EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23691      November 25, 1967

ARSENIO REYES, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO NOBLEJAS, in his official capacity as Land Registration Commissioner, and JOSE SANTOS, in his capacity as the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Respondents.

ANGELES, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

An appeal by certiorari to review the resolution of the Land Registration Commissioner dated August 25, 1964 - ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny registration of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership presented to him by herein petitioner. The main issue is, whether or not the period of redemption of properties sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, is to be counted from the date of the execution of the certificate of sale by the sheriff, or, from the date of registration of the corresponding certificate of sale issued by the sheriff in the Office of the Register of Deeds concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For purposes of disclosing the law question involved, the following statement of facts lifted from the resolution appealed from will suffice:

It appears from the facts of record that the spouses Leonardo Gamboa and Aurora L. Cariaga are the registered owners of the properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Titles Nos. 18230, 18231, 18232, 18233 and 18234, of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. These properties were mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and upon the failure of the mortgagors to pay the amount of the indebtedness upon maturity, the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially under the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 6, 1963, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the sum of P6,010.00 in favor of Arsenio Reyes, the highest bidder, and the corresponding certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff on February 21, 1963. In said certificate, the expiration date of the period of redemption was fixed by the sheriff to be "one (1) year from and after the date of the sale." It should be noted in this connection, that the duplicate of the certificate of sale was not filed (registered) by the sheriff in the office of the Register of Deeds. A copy thereof which was attached to the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership as a supporting paper, was neither entered in the Primary Entry Book for Act 496.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 10, 1964, there were presented for registration in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed on February 8, 1964, by the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes, and a Deed of Sale executed by the Philippine National

Bank as attorney-in-fact of the mortgagee (sic), in favor of the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Register of Deeds denied the registration of the above mentioned documents on the ground that the period of redemption has not yet expired. In support of his opinion on the matter, the Register of Deeds invoked the doctrine laid by the Supreme Court in the case of Salazar v. Meneses, G. R . No. L-15378, promulgated on July 31, 1963, wherein it was held that the rule that the period of redemption in execution sales pursuant to Section 26 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which begins to run not from the date of sale but from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, is also applicable in extrajudicial foreclosure sales of registered land.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Claiming that Section 6 of Act 3135, as amended, is so clear on the point that the redemption period shall begin to run from the date of sale, the petitioner, thru his counsel, disagreed with the ruling of the Register of Deeds. Hence, this appeal.

As stated in the opening paragraph of this opinion, the Land Registration Commissioner, upon the foregoing premises, promulgated the resolution appealed from, ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale executed by the mortgagee and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the auction-vendee, Arsenio Reyes, who presented the said documents for registration. A motion for reconsideration of the resolution was subsequently denied by the Land Registration Commissioner, hence, the instant petition for review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is the theory of petitioner that in sales of property at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, the period of redemption should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale which, he contends, is the express mandate of Section 6 of Act No. 3135: chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 6. In all cases in which the extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of sections 464 to 466 inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, the Land Registration Commissioner is of the opinion that the above-quoted provision is not the only pertinent and controlling law on the matter, specially when it is taken into consideration that the land involved is registered land under the Torrens system. He maintains, and so held in the resolution appealed from, that Section 6 of Act 3135 should be applied to the present case together with: (1)

sections 30 to 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court with regard to redemption; (2) Section 27, Rule 39 of the said Rules and Section 71 of Act 496 with regard to the filing (registration) of the sheriff's certificate of sale; and (3) Section 50 of Act 496, with regard to the registration of the certificate of sale so as to consider the land conveyed and affected under the Land Registration Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The ruling of the Land Registration Commissioner must be sustained. Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the certificate of sale executed by the sheriff in a public auction sale must be filed (registered) in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land is situated. This is mandatory requirement. Failure to register the certificate of sale violates the said provision of law and, construed in relation with Section 50 of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land covered by a torrens title because "the act of registration is the operative act to convey and effect the land." So the redemption period, for purposes of determining the time when a final deed of sale may be executed or issued and the ownership of the registered land consolidated in the purchase at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale under Act 3135, should be reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned and not from the date of the public auction sale. To this effect is the holding in the case of Ernesto Salazar v. Flor de Lis Meneses, L-15378, July 31, 1963, where this Court explained at length this principle, as follows:

The issue decisive of this appeal is the one raised by, the appellant in their third assignment of error, which is to this effect: That the lower court erred in not holding that the period of redemption in this case, as far as appellants are concerned, started only on May 26, 1956, the date when the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered. Should we rule to this effect, it is clear that when the appellants attempted to exercise their right to redeem, as judgment creditors of the deceased mortgagor by judgment subsequent to the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, and when they instituted the present action on October 1, 1956, the period of redemption had not yet expired.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find appellants' contention to be meritorious. In the case of Agbulos v. Alberto, G. R. No. L-17483, promulgated on July 31, 1962, we held:

The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction that when property brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act is sold, the operative act is the registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not 'take effect as a conveyance, or bind the land' until it is registered (Section 50, Act 496; Tuason v. Raymundo, 28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna V. Guevarra, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646). Undoubtedly, to be in consonance with this well settled rule, Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides that the duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff who made the auction sale to the purchaser must be filed (registered) in the office of the register of deeds of the province where the property is situated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Garcia v. Ocampo, G. R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959, we held that the twelve months period of redemption provided for in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "begins to run not from the date of sale, but from the time of the registration of the sale in the office of the register of deeds." The entry or annotation on the back of the certificate of title of the property in question on July 18, 1959 (supra) was in accordance with this ruling when it provided that the execution sale was "subject to redemption within one year from registration hereof." chanrobles virtual law library

A case similar to the present is that of Gonzales, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 48 Phil. 824, where we held that the provision of Section 32, Act 2938 (Charter of the Philippine National Bank) providing for a right of redemption in favor of the bank's mortgagor "within one year from the sale of the real estate as a result of the foreclosure" should be construed to mean one year after the confirmation of the foreclosure sale, because the sale becomes valid only after the confirmation. Along the same line we may say in this case that the period of one year after the sale must likewise start only from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, because it is only when that the certificate takes "effect as a conveyance" in accordance with Act 496.

The above ruling is squarely applicable to the present case which involves also registered land, inspite of the fact that the sale in question is not an execution sale but a foreclosure sale.

