Casibang

FACTS:

Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan.  Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect.  Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and

2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure.

RULING:

1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.”

2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., ETC., ET AL. vs. VICENTE GELLA, ETC., ET AL. (THE SECOND EMERGENCY POWER CASE) G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953 FACTS: Eulogio Rodriguez, et. al. seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were issued pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs issued issued have no force and effect on the ground that they are violative of the principle of separation of power.

HELD: Yes, the EOs are invalid. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For “while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law.” Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

Rodriguez v Gella

G.R. No. L-6266 February 2, 1953

Paras, C.J.:

Facts:

1.   Petitioners sought to invalidate Executive Orders (EO) 545 and 546 issued on

November 10, 1952. EO 545 appropriated the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and

essential public works, while EO 546 set aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in

the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic

action and other calamities.

2.     Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "in times of war or other

national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited

period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and

regulations to carry out a declared national policy." Accordingly the National

Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 671, declaring (in section 1) the national

policy that "the existence of war between the United States and other countries of

Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines makes it necessary to invest the

President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency," and

(in section 2) authorizing the President, "during the existence of the emergency, to

promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the

national policy declared in section 1."

3.   House Bill No. 727 sought to repeal all Emergency Powers Acts but was vetoed by the

President. HB 727 may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the

Congress to formally declare the termination of the emergency powers. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders are still operative

NO.

1.   EOs 545 and 546 must be declared as having no legal anchorage. The Congress has

since liberation repeatedly been approving acts appropriating funds for the operation

of the Government, public works, and many others purposes, with the result that as to

such legislative task the Congress must be deemed to have long decided to assume

the corresponding power itself and to withdraw the same from the President.

2.     CA 671 was in pursuance of the constitutional provision, it has to be assumed that

the National Assembly intended it to be only for a limited period. If it be contended

that the Act has not yet been duly repealed, and such step is necessary to a

cessation of the emergency powers delegated to the President, the result would be

obvious unconstitutionality, since it may never be repealed by the Congress, or if the

latter ever attempts to do so, the President may wield his veto.

3.    If the President had ceased to have powers with regards to general appropriations,

none can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may accomplish

indirectly what he cannot do directly. Besides, it is significant that Act No. 671

expressly limited the power of the President to that continuing "in force"

appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, so that, even

assuming that the Act is still effective, it is doubtful whether the President can by

executive orders make new appropriations.

4.     The specific power "to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse

or otherwise become inoperative" is a limitation on the general power "to exercise

such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfil its

responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority." Indeed, to hold that

although the Congress has, for about seven years since liberation, been normally

functioning and legislating on every conceivable field, the President still has any

residuary powers under the Act, would necessarily lead to confusion and overlapping,

if not conflict.

5.   The framers of the Constitution, however, had the vision of and were careful in

allowing delegation of legislative powers to the President for a limited period "in times

of war or other national emergency." They had thus entrusted to the good judgment of

the Congress the duty of coping with any national emergency by a more efficient

procedure; but it alone must decide because emergency in itself cannot and should

not create power. In our democracy the hope and survival of the nation lie in the

wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful adherence to the

Constitution.

G.R. No. L-6266; February 2, 1953

FACTS:         

On August 26, 1949, the court passed upon the status of CA No. 671 approved on December 16, 1949. Five members held that the Act ceased to be operative in its totality when the Congress convened in special session. Herein petitioners seek to invalidate EO Nos. 545 and 546 appropriating the sum of P37, 850, 500 for urgent and essential public works and setting aside the sum of P11, 367, 600 for relief from typhoons, floods and other calamities. Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but was vetoed by the President.

ISSUE:Whether or not EO 545 and 546 are still operative

HELD:Act 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency whereby the consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or the will of the agent. The logical view consistent with constitutionality is to hold that the power lasted only during the emergency resulting from the last world war. That emergency, which naturally terminated upon the ending of the last world war, was contemplated by the members of the National Assembly. Shelter may not be sought in the proposition that the President should be allowed to exercise emergency powers for the sake of speed and expediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people because we have the Constitution designed to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, and since our government is based on the system of separation of powers. Wherefore, EO Nos. 545 and 546 are declared null and void.  

WHEREFORE, Executive Orders Nos. 545 and 546 are hereby declared NULL and VOID, and the respondents are ordered to desist from appropriating, releasing, allotting, and expending the public funds set aside therein. SO ORDERED, without costs.

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO

626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the

movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.

