be transferred to US Third Army short ly,while VII Corps consoli dated Irs poxitions

between the Rivers Elbe an d Mulde taki ng

Halle on the 18th . US V Corps' leading HOOps12nd and 9th Inf Divs.)converged on Leipzig onthe 17th, then launched a co-o rdinated attack

and captured thl' cit y next da y. On 2 J April VIICorps began an offensive agatnst Desseu, and

had taken the enti re sec...or by the 23rd .

On the J7t h US Th ird Army was ordered 10change the direction of advance 10 the ....unh-

180

ea st into Bavaria to attack the so-called

'German-Austrian Redoubt' , while main ­

ta ini ng pat rols alo ng the Czech border. Tht s

led 10 VIII Corps betng pili under comma nd ofUS Hrst Army; III Corps took its p lace . but was

moved to the southern flank , to be responsible

for .....hat had been part of the US Seventh

Army's. sector. This. re-organisation and rede­

ployment took from 17 to 22 April and the

assault was then resumed on all fronts, Grafen­

wohr was taken by XII Corps, and t'egnttz.

sou th of Bayreuth. by XX Corps. It was soondear that the l'nemy defences wert' me rely a

Above: Gis of me 61stArmel Inf Bn ode on theback of a Shermanbelonging to 21st TankBn. CCA. 10t h ArmdDiy, US Seventh Army.as they move forwardtowards Bubenorbic. 17April 1904 5. (US Army YI3

Real War Photos _A

985B )

l e ft : Betsen Concen­tra tion Camp . When theBritish libera ted theBergen-Belsen campnear Celie. on 15 April19"'5. they foundunspeakable horrors.some of which weredescribed on the I'wtilyerected SIgnboard.(Ground Photo ReeceUnit. HQ 2nd Army)

Righ t : 11 th Armd Oivreaches the BaltIC couto) May 1945, HaVingpushed on from Lubeck.via the autobahn to thecoastal town or Trave­munde. where [heycaptured the aufleldintiK[ and also took agreat number of pris­oners. the dIVisiontwted. This Cromwellunk. near the t\arboor.mounts a 95mmOOwlttef' in place of theusual 6pd r Of" 75mm gunand was the closesupport variant. (IWM •BU 5278)

Rig ht: Link-up with theRed Army, Brit ish troopsof 6t h Airborne Divisionlink up with Red Armysoldiers near W ismar o nthe Balt ic coast.ellchanging handshakes.drinks and cigarettes.(IWM - BU 52] 0)

th in cr ust, eas ily pe ne trated a nd th e speed ofadva nce gained momentu m eve ry day.

In US Seventh Army's sector, XV Corpshegan its batt le for x uremburg on the 17th;next day XXI Corps t roops entered Furth jmtwest of t he cit)' and closed off a ll ex it routes.The cuy fell on t he 20th under the co-ontt­nated attacks of three infantry d ivisions of XVCorp'> (jrd, 42nd and 45th}. On the 22nd XXICorp' units reached t he Danube at La umgen

and Dttlengen. quickly establishing bridge.heads, w hil e further south the river w asreached and crossed by VI Corps at Ehrtngen .

In t he south, French First Arm y's II Corpstook Freudcn stadt on t he 17t h a nd pushed o ntowa rds Stuttga rt. while I Co rps occupied t hewes tern pa rt of the Black Forest. reach ingUihl'rach and Ma hlberg. On the 20th Stuttgartw as at tacked by French II Corps and USSeventh Army's VI Corps. Next day French IICorps' 5th Armd Div penetrated the defences

and occuptcd th e city.