But it is further argued by the petitioner that the rule should not be applied to this case where there are no third parties involved. He cites a number of authorities,1 to the effect that as between the parties registration is not necessary to bind the immediate parties to a transaction involving registered land. He would then conclude that since the only purpose of registration is not protect the buyer from third party claims, it stands to reason that when as in this case, there are no third party claimants to the land, registration is not necessary and the sale between the parties should be made to take effect from the date of the auction sale. We are not impressed by the argument. Apparently, herein petitioner failed to see the "other side of the coin" and overlooked the doctrine, also well settled, that the registration required by Section 50 of the Land Registration Law is intended primarily for the protection of innocent third persons, i.e., persons who, without knowledge of the sale and in good faith, have acquired lights to the property.2 The same protection to third parties is obviously one of the objects of Section 27, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court in requiring that the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff in an auction sale be registered in the office of the register of deeds, for the purpose of the legislature in providing for our present system of registration is to afford some means of publicity so that persons dealing with real property may reach the records and thereby acquire security against instruments the execution of which has not been revealed. Redemption is not the concern merely of the auction-vendee and the mortgagor, but also of the latter's successors in interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said mortgagor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage under which the property has been sold. It is precisely for this reason that the certificate of sale should be registered, for only upon such registration may it legally be said that proper notice, though constructive, has been

served unto possible redemptioners contemplated in the law. We have to conclude, therefore, that the date of sale mentioned in Section 6 of Act 3135, as amended, should be construed to mean the date of registration of the, certificate of sale in the office of the register of deeds concerned. Only after the lapse of the twelve-month redemption period from the date of registration of the certificate of sale and in the absence of any redemptioner within the said period, may the deed of final sale be executed in favor of the purchaser who may then consolidate the title of the property in his favor. Consequently, We have to declare that the Land Registration Commissioner was right in ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to deny the registration of the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, the simultaneous registration of which documents was sought by herein petitioner even before the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff was registered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, and considering all the foregoing, the resolution appealed from should be, as hereby it is affirmed, with costs against herein petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J., and Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

CITY MAYOR, CITY

TREASURER, CITY

ASSESSOR, ALL OF

QUEZON CITY, and

ALVIN EMERSON S. YU,

Petitioners,

-versus-

RIZAL COMMERCIAL             

BANKING CORPORATION,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 171033

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 3, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated December 6,

2005, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101,

Quezon City, in SP. Civil Action Q-04-53522 for Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of

a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

The procedural and factual antecedents are as follows:

The facts are undisputed. The spouses Roberto and Monette Naval obtained a loan

from respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, secured by a real estate

mortgage of properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-167986, N-

167987, and N-167988. In 1998, the real estate mortgage was later foreclosed and the

properties were sold at public auction with respondent as the highest bidder. The

corresponding Certificates of Sale were issued in favor of respondent on August 4,

1998.  However, the certificates of sale were allegedly registered only on February 10,

2004.

Meanwhile, on May 30, 2003, an auction sale of tax delinquent properties was

conducted by the City Treasurer of Quezon City.  Included in the properties that were

auctioned were two (2) townhouse units covered by TCT Nos. N-167986 and N-167987

and the parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-167988.  For these delinquent properties,

Alvin Emerson S. Yu was adjudged as the highest bidder.  Upon payment of the tax

delinquencies, he was issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale of Delinquent

Property.

On February 10, 2004, the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property was registered with

the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

On June 10, 2004, respondent tendered payment for all of the assessed tax

delinquencies, interest, and other costs of the subject properties with the Office of the

City Treasurer, Quezon City.  However, the Office of the City Treasurer refused to

accept said tender of payment.

Undeterred, on June 15, 2004, respondent filed before the Office of the City Treasurer a

Petition[2] for the acceptance of its tender of payment and for the subsequent issuance

of the certificate of redemption in its favor. Nevertheless, respondent’s subsequent

tender of payment was also denied.

Consequently, respondent filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for Issuance of a

Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[3] before the RTC. 

Petitioners contended, among other things, that it had until February 10, 2005, or one

(1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale on February 10, 2004,

within which to redeem the subject properties, pursuant to Section 78 of Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the RTC initially denied the petition in

the Order[4] dated December 6, 2004.  In denying the petition, the RTC opined that

respondent’s reliance on Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 as basis of the reckoning period in

counting the one (1) year period within which to redeem the subject properties was

misplaced, since P.D. No. 464 has been expressly repealed by Republic Act (R.A.) No.

7160, or the Local Government Code.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration[5] questioning the Order,

arguing that:

A.

The Honorable Court committed grave error when it summarily denied the petition for

Mandamus filed by herein petitioner during the hearing on the Motion for Issuance of

Temporary Restraining Order and/or Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction without

conducting a hearing or trial on petition for mandamus. The order of the court effectively

denied petitioner its right to due process.

B.

The principal action subject of the petition for mandamus is the annulment of the auction

sale. Alternatively, petitioner sought the right to consign the redemption price, inclusive

of interests on the basis that it was exercising the right of redemption within the period

provided by law. The Honorable Court ruled only on the repeal of Presidential Decree

No. 464 and not the issues/grounds raised in the temporary restraining order/writ of

preliminary injunction nor on the issues raised in the petition for mandamus, contrary to

law.

C.

The Honorable Court committed grave error when it sustained the validity of the actions

of the City Treasurer with respect to the auction sale of the properties subject of the

petition and its unlawful refusal to accept the redemption price of the properties subject

of the auction sale contrary to the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No.  91-93, in

relation to Presidential Decree No. 464 and the Local Government Code and DOF

Assessment Regulations No. 7-85.

D.

The Honorable Court committed grave error when it denied petitioner its right to consign

the payment of the redemption price of the properties sold in auction sale without a

determination of the factual issues of the case, contrary to due process.

E.

The legal and factual question of the validity of the notice of the auction sale cannot be

summarily dismissed without hearing and ruling on the allegation of lack of notice and

fraud raised by petitioner in its petition for mandamus.[6]

On December 6, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision[7] granting the petition, the

decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the above-captioned petition for mandamus is

hereby granted.

