Cases for Legprof

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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6353 February 27, 2006

SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS, Complainants, vs. ATTY.

RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with "unlawful, dishonest, immoral

and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an

attorney." The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for

Disbarment1 filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B.

Williams.

It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil

Case No. 134432 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,

Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to

the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the

controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her

favor, stating that she is "Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an

American citizen."3 On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with

falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor

of Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.4

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,

Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-

affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-

2). He then knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue

that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship

when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in

the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she

executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.

22. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites

Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she

would not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she

renounced it in a specific act.

23. That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law,

declaring that her "act of marrying" her husband was equivalent to

renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the

1987 Constitution supports his position, not Marisa’s (Annex A-4).5

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who

knows that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) "will

not prevail in the end."6

In his "Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,"7 respondent

enumerated matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of

falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the

complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the

criminal charges against the complainants, and that the charges against



him were bereft of any factual basis.

On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8

Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case formandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared.

The parties were then directed to submit their verified position papers.

In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had

maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his

acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint

complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other

pleadings.

For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams

was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her

marriage to David Williams.

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner

Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross

ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in

its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the

modification that respondent be "reprimanded, with a warning and

advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients."

The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his

actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner:

There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa

Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her

Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically

acquired her husband’s citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases

cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they

refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following

objectives: (a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve

the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its

public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the

Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated

Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do

this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and

jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly

promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the

significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executiveorders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated

by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice.

The lawyer’s life is one of continuous and l aborious study, otherwise, his

skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and

become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional

Responsibility.)9

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest

laws and jurisprudence.10 Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to

know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of

the law.11 As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his

duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on

the issues and legal problems confronting a client.12 In this case, the law



he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution, 13 the most

basic law of the land.14 Implicit in a lawyer’s mandate to protect a client’s

interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty

to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in

continuing legal education programs.15 Thus, in championing the interestof clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the

strict standards imposed by the lawyer’s oath, but should likewise

espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latter’s cause be

dismissed on a technical ground.16 Ignorance encompasses both

substantive and procedural laws.17lavvph!1.net

We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating

Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend

must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct

that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer

of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension beimposed as a penalty.18 Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline’s Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,19 and considering

further that this is respondent’s first infraction, we find that the penalty

of reprimand as recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,

will suffice.

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties

repeatedly invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus,

we find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be

determined on the merits in the courts a quo.

WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is

REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give

to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act

shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.


SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]

JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,

Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan

(respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation

Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2 and 7.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as

follows:

Complainant’s wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building

permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with allthe requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she

attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a

September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and

concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted



verbatim:

x x x x

This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F.Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and

Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.

It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the

building of the abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned

and his family, and those other families mentioned above are respective

owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building

under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to

mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects

to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly the

imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.

It was represented that the intended construction of the building would

only be a regular and with standard height building and not a high rise

one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its

accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of

the undersigned’s residential house in particular, which readily poses

danger to their residential house and life.

To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property,

loss of life and for the protection of the safety of all the people

concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action

on the matter please at your earliest opportune time.

Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of

Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and

by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local

Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full

compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under construction

with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of theNational Building Code and on the part of your good office, your

compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same

foregoing cited Building Code.

Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the

non-compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National

Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only

to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)

x x x x4 (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)

By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the application for building

permit because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected

to respondent’s marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondent’s

marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.5

To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit 6

he filed against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for

violation of Section 3 (e)7 of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c) 8 of Republic Act

No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and

Employees).9

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,10 the IBP

Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-



Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the

following findings:

The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly

opposes the application of his wife for a building permit for theconstruction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by

the complainant was that his wife was not in favor of Imelda’s

relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason

is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in

opposing the construction of his building.

From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have

satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of complainant.

We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the

disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal

presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against himuntil the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests upon the

complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a

clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required

evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer

continues and the complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De

Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs.

Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).

x x x x.11 (Underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of June 25, 2005,12 the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of

Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

Hence, the present Petition for Review13 filed by complainant.

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he

contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17,

1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized onDecember 17, 1967, is still subsisting.

Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the

Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wife’s application

for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal

Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent

violated Rule 7.03.

To his Comment,14 respondent attached the July 29, 2005 15 Joint

Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing

complainant’s complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section

4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution

reads:

x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of

herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official

appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainant’s

building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to

whether compliance with the requirements for the construction of an

edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after

conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the

Building Code for constructing without a building permit committed by



herein complainant’s wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order

was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said

violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building

permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is being

processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of theMunicipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the

allegation that respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law

profession despite being employed in the government as Municipal Legal

Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into

consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent

to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of

herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the

complaints against the respondent.16 (Underscoring supplied)

After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of

the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.

Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as

Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against

complainant and his wife.

As for respondent’s September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show

that he opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired

whether complainant’s wife fully complied with the requirements

provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his

concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties, health and

safety" occasioned by the construction of the building.

Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed

on September 28, 2004,17

whereas the questioned letter of respondent

was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal

Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection

and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to

comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal

action against you."18

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005 19 from the Office of

the Municipal Engineer showed, complainant’s wife eventually withdrew

the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal

Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to

be constructed.

Respecting complainant’s charge that respondent engaged in an

unauthorized private practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal

Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing

authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that hisprivate practice is not prohibited.

20

It is, however, with respect to respondent’s admitted contracting of a

second marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court

finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark

County, Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of the Philippines had

already taken effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to

have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time wasArticle 83 of the Civil Code.

23 For while Article 256 of the Family Code

provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a

qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or



acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct,

connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of societyand the opinion of good and respectable members of the community." 24

Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as

to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a

high degree.25

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,26 this Court

declared that the therein respondent’s act of contracting a second

marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral

conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating

following circumstances were considered:

a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a

period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved

with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love

for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with

relation to his wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways

when the mother and child went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.27

In respondent’s case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be

given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code

was the applicable provision when he contracted the second marriageabroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an

allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda

Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any

woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee

even during the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with

Imelda Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact

elected him and served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from

1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.

Respondent’s misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which

applied at the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly

unmindful attitude of his residential community towards his second

marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a

second marriage while the first marriage was still in place as being

contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.28

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides:

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate

in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high



standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students

and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and

jurisprudence.

Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Co de alreadytook effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986

and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his

second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law

excuses no one from compliance therewith."

Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:29

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the

laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and

maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation tobe well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal

developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative

that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully

comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently

and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may

become susceptible to committing mistakes.30 (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule

1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that asimilar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the

country.

SO ORDERED.


THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O.

TANSINGCO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.

Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation

of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility ("Code").

The Facts

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant")

stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a

public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay



("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the

Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge

for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint,stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was

prepared and notarized by me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real

property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy,

Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby

disqualified to own real property in his name – agreed that the propertybe transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare

several documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the

actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of

Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY

AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the

property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY

AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.Donton.6

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy

Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is

disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious

misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed

that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in

violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that

complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of

complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent

refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case against Stier

and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the

Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.

In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and

recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros

V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to

circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of

land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended

respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years and the

cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended

respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.



On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the

Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.

On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the

IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and wouldalready retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also

said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and

his six minor children.

In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for

reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as

the matter had already been referred to the Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which

will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A

lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in

violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against

the lawyer.10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was

disqualified from owning real property.11 Yet, in his motion for

reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer ofownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of

the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in

complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by

preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that

would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property

despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In e ffect, respondent advised

and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against

foreign ownership of lands14

by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his

oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy

Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.

Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.

Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be

suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16

respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from

the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually

permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondentAtty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for

preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after

nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately

subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY

of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.

Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality

of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to

be appended to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all



courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED


FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 5542 July 20, 2006

DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.

and/or its Officers, Members, namely: MINERVA A. GENATO, JULIETA P.

BENEDICTO, PRAXEDES A. MORENO, PATRICIA DE GUZMAN, PACITA G.

MEQUERIO, HELEN RESUELLO, RIC DE GUZMAN, and ERLINDA RAMIREZ,

complainants, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ESPIRITU, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The instant disbarment case was filed by the officers/members of the

Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc., charging Atty.

Napoleon A. Espiritu with "deceitful conduct, malpractice, gross

misconduct in office, and/or violation of oath of office." The charges are

contained in the Complaint-Affidavit1 dated May 17, 2001.

Complainants sought the services of respondent sometime in November

1997 regarding a consolidated ejectment case where they were being

sued in their respective capacities as officers and members of the

association. The case, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 153905-90, was

pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26.

Complainants lost, however, and respondent advised them to file a

supersedeas bond to stay their eviction.2 Complainants then entrusted

the following amounts to respondent as payment therefor:

a.) On November 13, 1997 and November 28, 1997, he received theamount of P12,000.00 and P13,000.00 respectively from Minerva Genato.

(Annexes "B" and "B-1")

b.) On March 31, 1998, he received the amount of P41,257.00 from Rico

Ramirez. (Annex "C")

c.) On March 23, 1998, he received from us the amount of P116,605.00,

which are imparted under the fo llowing circumstances:

c.1.) Ric De Guzman ---------- P14,010.00

c.2.) Patricia De Guzman ---------- P15,784.00

c.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto ---------- P37,870.00

c.4.) Helena Resuello ---------- P11,363.00

c.5.) Praxedes Moreno ---------- P12,040.00

c.6.) Pacita Moquerio ---------- P25,538.00

which he receipted erroneously in the amount of P86,666.72, but duly

corrected by one of the members thereon. The aforesaid amount was

accepted by him in the name of Dayan as shown by the receipt he issued

thereto marked as Annex "D."



d.) Again for the same reason, on July 28, 1998 he received the amount of

P8,930.00 from us the following:

d.1.) Ric De Guzman ---------- P1,250.00

d.2.) Patricia De Guzman ---------- P1,125.00

d.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto ---------- P3,130.00

d.4.) Helena Resuello ---------- P 625.00

d.5.) Praxedes Moreno ---------- P 935.00

d.6.) Pacita Moquerio ---------- P1,865.00

which he again receipted under Dayan as evidenced by hereto attachedcopy of the receipt marked as Annex "E."

e.) On July 28, 1998, he received again from Rico/Erlinda Ramirez the

amount of P3,370.00. (Annex "F")

f.) Also on July 28, 1998, he received from Minerva Genato the amount of

P4,000.00. (Annex "H")

g.) On August 7, 1998, he received from Manuel Rivera/Myrna Sayson the

amount of P2,000.00 (Annex "H") and Prima Fidel the amount of

P4,000.00. (Annex "H-1")

h.) On August 27, 1998, he received from Minerva Genato the amount of

P4,000.00. (Annex "I").3

According to complainants, respondent deposited only P48,000.00 before

the Clerk of Court as evidenced by receipts furnished by respondent

himself.4 Association President Minerva Genato then made a verbal

demand for respondent to return the remaining balance, upon which

respondent delivered a personal check for P141,904.00 in the name ofAtty. Leonardo Ocampo. The check bounced for insufficiency of funds.

Consequently, Atty. Ocampo sent a demand letter5 to Genato to make

good the payment of the check. Genato continued to make verbal

demands and later sent a letter6 dated May 25, 2000 demanding the

payment of the amount of the check, to no avail. The Association was

thus constrained to seek the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP). Through Atty. Helengrace G. Cabasal, another demand letter 7 dated

July 17, 2000 was sent for respondent to return the "remaining balance"

of P206,497.00. An Information8 charging respondent with estafa was

likewise filed before the RTC of Manila.

In his Comment, 9 respondent admitted that he deposited to the clerk of

court the amount of P48,481.00 as "partial supersedeas bond." In his

desire to help complainants, he talked to the counsel of plaintiffs in Civil

Case No. 153905-90. Respondent likewise admitted that he issued a

postdated check to cover the balance (P141,904.00), and that he was

unable to fund the same. He, however, made arrangements with Atty.

Ocampo and his clients for the payment of the subject check, and

requested the latter for complainants to stay in the subject property until

December 1999, or even beyond. He pointed out that it was upon his

representations that complainants were allowed to stay in the subject

premises up to the present, and that the said amount (P141,904.00 andnot P206,497.00 as falsely claimed by complainants), was meant as

payment for supersedeas bond in Civil Case No. 153686-CV for the use

and occupation of the complainants of the subject property from January



1991 to December 1996. Respondent likewise disclosed that

complainants had lodged several complaints against him for estafa and/or

theft in connection with the amount covered by the postdated check

which he issued in favor of Atty. Ocampo, which, however, are all

baseless. He insisted that complainants have no cause of action againsthim, and that the instant administrative complaint must be dismissed

outright for the following reasons:

As stated earlier, the basis of this administrative case as well as the

criminal complaints is the demand letter to Atty. Ocampo to make good

the check issued by respondent, and in case of failure, Atty. Ocampo will

insist on the issuance of the execution. It bears stressing, however, that

because of the arrangement made by respondent with Atty. Ocampo, and

as per their (Atty. Ocampo and the respondent) agreement, Atty. Ocampo

no longer pursued the eviction f the complainants. UP TO THE PRESENT,

complainants are still in the premises in question.

The complainants were never prejudiced by the bounced check and the

demand letter sent by Atty. Ocampo to the complainants. On the

contrary, they have benefited by the representations made by

respondent to Atty. Ocampo. Moreover, respondent had made

representations with the City Council of Manila for the expropriation of

the premises in question, which is now under consideration by the said

City Council.

Hence, complainants have no cause to complain. In fact, they should be

grateful to the respondent because without his representations with Atty.Ocampo and the plaintiff in CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, and with the City

Council of Manila, complainants have long been evicted from the said

premises. To sanction complainants' administrative and criminal

complaints against the respondent is a mockery of justice; respondent

will be placed in an unjust situation where he has to answer severally a

single offense, if at all. He will be made liable to Atty. Ocampo or to the

plaintiff in CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, to the herein complainants and to

the Honorable Court.

Parenthetically, complainants have absolutely no personality to file or

institute this action against the respondent. As it now clearly appears, the

instant case is a persecution rather than a prosecution, where the aim or

purpose of the complainants is to exact or extort money from the

respondent. Complainants are well aware that they are not entitled to

the money they sought to collect from the respondent which served as

basis of their malicious and perjurious criminal and administrative

complaints. The purpose of the money received by the respondent had

greatly been served through the issuance of the check by respondent to

Atty. Ocampo and respondent's representations with Atty. Ocampo andhis client-plaintiff NOT TO EJECT complainants from the premises.

Complainants have benefited too much from the representations of

respondent with Atty. Ocampo, UNTIL NOW.

To reiterate, it is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 153686-CV which has a

cause of action against the respondent – and not or never the herein

complainants.10

Complainants refuted these allegations, insisting that the basis of the

filing of the instant administrative case, as well as the criminal charges for

estafa against respondent, is the misappropriation or conversion of theamounts which should have been deposited with the court or with the

lessor in order to cover the required bond or arrears in rental over the

property; the check was adduced in evidence to prove the fact of



misappropriation or conversion, as respondent issued the same after he

failed to deposit the complete amount entrusted to him by complainants;

and due to respondent's unlawful acts, they were prejudiced and suffered

damages, thus:

b. The continuing failure of the respondent to transmit the subsequent

amounts he further collected and received, is not further prejudicial to

the enforcement and effective implementation of the rights of the

complainants under the expropriation ordinance, enacted by the local

government, because of the nonpayment of the backrental constituting

the supersedeas bond, which up to the present, is being demanded by

the lessor, as precondition for negotiating, for the expropriation

compensation due to the lessor-owner.

c. It must be further noted and stressed, there was no representation at

all made by respondent with the lessor through Atty. Ocampo; nor, withthe local government in the enactment and enforcement of said

ordinance. Contrary then, to the respondent's contention, it was through

the coordinative efforts of the complainants through their President,

which caused the passage of said expropriation law. Further, the

continuing stay of complainants in the premises is but the due

consequence of such enactment and not through any representation on

the part of respondent, who failed to protect the interest of the

complainant, as legal counsel of his clients, the herein complainants, in

gross dereliction of his duty as such.11

The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)for investigation, report and recommendation.12 Investigating IBP

Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan scheduled the case for hearing.

Witnesses for complainants testified on November 6, 2003. On the

hearing set for June 13, 2004, however, respondent failed to appear. A

representative informed the Commission that respondent was suffering

from "high sugar blood count." The hearing was reset to February 26,

2004, where respondent was ordered to present his medical certificate.

On the last scheduled hearing of the case on August 26, 2004, respondentfailed to appear despite due notice, hence, complainant's testimony was

heard ex-parte. Complainant was then given 15 days to make a formal

offer of evidence, after which the case was submitted for resolution. The

last notice sent to respondent was returned for being unclaimed.

In her Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner

San Juan recommended that respondent be disbarred, considering the

following findings:

The claim of respondent that the complainants [have] no cause of action

against him is without merit. He admitted receiving the funds fromcomplainants and that he deposited only P48,481.00 with the Clerk of

Court as partial supersedeas bond. The fact that Atty. Leonardo Ocampo

counsel of the plaintiff in the ejectment case accommodated the

respondent with his personal check does not relieve respondent from

liability. On the contrary it is evident that the arrangement was resorted

to in order that respondent could extricate himself from the situation he

was in. By obtaining a loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a

clear admission that the money entrusted to respondent by complainants

was misappropriated. Noted is the failure of respondent to make an

accounting of the funds entrusted to him and the absence of an

explanation why only a partial payment of the bond was made. Thecontention of respondent that complainants were never prejudiced by

the bouncing check likewise must fail. Neither will the payment of the

check and the funds entrusted to him "doubly prejudice" respondent.13



On January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.

XVII-2006-05, modifying the penalty meted on respondent, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of theInvestigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part

of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation duly

supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,

and for obtaining a loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a

clear admission that the money entrusted to respondent by complainants

was misappropriated, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is hereby SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for (1) year.

We agree with the foregoing recommendation. It is clear that respondent

misappropriated the money which his clients, herein complainants, had

entrusted to him for a specific purpose, and such an act cannot becountenanced.

Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or

received for or from his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in

handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a

high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. 14 In Pariñas v.

Paguinto,15 the Court had the occasion to state that "money entrusted to

a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for

failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on

demand."16

Indeed, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his orher client's money.17

We note that respondent failed to appear before the IBP Investigating

Commissioner to explain his actions, much less present his defense. In

Rangwani v. Diño,18 we ruled that it is not enough for a member of the bar

to deny the charges:

Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent torefute the charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid

explanation. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that

respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet the

charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it

reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were

assigned to investigate the cases. On the contrary, respondent's

comments only markedly admitted complainant's accusations. When the

integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he

denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome

the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that

degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.These, respondent miserably failed to do.19

The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law

profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes

it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the

faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal

profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are

strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public

confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession. 20 The

nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral

character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent toadmission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential

to maintain one's good standing in the profession. 21 Law is a noble

profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon



individuals who are competent intellectually, academically, and, equally

important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal

system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their

dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and

integrity in a manner beyond reproach.22

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;

grounds therefore. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended

from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,

malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral

conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take

before admission to the practice, or for a willful disobedience of any

lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing asan attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice

of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or

through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and

only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and

character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. It

should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary

suspension, would accomplish the end desired.23 In this case, the Court

finds that one-year suspension from the practice of law will suffice as

penalty against respondent.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is guilty of violating the Code of

Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is penalized with

SUSPENSION from the practice of law for One (1) Year effective

immediately. Respondent is DIRECTED to return the funds entrusted to

him by complainants, and to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of

this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to

be appended to respondent's personal records; the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and

guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, J.J.,

concur.


EN BANC

A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON,

Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel

Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine



(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges

that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude,

together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates

Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;2 and

constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule138 of the Rules of Court.

3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the

Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him

that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled

for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he

was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its

attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,

which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed

submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her

Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by

the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March

12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had v iolated

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that

the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral

turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his

way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion,

Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car

driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had

overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of

the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed,the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn

at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,

berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression,

the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the

ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because

he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the

taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now

enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist

blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell

down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver

but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driverheld on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him.

The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that

the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way

back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the

ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But

as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of

the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the

neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and

sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose

testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this

case, Roberto Soriano."

8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of

Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had



lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck, 9 complainant

would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely

medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco

Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused

paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxidriver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On

January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which

was granted by the court on several conditions. These included

satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the

offended party, Roberto Soriano."10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who

has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil

liability to the Court of Appeals.11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa

recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for

having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of

such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good

moral character, based on the following facts:

"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only

because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;

"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,

Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a

handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him outand fled;

"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,

Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;

"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he

was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,

"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to

date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP

Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner

Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime

involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By

such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the

administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moralcharacter.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he

stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his

conviction has already been established and is no longer open to



question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1)

whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)

whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contraryto justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or

depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his

fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,

or good morals."14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude

has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v.

NLRC,15

a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the

basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular

circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court

rejected the employer’s contention and held that homicide in that casedid not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been

violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a

ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the

attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was

precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine

conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion

belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the

degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act

and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, butwhether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a

question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding

circumstances. x x x."16

(Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case , in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral

turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense

and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better

understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are

quoted as follows:

"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then

urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto

Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the

filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was

ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a

fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the

victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed

him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to

slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor

of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender,plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that

Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or

unjust."17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the

circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his

unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot

complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression

shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hitonce and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those

were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.



We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further

indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when

the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the

impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant

was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latterunexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the

handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so

doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral

turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance

and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,

who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his

inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his

fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also

evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in anyindividual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued

complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been

grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense

of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of

an unlicensed firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil

liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the

lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s

oath

20

and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to"obey the laws of the land."

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in

even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial

court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And

yet, it has been four years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil

liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in

refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity andintolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic

altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and

youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the

measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has

lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the

exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral

character.22 Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings

is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of

the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the courtmay be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.23

We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of

good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege

to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least

common honesty.24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and

duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the

aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court settlement with

complainant’s family.25

But when this effort failed, respondent concocteda complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that

had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a

neurosurgeon.26



The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an

entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two

other persons.27 The trial court had this to say:

"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctorswho examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three

people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing

him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not

downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on

beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his

injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident particularly

when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar

membership is more important than truthfulness.29

The rigorous ethics of

the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitousbehavior.

30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be

misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in

good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception

of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he

should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to

practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent

intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they

are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times

conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and thepublic at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond

reproach."31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable;

they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense

he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and

commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the

administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this

important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in

whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a

clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile

confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious

members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great

caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser

penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however,the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so

despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his

profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be

irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that

every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege

demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition

precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the

practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting

standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending

circumstances – not the mere fact of their conviction – would



demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present

case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of

respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of

the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED , and

his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of

this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let

notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and

on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the

country.

SO ORDERED.


FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE,

Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a Complaint1 filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004,

complainant Victorina Bautista2 prays for the suspension or disbarment of

respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct

in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.

Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and

notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay

3

purportedly executed by DonatoSalonga and complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz.4 Both affiants

declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was

being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years.

Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint

affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28,

1961.5

In his Answer,6 respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na

Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia’s death. He alleged

that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia’s

presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly ason-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the

word "by " on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that

there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilia’s

name was the signature of Pronebo.

On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation7 attaching thereto the

affidavit of desistance8 of complainant which reads in part:

Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng

naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga

sumusunod:

1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado,

SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated



Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;

2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay

pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado

na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi akonakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;

3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang

kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado

SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;

4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa

nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.

In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner9

recommended that:

1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the

legal profession for one (1) month;

2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary

public, be revoked; and

3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial

commission for a period of one (1) year.10

In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP

adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the

practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and

that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when

the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondent’s alleged

lack of knowledge of Basilia’s death does not excuse him. It was his d uty

to require the personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his

notarial seal and signature on the instrument.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who

signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally

appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are

stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the

notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.

11

Respondent’s act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the

absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,12 Canon 1 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. 13 By affixing his

signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that

Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and

veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain

Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent’s conduct is fraught with

dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due

execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on

notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmostdiligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to

comply with the mandates of the law.14



Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign

in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary

public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the

same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared

before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for

what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge.

They should swear to the document personally and not through any

representative. Otherwise, their representative’s name should appear in

the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only

time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear

before the notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply

put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones

to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the

document.15

Complainant’s desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does notexonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A

case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or

lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis

of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly

immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of

disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is

not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent

lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest

and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and

prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the

purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration ofpersons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the

court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the

person who called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged

misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the

outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper

administration of justice.16

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord withrecent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,17 respondent lawyer was

found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of

one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked

and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In

addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 218

of

complainant’s affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C.

Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay 19

dated November 12, 2004

which was attached to the complaint filed with the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear beforehim in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be

investigated.

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional

Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E.

Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary

Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further

WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt

with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this

Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin



notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November

12, 2004 without requiring the latter’s personal appearance.lavvph!1.net

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country.

Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of

the respondent.

SO ORDERED.


SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6270 January 22, 2007

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA,

Complainants, vs. ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed

by the heirs of the late spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spousesVillanueva), namely: Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M.

Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V.

Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado, and Herminigildo Ylhi

(complainants).

The Facts

During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels ofland in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by Original Certificate of

Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five

children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia,

survived them.

On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication 1 (affidavit

of adjudication) stating that as "the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic)"

of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of

land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale2 (deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to Adriano

Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary public on both the affidavit ofadjudication and the deed of sale.

Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was

still alive at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the

deed of sale, as were descendants of the other children of the spouses

Villanueva. Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of this fact,

as respondent had been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the

time of their birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their family.

Complainants accused respondent of knowing the "true facts and

surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties of the spouses

Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of theirrightful shares in the property.

In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to



comment on the complaint.

In her Comment,3 respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit

of adjudication and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984.

However, respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso to dispose

of fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed

the two documents under the following circumstances:

That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided

equally among their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for

themselves one titled lot, the subject now of the complaint x x x That said

titled property was the only property left by the old couple, to answer for

their needs while they are still alive until their deaths x x x. Alfonso [and

his wife] were tasked to take care of the old couple, as they were the

ones living in the same compound with their late parents. This fact was

and is known by the other compulsory heirs, and they never questionedthe said act of their parents, as they already had their own share on the

estate of the late [spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me

because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across the street from our house

and I was requested to the house of the old man when he gave said title

to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were

still alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in

their old house to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the

parents died, it was [Alfonso and his wife] who took charge of the funeral

and all other acts relative thereto.

x x x x

That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death

of the old man, when the spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money

to finance the schooling of their children, it was then that they thought of

disposing the land x x x and said land was sold by them to one Adriano

Villanueva of which in both documents, I notarized the same (sic).

x x x x

I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said

documents, it was done in good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to

help, assist and to guide people who come to me for legal assistance, as

contained in my oath as a lawyer when I passed the bar. x x x 4 (Emphasis

supplied)

According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonso’s co-heirs filed

their objections at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication

proved that most of the properties of the spouses Villanueva had earlier

been distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs hadagreed to abide by the intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the

property to Alfonso. Respondent asserted that "the personal appearances

and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the core of the

ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public document

x x x."

On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP), which designated Commissioner Leland R.

Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his

report and recommendation on, the complaint.

The IBP’s Findings

In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid



found that respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional

Responsibility and the spirit and intent of the notarial law when she

notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory

heir of the spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of

fraudulent intent on respondent’s part, IBP Commissioner Villadolid held

that respondent "engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in the

legal system." Thus, he recommended suspension of respondent’s

notarial commission for one year. He further recommended that

respondent be reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for up

to six months.

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain partly the IBP’s findings and recommendations.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, mostcommon of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a

document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts, the

notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as

affixed on a document. The notarial seal converts the document from

private to public, after which it may be presented as evidence without

need for proof of its genuineness and due execution. 5 Thus, notarization

should not be treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. 6 As

early as Panganiban v. Borromeo, 7 we held that notaries public must

inform themselves of the facts to which they intend to certify and to take

no part in illegal transactions. They must guard against any illegal or

immoral arrangements.

8

On its face, Alfonso’s affidavit does not appear to contain any "illegal or

immoral" declaration. However, respondent herself admitted that she

knew of the falsity of Alfonso’s statement that he was the "sole heir" of

the spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document

while fully aware that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonso’s

assertion of status as sole heir. The affidavit of adjudication is premised

on this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his

parents’ estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his co -heirs. Shortly

afterwards, respondent notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed

took basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication.

Respondent never disputed complainants’ allegation of her close

relationship with the Villanueva family spanning several decades.

Respondent even underscored this closeness by claiming that Lucas

himself requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to

Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the

conversation between them.

Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time

Alfonso executed the affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their

respective shares from the estate of the spouses Villanueva. However, we

are not concerned here with the proper distribution of the spouses

Villanueva’s estates. Rather, respondent’s liability springs from her failure

to discharge properly her duties as a notary public and as a member of

the bar.

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false

statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized,

yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must nothesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances

of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the

notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on



notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct

amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and

promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also

violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in

unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

We also view with disfavor respondent’s lack of candor before the IBP

proceedings. The transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied

preparing or notarizing the deed of sale, 9 when she already admitted

having done so in her Comment.

WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, we REVOKE the commission of respondent

Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY

her from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We further

SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective

upon finality of this decision.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to

be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise,

copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all

courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.


EN BANC

A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007

CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA,

Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala

(complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for

Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate

occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the

court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous

cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a

reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of

October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.2

The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B.

Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective

memoranda 3 and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and

Recommendation

4

dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guiltyof violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.



In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of

Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six

months to one year.

We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue

on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.

On serving as counsel for contending parties.

Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial

Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v.

Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being

the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants

Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga6 by filing an Explanation and

Compliance before the RTC.7

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),

Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr.

v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent

represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the

property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC,

Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his

decision dated May 2, 2000, 8 Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz 9

warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of

record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina

City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds

of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for

Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer

Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in

Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.

Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003,

respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer

for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga 10

albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the

tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil

Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and

her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is

entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because

Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the

property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for

ejectment. 13 But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba,

respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation

for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the

filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides

that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written

consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as

counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or

former client. 15 He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties

any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is

founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. 16 It springs

from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and

confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's



confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-

dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets

to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration

of justice. 17

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of

a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of

undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of

unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 18

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded

on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the

attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to

maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction

forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged

communications of his client.19

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has

represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has

terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client

precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the

client's adversary either in the same case 21 or in a different but related

action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client

against a former client when the subject matter of the present

controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the

previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez24

that the termination of the relation

of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent

an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The

reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be

divested by the expiration of the professional employment. 25

Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the

relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former

client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he

disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous

relation.26

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has

long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the

proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the

complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship

precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is

adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the

fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her

husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests

of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim

that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been

severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

wherein the written consent of his client is required.

In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28

we held that:

The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to

a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same

action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would

not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to

oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the

confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the



other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the

opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are

present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective

retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of

undivided fidelity to both clients. 29

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the

confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client

relation is terminated."

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and

client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A

lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's

case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the

strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded

with care. 30

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of

Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and

Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests

which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may

have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon

being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not exculpate him from

the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in

Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.

Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional

employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety

including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at

all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the

Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions

with his clients. 32

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary

evidence.

Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC,

Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as

evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No.

275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.

Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November

27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's

ownership of the subject property.33

During the hearing before

Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in

the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was

already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the

complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent further avers

that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him

only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.

Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-

657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was

also filed on November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina

City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of

Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was

revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case

Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in

different courts and at different times.



Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he

submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name

of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.

Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood,

nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the

Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was

not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of

Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the

complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's

intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite

the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No.

275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.

In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth.

He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor

consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a

lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all

good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."38

He should bear in

mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform

the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing

justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the other

hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers

appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty

to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in

defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of

truth.

A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which

society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of

justice. 40 As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others

to emulate. 41

>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental

fees.

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil

Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137

at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both

entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively,

before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two

criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against

Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318

against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.

As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with

respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the

property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their

retainer agreement. 42

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled

"Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to

protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45

for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47

for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent

of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one

hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an



administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was

being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the

interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a

practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of

his client.

On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate

children.

During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by

Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife

was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife,

the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in

1997, he married Lagmay in 1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that

Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by

complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a

relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second family. 51 He

reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two

houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough

to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing,

respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression

by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite

the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider

them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent

boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in

Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay

lives. 53 It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay

after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did

not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of

the legal profession.

Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a

lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful

conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency

that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a

lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is

willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to

the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in several

cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a

mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the

community. 55 That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998

after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards

immorality serve to mitigate his liability.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia

GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for

three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant

for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's

personal records.



SO ORDERED.

Cases for Legprof

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