APENDIX F, CANON 2, Sec. 1[A.M. NO. RTJ-03-1791 : July 8, 2004(Formerly AM OCA IPI No. 02-1427-RTJ)DOMINGO B. PANTIG,Complainant, v.JUDGE LAMBERTO A. DAING, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, JUDGE CARMELITA GUTIERREZ-FRUELDA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, JUDGE PEDRO M. SUNGA, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, all in San Fernando City, Pampanga and JUDGE PAMELA ANN A. MAXINO, Municipal Trial Court, Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1.,Respondents.R E S O L U T I O NCORONA,J.:This is an administrative matter stemming from the affidavit-complaint1filed by complainant Dominador Pantig charging the following judges with conduct unbecoming of officers of the court: Judge Lamberto Daing, Jr., Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 46; Judge Pamela Ann Maxino, Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1; Judge Pedro Sunga, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42 and Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda, Regional Trial Court of San Fernando Pampanga, Branch 43.In his affidavit-complaint, Pantig alleged that he and his siblings (Baltazar, Pedro and Ursula Pantig-Sahagun) were co-owners of Lot 1471, a 13.99 hectare fishpond. In 1969, ownership of Lot 1471 (together with Lots 1747 and 1801) was awarded, pursuant to original registration, to Venancio Baltazar. However, Baltazar's ownership over Lot 1471 was challenged by complainant Pantig and his siblings in an action for reconveyance. The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41 ruled in favor of the Pantigs and ordered Baltazar to surrender the possession of Lot 1471. The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by Judge Felipe B. Kalalo read:Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing a new judgment is hereby rendered as follows:1. That portion of the Decision rendered on August 24, 1969 confirming applicant-respondent's title to Lot 1471, is hereby set aside;2. Petitioner's title to Lot 1471, described in plan AP-19164 (Exhibit D) and in its technical description (Exhibit H), is hereby confirmed and orders that the same be decreed in an undivided equal shares in favor of petitioners Baltazar Pantig, Domingo Pantig, Pedro Pantig, Filipinos, of legal ages, all married, the first two being residents of Sexmoan, Pampanga, and the last two being residents of Guagua, Pampanga; andcralawlibrary3. Upon the finality of this decision, respondent Venancio Baltazar is hereby ordered to surrender possession of Lot 1471 to the petitioners and to render within sixty (60) days thereof an accounting of the produce thereof from 1969.Once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree issue.With costs against applicants, respondent Venancio Baltazar.2The April 5, 1984 decision of Judge Kalalo was affirmed by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.3It became final and executory on February 7, 1997. However, in spite of the issuance of a writ of execution and an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in the name of complainant Pantig, the Baltazars continued to be in possession of the property without any accounting of the produce rendered.Complainant Pantig alleges that the final and executory decision has not been implemented because of the maneuverings of the Baltazars through their counsel, Atty. Ernesto Pangalangan, and the acts of the respondent judges which amount to conduct unbecoming of officers of the court.As summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the acts complained of are:a)JUDGE LAMBERTO A. DAING, JR.Complainant alleges that he filed an indirect contempt charge against the Baltazars' counsel, Atty. Ernesto Pangalangan, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 12056 before the RTC, Branch 45, San Fernando City presided by respondent Judge Lamberto A. Daing, Jr. A motion to dismiss the complaint was filed by Atty. Pangalangan after which the court ordered him to file his position paper. Complainant received a copy of Atty. Pangalangan's position paper on 28 June 2000 and filed his comment thereon on 03 August 2000. However, despite lapse of almost two (2) years, respondent Judge has not resolved the motion to dismiss in violation of the rules.b)JUDGE CARMELITA GUTIERREZ-FRUELDAComplainant avers that, relative to the above-mentionedLand Registration Case No. N-850 LRC Rec. No. N-35668 entitled "Baltazar Pantig, et al. v. Venancio Baltazar,"RTC, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga issued an order on 01 September 1999 finding defendant Baltazars guilty of indirect contempt and ordering them to payP25,000.00 each for their refusal to render an accounting on the produce of the subject fishpond from 1969 up to the present. Upon the motion of plaintiff Pantigs, the court issued another Order dated 07 June 2000 further ordering the imprisonment of defendant Baltazars until they comply with the Order of 01 September 1999.Complainant maintains that on 27 June 2000 the Baltazars filed their first Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order of 07 June 2000 etc. On 20 December 2001, Judge Simbulan issued an order denying the motion; rejecting the accounting submitted by the Baltazars; and ordering the issuance of the warrants of arrest. A second Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order dated 20 December 2001 was filed by the Baltazars which was likewise denied on 17 January 2002. Later, upon the motion of the Baltazars, Judge Simbulan inhibited himself from hearing the case. The case was then re-assigned to RTC, Branch 43 presided by respondent Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda.Complainant contends that for the third time the Baltazars filed an urgent Motion to Reconsider Order dated 17 January 2002. During the hearing on the motion, complainant's counsel emphasized that the motion ought to be denied for being pro-forma and actually the third motion filed by the Baltazars seeking the reconsideration of the Order dated 07 June 2000 which cited them in contempt of court. The Pantigs observed that during said trial Atty. Pangalangan, counsel for the Baltazars, was unusually silent and it was respondent Judge who was actively arguing with their counsel. Sensing bias on the part of the judge they requested their counsel to file a motion for her inhibition. Their suspicion was confirmed when on 19 February 2002 respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion and setting aside the Order of 01 September 1999 which cited the Baltazars in contempt of court. The same order accepted the accounting previously rejected by Judge Simbulan and considered the same as their substantial compliance with the accounting mandated by the dispositive portion of the Decision dated 05 April 1984 even in the absence of any receipt or voucher showing how the expenses were incurred.c)JUDGE PEDRO M. SUNGA, JR.Complainant alleges that respondent Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., issued an Order dated 07 June 2000 in LRC No. N-850 N-35668 ordering the imprisonment of the Baltazars until they comply with the Order dated 10 February 1998. However, upon the Baltazars' filing of an "Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order of 07 June 2000" dated 27 June 2000, respondent Judge immediately recalled the Warrants of Arrest issued against respondent Baltazars without first giving the plaintiffs the opportunity to comment on the said motion.d)JUDGE PAMELA ANN A. MAXINOComplainant avers that he is one of the plaintiffs in a forcible entry case against the Baltazars docketed as Civil Case No. 732. On 13 August 2001, respondent Judge Maxino ordered expunged the Position Paper and the supporting affidavits of the Baltazars for having been filed out of time and considered the case submitted for decision. On 31 August 2001, Atty. Pangalangan filed a Motion for Reconsideration which did not contain a notice of hearing. Instead of disregarding the motion for being defective, respondent Judge, on 06 September 22001, set the said motion for hearing on 28 September 2001. Complainant's counsel objected thereto saying that the court had no obligation to set the motion for hearing and that such hearing would unnecessarily delay the case. Yet the hearing proceeded. On 03 October 22001, respondent judge instead of deciding the case, merely inhibited herself as a consequence of which the case remained pending and the Baltazars were given the undue advantage of staying on the fishpond for some more years to the prejudice of the Pantigs.4Respondent judges submitted their respective comments denying that their acts constituted conduct unbecoming of officers of the Court. As summarized by the OCA, the comments of respondent judges follow:1. COMMENT dated 02 May 2002 of respondent Judge Lamberto A. Daing, Jr.Respondent Judge Daing avers that although the pending incident in the subject case was the motion to dismiss and the opposition thereto, he claims that both parties already presented their respective evidence on the merits. Several documents were allegedly submitted by them revering to some records of no less than three separate cases aside from the pleadings and decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Due to these voluminous records, he admits that through sheer inadvertence and oversight, he was able to resolve the pending incident only on 10 May 2002. He asserts though that his inaction was not attended or brought about by malice or ill-motive to unjustifiably favor one party over another.2. COMMENT dated 06 May 2002 of respondent Judge Carmelita S. Gutierrez-Fruelda denying the charge against her.Respondent Judge Fruelda states that the charge against her hinges on the Order dated 19 February 2002 which she issued as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 43, San Fernando City, Pampanga, inLRC No. N850 N-35668 entitled "Baltazar Pantig, et al v. Venancio Baltazar,"the dispositive portion of which, inter alia, states:"Considering all the foregoing, this Court believes and so holds that, in view of the compliance by the Baltazars (thru counsel) with the Decision and the Orders aforestated, by rendering an accounting of the produce of the fishpond from 1969 up to the present, notwithstanding that some entries in the accounting may not be acceptable to the opposing party, there is still