cases I (persons and family relations).docx

7/28/2019 cases I (persons and family relations).docx

1/31

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OFATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.(MABINI), petitioners,

vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to thePresident, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number ofpresidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not sowhen it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that theywere to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this caseon April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of thesedecrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move forreconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the followingquestions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which arenot?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinctionbetween laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means


2/31

complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the OfficialGazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motionwas a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the

merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Codemeant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication,when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any casethe subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently notbinding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the FebruaryRevolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view ofthe supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding,he submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of agovernment agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published; thatpublication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because it was not

supported by eight members of this Court.

5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of theirpublication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shalltake effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on theoriginal petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to

the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clausedoes not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately uponapproval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretionprovide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the originaldecision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from itspublication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general ruledid not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed withaltogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as itwould deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislaturecould validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approvalnotwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period afterpublication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a resultand they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because theydid not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is


3/31

commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law onprescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect beforethey can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,

which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is tohave any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 ofthe Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of publicconcern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, thelegislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, forstrictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do notapply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surelycannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably

does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of publicinterest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, ifhe is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing onthe public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultravires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interesteven if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that allstatutes, including those of local application and private laws,shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days afterpublication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by thePresident in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegatedby the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrativerules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce orimplement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only thepersonnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued byadministrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by theirsubordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it appliesto only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of thatplace. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming apublic place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions orrequirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are


4/31

meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which thatbody is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister ofSocial Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid

down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of hispersonnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances arenot covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose isto inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by thepetitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of suchdecree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publicationrequirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally,in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably

of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration.

7

Theevident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categoricallyfor publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could bemade elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved hisvote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicatingwhere it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of thisCourt to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decisionsupported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in theOfficial Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating,the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a widerreadership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publicationis not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendmenthas been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed tosuch a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yetbeen published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal ormodify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to thelegislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approvedby the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribedprocedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 ofthe Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and notelsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publicationor after a different period provided by the legislature.


5/31

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon aspossible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility,of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be renderedunenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause itspublication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at

this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request foran advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once againan open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny andavailable always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remaindemocratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authorityemanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority toreview the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if theacts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in theshadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rulescannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by avalid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the nakedblade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediatelyupon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the OfficialGazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on anotherdate specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., andParas, JJ., concur.


6/31

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent

argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise aswhen the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their

approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and lawswhich are not as to their publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the

requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not

mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other

date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,

all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. Alaw without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class

legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affectthe public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of thepeople only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as acondition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different

effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public

of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the OfficialGazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not

called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:


7/31

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows

with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be

recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publicationintended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a

scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.


8/31

G.R. No. 105364* June 28, 2001

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. and PERFECTO V.FERNANDEZ, petitioners,vs.

HONORABLE BENJAMIN VEGA, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the REGIONALTRIAL COURT of Manila, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and THELIQUIDATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, respondents

KAPUNAN, J.:

May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank

(PVB) when Congress had mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

This is the sole issue raised in the instant Petition for Prohibition with Petition for PreliminaryInjunction and application for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity) filed withBranch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of

the Philippine Veterans Bank, the same docketed as Case No. SP-32311. Thereafter, the

Philipppine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E., herein petitioner, represented bypetitioner Perfecto V. Fernandez, filed claims for accrued and unpaid employee wages and

benefits with said court in SP-32311.1

After lengthy proceedings, partial payment of the sums due to the employees were made.

However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the benefits, many remain unpaid.

2

On March 8, 1991, petitioners moved to disqualify the respondent judge from hearing the above

case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.3

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation

of the Philippine Veterans Bank.4

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for

reinstatement upon reopening of the bank.5

Sometime in May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB toreopen.6

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge

continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that

respondents were set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion ofanother lawyer, while petitioners claims have been frozen to their prejudice.


9/31

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners argue that with the passage ofR.A. 7169, the liquidation court becamefunctus officio,and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

In a Resolution, dated June 8, 1992, the Supreme Court resolved to issue a TemporaryRestraining Order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.

On June 22, 1992, VOP Security & Detective Agency (VOPSDA) and its 162 security guards

filed a Motion for Intervention with prayer that they be excluded from the operation of the

Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court. They alleged that they had filed a motionbefore Branch 39 of the RTC of Manila, in SP-No. 32311, praying that said court order PVB to

pay their backwages and salary differentials by authority of R.A. No 6727, Wage Orders No.

NCR-01 and NCR-01-Ad and Wage Orders No. NCR-02 and NCR-02-A; and, that said court, in

an Order dated June 5, 1992, approved therein movants case and directed the bank liquidator orPVB itself to pay the backwages and differentials in accordance with the computation

incorporated in the order. Said intervenors likewise manifested that there was an error in thecomputation of the monetary benefits due them.

On August 18, 1992, petitioners, pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, dated July 6, 1992,

filed their Comment opposing the Motion for Leave to File Intervention and for exclusion fromthe operation of the T.R.O. on the grounds that the movants have no legal interest in the subjectmatter of the pending action; that allowing intervention would only cause delay in the

proceedings; and that the motion to exclude the movants from the T.R.O. is without legal basis

and would render moot the relief sought in the petition.

On September 3, 1992, the PVB filed a Petition-In-Intervention praying for the issuance of the

writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in connection with theissuance by respondent judge of several orders involving acts of liquidation of PVB even after

the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169. PVB further alleges that respondent judge clearly acted in

excess of or without jurisdiction when he issued the questioned orders.

We find for the petitioners.

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created

Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes",

which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which waspublished in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the

Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years from

the date of the reopening of the head office.7

The law likewise provides for the creation of a

rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same.8

Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposedRehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a

Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the


10/31

respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of

the passage of R.A. No. 7169.

On April 10, 1992, the Monetary Board issued Monetary Board Resolution No. 348 which

approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitaion Committee.

Thereafter, the Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen.

On June 3, 1992, the liquidator filed A Motion for the Termination of the Liquidation

Proceedings of the Philippine Veterans Bank with the respondent judge.

As stated above, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, issued a temporary restraining

order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with the

liquidation of PVB.

On August 3, 1992, the Philippine Veterans Bank opened its doors to the public and started

regular banking operations.

Clearly, the enactment of Republic Act No. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments has

rendered the liquidation courtfunctus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been strippedof the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors.9

Itis the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them.

It is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss.

On the opposite end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or

reorganization. Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in aneffort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation andsolvency.

10

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to theconcept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the

liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became

effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette;

and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is

conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, theCourt is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their

publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the

legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unlessotherwise provided."


11/31

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10.Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its

approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C.Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No.

7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was

published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed byrespondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE

and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from furtherproceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

* This case was transferred to the ponente pursuant to the resolution in AM No. 00-9-03-SC. Re:Creation of Special Committee on Case Backlog dated February 27, 2001.


12/31

G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.

HON. PRESIDING JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, BRANCH 58, RTC, MAKATI;

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION; AND FIRESTONE CERAMIC,INC., respondents.

TORRES, JR., J .:p

The PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION (PITC, forbrevity) filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking the reversal of theDecision dated January 4, 1993 of public respondent Hon. Zosimo Z. Angeles,Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58, in Civil Case

No. 92-158 entitled Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, et. al. vs. PhilippineIndustrial Trading Corporation.

The said decision upheld the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus ofREMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION (Remington, for brevity)and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC. (Firestone, for brevity), and, in the process,declared as null and void and unconstitutional, PITC's Administrative Order No.SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant regulations. The dispositive portion of thedecision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Petitionerand Intervenor and against the Respondent, as follows:

1) Enjoining the further implementation by the respondent of the following issuancesrelative to the applications for importation of products from the People's Republic ofChina, to wit:

a) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 dated August 30, 1989 (Annex A,Amended Petition);

b) Prescribed Export Undertaking Form (Annex B, Id.);

c) Prescribed Importer-Exporter Agreement Form for non-exporter-importer (Annex C,Id.);

d) Memorandum dated April 16, 1990 relative to amendments of Administrative Order No.SOCPEC 89-08-01 (Annex D, Id.);

e) Memorandum dated May 6, 1991 relative to Revised Schedule of Fees for theprocessing of import applications (Annexes E, E-1., Ind.);

f) Rules and Regulations relative to liquidation of unfulfilled Undertakings and expiredexport credits (Annex Z, Supplemental Petition),


13/31

the foregoing being all null and void and unconstitutional; and,

2) Commanding respondent to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and allthose that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from andwithout the requirements prescribed in the above-mentioned issuances.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The controversy springs from the issuance by the PITC of Administrative OrderNo. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for importationfrom the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompaniedby a viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROCcarried out by the improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importerin an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being appliedfor, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Pertinent provisions of the questioned administrative order read:

3. COUNTERPART EXPORTS TO PROC

In addition to existing requirements for the processing of import application for goods andcommodities originating from PROC, it is declared that:

3.1 All applications covered by these rules must be accompanied by aviable and confirmed EXPORT PROGRAM of Philippine products toPROC in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation fromPROC being applied for. Such export program must be carried out andcompleted within six (6) months from date of approval of the ImportApplication by PITC. PITC shall reject/deny any application forimportation from PROC without the accompanying export program

mentioned above.

3.2 The EXPORT PROGRAM may be carried out by any of the following:

a. By the IMPORTER himself if he has the capabilitiesand facilities to carry out the export of Philippineproducts to PROC in his own name; or

b. Through a tie-up between the IMPORTER and alegitimate exporter (of Philippine products) who is willingto carry out the export commitments of the IMPORTERunder these rules. The tie-up shall not make theIMPORTER the exporter of the goods but shall merelyensure that the importation sought to be approved ismatched one-to-one (1:1) in value with a correspondingexport of Philippine products to PROC. 2

3.3 EXPORT PROGRAM DOCUMENTS which are to be submitted bythe improper together with his Import Application are as follows:

a) Firm Contract, Sales Invoice or Letter of Credit.


14/31

b) Export Performance Guarantee (SeeArticle 4 hereof).

c) IMPORTER-EXPORTER AGREEMENT for non-exporter IMPORTER (PITC Form No. M-1006). Thisform should be used if IMPORTER has tie-up with anexporter for the export of Philippine Products to PROC.

4. EXPORT GUARANTEE

To ensure that the export commitments of the IMPORTER are carried out in accordancewith these rules, all IMPORTERS concerned are required to submit an EXPORTPERFORMANCE GUARANTEE (the "Guarantee") at the time of filing of the ImportApplication. The amount of the guarantee shall be as follows:

For essential commodities: 15% of the value of the imports applied for.

For other commodities: 50% of the value of the imports applied for.

4.1 The guarantee may be in the form of (i) a non-interest bearing cashdeposit; (ii) Bank hold-out in favor of PITC (PITC Form No. M-1007) or(iii) a Domestic Letter of Credit (with all bank opening charges foraccount of Importer) opened in favor of PITC as beneficiary.

4.2 The guarantee shall be made in favor of PITC and will beautomatically forfeited in favor of PITC, fully or partially, if the requiredexport program is not completed by the importer within six (6) monthsfrom date of approval of the Import Application.

4.3 Within the six (6) months period above stated, the IMPORTER isentitled to a (i) refund of the cash deposited without interest; (ii)cancellation of the Bank holdout or (iii) Cancellation of the Domestic

Letter of Credit upon showing that he has completed the exportcommitment pertaining to his importation and provided further that thefollowing documents are submitted to PITC:

a) Final Sales Invoiceb) Bill of lading or Airway billc) Bank Certificate of Inward Remittanced) PITC EXPORT APPLICATION FOR NO. M-1005

5. MISCELLANEOUS

5.1 All other requirements for importations of goods and commoditiesfrom PROC must be complied with in addition to the above.

5.2 PITC shall have the right to disapprove any and all importapplications not in accordance with the rules and regulations hereinprescribed.

5.3 Should the IMPORTER or any of his duly authorized representativesmake any false statements or fraudulent misrepresentations in theImport/Export Application, or falsify, forge or simulate any documentrequired under these rules and regulations, PITC is authorized to reject


15/31

all pending and future import/export applications of said IMPORTERand/or disqualify said IMPORTER from doing any business withSOCPEC through PITC.

Desiring to make importations from PROC, private respondents Remington andFirestone, both domestic corporations, organized and existing under Philippine

laws, individually applied for authority to import from PROC with the petitioner.They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for importers,and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importationsfrom PROC with corresponding export of Philippine products to PROC.

Private respondent Remington was allowed to import tools, machineries andother similar goods. Firestone, on the other hand, imported Calcine Vauxite,which it used for the manufacture of fire bricks, one of its products.

Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit exportcredits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications

were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that the latterwere both barred from importing goods from PROC. 3

Consequently, Remington filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus, withprayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of PreliminaryInjunction on January 20, 1992, against PITC in the RTC Makati Branch 58. 4 Thecourt issued a Temporary Restraining Order on January 21, 1992, ordering PITCto cease from exercising any power to process applications of goods fromPROC. 5 Hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction ensued.

Private respondent Firstone was allowed to intervene in the petition on July 2,

1992, 6 thus joining Remington in the latter's charges against PITC. It specificallyasserts that the questioned Administrative Order is an undue restriction of trade,and hence, unconstitutional.

Upon trial, it was agreed that the evidence adduced upon the hearing on thePreliminary Injunction was sufficient to completely adjudicate the case, thus, theparties deemed it proper that the entire case be submitted for decision upon theevidence so far presented.

The court rendered its Decision 7 on January 4, 1992. The court ruled that PITC'sauthority to process and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to

issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. No. 1071, has alreadybeen repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President

Aquino.

The court observed:

Given such obliteration and/or withdrawal of what used to be PITC's regulatory authorityunder the Special provisions embodied in LOI 444 from the enumeration of power that it


16/31

could exercise effective February 27, 1987 in virtue of Section 16 (d), EO No. 133, it maynow be successfully argued that the PITC can no longer exercise such specific regulatorypower in question conformably with the legal precept "expresio unius est exclusioalterius."

Moreover, the court continued, none of the Trade protocols of 1989, 1990 or

1991, has empowered the PITC, expressly or impliedly to formulate orpromulgate the assailed Administrative Order. This fact, makes the continuedexercise by PITC of the regulatory powers in question unworthy of judicialapproval. Otherwise, it would be sanctioning an undue exercise of legislativepower vested solely in the Congress of the Philippines by Section, 1, Article VII ofthe 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The lower court stated that the subject Administrative Order and other similarissuances by PITC suffer from serious constitutional infirmity, having beenpromulgated in pursuance of an international agreement (the Memorandum of

Agreement between the Philippines and PROC), which has not been concurred

in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Philippine Senate as required byArticle VII, Section 21, of the 1987 Constitution, and therefore, null and void.

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unlessconcurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Furthermore, the subject Administrative Order was issued in restraint of trade, inviolation of Sections 1 and 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution ofopportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods andservices produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and, an expanding

productivity as the key to raising the equality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest sorequires. No combination in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

Lastly, the court declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since thesame was not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code whichprovides, that:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publicationin the Official Gazette, unless the law otherwise provides. . . .

Petitioner now comes to use on a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 8 questioningthe court's decision particularly on the propriety of the lower court's declarationson the validity of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. The Court directed therespondents to file their respective Comments.

Subsequent events transpired, however, which affect to some extent, thesubmissions of the parties to the present petition.


17/31

Following President Fidel V. Ramos' trip to Beijing, People's Republic of China(PROC), from April 25 to 30, 1993, a new trade agreement was entered intobetween the Philippines and PROC, encouraging liberalization of trade betweenthe two countries. In line therewith, on April 20, 1993, the President, throughChief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, directed the Department of

Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing Administrative OrderNo. SOCPEC 89-08-01, as amended by PITC Board Resolution Nos. 92-01-05and 92-03-08. 9

In the implementation of such order, PITC President Jose Luis U. Yulo, Jr. issueda corporate Memorandum 10 instructing that all import applications for the PROCfiled with the PITC as of April 20, 1993 shall no longer be covered by the tradebalancing program outlined in the Administrative Order.

Forthwith, the PITC allowed the private respondents to import anew from thePROC, without being required to comply anymore with the lifted requirement of

balancing its imports with exports of Philippine products to PROC.

11

In itsConstancia 12 filed with the Court on November 22, 1993, Remington expressedits desire to have the present action declared moot and academic considering thenew supervening developments. For its part, respondent Firestone made aManifestation 13 in lieu of its Memorandum, informing the court of the aforesaiddevelopments of the new trade program of the Philippines with China, andprayed for the court's early resolution of the action.

To support its submission that the present action is now moot and academic,respondent Remington cites Executive Order No. 244, 14 issued by PresidentRamos on May 12, 1995. The Executive Order states:

WHEREAS, continued coverage of the People's Republic of China by Letter ofInstructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with the country's national interest, ascoursing Republic of the Philippines-People's Republic China Trade through thePhilippine International Trading Corporations as provided for under Letter of InstructionsNo. 444 is becoming an unnecessary barrier to trade;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order;

The Committee on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Socialist Countries to deletethe People's Republic of China from the list of countries covered by Letter of InstructionsNo. 444.

Done in the City of Manila, this 12th day of May in the year of Our Lord, NineteenHundred and Ninety-Five.

PITC filed its own Manifestation 15 on December 15, 1993, wherein it adopted thearguments raised in its Petition as its Memorandum. PITC disagrees withRemington on the latter's submission that the case has become moot andacademic as a result of the abrogation of Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-


18/31

08-01, since respondent Remington had incurred obligations to the petitionerconsisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service providedby PITC to Remington, which obligations remain outstanding. 16 The propriety ofsuch charges must still be resolved, petitioner argues, thereby maintaining theissue of the validity of SOCPEC Order No. 89-08-01, before it was abrogated by

Executive fiat.

There is no question that from April 20, 1993, when trading balancing measureswith PROC were lifted by the President, Administrative Order SOCPEC No. 89-08-01 no longer has force and effect, and respondents are thus entitled anew toapply for authority to import from the PROC, without the trade balancingrequirements previously imposed on proposed importers. Indeed, it appears thatsince the lifting of the trade balancing measures, Remington had been allowed toimport anew from PROC.

There remains, however, the matter of the outstanding obligations of the

respondent for the charges relating to the 0.5% Counter Export DevelopmentService in favor of PITC, for the period when the questioned Administrative Orderremained in effect. Is the obligation still subsisting, or are the respondents freedfrom it?

To resolve this issue, we are tasked to consider the constitutionality ofAdministrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, based on the arguments set up bythe parties in their Petition and Comment. In so doing, we must inquire into thenature of the functions of the PITC, in the light of present realities.

The PITC is a government owned or controlled corporation created under P.D.

No. 252

1

7 dated August 6, 1973. P.D. No. 1071,

18

issued on May 9, 1977 whichrevised the provisions of P.D. 252. The purposes and powers of the saidgovernmental entity were enumerated under Section 5 and 6 thereof. 19

On August 9, 1976, the late President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter ofInstruction (LOI) No. 444, 20 directing, inter alia, that trade (export or import of allcommodities), whether direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of theSocialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries (SOCPEC), includingthe People's Republic of China (PROC) shall be undertaken or coursed throughthe PITC. Under the LOI, PITC was mandated to: 1) participate in all official tradeand economic discussions between the Philippines and SOCPEC; 2) adopt suchmeasures and issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary for theeffective discharge of its functions under its instructions; and, 3) undertake theprocessing and approval of all applications for export to or import from theSOCPEC.

Pertinent provisions of the Letter of Instruction are herein reproduced:

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION 444


19/31

xxx xxx xxx

II. CHANNELS OF TRADE

1. The trade, direct or indirect, between the Philippines and any of the Socialist and othercentrally-planned economy countries shall upon issuance hereof, be undertaken by or

coursed through the Philippine International Trading Corporation. This shall apply to theexport and import of all commodities of products including those specified for export orimport by expressly authorized government agencies.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall participate in all official trade andeconomic discussions between the Philippines and other centrally-planned economycountries.

xxx xxx xxx

V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

The Philippine International Trading Corporation shall adopt such measures and issuesuch rules and regulations as may be necessary for the effective discharge of itsfunctions under these instructions. In this connection, the processing and approval ofapplications for export to or import from the Socialist and other centrally-plannedeconomy countries shall, henceforth, be performed by the said Corporation. (Emphasisours)

After the EDSA Revolution, or more specifically on February 27, 1987, thenPresident Corazon C. Aquino promulgated Executive Order (EO) No.133 21 reorganizing the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) empowering thesaid department to be the "primary coordinative, promotive, facilitative andregulatory arm of the government for the country's trade, industry and investmentactivities" (Sec. 2, EO 133). The PITC was made one of DTI's line agencies. 22

The Executive Order reads in part:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 133

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 16. Line Corporate Agencies and Government Entities.

The following line corporate agencies and government entities defined in Section 9 (c) ofthis Executive Order that will perform their specific regulatory functions, particularlydevelopmental responsibilities and specialized business activities in a manner consonantwith the Department mandate, objectives, policies, plans and programs:

xxx xxx xxx

d) Philippine International Trading Corporation. This corporation, which shall besupervised by the Undersecretary for International Trade, shall only engage in both


20/31

export and trading on new or non-traditional products and markets not normally pursuedby the private business sector; provide a wide range of export oriented auxiliary servicesto the private sector; arrange for or establish comprehensive system and physicalfacilities for handling the collection, processing, and distribution of cargoes and othercommodities; monitor or coordinate risk insurance services for existing institutions;promote and organize, whenever warranted, production enterprises and industrialestablishments and collaborate or associate in joint venture with any person, association,company or entity, whether domestic or foreign, in the fields of production, marketing,procurement, and other relate businesses; and provide technical advisory, investigatory,consultancy and management services with respect to any and all of the functions,activities, and operations of the corporation.

Sometime in April, 1988, following the State visit of President Aquino to thePROC, the Philippines and PROC entered into a Memorandum of Understanding23 (MOU) wherein the two countries agreed to make joint efforts within the nextfive years to expand bilateral trade to US $600 US $800 Million by 1992, andto strive for a steady progress towards achieving a balance between the value oftheir imports and exports during the period, agreeing for the purpose that upon

the signing of the Memorandum, both sides shall undertake to establish thenecessary steps and procedures to be adopted within the framework of theannual midyear review meeting under the Trade Protocol, in order to monitor andensure the implementation of the MOU.

Conformably with the MOU, the Philippines and PROC entered into a TradeProtocol for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, 24 under which was specified thecommodities to be traded between them. The protocols affirmed their agreementto jointly endeavor between them. The protocols affirmed their agreement to

jointly endeavor to achieve more or less a balance between the values of theirimports and exports in their bilateral trade.

It is allegedly in line with its powers under LOI 444 and in keeping with the MOUand Trade Protocols with PROC that PITC issued its now assailed AdministrativeOrder No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 25 on August 30, 1989 (amended in March, 1992).

Undoubtedly, President Aquino, in issuing EO 133, is empowered to modify andamend the provisions of LOI 444, which was issued by then President Marcos,both issuances being executive directives. As observed by us in Philippine

Association of Services Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 26

there is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the Letter ofInstruction by way of an Executive Order. This is notwithstanding the fact that the subjectLOI 1190 was issued by President Marcos, when he was extraordinarily empowered toexercise legislative powers, whereas EO 450 was issued by Pres. Aquino when hertransitional legislative powers have already ceased, since it was found that LOI 1190 wasa mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered, or modified by EO 450.

We do not agree, however, with the trial court's ruling PITC's authority to issuerules and regulations pursuant to the Special Provision of LOI 444 and P.D. No.1071, have already been repealed by EO 133.


21/31

While PITC's power to engage in commercial import and export activities isexpressly recognized and allowed under Section 16 (d) of EO 133, the same isnot limited only to new or non-traditional products and markets not normallypursued by the private business sector. There is not indication in the law of theremoval of the powers of the PITC to exercise its regulatory functions in the area

of importations from SOCPEC countries. Though it does not mention the grant ofregulatory power, EO 133, as worded, is silent as to the abolition or limitation ofsuch powers, previously granted under P.D. 1071, from the PITC.

Likewise, the general repealing clause in EO 133 stating that "all laws,ordinances, rules, and regulations, or other parts thereof, which are inconsistentwith the Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly, cannotoperate to abolish the grant of regulatory powers to the PITC. There can be norepeal of the said powers, absent any cogency of irreconcilable inconsistency orrepugnancy between the issuances, relating to the regulatory power of the PITC.

The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul thefunctions of the PITC. The DTI was established, and was given powers andduties including those previously held by the PITC as an independentgovernment entity, under P.D. 1071 and LOI 444. The PITC was therebyattached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said department.

EO 133 established the DTI as the primary coordinative, promotive, facilitativeand regulatory arm of government for the country's trade, industry andinvestment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sectoractivity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. 27 In furtherance ofthis mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and

coordinate activities of the government related to trade industry and investments;to formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the investment prioritiesplan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and productexport strategies which will guide the export promotion and development thrustsof the government. 28 Corollarily, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given thepower to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out thedepartment's objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects.

The PITC, on the other hand, was attached as an integral part to the saiddepartment as one of its line agencies, 29 and given the focal task of implementingthe department's programs. 30 The absence of the regulatory power formerlyenshrined in the Special Provision of LOI 444, from Section 16 of EO 133, andthe limitation of its previously wide range of functions, is noted. This does notmean, however, that PITC has lost the authority to issue the questioned

Administrative Order. It is our view that PITC still holds such authority, and maylegally exercise it, as an implementing arm, and under the supervision of, theDepartment of Trade and Industry.


22/31

Furthermore, the lower court's ruling to the effect that the PITC's authority toprocess and approve applications for imports from SOCPEC and to issue rulesand regulations pursuant to LOI 444 and P.D. 1071 has been repealed by EO133, is misplaced, and did not consider the import behind the issuance of thelater presidential edict.

The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power to regulatethe flow of trade between the Philippines and PROC under the two countries'Memorandum of Understanding, a power which necessarily flows from her officeas Chief Executive. In issuing Executive Order 133, the President intendedmerely to reorganize the Department of Trade and Industry to cope with the needof a streamlined bureaucracy. 31

Thus, there is not real inconsistency between LOI 444 and EO 133. There is,admittedly, a rearranging of the administrative functions among theadministrative bodies affective by the edict, but not an abolition of executive

power. Consistency in statutes as in executive issuances, is of prime importance,and, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are presumed to beconsistent with each other. Where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of courts, inthe construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile them, and to adopt aconstruction of a statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it withother statutory provisions. 32 The fact that a later enactment may relate to thesame subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to causean implied repeal of the latter, since the law may be cumulative or a continuationof the old one. 33

Similarly, the grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not

unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modernsociety, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodiesto help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fieldassigned to them, they can deal within the problems thereof with more expertiseand dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicialpowers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of thegovernment. 34 Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concernedmust commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of privateparties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrativeagencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of privaterights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by ourregular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation vs. National Housing Authority, G.R.No.L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).

With global trade and business becoming more intricate may even with newdiscoveries in technology and electronics notwithstanding, the time has come tograpple with legislations and even judicial decisions aimed at resolving issues


23/31

affecting not only individual rights but also activities of which foreign governmentsor entities may have interests. Thus, administrative policies and regulations mustbe devised to suit these changing business needs in a faster rate than to resortto traditional acts of the legislature.

This tendency finds support in a well-stated work on the subject, viz.:

Since legislatures had neither the time nor the knowledge to create detailed rules,however, it was soon clear that new governmental arrangements would be needed tohandle the job of rule-making. The courts, moreover, many of them already congested,would have been swamped if they had to adjudicate all the controversies that the newlegislation was bound to create; and the judges, already obliged to handle a greatdiversity of cases, would have been hard pressed to acquire the knowledge they neededto deal intelligently with all the new types of controversy.

So the need to "create a large number of specialized administrative agencies and to givethem broader powers than administrators had traditionally exercised. These included thepower to issue regulations having the force of law, and the power to hear and decide

cases

powers that had previously been reserved to the legislatures and the courts.(Houghteling/Pierce, Lawmaking by Administrative Agencies, p. 166)

The respondents likewise argue that PITC is not empowered to issue theAdministrative Order because no grant of such power was made under the TradeProtocols of 1989, 1990 or 1991. We do not agree. The Trade Protocolsaforesaid, are only the enumeration of the products and goods which signatorycountries have agreed to trade. They do not bestow any regulatory power, forexecutive power is vested in the Executive Department, 35 and it is for the latter todelegate the exercise of such power among its designated agencies.

In sum, the PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as avalid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation.

This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a validexercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issuedon August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications forimportation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it ispublished, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication inthe Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it

is otherwise provided. . . .

The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National

Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of theAdministrative Order.

This court, in Tanada vs. Tuvera36 stated, thus:


24/31

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days afterpublication unless a different effectivity is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by thePresident in the exercise of legislative powers or, at present, directly conferred by the

Constitution. Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published if theirpurpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only thepersonnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neitheris publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrativesuperiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in theperformance of their duties

xxx xxx xxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purposeis to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances whichshould be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce andimplement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, inrelation to LOI 444 and EO 133.

Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner werelifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never legally effective, andprivate respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject to them, because

Administrative Order 89-08-01 embodying the same was never published, asmandated by law, for its effectivity. It was only on March 30, 1992 when the

amendments to the said Administrative Order were filed in the UP Law Center,and published in the National Administrative Register as required by the

Administrative Code of 1987.

Finally, it is the declared Policy of the Government to develop and strengthentrade relations with the People's Republic of China. As declared by the Presidentin EO 244 issued on May 12, 1995, continued coverage of the People's Republicof China by Letter of Instructions No. 444 is no longer consistent with thecountry's national interest, as coursing RP-PROC trade through the PITC asprovided for under Letter of Instructions No. 444 is becoming an unnecessarybarrier to trade. 37

Conformably with such avowed policy, any remnant of the restrained atmosphereof trading between the Philippines and PROC should be done away with, so as toallow economic growth and renewed trade relations with our neighbors to flourishand may be encouraged.


25/31

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED,to the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents,subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Enjoining the petitioner:

a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Servicefee of 0.5% of the total value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of theprivate respondents;

b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No.SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and,

2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and allthose that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free fromand without complying with the requirements prescribed in the above-stated

issuances.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


26/31

G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988

FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL,

JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL andLUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

CORTES, J.:

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions ofthe Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v.

Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgatedon 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motionfor reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case hadbecome final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners'motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.

At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified asrequired by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petitiondid not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, wouldstill resolve to deny it.

The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned bypetitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of privaterespondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of MarissaBernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate theirshop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On thebasis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, BranchXXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitionersguilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal,the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decisionpromulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on

August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an

appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion forreconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution ofSeptember 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretionwhen it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion forreconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration.


27/31

It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R.No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing orfor filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its Resolution denying themotion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Courten bancrestated and clarified the rule, to wit:

Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictlyenforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may befiled with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and theIntermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with theSupreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grantor deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)

Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R.No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further torestate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.

Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of thegrace period, to wit:

In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30,1986 of the Court's Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30,1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial orreconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.

Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is stillwithin the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.

This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court[G.R. No.73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]

In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed onSeptember 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering thelength of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decisionof the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in theignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion forreconsideration within the reglementary period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be madeto apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in theOfficial Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals waspromulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication ofSupreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as acondition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer inactive law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where


28/31

issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reportsof Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme CourtReports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of

discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure isresponsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be dueto the lack of necessary repairs.

Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the"last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate thetailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, sincethe doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, isinapplicable to this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instantpetition for lack of merit.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.


29/31

G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General and Ernesto T. Duran for respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued its Circular No. 22 of the following

tenor: .

Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in computing the premiums due the System,

will take into consideration and include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and

overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. All these willcomprise the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2%contributions will be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one month.

Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel,

wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to

a previous Circular No. 7, dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus inthe computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions,

and submitting, "In order to assist your System in arriving at a properinterpretation of the term

'compensation' for the purposes of" such computation, their observations on Republic Act 1161

and its amendment and on the general interpretation of the words "compensation",

"remuneration" and "wages". Counsel further questioned the validity of the circular for lack ofauthority on the part of the Social Security Commission to promulgate it without the approval of

the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.

Overruling these objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a

rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and publication in the OfficialGazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement

of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.

Not satisfied with this ruling, petitioner comes to this Court on appeal.

The single issue involved in this appeal is whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation,as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security

Commission "to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval of the President such rules and

regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes of this Act."

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and

an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrativebody. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law


30/31

with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of

policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law (Parker, Administrative Law, p. 197; Davis,

Administrative Law, p. 194). Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of theprocedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of

a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law.

This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy,purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and themanner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its

enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a

delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. (Davis,op. cit., p. 194.) .

A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followedand its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not

in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom (Davis, op. cit., 195-197). On the

other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts

that finally determine what the law means.

Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of theamendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation"

contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as

follows: .

(f) CompensationAll remuneration for employment include the cash value of any

remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration

in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay;and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not

legally required to do so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to:

(f) CompensationAll remuneration for employment include the cash value of any

remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in

excess of P500.00 received during the month.

It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay

given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or exempted from the

definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by theamendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the

effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those

concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended,which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law

as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law

should be construed. 1wph1.t


31/31

The case ofPeople v. Jolliffe (G.R. No. L-9553, promulgated on May 30, 1959) cited by

appellant, does not support its contention that the circular in question is a rule or regulation.

What was there said was merely that a regulation may be incorporated in the form of a circular.Such statement simply meant that the substance and not the form of a regulation is decisive in

determining its nature. It does not lay down a general proposition of law that any circular,

regardless of its substance and even if it is only interpretative, constitutes a rule or regulationwhich must be published in the Official Gazette before it could take effect.

The case ofPeople v. Que Po Lay (50 O.G. 2850) also cited by appellant is not applicable to thepresent case, because the penalty that may be incurred by employers and employees if they

refuse to pay the corresponding premiums on bonus, overtime pay, etc. which the employer pays

to his employees, is not by reason of non-compliance with Circular No. 22, but for violation of

the specific legal provisions contained in Section 27(c) and (f) of Republic Act No. 1161.

We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the

System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the

monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should bebased, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official

Gazette for its effectivity.

It hardly need be said that the Commission's interpretation of the amendment embodied in its

Circular No. 22, is correct. The express elimination among the exemptions excluded in the oldlaw, of all bonuses, allowances and overtime pay in the determination of the "compensation"

paid to employees makes it imperative that such bonuses and overtime pay must now be included

in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of the amendatory law. It is true that in previous

cases, this Court has held that bonus is not demandable because it is not part of the wage, salary,or compensation of the employee. But the question in the instant case is not whether bonus is

demandable or not as part of compensation, but whether, after the employer does, in fact, give orpay bonus to his employees, such bonuses shall be considered compensation under the SocialSecurity Act after they have been received by the employees. While it is true that terms or words

are to be interpreted in accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when

such term or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adoptedin enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase or term may

have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some other purpose. Such is the case

that is now before us. Republic Act 1161 specifically defined what "compensation" should mean

"For the purposes of this Act". Republic Act 1792 amended such definition by deleting sameexemptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express substantial change in the

phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or judicial construction may have been given to

the phrase in question should give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs

against appellant. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon

and De Leon, JJ., concur.

cases I (persons and family relations).docx

Documents

Transcript of cases I (persons and family relations).docx