Wl"Ck 4 7: 24-30 April 194 5On th e 241h, British XXX Corps launched anoffensive a/o:ainst Bremen and completed irs

181

INTO GERMANY

capture on the 26t h; VIIICorps reached the Elbeat I.aucnbcrg. and XII Corps was now deployedalo ng the west ba n k of the river oppositeHamburg. The plan was for VIII Corps to assaultand establish a bridge-head. while to th eir righ tin US Nin th Army's sector. XVIII Corps wouldestablish another bridge-head; VIII Corps woul d

then mow troops across with all speed. and tumnorthwards to take Lubeck, while XII Corpsmasked off Hamburg [which would surren de run cond itiona lly on ,1 May). Th is last operation

began in the early hours of the zsth. 15th InfDtv, supported by I Cdo Bde, crossing inamphibians. as in the Rhine crossing. supportedby on tanks, All went according to plan, British

XVIII Corps also began its advance towards theBalt ic. North of the E1 b\.> the co untryside waspacked with refugee s - milita ry and civilian ­fleeing from th e armies that were converging

from west and east.In US Ninth Army 's sector, all its three corps

- XIII. XIX and XVI- were across the Elbe andhad dug in on t he easte rn ha nk by the en d ofApril.

In US Thi rd Army's area, III Corps had nowta ken over the fo rme r XV Corps' zone and wasadvancing with th ree divivions abreast: XIICor ps' units were moving sou th in a lo ng

continuous co lum n along the Czech border. XXCorps in the centre wit h 80t h Inf Div (SHAHreserve ) to t he rear. III Co rps crossed theAltm uhl in th ree places on the 24th, advan cedsome 25 miles and captu red nu merous smalltowns, while ot he r un its reached th e Danube.On t he 28t h ano ther order from 12th ArmyGro up directed Th ird Army to continue its dr iveto join the Russians in the Danube valley and to

seize Salzburg. US First Anny bavtng taken overresponsibilit y for the Czech border. Advancingfrom t he ir bridge-h ea ds over the Dan uhe, 111

an d XX Corps swep t south to reach t he tstar onth e 29 th, whi le armoured elements of XII Corpshad also crossed the Austrian border a nd we rewell inside, with enemy res istance conapsrngeverywhere.

US Seventh Army a lso pressed on towa rdsthe Danube , VI Corps taking Ulm on the 24th,

XV Co rps Munich o n t he :\0111, whi le XXI a ndVI Co rps ad van ced toward s the Aus t rianbor der in th e a reas of Gar misch an d Rosen-

182

helm. By t he end of April, XV Corps wer emopping-up around Mun it-h wh ile VI Corpswas adva nc ing towards Innsbruck a nd lrnst,

O n t he 24t h fre nc h First Army's II Corpsreached th e Swiss frontier at Basel , and I Corpswas e ngaged agai nst a last desperate attemptby Ger ma n forces to esca pe in to the Bavar ia nAlps. By t he end of April the Frenc h Army hadc rossed th e Austrian fro n tier an d occupied

Brcgenz.

Uncond tt fo nal Surrende rDuring the next few days the Germans' situa­tion on all fronts was o ne of completecolla pse. It was soon evident that there hadbee n a total breakdown of a ny ce ntral co nt rol ,in dividual un its, di visions, co rps a nd a rm iesa ll eur rende n ng piece mea l to whichever Alliedforces were nearest and prepared to acceptthei r surrender. All the time there was a

desperate move by both civilians andservicemen to move westwards, out of the

clutches of the advancing Red Army. Therewas on ly one way to resolve the chaotic situa­tion a nd t ha t was d early uncou dtt tona lsurrender by th e enti re Ger man na tion.

Abo ve : Tanks of 10thAnnd Div, US SeventhArmy. entering thefamous Winter-sportscentre of Garm isch­partenkircheo in theBavarian Alps, 30 April1945. They halted hereto allow 44th and I03rdInr Divs to pass throughthe ir lines and fini shedthe war at lnnsbruck on7 May 1945. (US Army)

Below: Shame It'S only ~

~! BnmhT~

captured this oil painting

of the Fuhrer, U [heyadvanced through Cleve,on their way to crossthe Rhine . (IWM - AP275362)

Wl't"k\ 4S a n t.l 49 : 1- 13 ~Iay 1945

There was a senes of surrenders by the Germanforces in North West Europe , the first beingtriggered by the capitu latio n in Italy on 2 May1945. This placed the German forces (main lyArmy Group G) just to the north of Italy, in animpossible positi on and on 2 May theircommander, Ge neral der Infanterie FriedrichSchulz, sent word asking to whom he sho uldsurrende r. He was told to apply to GeneralJacob Devers , co mmander of 6th Army Group,

12Victory

the southern most of SHAH's ann)' groups.However, he was also told th at only uncondi­tional surrende r would be acceptable. TheseGe rman forces therefore capitulated and thesurrender document was signed at 1400 hrs on5 ~lay, th e surrender being made effect ivefrom noon on the 6th.