compliance made by the respondents. Since there was compliance the fine ofP25,000.00 for each of the respondents must be reconsidered and the Warrant of Arrest issued against all the respondents must necessarily be recalled."Respondent Judge Fruelda in justifying her afore-mentioned Order states, inter alia, thus:A. Specifically, the April 5, 1984 Decision, required the person of VENANCIO BALTAZAR, and none other to render an accounting of the income and expenses of the fishpond from 1969 to the present;b. The person of Venancio Baltazar failed to render the ordered accounting until he died on February 5, 1979;c. The record does not show that the respondents, who were cited for contempt and ordered imprisoned, were duly named substitutes to the principal respondent, the deceased Venancio Baltazar. Neither were they appointed executors or administrators of the estate of the deceased respondent.d. In fact, there is no showing in the record that the respondents, who were ordered arrested, had a hand in the management and administration of the subject fishpond for them to get involved in the matter of rendering an accounting which is personal in nature;e. The order for these respondents to render an accounting, otherwise face incarceration, compelled them to hire a public accountant who prepared one for them, and hence, upon submission of the same would be treated as full compliance of the order, the non-acceptance of the same by petitioner notwithstanding. As such, the re-issuance of the warrants of arrest against them would be iniquitous and unjust;xxxxxxi. If the herein complainant found error in the questioned order of the undersigned respondent Judge, the proper remedy, if she may suggest, is to attach the same in a petition forcertiorari, as the same is not proper for an administrative complaint against the judge issuer thereof.3. COMMENT dated 22 April 2002 of respondent Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr. denying the charge against him.Respondent Judge alleges that as the then designated Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 41, he issued the Order dated 07 June 2000 in LRC No. N-850 N-35668 finding defendant Baltazars guilty of indirect contempt and ordering them to pay a fine ofP25,000.00 each and to be imprisoned until they comply with the Order dated 23 June 1998 by rendering an accounting of the produce of the fishpond in issue from 1969 up to the present. One 15 June 2000, he issued the corresponding Order of Arrest. On 23 June 2000, counsel for the Baltazars filed an "Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order of 07 June 2000 and to Set Aside Order of Imprisonment or to Quash Warrant of Arrest for Having Become Moot and Academic" wherein the required accounting was incorporated. According to respondent Judge, considering that the Baltazars had already submitted the required accounting, he immediately ordered the recall of the warrants of arrest per his Order dated 27 June 2000. He argues that whether or not the submitted accounting is correct and/or acceptable to complainant is of no moment for as long as an accounting was submitted as required by the order. The parties may prove the correctness or incorrectness of the accounting by submitting evidence thereof but in the meanwhile the court cannot order the Baltazars to be imprisoned until the accounting submitted is proven correct.4. COMMENT dated 15 May 2002 of respondent Judge Pamela Ann A. Maxino denying the charges against her.Respondent Judge Maxino says that the subject Civil Case No. 732 for forcible entry, together with three (3) other Criminal Cases Nos. 2068, 2080 and 2081 involving the same parties, were assigned to her by the Executive Judge after the Presiding Judges of Sasmuan, Branch 2 of Guagua and Floridablanca inhibited themselves from hearing said cases. Relative to civil Case No. 732, she admits that she issued the Order dated 13 August 2001 granting the plaintiff's motion to expunge the Baltazars' Position Paper, Specific Offer of Exhibits and the Affidavits of their witnesses for having been filed out of time. She further admits that she gave due course on the Baltazars' motion for reconsideration by setting the same for hearing although said motion did not contain any notice of hearing because she later realized the importance and evidentiary value of the position paper, exhibits and affidavits which, in a forcible entry case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, are submitted in lieu of evidence presented during trial and without which the Baltazars' would be left without any evidence at all. Thus, she set the motion for hearing in order for her to have a second hard look at her earlier ruling and hear the parties' respective arguments.Moreover, respondent Judge mentioned the case ofSun Uy Giok v. Matusa, 101 Phil. 727 cited in 1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 233 [6thRevised Edition, 1997], wherein the Court held as follows:"x x x. Where plaintiffs have had the chance to present and did not present their objection to the motion to dismiss, the Honorable Supreme Court held that the ends of justice had been served and the court's failure to note that on the date of the hearing of said motion, plaintiffs had no notice thereof became an error without prejudice which may well be overlooked. x x x."She claims that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 332 received the Order dated 06 September 2001 setting the motion for reconsideration for hearing on 28 September 2001. They were afforded the opportunity to comment on or oppose the motion for reconsideration as they in fact filed a Manifestation with Respectful Objections on 20 September 2001. Hence, they were not prejudiced. And following the aforequoted ruling of this Court, the error in the notice of hearing may well be overlooked.As to her order of inhibition, respondent Judge maintains that she had no other recourse but to inhibit herself from hearing the forcible entry case as well as the related Criminal Cases Nos. 2068, 2080 and 2081 because inCriminal Case No. 2068, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Norben O. Dimalanta, et al."for frustrated usurpation of real rights in property, the accused therein alleged that she (respondent Judge) had taught or coached the prosecution on what to do and not to do thereby accusing her of bias and partiality in favor of the Baltazars. Although it was baseless and untrue, she opted to inhibit herself to avoid any appearance of impropriety.5Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Jose P. Perez, as approved by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., recommends that the charges against Judges Gutierrez-Fruelda, Sunga, Jr. and Maxino be dismissed because the acts complained of pertained to the exercise of their judicial discretion. However, he recommends that Judge Daing, Jr. be finedP2,000 for his delay in resolving the motion to dismiss. To the DCA, there was no reasonable excuse for Judge Daing's failure to promptly decide the case since judges must have an efficient recording and filing system to ensure the speedy disposition of cases.We adopt the recommendations of the OCA with modification.With regard to respondent Judges Gutierrez-Fruelda, Sunga, Jr. and Maxino, the Court finds that the acts6complained of as constituting conduct unbecoming of public officers were not tainted with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith and thus, not subject to disciplinary action by this Court.7We have ruled that, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous.8A judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment unless there is proof that the error is made with a conscious and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. Thus,as a matter of public policy, not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties makes him liable therefor.9In the case at bar, the questioned orders of respondent judges were well-reasoned and legally sound. Although the accounting of the Baltazars was unsatisfactory to the Pantigs, one was nevertheless still rendered and thus the order of the court was deemed complied with. If complainant did not approve of the accounting submitted by the Baltazars, then he should have filed an action questioning it instead of seeking to hold them in direct contempt. Certainly, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate course of action when judicial remedies exist (such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal) and are available to question an allegedly irregular or aberrant judicial act. Obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judge's challenged act to be correct, then there would be no reason to proceed against him at all.10The Court notes, however, that the execution of the decision in complainant's favor has long been delayed. The April 5, 1984 decision awarding ownership of the fishpond to complainant became final and executory in 1997. It has been seven years since then and complainant is still not in possession of his property. The judge handling the case should not condone the delaying tactics of complainant's opponent and ought to dispose of the case at the soonest possible time.With regard to Judge Daing, Jr., the Court adopts the recommendation of the OCA that respondent judge should be fined for his unreasonable delay in resolving the motion to dismiss. Judge Daing took almost two years to resolve the motion to dismiss in violation of Section 15(1), Article 8 of the Constitution11which requires him to resolve such matters within 90 days from the submission of the last pleading. His only explanation for the delay was inadvertence and oversight due to the voluminous case records. This does not excuse him from administrative sanction by this Court.Canon 6, Section 512of the new Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. In the case ofGuintu v. Judge Lucero,13we said that:Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. The judge is likewise guilty of a violation of Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a magistrate shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. This Court cannot countenance such undue delay of a judge especially now when there is an all-out effort to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay which have long plagued our courts. Thus, judges are called upon to exercise the utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their duties. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement for deciding a case but should, in fact, persevere in its implementation. The people's faith in the administration of justice would be greatly impaired if decisions are long in coming, more so from trial courts which, unlike collegiate tribunals where there is a need for extended deliberations, could be expected to act with dispatch.Under Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious offense. A judge who is found guilty of a less serious charge may either be (1) suspended from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or (2) fined in the amount of more thanP10,000 but not exceedingP20,000.14In this case, Judge Daing should be meted a fine ofP20,000 as a reminder to all judges of their paramount duty to resolve cases with dispatch.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered approving the findings and recommendation of the Court Administrator with modification:1. Judge Lamberto A. Daing is herebyORDEREDtoPAYaFINEofP20,000 and isWARNEDthat a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely; andcralawlibrary2. the charge of conduct unbecoming of officers of the Court against Judge Carmelita Gutierrez-Fruelda, Judge Pedro M. Sunga and Judge Pamela Ann Maxino is herebyDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.SO ORDERED.Vitug, Chairman, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