Accordingly, the public respondents are ordered to accept the petitioner’s tender of

redemption payment, to issue the corresponding certificate of redemption in the name of

the petitioner and to cancel the certificate of tax sale issued to the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In granting the petition, the RTC ratiocinated that the counting of the one (1) year

redemption period of tax delinquent properties sold at public auction should start from

the date of registration of the certificate of sale or the final deed of sale in favor of the

purchaser, so that the delinquent registered owner or third parties interested in the

redemption may be notified that the delinquent property had been sold, and that they

have one (1) year from said constructive notice of the sale within which to redeem the

property.  The RTC was also of the opinion that Section 261, R.A. No. 7160 did not

amend Section 78 of P.D. No. 464.

Hence, the petition raising the following arguments:

I

The regional trial court, branch 101, quezon city, decided a question [of] law contrary to

law and jurisprudence when it decided that section 78 of p.d. 464 was not repealed by

republic act no. 7160 known as the local government code of 1991.

II

The regional trial court, branch 101, quezon city, decided a question [of] law contrary to

law and jurisprudence when it raised the following issues which do not conform to the

petition and answer filed by the parties:

a.  whether or not the respondent is entitled to the protection of all the provisions of

quezon city tax ordinance number sp-91-93, otherwise known as quezon city revenue

code of 1993, including section 14 thereof, promulgated pursuant to r.a. 7160;

b.  whether the period of redemption in a realty tax sale in quezon city [h]as to be

reckoned from the date of ANNOTATION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF sale pursuant to

paragraph 7, section 14 of quezon city tax ordinance no. sp-91-93 or from the date of

sale pursuant to section 261 of r.a. 7160.[9]

Petitioners argue that the RTC erred when it ruled that P.D. No. 464 was not repealed

by R.A. No. 7160 and when it concluded that the phrase “from the date of sale” as

appearing in Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160 means that the counting of the one (1) year

redemption period of tax delinquent properties sold at public action shall commence

from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.

Petitioners insist that, since Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue

Code of 1993 was not initially alleged in respondent’s petition and was not used as

basis for its filing, the RTC erred when it took cognizance of it when it rendered the

assailed decision.

Conversely, respondent argues, among other things, that the RTC did not rule that P.D.

No. 464 was not repealed by R.A. No. 7160, it merely made reference to Section 78 of

P.D. No. 464.  Respondent maintains that it has not altered its cause of action when it

cited Section 14 (a), paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 for the first

time in its memorandum and that its failure to invoke the said provision in the petition for

mandamus does not preclude respondent from invoking it in the later part of the

proceedings.  Ultimately, respondent contends that the RTC correctly ruled that it had

timely exercised its right to redeem the subject properties.

Section 78 of P.D. No. 464 provides for a one-year redemption period for properties

foreclosed due to tax delinquency, thus:

Sec. 78. Redemption of real property after sale. – Within the term of one year from the

date of the registration of the sale of the property, the delinquent taxpayer or his

representative, or in his absence, any person holding a lien or claim over the property,

shall have the right to redeem the same by paying the provincial or city treasurer or his

deputy the total amount of taxes and penalties due up to the date of redemption, the

costs of sale and the interest at the rate of twenty per centum on the purchase price,

and such payment shall invalidate the sale certificate issued to the purchaser and shall

entitle the person making the same to a certificate from the provincial or city treasurer or

his deputy, stating that he had redeemed the property.[10]

From the foregoing, the owner or any person holding a lien or claim over a tax

delinquent property sold at public auction has one (1) year from the date of registration

of sale to redeem the property.  However, since the passing of R.A. No. 7160, such is

no longer controlling.  The issue of whether or not R.A No. 7160 or the Local

Government Code, repealed P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code has long

been laid to rest by this Court.  Jurisdiction thrives to the effect that R.A. No. 7160

repealed P.D. No. 464.[11] From January 1, 1992 onwards, the proper basis for the

computation of the real property tax payable, including penalties or interests, if

applicable, must be R. A. No. 7160.  Its repealing clause, Section 534, reads:

SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. –

x x x x

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital

fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special

Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.

559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436

as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decrees Nos. 381, 436,

464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and

effect.

Inasmuch as the crafter of the Local Government Code clearly worded the above-cited

Section to repeal P.D. No. 464, it is a clear showing of their legislative intent that R.A.

No. 7160 was to supersede P.D. No. 464. As such, it is apparent that in case of sale of

tax delinquent properties, R.A. No. 7160 is the general law applicable.  Consequently,

as regards redemption of tax delinquent properties sold at public auction, the pertinent

provision is Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160, which provides:

Section 261. Redemption of Property Sold. –  Within one (1) year from the date of sale,

the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal interest therein, or his

representative, shall have the right to redeem the property upon payment to the local

treasurer of the amount of delinquent tax, including the interest due thereon, and the

expenses of sale from the date of delinquency to the date of sale, plus interest of not

more than two percent (2%) per month on the purchase price from the date of sale to

the date of redemption. Such payment shall invalidate the certificate of sale issued to

the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal

interest therein shall be entitled to a certificate of redemption which shall be issued by

the local treasurer or his deputy.

From the date of sale until the expiration of the period of redemption, the delinquent real

property shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest

therein who shall remain in the possession of the owner or person having legal interest

therein who shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof.

The local treasurer or his deputy, upon receipt from the purchaser of the certificate of

sale, shall forthwith return to the latter the entire amount paid by him plus interest of not

more than two percent (2%) per month.  Thereafter, the property shall be free from all

lien of such delinquent tax, interest due thereon and expenses of sale.[12]

From the foregoing, the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal

interest therein, or his representative, has the right to redeem the property within one (1)

year from the date of sale upon payment of the delinquent tax and other fees. Verily, the

period of redemption of tax delinquent properties should be counted not from the date of

registration of the certificate of sale, as previously provided by Section 78 of P.D. No.

464, but rather on the date of sale of the tax delinquent property, as explicitly provided

by Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160.

Nonetheless, the  government  of  Quezon  City,  pursuant  to the taxing  power  vested 

on  local government units by Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution[13] and R.A.