Co nsiderably farth er north, in the Hamburgarea, th e local German commander also appre­ciated the situ ation and realised that the endwas nigh. On 29 April, word came via Stock­holm , that Field Marshal Ernest Busch, CinCin th e North West, who was then stationed inNorway, and Gen eral Georg Lindemann, whowas commanding in Denmark, both wished tosurrender as soo n as the Allied advancereach ed the Baltic. They did no t wan t to capit­ula te to the Red Army nor to be ordered tocon tinue to fight by th e Nazi h ierarch y, sothe y plan ned that as soon as 2 1st Army Groupar rived in th e Lube ck area, thus cutt ing the moff from th e rest of Germa ny, they would acto n thetr ow n and immed iately cap itulate.MOl1 t ~oml' ry\ forces arrived there on J May,but be cause Hitler had committ ed suicide o n] () April, there was now a new leader of theThird Reich , nam ely Admiral Karl Do rutz, andhe sl'll\ibly d irected that a ll Germa n forceseverywhere should surrender to th e westernAllies. Thus it was that on 3 May 1945, nearl yone million German troops, the en tire forcewhich had been occupying north -westGermany, Holland , Norway and Den mark,decided to surrender unconditionally to FieldMarshal Montgome ry. Nex t day, '" ~Iay,

Ge rman delegates att ended Montgomery's HQo n Luneburg Heath , to hear the un condi­tional surre nder te rms. Admiral Han s vo nFnedburg. now CinC German Navy, w howould later co mmit suic ide, signed th e term s,which were to become effec t ive o n themorning of 5 \ Iay.

183

VICTORY

184

l e ft : Fie ld Ma~a1 5N"Bemard MontgOfTlef'y

with the Germandeleg:atlOfl led byGeneral-Admiral vonFriedburg. outside thetent tn whtch the$l.Irrendet" of all GenNnforces in Denmark.north-west Germanyand the Netherlands.will be signed. The Ioc.a­(Ion was on LuneburgHeath, some 25 milessouth of Hamburg andthe date was 4 May1945. (rWM au 5142)

left: GenTw1s on theBntish front c.aprtulate.Around the table from lto R are: Konuw Adm!Wagner. Gen Adm! vonFriedburg. FM Mont­gomery. Gen of InfKinzel and Col Pcleck.Montgomery is seenreading the surrenderterm s to the Germandelegates. (IWM • a u5207)

l e ft : Gen-Admiral vonFriedburg commrttedsuiCide soon aftef"signilllthe surrender docmentat Montgomery's tent onliineburg Heath. (IWM ­a u 6681 )

Above: The 'MasterRace' is vanquished ,

Close-up 01a group orGerman pr isoners fromthe N ijmegen area,queuing for food.(Au thor's Collection)

Right: 'De feat andhumi liation to the H un' ­that is how the originalcaption to this photo­graph reads, whichshows some of the thou­sands of prisoners nowstumbling through vaststockades for count ing.

(IWM - FRA 100)19)

185

•

VICTORY

186

Abo ve: Rejchsma~hall

He rman n Goering surren­dered to 36 US Inf D iv nearMautendorl on 8 May 19<4S.He is seen het"e talking to

CG 36 D iv - Maj Gen JonnE. Dahlquist and his deputy,

Brig Gen Robert I. Stack.Goering was the se niorN.ui tried at Nuremburg.but took poison on 1SOctober 19<46. the daybefore he was doe to behanged. (US Army via RealWar Pbc tcs • A 3212 )

Left: Field Marshal vonRundstedt was alsocaptured by the US 36th Inf

Div. Seventh Army and isseen hef"e WIth his son LtHans von Rundstedt and aGe rm an medical att en dant .He was rec e iving treatmentfOf" arthritis at Bad Toll..when captured on 2 May19<4S . (IWM - EA6S3S))

Above: Gen jean-ManeLartre de Tassignyrepresented France atthe formal Gennansurreoder in the earlyhours of 8 May 19'15, inthe Berlin suburb ofKarfshorst. signing il5 awitness. He was thencommanding the FrenchFirst Army, but went onpostwar to become the

French CGS . (IWM - AP69738)

It was also on 5 ~fay that a rep resentanve ofAdmiral Donit z co ntacted General Eisenhower'sSIIAIT headquarters at Rheim v and proposed..urrender, at the same time advtstng t hem that

.111 V-ho ats had been ordered to ret u rn to port .