EN BANCSILAS Y. CAADA,A.M.No.RTJ-04-1884Complainant,(Formerly OCA IPI No. 03-1806-RTJ)Present:PUNO,C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,- v e r s u s -CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,REYES andLEONARDO-DE CASTRO,JJ.ILDEFONSO B. SUERTE,former Presiding Judge,Regional Trial Court,Barili, Cebu City, Branch 60,Respondent.Promulgated:February 22, 2008x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xR E S O L U T I O NPer Curiam:On July 11, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the complaint[1]of Silas Y. Caada against respondent Ildefonso B. Suerte, former presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Barili, Cebu City, Branch 60. Respondent was charged with grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty, harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics.[2]Complainant alleged that he and respondent were neighbors in Badian, Cebu.Sometime in early 2002, respondent volunteered to act as an agent-broker to sell complainants beach lot in Barangay Bato, Badian, Cebu.They agreed that the selling price would beP1,600,000 and that respondent would receiveP600,000 as commission.In July 2002, respondent informed complainant that he had a foreign buyer but insisted on a commission ofP1,000,000 with the balance ofP600,000 for the complainant. The latter, protesting, did not agree to the proposed new arrangement and refused to sign the deed of sale prepared by respondent. The latter was furious and told complainant in the Cebuano dialect:Silas, wa ka ba masayod nga huwes ako sa RTC, Branch 60 nga imo lang tagaan ugP600,000.00 sa kantidad nga halin sa yuta ngaP1.6M?Ikaw nasayod nga ako makasugo paghikaw sa usa ka tawo sa iyang mga butang pagpasulod ngadto sa presohan ug pagpabitay sa usa ka tawo ngadto sa iyang kamatayon.Dinhi sa yuta ako ray makahimo.Kon ikaw dunay kaso unya sa akong husgado siguro gyod ikaw mabilanggo.(Silas, do you know that I am the judge in RTC Branch 60 and you will only give me a mereP600,000.00 as commission for the sale of your land forP1.6M? You know I can deprive a man of his property, [send] him to jail and have him executed either by hanging, electrocution or [by] lethal injection).[3]Despite the fact that the sale did not proceed, respondent demandedP200,000 from complainant for his effort in finding a buyer. Complainant was forced to give himP100,000.[4]After the incident, respondent harbored ill-feelings towards complainant and his family.Complainant further alleged that before this incident or sometime in 1998, he had refused the respondent who was trying to sell him a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and Daewoo car.Complainant feared that respondent would use his judicial power to persecute him and seek vengeance for what he considered as complainant's infractions against him.[5]Complainant submitted affidavits executed by Ludovico M. Diong and Ernesto Bobiges who corroborated complainant's allegations. Diong testified that he was in the house of complainant (who was a prospective business client) when he saw respondent arrive, heard his disagreement with complainant and the demand forP200,000.Bobiges, on the other hand, was a colleague of complainant in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).He was visiting the complainant and witnessed the incident.[6]In his comment dated August 12, 2003, respondent maintained thatcomplainant had never been his neighbor as he lived three kilometers away and they had not seen each other for 20 years.He denied having acted as an agent-broker for complainant or anybody else.He likewise denied offering to sell complainant a dilapidated truck or a Daewoo car since he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998.[7]Responded countered that complainant was accused of and arrested for possessing 14 packs ofshabuand ammunition. He further contended that he issued an order for the arrest of complainant for direct contempt after the latter filed a petition for certiorari using as grounds the false allegations in the present complaint. At the time of the comment, complainant was detained at the Barili jail not only for direct contempt but also for illegal possession of firearms. However, respondent neither admitted nor denied the receipt of theP100,000. He averred that complainant was simply being vengeful and that his complaint should be dismissed for being baseless.[8]In a resolution of this Court dated October 4, 2004, the complaint was referred to the presiding justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among the justices of the same court.[9]It was originally raffled to Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo of the Nineteenth Division and subsequently[10]to Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. of the Eighteenth Division for investigation, report and recommendation.However, no hearing was conducted because respondent manifested that he was submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings already filed.[11]Complainant did not object.In his report dated January 20, 2006, Justice Bruselas stated:On 24 January 2005[,] the counsel for the respondent filed aManifestationstatinginter aliathat the [complainant] filed a manifestation that he is willing to submit this case for resolution based on the pleadings on record.No such manifestation from the [complainant] can be found in the records of the case, although no objection to the respondent's manifestation was filed as well despite service by mail thereof one year ago as of this writing.xxxxxxxxxThe Honorable Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco Jr.[12]in his written report and recommendation on the case stated that (t)he foregoing allegations and contentions of both parties have given rise to conflicting factual submissions which cannot be resolved on the basis of the pleadings submitted.Thus, to ascertain the veracity of the parties allegations and contentions, a more extensive and open inquiry is necessary to enable them to ventilate and substantiate their respective positions and ultimately arrive at the truth. This investigating justice cannot agree more with the esteemed court administrator. Regrettably, lost is the chance to determine once and for all the truth behind the avowals of the parties, with their respective manifestations of submitting the case for decision sans open-court testimonies or other evidence.In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the act complained of rests on the complainant.He must be able to show this by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.Failing this, the complaint must be dismissed.The inherent weakness of affidavits, even sworn statements, being as they often are self-serving, easy to concoct, and non-receptive to cross-examination (or the constitutional right of the accused to confront witnesses against him), is well-known. Generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself. For this reason, the infirmities of affidavits as species of evidence is a matter of judicial notice.To prove his case, the [complainant] could have filed other clear, sufficient and convincing evidence to substantiate his claim.This, he failed to do.Hard as he tried, this investigating justice may not simply overlook the improbability of the [complainant], seemingly a wealthy man of affairs and a former or incumbent member of the AFP, shelling outP100,000.00 upon demand by a judge, who was presumably unarmed.There were at least two witnesses to the transaction who could have readily rendered succor to halt the threat and/or intimidation.xxxxxxxxxOn the other hand, one cannot close his eyes to [respondent's] dishonesty which tended not only to impair his credibility, obstruct or impede the investigation of his case, thereby also the administration of justice, but sets at naught the salutary principles embodied in our judicial canons.In one case, dishonesty justified the imposition of the penalty of dismissal to an erring utility worker.xxxxxxxxxIN VIEW OF THE ABOVE-CITED REASONS, and considering that [respondent] had been dismissed from the bench previously, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the respondent , at the very least, be PERPETUALLY BARRED from reappointment to government service, and the instant petition be considered closed and terminated.