No. 7160, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon

City Revenue Code of 1993, providing, among other things, the procedure in the

collection of delinquent taxes on real properties within the territorial jurisdiction of

Quezon City.  Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7, the Code provides:

7)      Within one (1) year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at

the proper registry, the owner of the delinquent real property or person having legal

interest therein, or his representative, shall have the right to redeem the property by

paying to the City Treasurer the amount of the delinquent tax, including interest due

thereon, and the expenses of sale plus interest of two percent (2) per month on the

purchase price from the date of sale to the date of redemption.  Such payment shall

invalidate the certificate of sale issued to the purchaser and the owner of the delinquent

real property or person having legal interest therein shall be entitled to a certificate of

redemption which shall be issued by the City Treasurer.

x x x x

Verily, the ordinance is explicit that the one-year redemption period should be counted

from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper registry.  At first

glance, this provision runs counter to that of Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160 which

provides that the one year redemption period shall be counted from the date of sale of

the tax delinquent property.  There is, therefore, a need to reconcile these seemingly

conflicting provisions of a general law and a special law.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not

omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class.  A special statute, as the

term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a

class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.[14] In the present case, R.A.

No. 7160 is to be construed as a general law, while City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93 is a

special law, having emanated only from R.A. No. 7160 and with limited territorial

application in Quezon City only.

A general law and a special law on the same subject should be accordingly read

together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.  Where there

are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other general which, if

standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the

special must prevail, since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of the

general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the rule.[15]

More so, when the validity of the law is not in question.

In giving effect to these laws, it is also worthy to note that in cases involving redemption,

the law protects the original owner.  It is the policy of the law to aid rather than to defeat

the owner’s right.  Therefore, redemption should be looked upon with favor and where

no injury will follow, a liberal construction will be given to our redemption laws,

specifically on the exercise of the right to redeem.[16]

To harmonize the provisions of the two laws and to maintain the policy of the law to aid

rather than to defeat the owner’s right to redeem his property, Section 14 (a), Paragraph

7 of City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93 should be construed as to define the phrase “one

(1) year from the date of sale” as appearing in Section 261 of R.A. No. 7160, to mean

“one (1) year from the date of the annotation of the sale of the property at the proper

registry.”

Consequently, the counting of the one (1) year redemption period of property sold at

public auction for its tax delinquency should be counted from the date of annotation of

the certificate of sale in the proper Register of Deeds.  Applying the foregoing to the

case at bar, from the date of registration of the Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property

on February 10, 2004, respondent had until February 10, 2005 to redeem the subject

properties.  Hence, its tender of payment of the subject properties’ tax delinquencies

and other fees on June 10, 2004, was well within the redemption period, and it was

manifest error on the part of petitioners to have refused such tender of payment.

Finally, respondent’s failure to cite Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7, City Ordinance No. SP-

91, S-93 in its petition for mandamus does not preclude it from invoking the said

provision in the later part of the judicial proceeding.

The issues in every case are limited to those presented in the pleadings.  The object of

the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle between the litigants and to indicate fairly the

nature of the claims or defenses of both parties.[17] Points of law, theories, issues and

arguments should be brought to the attention of the trial court to give the opposing party

an opportunity to present further evidence material to these matters during judicial

proceedings before the lower court.  Otherwise, it would be too late to raise these

issues during appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of

the issue in the case.  When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is

decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the

same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.

[18]

As early as in its Memorandum to Serve as Draft Resolution,[19] respondent had

brought Section 14 (a), Paragraph 7 of City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, or the Quezon

City Revenue Code of 1993, to the attention of petitioners.  Respondent also reiterated

the applicability of the provision to his claim of redemption in its motion for

reconsideration of the Order initially denying the petition for mandamus.  Petitioners

were given every opportunity to counter respondent’s allegations, which it in fact did by

filing an Opposition[20] to the motion for reconsideration.  Since the inception of the

petition in the lower court, respondent has not changed its preposition that the one (1)

year redemption period shall be counted from the date of registration of the certificate of

sale and not from the date of sale of the subject properties.  Citing the appropriate

provision of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993 did not alter this, but on the

contrary, even buttressed its claim.

Furthermore, petitioners cannot feign ignorance of a law that it has promulgated in the

exercise of its local autonomy.  Nor can it be allowed to deny the applicability of Section

14 (a), Paragraph 7 of the Quezon City Revenue Code of 1993, while at the same time

invoking that it has strictly adhered to the Quezon City Revenue Code when it

conducted the public auction of the tax delinquent properties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.  Subject to the above

disquisitions, the Decision of the RTC in SP. Civil Action Q-04-53522, dated December

6, 2005, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA                ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice                                       Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation

before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s

Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s

Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,

Petitioner,

- versus -

AUGUSTO BASA, JR., LUZ BASA and EDUARDO S. BASA,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 149121

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

Chairperson,

CARPIO,*

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

April 20, 2010

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

*

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks

to set aside the Amended Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2000

and its Resolution dated July 19, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration of the

National Housing Authority (NHA).

On April 19, 1983, spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA the amount

of P556,827.10 secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties covered by

Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. 287008 and 285413, located at No. 30 San

Antonio St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.2[2] Spouses Basa did not pay the

loan despite repeated demands. To collect its credit, the NHA, on August 9, 1990, filed

a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage before the Sheriff’s Office in

Quezon City, pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended.3[3]

After notice and publication, the properties were sold at public auction where

NHA emerged as the highest bidder.4[4] On April 16, 1991, the sheriff’s certificate of sale

was registered and annotated only on the owner’s duplicate copies of the titles in the

hands of the respondents, since the titles in the custody of the Register of Deeds were

among those burned down when a fire gutted the City Hall of Quezon City on June 11,

1988.5[5]

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On April 16, 1992, the redemption period expired,6[6] without respondents having

redeemed the properties. Shortly thereafter, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an

Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership7[7] over the foreclosed properties, and the same

was inscribed by the Register of Deeds on the certificates of title in the hand of NHA

under Entry No. 6572/T-287008-PR-29207.8[8]

On June 18, 1992, NHA filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession.

The said petition was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an Order9[9] dated

August 4, 1992.

A Writ of Possession10[10] was issued on March 9, 1993 by the RTC, ordering

spouses Augusto and Luz Basa to vacate the subject lots. The writ, however, remained

unserved. This compelled NHA to move for the issuance of an alias writ of possession

on April 28, 1993.

