Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2

The Facts

John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:

We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.

The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:

Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."

The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.

x x x x

In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.

III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record

To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:

Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.

We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.

Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13

Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.

The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law

This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

x x x x

(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as

prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined atthe time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority. (Emphasis supplied)

Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.

We disagree.

a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended

Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)

As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:

As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)

Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."

It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:

It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx

According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)

In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause

To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.

As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19

The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."20

In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.

There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in

its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.

To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.

True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.

John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?

To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:

Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)

The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned.1âwphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.

To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries

who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.

All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 209741               April 15, 2015

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs.EDNA A. AZOTE, Respondent.

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

We are asked in this case to sustain the action of the Social Security Commission as it makes conjectures and then proceeds to adjudicate on the marital status of a claimant. There is no conflicting claim made against respondent Edna Azote's claim. We are asked to sustain an action by the Social Security Commission against an individual much in need of financial succor who is asking the State to honor the declaration of a beneficiary of one who has since deceased. I, thus, disagree with the ponencia in disallowing the claim of Edna Azote (Edna) for death benefits on the ground that she failed to sufficiently establish the legality of her marriage to deceased Social Security System member Edgardo Azote in consideration of his first marriage to Rosemarie (the designated wife in the 1982 Form E-4).

The latest Form E-4 (1994) submitted by the deceased to the Social Security System prior to his death designated Edna as his wife-beneficiary. In my view, the 1994 Form E-4 should supersede the earlier one. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the 1994 Form E-4 designating Edna as his wife manifested the deceased' s intention to revoke his formal declaration in the 1982 Form E-4.

This conclusion is consistent with Section 24 (c) of Republic Act No. 8282,1 which states that "records and reports duly accomplished and submitted to the Social Security System by the employer or the member .. . [are] presumed correct as to the data and other matters stated therein .. . [and will be] made the basis for the adjudication of the claim"2 unless corrected before the right to the benefit being claimed accrued.3 There is nothing in Republic Act No. 8282 expressly prohibiting the change of beneficiary. On the contrary, Section 24 (c), by implication, acknowledges a member's right to change beneficiaries.

Social security benefits are paid to members (or their beneficiaries) by reason of their membership in the System for which they contribute their money to a general common fund.4 These benefits ripen as vested rights of members and their declared so that they are assured minimum financial assistance whenever the hazards of disability, sickness, old age, and death provided for in the law occur.5 As a property interest of the member under compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 8282,6 a member's designation of a beneficiary in his Form E-4 should not easily be set aside, absent any adverse claim, in the distribution of the death benefits under the law.

In Tecson v. SSS,7 this court allowed Tecson - a friend and coworker of the deceased - to claim the death benefits giving regard to the deceased's express desire to extend the benefits of his contributions to his friend and co-worker, to the exclusion of his wife:

It should be remembered that the benefits or compensation allowed an employee or his beneficiary under the provisions of the Social Security Act are paid out of funds which are contributed in part by the employees and in part by the employers' (commercial or industrial companies members of the System) .... As these funds are obtained from the employees and the employers, without the Government having contributed any portion thereof: it would be unjust for the System to refuse to pay the benefits to those whom the employee has designated as his beneficiaries. The contribution of the employee is his money; the contribution of the employer is for the benefit of the employee. Hence the beneficiary should primarily be the one to profit by such contributions. This is what is expressly provided in above-quoted Section 13 of the law.

It should also be noted that the Social Security System is not a law of succession. Its purpose is to provide social security, which means funds for the beneficiary, if the employee dies, or for the employee himself and his dependents if he is unable to perform his task because of illness or disability, or is laid off by reason of the termination of the employment, or because of temporary lay-off due to strike, etc. It should also be remembered that the. beneficiaries of the System are those who are dependent upon the employee for support. . . .

. . . .

. . .It was subsequently known that Lim Hoc had a wife and children in Communist China; the omission by him of their existence and names in the records of the employer must have been due to the fact that they were not at the time, at least, dependent upon him. If they were actually dependents, their names would have appeared in the record of the employer. The absence in the record of his employee of their existence and names must have been due to the lack of communication, of which We can take judicial notice, between Communist China and the Philippines, or to the express desire of Lim Hoc to extend the benefits of his contributions to the System to his "friend and co-worker", to the exclusion of his wife[.]