[13]Justice Bruselas did not find substantial evidence to prove that respondent indeed committed the acts he was accused of but found him administratively liable for dishonesty. Consequently, he recommended that respondent be perpetually barred from reappointment to government service.The OCA, in its memorandum dated January 10, 2007, agreed with the findings and recommendation of Justice Bruselas:Respondent's dishonesty referred to by the Investigating Judge pertains to [respondent's] defenses that he has never been complainant's neighbor and that he does not own a cargo pick-up or a Daewoo Sedan car.Respondent's personal records on file with the Court proved otherwise.His personal data sheet shows that he lives within the same municipality where complainant lives, thus, they may not be totally unfamiliar with one another.His statement of Assets and Liabilities, on the other hand, shows that he owned a Daewoo car and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1996 and 1998 respectively.xxxxxxxxxConsidering the foregoing and conformably to Section 11 (a), Rule 140[14]of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, we find it appropriate to adopt the investigating Justices recommendation.WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that [respondent] be perpetually disqualified from being reinstated or appointed to any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporation.[15]While this case was pending, respondent was dismissed from the service inRe: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebupromulgated in 2004.[16]The Court found him guilty of gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.[17]Aside from dismissal, his retirement benefits and privileges were also forfeited with prejudice to being reinstated in any branch of government service, including government-owned and controlled agencies or corporations.[18]In 2005 after respondent was dismissed, we resolvedCaada v. Suerte,[19]a different caseinvolving the same parties.It arose from a complaint dated November 8, 2003 wherein complainant charged respondent with arbitrary detention punished under Article 124 of the RPC for having issued an order citing him with direct contempt and ordering his arrest and detention for 14 days without bail.We found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and rules of procedure and imposed on him the maximum fine ofP40,000 considering that he had earlier been dismissed from the service.It appears that the aforequoted case is intimately connected to the present case.In his comment, respondent stated that he issued an order for the arrest of complainant for direct contempt because the latter filed a petition for certiorari and used as grounds the false allegations contained in his complaint.He also mentioned that complainant was detained in jail.Thus it can be surmised that the 2005 decision tackled respondent's act of causing complainant's unlawful detention while this complaint pertained to his acts prior to the detention.The findings and evaluation of the OCA are well-taken.In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with substantial evidence,i.e., that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[20]If a judge should be disciplined for a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge.[21]Here, complainant failed to present concrete evidence to substantiate his charges against respondent. He did not appear before the investigating justice to prove his allegations.[22]While it is true that he attached to his complaint two affidavits to corroborate his story, the affiantsa prospective business partner and an AFP comradewere not disinterested witnesses whose statements could be given credence.Mere allegations will leave an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on.[23]This is in line with the well-settled rule that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand.[24]If, indeed, complainant was interested in pursuing the case against someone he perceived to be an erring judge, he should have appeared before the investigating justice and presented his evidence and witnesses to substantiate his claim.[25]Accordingly, the charges of grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the RPC must be dismissed.However, we agree with the investigating justice and OCA that respondent should be held liable for dishonesty.In his defense, respondent claimed that he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and could not recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998. But his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1998 to 2001 onfile in the Court prove otherwise. They show that among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998.Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[26]This is a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal fromthe service, even for the first offense,[27]with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service.[28]In fixing the penalty, we take into consideration the fact that, including this case, we would have found respondent administratively liable for the second time already after his dismissal from the service.Therefore, as with the earlierCaadacase, we deem it proper to impose on him the maximum fine ofP40,000.[29]Time and time again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which will reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible representation of the law.[30]Unfortunately, respondent showed his capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty not only tended to mislead the Court but also tarnished the image of the judiciary. It will warrant the maximum penalty of dismissal, if not for the fact that he has already been dismissed from the service in another administrative case.[31]The case does not end here. Pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, this administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the bar.[32]Under this resolution dated September 17, 2002 which took effect on October 1, 2002, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[33]Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1[34]and 11[35]of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).[36]Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR further enjoins a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.Similarly, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 states that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.[37]These rules are broad enough to cover dishonesty of a lawyer both in his professional or private capacity.[38]In accordance with Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may be suspended or disbarred.[39]WHEREFORE, respondent, former judge Ildefonso B. Suerte, is hereby foundGUILTYof dishonesty. He is ordered to pay aFINEin the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000), which shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits. In the event that his leave credits are found insufficient to answer for the fine, the respondent shall pay the amount or the balance thereof, as the case may be, to the Court within ten (10) days from the date of finality of this resolution.Respondent is likewiseDISBARREDfor violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his nameORDERED STRICKENfrom the Roll of Attorneys.Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents record as a member of the bar and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED.REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

THIRD DIVISIONELADIO D. PERFECTO,Complainant,- versus -JUDGE ALMA CONSUELO DESALES-ESIDERA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Catarman, Northern Samar,Respondent.A.M. No. RTJ-11-2270[Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 10-3380-RTJ]Present:CARPIO MORALES,J.,Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,VILLARAMA, JR., andSERENO,JJ.Promulgated:January 31, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Eladio D. Perfecto (complainant), in a Complaint[1]which was received at the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on March 5, 2010, charges Judge Alma Consuelo Esidera (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Northern Samar, Branch 20, of soliciting and receiving on January 6, 2010 at the Prosecutors Office the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) from practitioner Atty. Albert Yruma (Atty. Yruma), and the same amount from Public Prosecutor Rosario Diaz (Prosecutor Diaz), purportedly to defray expenses for a religious celebration and barangay fiesta.To prove her charge, complainant attached the Affidavit[2]dated February 16, 2010 of Public Prosecutor Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching (Prosecutor Ching) who claimed to have witnessed the first incident, without respondent issuing any receipt.In the same Affidavit, Prosecutor Ching added that she heard that respondent also solicited the same amount from Prosecutor Diaz.Complainant also questions the conduct of respondent in Special Proceedings No. C-360, for Cancellation of Birth Registration of Alpha Acibar, in which she issued a January 5, 2010 Order directing the therein petitioner to publish said Order in a newspaper of general circulation, instead of in theCatarman Weekly Tribune(of which complainant is the publisher), the only accredited newspaper in the province.Furthermore, complainant charges respondent with acts of impropriety scolding her staff in open court and treating in an inhuman and hostile manner practitioners who are not her friends. He adds that respondent even arrogantly treats public prosecutors assigned to her sala, citing instances of this charge in his complaint.To the first charge, respondent explains that when she went tothe Prosecutors office, she was merely following up the pledge of Adelaida Taldo, a member of a Catholic charismatic group of which she (respondent) belongs, to donate a Sto. Nio image when Atty. Yruma, who had received a solicitation letter countersigned by Father Alwin Legaspi, the parish priest of San Jose, overheard her (respondent) andrequested her to receive his donation ofP1,000.00 through her.Respondent brushes off the above-stated Affidavit of Prosecutor Ching who, she opines, is of dubious personalityand has a narcissistic personality disorder, the details of the bases of which she narrates in her Comment.