Cases Part3

8/12/2019 Cases Part3

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/cases-part3 1/129

IV. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNULMENT OR

DECLARATION OF NULLITY

Enrico case: PDF

CARLOS v. SANDOVAL

Teofilo and Felicidad got married in 1962. Thirty years after marriage, Teofilodied intestate leaving his wife and son Teofilo Carlos ll. In 1995, Teofilo’s brother

Juan filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of Teofilo and Felicidad's

marriage in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewisemaintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father

of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Can Juan file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage?

SUGGESTED ANSWER

In Carlos vs. Sandoval, although the marriage was celebrated before Aug. 3,1988and the petition was filed before March, 15, 2003, Juan should first showthat he is a real party-in interest before he may be allowed to file the saidpetition.

"The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a licensefor any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person mustappear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgmentin the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, Juanmust be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that everyaction must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest."

Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest

in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguishedfrom mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction ofthe court as plaintiff in an action.

Is Juan a Real Party-in-Interest?



The SC ruled that "the case must be remanded to determine whether or not Juan isa real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in

controversy.

It bears stressing that the legal personality of petitioner Juan to bring thenullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo IIis not a legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in1992, his only surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and theirson, Teofilo II. Under the law on succession, successional rights aretransmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the compulsory

heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs inArticle 887, CC. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does notfall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to theestate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

xxx

xxx Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner Juan succeeds to the otherhalf of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widowpursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes Juan a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceasedbrother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be voidab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.

However, If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legallyadopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to ask for the nullity

of marriage of his deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is basedon the ground that he has no successional right to be protected, hence, doesnot have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may befound to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This isbecause the presence of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.



Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits todetermine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But theRTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack ofcause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate,illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother ofpetitioner.(Carlos vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008)

ISIDRO ABLAZAvs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 158298 August 11,2010BERSAMIN,J.FACTS:On October 17, 2000, the petitioner, Isidro Ablaza filed in the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) inCataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of theabsolute nullity of the marriagecontracted on December 26, 1949 between hislate brother Cresenciano Ablaza and LeonilaHonato. The petitioner allegedthat the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had beencelebratedwithout a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,1950,thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having beensolemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the survivingbrother of Cresenciano who had died without anyissue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death,therebymaking him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,could impugnthe validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila atany time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being voidab initio.

ISSUE:Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek thedeclaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.

HELD:

The Court Ruled that, being good for no legal purpose other than remarriage,a void marriageinvalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which thefact of marriage may be material,either direct or collateral, in any civil courtbetween any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either orboth the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the factsrenderingsuch marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by thecourts." It isnot like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally



attacked except in direct proceedinginstituted during the lifetime of theparties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot beimpeached, andis made goodab initio

Aurelio vs Aurelio, G. R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011

Facts: Petitioner Danilo Aurelio and respondent Vda. Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March 23,1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed

with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition,respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing andcomplying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that suchstate of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of their marriage ceremony.Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue: May the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to be waived pursuant toSupreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10?

Ruling: This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10 has modifiedthe Molina guidelines, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the SolicitorGeneral required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 of the Family Codemandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned on behalf of the State to takesteps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated orsuppressed.

G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

DANILO A. AURELIO, Petitioner,

vs.VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision2 and October 26, 2006 Resolution,

3 of the

Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on March

23, 1988. They have two sons, namely: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.

On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch

94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.4 In her petition, respondent alleged that

both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/jun2011/gr_175367_2011.html#fnt1

















their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of

psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony.

Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of theFamily Code which provides:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall

likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

As succinctly summarized by the CA, contained in respondent’s petition are the following

allegations, to wit:

x x x The said petition alleged, inter alia, that both husband and wife are psychologically

incapable of performing and complying with their essential marital obligations. Said

psychological incapacity was existing prior and at the time of the marriage. Said psychologicalincapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and

incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousyand distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He

refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. He refused to foot the household bills and provide for his family’s needs. He exhibited arrogance. He was completely insensitive to the

feelings of his wife. He liked to humiliate and embarrass his wife even in the presence of their

children.

Vida Aurelio, on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her

feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she

cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset

when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostilitytowards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essentialobligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. Private respondent manifested

psychological aversion to cohabit with her husband or to take care of him. The psychological

make-up of private respondent was evaluated by a psychologist, who found that the psychological incapacity of both husband and wife to perform their marital obligations is grave,

incorrigible and incurable. Private respondent suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder with

Narcissistic features; whereas petitioner suffers from passive aggressive (negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume the normal

obligations of a marriage.5

On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss6 the petition. Petitioner principally

argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set

by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

On January 14, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 7 denying petitioner’s motion.

On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however,

denied by the RTC in an Order 8 dated December 17, 2003. In denying petitioner’s motion, the



















RTC ruled that respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of marriage complied with the

requirements of the Molina doctrine, and whether or not the allegations are meritorious would

depend upon the proofs presented by both parties during trial, to wit:

A review of the petition shows that it observed the requirements in Republic vs. Court of

Appeals (268 SCRA 198), otherwise known as the Molina Doctrine. There was allegation of theroot cause of the psychological incapacity of both the petitioner and the respondent contained in

paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition. The manifestation of juridical antecedence was alleged in

paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition. The allegations constituting the gravity of psychologicalincapacity were alleged in paragraph 9 (a to l) of the petition. The incurability was alleged in

paragraph 10 of the petition. Moreover, the clinical finding of incurability was quoted in

paragraph 15 of the petition. There is a cause of action presented in the petition for the

nullification of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Whether or not the allegations are meritorious depends upon the proofs to be presented by both

parties. This, in turn, will entail the presentation of evidence which can only be done in the

hearing on the merits of the case. If the Court finds that there are (sic) preponderance of evidenceto sustain a nullification, then the cause of the petition shall fail. Conversely, if it finds, through

the evidence that will be presented during the hearing on the merits, that there are sufficient proofs to warrant nullification, the Court shall declare its nullity.

9

On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the CA via petition forcertiorar i

10 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

On October 6, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition, the dispositive portionof which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [the] instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11

In a Resolution dated October 26, 2004, the CA dismissed petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration.