Ge ne ral Eisenhower immediately appraised the

Sovie ts of the situatio n and requested that they

send a rep resentative to he present at any IIl'go­

neuons - Major -General Ivan Suslo parov, who

had long been the Soviets' liaison o fficer at

SHAFF was so designated . Ad m iral Friedburga rrived al Rhctms tha t day, to be fo llowed

rapid ly by General Alfred JodI, Ch ief o f StaffOKW, di rect from Donitz's HQ.

VICTORY

It seemed to Gene ral Eisenhower as though

the Germans were sta lling for time, so as to

allo w the maximum number o f th eir beatent roops to move we..twards in to Allied lin es

and away from the Red Arm y. He to ld hi s

Chief of Staff, Lieut enant General W. Bedell

Sm it h , to warn JodI that unless he stop pedprevar icating, the frontier wo uld be closed to

prevent any more refugees reaching the w e..t .

Finall y the German represent at ive.. sen t a

message to Donttz, asking for au t ho rity to

make a co m ple te sur re nder w hich they

wanted to he cttecttve 48 hours afte r sig ni ng.

But this could d early lead to even more delay,

so Eisenhower put hi s fool firm ly down a nd

told them that the sur rende r would be ef fec­

tive 48 hours from mi dnight o f thaI ver y day!

In the War Room of the SHAH HQ (in a boys'

red b ric k ..chool in Rhe tm s! Bedell Smith and

Jodi signed the uncondit ional su rrender docu­

ment at 0241 hr.. o n Monda y, 7 May 19-15,which was w itne..sed by the I\rili sh , trench

and Ru....ian rcp rcscntanvcs. All hosuuneswould therefore o fficially cease at m idnight

011 Tue..da y, H May 194 5. Pre..iden t Harr y S.

Truman and Prime Mini st er Winst on

Ch urch ill m ad e Ih is hi storic an nounce mentto both nations on th e 8th .

In the ea rly hours o f the morning 01 8 May1945, Field Marshal Wilhel m Keitel tC h ief of

OKW , signed the third and fin al su rrender

document ill the Bertin subur b o f Kartsnorst .Ill' wa.. accornparucd by Admiral vo n Fned­burg and Genera l Stum pf o f th e Luft waffe. At

midnight the Ge rmans had been brough t in to

a room draped with t he Ameri can, Bnnsh,

French and Soviet Union flags. Keite l wa s

asked by Air Ch ief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder if

he clearly understood wha t he was signi ng.

Whe n he rep lied t ha t he did. he, Fncdburg

and Stum pf all signe d, followed by the Alliedstgnatortcs wh o we re; Mar sh al Zh ukov for the

Soviet Un ion High Comma nd and Air Ch ief

Mar sh al Tedder, for the Allied Expeditionary

force. Lieut en ant General Ca rl A. Spaa tz.Com mander VS Snategtc Air Fo rces and

General de Laure de Tass igny, Commande r ofFrench First Army, also sig ned as witnes ses.

v tctory in Euro pe (V E) Day was thus held

o n wednesda y, 9 xra y 19-1 5.