[3]Respecting the complaint against her Order of publication, respondent claims that theCatarman Weekly Tribuneis not in circulation.Respondent echoes her Comment in A.M. OCA IPI No. 10-3340-RTJ, a complaint previously filed by complainant bearing on his claim that all orders of the court should be published inCatarman Weekly Tribune, in which Comment she listed pending cases the hearing of which had to be reset for failure of theCatarman Weekly Tribuneto publish her orders on time.As for the charge of impropriety, respondent denies the instances thereof cited by complainant in his complaint and claims that she has been maintaining a professional relationship with her staff and the lawyers who appear in her court.The OCA has come up with the following:EVALUATION:There ismerit in the allegation of impropriety against respondent Judge Esidera.x x x xThe fact that she is not the principal author of the solicitation letter or that the solicitation is for a religious cause is immaterial.Respondent Judge Esidera should have known thatgoing to the Prosecutors Office to receive donationsfrom a private lawyer and a public prosecutordoes not bode well for the image of the judiciary.Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for the Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC; date of effectivity: 1 June 2004)explicitly provides that judges shallavoid impropriety and theappearance of improprietyin all of their activities.x x x xSoliciting donations from lawyers is not the only act of impropriety from respondentJudge Esidera.In a 27 May 2010 Comment, respondent Judge Esideravirtually gave Public Prosecutor Atty. Ruth Arlene Tan-Ching averbal lashingfor the affidavit the latter executed relative to the solicitation incident.To quote pertinent portions of the Comment of respondent Judge Esidera:The affidavit of Fiscal Ruth Arlene Ching should not be believed and accepted simply because she is a fiscal.Not all prosecutors are credible and have integrity and are in possession of their normal mental faculties. x x x Fiscal Ching is one whose personality is dubious.I get the impression that she (Prosecutor Ching) issuffering from some sort of personality disorder and should be subjected to neurological, psychiatric or psychological examinationbefore she gets worse x x x Having read enough psychological examination reports of psychologists/psychiatrists submitted in annulment cases, it is my non-expert opinion thatthe character of Fiscal Ching falls under the category of narcissistic personality disorder.She was one of my students in Taxation in the UEP,CollegeofLaw, I was not a judge then.I gave her a 3 because when I checked her finals test booklet, her codigo was still inserted in the examination booklet.Until now, that is one of the gossips she is spreading around.x x x xThe use of acerbic words was uncalledfor considering the status of respondent Judge Esidera.InAtty. Guanzon, et al. v. Judge Rufon(A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038; 19 October 2007), the Court found respondent Judge Rufon guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct for uttering discriminatory remarks against women lawyers and litigants.Although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court.Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language,held the Court in theGuanzoncase.Anent the allegations of ignorance of the law and usurpation of authorityagainst respondent Judge Esidera, for issuing a directive to the petitioner in a special proceedings case to cause the publication of her order in a newspaper of general publication, this Office findsthe same devoid of merit.Complainant Perfecto had made a similar allegation in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ, insisting that all orders from the courts ofNorthern Samarshould only be published in theCatarman Weekly Tribune, the only accredited newspaper in the area.x x x x[T]hat Catarman Weekly Tribune is the only accredited newspaper of general publication in Catarman does not bar the publication of judicial orders and notices in a newspaper of national circulation.A judicial notice/order may be published in a newspaper of national circulation and said newspaper does not even have to be accredited.Section 1 of A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC thus provides:SECTION 1.Scope of application. These Guidelines apply only in cases where judicial or legal notices are to be published in newspapers or periodicals that are of general circulation in a particular province or city.Publication of notices for national dissemination may be published in newspapers or periodicals with national circulation without need of accreditation.Adopting the comments she made in OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3340-RTJ to the instant case, respondent Judge Esidera claims that she only arrived at the decision to direct the publication of her orders in a newspaper of national circulation after repeated failure of theCatarman Weekly Tribuneto meet the publication requirements in other pending cases in the court.Respondent Judge Esidera even presented a list of cases where the hearings therein had to be reset because of the failure of theCatarman Weekly Tribuneto publish the pertinent orders on time.Moreover, the petitioner in the subject special proceedings case where respondent Judge Esidera issued the directivedid not contest the order calling for the publication of the courts order in a newspaper of national circulation.[4](emphasis and underscoring supplied)Thus, the OCA RECOMMENDS that respondent be faulted for Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct for which a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) should be imposed, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.While the Court finds the Evaluation and Recommendation of the OCA that respondent be charged with Impropriety and Unbecoming Conduct to be well-taken, it deems the recommendation for the imposition of a fine in the amount ofP5,000.00 to be insufficient as would impress upon her the gravity of the indictment. Respondents improprieties as manifested in, among other things, her lack of discretion and the vicious attack upon the person of Prosecutor Ching as characterized by her use of uncalled for offensive language prompts this Court to raise the fine to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).[5]Specifically with respect to respondents alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz, albeit Prosecutor Ching merely claimed to have heard of it, respondent did not deny it categorically as she merely, as reflected above, brushed off Prosecutors Chings Affidavit as coming from one with a dubious personality and possessed of a narcissistic personality disorder. With respect to the alleged solicitation from Prosecutor Diaz, respondent never disclaimed or disavowed the same.Respondents admission of having received the sum of P1,000.00 from Atty. Yruma albeit allegedly as a mere accommodation to the latter, and her failure to disclaim the same act with respect to Prosecutor Diaz,only confirms her lack of understanding of the notion of propriety under which judges must be measured.In hisAnnotation on Judges Fraternizing with Lawyers and Litigants,[6]Jorge C. Coquia[7]commented on the Spirit and Philosophy of Canon 2 on Impropriety of Judges,viz:InCastillo vs. Calanog, Jr.,199 SCRA 75 (1991), the Supreme Court said that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct ofa judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to hisbehavior outside hissalaandasaprivateindividual.Thereisnodichotomyofmorality. A public official is also judged by his private morality being the subject of constant public scrutiny. A judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.(emphasis and underscoring supplied)Respondents act of proceeding to the Prosecutors Office under the guise of soliciting for a religious cause betrays not only her lack of maturity as a judge but also a lack of understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice, held in high esteem and respect by the local community, which must be preserved at all times. It spawns the impression that she was using her office to unduly influence or pressure Atty. Yruma, a private lawyer appearing before her sala, and Prosecutor Diaz into donating money through her charismatic group for religious purposes.To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a magistrates activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesars wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach.[8]Respondents act discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual.It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant observation.[9]WHEREFORE,Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera is, forImpropriety and Unbecoming Conduct,ORDEREDto pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) andWARNEDthat a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.

APENDIX F, CANON 2, Sec. 2[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864. December 16, 2004]Atty. ANTONIO D. SELUDO,complainant, vs. Judge ANTONIO J. FINEZA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 131, Caloocan City,respondent.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law,a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety[1]and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge.[2]A judge should be the last person to be perceived as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant. Sadly, respondent judge failed to live up to such standards of judicial conduct.In a complaint[3]dated July 24, 2003 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Atty. Antonio D. Seludo charged Judge Antonio J. Fineza of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.In his complaint, Atty. Antonio D. Seludo allegedinter aliathat on June 28, 2003, respondent judge filed with the same court (Branch 128), a complaint for revocation of notarial commission against him (complainant), docketed as Revocation of Commission No. C-001-(2003).During the hearing on July 8, 2003, respondent judge uttered vulgar and insulting words against complainant, thus:Court:Do you have anything to say Atty. Seludo?Atty. Seludo:Yes, Your Honor. May we know also, under what authority is the complainant appearing in this case, Your Honor? Is he going to prosecute this case?Court:He is appearing for himself as petitioner.Atty. Seludo:Under what authority, Your Honor?Judge Fineza:If the respondent knows how to read English, he would find in the petition itself that under the rule, we are obligated to bring to the court any anomaly or dishonesty or dereliction in the performance of a duty of a Court Officer. And may I point out and make it on record that this time, despite the fact of respondents answer, last paragraph of page 1 states and I quote; I think page 2, and I read: That the undersigned has taken steps to prevent a recurrence of the lapses in the notarial registry. An informal inquiry made by this Judge this afternoon from the Office of the Clerk of Court, the reply was that the respondenthas not filed any notarial report for the year 2003, x x x.Court:You want to put that on record?Judge Fineza:Not only to put on record . . . , and courtesy calls that when someone is speaking, a courtesy should require. May I ask the Judge to remind him . . .Court:Let him finish first, Atty. Seludo.Atty. Seludo:Yes, Your Honor.Judge Fineza: (continuation)Before the Executive Judge or Investigating Judge finally inhibits himself, he should order the Office of the Clerk of Court to issue a certification to the effect that for the year 2003, no notarial report has been made by the respondent which is a ground for cancellation of his notarial commission. Thats why I raised this, so that while the case is pending, he should be suspended from the practice of . . . . and may I ask that he be declared in contempt for laughing?Court:Judge Fineza, will you please stay calm.Judge Fineza: (to respondent)Putang-ina mo eh!Court:Please be just civil with each other, Judge Fineza.Judge Fineza:Why is he laughing?Let it be put on record that he has a moronic attitude. Thats why he was laughing.Court:Judge Fineza, are you making an additional manifestation or additional charge against the respondent because of the information that you got now from the Office of the Clerk of Court?Judge Fineza:No, Your Honor. It is in accordance with my petition, that during the pendency of this case, the respondent should be suspended.Court:He should be suspended because of the non-compliance?Judge Fineza:Yes, Your Honor.He promised in his answer, that he has remedied the situation.x x xAtty. Seludo:Yes, Your Honor. I just want that all the manifestations of the complainant be put on record, Your Honor.Judge Fineza:If Your Honor please,I dont know if this guy is really stupid. This is a court proceeding and everything that is being taken is recorded. If you want to use that for libel, you cannot. This is a Court proceeding, we should have privileged communication.Court:Judge Fineza, will you please refrain from calling the other person, who is a brother in profession?Judge Fineza:Im just telling the truth, Your Honor.Court:But I would like to ask you to use temperate words. You are brother lawyers. If you have nothing more to say, I would like to adjourn this preliminary conference. I will indorse all the records to the 1stVice Executive Judge who will notify you of the schedule for the continuation of the investigation.continuation . . .We will prepare the minutes and we will let you sign, Judge Fineza.Judge Fineza:Where is the minutes? This is not the prescribed form for minutes, Your Honor? Okay.Court:I have not yet adjourned, Judge Fineza? I hope you will be more civil to everybody here just like anybody who is civil with you.Judge Fineza:Okay, okay. My apologies, Your Honor.Court:Accepted.Judge Fineza:And now you adjourn?Court:You are requesting for that? I will give you copy so that you can be satisfied. What do you say, Atty. Basa? You are the collaborating counsel. Probably, you are being more civil with us.Atty. Basa:May we just ask for the adjournment of the session, Your Honor.Judge Fineza:You will give me the minutes now?Court:We will provide you including with the copy of the Order of the Court inhibiting itself.[4]In his comment[5]dated September 8, 2003, respondent judge admitted that he uttered derogatory words during the proceeding held on July 8, 2003. He, however, explained that he has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes since November, 2002, causing him considerable anxiety and pain. This must be the reason why he could not control his outburst. Besides, the incident was precipitated by the conduct of the complainant and the Executive Judge. Complainant was unkind and impolite to him. He kept on interrupting him. In fact, after his oral manifestation, complainant began to laugh and ridicule him. Moreover, when he (respondent) asked the Executive Judge to cite complainant in contempt of court, the latter stood up with clenched fists and acted in a menacing manner.Respondent further admitted in his answer that he is aware that there is no justification for his use of improper language, and for this, he is sincerely contrite and penitent. But as a member of the bench for over twenty years, he expected the complainant to respect him, to treat him with politeness, dignity and courtesy, and to give him his due as a magistrate.On January 9, 2004, complainant filed aMotion to Withdraw Complaint[6]on the ground that he is no longer interested in pursuing the case since respondent has retired from the judiciary.[7]In his Report and Recommendation,[8]Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco made the following evaluation:EVALUATION: We will dwell first on the issue of desistance of complainant to pursue instant complaint. The settled rule is that the complainants withdrawal of his complaint, or desistance from pursuing the same, does not necessarily warrant the dismissal of the administrative case. The outcome of an administrative action cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who, for reasons of his own, may condone what may be detestable. Certainly, complainants desistance cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction, under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, to investigate and decide complaints against erring employees of the judiciary. Otherwise stated, such unilateral act does not bind this Court on a matter relating to its disciplinary power.As to the fact that respondent has already retired from the service, the Court has pointed out in several cases that the retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof.Proceeding thereon with the issues, we find ourselves in accord with complainants observation that respondent has indeed consciously ignored to heed the Courts advice and warning when he was admonished for using intemperate language in A.M. No. P-01-1522. A careful scrutiny of the transcripts taken on that unfateful day reveals that respondent has precisely uttered the following vitriolic language against complainant:a)Putang ina mo!b)If respondent knows how to read English.c) Let it be put on record, that he has a moronic attitude.d) If Your Honor plese,I dont know if this guy is really stupid.As shown by the records, respondents attention was called several times by the Investigating Executive Judge to stay calm and be civil. In fact, his attitude was generally antagonistic not only to complainant but also to the Executive Judge who dared to question his motives/oppose his view. Such, is a glaring display of haughtiness and arrogance of respondent. His disgraceful behavior reflected adversely on the good image of the judiciary and fell short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law. His justifications of provocation (which we found none), discourtesy of complainant and the various illnesses he professed to be suffering should not be viewed to exculpate him from liability. As a member of the bench he should have adhered to that standard of behavior expected of all those who don the judicial robe.His choice of words, aside from being inflammatory and uncalled for, betrays a lack of judicial decorum. The respect and dignity of the court has to be upheld hence, respondent should not have acted with anger and shouted at complainant who must have suffered embarrassment in front of many people. He should have maintained his composure for patience and courtesy are marks of culture and good-breeding.The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of official duties,but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.The Code dictates that a judge must behave with propriety at all times.Because respondent has already retired from the service, dismissal or suspension is no longer feasible as a penalty for the present charges. Therefore, we opine that a fine is appropriate under the circumstances. Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct is classified as aserious chargeunder Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the penalty of which is either dismissal, suspension for 3 to 6 months without salary and benefits or a fine of not less thanP20,000.00 but not more thanP40,000.00. Considering that this is not the first offense of similar nature committed by respondent, we believe a penalty ofP20,000.00 is commensurate, to the acts complained of, which amount should be taken from his retirement benefits.Court Administrator Velasco recommended that (1) the instant administrative case be re-docketed as an administrative matter; and that (2) respondent judge be fined in the amount ofP20,000.00 for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the amount to be deducted from his retirement benefits.In our Resolution[9]dated June 21, 2004, we required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and records filed.On August 12, 2004, respondent submitted a Manifestation[10]requesting a formal hearing of this case. In our Resolution dated September 20, 2004,[11]we denied his request for lack of merit.For his part, complainant, in his Manifestation dated August 12, 2004,[12]stated that he is submitting the matter to our sound discretion.Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provide:Canon 2A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.x x xCanon 3A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBLITIESx x xRule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.In ascribing the words "moronic attitude,""stupid", "if he knows how to read English"andputang ina mo to complainant during the proceeding before the Executive Judge, respondent displayed a conduct so unbecoming of a magistrate. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and outrageous. That respondent was suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the assistance of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the case. As correctly observed by the Court Administrator, his disgraceful behavior tainted the good image of the judiciary he is expected to uphold at all times.We have admonished judges to observe judicial decorum which requires thatthey must at all times be temperate in their language,[13]refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric[14]or from resorting "to the language of vilification."