Before the RTC could resolve the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of

possession, respondents spouses Basa and Eduardo Basa, on June 2, 1993, filed a

Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition in Intervention (with Prayer for Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction).11[11] Respondents anchored

said petition for intervention on Section 812[12] of Act No. 3135, as amended, which gives

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the debtor/mortgagor the remedy to petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of

possession be cancelled. In the said petition for intervention, respondents averred that

the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject properties was a nullity since notices were

not posted and published, written notices of foreclosure were not given to them, and

notices of sale were not tendered to the occupants of the sold properties, thereby

denying them the opportunity to ventilate their rights.13[13] Respondents likewise insisted

that even assuming arguendo that the foreclosure sale were valid, they were still

entitled to redeem the same since the one-year redemption period from the registration

of the sheriff’s certificate of foreclosure sale had not yet prescribed.14[14] Citing

Bernardez v. Reyes15[15] and Bass v. De la Rama,16[16] respondents theorized that the

instrument is deemed registered only upon actual inscription on the certificate of title in

the custody of the civil registrar.17[17] Since the sheriff’s certificate was only inscribed on

the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, and not on the certificate of title in the

possession of the Register of Deeds, then there was no effective registration and the

one-year redemption period had not even begun to run. Thus, respondents asked the

RTC, among others, to declare the foreclosure sale null and void, to allow the

respondents to redeem the mortgaged properties in the amount of P21,160.00, and to

cancel the Writ of Possession dated March 9, 1993.

NHA opposed respondents’ petition for intervention.18[18] It countered that the

extrajudicial foreclosure sale was conducted validly and made in accordance with Act

No. 3135 as evidenced by the publication of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in the Manila

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Times in its issues dated July 14, 21 and 28, 1990.19[19] NHA also said that respondents

had been furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale as shown at the bottom

portion of said notice.20[20] NHA maintained that respondents’ right of redemption had

long expired on April 15, 1992 since the certificate of sale was inscribed on their TCT

Nos. 285413 and 287008 a year earlier, or on April 16, 1991. It pointed out that the

RTC, via its Order dated August 4, 1992, had already ruled that respondents’ right of

redemption was already gone without them exercising said right. Since said order had

already attained finality, the ruling therein could no longer be disturbed.

On January 2, 1995, the RTC issued the first assailed Order21[21] with the

following directives: 1) granting the issuance of the alias writ of possession which

allowed NHA to take possession of the subject properties; 2) admitting the Petition in

Intervention and “treating the same as the petition to set aside sale mentioned in [Sec.

8] of Act No. 3155”; and 3) granting the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction in

favor of respondents that ordered NHA to refrain from selling or disposing of the

contested properties. The pertinent portion of the order reads:

After examining the record and following precedents x x x this Court hereby orders:

1. The issuance of an alias writ of possession;

2. Admission of the “Petition in Intervention,” treating the same as the “petition” to set aside sale, etc., mentioned in [Sec. 8] of Act No. 3155;

3. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, after a BOND in the amount of P20,000.00 had been duly filed by intervenors, ordering movant National Housing Authority, its agents and/or any other person acting under its command, to desist and refrain from selling or in any manner from disposing of the subject properties covered by TCT Nos. 287008 and 285413 and located at No. 30, San Antonio Street, San

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Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, pending the termination of this proceeding and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this Court;

4. Setting the hearing of the petition in intervention (to set aside) on March 17, 1995, at 8:30 a.m.22[22]

NHA filed a motion for reconsideration23[23] assailing the RTC’s Order insofar as it

admitted respondents’ motion for intervention and issued a writ of preliminary injunction.

NHA argued that respondents should have assailed the foreclosure sale during the

hearing in the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, and not during the

hearing in the petition for the issuance of an alias writ of possession since the “petition”

referred to in Section 8 of Act No. 3135 pertains to the original petition for the issuance

of the Writ of Possession and not the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of

Possession. NHA stressed that another reason why the petition for intervention should

be denied was the finality of the Order dated August 4, 1992 declaring respondents’

right of redemption barred by prescription. Lastly, NHA asserted that the writ of

possession was issued as a matter of course upon filing of the proper motion and

thereby, the court was bereft of discretion.

In the second assailed Order24[24] dated September 4, 1995, the RTC denied

NHA’s motion for reconsideration reasoning that the admission of the intervention was

sanctioned by Section 8 of Act No. 3135. As to the grant of preliminary injunction, the

RTC made the justification that if the NHA was not restrained, the judgment which may

be favorable to respondents would be ineffectual. The order partly provides:

The motion is without merit. The admission of the intervention is sanctioned by Sec. 8 of Act No. 3135. And, because, otherwise or if no preliminary injunction is issued, the movant NHA may, before final judgment, do or continue the doing of the act with the intervenor asks the

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court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered afterwards which may grant the relief sought by the intervenor.

ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 25[25]

Undaunted, NHA filed on November 24, 1995, a special civil action for certiorari

and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision26[26] dated February 24, 2000, in favor

of the NHA. It declared null and void the assailed orders of the RTC dated January 2,

1995 and September 4, 1995, to the extent that the said orders admitted the petition in

intervention and granted the issuance of the preliminary injunction; but it upheld the

grant of the alias writ of possession, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the assailed order of January 2, 1995 is declared NULL AND VOID except for the portion directing the issuance of an alias writ of possession. Likewise declared NULL AND VOID is the second assailed order of September 4, 1995 denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Let an alias writ of possession be issued and executed/implemented by the public respondent without further delay.27[27]

The Court of Appeals defended its affirmation of the RTC’s grant of the alias writ

of possession in NHA’s favor by saying that it was a necessary consequence after the

earlier writ was left unserved to the party. It further explained that NHA was entitled to

the writ of possession as a matter of course after the lapse of the redemption period.

As to the RTC’s admission of respondents’ petition for intervention, the appellate

court opined that it was improperly and erroneously made. The Court of Appeals

believed that the only recourse available to a mortgagor, in this case the respondents, in

a foreclosure sale is to question the validity of the sale through a petition to set aside

the sale and to cancel the writ of possession, a summary procedure provided for under

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27

Section 112 of the Land Registration Act. It also observed that the grant of the

preliminary injunction by the RTC was uncalled for as it would effectively defeat the right

of NHA to possession, the latter having been entitled by virtue of the grant of the alias

writ of possession.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration.28[28] They alleged that since they

raised the issue that their right of redemption had not prescribed, said fact should have

changed the whole scenario such that the issuance of a writ of possession ceased to be

summary in nature and was no longer ministerial. Respondents then concluded that

their right to redeem the properties against NHA’s right to the writ of possession must

be threshed out in a hearing of the case on its merits.