In its Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and held that respondent’s complaint for

declaration of nullity of marriage when scrutinized in juxtaposition with Article 36 of the FamilyCode and the Molina doctrine revealed the existence of a sufficient cause of action.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising two issues for this Court’s consideration, to wit:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLE

LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ALLEGATIONSCONTAINED IN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF THE NULLITY OF















MARRIAGE ARE SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO DECLARE THE NULLITY

OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN VIDA AND DANILO.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE APPLICABLELAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR

CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO

DISMISS BY THE TRIAL COURT IS PATENTLY AND UTTERLY TAINTED WITHGRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION; AND THAT APPEAL IN DUE COURSE IS NOT A PLAIN,

ADEQUATE OR SPEEDY REMEDY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 12

Before anything else, it bears to point out that had respondent’s complaint been filed after March

15, 2003, this present petition would have been denied since Supreme Court AdministrativeMatter No. 02-11-10

13 prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss in actions for annulment of

marriage. Be that as it may, after a circumspect review of the arguments raised by petitionerherein, this Court finds that the petition is not meritorious.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14

this Court created the Molina guidelines to aid the courts in

the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity, to wit:

(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically

identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly

explained in the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the

marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of

the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 ofthe same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital

obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in thetext of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the CatholicChurch in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect

by our courts.














(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General

to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless theSolicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, brieflystating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, tothe petition.

15

This Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10, has modified the

above pronouncements, particularly Section 2(d) thereof, stating that the certification of the

Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed with to avoid delay. Still, Article 48 ofthe Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be

on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that

evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.16

Petitioner anchors his petition on the premise that the allegations contained in respondent’s

petition are insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological

incapacity. Specifically, petitioner contends that the petition failed to comply with three of the

Molina guidelines, namely: that the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be alleged inthe complaint; that such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to

assume the essential obligations of marriage; and that the non-complied marital obligation must be stated in the petition.

17

First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychologicalincapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of

respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the

complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert

psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.

Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature asto bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with

Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive

(Negativistic) Personality Disorder.lawph!1 The incapacity of both parties to perform theirmarital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.

Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with

were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition,

respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that "the husband

and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and rendermutual help and support."

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically incapacitatedto fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first instance. A perusal

of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation wherein the parties

have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision has been reached bythe court after due hearing. Such process can be gleaned from guidelines 2, 6 and 8, which refer

to a decision rendered by the RTC after trial on the merits. It would certainly be too burdensome















to ask this Court to resolve at first instance whether the allegations contained in the petition are

sufficient to substantiate a case for psychological incapacity. Let it be remembered that each case

involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.

Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings

of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

18

Itwould thus be more prudent for this Court to remand the case to the RTC, as it would be in the best position to scrutinize the evidence as well as hear and weigh the evidentiary value of the

testimonies of the ordinary witnesses and expert witnesses presented by the parties.

Given the allegations in respondent’s petition for nullity of marriage, this Court rules that the

RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. By

grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as isequivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse

of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of

passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a

positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplationof law.19

Even assuming arguendo that this Court were to agree with petitioner that the

allegations contained in respondent’s petition are insufficient and that the RTC erred in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, the same is merely an error of judgment correctible by appeal andnot an abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.

20

Finally, the CA properly dismissed petitioner’s petition. As a general rule, the denial of a motionto dismiss, which is an interlocutory order, is not reviewable by certiorari. Petitioner’s remedy is

to reiterate the grounds in his motion to dismiss, as defenses in his answer to the petition for

nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in duetime.

21 The existence of that adequate remedy removed the underpinnings of his petition for

certiorari in the CA.22

WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision

and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82238, areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; elements. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the

Family Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance ofmarital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials

of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the

conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation

and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychologicalabnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married

person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due

to some psychological illness. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.
















http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/november2012/159594.pdf













Marriage; psychological incapacity; expert evidence; thorough and in-depth assessment required.

The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on

psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence

of psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No.

159594. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; proof of natal or disabling supervening factor required. It is

not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty incomplying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a

natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent’s

personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital

obligations – must be shown. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; Santos and Molina guidelines. The pronouncements in

Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the

psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of

evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the

existence of the psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos,

Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; three basic requirements. To entitle petitioner spouse to a

declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse’s psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior

to the time of the marriage. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.

G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DEQUINTOS, .JR., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals

(CA) affirmed the declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen, Pangasinanof the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. (Eduardo) and

Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's psychological incapacity under

Article 36 of the Family Code.















http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_159594_2012.html#fnt1












We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a

marriage on the ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently established.

Antecedents

Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the MunicipalMayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to Catalina’s

hysterectomy following her second miscarriage.3

On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage ,4 citing

Catalina’s psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina didnot interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal house

and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation, the public

prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and Catalina.6

Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged in

petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that shespent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores andcaring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances as an

overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in 1997 to live

with Bobbie Castro, her paramour .7

Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle L.

Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina,8 Dr. Reyes opined that

Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no longer treatable. Dr.

Reyes found that Catalina’s disorder was mainly characterized by her immaturity that rendered

her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations.9

Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation,10

whereby she

admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without Eduardo’sconsent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in partner; and

that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she intended to live there

or to receive her share should the residence be sold.11

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos Santos deQuintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.











































2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the marriage

of the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in accordance with this

decision.

SO ORDERED.12

The RTC ruled that Catalina’s infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with

her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her

duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the matterof determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to experts like

Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the best evidence of

Catalina’s psychological incapacity.13

Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES’ MARRIAGE NULL ANDVOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS’ PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.

On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The CA

concluded that Eduardo proved Catalina’s psychological incapacity, observing that the results ofthe neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had been

"mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital obligations;"

and that Catalina’s psychological incapacity had been medically identified, sufficiently proven,

duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.

Issue

In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA

gravely erred because:

I

THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINA’S ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS

ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE

TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE

CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO

BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

III











ABANDONMENT OF ONE’S FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL

SEPARATION.

IV

GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE ASYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.

V

THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR.ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINA’S

INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF

MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.14

The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform to the

guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);

15

and thatCatalina’s refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and theiradopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the declaration of

nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect to perform her

marital obligations.

The OSG further argues that Catalina’s infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of theconjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof

that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment

would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the

neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalina’s psychological

incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into Catalina’s past life,attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged psychological incapacity; that

there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged psychological incapacity; and thatthere appeared to be a collusion between the parties inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the

trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.

The OSG postulated that Catalina’s unsupportive in-laws and Eduardo’s overseas deployment

that had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the couple’s relationship

and forced her to seek her friends’ emotional support and company; and that her ambivalent

attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her inability to bear children of herown.

Issue

The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity ofCatalina’s marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the

Family Code.

Ruling











We grant the petition for review.

Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity orinability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the

difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:

(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer tothe essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the

rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability

must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his orher responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must

be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.16

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17

we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a

mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such

as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity,

juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may arise in

deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, we thenlaid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,18

viz:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any

doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and

against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.

x x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically

identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly

explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be

physical. x x x.

x x x x

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the

marriage. x x x.

x x x x

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent orincurable. x x x.

x x x x

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood

changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. x x x.















x x x x

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 ofthe Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of

the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital

obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in thetext of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the CatholicChurch in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect

by our courts. x x x.

x x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Generalto appear as counsel for the state. x x x.

19

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guidesin deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has

declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of

each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20

Indeed, theincapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial,

21 making it

incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the psychological

incapacity.22

Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained the

gravity and severity of Catalina’s psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to the

celebration of their marriage.

23

We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement ofsufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalina’s purported

psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty evidence

that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.

To start with, Catalina’s supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors, leaving

the house without Eduardo’s consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take care of theiradopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo presented no other

witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his testimony was self-serving

and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a serious matter that was submitted to acourt of law.

Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-psychologicalevaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support the claim of

Catalina’s psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following portion of the

report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:























REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly byimmaturity in several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal

relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship that

involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be attended to

as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people however usually do

not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from their mistakes, and theyhave the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their own lives and that of their

families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern of traits cannot be expected to

have lasting and successful relationships as required in marriage. It is expected that even with

future relationships, things will not work out.

Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this be

the background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also end up

as such.

x x x x

With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendantmade, it is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of heras a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of a very

immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up and meet

the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably failed to fulfillher role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her duties inherent in

marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and behavior of defendant will

still change because her traits have developed through the years and already ingrained withinher .24

Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of Catalina’ssupposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr. Reyes a source

of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a brief and general

description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the report and courttestimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have brought about

such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of Catalina’s various acts or

omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss

the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic marital duties. Dr.Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and immature, and that her childishness and

immaturity could no longer be treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond

maturity."25

Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of

marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment ofthe parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and











The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her

abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of

the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of

the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the nullity

of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a showing thatsuch marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completelyunable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

33 Needless to state, Eduardo did not

adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of factual and legal basis.

Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina. The

assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of P50,000.00

as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his petition or to bringany action on her part,

34 to wit:

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG

Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant,

Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I noticedthat she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?

A No, sir.

Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attendthe hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not?

A No, sir. I did not.

Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this

case?

A None, sir.

Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount of

P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?

A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.

Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your marriage?

A Yes, sir.

Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?

A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.











Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of

marriage which you filed against her?

A She does not opposed [sic], sir.

Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division ofyour conjugal properties?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal properties,so that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the case you filed

against her, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she is no

longer around here?

A Yes sir, it could be.35

Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and

Eduardo.1âwphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of

conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she wasunwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly gave

her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition of her

unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not he did soalso to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing the petition for

nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in determining the issue of

collusion between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of Catalina,

we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its

dissolution and nullity.36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision theCourt of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration of

nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

Costs to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.











G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012

ARABELLE J. MENDOZA, Petitioner,vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DOMINIC C. MENDOZA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J.:

To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality ofthe evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was

grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.

Petitioner wife appeals the decision promulgated on March 19, 2003,1 whereby the Court of

Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City (RTC)

declaring her marriage with respondent Dominic C. Mendoza (Dominic) as null and void.

Antecedents

Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in

Papua New Guinea. They had been next-door neighbors in the appartelle they were renting while

they were still in college – she, at Assumption College while he, at San Beda College taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their

intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca.They got married on her eighth month of pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City on

June 24, 1991,2 after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their

parents for support.

When petitioner delivered Alyssa Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds from petitioner’s best

friend to settle the hospital bills. He remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support

until he finished his college course in October 1993. She took on various jobs to meet the

family’s needs, first as a part-time aerobics instructor in 1992 and later, in 1993, as a full-timeemployee in Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company. Being the one with the fixed income, she

shouldered all of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational

needs).

On his part, Dominic sold Collier’s Encyclopedia for three months after his graduation from

college before he started working as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in Bel-Air, Makati in1994.3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends

inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their child’s schooling because his

irregular income could not be depended upon. In September 1994, she discovered his illicitrelationship with Zaida, his co-employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between

them became rare until they started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual

relationship.4



















In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present. Later on, he

asked her to issue two blank checks that he claimed would be for the car’s insurance coverage.

She soon found out, however, that the checks were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage butfor his personal needs. Worse, she also found out that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her

to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car, leaving her to bear the balance of

P120,000.00.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with

P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of BatasPambansa Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. After petitioner and

her mother bailed him out of jail, petitioner discovered that he had also swindled many clients

some of whom were even threatening petitioner, her mother and her sister themselves.5

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for

"time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,

causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house

to live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity ofher marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family

Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition.

Ruling of the RTC

In the RTC, petitioner presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr.

Rocheflume Samson, and Professor Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during

trial and presented no evidence.

On August 18, 2000, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and Dominic an absolute

nullity,6 holding in part:

xxx. The result of Dr. Samson’s clinical evaluation as testified to by her and per Psychiatric

Report she issued together with one Dr. Doris Primero showed that petitioner appears to bemature, strong and responsible individual. Godly, childlike trust however, makes her vulnerable

and easy to forgive and forget. Petitioner also believes that marriage was a partnership "for better

and for worse", she gave all of herself unconditionally to respondent. Unfortunately, respondent

cannot reciprocate. On the one hand, respondent was found to have a personality that can becharacterized as inadequate, immature and irresponsible. His criminal acts in the present time are

mere extensions of his misconduct established in childhood. His childhood experiences of

separations and emotional deprivation largely contributed to this antisocial (sociopathic) attitude

and lifestyle.

She concluded that respondent had evidently failed to comply with what is required of him as ahusband and father. Besides from his adulterous relationship and irresponsibility, his malevolent

conduct and lack of true remorse indicate that he is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the

role of a married man.7















The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity, antecedence

and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina),8 were attendant,

establishing Dominic’s psychological incapacity, viz:

Gravity — from the evidence adduced it can be said that respondent cannot carry out the normal

and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing underordinary circumstances of life and work. Respondent is totally incapable of observing mutual

love, respect and fidelity as well as to provide support to his wife and child. Ever since the start

of the marriage respondent had left all the household concerns and the care of their child to petitioner while he studied and indulged in night outs with friends. This continued even when he

finished his studies and landed a job. He concealed his salary from the petitioner and worse, had

the gall to engage in sexual infidelity. Likewise worthy of serious consideration is respondent’s

propensity to borrow money, his deceitfulness and habitual and continuous evasion of hisobligations which (sic) more often than not had led to the filing of criminal cases against him.

Antecedence — Before the marriage petitioner was not aware of respondent’s personality

disorder and it was only after marriage that it begun to surface. Dr. Samson declared thatrespondent’s behavioral equilibrium started at a very early age of fifteen. His dishonesty and lack

of remorse are mere extensions of his misconduct in childhood which generally attributable torespondent’s childhood experiences of separation and emotional deprivations. In fine, his

psychological incapacity is but a product of some genetic causes, faulty parenting and influence

of the environment although its over manifestation appear only after the wedding.

Incurability — Respondent’s personality disorder having existed in him long before he

contracted marriage with petitioner, there appears no chance for respondent to recover any (sic)

ordinary means from such incapacity.

All told, the callous and irresponsible ways of respondent show that he does not possess the proper outlook, disposition and temperament necessary for marriage. Indeed, this ultimaterecourse of nullity is the only way by which petitioner can be delivered from the bondage of a

union that only proved to be a mockery and brought pain and dishonor to petitioner .9

Ruling of the CA

The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s personality

traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were of

the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert

witness, while persuasive, was not conclusive upon the court; and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases

brought against Dominic.10

On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the

RTC.11

Specifically, it refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of petitioner’s expert

witness, holding:



















It has not been established to our satisfaction as well that respondent’s condition, assuming it is

serious enough, was present before or during the celebration of the marriage. Although

petitioner’s expert witness concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated even before the parties’ marriage, the Court refuses to be bound by such finding, in view of the fact

that the witness’ findings, admittedly, were concluded only on the basis of information given by

the petitioner herself, who, at the time of the examination, interview, was already head strong inher resolve to have her marriage with the respondent nullified, and harbored ill-feelings againstrespondent throughout her consultation with Dr. Samson.

12

The CA held the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses insufficient to establish Dominic’s

psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically

rooted. Relying on the pronouncements in Republic v. Dagdag,13

Hernandez v. Court of

Appeals14

and Pesca v. Pesca,15

the CA observed:

In her testimony, petitioner described her husband as immature, deceitful and without remorse

for his dishonesty, and lack of affection. Such characteristics, however, do not necessarily

constitute a case of psychological incapacity. A person’s inability to share or take responsibility,or to feel remorse for his misbehavior, or even to share his earnings with family members, are

indicative of an immature mind, but not necessarily a medically rooted psychological afflictionthat cannot be cured.

Even the respondent’s alleged sexual infidelity is not necessarily equivalent to psychologicalincapacity, although it may constitute adequate ground for an action for legal separation under

Article 55 of the Family Code. Nor does the fact that the respondent is a criminal suspect for

estafa or violation of the B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes a ground for the nullification of his marriage to

petitioner. Again, it may constitute ground for legal separation provided the respondent isconvicted by final judgment and sentenced to imprisonment of more than six (6) years.

16

Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

Issues

Petitioner assails the CA’s refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and psychiatric evaluation

she had presented in the trial of the case, and the CA’s reliance on the pronouncements inDagdag, Hernandez and Pesca, supra. She contends that the report on the psychiatric evaluation

conducted by Dr. Samson more than complied with the requirements prescribed in Santos v.

Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20) and Molina. She insists that

the CA should have applied the ruling in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000,343 SCRA 755) to the effect that personal medical or psychological examination was not a

requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

Ruling

The appeal has no merit.






















We consider the CA’s refusal to accord credence and weight to the psychiatric report to be well

taken and warranted. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards

Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson, furnished the basis todoubt the findings of her expert witness; that such findings were one-sided, because Dominic

was not himself subjected to an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert; and that he

also did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptionsand characterizations of him rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.

Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to resort to other people in order

to verify the facts derived from petitioner about Dominic’s psychological profile considering the

ill-feelings she harbored towards him. It turned out, however, that the only people she

interviewed about Dominic were those whom petitioner herself referred, as the followingtestimony indicated:

Fiscal Zalameda

Q: So you’re saying that the petitioner have an ill-feeling towards the respondent? At the time

you interviewed?

A: Yes, Sir, during the first interview.

Q: How about during the subsequent interview?

A: During the subsequent interview more or less the petitioner was able to talk regarding her

marital problems which is uncomfort(able), so she was able to adapt, she was able to condition

herself regarding her problems, Sir.

Q: But the ill-feeling was still there?

A: But the feeling was still there, Sir.

Q: Now, considering that this ill feeling of the petitioner insofar as the respondent is concerned,

would you say that the petitioner would only tell you information negative against the

respondent?

A: Yes, may be Sir. But I do try to conduct or verify other people the facts given to me by the

petitioner, Sir.

Q: And these other people were also people given to you or the name are given to you by the

petitioner, Madame Witness?

A: Yes, Sir .17

In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally cast serious doubt on Dr.

Samson’s findings. The CA rightly refused to accord probative value to the testimony of such







expert for being avowedly given to show compliance with the requirements set in Santos and

Molina for the establishment of Dominic’s psychological incapacity.

The CA’s reliance on Dagdag, Hernandez and Pesca was not misplaced. It is easy to see why.

In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that theroot cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently

proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged

psychological incapacity of her husband."18

But here, the expert’s testimony on Dominic’s psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root cause of his psychological

incapacity because said expert did not examine Dominic in person before completing her report

but simply relied on other people’s recollection and opinion for that purpose.

In Hernandez, we ruminated that:

xxx expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private

respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception ofthe marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. TheCourt is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the

basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any

doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.19

but the expert evidence submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed

psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the psychological incapacity existedat the inception of the marriage.

The Court in Pesca observed that:

At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her

evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone atthe time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.

Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychologicalincapacity.

20

Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the absence of the medical

expert’s testimony alone that was crucial but rather petitioners’ failure to satisfactorily discharge

the burden of showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the marriage.

In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such incapacity at and prior to the time of themarriage was the crucial consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical andunderstandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the

psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,

gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highlyadvisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of



















marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in

determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to

sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examinationof the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case

presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by

the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

Petitioner’s view that the Court in Marcos stated that the personal medical or psychological

examination of respondent spouse therein was not a requirement for the declaration of his psychological incapacity

22 is not entirely accurate. To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as

follows:

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos

v. Court of Appeals: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical

antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician

examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be

"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that canadequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence

presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medicalexamination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine quanon in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical

examination of Dominic was to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was

enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity. This did not mean that the

presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychologicalincapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of

nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence ofevidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition," as the Court said inMarcos.

But where, like here, the parties had the full opportunity to present the professional and expertopinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged

psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be presented and be weighed by the trial

courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages.

It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always base their

judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality ofevidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.

23

We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered

from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the CA did not

err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.










fees in the amount of P150 defendant took the case directly to this Court attributing five errors to

the court below. This implies that the facts are not disputed.

The important facts which need to be considered in relation to the errors assigned appear well

narrated in the decision of the court below which, for purposes of this appeal, are quoted

hereunder:

On November 19, 1937, plaintiff Salud R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier had their

marriage solemnized by Judge Mariano Nable of the Municipal Court of Manila. At thetime of their marriage, they had already begotten a son named Alfredo Javier, Junior who

was born on December 2, 1931. Sometime in 1938, defendant Alfredo Javier left for the

United States on board a ship of the United States Navy, for it appears that he had joinedthe United States Navy since 1927, such that at time of his marriage with plaintiff Salud

R. Arca, defendant Alfredo Javier was already an enlisted man in the United States Navy.

Because of defendant Alfredo Javier's departure for the United States in 1938, his wife,

Salud R. Arca, who is from (Maragondon), Cavite, chose to live with defendant's parents

at Naic, Cavite. But for certain incompatibility of character (frictions having occurred between plaintiff Salud R. Arca's and defendant's folks) plaintiff Salud R. Arca had found

it necessary to leave defendant's parents' abode and transfer her residence to(Maragondon), Cavite — her native place Since then the relation between plaintiff Salud

R. Arca and defendant Alfredo Javier became strained such that on August 13, 1940

defendant Alfredo Javier brought an action for divorce against Salud R. Arca before the

Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, docketed as civil case No.14313 of that court and marked as Exhibit 2(c) in this case. Having received a copy of the

complaint for divorce on September 23, 1940, plaintiff Salud R. Arca — answering the

complaint — alleged in her answer that she received copy of the complaint on September23, 1940 although she was directed to file her answer thereto on or before September 13,

1940. In that answer she filed, plaintiff Salud R. Arca averred among other things that

defendant Alfredo Javier was not a resident of Mobile County, State of Alabama, for the

period of twelve months preceding the institution of the complaint, but that he was aresident of Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Another averment of interest, which is essential to

relate here, is that under paragraph 5 of her answer to the complaint for divorce, Salud R.

Arca alleged that it was not true that the cause of their separation was desertion on her part but that if defendant Alfredo Javier was in the United States at that time and she was

not with him then it was because he was in active duty as an enlisted man of the United

States Navy, as a consequence of which he had to leave for the United States without her.She further alleged that since his departure from the Philippines for the United States, he

had always supported her and her co-plaintiff Alfredo Javier Junior through allotments

made by the Navy Department of the United States Government. She denied,

furthermore, the allegation that she had abandoned defendant's home at Naic, Cavite, andtheir separation was due to physical impossibility for they were separated by about

10,000 miles from each other. At this juncture, under the old Civil Code the wife is not

bound to live with her husband if the latter has gone to ultra-marine colonies. Plaintiff

Salud R. Arca, in her answer to the complaint for divorce by defendant Alfredo Javier, prayed that the complaint for divorce be dismissed. However, notwithstanding Salud R.

Arca's averments in her answer, contesting the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Mobile



County, State of Alabama, to take cognizance of the divorce proceeding filed by

defendant Alfredo Javier, as shown by her answer marked Exhibit 2(d ), nevertheless the

Circuit Court of Mobile County rendered judgment decreeing dissolution of the marriageof Salud R. Arca and Alfredo Javier, and granting the latter a decree of divorce dated

April 9, 1941, a certified copy of which is marked Exhibit 2(f). Thereupon, the evidence

discloses that some time in 1946 defendant Alfredo Javier returned to the Philippines butwent back to the United States.

In July, 1941 — that is after securing a divorce from plaintiff Salud R. Arca on April 9,1941 — defendant Alfredo Javier married Thelma Francis, an American citizen, and

bought a house and lot at 248 Brooklyn, New York City. In 1949, Thelma Francis,

defendant's American wife, obtained a divorce from him for reasons not disclosed by the

evidence, and, later on, having retired from the United States Navy, defendant AlfredoJavier returned to the Philippines, arriving here on February 13, 1950. After his arrival in

the Philippines, armed with two decrees of divorce — one against his first wife Salud R.

Arca and the other against him by his second wife Thelma Francis — issued by the

Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama, USA, defendant Alfredo Javiermarried Maria Odvina before Judge Natividad Almeda-Lopez of the Municipal Court of

Manila on April 19, 1950, marked Exhibit 2(b).

At the instance of plaintiff Salud R. Arca an information for bigamy was filed by the City

Fiscal of Manila on July 25, 1950 against defendant Alfredo Javier with the Court of First

Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 13310 and marked Exhibit 2(a).However, defendant Alfredo Javier was acquitted of the charge of Bigamy in a decision

rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila through Judge Alejandro J. Panlilio,

dated August 10, 1951, predicated on the proposition that the marriage of defendantAlfredo Javier with Maria Odvina was made in all good faith and in the honest belief that

his marriage with plaintiff Salud R. Arca had been legally dissolved by the decree of

divorce obtained by him from the Circuit Court of Mobile County, State of Alabama,

USA which had the legal effect of dissolving the marital ties between defendant AlfredoJavier and plaintiff Salud R. Arca. At this juncture, again, it is this court's opinion that

defendant Alfredo Javier's acquittal in that Criminal Case No. 13310 of the Court of First

Instance of Manila by Judge Panlilio was due to the fact that the accused had no criminalintent in contracting a second or subsequent marriage while his first marriage was still

subsisting.

Appellant was a native born citizen of the Philippines who, in 1937, married Salud R. Arca,

another Filipino citizen. Before their marriage they had already a child, Alfredo Javier, Jr., who

thereby became legitimated. In 1927 appellant enlisted in the U.S. Navy and in 1938 sailed for

the United States aboard a navy ship in connection with his service leaving behind his wife andchild, and on August 13, 1940, he filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mobile

County, Alabama, U.S.A., alleging as ground abandonment by his wife. Having received a copy

of the complaint, Salud R. Arca filed an answer alleging, among other things, that appellant wasnot a resident of Mobile County, but of Naic, Cavite, Philippines, and that it was not true that the

cause of their separation was abandonment on her part but that appellant was in the United

States, without her, because he was then enlisted in the U.S. Navy. Nevertheless, the Circuit



Court of Mobile County rendered judgment granting appellant a decree of divorce on April 9,

1941.

The issue now to be determined is: Does this decree have a valid effect in this jurisdiction?

The issue is not new. This court has had already occasion to pass upon questions of similarnature in a number of cases and its ruling has invariably been to deny validity to the decree. In

essence, it was held that one of the essential conditions for the validity of a decree of divorce is

that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and in order that this may beacquired, plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith in the State in which it is granted (Cousins

Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, 856). Most recent of such cases is Sikat vs. Canson , 67 Phil., 207,

which involves a case of divorce also based on the ground of desertion. In that case, John Cansonclaimed not only that he had legal residence in the State of Nevada, where the action was

brought, but he was an American citizen, although it was proven that his wife never

accompanied him there but has always remained in the Philippines, and so it has been held that

"it is not ... the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers jurisdiction upon a court, but

his legal residence within the State." The court further said: "And assuming that John Cansonacquired legal residence in the State of Nevada through the approval of his citizenship papers,

this would not confer jurisdiction on the Nevada court to grant divorce that would be valid in this jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction that could determine their matrimonial status, because the wife was

still domiciled in the Philippines. The Nevada court never acquired jurisdiction over her person."

It is true that Salud R. Arca filed an answer in the divorce case instituted at the Mobile County in

view of the summons served upon her in this jurisdiction, but this action cannot be interpreted as

placing her under the jurisdiction of the court because its only purpose was to impugn the claim

of appellant that his domicile or legal residence at that time was Mobile County, and to show thatthe ground of desertion imputed to her was baseless and false. Such answer should be considered

as a special appearance the purpose of which is to impugn the jurisdiction of the court over thecase.

In deciding the Canson case, this court did not overlook the other cases previously decided on

the matter, but precisely took good note of them. Among the cases invoked are Ramirez vs.Gmur , 42 Phil. 855; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851, and Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales,

58 Phil., 67. In the cases just mentioned, this court laid down the following doctrines:

It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in which

neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may resort merely

for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonialstatus; and a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59 L. R. A., 143) The voluntary appearance of the

defendant before such a tribunal does not invest the court with jurisdiction. (Andrews vs.

Andrews, 188 U. S., 14; 47 L. ed., 366.)

It follows that, to give a court jurisdiction on the ground of the plaintiff's residence in theState or country of the judicial forum, his residence must be bona fide. If a spouse leaves

the family domicile and goes to another State for the sole purpose of obtaining a divorce,



and with no intention of remaining, his residence there is not sufficient to confer

jurisdiction on the courts of the State. This is especially true where the cause of divorce is

one not recognized by the laws of the State of his own domicile. (14 Cyc. 817, 181.)"(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 82 Phil., 855.)

But even if his residence had been taken up is good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not

binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of

Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by

counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person. (Cousins Hix vs.

Fluemer, 55 Phil., 851.)

At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine

Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose

of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction upon

the court of the State to dissolve the bonds of matrimony in which he had entered in1919. (Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)

In the light of the foregoing authorities, it cannot therefore be said that the Mobile County Court

of Alabama had acquired jurisdiction over the case for the simple reason that at the time it was

filed appellant's legal residence was then in the Philippines. He could not have acquired legalresidence or domicile at Mobile County when he moved to that place in 1938 because at that

time he was still in the service of the U.S. Navy and merely rented a room where he used to stay

during his occasional shore leave for shift duty. That he never intended to live there permanently

is shown by the fact that after his marriage to Thelma Francis in 1941, he moved to New Yorkwhere he bought a house and a lot, and after his divorce from Thelma in 1949 and his retirement

from the U.S. Navy, he returned to the Philippines and married Maria Odvina of Naic, Cavite,where he lived ever since. It may therefore be said that appellant went to Mobile County, notwith the intention of permanently residing there, or of considering that place as his permanent

abode, but for the sole purpose of obtaining divorce from his wife. Such residence is not

sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.

It is claimed that the Canson case cannot be invoked as authority or precedent in the present case

for the reason that the Haddeck case which was cited by the court in the course of the decisionwas reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Williams vs. North

Carolina, 317 U.S. 287. This claim is not quite correct, for the Haddeck case was merely cited as

authority for the statement that a divorce case is not a proceeding in rem, and the reversal did not

necessarily overrule the ruling laid down therein that before a court may acquire jurisdiction overa divorce case, it is necessary that plaintiff be domiciled in the State in which it is filed. (Cousins

Hix vs. Fluemer, supra.) At any rate, the applicability of the ruling in the Canson case may be

justified on another ground: The courts in the Philippines can grant divorce only on the ground of

adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, and if the decree is predicated on another ground, that decree cannot be enforced in this jurisdiction. Said the Court

in the Canson case:



. . . In Barretto Gonzales vs. Gonzales (55 Phil., 67), we observed:

. . . While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity offoreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack

of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not overlooked the provisions of

the Civil Code now enforced in these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:

"The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal

capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreigncountry."

"And Article 11, the last part of which reads

". . . prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended

to promote public order and good morals shall not be rendered without effect by anyforeign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign

country."

"It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the

Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and

under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce."

The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of "adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as provided for under section

1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was granted on the ground of

desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws. That our divorce law, Act No.

2710, is too strict or too liberal is not for this court decide. (Barretto Gonzales vs.

Gonzales, supra). The allotment of powers between the different governmental agenciesrestricts the judiciary within the confines of interpretation, not of legislation. The

legislative policy on the matter of divorce in this jurisdiction is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710 and has been upheld by this court (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252;

Garcia Valdez vs. Soterana Tuazon, 40 Phil., 943-952; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855;

Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43 Phil., 216; Fernandez vs. De Castro, 48 Phil., 123; Gorayeb

vs. Hashim, supra; Francisco vs. Tayao, 50 Phil., 42; Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian NgShun and Lim Tingco, 52 Phil., 571; Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer, supra; and Barretto

Gonzales vs. Gonzales, supra).

The above pronouncement is sound as it is in keeping with the well known principle of Private

International Law which prohibits the extension of a foreign judgment, or the law affecting the

same, if it is contrary to the law or fundamental policy of the State of the forum. (Minor, Conflict

of Laws, pp. 8-14). It is also in keeping with our concept or moral values which has alwayslooked upon marriage as an institution. And such concept has actually crystallized in a more

tangible manner when in the new Civil Code our people, through Congress, decided to eliminate

altogether our law relative to divorce. Because of such concept we cannot but react adversely toany attempt to extend here the effect of a decree which is not in consonance with our customs,



morals, and traditions. (Article 11, old Civil Code; Articles 15 and 17, new Civil Code; Gonzales

vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil., 67.)

With regard to the plea of appellant that Salud R. Arca had accused him of the crime of bigamy

and consequently she forfeited her right to support, and that her child Alfredo Javier, Jr. is not

also entitled to support because he has already reached his age of majority, we do not need toconsider it here, it appearing that these questions have already been passed upon in G. R. No. L-

6706.1 These questions were resolved against the pretense of appellant.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

ENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAÑO Case Digest

TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAÑO

FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of coursewithout the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriagewas celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted achurch wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration because she heardthat Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship wentsour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce andshe subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.

In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged thatEscaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged fromhim hence he’s asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did notgrant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of

counter-claim by the Escaños.

ISSUE:Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar. Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escaño were valid. Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escaño may beinvoked by Tenchavez as a ground for

legal separation.

HELD: Yes.

On the part of Tenchavez:

His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result topublic humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling themarriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the samewas dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’sparents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claimcannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge ofTenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable toremarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to bepaid by Escaño and not her parents.



On the part of Escaño’s parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños isunfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, thesame could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,

lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and hasbeen correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of anyimproper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded fromP45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only. The Supreme Court held that the divorce is notvalid, making the second marriage void sincemarriageties of Escaño and Tenchaves is existing.Tenchavez can file a petition for legalseparationbecause Escaño committed sexual infidelity because ofthe fact that she had childrenwith the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of thegrounds for legal separation.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. Case Digest

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.139 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, thewife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She latermarried Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, BranchLXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an accounting of her business,which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with aright to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss thecomplaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in

the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no“community property”.

Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipinawife and American husband held binding upon the latter.

Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can beno question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. Thedecree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, asher husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationalityprinciple under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the

policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce inNevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus,pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He wouldhave no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise controlover conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own representation before the Nevadacourt from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continueto be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.



PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA174 SCRA 653FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina andtherespondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, weremarried atFriedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After aboutthree and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceedingagainst Pilapil in Germanyin January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action forlegal separation, support andseparation of property before RTC of Manila inJanuary 23, 1983 where it is stillpending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986,the local Court of Germanypromulgated a divorce decree on the ground offailure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child,Isabella PilapilGeiling, was granted to petitioner.On June 27, 1986, private respondent filedtwo complaints for adultery alleging that,while still married to respondent,petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chiaand Jesus Chua sometime

in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The respondent city fiscalapproved a resolutiondirecting the filing of two complaints for adultery againstpetitioner.Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to deferherarraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merelyreset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date,petitioner movedfor the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987,respondent judge deniedthe motion to quash and also directed thearraignment of both accused. Petitionerrefused to be arraigned and thuscharged with direct contempt and fined.ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against

thepetitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior tothe filingof charges.HELD:The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage

theperson who can legally file the complaint should only be the offendedspouse. Thefact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in hiscountry in 1983, isadmitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, withrelation to the status of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal

separation of the petitionerand respondent has been finalized through thecourts in Germany and the RTC inManila, the marriage of the couple werealready finished, thus giving no merit to thecharges the respondent filedagainst the petitioner. Private respondent, being nolonger married topetitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery case asthe offendedspouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restrainingorder issuedin this case was made permanent.



PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et alG.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a

German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, suchconnubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in

Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on

the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for

adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,Pilapil ―had an affair with a certain William Chia.‖ The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding

investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution

directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled ―PP

Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia‖ was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judgeIbay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed

this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the

annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital

relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery,

considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE andanother one entered DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in

this case … is hereby made permanent.

NO

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a swornwritten complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with

unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a

formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it

necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to doso at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison

d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to

be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.



Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a

criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be

unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the

Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognizedin the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle

in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale,

private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing tocommence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he

filed suit.

Quita case on PDF

LORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS Case Digest

LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo

Llorente, in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war,Lorenzo departed for the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzobecame an American citizen on November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of thePhilippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in the

Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. InDecember 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying that thechild was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.

On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolvingtheir marital union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file acase of adultery against her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951which was granted in 1952.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines;afterwhich, they bore three children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executeda will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia and three children. Before the proceedingcould be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.

On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters ofadministration over Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving

spouse.In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was

void and inapplicable in the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void.The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their conjugal properties, and one-third of the



estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally among the illegitimate children. Paulawas appointed as legal administratix of the estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo

Llorente.

HELD: Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are

governed by foreign law. The CA and RTC called to the fore ther en voi doctrine, wherethe case was referred back to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, thePhilippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus, the Philippine lawapplies when determinging the validity of Lorenzo’s will.

The case was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of thewill ofthe deceased.

Llorente vs CA

On November 5, 2010

345 scra 592

Nationality Principle

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of

war, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzowas naturalized by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and

visited his wife to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous

relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente;they lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament

bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters

administration over Lorenzo’s estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On appeal, the decisionwas modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired. Hence,

this petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are

entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality

principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the

policy against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce

abroad provided that they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held thatdivorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this

jurisdiction as a matter of comity.



The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic

validity of Lorenzo’s will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

The deceased is not covered by our laws on “family rights and duties, status, condition and legal

capacity” since he was a foreigner.

Garcia-Recio vs. RecioTI TLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederi ck A. Recio CITATI ON: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,

Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australianfamily court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and

Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of

Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately

without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still inAustralia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory

Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy onMarch 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with

Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to

prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid

and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,

there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though

the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was

inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public orofficial record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record isnot kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:



(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the

Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to

receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry

petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

Garcia vs Recio

On November 5, 2010

366 scra 437

Foreign Law – Divorce

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1,

1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the AustralianFamily Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Subsequently,respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994. Starting October

22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their

marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriageon the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly

dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry

petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner andrespondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated

him to remarry.

HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records,the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was

legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare

her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under

Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. TheSC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be

dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil

Code.

Republic vs. Orbecido Case Digest

Republic vs. Orbecido472 SCRA 114

Facts:



On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were marriedin Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, LadyMyros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she wasnaturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son – who was living

with his wife in the States – that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorcedecree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invokingpar. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboangadel Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that,petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional TrialCourt. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to theinstant case.

Issue:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).

Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instantcase is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were twoFilipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen andsubsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed sheremarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of

Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the

celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtainedabroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, therewas still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fatewould have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorcecapacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced” Filipinospouse, should be allowed to remarry.

However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization heis still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidenceshowing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorcedecree and had remarried. GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMASG.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadiancitizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipinanamed Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert



left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having anaffair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and fileda petition for divorce and was granted.

Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his newFilipina fiancée, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered theCanadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSOofficial informed Gerbert that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to beenforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippinecourt.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration ofmarriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested forthe same prayer.

RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos andnot to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.

HELD: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that“no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” TheRules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for aspecial remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judiciallycancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictionaland procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizingthe cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.

Civil Law:

Bigamy; Legal

Standing



[G. R. No.

169766, March 30

: 2011]

ESTRELLITA

JULIAJVO-LLAVE,

PETITIONER,VS. REPUBLIC



OF THE

PHILIPPINES,

HAJA

PUTRIZORAYDA A. TAMANO

AND ADIBAHMAD A.

TAMANO,RESPONDENTS.