[15]In the same vein, inFidel vs. Caraos,[16]we heldthat although, respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.Respondent judges behavior is incompatible with judicial temperament expected of him. He was discourteous, not only to complainant, but also to the trial judge. His actuation constitutes palpable violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01, and Canon 3, Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.This is not respondent's first offense. InA.M. No. P-01-1522,[17]we reprimanded him for failing to exercise prudence and restraint in his language. Obviously, he has not reformed.We thus find respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, this administrative offense is considered serious,[18]punishable under Section 8, paragraph 1(3), and Section 11, paragraph A(3), thus:Sec. 8.Serious charges. Serious charges include:1. Bribery, direct or indirect;2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding;5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;x x x.Sec.11.Sanctions.- A.If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.Provided, however,That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or3. A fine of more thanP20,000.00 but not exceedingP40,000.00.WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonio J. Fineza is hereby found GUILTY of gross violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P21,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. MTJ-04-1525. March 18, 2005]RUFINO CASIMIRO,complainant, vs. Judge OCTAVIO FERNANDEZ and Clerk of Court TERESITA ESTEBAN,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NCARPIO-MORALES,J.:Respondents Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Gen. Natividad and Llanera, Nueva Ecija Judge Octavio Fernandez and Clerk of Court Teresita Esteban were charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty in a sworn letter-complaint[1]dated August 2, 2000 filed by Rufino Casimiro (complainant).During the pendency of the complaint or sometime in 2003,[2]respondent judge applied for optional retirement under Republic Act 910, as amended, effective December 15, 2003. He later requested, by letter[3]of November 10, 2003, for the change of the effective date of his retirement toJanuary 2, 2004. The application was assignedAdministrativeMatterNo.11567-Ret.OnJanuary 29, 2004,this Court promulgated a Decision[4]in the case at bar finding respondent Judge guilty of gross misconduct constituting a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and imposing upon him the penalty ofSUSPENSION from office for three months without salary or benefits immediately from receipt of this Orderand a FINE in the amount ofP20,000.00, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offenses would be dealt with more severely. The complaint against respondent Clerk of Court was dismissed.RespectingAdministrativeMatterNo.11567-Ret.(the application for optional retirement of the Judge), the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), by Report[5]dated June 16, 2004, recommended that:a)theapplicationforOptionalRetirementunder RA 910, as amended by RA 5095 and PD 1438 of Hon. OCTAVIO A. FERNANDEZ (Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Natividad, Nueva Ecija)effective 2 January 2004beAPPROVED.b)payment of his retirement benefits be HELD IN ABEYANCE pending resolution of A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511;c)theDecisiondated29January2004of the Honorable Court (3rdDivision) in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1525 ( formerly OCA IPI No. 00-927-MTJ) ordering the suspension of Judge Fernandez for three (3) months beMODIFIEDandthathebeorderedinsteadtopayaFINEequivalenttohisthree(3)monthssalaryandotherbenefits,thesametobedeductedfromhisretirementbenefits;andd) the Fiscal Management Office, OCA be directed to deduct the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos from his Terminal Leave pay, representing the aggregate amount of FINE imposed upon him inAdministrativeMatterNos.MTJ-04-1525, MTJ-00-1312 and MTJ-01-1354, subject further to the availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)By Resolution[6]ofJuly 5, 2004, this Court approved the OCA recommendation to approve respondents application for optional retirement effectiveJanuary 2, 2004.Courts have inherent power and discretion to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when, in view of supervening events, it becomes imperative, in the interest of justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances, or whenever it is necessary to accomplish the administration of justice.[7]Since the penalty of suspension imposed on respondent judge in the decision of January 29, 2004 is no longer feasible, his application for optional retirement effective January 2, 2004 having been approved on July 5, 2004, this Court approves above-quoted paragraph (c) of the OCA Recommendation that the penalty of suspension for three months imposed on respondent judge in this Courts decision of January 29, 2004 be modified such that in lieu thereof, a FINE in an amount equivalent to his three (3) months salary[8]be imposed.With respect to paragraph (d) of the OCA Recommendation, this Court likewise approves the same in so far as it bears on the case at bar Administrative Matter No. MTJ-04-1525.WHEREFORE, in light of the subsequent grant on July 5, 2004 of the application for optional retirement of respondent Judge Octavio Fernandez effective January 2, 2004, the Decision of January 29, 2004 of this Court in the case at bar is hereby AMENDED such that, in addition to the therein imposed penalty of FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, he is FINED in an amount equivalent to his Three (3) Months salary.The Fiscal Management Office, OCA is hereby directed to deduct, from his Terminal Leave Pay the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos representing the FINE imposed upon the judge, and, from his retirement benefits, an amount equivalent to his Three (3) Months salary representing the additional fine.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCA.M. No. MTJ-98-1162 August 11, 1999ANA MAY M. SIMBAJON,complainant,vs.JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch I, Cabanatuan City,respondent.PER CURIAM:In a letter1dated September 8, 1997, Judge Rogelio M. Esteban of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch I, Cabanatuan City) was charged by Ana May V. Simbajon with sexual harassment and grave misconduct.In the Sworn Complaint dated September 8, 1997, which accompanied her letter, Simbajon narrated the following:3. When the local position of book binder in Branch I of the said Court became vacant, I applied for it, but my papers requiring the signature of Judge Esteban remained unacted upon for sometime;4. On June 25, 1997, I decided to approach Judge Rogelio M. Esteban about the matter, inside his airconditioned chamber, but during the course of our conversation, said Judge uttered the following:ANO NAMAN ANG MAGIGING KAPALIT NG PAGPIRMA KO RITO? MULA NGAYON GIRLFRIEND NA KITA. ARAW-ARAW PAPASOK KA DITO SA OPISINA KO, AT ARAW-ARAW, ISANG HALIK.to which I replied that it could not be possible because I look[ed] up to him like a father to me;5. As he signed my papers, he stood up from his chair, went to my back where I was seated, and to my shock suddenly kissed my left cheek;6. I stood up shaken and trembling in fear and immediately left the said chamber, promising myself never to enter that chamber again and never to talk to said Judge again;7. Then, on August 5, 1997 at around 9:30 o'clock in the morning, Court Interpreter Virginia S. Medina told me I was being called by Judge Rogelio M. Esteban regarding our payroll, and although in trauma over my experience in said chamber, I was constrained to enter said room, as I had no choice, being a mere lowly subordinate;8. As I was about to take a seat infront of Judge Rogelio M. Esteban's table, he instructed me to stand beside his table near where he was seated;9. Judge Esteban asked me since when I ha[d] been receiving [a] book binder's salary, and I told him for quite sometime already, and after that, he told me:MATAGAL NA PALA EH BAKIT HINDI KA PUMAPASOK DITO SA KUWARTO KO? DI BA SABI KO SA IYO, GIRLFRIEND NA KITA?to which I firmly answered back it could not be possible for he was only like a father to me. I really felt insulted to be treated that low by a Judge at that, being a married woman with two sons;10. At that point, Judge Esteban suddenly stood up from his seat, uttering:HINDI PUEDE 'YAN, MAHAL KITA.and then grabbed me, started kissing me all over my face, embraced me, and touched my right breast;11. I freed myself from his embrace, left the said chamber hurriedly, and threw the payroll on top of the table of co-employee Elizabeth Q. Malubay, teary-eyed, trembling in shock and fear;12. Sensing something was really wrong with me, she accompanied me to the comfort room and there I cried and related to her what had happened in the chamber of Judge Esteban;2In his Answer filed with this Court on December 2, 1997, respondent judge denied the allegations in the Complaint in this manner:4. That paragraph 4 is vehemently and specifically denied for lack of knowledge sufficient to determine its truth or falsity; the truth being that when Ms. Ana May Simbajon approached herein respondent and presented some papers/documents clipped to one another, he scanned over the same and when he saw that the same [were] already approved by the City Mayor, Hon. Manolette S. Liwag and that his signature thereon [was] a mere formality, he readily signed the same without hesitation [or] any questions asked; That after he ha[d] signed the document Ana May Simbajon rose from the chair placed in front of my desk where she was seated, walked towards the respondent and buzzed him on the forehead as she said "Thank you, sir, mahal ka namin, para kang tatay namin", to which he smiled and replied "salamat". Thereafter she took the signed documents and casually walked out of the chamber of the judge;x x x x x x x x x7. That paragraph 7 is specifically and vehemently denied for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to its truth or falsity[,] the truth being that respondent never sent for Ms. Ana May