187

\

I

Up per ri gh[: TheFuhrer's mountain-tophideaiway. This photo­graph of the 'Eagle's lair'

at Ben:htesgarten wastaken Ofl 19 May 191S andsnows 501diE'rt o r the USI0 Ist Airborne Division ­appropria te ly nicknamed'The Screaming Eagles'because of their shoulde rinsignia - lounging on thepatio! (US Army via RealWa r Phctos > A 3778)

Left: Pre side nt Harry S.Truman. Visiting BrusselsOfl IS July 1915. pauses tospeak to one of theHonor Guard, furnishedby 137th InfRegt.US 35thInf [);y. (US Army via RealWar Photos - A 3150)

Righ[: Although the tOPof Ado lf Hit le r 's mountainhideaway looked fine , thelower part was guned byfire - Started by SS troopswho I'Iad been left behindto guard it, (US Army viaReal War Photos - A2198)

Left: General Dwight D .Eisenhower together with

.. some of the seniOl'" Amer­ican generals who helpedpave the way to victory in

Europe, gatber at 12thArmy Group HQ, BadWildungen, Germ.any, Ofl12 May I'HS. Seated Oflthe front row from L to Rare : Lt Gen William H.Simpson (CG US Ninth

Army). Gen George S.PanOfl, Jr. (CG US ThirdArmy). Gen Cart A. Spaaa(CG USATAF). Gen Eisen­hower. Gen Omar N.Bradley (CG 12th AG).Gen Courtney H, Hodges(CG US First Army). LtGen Leonard 1. Gerow(CG US Fifteenth Army).IUS Anny)

VICTORY

Vic tory Para des

While the Western ,\ lIil'd Armies had halt ed as

agreed. well to th e west of Berlin, the city

wo uld be divided in to zones '>0 that all the

victorio us n ations cou ld be represented there.

And of course it was the obvious place in

wh ich to hold Victory Par ades. As the

Right : 5Ist HighlandDivision hold a ViCtoryParade in Bremerhaven.12 Hay 19"'5, at wh ichthe salute was taken byXXX Corps commanderGeo Sir Brian Horrocks.Here troops of the BlackWatch march past. (IWH- BU 6109)

lower right: US ThirdArmy revIeW in Berlin,20 July 19"'5. In theleading half-track are theUS Secretary of State forWar, Henry L Stimsonand Gen George 5,Patton . Jr, as they drivepast the tanks of US 2ndArmd Div. (US Army)

Opposite page, top:Fie ld MarshalMontgomery. accompa­nted by It Col PatHobMt CO I RTR.inspecting Ist Royal TankRegiment in Berlin inSeptember 19"'5. (TankMuseum)

Opposite page,bottom: All ied VICtory

~. 7 Septembet"I ~S. A Uio of RedArrrrt JS ) heavy tanksmOtor past the salutingbase . Over "',000infantrymen and 200/4FIIs. representing USA,USSR. Great Bntain andFnronce,~ in theTiergarten, wh IlstZhukov and Patton tookthe salute. (IWM • AP281590)

190

photographs sh o w, both the Amertcans and

British held Victory I'aradcs in Berlin d ur in g

Ju ly 19 .J5, and in September 1945 there wa s

another grand pa rad e which included rep reo

sentauves o f the Sovie t Union. Th e ' Road to

Berlin' had at long las t been completed.

Bibliography

Brett-Smith, Richard. Hitler's Gt'lIt'fllh. Osprey, 1976Eisenhowe r, Gene ra l Dwight D. Cru\ lIdt' in Europe. \Villiarn Heinem an n Ltd, 1948Forty, George . 1"/1t' A rm ies ofGem:'IW S. Pat t on, Mills and Armour Press Ltd., 1996joslen . Lieute na nt-Colonel H. .... O'l/a .\ of R.Jttle S«Ulil t WorM lVilT193 9-19-15 , vet . II,

H\ISO. 1960

vtontgomery, Field Marshal B. Soml<lll,l.v to til e Bettie. Barrie & Jen kins Ltd., 1971 (ina combined volume with £1 Alamein to tilt' Rh.,.,. S.mgfoJ

Toland, John . Allol( tinter. Do ubleday & Co. rnc., 1976

Bel ow : Allied nag-rais ing ceremonyin Berlin , Monday. 20 August 19<15.The four principals at the ce remonywere l [ 0 R: Montgomery. Zhukov.Eisenhower and Koenig. Beh ind rhemis the courthouse bu ilding wher"etheAllied Control Counci l w ill meet to

detide on policies to govern postw¥Germany. (IWM • KY "954(9)