Cases Object,Best evidence rule

8/13/2019 Cases Object,Best evidence rule

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force and intimidation.

Furthermore, the first hut where Marcelina was taken to was a small one-room affair occupied by a woman and two smallchildren. Her charge, therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly improbable and contrary to humanexperience. Also, the second hut where she was taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room separatedfrom the sala by a wall of split bamboos where Ceferino together with his wife and seven children lived. It challengeshuman credulity that she could have been sexually abused with so many within hearing and distance. Moreover, if rapewere, indeed, the malevolent intent of Bardaje and the 5 others, they would, in all probability, have taken turns in abusingher. That they did not, indicates that there was, indeed, some special relationship between Marcelina and Bardaje.Furthermore, with people around, and the hut constructed as it was, it would have been an easy matter for Marcelina tohave shouted and cried for help. Surely, Ceferino, his wife and/or his children could not have been insensible to heroutcries notwithstanding their relationship to the accused. The aphorism still rings true that evidence to be believedmust not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself.

Additionally, the curling of the hair of Narita, one of Ceferino's daughters, is inconsistent with her allegation of "captivity".

In respect of the alleged confession of Bardaje, it is to be remebered that "an extrajudicial confession made by anaccused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti isproved when the evidence on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed. That proof has not been metin the case at bar, the evidence establishing more of an elopement rather than kidnapping or illegal detention or forcibleabduction, and much less rape. Moreover, Bardaje made the confession without benefit of counsel nor of anyone toadvise him of his rights aside from his declaration that said confession was obtained through maltreatment and violence.

The judgment appealed from imposing the death penalty, is reversed and the appellant, Adelino Bardaje, acquitted of thecrime with which he is charged.

34. ROMEO SISON et a l . vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAG.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995.

FACTSFrom August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against 11 persons identified as Marcos loyalistscharging them with the murder of Salcedo. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented12 witnesses, including 2 eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at theLuneta at the time of the incident . In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentaryevidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.

On July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permitto hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, 3000 of them gathered at theRizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30pm of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, bothmembers of the IBP, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches inbetween. Col. Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked theleaders for their permit. As none could be produced, they were given 10 min. to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for 30minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Coryinfiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo ! "

At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approachedher and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers ! "Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin siMarcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw ! " The loyalists replied "Bugbugin ! " A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrestedby the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon ! " A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, acigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan ! "The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo andboxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him andpummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, anelectrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo fromthem. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang aloyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to towSalcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo onthe head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was alreadyfallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. Accused Nilo Pacadarpunched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lungedat the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell . Banculosaw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxedhim Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did.

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers. He sat on some cement steps and then tried to flee towardsRoxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, maulingSumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried:"Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis ? "The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until


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Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained variouscontusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures.

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press tookpictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national and internationalattention. This prompted Pres. Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District toinvestigate the incident. A reward of P10,000.00 was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, forpersons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang andRenato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including theaccused, were apprehended and investigated.

For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respectivealibis. Accused Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution because he wasin his house in Q.C. at that time. Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. Sison, acommercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at thattime. He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility and that he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully.Delos Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. He said that he merelywatched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. Pacadar admits having attendedthe rally on that fateful day but he merely viewed the incident. His face was in the pictures because he shouted to themaulers to stop hitting Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo.

The trial court found Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty asprincipals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court,however, acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The CA modifiedthe decision by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo,to reclusion perpetua . The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, butconvicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege the said qualifyingcircumstance.

ISSUEWhether or not the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, areworthy of credence.Whether or not the photographs presented in the instant case are admissible as evidence.

RULING1. According to the accused, the testimonies of the two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward

was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providinga new or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in anothercase as accused Rolando Fernandez. Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court toreprimand him several times.

There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General Lim, much less thatboth or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows thatSumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling,even before announcement of any reward. He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identifySalcedo's assailants if he saw them again. The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make themand his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended duringthe investigation of Salcedo's death.

The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for beingargumentative and evasive. This is not reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirableconduct all throughout his testimony.

Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthywitness. It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony.Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, thetestimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others.

2. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer asto its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidencelies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracyin portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify thepictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie , either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which thecourt can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by thephotographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

When the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel, objected to theiradmissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, counsel for accusedJoselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used the photographs presented as exhibits" to prove that his clients were not in any ofthe pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted byTamayo and Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused


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per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, theprosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was madeby counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuingobjection to their admissibility.

The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took thesame was not presented to identify them. However, the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show theiralleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs arefaithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tanidentified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.

The decision is affirmed with modification that Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard delos Santos are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance andare each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua . Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiorstrength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO ADOVISOG.R. No. 116196-97 June 23, 1999

FACTS Adoviso was charged with the murder of Rufino Agunos and Emetrio Vasquez.

The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in the place where the killing took place . One ofthe houses was a camalig the living area of which had walls of bamboo . This area was elevated from the ground . Threesteps led down to an awning walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally approximately four to sixinches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where Rufino Agunos(Vasquez's grandson) slept. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig withhis own son Elmer.

At around 8pm of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez, while preparing coffee, was shot inside the camalig . The edge ofgun used in the killing, as witnessed by Anastacia (Emetrio's wife), was protruding on the wall near the stairs whereEmeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed torecognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband. Upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio and his son elmer. Who

were at the adjacent house, immediately went down the front yard to investigate.

From a distance of 8 meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino being shot by several persons from the outside. Looking through thebamboo slats of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large built and long hair, as Pablo

Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig . Of Rufino's assailants, only Adoviso was notwearing a mask. Adoviso was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed whereRufino was sleeping. Adoviso then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard Emeterio shout "Pino" and sawhim go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Adoviso fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.

Elmer also testified that he saw 5 persons aiming their firearms at the camalig . Only Adoviso had not covered his face. 3of the assailants were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while 2 were near its door. Elmer saw these 5 persons shootRufino. Although hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag . Emetrio was also hit on the stomach but he managed toup the camalig . Adoviso and his companion by the camalig door fired at Elmer upon seeing him while the 3 others at theditch escaped. Elmer fled towards the coconut plantation.

After the incident, while Elmer attended to the wounded Rufino and Emetrio, Bonifacio went to the municipal building ofBula to fetch the police. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning.

Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense. He claimed that in the evening of the incident from 7pm to 11pm, hewas in Sitio Durabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with others, hadsome drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante.

Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified that from 7:00until past 11:00 of the said night, he and Adoviso had a drinking spree at the Tragante store.

Adoviso, in support of his denial, presented Lt. Antonio Lopez who identified a police certification prepared by Pfc. RamonN. Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified armed men." Lopez was one of thosewho brought the victims to the hospital who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shotthem or why they were shot.

SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that several days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez told him him during thefollow-up investigation that he "vividly saw the incident and recognized" Adoviso as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The defense offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the NBI in Manila, whoconducted a polygraph test on Adoviso. Lucena opined that Adoviso's ''polygrams revealed that there were no specificreactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the investigation of the crimes.


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Bonifacio Vasquez further revealed that he did not identify appellant as one of the culprits when he reported the incidentto the police because he was afraid of Adovsio who was a member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio mentioned tothe police that he recognized Adoviso as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he told them that he did notrecognize the other four. He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe Adovioso's identity because he was "confused" aboutwhat had happened in their house.

The trial court found Adoviso guilty of 2 counts of murder.

ISSUEWhether or not the accused was properly identified in the light of the circumstances of the case.Whether or not the result of the polygraph test can be used to absolve Adoviso from liability.

RULING1. Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the

perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do notappear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illuminationproduced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, evenmoonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility ofwitnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.

In this case, not one but two gas lamps illuminated the place (the one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterioas he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire). Moreover, the bamboo slats of the camalig could not haveeffectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of Adovsio considering that the slats were built four meters apart.Furthermore, Bonifacio had known Adoviso for ten years while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four years.Familiarity with his face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as tohis identity.

Adoviso's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. For an alibito prosper, there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was committed but thathe could not be physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. This factwas not proved by Adoviso.

2. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiologicalchanges in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's conscious attempt to deceivethe questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lie deliberately will have rising

blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courtsalmost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of establishing the guiltor innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason thatpolygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception. Same ruleapplies in the Philippines.

The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

36. EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING vs . CA and ANGELITA DIAMANTE G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

FACTSThis case involves a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

Edgardo Tijing, Jr. was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana,Manila to petitioners. Bienvenida Tijing served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante.

Sometime in August of 1989, Angelita went to Bienvenida's house for an urgent laundry job. As the latter was on her wayto do some marketing, Angelita was asked to wait for her return and was left the care Edgardo, Jr. (then 4 month old).Upon Bienvenida's return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were nowhere to be found. She later discovered that Angelita movedto another house.

Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita,whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she saw Edgardo,Jr. The boy who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named JohnThomas Lopez. Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite demand.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court to recover their son. They presented twowitnesses, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one EdgardoTijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinicalrecords.Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter wassterile. He also declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and

Angelita were not blessed with children.

On the other hand, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserted that at age 42, she gave birth


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to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She said thatthe birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar ofManila on August 4, 1989.

The trial court ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the naturalchild of petitioners since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children and that there exists a strongfacial similarity between the child and Bienvenida. The CA reversed the decision.

ISSUEWhether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners.

RULINGThe following evidence presented by Bienvenida proved that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, EdgardoTijing, Jr.:1.Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, sheunderwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a childbetween 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented incourt. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

2. Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, wassterile because of an accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together.Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

3. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strongsimilarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent iscompetent and material evidence to establish parentage. The trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, ithaving had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

4. Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlikeprivate respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book discharge.

37. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINOG.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002

FACTSThis case involves the rape&slaying of a 9-year old girl.

The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1pm of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughterDaisy Diolola to their neighbor's house so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of the accused, could help Daisy with her lessons.

An hour later, Daisy came back with the accused to look for a book which the accused could copy to make a drawing thatDaisy would submit to her teacher. Daisy and accused then went back to the latter's house. At about 5:30pm, Daisy wasstill not home so Ma. Nilda looked for her and proceeded to the house of Aimee. Aimee's mother told her that Daisy wasnot there. Ma. Nida continued to look for Daisy but to no avail. At about 7pm., Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor'shouse, and there saw the accused, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But,when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Jessiemin Mataverde told Ma. Nida that Daisywas playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with theaccused. The search for Daisy continued but remained fruitless.

At about 10am of July 11, 1999, the dead body of Daisy was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the"compuerta." Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. The accused wasinvited by the policemen for questioning as he was the suspect for the perpetration of the crime.

Jessiemin testified that at around 5pm of July 10, 1999, while she and her daughter were in front of a store across thestreet from her house, accused arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused had only his basketball shorts on andwas just holding his shirt. Both his shorts and his shirt were wet.

Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified that at about 4:30pm of the same day, July 10, 1999, whileshe and her husband and children were walking towards the "compuerta" they met the accused near the seashore andnoticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. She also testified that accused's shorts and shirt were wet, but his faceand hair were not.

The police recovered the white basketball shirt and the violet basketball shorts worn by the accused the day before. Theshirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.

Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that the accused told him that he killed the victim bystrangling her. He claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan'stestimony.

Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from accused-


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appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirtworn by the accused and the victim's clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1

Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups.

The results of the examinations conducted showed the accused to belong to Group "O". The clothings presented were allpositive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group "A".

NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from the accused as well as buccal swabsand hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples weresubmitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.

Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. Shetestified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of theaccused and the victim.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of rape with homicide.

ISSUEWhether or not accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence.Whether or the results of the DNA analysis proves the guilt of the accused.

RULING1. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence ispresented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. In rape withhomicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime,where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of theoffense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantialevidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of theperpetrator is unreasonable.

2. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identicaltwins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the suspect'sDNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from thesuspect and the victim.The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference

sample.The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yieldthree possible results:a) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion isabsolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;b) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types(inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of someaspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, toobtain a more conclusive result; orc) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples

are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the followingdata: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, theprocedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conductingthe tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused, the smears taken from thevictim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA due to theinadequacy of the specimens presented for examination and not due to contamination. But the vaginal swabs taken fromthe victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile ofthe accused.

The totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence isweighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accusedbut also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence inits effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case.

The decision finding the accused guilty of the crime rape with homicide is affirmed.

38. Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso, Court of AppealsG.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966.

FACTSCarrascoso traveled through the agent of Air France, PAL from Manila to Rome. PAL issued a first class ticket toCarrascoso, it having marked "ok". From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso was seated in the first class accommodation but


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he was forced to vacate his first class seat upon arriving at Bangkok as there was a white man who had the better right tosuch seat. A commotion ensued yet the captain refused to intervene. Carrascoso was transferred to the touristaccommodation against his will. Hence, an action for damages was instituted against Air France.

Air France contended that Carrascoso was aware of the that he had no confirmed reservations in the first classaccommodation.

One of the pieces of evidence was the log book of the purser who entered the incident in his log book, stating 'First-classpassenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene'. Air Franceobjected to its admissibility.

The trial court ruled in favor of Carrascoso and awarded the latter among others, moral damages. The Court of Appealsaffirmed the decision.

ISSUE1. Whether or not Carrascoso had the right to the first class accommodation.2. Whether or not the record on the log book is admissible.

RULING1. It has been established that the tickets paid for by Carrascoso were all first class accommodations and are confirmedok. In its counter argument, Air France wanted to prove that a confirmation was necessary in Hongkong for the said firstclass tickets, but the Court disbelieved such statements. It has noted that oral evidence to that effect cannot prevail overwritten evidence as the tickets has been clearly marked ok and the same were exhibited and admitted in court.

2. The record in the log book is admissible, the rule on the best evidence does not apply in the instant case. The subjectof the inquiry is not the entry in the log book but the incident itself. Also, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, whenthe dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement hadnot as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "outof the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding hisentry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness hasbeen guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

39. People of the Philippines vs Hon. Bienvenido Tan, Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales, Anglelita Centeno, Julia Carpio,Calixto Hermosa and Crispula Pagaran

G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959.

FACTSPacita Gonzales, Centeno, Hermosa and Pagaran were charged of falsification of public document in their capacity aspublic officials and employees that by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise werepurchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such quantities and at suchprices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when infact and in truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said PacitaGonzales. The evidence presented consisted of booklets of receipts issued by Metro Drug Corporation marked as ExhibitD. While the witness was presented, Judge Tan interrupted the proceedings and held that the booklet of receipts areinadmissible as the same are merely triplicate copies, the same in violation of the best evidence rule. Hence, this petition.

ISSUEWhether or not the triplicate copies of the receipts are admissible in evidence in the context of the "best evidence rule".

RULINGYes. The admissibly of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question.

"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon theoutside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath,such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, allof the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as suchwithout accounting for the nonproduction of the others."

A carbon copy of the original is admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the original, and the samedoes not require an accounting for the non-production of the original. Triplicates are admissible without accounting for theoriginals.

40. People of the Philippines vs Mario TandoyG. R. No. 80505.December 04, 1990.

FACTSTandoy was charged of a violation of RA 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In a buy-bustoperation conducted, Tandoy was caught in possession of 8 pieces of marijuana flowering tops, 2 pieces dried marijuanaflowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are all prohibited. Among the pieces of evidence


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presented were the photocopies of the marked money marked as ANU meaning Anti-narcotics Unit consisting of one 10-peso bill and two 5-peso bills. The admission of these photocopies was objected to by Tandoy being merely a photocopyand therefore a violation of the best evidence rule.

ISSUEWhether or not the photocopy of the 10-peso bill is admissible in evidence.

RULINGThe photocopy of the 10-peso bill is admissible in evidence.

The Best Evidence Rule does not apply in the instant case. The Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the BestEvidence Rule applies only when the contents of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as towhether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding itsexecution, the best evidence rule does not apply.

In the instant case, since what is in issue is the existence of the marked money, not its contents, substitutionary evidence,like a Xerox copy is admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

41. The United States vs Bernardo Gregorio and Eustaquio BalistoyG.R. No. L-5791. December 17, 1910.

FACTSSalazar is a creditor of Balistoy. He obtained a money judgment against Balistoy. Balistoy failed to pay the same.Salazar then moved for the attachment of Balistoys property which include 2 rural properties . Gregorio however movedto intervene in the auction sale of these properties contending that he owned one of the said properties. As evidence, hepresented a memorandum of a private sale showing that such claimed property is owned by him. In response, Salazarfiled an action for falsification of private document against Gregorio and Balistoy contending that the memorandum wasshown to have been executed in 1905 when in truth and in fact it was executed in 1908. As proof, a photocopy of thealleged memorandum was presented, and a further testimony of the sheriff that he saw once the original of the allegedmemorandum. The lower court convicted both Gregorio and Balistoy.

ISSUEWhether or not the photocopy of the alleged memorandum of a private sale is admissible in evidence in charging thecrime of falsification.

RULINGtTe photocopy of the alleged memorandum of a private sale is inadmissible in evidence in charging the crime offalsification

In the prosecution of falsification cases, it is important to note that judges and courts should have before them the originaldocument alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited or falsified, in order to find, pursuant to the evidence produces inthe cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed and also, to enable them to determine the degree ofeach defendan ts liability in the crime of falsification.

In the instant case, the original copy of the alleged memorandum had not been presented. Hence, there could be no basisby which the crime of falsification can be prosecuted. Accused Gregorio and Balistoy are acquitted.

42. The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Hon. Hermogenes Reyes Andres GuevarraG.R. No. 35366. August 05, 1931.

FACTSThe Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed two Informations for libel against Guevarra for having maliciously published amalicious statement against Clemente Dayrit and Mario Nepomuceno. The fiscal seked to present as evidence for theprosecution copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the liberous article with the innuendo, an article in the vernacularpublished in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. Counsel for the Guevarra objected to this evidence, whichobjection was sustained by the court. Guevarra filed a petition for mandamus praying for the admission of suchevidences.

ISSUEWhether or not the newspaper article exhibited in evidence for the crime of libel in admissible.

RULINGThe newspaper article exhibited in evidence for the crime of libel in admissible.

The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must berelevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, isapplicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and itstranslation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an articlepublished in it.


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43. Compana Maritima vs. Free Allied Workers Union et a l .G.R. No. L-23893.May 24, 1977.

FACTSOn August 11, 1952 the Compana Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract wherebythe union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees. The contract was to be effective for onemonth counted from August 12, 1952. It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expirationof the term if the union failed to render proper service. It was also stipulated that the company would not be liable for thepayment of the services of the union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation forsuch services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the cargoes".

The shippers and consignees paid the union for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring service. Theyclaimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading providedthat the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense.

On the other hand, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the contract provided that thecompensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees.

The company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association alleging thatthe Union is inefficient in the performance of the service. The union members then picketed the wharf which lasted fornine days and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and stevedoring work.

The company sued the union and its officers for the rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract, to enjoin the unionfrom interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of damages.

Claiming for damages, the company alleged that by reason of the acts of harassment and obstruction perpetrated by theunion in the loading and unloading of cargo and of the inefficiency of the Union, the company lost P450K. The cliam fordemages was supported by an auditor's report which was made by the accountants hired by Compana. The courtawarded Compana 450K by way of damages based on the auditor's report.

ISSUEWhether or not the auditor's report is admissible.

RULINGThe accountants' reports/auditor's reports are inadmissible in evidence.

The rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in courtwithout great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is the general result of the whole, the originalwritings need not be produced" does not apply.

The rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants'reports were based, was not duly established.

It is a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverseparty so that the company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. Such was not the case in the instantcase.

What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissiblein evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like"

That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to thedifficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidenceby the court.

44. Villa Rey Transit, Inc vs. Eusebio Ferrer, Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc., and Public Service CommissionOctober 29 1968. GR L-23893

FACTSVillarama was an operator of a bus transportaion under the business name of Villa Rey Transit pursuant to certificates ofpublic convenience granted by the Public Service Commission (PSC). He subsequently sold the two certificates of publicconvenience in favor of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc (PANTRANCO) with an agreement that he shall not for aperiod of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer. Only threemonths after the sale, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc was organized with the wife of Villarama as the treasurerand having the least subscription of its stocks. Villa Rey purchased from Fernando five certificates of public convenienceto be fully paid upon the approval of the sale by the PSC. On the day of the execution of the sale, Villa Rey applied withthe PSC to provisionally operate the service involved. Subsequently, two of the five certificates of public conveniencewere levied by the Sheriff, sold at a public auction and eventually sold to Ferrer who also sold to PANTRANCO. The latterapplied with the PSC for an authorization to provisionally operate the servicsye involved therein. The PSC granted theauthority to PANTRANCO. Villa Rey brought the matter to the Supreme Court which ordered to give the authority to VillaRey while the issue on ownership has not yet been determined.


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Pantranco filed a third-party complaint against Jose M. Villarama, alleging that Villarama and the Corporation, are one andthe same; that Villarama and/or the Corporation was disqualified from operating the two certificates in question by virtue ofthe aforementioned agreement between said Villarama and Pantranco, which stipulated that Villarama "shall not for aperiod of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer."PANTRANCO presented as evidence Celso Rivera, accountant of the Corporation, who testified that while in the books ofthe corporation there appears an entry that the treasurer received P95,000.00 as second installment of the paid-insubscriptions, and, subsequently, also P100,000.00 as the first installment of the offer for second subscriptions worthP200,000.00 from the original subscribers, yet Villarama directed him to make vouchers liquidating the sums. Thus, it wasmade to appear that the P95,000.00 was delivered to Villarama in payment for equipment purchased from him, and theP100,000.00 was loaned as advances to the stockholders. Villarama was accordingly given notice to produce the ledgersand the vouchers. As none of the originals was produced by Villarama, photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchersshowing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of theCorporation were introduced. Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these evidences contending that no evidentiaryvalue whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidencebeing the originals themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it was the most likelypossessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was ableto produce the alleged photostat copies thereof.

ISSUEWhether or not the photostatic copies of the ledgers and vouchers are admissible.

RULINGThe photostatic copies of the ledgers and vouchers are admissible.

Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence whenthe original is in the custody of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice toopponent to produce the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to producethe original in court.

Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth requisites. As to the third, he admitted their previous existence inthe files of the Corporation and also that he had seen some of them. Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is thatsince even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum , the originals were already missing, therefore, theCorporation was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introducesecondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that thecircumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required thatthe party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession.

Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidencemay introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when theoriginal has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court." The originals of the vouchers in question must bedeemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss.

45. E. Michael & Co., Inc vs. Adriano EnriquezG.R. No. L-10824. December 24, 1915.

FACTSThe action sprang from a sale with a right of repurchase made by Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co.,sociedad en comandita , the latter claming to be the successor, by virtue of an instrument duly executed and deliveredtransferring property, business and assets, including the land in question. It was alleged that the period to repurchase theproperty had expired. Thus, the title had been consolidated in favor of E. Michael & Co. To prove its claim, E. Michael &Co. Souhgt to prove the due execution of the instrument of sale with a right of repurchase and that such instrument waslost. This act of petitioner was objected to. The court sustained the objections.

ISSUEWhether or not the lower court erred in refusing E. Michael & Co. to prove the due execution and delivery of theinstrument of sale with a right of repurchase and that the same is lost.

RULINGThe lower court committed an error when it refused to admit proof of due execution and delivery of the instrument and itssubsequent lost.

Lower courts are correct in refusing admission pieces of evidence which are incompetent. For evidence on the contentsof written instruments to be admissible, the original writing must be produced and proved. This accepts certainexceptions. It is has been lost, there must be proof of its lost and only until such time that loss is proven can proof of itscontents can be duly proved. Thus, it is necessary for secondary evidence to be admissible, the following must beproved:

1. that the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary;2. that it has been lost or destroyed.

The execution and delivery of the document may be established by the following:1. persons who executed it;2. persons before whom its execution was acknowledged;


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3. any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered;4.any person who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures;5. any person to whom the parties to the instruments has previously confessed the execution thereof.

On the other hand, the destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may beshown by the following persons:

1. any person who know the fact of its loss;2. any person who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place where the

document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lostwas, and has been unable to find it;

3. any person who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument isindeed lost.

Once proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument and its subsequent loss, proof of its contents may beproved by the following:

1. any person who signed the document, or who read it, or who heard it read knowing, or it being proved fromother sources, that the document so read was the one in question;2. any person who was present when the contents of the document was talked over between the partiesthereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents;4. any person to who the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated the contents thereof;5. by a copy thereof;6. a recital of its contents in some authentic document.

Objections in the lower court were sustained primarily on the ground that counsel for E. Michael & Co characterized theinstrument as an instrument of transfer or cession. On this basis alone, although erroneous, the lower court has erred incutting off the counsel all together instead of allowing him to prove the due execution, delivery and the loss of theinstrument.

A new trial is in order.

46. Basilio De Vera et a l . vs. Spouses Mariano and Leona AguilarG.R. No. 83377. February 09, 1993.

FACTSPetitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria and respondent Leona are all children of Marcosa Bernabe. During

her lifetime, Marcosa owned the land in dispute. She mortgaged it to one Atty. Leonardo Bordador and was redeemed bySpouses Aguilar. Subsequently, Marcosa sold the same property to the Spouses Aguilar evidence by a Deed of AbsoluteSale. Mariano Aguilar obtained a free patent to the land and was issued an Original Certificate of Title. Subsequently,petitioners wrote a letter to Spouses Aguilar asking for the partition of the subject property as co-owners with a threat thatrefusal to do so would result to a falsification case. The Spouses refused. So a falsification of public document case wasfiled against them but the same was dismissed by the court.

Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of the property contending that the Spouses sold back the property toMarcosa. The lower court ruled in their favor. Sps. Aguilar appelaed alleging that petitioners failed to present the originalof the alleged Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses in favor of Marcosa as only a photocopy of the Deed waspresented. Petitioners averred that the due execution of the Deed has been duly proved by the testimony of the NotaryPublic before whom the document was acknowledged and by Luis De Vera who was present during its execution and thatthe loss was duly proved by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial

Assessor of Bulacan. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court.

ISSUEWhether or not the photocopy of the alleged Deed of Sale is admissible in evidence.

RULINGThe photocopy of the alleged Deed of Sale is not admissible in evidence. The Rules of Court provide in Section 4 (nowSection 5, Rule 130) that:

Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost ordestroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, itscontents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection ofwitnesses.

Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. Before the introduction ofsuch secondary evidence, the proponent must first establish the existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof isas follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of thecourt.

The petitioners has established in the lower court the due execution of the Deed by the testimony of the Notary Public. After having established the execution, it must likewise be established that the instrument is lost.

In the case, the Notary Public testified that the Deed comes in four or five copies. In this regard, all the original copiesmust be accounted for before secondary evidence can be offered. However, only 3 copies has been accounted for. Luis


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De Vera claimed that one copy is with the Register of Deeds but no proof of loss was presented. The absence ofknowledge of loss of the National Archives Division of the instrument is not sufficient basis for its loss.

47. Marina Llemos et al . vs. Romeo Llemos et alG.R. No. 150162.. January 26, 2007.

FACTSPetitioners and respondents are all heirs of Saturnina Salvatin. Saturnina had 4 children, Adriano, Santiago, Domingoand Felipe. Petitioners are the heirs of Felipe while respondents are the heirs of the other three children. Saturninaowned a parcel of land. On a certain date, the Register of Deeds cancelled the Certificate of Title in the name ofSaturnina and a new one issued in the name of Felipe by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale thumbmarked by Saturnina in1964. In 1991, Jovita, one of the respondents borrowed the title of the property and discovered that the same is alreadyin the name of Felipe. So respondents filed an action for annulment of the Transfer Certificate of Title on the ground thatSaturnina could not have executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, thumbmarked by her in 1964 because she died in 1938. Toprove her death in 1938, respondents presented a Certificate of Death issued by Rev. Fr. Camilo Natividad on January29, 1991, attesting that Saturnina died on March 12, 1938 and was buried in the Roman Catholic Cemetery. TheCertificate attests that it is a true copy of the original records as it appears in the Register of Dead of the Parish. The RTCruled in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

ISSUEWhether or not the Certificate of Death is admissible in evidence.

RULINGThe Certificate of Death is not admissible. After the enactment of General Orders No. 68 and Act No. 190, Churchregistries of births, marriages, and deaths are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized publicofficials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings inaccordance with the rules of evidence. As provided by Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received inevidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:a. by anyone who saw the document executed or written; orb. by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

In the instant case, respondents failed to prove the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Death for having

failed to present a witness to that effect. The CA also committed an error in admitting as evidence the entry in theRegistry Book of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral as to the date of death on the ground that it is an entry in the course ofofficial business which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Respondents failed to submit as evidence the Register ofDead. There was also no compliance with the rule provided in Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of court to the effect that theoriginal document must be produced and no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, exceptin the certain cases such as:

1. when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of theofferror;2. when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and thelatter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;3. when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court withoutgreat loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;4. when the original is public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

The respondents failed to show that their failure to present the Register of Dead falls under any of the exceptions. Therespondents likewise failed to prove that Salvatin Salvatin mentioned in the Certificate of Death is the same SaturninaSal vatin referred to by them as their predecessor -in-interest; and that Fr. Natividad has personal knowledge of the date ofdeath of Salvatin Salvatin. Thus, contentions of respondents must fail as opposed to the Notarized Deed of Sale whichestablishes prima facie the authenticity and due execution of the document.

48. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Ramon Codilla, Bangpai Shipping Company and Wallem Shipping, Inc.G.R. No. 170491. April 04, 2007.

FACTSM/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned by Bangpai Shipping Company bumped a power barged owned byNPC. Thus, NPC filed an action for damages against Bangpai.

Among the pieces of evidence exhibited by NPC are photocopies of certain documents proving its claim for damagesmanually signed by its officers. Bangpai posed an objection on the admissibility of these documents for violating the BestEvidence Rule of the Rules of Court. NPC countered that these photocopies are admissible as they consist of ElectronicEvidence sanctioned by the Rule on Electronic Evidence. The RTC ruled in favor of the Bangpai. The CA sustained theRTC.

ISSUEWhether or not the photocopies of the documents manually signed by the officers of NPC are admissible.


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RULINGThe documents which are manually signed are inadmissible under the purview of the Rule on Electronic Evidence.Section 1, Rule 2, Rules on Electronic Evidence defines Electronic Document as follows:

(h) Electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right isestablished or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which isreceived, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includesdigitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflectsthe electronic data message or electronic document. F or the purpose of these Rules, the term electronicdocument may be used interchangeably with electronic data message.

The Rules use the word information to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,retrieved or produced electronically. This suggests that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the informationcontained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. Whatdifferentiates an electronic document however with respect to a paper-based document is the manner the informationcontained therein is processed.

In the instant case, what are offered in evidence are photocopies manually signed. NPC contended that the photocopiesare considered as electronic evidence under the catch-all proviso of Par. H, Sec. 1, Rule 2, Rules on Electronic Evidence:

x x x any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data messageor electronic document.

The contention is untenable. It should be remembered that the signatures affixed in the document were manually done.Therefore, not all the information contained therein are processed electronically, thus, not falling within the definition ofElectronic Document.

The Best Evidence Rule requires the presentation of the original document when the contents of an instrument ordocument is in issue.

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror upon proof of itsexecution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by: (1)acopy; (2) a recital of its contents in some authentic document; (3) testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

The offerror of secondary evidence must prove the following:1.the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown bycircumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents;2. the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss ordestruction of the original copy;3. it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in theproper place or places.

NPC failed to show that it has complied for the foregoing rules in its attempt to offer the photocopies of the document.Therefore, its claim is denied.

49. People of the Philippines vs. Gorgonio VillaramaG.R. No. 139211. February 12, 2003.

FACTSVillarama was charged and convicted for the crime of Rape committed against the Elizabeth Tumulak, the youngestdaughter of her sister, Merlita. Elizabeth, four years old, together with her other two elder sisters, were left in their houseon the day of the incident. When Villarama arrived, the other two elder sisters were asked by Villarama to pasture thegoats leaving Elizabeth with her uncle. Villarama then took the opportunity to pursue his evil desires, undressed her, andmade her lie down while he pulled down his pants and briefs to his knees, and then mounted his niece. On that scenario,Ricardo Tumulak, the brother of Elizabeths father came to the house and saw the accused Villarama. When the latternoticed Ricardo, he hurriedly went out of the house through the backdoor. Elizabeth told her parents what happenedwhen they arrived. The RTC found Villarama guilty and sentenced him to death.

Villarama questioned his conviction since of the non-presentation of the victim Elizabeth on the witness stand and invokesthe doctrine of willful suppression of evidence which raises the presumption that such evidence was adverse to theprosecution.

Accused likewise asserted that the testimonies of the victim's parents were hearsay since they did not witness the actualrape and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.

ISSUE


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1. Whether or not there was suppression of evidence.2. Whether or not the testimonies of the victim's parents are hearsay.

RULING1. The contention of the accused is without merit.

Unlike countless other rape cases perpetrated in relative isolation and secrecy, where only the victim can testify on theforced coitus, the offense here was providentially witnessed by another person, an adult, who was definitely morearticulate in describing the sensitive details of the crime.

While the victim's testimony of the assault would have added support to accused's conviction, the same was notindispensable. The intent of the prosecution was to spare the victim from further trauma which could have resulted frombeing placed on the witness stand.

Moreoever, the prosecution did not suppress any evidence. The victim was present in the court room a few times duringthe trial. The defense could have called Elizabeth to the stand as a hostile witness but it did not.

2. The testimonies are not hearsay.

There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules ofCourt. Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides:SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place orimmediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part ofthe res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legalsignificance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence orimmediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence.In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to accusedas her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time gap from the sexualassault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously,there was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to fabricate her statement.

50. Nicasio Borje vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the PhilippinesNovember 25, 1983. G. R. No. L-55436.

FACTS An action for falsification of public document was filed against Borje, then, Provincial Plant Industry Officer for havingallegedly falsified the payroll covering January to March, 1977 and the Daily Time Record (DTR) of one Ducusin. Ducusinwas a Plant Officer, and in 1976, he became the Production Technician and was receiving NFAC incentive pay. In 1977,he claimed to have been transferred to the Surveillance Team by verbal order, hence is no longer entitled to the NFACincentive pay. He found out however that despite his claim that he is no longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay, it wasmade to appear that he is still covered by the same, that he signed the DTR and the payroll and that his name appearedin Special Order 172. The SB convicted Borje.

ISSUEWhether or not the SB erred in convicting Borje in believing that Ducusin was transferred to the Surveillance team andthus no longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay.

RULINGThe SB has committed an error in believing that indeed Ducusin was transferred to the Surveillance team on the basisonly of the claimed verbal order. According to the Supreme Court, the alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normaland usual official procedure, q written special order issued by a government office is cancelled, amended or modified onlyby another written special order, not only for purposes of record on file but also to prevent conflict and confusion ingovernment operations. Moreover, under the best evidence rule, Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposedverbal order cannot prevail over the written Special Order 172.

Decision is reversed.

51. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA, deceased,MARCELA RODELAS vs. AMPARO ARANZA, et a l .

December 07, 1982. G.R. No. L-58509.

FACTSRodelas filed a petition for the probate of the will of Bonilla and applied for the issuance of letters testamentary. Theevidence presented consists of a photostatic copy of the holographic will executed by Bonilla. However, the petition forprobate and the application for letters testamentary were opposed by Aranza on the ground that the alleged holographicwill and not merely the photostatic copy thereof must be produced and that a lost holographic will cannot be proved by aphotostatic copy thereof.


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The lower court initially granted the petition but on motion for reconsideration, reveresed its decision.

ISSUEWhether or not a lost or destroyed holographic will can be proved by a photostatic copy.

RULINGThe lost or destroyed holographic will can be proved by a photostatic copy. If the holographic will has been lost ordestroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is thehandwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statementsof the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowedbecause comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. The execution and the contents of a lost ordestroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as materialproof of authenticity. But, it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy;or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and testedbefore the probate court.

52. RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, et a l . vs. SOCORRO A. RAMOS

G.R. No. L-18077 September 29, 1962

FACTS

This case involves a foreclosure proceedings.

Sometime in 1966, plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario covering a parcel of land inQ.C. with a total area of 77,772 square meters for P10 per sq.m. A performance bond in the amount of P100K wasexecuted by Pedro del Rosario to guarantee the performance of the conditions. Del Rosario was given possession of theland for development as a subdivision at his expense. He undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the construction ofroads, the installation of light and water, and the income tax plaintiffs may be required to pay arising from the transaction,in consideration of which Del Rosario was allowed to buy the property for P600K within two years with the condition that,upon failure to pay the price when due, all the improvements introduced by him would automatically become part of theproperty without any right on his part to reimbursement and the conditional sale would be rescinded.

Unable to pay the consideration of P600K, plaintiffs and Del Rosario, together with defendant Ramos, who was a partnerof the latter, entered into a contract of rescission on Nov. 24, 1958. To release the performance bond and to enableRamos to pay some of the lots for her own purposes, plaintiffs allowed Ramos to buy 20 of the lots herein involved at therate of P16.00 per sq.m. on condition that she will assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roadsand other improvements required in the subdivision. This situation led to the execution of the contract of sale subject ofthe present foreclosure proceedings.

Ramos purchased the said 20 parcels of land for P235,056.00 of which only P35,056.00 was paid on the date of sale, thebalance being payable within two years from the date of sale, with 6% interest p.a. during the 1st year, and the remainderto draw 12% interest p.a. if paid thereafter, provided that at least P100,000.00 should be paid during the 1st year,otherwise the whole unpaid balance would become immediately demandable. To secure the payment of the balance,Ramos executed a mortgage in favor of plaintiffs upon the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest over a parcel ofland in Bulacan which was embodied in the same deed of sale. The deed of sale with mortgage was registered in theOffices of the Registers of Deeds of Q.C. and Pampanga. Ramos broke certain stipulations contained in the deed of salewith mortgage. Hence, plaintiffs instituted foreclosure proceedings.

As Ramos defense,it was claimed that the contract does not express the true agreement of the parties because certain

important conditions agreed upon were not included therein by the counsel who prepared the contract such that thestipulation with regards to the promise assumed by plaintiffs that they would construct roads in the lands which were to besubdivided for sale on or before January, 1959 was ommitted. The condition was not placed because it was only asuperfluity as claimed by plaintiffs counsel inasmuch as there is an ordinance in Q.C. that requires the construction ofroads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold. Hence, the ordinace was deemed part of the contract. Ramos alsoclaimed that the true purchase price was only P185,000.00, the difference of P50,000.00 being the voluntary contributionof defendant to the cost of the construction of the roads.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for being on premature. It found that plaintiffs assumed the construction of theroads as a condition precedent to the fulfillment of the obligation stipulated in the contract on the part of Ramos. Since thesame has not been undertaken, plaintiffs have no cause of action.

ISSUE

Whether or not the true purchase price is P185K or P235K

Whether or not an oral agreement to the effect that plaintiffs would undertake the construction of the roads on the lots soldbefore defendant could be required to comply with her financial obligation is valid and binding on the partiesnotwithstanding the exixtence of a deed of conditional sale

RULING

Decision is affirmed. There is no error in the conclusion reached by the court a quo.

In a subdivision, the main improvement to be undertaken before it could be sold to the public is feeder roads. Otherwise, itwould be inaccessible, valueless and would offer no attraction to the buying public. Hence, it is correct to presume thatwhen the sale in question was being negotiated, the construction of roads in the prospective subdivision must have been


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uppermost in the mind of defendant for her purpose in purchasing the property was to develop it into a subdivision. Thiswas exemplified by the stipulation that the sum of P50,000.00 was advanced by defendant as her contribution to theconstruction of the roads which plaintiffs assumed to undertake "in accordance with the provisions of the City Ordinanceof Q.C." It is to be noted that said document specifically states that the amount of P50,000.00 should be deducted fromthe purchase price of P235,056.00 appearing in the deed of sale, and this is a clear indication that the real purchase priceis only P185,000.00 as claimed by defendant, which would approximately be the price of the entire area of the land at therate of P16.00 per square meter.

It is argued that the presentation of parole evidence to prove that a contemporaneous oral agreement was also reachedbetween parties relative to the construction of the roads should not have been allowed for same is in violation of the rule

which provides that when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing allthat has been agreed upon and that no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties.However, the rule only holds true if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the intent of the parties. Ifthere is such an allegation and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject of parole evidence Inthis case, defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of theparties with regard to the construction of the roads.

53. ESPIRIDIONA CANUTO vs. JUAN MARIANO

G.R. No. L-11346 March 21, 1918

FACTS

On December 4, 1913, Canuto executed a deed of sale with right of repurchase for the same amount within one year from

the date of the deed of sale of the parcel of land described in the complaint to Mariano for the sum of P360. For failue ofCanuto to exercise her right to repurchase within the perioed agreed upon, Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownershipto the land, notwithstanding the insistent demand of Canuto that she be permitted to exercise her right of repurchase inaccordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption period upto the end of the month ofDecember, 1914. She claimed that on the 2nd day of December, 1914, two days before the expiration of the originalredemption period, Mariano agreed to extend the redemption set out in the written contract upto the end of the monthupon her request. Canuto fruther calimed that she thought to make the repurchase within the extended time but Marianodid not appear at the time and place agreed upon for the payment of the purchase price and has refused to execute adeed of resale or to reserve the purchase price agreed upon despite Canutos repeated demands and tender of thepurchase price. This claim of Canuto was corroborated by one Severino Pascual who was present when the extensionwas granted by Mariano.

ISSUE

Whether or not the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by theintroduction of oral evidence in the instant case

RULING

YES.

The defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff could repurchase the land on condition that she wouldfind the money and make repurchase within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to repudiate hispromise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment within the extended period, and was onlyprevented from doing so by the conduct of the defendant himself.

The rule that the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by theintroduction of oral evidence does not apply in the instant case.

The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does notapply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered intosubsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effectof adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; forthe parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purportsto express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or tomake a new and independent contract.

It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was made. If it was in factsubsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced.

The contention that the plaintiff lost her right to redeem because she failed to make judicial deposit of the purchase pricewhen the defendant declined to receive it is not entitled to serious consideration. A bona fide offer or tender of the priceagreed upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of the party making it, without the necessity of making

judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is refused.

54. YU TEK and CO. vs. BASILIO GONZALES

G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915

FACTS

Plaintiff and Basilio Gonzales executed a written contract whereby Gonzales acknowledged receipt of P3K from plaintiff.In consideration of said sum, Gonzales undertook to deliver to plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the 1st and 2nd grade


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beginning on the 1st day of January, 1912 and ending on the 31st day of March of the same year at any place within themunicipality of Santa Rosa which plaintiff or its representative designate. It was provided in the contract that in case offailure to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within three months, the contract will be rescinded and Gonzales will be obliged toreturn to plaintiff the P3,000 and to pay the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and damages.

No sugar had been delivered to plaintiff. The P3,000 was also not returned. Hence, plaintiff filed an action for the recoveryof P3,000 and of the P1,200. Judgment was rendered for P3,000 only. Thus, both parties appealed.

Gonzales contended that the trial court erred in not permitting parol evidence showing that the parties intended that thesugar was to be secured from the crop which he raised on his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract byreason of the almost total failure of his crop.

Gonzales also contended that the contract represented a perfected sale. Hence, by failure of his crop, he was relievedfrom complying with his undertaking by loss of the thing due.

ISSUE

1.Whether or not parol evidence should be allowed

2. Whether or not the contract represented a perfected sale

RULING

1. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract

Cases Object,Best evidence rule

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