Edna established her right to the benefits through substantial evidence. She presented her marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates of her children. Being public documents, these constitute prima facie proof of their contents, and, therefore, her claim to death benefits as legal wife and dependent of Edgardo should have been approved.8

SSS v. Vda. De Bailon9 cites Arturo M .. Tolentino, a recognized authority in civil law, as having commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second marriage to prove that. the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.10 (Emphasis supplied)

There was yet no attack on the validity of the deceased' s marriage to Edna. No adjudicatory process was pending. Certainly the Social Security Commission was not invoked as the forum to test the validity of her marriage. The validity of that marriage passed unchallenged. No right was asserted by the proper real party in interest under the superceded forms submitted by the claimant. The Social Security. System motu proprio conducted its investigation based solely on the conflicting information in the 1982 and 1994 forms submitted by the deceased. It made pronouncements without any complaint and without affording all the parties the usual due process rights accorded to

them. It made a judgment as to the marital status of the claimant when it did not have jurisdiction to do so. This action is null and void many times over.

In these circumstances, the presumption in favor of the validity of the second marriage must prevail, and sound reason requires that it be not lightly impugned and discredited by the alleged prior marriage stated in the 1982 Form E-4.

The Social Security Commission cited SSS v. De Los Santos11 and Signey V. SSS12 to justify its position that it can .pass upon the validity of marriages to determine who are entitled to social security benefits. However, in those cases, there were two conflicting claimants both claiming to be wives of the deceased, although in Signey, the first wife subsequently executed a waiver of the benefits being claimed. The Commission necessarily had to rule on the validity of marriages in order to determine who had a better right to the death benefits.

There is only one claimant in this case. No one contests her claim.

The question on the validity of Edna's designation as wife-beneficiary or the legality of her marriage to the deceased is not yet upon us. The alleged first wife has neither challenged the same nor claimed death benefits, and thus, there appears to be no controversy yet. · We are asked to disturb their domestic peace. Certainly, this amounts to unreasonable state intrusion on the autonomy that we should respect in intimate relationships. Their inherent rights to privacy must impose on us the deserved judicial restraint from making a determination on this matter. Ruling on the validity of Edna's marriage to the deceased would be premature and anticipatory. These cases are problematic because of the absence of a divorce law.

Divorce is not alien in our jurisdiction. Our new Civil Code has repealed the earlier provisions on divorce, which we used to have under Act No. 2710 on grounds of conjugal infidelity of one spouse.13 Divorce between Filipinos has remained unrecognized even under the Family Code of the Philippines.14

Instead of divorce, the present Family Code only provides for legal separation (Title II),15 and even this expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed."16 Under our present laws, the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse or that which is expressly provided by law (for defective marital unions).17 In the alternative, estranged couples undergo the expensive labyrinth of claiming "psychological incapacity" under article 36 of the Family Code to be awarded an order to declare their marriage a nullity ab initio.

There are many second marriages like that of Edgardo and Edna, which was celebrated in Legazpi City and accepted by all parties concerned. They have lived together as husband and wife without issue for 13 long years until the husband's death in 2005. By all indications, they have established a strong family foundation. This case shows that without divorce, our laws remain insensitive to a multitude of intimate relations. As people with autonomous and private choices that do no harm to society, they are wholly and immoderately disregarded. This case, like many others, should be basis for Congress to seriously consider the respect due to voluntary adult. choices of our people. 1âwphi1 A divorce law is no longer a luxury; it has become a just and inevitable necessity.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition. The Decision dated August 13, 2013 and Resolution dated October 29, 2013 of the Court of Appeals should be AFFIRMED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONENAssociate Justice

Footnotes

1 Rep. Act No. 8282 ( 1997), An Act Further Strengthening the Social Security System thereby amending for this purpose Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law.

2 Rep. Act No, 8282 (1997), sec. 24 (c).

3 Rep. Act No. 8282 (l 997), sec. 24 (c).

4 Valencia v. Manila Yacht Club, i38 Phil. 761 (1969) [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc], citing Rural Transit Employees Association, et al. v. Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc., et al., 129 Phil. 503 [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L., En Banc].

5 Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. SSS, 119 Phil. 890 (1964) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc].

6 Dycaico v. Social Security System, 513 Phil. 23 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]. See also GSIS v. Montesclaros, 478 Phil. 573 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

7 113 Phil. 703 (1961) [Per J. Labrador. En Banc].