On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He

was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as

unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said

that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even

without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that

the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to

curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO

626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The

movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent

slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and

explain why the carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The

SC  found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power

because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary

to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated

because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his

defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the

administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is

a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of

separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers

to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the

distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

 

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

GR No. L-74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that nocarabao and carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall besubject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitableinstitutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat InspectionCommission may see fit for the carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of the carabaos.On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police stationcommander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo inviolation of EO 626-A. He issued a writ for 

replevin

, challenging the constitutionality of saidEO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validityof the law on the ground that it

lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC.Hence, this petition for review filed by Petitioner.ISSUE:Whether or not police power is properly enforcedHELD: NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of thegeneral welfare. As long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare,its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribiocase) but NOT the same lawful method. The reasonable connection between the means employedand the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challengedmeasure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve thecarabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.

QuickGuide: Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held unconstitutional for violating the due process clause.

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from

Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station commander of

Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner

questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos.

After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court

declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to

the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC. 

Issue: 

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?  

Ruling: 

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the

prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was

carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed.

FACTS:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if female).  The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process.

RULING:

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.”  Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty.  The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement.  The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing.  Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00.  The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive.  Due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights.  Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled.

Pelaez

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. 

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.  It

seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.  This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.  Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one.  Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. 

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

 

Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965)

 This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunctioninstituted by Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives andagents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs issued by the President creating 33 municipalities and/or any disbursementby said municipalities.

FACTS:

In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Codeissued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-

three(33) municipalities.Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the ground thatsaid Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 andconstitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides that barrios may "not be created ortheir boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in theareas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality ormunicipalities.Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President maydefine or divide the boundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province,municipality, municipal district XXX as the public welfare may require provided, thatthe authorization of the Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained.Petitioner argues that the President under the new law cannot create a barrio, howmuch more of a municipality which is composed of several barrios.Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created without creating newbarrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the newmunicipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of the petitionersargument, which questions the President’s authority to create municipalities.Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities underthis section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relyingupon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan.

ISSUE:

WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs creatingmunicipalities.

PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR-GENERAL G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 FACTS: President Diosdado Macapagal, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirtythree (33) municipalities. petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, questioned the said EOs and petitioned the court to restrain the Auditor General and his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void on the ground that the President has no power to create municipalities.

HELD: Yes, the creation of the 33 municipalities is null and void as the power to create municipal corporations is solely legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a

violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.

EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,

vs.

THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

G.R. No. L-23825

December 24, 1965

DOCTRINAL RULE:

"municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."

FACTS:

By virtue of section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the presidents of the

Philippines in exercised its executive power issued executive orders creating several

municipalities in different places in the Philippines.

The Vice President of Philippines Emmanuel Pelaez as a taxpayer, instituted a

special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the

Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from

passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive

orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.

The Vice-President contends that the President has no power to create a municipality

by executive order. It is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of

1917, so far as it purports to grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already

repealed, in light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio

Charter)

The Vice President further alleges that "If the President, under this new law, cannot

even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several

barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can

be created without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the

jurisdiction of the new municipality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, in the exercise of its executive power

can create municipalities.

HELD:

Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,

or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may

be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to

interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers

of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well

as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the

Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.

In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly

does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on

March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the

Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory

enactment.7

WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void

ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any

expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any

disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.

Casibang v. AquinoG.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979

Makasiar, J.

Facts:

                Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.

In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.

Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which — principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that “... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI.” He further submitted that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.

The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue:

                whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit

Held:

                No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest” and that “subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect’s right to the contested office.               

The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision.               

Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.               

There is a difference between the ‘term’ of office and the ‘right’ to hold an office. A‘term’ of office is the period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and emoluments. A ‘right’ to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities

of the office. In other words, the ‘term’ refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the ‘right’ of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the ‘term’ to the office, although the ‘right’ of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the ‘term’ thereof,” and that “it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite.

The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election protests: “Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that ‘all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. ‘And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected,” and “according to Section 8, Article XVII of the New Constitution ‘all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.’ Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners.”

While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional provision.

General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.

In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term “political question” connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure”.                               The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

Casibang vs Aquino

FACTS:Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed on November 24, 1971 a protestagainst the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of As the proceedings continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss the election protestof petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution by reason of which —Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] andSection 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by the 1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. Thisis clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials haveno more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodiedin the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.ISSUE

WON the protest case is a political questionHELD:

 

 No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of theincumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if therespondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means inordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution,are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authorityhas been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure" The only issue in the electoral protestcase dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu — was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan,and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge thefunctions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondentJudge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the onlyconsequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy asit implies a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right,and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to be made on thatissue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article XVII. Neither doesSection 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply,that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code