With regard to the RTC Order dated August 4, 1992 granting the writ of

possession which, according to the NHA, became final and executory, respondents

argued that said order did not constitute res judicata so as to bar the filing of the petition

for intervention since the said order was not a judgment on the merits that could attain

finality.

Also, respondents would like the Court of Appeals to treat the petition for

intervention not only as an opposition to the issuance of the alias writ of possession, but

also as a proper remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended, in view of the

various issues raised.

On November 27, 2000, the Court of Appeals, in its Amended Decision,

reconsidered its earlier stance. It declared that the period of redemption had not

expired as the certificate of sale had not been registered or annotated in the original

copies of the titles supposedly kept with the Register of Deeds since said titles were

earlier razed by fire. Taking its cue from Bass v. De la Rama where the Court

purportedly made a ruling that entry of a document, such as sale of real property, in the

entry book is insufficient to treat such document as registered, unless the same had

been annotated on the certificate of title; the Court of Appeals went on to say that the

entry of the certificate of sale in the owner’s duplicate of the titles could not have been

28

sufficient to register the same since anyone who would wish to check with the Register

of Deeds would not see any annotation. Thus, entry made on the owner’s duplicate of

the titles cannot be considered notice that would bind the whole world. Having been

deprived of their right of redemption, the Court of Appeals deemed it proper to allow

respondents to intervene. The dispositive part of the amended decision decrees:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision dated February 24, 2000, is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the petition DISMISSED.29[29]

Unfazed, NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals

denied in its July 19, 2001 Resolution, to wit:

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2000 is DENIED for lack of merit.30[30]

Hence, the instant petition.

In its memorandum, NHA tendered the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ANNOTATION OF THE SHERIFF’S CERTIFICATE OF SALE IN THE PRIMARY ENTRY BOOK OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS AND ON THE OWNER’S DUPLICATE TITLE IS SUFFICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF LAW ON REGISTRATION.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF BASS VS. DE LA RAMA HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED.31[31]

Respondents, on the other hand, offered the following as issues:

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WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE RESPONDENTS’ INTERVENTION AND GRANTING THE EQUITABLE WRIT OF INJUNCTION THEREBY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION COMPLIES WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT.32[32]

On the procedural aspect, respondents question NHA’s alleged failure to include

in its petition copies of material portions of the record such as pleadings filed in the RTC

and the Court of Appeals as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents also pointed out the purported defective verification of NHA in view of the

fact that it merely stated that the one verifying had read the allegations of the petition

and that the same were true and correct to the best of his knowledge. According to

respondents, such declarations were not in accordance with the rules which require that

a verified pleading must state that the affiant had read the pleading and that the

allegations therein were true and correct based on his personal knowledge and not

only to the “best” of his knowledge.

As to the merits, NHA stresses that the annotation and entry in the owner’s

duplicate certificate of titles of the sheriff’s certificate of sale are sufficient compliance

with the requirement of law on registration. To support this, NHA refers to Land

Registration Administration Circular No. 3 dated December 6, 1988, entitled “Entry and

Provisional Registration of Instruments Pending Reconstitution of Title” which allegedly

authorized all Registers of Deeds to accept for entry and provisional registration

instruments affecting lost or destroyed certificates of title pending reconstitution of the

original. The legality and validity of the disputed registration on its duplicate copies of

the sheriff’s certificate of sale, NHA insists, are backed by this Court’s ruling in

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Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija ,33[33]

where purportedly, this Court made a favorable interpretation of Section 56 of

Presidential Decree No. 1529. NHA says that the inscription of the sheriff’s certificate of

sale only to the owner’s duplicate copies, but not to those in the custody of the register

of deeds is justified as the latter were burned down. Thus, it could not be blamed for

the non-registration of the sale in the original copies.

NHA faults the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Bass v. De la Rama since the ruling

therein stating that entry and annotation of a sale instrument on the owner’s duplicate

copy only as insufficient registration, was already abandoned in Development Bank of

the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, where it was allegedly ruled

that the primary entry alone of the transaction produces the effect of registration so long

as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and

annotation.

In contrast, respondents submit that annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale

on the owner’s copy is inadequate to propel the running of the redemption period. They

firmly believe that for the sale instrument to be considered as registered, the inscription

must be made on the reconstituted titles.

Respondents disagree with NHA’s opinion that Bass v. De la Rama was

superceded by Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of

Nueva Ecija. They are of the persuasion that the ruling in DBP pertains exclusively to

the unique factual milieu and the issues attendant therein, but not to the instant case

where Bass purportedly applies. Respondents also assail NHA’s citation of Sta. Ignacia

Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.34[34] According to them, said case finds no

application to the instant controversy because the issue involved in the former was

whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the date of the auction sale or

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the registration of the certificate of sale, which ostensibly is not the bone of contention in

this case.

Ascribing NHA’s inaction to have the burned titles reconstituted, respondents

assert that such neglect should not be used as a justification for the non-inscription in

the original titles of the certificate of sale. Additionally, respondents insist that the

question of whether the redemption period should be reckoned from the inscription on

the owner’s duplicate copies is a factual and legal issue that is appropriately adjudicated

in a hearing on the merits of their petition in intervention, and not in the instant special

civil action for certiorari and prohibition which is limited in scope, namely, whether the

RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in admitting

their petition in intervention.

Respondents reiterate that the issuance of the writ of possession prayed for by

NHA before the RTC is no longer ministerial since it raised the issue of whether their

period of redemption has already expired. They cite Barican v. Intermediate Appellate

Court35[35] as the authority to this argument.

We dwell first with the procedural issues before the main controversy.

Respondents contend that the instant petition is dismissible on the ground that NHA

failed to attach pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required under

Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which partly provides:

SEC. 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; x x x.

