Cases Finals (1)

7/30/2019 Cases Finals (1)

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GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AND VOLUNTARY ABITRATION

Extent of power of Voluntary Arbitrator

G.R. No. 140960 January 20, 2003LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION, petitioner,vs.FERDINAND SAORNIDO as voluntary arbitrator and LUDO

EMPLOYEES UNION (LEU) representing 214 of its officers andmembers, respondents.QUISUMBING, J.:This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside thedecision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 6, 1999 andits Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R.SP No. 44341.The relevant facts as substantially recited by the Court of Appeals inits decision are as follows:Petitioner LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION (LUDO for brevity) is adomestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil,corn starch, glucose and related products. It operates amanufacturing plant located at Tupas Street, Cebu City and a wharfwhere raw materials and finished products are shipped out.In the course of its business operations, LUDO engaged the arrastreservices of Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services (CLAS) for the loadingand unloading of its finished products at the wharf. Accordingly,several arrastre workers were deployed by CLAS to perform theservices needed by LUDO.These arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different dates,as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO every time the latterneeded additional manpower services. Said employees thereafterjoined respondent union, the LUDO Employees Union (LEU), whichacted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-fileemployees.On April 13, 1992, respondent union entered into a collectivebargaining agreement with LUDO which provides certain benefits tothe employees, the amount of which vary according to the length ofservice rendered by the availing employee.Thereafter, the union requested LUDO to include in its membersperiod of service the time during which they rendered arrastreservices to LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higherbenefits. LUDO failed to act on the request. Thus, the matter wassubmitted for voluntary arbitration.The parties accordingly executed a submission agreement raisingthe sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers forresolution by the Voluntary Arbitrator.In its decision dated April 18, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator ruledthat: (1) the respondent employees were engaged in activitiesnecessary and desirable to the business of petitioner, and (2) CLASis a labor-only contractor of petitioner.2 It disposed of the case thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this VoluntaryArbitrator finds the claims of the complainants meritoriousand so hold that:

a. the 214 complainants, as listed in the AnnexA, shall be considered regular employees of therespondents six (6) months from the first day ofservice at CLAS;b. the said complainants, being entitled to theCBA benefits during the regular employment,are awarded a) sick leave, b) vacation leave & c)annual wage and salary increases during such

period in the amount of FIVE MILLION SEVENHUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND TWOHUNDRED SIXTY ONE PESOS AND SIXTYONE CENTAVOS (P5,707,261.61) as computedin "Annex A";c. the respondents shall pay attorneys fees often (10) percent of the total award;d. an interest of twelve (12) percent per annumor one (1) percent per month shall be imposedto the award from the date of promulgation untilfully paid if only to speed up the payment ofthese long over due CBA benefits deprived ofthe complaining workers.

Accordingly, all separation and/or retirement benefits shallbe construed from the date of regular izationaforementioned subject only to the appropriategovernment laws and other social legislation.SO ORDERED.3

In due time, LUDO filed a motion for reconsideration, which wasdenied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decisionof the Voluntary Arbitrator, thus:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed byrespondent voluntary arbitrator, the instant petition ishereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.4

Hence this petition. Before us, petitioner raises the following issues:I

WHETHER OR NOT BENEFITS CONSISTING OFSALARY INCREASES, VACATION LEAVE AND SICKLEAVE BENEFITS FOR THE YEARS 1977 TO 1987 AREALREADY BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION WHENPRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED THEIR CASE INJANUARY 1995;

IIWHETHER OR NOT A VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CANAWARD BENEFITS NOT CLAIMED IN THESUBMISSION AGREEMENT.5

Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely erred when itupheld the award of benefits which were beyond the terms ofsubmission agreement. Petitioner asserts that the arbitrator mustconfine its adjudication to those issues submitted by the parties forarbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date ofregularization of the workers. Hence, the award of benefits by thearbitrator was done in excess o f jurisdiction.6

Respondents, for their part, aver that the three-year prescriptiveperiod is reckoned only from the time the obligor declares his refusalto comply with his obligation in clear and unequivocal terms. In thiscase, respondents maintain that LUDO merely promised to reviewthe company records in response to respondents demand foradjustment in the date of their regularization without making acategorical statement of refusal.7 On the matter of the benefits,respondents argue that the arbitrator is empowered to award the

assailed benefits because notwithstanding the sole issue of the dateof regularization, standard companion issues on reliefs and remediesare deemed incorporated. Otherwise, the whole arbitration processwould be rendered purely academic and the law creating it inutile.8

The jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of VoluntaryArbitrators and Labor Arbiters is clearly defined and specificallydelineated in the Labor Code. The pertinent provisions of the LaborCode, read:

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and theCommission . --- (a) Except as otherwise provided underthis Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original andexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)calendar days after the submission of the case by theparties for decision without extension, even in the absenceof stenographic notes, the following cases involving allworkers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases:2. Termination disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,those cases that workers may file involvingwage, rates of pay, hours of work and otherterms and conditions of employment;4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and otherforms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;xxx

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel ofVoluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panelof Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusivejurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievancesarising from the interpretation or implementation of theCollective Bargaining Agreement and those arising fromthe interpretation or enforcement of company personnelpolicies referred to in the immediately preceding article.Accordingly, violations of a Collective BargainingAgreement, except those which are gross in character,shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shallbe resolved as grievances under the Collective BargainingAgreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations ofCollective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrantand/or malicious refusal to comply with the economicprovisions of such agreement.The Commission, its Regional Offices and the RegionalDirectors of the Department of Labor and Employmentshall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under


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the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the VoluntaryArbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shallimmediately dispose and refer the same to the GrievanceMachinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in theCollective Bargaining Agreement.

Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators,upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decideall other labor disputes including unfair labor practices andbargaining deadlocks."

In construing the above provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC,9 that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitratoror Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in theLabor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262, can possibly include moneyclaims in one form or another.10 Comparatively, in Reformist Union ofR.B. Liner, Inc. vs. NLRC,11 compulsory arbitration has been definedboth as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a governmentagency which has the authority to investigate and to make an awardwhich is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitrationwhere the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of theirdispute through arbitration by a third party (emphasis supplied)." 12

While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit orlabor departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitrationservices provided for under labor laws.Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questionsexpressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless,the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power tomake a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort forthe adjudication of disputes.13 The succinct reasoning enunciatedby the CA in support of its holding, that the Voluntary Arbitrator in alabor controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitralawards, deserves our concurrence, thus:

In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide thosequestions expressly stated and limited in the submissionagreement. However, since arbitration is the final resort forthe adjudication of disputes, the arbitrator can assume thathe has the power to make a final settlement. Thus,assuming that the submission empowers the arbitrator todecide whether an employee was discharged for justcause, the arbitrator in this instance can reasonableassume that his powers extended beyond giving a yes-or-no answer and included the power to reinstate him with orwithout back pay.In one case, the Supreme Court stressed that "xxx theVoluntary Arbitrator had plenary jurisdiction and authorityto interpret the agreement to arbitrate and to determine thescope of his own authority subject only, in a proper case,to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. The Arbitrator, asalready indicated, viewed his authority as embracing notmerely the determination of the abstract question of

whether or not a performance bonus was to be granted butalso, in the affirmative case, the amount thereof.By the same token, the issue of regularization should beviewed as two-tiered issue. While the submissionagreement mentioned only the determination of the date orregularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntaryarbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequateprerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on

voluntary arbitration was created speedy labor justice. Itbears stressing that the underlying reason why this casearose is to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question ofwhether respondent employees are entitled to higherbenefits. To require them to file another action for paymentof such benefits would certainly undermine laborproceedings and contravene the constitutional mandateproviding full protection to labor.14