8 In Suarnaba v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 175 Phil. 8 ( 1978) [Per J. Santos, Second Division], this court held that the parish certificate attesting to the marriage of petitioner and the deceased, other parol evidence, and the presumption that "a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" clearly show that the petitioner is the legal wife of the deceased employee and, therefore, her claim to coh1pensation benefits as legal wife and dependent of the deceased should have been approved, especially where no other person claimed to be the wife of the deceased employee.

9 529 Phil. 249 (2006) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].

10 Id. at 262-263, citing 1 A. TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 282 (1999 ed.).

11 585 Phil. 684 (2008) (Per J. Reyes, R. T., Third Division].

12 566 Phil. 617 (2008) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].

13 Act No. 271 O ( 1917), An Act to Establish Divorce.

Sec. 1. A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, committed in any of the forms described in article four hundred and thirty-seven of the Penal Code.

. . . .

Sec. 11. The dissolution of the bonds of matrimony shall have the following effects:

First. The spouses shall be free to marry again.

Second. The minor children shall remain in the custody of the innocent spouse unless otherwise directed by the cou11 in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian.

Third. The children shall, with regard to their parents, retain all rights granted to them by law as legitimate children; but upon the partition of the estate of said parents they shall bring to collation everything received by them under the provisions of the second paragraph of section nine.

14 Exec. Order No. 209 (1987), The Family Code of the Philippines.

15 Exec. Order No. 209 (1987), Title II.

16 Exec. Order No. 209 (l 987), Title II, art. 63 (I).

17 Exec. Order No. 209 (1987), Title I, chapter 3. Void and Voidable Marriages.

Gomera v. Social Security System

-This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 30, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99156. The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: xx xx The petitioner Edilberto D. Gomera ("Gomera" for brevity) xx x was employed and rose from his job as an industrial mechanic to become a senior mechanic at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac in San Miguel, Tarlac, from 1963 up to 1 November 2004 or for a period of roughly forty years. xxx xx xx xx x. As early as the year 1997, Gomera was diagnosed to have "essential hypertension" (HPN). His Blood Pressure went as high as systole 160 mmHg over diastole 119 mmHg (B.P. = 160/110), and even 180/120 for which reason St. Martin [De Porres Hospital, the Medical Service Department of the sugar central] prescribed Metoprolol/Neoblock. During his examination on 4 September 2002 at the same hospital facility, he was advised to have a disciplined diet regimen and quite vaguely, initiate a "lifestyle modification." As the years went by, the condition progressed, until before his retirement on 1 November 2004 at age 61 years, when the HPN varied between moderate and severe. [Meanwhile, o]n 14 March 1993, Gomera and his group were adjusti,ng the discharger assembly of "WSFA Basket No. 4" during the second shift; and he was in a rather awkward position, because of which, he suddenly felt severe pain in his back after re-tightening the adjustment bolt. He suffered what is commonly known as "slipped-disc." Despite Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr .. , with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now a member of this Court) and Aurora SantiagQ-Lagman, concurring; rollo pp. 19-28. 183264 ' -over-

... ,i Resolution -2-G.R. No. 183264 January 26, 2015 physical therapy, and dural steroid injections during his first confinement in the hospital from 31 March to 5 April 1993, the low back pain persisted . . . . "· -. · .· and. he at times developed numbing of his extremities or "peripheral , :. :·. ..-.. ;: :,. · " . '. · neuropathy." He was thus re-confined several days later and underwent a ' ' ·, · ·magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) examination of the lumbosacral spine xxx. xx xx Believing that his illnesses were work-related, the petitioner applied for compensation with the Social Security System (SSS or system). In a letter dated 19 January 2006, the system granted [petitioner] a total of thirty-eight (38) months of permanent partial disability (PPD) pension benefits for herniated disc x x x. xx xx However, [SSS] altogether denied his claim as to the compensability of HPN saying "EC disability benefits for hypertension was denied since there is no proof of resulting disability due to said illness prior to or after the time of retirement." Dissatisfied with the SSS decision, petitioner Gomera elevated his claim to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC or commission), which affirmed the system's decision. x x x xxxx2 Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the ECC and the SSS. On October 30, 2007, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision dismissing petitioner's petition for review and affirming the decision of the ECC and the SSS. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari with the following Assignment of Errors: 2 183264 I. The COMMISSION and COURT ignored the 38 months partial disability benefits granted to the petitioner before his retirement (optional) II. The court ignored Hypertension, Heart Disease and CVA, Cerebro-Vascular Accident as occupational and compensable diseases pursuant to existing jurisprudence. 3 Rollo, pp. 19-22. Id. at 5. -over-I (128) 1Y· • '