In its petition, NHA attached the February 24, 2000 Decision, the November 27,

2000 Amended Decision, and the July 19, 2001 Resolution all of the Court of Appeals;

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copies of the transfer certificates of title of the disputed properties; and the June 13,

1994 Order of the Quezon City RTC ordering the reconstitution of the said titles. This

Court finds that NHA substantially complied with the requirements under Section 4 of

Rule 45. The same conclusion was arrived at by this Court in Development Bank of the

Philippines v. Family Foods Manufacturing Co., Ltd.36[36] when it was faced with the

same procedural objection, thus:

As held by this Court in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora:

[E]ven if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and other supporting documents were not attached to the petition, the dismissal is unwarranted because the CA records containing the promissory notes and the real estate and chattel mortgages were elevated to this Court. Without a doubt, we have sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of the case.

We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules,

36

resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Contrary to respondents’ assertion, NHA’s verification conforms to the rule.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that

the allegations of a pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely

imagined; and have been made in good faith.37[37] To achieve this purpose, the

verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn statement confirming that

the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations are true and correct of the affiant's

personal knowledge or based on authentic records.38[38]

The General Manager of NHA verified the petition as follows:

3. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the best of my own personal knowledge.39[39]

A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. The

affiant confirmed that he had read the allegations in the petition which were true and

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correct based on his personal knowledge. The addition of the words “to the best” before

the phrase “of my personal knowledge” did not violate the requirement under Section 4

of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the affiant declared that the allegations in the petition

are true and correct based on his personal knowledge.

Now, as to the merits of the case. The main issue before us is whether the

annotation of the sheriff’s certificate of sale on the owner’s duplicate certificate of titles

is sufficient registration considering that the inscription on the original certificates could

not be made as the same got burned.

Jurisprudence is replete with analogous cases. Of foremost importance is

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija40[40]

where the Court listed cases where the transaction or instrument was annotated not on

the original certificate but somewhere else. In that case, DBP, following the extrajudicial

foreclosure sale where it emerged as the highest bidder, registered with the Register of

Deeds the sheriff’s certificate of sale in its favor. After it had paid the required fees, said

transaction was entered in the primary entry book. However, the annotation of the said

transaction to the originals of the certificates of title could not be done because the

same titles were missing from the files of the Registry. This prompted DBP to

commence reconstitution proceedings of the lost titles. Four years had passed before

the missing certificates of title were reconstituted. When DBP sought the inscription of

the four-year old sale transaction on the reconstituted titles, the Acting Register of

Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take, referred the matter to the

Commissioner of the Land Registration Authority by consulta, the latter resolved against

the annotation of the sale transaction and opined that said entry was “ineffective due to

the impossibility of accomplishing registration at the time the document was entered

because of the non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved.”41[41] In other

words, annotation on the primary book was deemed insufficient registration. The Court

disagreed with this posture. Considering that DBP had paid all the fees and complied

with all the requirements for purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the

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certificate of sale, the Court declared that mere entry in the primary book was

considered sufficient registration since “[DBP] cannot be blamed that annotation could

not be made contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the subject

certificates of title were missing and could not be found, since it had nothing to do with

their safekeeping. If anyone was responsible for failure of annotation, it was the

Register of Deeds who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those

documents.”42[42] To buttress its conclusion, the Court reviewed the relevant

jurisprudence starting from 1934. The Court noted that before the Second World War,

particularly in Government of the Philippine Islands v. Aballe,43[43] the prevailing doctrine

was an inscription in the book of entry even without the notation on the certificate of title

was considered as satisfactory and produced all the effects which the law gave to its

registration. During the war, however, the Court observed that there was apparent

departure from said ruling since in Bass v. De la Rama, the holding was that entry of an

instrument in the primary entry book does not confer any legal effect without a

memorandum thereof inscribed on the certificate of title.44[44] DBP noted that Bass v. De

la Rama, however, survived only for a little while since “later cases appear to have

applied the Aballe ruling that entry in the day book, even without the corresponding

annotation on the certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of,

registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees are paid and the

owner’s duplicates of the certificates of title affected are presented.”45[45]

These later cases are Levin v. Bass46[46] and Potenciano v. Dineros,47[47] both of

which involve the issue of whether entry in the day book of a deed of sale, payment of

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the fees, and presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate of title constitute a

complete act of registration.48[48]

Simply, respondents’ resort to Bass v. De la Rama is futile as the same was

abandoned by the later cases, i.e., Bass, Potenciano and DBP.

In the recent case of Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,49[49] the respondent

was awarded the foreclosed parcels of land. A sheriff’s certificate of sale was thereafter

issued in its favor. Thereafter, petitioners in that case filed a complaint before the RTC

with a prayer for the issuance of an ex parte TRO aimed at preventing the Register of

Deeds from registering the said certificate of sale in the name of the respondent and

from taking possession of the subject properties.50[50] Before the RTC could issue a

TRO, respondent presented the sheriff’s certificate of sale to the Register of Deeds who

entered the same certificate in the primary book, even if the registration fee was paid

only the following day. Four days after, the RTC issued a TRO directing the Register of

Deeds to refrain from registering the said sheriff’s certificate of sale. A preliminary

injunction was thereafter issued as the TRO was about to expire. The preliminary

injunction was questioned by therein respondent. One of the main issues raised there

was whether the entry of the certificate of sale in the primary book was equivalent to

registration such that the TRO and the preliminary injunction issues would not lie

anymore as the act sought to be restrained had become an accomplished act. The

Court held that the TRO and the preliminary injunction had already become moot and

academic by the earlier entry of the certificate of sale in the primary entry book which

was tantamount to registration, thus:

In fine, petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction, to prevent the register of deeds from registering the subject certificate of sale, had been rendered moot and academic by the valid entry of the instrument in the primary entry book. Such entry is equivalent to

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registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act sought to be enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.51[51]

Indeed, the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant

has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what

is left to be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds. The Court thus once held:

Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.52

[52]

In the case under consideration, NHA presented the sheriff’s certificate of sale to

the Register of Deeds and the same was entered as Entry No. 2873 and said entry was

further annotated in the owner’s transfer certificate of title.53[53] A year later and after the

mortgagors did not redeem the said properties, respondents filed with the Register of

Deeds an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership54[54]after which the same instrument

was presumably entered into in the day book as the same was annotated in the owner’s

duplicate copy.55[55] Just like in DBP, Levin, Potenciano and Autocorp, NHA followed the

procedure in order to have its sheriff’s certificate of sale annotated in the transfer

certificates of title. There would be, therefore, no reason not to apply the ruling in said

cases to this one. It was not NHA’s fault that the certificate of sale was not annotated

on the transfer certificates of title which were supposed to be in the custody of the

Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed for the fact that

there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription as it had taken

the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted as early as July 15, 1988.56[56]

NHA did everything within its power to assert its right.