As regards petitioners contention that the money claim in this caseis barred by prescription, we hold that this contention is withoutmerit. So is petitioners stance that the benefits claimed by therespondents, i.e., sick leave, vacation leave and 13th-month pay,had already prescribed, considering the three-year period for theinstitution of monetary claims.15 Such determination is a question offact which must be ascertained based on the evidence, both oral anddocumentary, presented by the parties before the VoluntaryArbitrator. In this case, the Voluntary Arbitrator found thatprescription has not as yet set in to bar the respondents claims forthe monetary benefits awarded to them. Basic is the rule thatfindings of fact of administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, whichhave acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined tospecific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect buteven finality.16 Here, the Voluntary Arbitrator received the evidenceof the parties first-hand. No compelling reason has been shown forus to diverge from the findings of the Voluntary Arbitrator, especiallysince the appellate court affirmed his findings, that it took some timefor respondent employees to ventilate their claims because of therepeated assurances made by the petitioner that it would review thecompany records and determine there from the validity of the claims,without expressing a categorical denial of their claims. As elucidatedby the Voluntary Arbitrator:

The respondents had raised prescription as defense. Thecontrolling law, as ruled by the High Court, is:"The cause of action accrues until the party obligatedrefuses xxx to comply with his duty. Being warded off bypromises, the workers not having decided to assert [their]right[s], [their] causes of action had not accrued"(Citation omitted.)Since the parties had continued their negotiations evenafter the matter was raised before the GrievanceProcedure and the voluntary arbitration, the respondentshad not refused to comply with their duty. They justwanted the complainants to present some proofs. Thecomplainants cause of action had not therefore accruedyet. Besides, in the earlier voluntary arbitration case

aforementioned involving exactly the same issue andemployees similarly situated as the complainants, thesame defense was raised and dismissed by HonorableThelma Jordan, Voluntary Arbitrator.In fact, the respondents promised to correct their length ofservice and grant them the back CBA benefits if thecomplainants can prove they are entitled rendered theformer in estoppel, barring them from raising the defense

of laches or prescription. To hold otherwise amounts torewarding the respondents for their duplicitousrepresentation and abet them in a dishonest schemeagainst their workers.17

Indeed, as the Court of Appeals concluded, under the equitableprinciple of estoppel, it will be the height of injustice if we will brushaside the employees claims on a mere technicality, especially whenit is petitioners own action that prevented them from interposing theclaims within the prescribed period.WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The appealed decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44341 and the resolutiondenying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Art. 262-A

Motion for Reconsideration required

THIRD DIVISION

ALBERT TENG, doingbusiness under thefirm name ALBERTTENG FISHTRADING, andEMILIA TENG-CHUA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC,EDDIE D. NIPA, ORLANDO P.LAYESE, HERNAN Y.BADILLES and ROGER S.PAHAGAC,Respondents.

G.R. No. 169704

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 17, 2010


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x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

D E C I S I O NBRION, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filedby petitioners Albert Teng Fish Trading, its owner Albert Teng, andits manager Emilia Teng-Chua, to reverse and set aside theSeptember 21, 2004 decision and the September 1, 2005 resolutionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78783. The CAreversed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator (VA), NationalConciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), Region IX, ZamboangaCity, and declared that there exists an employer-employeerelationship between Teng and respondents Hernan Badilles,Orlando Layese, Eddie Nipa, Alfredo Pahagac, and Roger Pahagac(collectively, respondent workers). It also found that Teng illegallydismissed the respondent workers from their employment.

BACKGROUND FACTS

Albert Teng Fish Trading is engaged in deep sea fishingand, for this purpose, owns boats ( basnig), equipment, and otherfishing paraphernalia. As owner of the business, Teng claims that hecustomarily enters into joint venture agreements with masterfishermen (maestros) who are skilled and are experts in deep seafishing; they take charge of the management of each fishing venture,including the hiring of the members of its complement. He avers thatthe maestros hired the respondent workers as checkers todetermine the volume of the fish caught in every fishing voyage.

On February 20, 2003, the respondent workers filed acomplaint for illegal dismissal against Albert Teng Fish Trading,Teng, and Chua before the NCMB, Region Branch No. IX,Zamboanga City.

The respondent workers alleged that Teng hired them,without any written employment contract, to serve as his eyes andears aboard the fishing boats; to classify the fish caught by baera;to report to Teng via radio communication the classes and volume ofeach catch; to receive instructions from him as to where and when tounload the catch; to prepare the list of the provisions requested bythe maestro and the mechanic for his approval; and, to procure theitems as approved by him. They also claimed that they receivedregular monthly salaries, 13th month pay, Christmas bonus, andincentives in the form of shares in the total volume of fish caught.

They asserted that sometime in September 2002, Tengexpressedhis doubts on the correct volume of fish caught in everyfishing voyage. In December 2002, Teng informed them that theirservices had been terminated.

In his defense, Teng maintained that he did not have any hand

in hiring the respondent workers; the maestros, rather than he,invited them to join the venture. According to him, his role wasclearly limited to the provision of the necessary capital, tools andequipment, consisting of basnig, gears, fuel, food, and othersupplies.

The VA rendered a decision in Tengs favor and declared thatno employer-employee relationship existed between Teng and therespondent workers. The dispositive portion of the VAs May 30,2003 decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,judgment is hereby rendered dismissing theinstant complaint for lack of merit.

It follows also, that all other claims arelikewise dismissed for lack of merit.

The respondent workers received the VAs decision onJune 12, 2003. They filed a motion for reconsideration, whichwas denied in an order dated June 27, 2003 and which theyreceived on July 8, 2003. The VA reasoned out that Section 6, RuleVII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of VoluntaryArbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does notprovide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the partyadversely affected by the VAs order or decision. The order states:

Under Executive Order No. 126, as

amended by Executive Order No. 251, and inorder to implement Article 260-262 (b) of theLabor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715,otherwise known as the Procedural Guidelinesin the Conduct of Voluntary ArbitrationProceedings, inter alia:

An award or theDecision of the VoluntaryArbitrators becomes finaland executory after ten (10)calendar days from receiptof copies of the award ordecision by the parties (Sec.6, Rule VII).

Moreover, the above-mentioned

guidelines do not provide the remedy of amotion for reconsideration to the partyadversely affected by the order or decisionof voluntary arbitrators.

On July 21, 2003, the respondent-workers elevated thecase to the CA. In its decision of September 21, 2004, the CAreversed the VAs decision after finding sufficient evidence showingthe existence of employer-employee relationship:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

the petition is granted. The questioned decisionof the Voluntary Arbitrator dated May 30, 2003 ishereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE byordering private respondent to pay separationpay with backwages and other monetarybenefits. For this purpose, the case isREMANDED to the Voluntary Arbitrator for thecomputation of petitioners backwages and othermonetary benefits. No pronouncement as tocosts.

SO ORDERED.

Teng moved to reconsider the CAs decision, but the CAdenied the motion in its resolution of September 1, 2005. He,thereafter, filed the present Petition for Review on CertiorariunderRule 45 of the Rules of Court, claiming that:

a. the VAs decision is not subject to a motion

for reconsideration; andb. no employer-employee relationship existed

between Teng and the respondent workers.

Teng contends that the VAs decision is not subject to amotion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provisionallowing this recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code. Hecites the 1989 Procedural Guidelines, which, as the VA declared,does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration. Heclaims that after the lapse of 10 days from its receipt, the VAsdecision becomes final and executory unless an appeal is taken. Heargues that when the respondent workers received the VAs decisionon June 12, 2003, they had 10 days, or until June 22, 2003, to file anappeal. As the respondent workers opted instead to move forreconsideration, the 10-day period to appeal continued to run; thus,the VAs decision had already become final and executory by thetime they assailed it before the CA on July 21, 2003.

Teng further insists that the VA was correct in ruling that therewas no employer-employee relationship between him and therespondent workers. What he entered into was a joint ventureagreement with the maestros, where Tengs role was only to providebasnig, gears, nets, and other tools and equipment for every fishingvoyage.

THE COURTS RULING

We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.


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Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing ofa motion for reconsideration.

On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect,amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code which wasoriginally worded as:

Art. 263 x x x Voluntary arbitration

awards or decisions shall be final,unappealable, and executory.

As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states:

Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award ordecision x x x shall contain the facts and the lawon which it is based. It shall be final andexecutory after ten (10) calendar days fromreceipt of the copy of the award or decisionby the parties.

Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word unappealable

from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in theamendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates thatthe legislature intended a change in the law, and the court shouldendeavor to give effect to such intent. We recognized the intent ofthe change of phraseology in Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang,where we ruled that:

It is true that the present rule [Art.

262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration awardfinal and executory after ten calendar days fromreceipt of the copy of the award or decision bythe parties. Presumably, the decision may stillbe reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitratoron the basis of a motion for reconsiderationduly filed during that period.

In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., we likewiseruled that the VAs decision may still be reconsidered on the basisof a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 daysfrom receipt thereof. The seasonable filing of a motion forreconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall thefinality of such decision. We further cited the 1989 ProceduralGuidelines which implemented Article 262-A, viz:

[U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of thesame guidelines implementing Article 262-A ofthe Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter ofcourse, would become final and executory afterten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of

the decision by the parties x x x unless, in themeantime, a motion for reconsideration or apetition for review to the Court of Appealsunder Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filedwithin the same 10-day period.

These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categoricallanguage in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion forreconsideration of the VAs decision within the 10-day period. Tengsallegation that the VAs decision had become final and executory bythe time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thusfails. We consequently rule that the respondent workers seasonablyfiled a motion for reconsideration of the VAs judgment, and the VAerred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration isallowed.

The Court notes that despite our interpretation that Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of theVAs decision, a contrary provision can be found in Section 7, RuleXIX of the Department of Labors Department Order (DO) No. 40,series of 2003:

Rule XIXSection 7. Finality o f

Award/Decision. The decision, order,resolution or award of the voluntary arbitrator orpanel of voluntary arbitrators shall be final andexecutory after ten (10) calendar days fromreceipt of the copy of the award or decision bythe parties and it shall not be subject of amotion for reconsideration.

Presumably on the basis of DO 40-03, the 1989 Procedural

Guidelines was revised in 2005 (2005 Procedural Guidelines),whose pertinent provisions provide that:

Rule VII DECISIONS

Section 6. Finality of Decisions. Thedecision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be finaland executory after ten (10) calendar days fromreceipt of the copy of the decision by the parties.

Sect ion 7. Motions forReconsideration. The decision of theVoluntary Arbitrator is not subject of a Motionfor Reconsideration.

We are surprised that neither the VA nor Teng cited DO40-03 and the 2005 Procedural Guidelines as authorities for theircause, considering that these were the governing rules while thecase was pending and these directly and fully supported their theory.

Had they done so, their reliance on the provisions would havenevertheless been unavailing for reasons we shall now discuss.

In the exercise of its power to promulgate implementingrules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as theDepartment of Labor, is restricted from going beyond the terms ofthe law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor improvethe law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannotexceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature.

By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent ofCongress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide anopportunity for the party adversely affected by the VAs decision toseek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition forreview under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed,a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in linewith the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For thisreason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remediesas a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.

The requirement that administrative remedies beexhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedybefore an administrative agency, every opportunity must be given tothe agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities fora resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, orresorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearlyrequired exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided bycongressional intent.

By disallowing reconsideration of the VAs decision,Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intentbehind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA thechance to correct himself and compel the courts of justice toprematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agencyentrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under itsspecial knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this eraof clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrativeagencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability tohear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters orintricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, isindispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, weruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceedingbefore a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though thematter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.

There exists an employer-employee relationship betweenTeng and the respondent workers.

We agree with the CAs finding that sufficient evidenceexists indicating the existence of an employer-employee relationshipbetween Teng and the respondent workers.


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While Teng alleged that it was the maestros who hired the

respondent workers, it was his company that issued to therespondent workers identification cards (IDs) bearing their names asemployees and Tengs signature as the employer. Generally, in abusiness establishment, IDs are issued to identify the holder as abona fide employee of the issuing entity.

For the 13 years that the respondent workers worked for

Teng, they received wages on a regular basis, in addition to theirshares in the fish caught. The worksheet showed that therespondent workers received uniform amounts within a given year,which amounts annually increased until the termination of theiremployment in 2002. Tengs claim that the amounts received by therespondent workers are mere commissions is incredulous, as itwould mean that the fish caught throughout the year is uniform andincreases in number each year.

More importantly, the element of control which we have

ruled in a number of cases to be a strong indicator of the existenceof an employer-employee relationship is present in this case. Tengnot only owned the tools and equipment, he directed how therespondent workers were to perform their job as checkers; they, infact, acted as Tengs eyes and ears in every fishing expedition.

Teng cannot hide behind his argument that the respondentworkers were hired by the maestros. To consider the respondentworkers as employees of the maestros would mean that Tengcommitted impermissible labor-only contracting. As a policy, theLabor Code prohibits labor-only contracting:

ART. 106. Contractor or Subcontractor x x xThe Secretary of Labor and Employment may,by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit thecontracting-out of labor.x x x xThere is labor-only contracting where theperson supplying workers to an employerdoes not have substantial capital orinvestment in the form of tools, equipment,machineries, work premises, among others,and the workers recruited and placed bysuch persons are performing activities whichare directly related to the principal businessof such employer. In such cases, the personor intermediary shall be considered merely as anagent of the employer who shall be responsibleto the workers in the same manner and extentas if the latter were directly employed by him.

Section 5 of the DO No. 18-02, which implements Article 106 of theLabor Code, provides:

Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only contracting ishereby declared prohibited. For this purpose,labor-only contracting shall refer to anarrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or placesworkers to perform a job, work or service for aprincipal, and any of the following elements arepresent:(i) The contractor or subcontractor

does not have substantial capital orinvestment which relates to the job,work or service to be performed andthe employees recruited, supplied orplaced by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activitieswhich are directly related to the mainbusiness of the principal; or

(ii) The contractor does not exercise theright to control over the performanceof the work of the contractualemployee.

In the present case, the maestros did not have any

substantial capital or investment. Teng admitted that he solelyprovided the capital and equipment, while the maestros supplied theworkers. The power of control over the respondent workers waslodged not with the maestros but with Teng. As checkers, therespondent workers main tasks were to count and classify the fishcaught and report them to Teng. They performed tasks that werenecessary and desirable in Tengs fishing business. Taken together,these incidents confirm the existence of a labor-only contractingwhich is prohibited in our jurisdiction, as it is considered to be theemployers attempt to evade obligations afforded by law toemployees.

Accordingly, we hold that employer-employee ties existbetween Teng and the respondent workers. A finding that themaestros are labor-only contractors is equivalent to a finding that anemployer-employee relationship exists between Teng and therespondent workers. As regular employees, the respondent workersare entitled to all the benefits and rights appurtenant to regularemployment.

The dismissal of an employee, which the employer mustvalidate, has a twofold requirement: one is substantive, the other isprocedural. Not only must the dismissal be for a just or anauthorized cause, as provided by law; the rudimentary requirementsof due process the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself must be observed as well. The employer has the burden of proving

that the dismissal was for a just cause; failure to show this, as in thepresent case, would necessarily mean that the dismissal wasunjustified and, therefore, illegal.

The respondent workers allegation that Teng summarilydismissed them on suspicion that they were not reporting to him thecorrect volume of the fish caught in each fishing voyage was neverdenied by Teng. Unsubstantiated suspicion is not a just cause toterminate ones employment under Article 282 of the Labor Code.To allow an employer to dismiss an employee based on mereallegations and generalities would place the employee at the mercyof his employer, and would emasculate the right to security of tenure.For his failure to comply with the Labor Codes substantiverequirement on termination of employment, we declare that Tengillegally dismissed the respondent workers.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM theSeptember 21, 2004 decision and the September 1, 2005 resolutionof the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78783. Costs against thepetitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149050 March 25, 2009

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT - NUWHRAIN-APL, Petitioner,vs.VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN andHYATT REGENCY MANILA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O NTINGA, J.:Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1assailing thetwin resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60959.The Resolution2 dated 16 November 2000 dismissed outrightpetitioners special civil action for certiorari therein on the ground thatit was a wrong remedy while the Resolution 3 dated 10 July 2001denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.The following factual antecedents are matters of record.In 1995 and 1996, Mario Dacles and Teodoro Valencia respectively

assumed their duties as glass cleaners at Hyatt Regency Manila(respondent Hyatt), pursuant to the cleaning service contract4

executed between respondent Hyatt and City Service Corporation(CSC).51awphi1Meanwhile, in April 1998, respondent Hyatt hired Amelia Dalmacioand Renato Dazo on a casual basis as florist/sales clerk andhelper/driver, respectively. After their contracts expired on 30 August1998, Dalmacio and Dazo continued reporting for work. On 16September 1998, Dalamcio and Dazo signed another employmentcontract with respondent Hyatt.6

During the Labor Management Committee Meeting (LMC), petitionerSamahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Hyatt-NUWHRAIN-APL(petitioner union), a legitimate labor organization composed of the
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rank-and-file employees of respondent Hyatt, questioned the statusas non-regular employees of Dacles, Valencia, Dalmacio andDazo (Dacles, et al.).7

On 19 April 1999, petitioner union and respondent Hyatt agreedto submit the matter for resolution through the grievancemachinery as provided for in their collective bargainingagreement (CBA). Petitioner union claimed that Dacles, et al. wereregular employees on account of the nature of their functions as wellas the length of their service. On the other hand, respondent Hotelmaintained that Dalmacio and Dazo were mere project employeeswhose employments were co-terminus with the existence of theflower shop outlet and that Dacles and Valencia were employees ofCSC, an independent contractor.On 16 September 1999, respondent Hyatt dismissed Dacles andValencia and disallowed them from reporting to work on the groundthat the service contract between respondent Hyatt and CSC hadbeen terminated.Petitioner union and respondent Hyatt were unable to settle thedispute through the grievance procedure and, thus, agreed toelevate the issue for voluntary arbitration. The parties selected DeanFroilan Bacungan as voluntary arbitrator. After the exchange ofresponsive pleadings, the case was deemed submitted forresolution.On 11 January 2000, the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision,the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Voluntary Arbitrator rules that:

1. Mario Dacles and Teodoro Valencia are not employeesof the Hotel. They are employees of the City ServiceCorporation.2. As employees of the Hotel, Amelia Dalmacio andRenato Dazo can not be legally terminated on September17, 1999 and November 16, 1999 respectively, but theymay be legally terminated anytime the Hotel closes downthe Flower Shop wherein Dalmacio and Dazo work, orearlier for cause provided by law.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner union moved for reconsideration, which was denied in aResolution dated 10 July 2000. On 08 September 2000, petitionerunion elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition forcertiorari.In the assailed Resolution dated 16 November 2000, the Court ofAppeals dismissed the petition, to wit:Contrary to Secs. 1, 4 and 6, in relation to Sec. 7, Rule 43 of the1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner resorted to the instantspecial civil action for certiorari, instead of a petition for review; itspayment of the docket fees is short by P10.00; and the petition is notaccompanied by a certified true copy of the motion forreconsideration of the decision dated January 11, 2000.If the action were to be treated as a petition for review, then it wasfiled out of time. On July 20, 2000, petitioner received the resolutiondated July 10, 2000 denying its motion for reconsideration of theassailed decision. Consequently, it had until July 25, 2000,

or fifteendays from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration, within

which to file a petition for review (Sec. 4, Rule 43). However, thepetition was only filed on September 8, 2000, or forty-five daysbeyond the reglementary period.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing that the voluntaryarbitrators decision was rendered under Title VII-A of the LaborCode and, therefore, is not covered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure as provided in Section 2 thereof. On 10 July 2001,the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying the motion forreconsideration.10

Hence, the instant petition, attributing the following errors to theCourt of Appeals:I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDGRIEVOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT THE APPROPRIATEREMEDY FOR ASSAILING THE DECISION OF THERESPONDENT VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR IS AN APPEAL BYPETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 AND NOT A PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OFCIVIL PROCEDURE.II.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTEDGRIEVOUS ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THEBASIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN RULE 43 OFTHE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.11

Petitioner union argues that the proper remedy to assail a decision ofa voluntary arbitrator is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule65 of the Rules of Court and not an appeal via a petition for reviewunder Rule 43. Petitioner unions theory is based on the followingratiocinations: first, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator is similarto the decisions rendered by the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC) and the Secretary of Labor and Employment,which become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days fromreceipt of notice, in that the Labor Code expressly disallows anappeal from their judgment or final order; second, Section 2 of Rule43, which exempts judgments or final o rders issued under the LaborCode from an appeal via Rule 43, should apply with equal force todecisions of labor voluntary arbitrators.The petition lacks merit.The question on the proper recourse to assail a decision of avoluntary arbitrator has already been settled in Luzon DevelopmentBank v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees,12

where the Court held that the decision or award of the voluntaryarbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to theCourt of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlines in RevisedAdministrative Circular No. 1-95 (now embodied in Rule 43 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), just like those of the quasi-judicialagencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein, andconsistent with the original purpose to provide a uniform procedurefor the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities.13

Subsequently, in Alcantara, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,14 and NipponPaint Employees Union v. Court of Appeals ,15 the Court reiterated

the aforequoted ruling. In Alcantara, the Court held thatnotwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 43, the ruling in LuzonDevelopment Bankstill stands. The Court explained, thus:The provisions may be new to the Rules of Court but it is far frombeing a new law. Section 2, Rules 42 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure, as presently worded, is nothing more but a reiteration ofthe exception to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court ofAppeals, as provided for in Section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, asamended by Republic Act No. 7902:(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, includingthe Securities and Exchange Commission, the EmployeesCompensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission,except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the SupremeCourt in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of thePhilippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, theprovisions of this Act and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraphand subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of theJudiciary Act of 1948.The Court took into account this exception in Luzon DevelopmentBank but, nevertheless, held that the decisions of voluntaryarbitrators issued pursuant to the Labor Code do not come within itsambit x x x16

On some occasions, rules of procedure may be relaxed and on thatbasis the Court of Appeals could have treated the petition forcertiorari as a petition for review under Rule 43. However, ascorrectly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petition was filedbeyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for reviewunder Rule 43. It is elementary in remedial law that the use of anerroneous mode of appeal is a cause for dismissal of the petition forcertiorari and it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition forcertiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.17

In any event, the voluntary arbitrator did not commit any reversibleerror in ruling that Dacles and Valencia were employees of CSC, anindependent contractor, whose services may be terminated upon theexpiration of the contract for cleaning services between CSC andrespondent Hyatt. There is no dispute that Dacles and Valenciaperformed services at respondent Hyatt pursuant to the saidcontract.The Court affirms the ruling of the voluntary arbitratorthat Dacles and Valencia cannot be considered as employees ofrespondent Hyatt in the absence of evidence to prove that CSChad been engaged in labor-only contracting.The Court also affirms the voluntary arbitrators findings thatDalmacio and Dazo were project employees, whose employmentmay be terminated only upon the closure of the flower shop. Saidfindings are in accord with the conditions of the employmentcontracts between respondent Hyatt and the two employees.Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative agenciesand quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise becausetheir jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generallyaccorded not only great respect but even finality. They arebinding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
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discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived atarbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record .18

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIEDand the resolutions dated 16 November 2000 and 10 July 2001 ofthe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60959 are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner,vs.ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEESand ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARYARBITRATOR, respondents.ROMERO, J.:From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank(LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue:

Whether or not the company has violated theCollective Bargaining Agreement provision andthe Memorandum of Agreement dated April1994, on promotion.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their

respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S.Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE'sPosition Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failedto submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the VoluntaryArbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no PositionPaper had been filed by LDB.On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the VoluntaryArbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that theBank has not adhered to the CollectiveBargaining Agreement provision nor theMemorandum of Agreement on p romotion.

Hence, this petition forcertiorariand prohibition seeking to set asidethe decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her fromenforcing the same.In labor law context, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute toan impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidenceand arguments presented by such parties who have boundthemselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final andbinding.Arbitration may be classified, on the basis of the obligation on whichit is based, as either compulsory or voluntary.Compulsory arbitration is a system whereby the parties to a disputeare compelled by the government to forego their right to strike andare compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute througharbitration by a third party. 1The essence of arbitration remains sincea resolution of a dispute is arrived at by resort to a disinterested thirdparty whose decision is final and binding on the parties, but in

compulsory arbitration, such a third party is normally appointed bythe government.Under voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, referral of a disputeby the parties is made, pursuant to a voluntary arbitration clause intheir collective agreement, to an impartial third person for a final andbinding resolution. 2 Ideally, arbitration awards are supposed to becomplied with by both parties without delay, such that once an awardhas been rendered by an arbitrator, nothing is left to be done by bothparties but to comply with the same. After all, they are presumed tohave freely chosen arbitration as the mode of settlement for thatparticular dispute. Pursuant thereto, they have chosen a mutuallyacceptable arbitrator who shall hear and decide their case. Aboveall, they have mutually agreed to de bound by said arbitrator'sdecision.In the Philippine context, the parties to a Collective BargainingAgreement (CBA) are required to include therein provisions for amachinery for the resolution of grievances arising from theinterpretation or implementation of the CBA or company personnelpolicies. 3 For this purpose, parties to a CBA shall name anddesignate therein a voluntary arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators, orinclude a procedure for their selection, preferably from thoseaccredited by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board(NCMB). Article 261 of the Labor Code accordingly provides forexclusive original jurisdiction of such voluntary arbitrator or panel ofarbitrators over (1) the interpretation or implementation of the CBAand (2) the interpretation or enforcement of company personnelpolicies. Article 262 authorizes them, but only upon agreement of theparties, to exercise jurisdiction over other labor disputes.On the other hand, a labor arbiter under Article 217 of the LaborCode has jurisdiction over the following enumerated cases:

. . . (a) Except as otherwise provided under thisCode the Labor Arbiters shall have original andexclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, withinthirty (30) calendar days after the submission ofthe case by the parties for decision withoutextension, even in the absence of stenographicnotes, the following cases involving all workers,whether agricultural or non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Termination disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement,

those cases that workers may file involvingwages, rates of pay, hours of work and otherterms and conditions of employment;4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and otherforms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264of this Code, including questions involving thelegality of strikes and lockouts;6. Except claims for Employees Compensation,Social Security, Medicare and maternitybenefits, all other claims, arising from employer-

employee relations, including those of personsin domestic or household service, involving anamount exceeding five thousand pesos(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompaniedwith a claim for reinstatement.xxx xxx xxx

It will thus be noted that the jurisdiction conferred by law on avoluntary arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limitedcompared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter and theappellate jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission(NLRC) for that matter. 4 The state of our present law relating tovoluntary arbitration provides that "(t)he award or decision of theVoluntary Arbitrator . . . shall be final and executory after ten (10)calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision bythe parties," 5 while the "(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the LaborArbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commissionby any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt ofsuch decisions, awards, or orders." 6 Hence, while there is anexpress mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, RepublicAct No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision ofa voluntary arbitrator.Yet, past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntaryarbitrator is, more often than not, elevated to the Supreme Courtitself on a petition for certiorari, 7 in effect equating the voluntaryarbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals. In the view of theCourt, this is illogical and imposes an unnecessary burden upon it.In Volkschel Labor Union, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 8 on the settledpremise that the judgments of courts and awards of quasi-judicialagencies must become final at some definite time, this Court ruledthat the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights ofparties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect asjudgments of a court. In Oceanic Bic Division (FFW), et al. v.Romero, et al., 9 this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by thenature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity." Under theserulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solelyor in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agencybutindependent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions arenot appealable to the latter. 10

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all finaljudgments, decisions, resolutions, orders orawards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards orcommissions, including the Securities andExchange Commission, the EmployeesCompensation Commission and the CivilService Commission, except those falling withinthe appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Courtin accordance with the Constitution, the LaborCode of the Philippines under PresidentialDecree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
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this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the thirdparagraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourthparagraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of1948.xxx xxx xxx

Assuming arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel ofvoluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and the panel arecomprehended within the concept of a "quasi-judicialinstrumentality." It may even be stated that it was to meet the verysituation presented by the quasi-judicial functions of the voluntaryarbitrators here, as well as the subsequent arbitrator/arbitral tribunaloperating under the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, 11

that the broader term "instrumentalities" was purposely included inthe above-quoted provision.An "instrumentality" is anything used as a means or agency. 12 Thus,the terms governmental "agency" or "instrumentality" aresynonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which agovernment acts, or by which a certain government act or function isperformed. 13 The word "instrumentality," with respect to a state,contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmentalpower for the performance of a state function. 14 An individual person,like an administrator or executor, is a judicial instrumentality in thesettling of an estate, 15 in the same manner that a sub-agentappointed by a bankruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, 16

and a trustee in bankruptcy of a defunct corporation is aninstrumentality of the state. 17

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant toa governmental power delegated to him under the provisionstherefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within thecontemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided forin the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to saidSec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplatedtherein. It will be noted that, although the Employees CompensationCommission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. 1-91, which is the forerunner of the present Revised AdministrativeCircular No. 1-95, laid down the procedure for the appealability of itsdecisions to the Court of Appeals under the foregoing rationalization,and this was later adopted by Republic Act No. 7902 in amendingSec. 9 of B.P. 129.

A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel ofarbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, inline with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative CircularNo. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards andcommissions enumerated therein.This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the originalpurpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for theappellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities 18 notexpressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by eitherthe Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to thelegislative intendment that decisions of the NLRC be reviewabledirectly by the Supreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the

adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are excludedfrom the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter.In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 ofRepublic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitrationis deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in thecontract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional TrialCourt for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or isdoing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall havejurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one(1) month after an award is made, apply to the court havingjurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court mustgrant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected.19

In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntaryarbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in apetition for certiorari from that award or decision, the Court ofAppeals must be deemed to have concurrent jurisdiction with theSupreme Court. As a matter of policy, this Court shall henceforthremand to the Court of Appeals petitions of this nature for properdisposition.ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Courtof Appeals.SO ORDERED.

STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS (Art. 263-266)Requirements of Strike

G.R. No. 101858 August 21, 1992BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner,vsNATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRDDIVISION), TINIG AT LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA SA BLTBCO-NAFLU and its reinstated one hundred ninety (190) members,namely, BIENVENIDO PAGKATUTUHAN, GIL A. ALANO,ANGELITO CALISIHAN, CARLOS CORTEZ, RUSTICO PANTOJA,RICO M. SERDAN, NESTOR GARCIA, DANILO SAN AGUSTIN,MARLON TIZON, MANUEL LUBUGUIN, EDGARDO AVENIDA,LEONARDO ROLDAN, HILARION QUINTAIN, BASILIO BITUIN,LEONARDO PINEDA, GREGORIO CABRERA, ALFREDOARROYO, NOLITO BESAS, CRISOSTOMO DE LUNAS,MARTINIO ORTEGA, ENRIQUITO CIPRIANO, PEDRO BUGAY,NOLASCO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO GAA, VIRGILIO AVENANTE,DANTE AURE, FELIPE ANDALEON, REYNALDO CANETE,GREGORIO DELOS REYES, ZOSIMO P. ROZEL, RUBEN ROZEL,TOMAS ESTEVA, JACINTO LANDICHO, OSCAR DELOS REYES,ROBERTO PESCASIO, MANUEL PEREJA, FELIX P. SALIBA,LEOGARIO SALAZAR, EDUARDO DELA CUESTA, REYNALDOCATANGAY, CELSO PENANA, ROGELIO SAVIDO, EDGARDODIMAYUGA, RODRIGO LORENZANA, LORETO UMALI,LEONIDES MENDOZA, JOSE ALINA, MANOLITO F.CAPIANGAO, RAMON ALCANTARA, GREGORIO M. BREGONIA,ENRICO P. DIASANTA, FORTUNATO GAITE, NESTOR R.

HOMOROK, JR., NESTOR LIM, SONIA MARALIT, NATALIA M.MARAMOT, FERNANDO A. MARAHAN, AURORA S. MARIANO,CEFIRINO M. ROYO, DANILO M. SAMBOJON, DIONISIOAPURADO, AUGELIO PASUMBA, DEMOCRITO SISPEREZ,CARLITO R. ZUGUIRE, MARIANO UMALI, NEMESIO T.RUMOLO, PEDRO MONTERO, JAIME MALLA, ROMEO C.EBORA, LEOPOLDO REGALO, MARIO C. GRINDALO, BASILIOADAJAR, GREGORIO P. CESAR, PEDRO DYPIANGCO, ARTUROB. DE LUNA, YOLANDA MONTICER, ARMANDO P. CODERA,CARLITO C. LUBUGUIN, ILUMINADO A. MEDINA, RAMON V.EM, JR., JAIME N. BENEDICTO P. BLASTIQUE, CESAREVILLANUEVA, EDWIN CARASCO, CRISANTO T. VALENTE, LUISS. DELEMA, CARLOS D. DELGADO, PEDRO B. PERENA, JR.,AMANCIO C. CLARETE, ALFREDO E. AREJA, RUFINO G.ALINSUNURIN, TELESFORO URI, ARNEL ASOY, RODRIGO A.AVARADO, PABLITO BELLERAS, ROMEO M. HUTALIA, JOSEM. MAGPANTAY, ERNESTO C. MASCULINO, DANILO O.PARDILLA, ROMEO C. QUINDARA, ROMEO R. RAZA, RODOLFOS. SANTILLAN, DANILO C. VISITACION, ROGELIO B. YAMBAO,AIDEN P. MANUPIL, BUENAVENTURA ARGENTE, ROGELIO M.DELICA, NARCISO M. RAMIREZ, ROGELIO A. TAN, CARLOS T.CHUA, NONILON A. GUTIERREZ, PEDRO E. LOBO, WILFREDOG. LEGUA, FELICIANO G. GONZALES, ORLANDO H. VERGARA,CARLOS A. BORDON, HOSPICIO D. BRIONES, MARTINDALISAY, ISIDRO C. MACATANGAY, FLORENCIO E. MALAPIT,MIGUEL SANCHEZ, RENATO A. VILLENA, CARLIE M. DELICIA,REYNALDO B. ABANADOR, CELESTINO A. DALISAY,REYNALDO E. ACAB, RONELO U. ALINEA, REYNALDO T.ALVISO, JESUS V. CATAPIA, NOLETO R. DE CHAVEZ,INOCENCIO S. EGAMINO, DOMINADOR ILAO, CRISOSTOMO E.MAGADIA, RODOLFO B. MARALIT, ISIDRO PACIA, EFRENIO R.PALMA, PROSPERO B. PENA, ARMANDO V. PON, NICOLAS M.RECEDE, DOMINGO SECRETARIO, CRISANTO V. ULAC,REYNALDO V. FERMIN, MARCELINO N. NOSES, MARIO C.SUAREZ, ROGELIO W. BURON, MARIO D. ZOMBILLA, JACINTOB. ORANTE, SANECITO Q. DE LUNA, JACINTO S. GRIMALDO,DANTE LADERA, FELIX S. LADINES, NOEL S. MARQUEZ,JUANCHO S. ALMORAS, DANILO S. RICO, TIMOTEO J.QUINCENA, MELECIO F. LLAMELO, NICOLAS C. ASEJA,DOMINGO J. EVANGELISTA, ROLANDO P. REYES, RENATOABILLA, DONATO ALCANTARA, ELADIO Q. MANALO,

OLYMPIO C. PERENA, ARMANDO C. SAAVEDRA, JOSELITOTROZADA, LAURO M. ZUBRANO, JULIO A. ANTENOR,MANOLO A. ATIENZA, CELESTINO D. ENRIQUEZ, RODANTE C.VICTORIA, EDUARDO, E. ALCANTARA, SANTIAGO ARENDA,LEOPOLDO V. DEL MUNDO, LEOPOLDO REGALO, JAIMEMALLA, ELMAR CHUA, RENE A. ANEMIAS, MANUEL MILLAR,JESUS M. FAVIS, SALLY ALMARIO, ARCANGEL F. FAURA,FLORENCIO BUHAY, JUANELIO ALMORES, JAIME FAJELAN,CRISTOBAL M. LUCI, JUANITO CRIMALDO, RAUL I.CONSIGNADO, ISAGANI R. SUNGA, EFREN LINA, and PEPITOABRATIQUE, respondents.Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Corpus for petitioner.


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Villy Cadiz for private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa saBLTBCO-NAFLU.Samuel D. Entuna, Napoleon Banzuela, Jr., Noli J. Delos Santos,Alvin M. Exconde, Angel Al. Caluntad, Ildefonso B. Malueda forprivate respondents.CRUZ, J.:This case arose when on May 23, 1988, private respondent Tinig atLakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU),an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU),filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna Tayabas BusCompany on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of theCBA.The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor toassume jurisdiction over the dispute or to certify it to the NationalLabor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. Thepetitioner also moved to dismiss the notice of strike on August 3,1988.Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor SecretaryC. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC on August 29, 1988. 1

A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU onAugust 29, 1988, and on the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU on August 30,1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order that unionsecretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it.On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking thepremises of BLTBCo's terminals.On September 6, 1988, the NLRC issued an en banc resolutionordering the striking employees to lift their picket and to remove allobstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as ofMay 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo was directedto accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms andconditions prevailing before the strike. 2

On September 15, 1988, the BLTBCo caused the publication of theresolution and called on all striking workers to return to work not laterthan September 18, 1988. It later extended the deadline toSeptember 19, 1988.Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those whowere allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed

individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground wasthat they were refused admission when they reported back for work.Among those who failed to comply with the return-to-work order werethe respondent individual union members.On July 19, 1991, the NLRC issued a resolution deciding the disputethus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered asfollows:1. Dismissing the charge of unfair laborpractice and union busting filed by the unionagainst BLTBCo for lack of merit ;

2. Ordering BLTBCo to fully implement theprovisions of the CBA in the matter of uniformand safety shoes;3. Declaring valid the dismissal of Jose M.Calubayan, Tirso Vinas, Ronelito Torres, FloroT. Isla and Rosauro Aguilar, being grounded onlawful causes:4. Declaring the strike illegal;5. Declaring the following officers andmembers of the union, namely: . . . to havelost their employment status;6. Ordering the reinstatement of the followingunion members, namely; . . . to their formerposition without loss of seniority rights butwithout backwages.7. The case of Ladislao Violanda is consideredwithdrawn.8. Directing likewise the reinstatement of allstriking employees of BLTBCo who have notcommitted illegal acts.9. Declaring regular the employment ofcasual employees who have alreadyrendered service of at least one year whethercontinuous or broken.

On September 16, 1991, the NLRC issued the other challengedresolution, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsiderationof Respondent BLTBCo and Complainant PepitoAbratique are denied for lack of merit. As aconsequence, respondent's prayer for temporaryrestraining order is likewise denied.As prayed for, respondent is directed to reinstatethe union members specifically named in thequestioned resolution and all those strikingemployees who have not committed illegal acts.This order of reinstatement is immediatelyexecutory. No further motions forreconsideration shall be allowed.

BLTB then filed this special civil action forcertiorari, claiming that therespondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in:

1. ordering the reinstatement of the aforenamed

190 individual respondent union membersnotwithstanding the fact that they knowinglyparticipated in a strike which was illegal from itsinception as it was done in complete defianceand/or disobedience to the Assumption Order ofAugust 29, 1988 and the Return-To-Work Orderof September 6, 1988;2. failing to consider that aforenamed individualunion members have already abandoned theiremployment when they defied the Return-To-Work Order of September 6, 1988;

3. limiting the declaration of forfeiture ofemployment status to mere thirty-six (36) unionofficers and members of the striking union whenBLTBCo was able to initially identify at least (a)one hundred (100) employees who committedillegal/violent acts during and after the strike;and (b) twenty (20)employees who reportedback for work and later on abandoned it andresumed their strike activities;4. not including the recognized union officers Jerry Soriano, Serafin Soriano and DesiderioComel among the union officers whoseemployment status have been declaredforfeited; and5. incorporating in its subject Resolution ablanket order reinstating BLTBCo's strikingemployees who have not committed illegal acts.

On motion of the petitioner and upon its posting of a cash bond in theamount of P500,000.00, the Court issued a temporary restrainingorder on November 6, 1991, against the enforcement of the above-quoted resolutions. 3

Separate comments on the petition were filed by two of the privaterespondents, Celso Peana and Pepito Abratique, and by theSolicitor General on behalf of the public respondent. A consolidatedreply to these comments was later submitted by the petitioner.The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties and findsthat the challenged resolutions must be sustained.BLTBCo contends that the 190 union members who participatedin the illegal strike should not have been reinstated becausethey defied the return-to-work order of September 6, 1988. Itinvokes against the NLRC its own words in its resolution of July 19,1991, where it said:

A strike that is undertaken despite the issuanceby the Secretary of Labor of an assumption orcertification order becomes a prohibited activityand thus illegal, pursuant to the secondparagraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code asamended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v.NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989: 178SCRA 482). The Union officers and members,as a result, are deemed to have lost their

employment status for having knowinglyparticipated in an illegal act. (Union of FilipinoEmployees (UFE), et al. vs. Nestle Philippines,Inc., et al., G.R. No. 88710-13, December 19,1991)

That is only half the picture, however. As the NLRC furtherexplained, it was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture ofemployment status of all those who participated in the strike"because, first of all, there was inadequate service of the certificationorder on the union as of the date the strike was declared and therewas no showing that the striking members had been apprised ofsuch order by the NAFLU.


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Secondly, and more importantly, the resolution declared as follows:Applying the principle of vicarious liability, onlythe officers of the union deserved to bepenalized with the loss of their employmentstatus. The leaders of the union are the movingforce in the declaration of the strike and theRank-in-file employees merely followed.Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264,paragraph (e), those who participated in thecommission of illegal acts who stood chargedcriminally thereof in court must be penalized.BLTBCo will have to agree with Us that while thegeneral membership of TLM-NAFLU may havejoined the strike at its inception, We areconvinced that they returned to work onSeptember 19, 1988 or, immediately thereafter.And, We are not swayed that these employeeshave abandoned their job just because theyreported late or, beyond the period required bythe Commission and by BLTBCo. Thecircumstances of time and place of employmentand the residences of the employees as well asthe lack of individual notice to them are reasonsenough to justify their failure to beat thedeadline.True it is, that management of BLTBCo causedthe publication of the Resolution of theCommission of September 5, 1988 in the ManilaBulletin, We cannot reasonably expect thecomplainants, who are ordinary workers, to beregular readers of such newspaper. Moreover,the publication of the said resolution was onlymade once.

We accept these factual conclusions as they do not appear to havebeen reached arbitrarily. The mere fact that the majority of thestrikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean thatthe rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they hadbeen sufficiently notified thereof. As the Solicitor General correctlyadds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not haveenough time to return during the period given by the petitioner, whichwas only five days.

The contention of the petitioner that the private respondentsabandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employeewho forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by anylogic be said to have abandoned his work .For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination ofemployment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of theemployee to resume his employment. 4 This refusal must be clearlyestablished. As we stressed in a recent case, 5mere absence is notsufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointingto the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.In the case at bar, the affidavit of Eduardo Azucena, BLTBCooperations manager, 6 besides being hearsay, lacks credibility in light

of the subsequent acts of the private respondents in complainingabout their separation.A worker who joins a strike does so precisely to assert or improvethe terms and conditions of his employment. If his purpose is toabandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.The petitioner also alleges that the NLRC erred in limiting theforfeiture of employment status to the 36 union officers andmembers although there were at least 100 employees whocommitted violent acts and 20 employees who reported back forwork and later abandoned it to resume their strike activities.These issues are also factual. The findings thereon of the NLRC areconclusive on us and will not be disturbed as it clearly appears thatthey are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.We agree with the Solicitor General that the mere filing of chargesagainst an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does notby itself justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at aninvestigation duly called where the employee shall be given anopportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the alleged groundconstitutes a criminal offense, as we held in Almira v. B.F.Goodrich Phil., Inc. 7 In that case, we ordered the reinstatementof employees against whom criminal complaints had been filedbut not yet proved.The next contention of the petitioner is that Serafin Soriano,Jerry Soriano and Desiderio Comel should also be dismissedwith the other union officers and members who participated inthe illegal strike. We note, however, that these three have not beenimpleaded in this petition (unlike the others who have beenindividually named) and so have not been given an opportunity todefend themselves against the charges of BLTBCo. Absent such anopportunity, we are precluded from making any pronouncementregarding their alleged role in the strike for which their dismissal issought.The petitioner's last point is that the NLRC should not haveissued the blanket directive for the "reinstatement of all strikingemployees of BLTBCo who have not committed illegal acts."The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts." Thedirective was not really "blanket," as the petitioner would call it, butindeed selective. The NLRC made this clear in the resolution datedSeptember 16, 1991, thus:

The loss of employment status of striking unionmembers is limited to those "who knowingly

participates in the commission of illegal acts."(Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must bepresented to substantiate the commissionthereof and not merely an unsubstantiatedallegation. He who asserts the commission ofillegal acts, must prove the same, and it is onthe basis of substantiated evidence that thisCommission declares the loss of employmentstatus of specific union members who havecommitted illegal acts.This Commission's order directing thereinstatement of all striking employees against

whom no complaint of illegal acts having beencommitted during the strikes, and who werebarred from returning to work and is similarlysituated with those who have been directed tobe reinstated, should, as a consequence and onthe basis of the reasons discussed in thequestioned resolution be reinstated. There is nodenial of due process in this direction, forrespondent has been given the chance todefend its position.

Elaborating on the same issue, the Solicitor General astutelyobserves:

The assailed Resolution does not preventpetitioner from continuing with its investigationand come up with evidence against theseworkers. But they have to be admitted back totheir work first. This is clearly a situation wherethe social justice provisions of our laws andjurisprudence come in aid of labor. Since suchinvestigations might be extended, intentionally orotherwise, the workers are in danger of losingtheir l ivelihood. As compared to themanagement that is in a position to wage anextended legal struggle against labor, the lattercannot do so. This is where the State intervenesto equalize matters between labor andmanagement.

The right to strike is one of the rights recognized andguaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for itsprotection against exploitation by management. By virtue of thisright, the workers are able to press their demands for betterterms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness,poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer'sintransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of theworking class. But precisely because of this, it must be handledcarefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in theworkers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after themost thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in theonly way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every caseconformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legalrequirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-

work order in industries affected with public interest, will renderthe strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it issupposed to protect.Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands noless observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions datedJuly 19, 1991, and September 16, 1991, are AFFIRMED. Thetemporary restraining order dated November 6, 1991, is LIFTED.Costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.


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LEGALITY OF STRIKE

1. Statutory Prohibition

G.R. No. 124678 July 31, 1997DELIA BANGALISAN, LUCILIN CABALFIN, EMILIA DE GUZMAN,CORAZON GOMEZ, CORAZON GREGORIO, LOURDESLAREDO, RODOLFO MARIANO, WILFREDO MERCADO, LIGAYAMONTANCES and CORAZON PAGPAGUITAN, petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONand THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.REGALADO, J.:This is an appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38316, which affirmed severalresolutions of the Civil Service Commission finding petitioners guiltyof conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as itsresolution of April 12, 1996 denying petitioners' motion forreconsideration.1

Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 publicschool teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19,1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, thealleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and

correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their materialbenefit.On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department ofEducation, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-WorkOrder. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they werecharged by the Secretary with "grave misconduct; gross neglect ofduty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations andreasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; grossinsubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of theservice; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807,otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines."They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension.Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to thecomplaint. On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered adecision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing themfrom the service effective immediately.

Acting on the motions for reconsideration filed by petitionersBangalisan, Gregorio, Cabalfin, Mercado, Montances andPagpaguitan, the Secretary subsequently modified the penalty ofdismissal to suspension for nine months without pay.Petitioner Gomez likewise moved for reconsideration with the DECSand then appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).The other petitioners also filed individual appeals to the MSPB, butall of their appeals were dismissed for lack of merit.Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their respectivecases, petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission(CSC). The appeals of petitioners Cabalfin, Montances andPagpaguitan were dismissed for having been filed out of time. On

motion for reconsideration, however, the CSC decided to rule on themerits of their appeal in the interest of justice.Thereafter, the CSC issued Resolution No. 94-1765 finding Cabalfinguilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service andimposing on him a penalty of six months suspension without pay.The CSC also issued Resolutions Nos. 94-2806 and 94-2384affirming the penalty of nine months suspension without paytheretofore imposed on petitioners Montances and Pagpaguitan.With respect to the appeals of the other petitioners, the CSC alsofound them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of theservice. It, however, modified the penalty of nine months suspensionpreviously meted to them to six months suspension with automaticreinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages.All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSCresolutions but these were all denied, 2 except that of petitionerRodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation ofreasonable office rules and regulations because of his failure toinform the school of his intended absence and to file an applicationfor leave therefoer. This petitioner was accordingly given only areprimand. 3

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorariwith this Court but, onAugust 29, 1995, their petition was referred to the Court of Appealspursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. 4

On October 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition forlack of merit. 5 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also

denied by respondent court, 6 hence the instant petition alleging thatthe Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion whenit upheld the resolutions of the CSC (1) that penalized petitionerswhose only offense was to exercise their constitutional right topeaceably assemble and petition the government for redress ofgrievances; (2) that penalized petitioner Mariano even afterrespondent commission found out that the specific basis of thecharges that former Secretary Cario filed against him was afalsehood; and (3) that denied petitioners their right to back wagescovering the period when they were illegally not allowed to teach. 7

It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in thepublic service may not engage in strikes . While the Constitutionrecognizes the right of government employees to organize, theyare prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, massleaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which willresult in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services.

The right of government employees to organize is limited onlyto the formation of unions or associations, without includingthe right to strike. 8

Petitioners contend, however, that they were not on strike but weremerely exercising their constitutional right peaceably to assembleand petition the government for redress of grievances. We find suchpretension devoid of merit.The issue of whether or not the mass action launched by thepublic school teachers during the period from September up tothe first half of October, 1990 was a strike has been decided bythis Court in a resolution, dated December 18, 1990, in the hereincited case ofManila Public School Teachers Association, et al. vs.

Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held "that from the pleaded andadmitted facts, these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposesa strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of,or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform,undertaken for essentially economic reasons."It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and thatpetitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding theirservices. The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used bythe striking employees to describe their common course of action isinconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not itsappearance, will be deemed to be controlling. 9

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In theabsence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engagein concerted work stoppages for any purpose. 10

Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalizednot because they exercised their right of peaceable assemblyand petition for redress of grievances but because of theirsuccessive unauthorized and unilateral absences whichproduced adverse effects upon their students for whoseeducation they are responsible. The actuations of petitionersdefinitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of theservice, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules andregulations.As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by thepetitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that

was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such rightwhich resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of publicservice and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For,indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than themass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition thegovernment for redress of grievances." 11

It bears stressing that suspension of public services, howevertemporary, will inevitably derail serv

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