Facts:

Around 11

months before his

death, Sen.Tamano married

Estrellita twice -initially under the

Islamiclaws andtradition on May



27, 1993 in

Cotabato City and,

subsequently,

under a civilceremony

officiated byanRTC Judge at

Malabang, Lanaodel Sur on June 2,



1993. In their

marriage contracts,

Sen. Tamano's

civilstatusw a s

i n d i c at e d a s

' d i v o r c e d . ' Sinc



e then, Estrellita

has been

representing

herself to thewhole world as

Sen. Tamano'swife, and uponhis

death, hiswidow.On



November 23,

1994, private

respondents Haja

Putri Zorayda A.Tamano (Zorayda)

and her sonAdibAhmad A.

Tamano (Adib),in their own



behalf and in

behalf of the rest

of Sen. Tamano's

legitimatechildrenwith

Zorayda, filed acomplaint with the

RTC of QuezonCity for the



declaration of

nullity of marriage

between

Estrellita and Sen.

Tamano for being

bigamous. Thecomplaint alleged,

inter alia



he

marriedEstrellita

in 1993.Summons

was then served onEstrellita. She then

asked from thecourt for an

extension of 30days to fileher



answer, and again,

another 15 days,

both of which the

courtgranted. Instead of

submitting heranswer, however,

Estrellita filed aMotion to Dismiss



where she declared

thatSen. Tamano

and Zorayda are

both Muslims whowere married

under the Muslimrites, as had been

averred in



the latter's

disbarment

complaint against

Sen. Tamano.Estrellita argued

that the RTC hasno jurisdiction to

takecognizance ofthe case because



under Presidential

Decree (PD) No.

1083, or the Code

of MuslimPersonal Lawsof

the Philippines(Muslim Code),

questions andissues involving



jurisdiction over

the case for

declaration

of nullity. Thus,Estrellita filed a

certiorari

petition with the

SC questioning thedenial of her



Motion to

Dismiss.The SC

referred the

petition to theCA. During the

pendency of the petition before the

CA, the RTCcontinued to try



the case since

there can beno

default in cases of

declaration ofnullity of marriage

even if therespondent failed

to file an answer.Estrellitawas



allowed to

participate in the

trial while her

opposing parties presented their

evidence. When itwas

Estrellita's turn toadduce evidence,



the hearings set

for such purpose

were postponed

mostly at herinstanceuntil the

trial court,suspended the

proceedings inview of the CA's



temporary

restraining order

enjoining it

fromhearing thecase.Eventually,

however, the CAresolved the

petition adverse toEstrellita. She then



elevated the

appellatecourt's

j u d g m e n t t o

t h e C o u r t b yw a y o f a

p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w o n

certiorari.



Unhappy with the

delays in the

resolution of their

case, Zorayda andAdib moved to

submit the casefor decision,

reasoning thatEstrellita had long



been delaying the

case. Estrellita

opposed, on the

ground that shehasnot yet filed

her answer as shestill awaits the

outcome of GR. No. 126603.



RTC rendered

judgment

declaring

Estrellita'smarriage with

Sen. Tamano asvoid

ab initio



.The CA upheld

the RTC’s

decision.

Issue:Whether or not

Zorayda and Adibhave the legal

standing to haveEstrellita's



marriage declared

voidabinitio.

Ruling:Yes.Her marriage

covered by theFamily Code of

the Philippines,"Estrellita relies



on A.M. No. 02-

11-10-SCwhich

took effect on

March 15, 2003claiming that

under Section 2(a)thereof, only the

husband or thewife, tothe



exclusion of

others, may file a

petition for

declaration ofabsolute nullity,

therefore only sheand Sen.Tamano

may directly attackthe validity of



their own

marriage.Estrellita

claims that only

the husband or thewife in a void

marriage can file a petition for

declarationof nullity of



marriage.

However, this

interpretation does

not apply if thereason behind the

petition is bigamy.In the

Rationale of theRules on



Annulment of

Voidable

Marriages and

Declaration ofAbsolute

Nullityo f V o i dM a r r i a g e s ,

L e g a lS e p a r a t i o n



a n d

P r o v i s i o n a l

O r d e r s ,

only an aggrieved

or injured spouse

may file a petitionfor annulment of

voidablemarriages or



declaration

of absolute nullity

of void marriages.

Such petitioncannot be filed by

compulsory orintestate heirs of

the spousesor bythe State. The



Committee is of

the belief that

they do not have

a legal right tofile the petition.

Compulsory orintestate heirs

have onlyinchoate rights



prior to the death

of their

predecessor, and

hence canonlyquestion the

validity of themarriage of the

spouses upon thedeath of a spouse



in a proceeding

for thesettlement

of the estate of the

deceased spousefiled in the regular

courts. On theother hand, the

concern of the



refers to the

"aggrieved or

injured spouse." If

Estrellita's

interpretation is

employed, the prior spouse is

unjustly precludedfrom filing



ana c t i o n .

S u r e l y ,

t h i s i s n o t

w h a t t h eR u l e

c o n t e m p l a te d . The

subsequent spousemay only be



expected to take

action if he or she

had only

discovered duringtheconnubial

period that themarriage was

bigamous, andespecially if the



conjugal bliss had

already

vanished.Should

parties in asubsequent

marriage benefitfrom the bigamous

marriage, it would



not be expected

that they

would file an

action to declare

the marriage void

and thus, in suchcircumstance, the

"injured spouse"whoshould be



given a legal

remedy is the one

in a subsisting

previous marriage.The latter is

clearly theaggrieved party as

the bigamousmarriage not only



threatens the

financial and the

property

ownership aspectof the prior

marriage but mostof all, it causes an

emotional burdento the prior



which sanctity

is protected by the

Constitution.Indee

d, Section 2(a) ofA.M. No. 02-11-

10-SC precludesthe son from

impugning thesubsequentmarria



ge. But in the case

at bar, both

Zorayda and Adib

have legal personalities to

file an action fornullity.Albeit the

Supreme CourtResolution



governs marriages

celebrated under

the Family Code,

such is prospectivein

application anddoes not apply to

cases already



commenced before

March 15, 2003.



Zorayda and Adibfiled the case for

declaration of

nullity of

Estrellita's

marriage in November

1994.While theFamily Code is



silent with respect

to the proper party

who can file a

petition fordeclaration

of nullity ofmarriage prior to

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has



been held that in

a void marriage,

in which

nomarriage hastaken place and

cannot be thesource of rights,

any interested party may attack



the

marriagedirectly

or collaterally

without prescription,

which may befiled even beyond

the lifetime of the parties to



themarriage.

Since A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC does

not apply, Adib,as one of the

children of thedeceased who

has property rightsas an heir, is



judgment in the

suit.Since the

Philippine laws

protect the maritalunion of a couple,

they should beinterpreted in a

way thatwould preserve



their respective

rights which

include striking

down bigamousmarriages.

Cases Part3

Documents

Transcript of Cases Part3