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While it may be true that, in DBP, the Court ruled that “in the particular situation

here obtaining, annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the

certificates of title to which it refers is entirely proper and justified,” this does not mean,

as respondents insist, that the ruling therein applies exclusively to the factual milieu and

the issue obtaining in said case, and not to similar cases. There is nothing in the

subject declaration that categorically states its pro hac vice character. For in truth, what

the said statement really conveys is that the current doctrine that entry in the primary

book produces the effect of registration can be applied in the situation obtaining in that

case since the registrant therein complied with all that was required of it, hence, it was

fairly reasonable that its acts be given the effect of registration, just as the Court did in

the past cases. In fact the Court there continued with this pronouncement:

To hold said entry ineffective, as does the appealed resolution, amounts to declaring that it did not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made, thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 be asserted as warranted by its terms.57[57]

What is more, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals,58[58] the pertinent DBP

ruling was applied, thereby demonstrating that the said ruling in DBP may be applied to

other cases with similar factual and legal issues, viz:

Petitioners contend that the aforecited case of DBP is not apropos to the case at bar. Allegedly, in DBP, the bank not only paid the registration fees but also presented the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. We find no merit in petitioner’s posture x x x.

x x x x

Like in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, the instrument involved in the case at bar, is a sheriff’s certificate of sale, We hold now, as we held therein, that the registrant is under no necessity to

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present the owner’s duplicates of the certificates of title affected, for purposes of primary entry, as the transaction sought to be recorded is an involuntary transaction.

x x x x

x x x Such entry is equivalent to registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act sought to be enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.59[59]

Moreover, respondents’ stand on the non-applicability of the DBP case to other

cases, absent any statement thereof to such effect, contravenes the principle of stare

decisis which urges that courts are to apply principles declared in prior decisions that

are substantially similar to a pending case.60[60]

Since entry of the certificate of sale was validly registered, the redemption period

accruing to respondents commenced therefrom, since the one-year period of

redemption is reckoned from the date of registration of the certificate of sale.61[61] It must

be noted that on April 16, 1991, the sheriff’s certificate of sale was registered and

annotated only on the owner’s duplicate copies of the titles and on April 16, 1992, the

redemption period expired, without respondents having redeemed the properties. In

fact, on April 24, 1992, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership.

Clearly, respondents have lost their opportunity to redeem the properties in question.

As regards respondents’ allegation on the defect in the publication and notice

requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the same is unavailing. The rule is

that it is the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite who has the burden of

establishing such fact.62[62] This is so because foreclosure proceedings have in their

favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on

the party who questions it.63[63] Here, except for their bare allegations, respondents failed

to present any evidence to support them. In addition, NHA stated in its Comment to

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Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene that it had complied with the publication of the

Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in the Manila Times in the latter’s issues dated July 14, 21 and

28, 1990.64[64] It also claimed that an Affidavit of Publication of said newspaper was

attached as Annex “B” in the said comment.65[65] NHA also said that respondents had

been furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale as shown at the bottom

portion of said notice.66[66] From all these, it would tend to show that respondents’

aspersion of non-compliance with the requirements of foreclosure sale is a futile attempt

to salvage its statutory right to redeem their foreclosed properties, which right had long

been lost by inaction.

Considering that the foreclosure sale and its subsequent registration with the

Register of Deeds were done validly, there is no reason for the non-issuance of the writ

of possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the sheriff to place a person in

possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property is extrajudicially

foreclosed.67[67] Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in the issuance of the

writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to

wit:

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the

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property is registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a

writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath

for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of

property with Torrens title.68[68] Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the

corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order

for a writ of possession.69[69]

The time-honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer’s

name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter

of right.70[70] Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a

ministerial function.71[71] The writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the

filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The judge

issuing the writ following these express provisions of law neither exercises his official

discretion nor judgment.72[72] As such, the court granting the writ cannot be charged with

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having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.73[73] To accentuate

the writ’s ministerial character, the Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance

despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.74[74]

Believing that the instant case does not come within the penumbra of the

foregoing rule, respondents resort to the ruling in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate

Court.75[75] Unfortunately for them, the instant case does not even come close to the

cited case. There, the Court deemed it inequitable to issue a writ of possession in favor

of the purchaser in the auction sale considering that the property involved was already

in the possession of a third person by virtue of a deed of sale with assumption of

mortgage even before the purchaser could register the sheriff’s certificate of sale. Also,

the auction buyer therein unreasonably deferred to exercise its right to acquire

possession over the property. These circumstances are not present in the instant case.

Moreover, in Fernandez v. Espinoza,76[76] the Court refused to apply the ruling in

Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court77[77] and Cometa v. Intermediate Appellate

Court,78[78] two cases which are exemptions to the stated rule, reasoning that:

In Cometa, which actually involved execution of judgment for the prevailing party in a damages suit, the subject properties were sold at the public auction at an unusually lower price, while in Barican, the mortgagee bank took five years from the time of foreclosure before filing the petition for the issuance of writ of possession. We have considered these equitable and peculiar circumstances in Cometa and Barican to justify the relaxation of the otherwise absolute rule. None of these exceptional circumstances, however, attended herein so as to place the instant case in the same stature as that of Cometa and Barican. Instead, the ruling in Vaca v. Court of Appeals is on all fours with the present petition. In Vaca,

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there is no dispute that the property was not redeemed within one year from the registration of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale; thus, the mortgagee bank acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the issuance of the writ of possession. Similarly, UOB, as the purchaser at the auction sale in the instant case, is entitled as a matter of right, to the issuance of the writ of possession.

Just as in Fernandez, this Court does not see any compelling reason to veer

away from the established rule.

In fine, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in

ruling that the annotation of NHA’s sheriff’s certificate of sale on the duplicate

certificates of title was not effective registration and in holding that respondents’

redemption period had not expired.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2000 is SET

ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeChairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice