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U.S. v. Espiritusanto

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC December 11, 1912 G.R. No. 7404 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ISIDORO ESPIRITUSANTO, defendant-appellant. Allen A. Garner, for appellant. Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee. TORRES, J.: This is an appeal by the defendant from the judgment of conviction rendered in this case by the Honorable Herbert D. Gale, judge. In view of certain proceedings in the justice of the peace court of Malabon and the appeal by the defendant from the judgment therein rendered, whereby he was sentenced to the payment of a fine of P50, to subsidiary imprisonment and the costs, the provincial fiscal of Rizal on June 24, 1911, filed an information in the Court of First Instance, charging Isidoro Espiritusanto with a violation of municipal ordinance No. 1, series of 1910, enacted by the municipal council of Malabon, Rizal, inasmuch as the accused, on November 19, 1910, was in that pueblo found to be engaged, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, in collecting wagers for the gambling game known as jueteng, the tickets necessary for conducting the same having been seized in his possession. Therefore this cause was instituted, and after due consideration of the evidence adduced judgment was rendered, on September 25, 1911, sentencing the defendant, for a violation of said ordinance, to the payment of the fine previously imposed upon him by the justice of the peace and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. Defendant's counsel appealed from this judgment on the ground that said ordinance was unconstitutional.

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The ordinance in question, exhibited on page 9 of the record, was passed by the municipal council of Malabon on January 5, 1910, and amended at the sessions of the 27th of march and the 14th of June of the same year. It strictly prohibits the game of jueteng within the limits of the said pueblo and prescribes the penalties to be imposed for its violation; and it further provides that any person who shall collect money for wagers on the said game, or who shall keep, make, or prepare any list of numbers, or representative signs thereof, for use in such game, shall be deemed to be a collector of jueteng, and bankers, those who directly conduct the game, receive from the collectors the tickets or other contrivances, and are found in possession of the tambiolos or other articles used for the purpose of conducting the said game; and that, finally, those who keep or maintain jueteng games shall be deemed to be keepers or maintainers of gambling houses, in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of Act No. 1757 . After this judgment had been rendered, defendant's attorney presented a motion requesting that it be set aside on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to try the case and sentence the defendant, for the reason that the ordinance under which he was tried and convicted was unconstitutional and invalid, but the court held in its judgment that it was no defect in an ordinance or municipal regulation to fail to express its subject in its title. This motion was overruled. Assuming the defendant's guilt, since he was engaged in collecting wagers for the game of jueteng, a game prohibited by law as one of chance, and since the judgment of conviction, rendered by the justice of the peace of the pueblo of Malabon, was affirmed by the Court of First Instance, we shall only treat in this decision of the argument advanced by the defense in maintaining this second appeal, to wit, that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, for the reason that the aforementioned ordinance passed by the municipal council of the pueblo of Malabon, under which the appellant was prosecuted and convicted, is unconstitutional. Defendant's attorney argues that the ordinance is contrary to the municipal code because the council exceeded the powers conferred upon it by the code which, in subsection (u) of section 39, only authorizes it "to provide against the evils of gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly houses of whatsoever sort, " while the first paragraph of the said ordinance prescribes that it is strictly prohibitedto play jueteng within the territorial limits of Malabon, and provides the penalties for its violation. From a perusal of the text of the ordinance referred to, it is unquestionable that it is in accord with the provisions of Act No. 1757, inasmuch as the latter strictly prohibits the playing of monte, jueteng, or any kind of lottery, banking or percentage games; and the said Municipal Code, by providing in section 39 that

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the municipal council shall provide against the evils of gambling, granted it the authority to prohibit gambling games such as those specified in the said ordinance; therefore, the municipal council concerned acted within the powers conferred upon it by the Municipal Code and in accordance with the provisions of the said Act No. 1757, since the game of jueteng, as one of chance absolutely prohibited by the latter, is not susceptible of regulation, but must be prosecuted and completely suppressed in order to avoid repetitions of the great and far-reaching social and moral evils it has been producing in the towns of these Islands. Hence it is undeniable that the said municipal council, in passing the said ordinance, did not exceed its authority and kept strictly within the powers conferred upon it by its organic law and the general laws that deal with gambling. With regard to the allegation that the said ordinance is in conflict with the provisions of section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, it must be considered that an ordinance has not the character of and is not a general law, but is merely a regulation of a local nature, and one perfectly valid and effective, provided it is in harmony with the general laws in force in the Islands. Therefore, it is not indispensable that its subject should appear in the title, for the provisions of the said Act of Congress refer to the general laws that govern in a State and to those enacted in these Islands which, indeed, must not embrace more than one subject and that subject must be expressed in the title. This constitutional provision has no application to municipal ordinances, as these do not partake of the nature of laws, but are mere rules provided for the fulfillment of the laws. This principle is laid down in the Encyclopedia of Law and Procedure. (Vol. 28, p. 378, and vol. 36, p. 1021.) For the foregoing reasons we deem it proper to affirm and do hereby affirm the judgment from, with the costs against the appellant. Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur. Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent.

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CASCO V. GIMENEZ

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.

Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner. Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

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The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:

The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.

x x x x x x x x x

XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t

Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:

Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

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WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala

and Makalintal, JJ., concur.