i• -l Resolution - 3 -G.R. No. 183264 January 26, 2015 Petitioner's basic contention is that his hypertension was a result of his prolonged exposure to air pollutants in the course of his employment as a mechanic. ' At the outset, it bears to point out that the issues raised by petitioner are essentially questions of fact. It is settled that only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised before the Supreme Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.4 This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioners in the lower courts and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence. 5 Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioner put into question .the factual findings of both the SSS and the ECC. However, it is likewise settled that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 6 In the present case, the SSS, the ECC and the CA were unanimous in finding that petitioner failed to prove any disability resulting from his hypertension prior to or at the time of his retirement. ' As correctly cited by the ECC and the CA, ECC Resolution No. 92-07-00317 stales that: 4 6 7 Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in any kind of disability; subject to the submission of any of the following: (a) chest X-ray report, (b) ECG report, ( c) blood chemistry report, ( d) funduscopy report, (e) C-T scan,8 Thus, this Court finds no error in the ECC Decision that: La Union Cement Workers Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 597 Phil. 452, 457 (2009). Id. Gatus v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 174725, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 553, 564. Dated July 8, 1992. Board Resolution No. 11-05-13, Series of 2011, approved on May 26, 20 II, amended ECC Resolution No. 92-07-0031 by adding Ophthalmological evaluation, M[agnetic] R[esonance] I[maging], M[agnetic] R[esonance] A[ngiogram], 2-D echo, kidney ultrasound, and B[lood] P[ressure] monitoring report as among pieces of evidence which may be submitted by a claimant to prove hypertension as the cause of the impairment of the functions of any of his/her body organs which results in his/her disability. 183264 -over-'I'. (128) hf'

Resolution -4-G.R. No. 183264 January 26, 2015 xx xx Whether or not the appellant's [herein petitioner's] Hypertension caused the manifestation of end-organ damage must be substantiated by diagnostic tests, failing this, the instant claim must fail. Unfortunately, the available medical records are not enough to validate his claim. There is nothing in the records that will sufficiently establish that he suffered end-organ impairment during the course of his employment with Central Azucarera de Tarlac. Hence, there is much sense in refusing the grant of EC dislilbility benefits where no such end-organ damage due to Hypertension has been proven. X'X X x9 tl1 In the same vein, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the CA holding that: xx xx x x x [I]t was incumbent upon Gomera to prove, at the first instance, that the environment and nature of his work worsened or at least contributed to his hypertensive condition. The burden of proof is on the petitioner who must establish that his disease intervened or was contracted in the course of his employment. x x x xx xx Nowhere in his complaint before the SSS did the petitioner ever trace the genesis or etiology of HPN to his work-stress, and the like. He did so belatedly only in his petition, and reproduced as a response to the respondents' Comment thereon, x x x. xx xx E;ven then, his research did not indubitably link the alleged exposure to toxic chemicals to the hypertensive state. Neither did he categorically deny his smoking or drinking habits. On the whole, Gomera failed to comply with the criteria or conditions set forth by the

[R]ules of the [C]ommission, thus warranting a denial of compensation.xx x XX X XIO I Indeed, petitioner failed to present competent evidence such as medical records or physician's reports to objectively substantiate his claim that there is a reasonable link between his work and his ailment. His bare allegations do not, by themselves, make his illness compensable. 9 10 183264 See ECC Decision, Annex "13" to Petition, ro/lo, p. 50. See CA Decision, Annex "1" to Petition, id. at 24-25. -over-(128) ir· '

t1 " ! Resolution - 5 -G.R. No. 183264 January 26, 2015 On basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no error on the part of the SSS, the ECC and the CA in denying petitioner's claim for disability benefits. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 30, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 99156, is AFFIAMED. (Reyes, J., no part; Del Castillo, J., designated Acting Member per Raffle dated January 26, 2015). SO ORDERED." Mr.