Simbajon thru Court Interpreter, Virgie Medina, on August 5, 1997; that when he re-entered his chamber after talking with some people at the MTCC lobby, found that [the] payroll voucher of the City Hall casual employees [was] already stacked above the piles of official papers on his table[,] all for signature of the Presiding Judge; that he signed the said payroll voucher without any hesitation, as he usually does even up to this writing;x x x x x x x x x10. That herein respondent hereby emphatically manifests the physical impossibility of the commission of the accusation considering that the . . . chamber's door to the staff room is always fully and widely [open] and almost all the employees of Branch I are respectively seated on their assigned places such that any unusual conversation or commotion inside the judge['s] chamber is easily and readily detected;11. That herein respondent always act[s] with fatherly attitude and behavior towards all the employees of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City;12. That herein respondent always conducts himself publicly with amiable, jolly and good behavior and [the] nice attitude of a good father of the family;13. That he has no personal enmity with anybody and harbors no ill-feeling towards anybody;14. That he is not aware of any reason sufficient to form a belief why he should be charged or indicted on any ground either civilly, criminally or administratively;15. That he is endowed with public trust and confidence, he being a former director and president of the Nueva Ecija Judges Association; former Deputy Grand Knight of the Knights of Columbus Sta. Rosa Council No. 5463; an active member of Gen. Llanera Lodge No. 168 F & AM; an active dual member of Santa Rosa Lodge No. 297, F & AM; incumbent Secretary-General of the City Judges Association of the Philippines; and a religious and charitable person;16. That he specifically and vehemently objects to all the contents of the Affidavit of Ms. Elizabeth Q. Malubay which she executed in relation to the above-cited sworn statement of Ms. Ana May Simbajon, it being entirely preposterous, hearsay and contrary to reason and common sense.3On August 31, 1998, this Court referred the case to Executive Judge Federico Fajardo Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City (Branch 30) for investigation, report and recommendation. Further, the Court placed respondent Judge Esteban under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation until further notice.4In his Report, Judge Fajardo accorded credibility to the complainant and her witnesses and rejected the testimonies of respondent and his witnesses. The investigating judge reported:[Respondent Judge] was not able to present any proof that complainant is a woman capable of spinning a lie, a woman so callused and thick-skinned to be able to bear the consequences of a tale of sexual harassment which put her own morality and reputation at stake, not counting the serious effect it will have on her own husband and children. Respondent failed to show what kind of relationship and/or agreement complainant and witness Malubay had that the former would risk her marriage, her reputation and her future only to help avenge the latter who was not recommended to the position of Utility Worker by respondent. Also, complainant filed a case against respondent before the Ombudsman, the case now being heard at the Sandiganbayan. Such determination to seek justice for herself negates the allegation or any suspicion that her case was just a blatant fabrication.1wphi1.ntWithout any convincing evidence on hand, respondent's last line of defense is denial. The Supreme Court held that "Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters".As to the pressure being exerted by respondent for complainant to withdraw her case against him as testified to by complainant and witnesses Priscilla Santos and Lea Rubio which was not convincingly rebutted by respondent, suffice it to say that pressure is the only recourse of any respondent who is bereft of any evidence to defend himself with.Based on the foregoing findings, the undersigned Investigator concludes that there is sufficient evidence to create a moral certainty that respondent committed the acts complained of. In a long line of cases involving judges, the Supreme Court has held that actuations like those done by respondent "are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision he being the Executive Judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being inloco parentisover his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them taking advantage of his superior position".Thus, respondent has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.At a time when the Courts are trying to disprove its "hoodlums-in-robes" image, this despicable act of respondent turning his august chambers into a bordello only further tainted the image of the judiciary. Respondent failed miserably to observe the exacting standards of morality and decency mandated by the Code of Judicial Conduct. Having proven himself unworthy to remain in office, respondent should be weeded out from the service the soonest possible time lest he further [erode] the faith of the people in Courts.5In view of the foregoing, Judge Fajardo recommended that Judge Rogelio M. Esteban be dismissed from the service.6The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report to this Court, agreed with the findings and the recommendation of the investigating judge.After examining the records of this case, we likewise hold that such findings and recommendations are supported by the evidence and the jurisprudence cited.By the nature of their work, judges are expected to possess the highest standard of morality and decency.7The Code of Judicial Conduct states:CANON 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.This is echoed by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which provides:3. Avoidance of appearance of impropriety.A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach.The conduct of the respondent falls short of this standard. According to complainant Ana May Simbajon, respondent told her that in exchange for his signature on her employment application, she would become his girlfriend. Thereafter, he went on to kiss her against her will.Later, after learning that her application had been approved, he called her to his chambers and said that she was already his girlfriend. He went on to embrace her, kiss her, and touch her right breast. Complainant affirmed all these even under withering cross-examination. Her allegations were corroborated by two witnesses, to whom she confided her humiliating experience.One of these witnesses was Elizabeth Q. Malubay, who narrated:8. That, after a while, I saw Ana May rushing out of the roo[m] of the judge, thr[o]w our payroll on top of my table and there I noticed that [she was] trembling in fear, teary eyed, as if afraid of something, so sensing that something happened inside that room, I brought her out of our office and proceeded to the comfort room and there bursting in tears, she relayed to me what had happened.8Complainant's husband, Conrado Simbajon Jr., described his wife's demeanor after the incident as follows:3. When I arrived at home I asked Ana May what happened but she refused to talk and was very quiet. Sensing that my wife had difficulty in revealing the problem I preferred for her to initiate the discussion of her problem;4. Sometime later, before going to bed, my wife embraced [me] tightly and suddenly burst into tear[s] and she told me that her superior Judge Rogelio Esteban made sexual advances in such a way that Judge Rogelio Esteban grabbed, kissed, embraced and touched her breast right inside the chamber of Judge Esteban[.]9The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondent's imputation of ill motive on the part of complainant. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.10The respondent judge and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the complainant. As the investigating judge correctly observed:. . .First, complainant herself testified that the door to the chambers was closed as she herself closed it, as she had always seen that [that] room was usually closed ever since she got assigned in the office, the room being airconditioned.Second, nowhere in the complaint [or] in the testimony of complainant and her witness was it mentioned that a commotion or unusual conversation took place on June 25 and or August 5, 1997 loud enough to be heard outside. A perusal of the complaint would show that right after the sexual harassment committed by respondent, complainant hurriedly left the chambers in both instances. She did not create a scene outside the chambers. She kept her silence after the first incident promising herself never to enter the chambers again and in the second incident, she and Malubay went to the comfort room where she cried and narrated what happened to her.11This Court further notes the ostentatious display of power and arrogance on the part of the respondent. Witness Priscilla Santos declared:3. [On] several occasions, I ran errands for Ana May Simbajon in the facilitation of her voucher in order for her to draw her salary;4. I know for a fact that sometime in the third week of June 1998, I went to Mr. Briones in order to retrieve the voucher of Ana May Simbajon, whom she requested to intervene in order for Judge Rogelio Esteban to sign the voucher. Mr. Briones did not release the voucher to me[;] instead he uttered the following words to the effect that: ["]nahihirapan na ako, hindi naman ako kasali nadadamay ako... itanong mo kay Ana May kung magkano ang gusto niya... kung diyes mil o magkano ba talaga. . . . At baka hindi niya nalalaman na malakas si Judge Esteban kay Mayor Vergara baka maalis siya sa plantilya. . . .". Instead, Mr. Briones instructed me to tell Ana May Simbajon to see him;5. There was also an instance sometime in July 1998 when again Ana May Simbajon requested me to submit to the Municipal Trial Court in Cities her detail order to the office of the City Mayor which is a supporting document in order for her to draw her salary[,] however, neither the office of the clerk of court nor Judge Rogelio Esteban received the detail order[;] instead Judge Rogelio Esteban told me that he [could] not affix his conformity to the detail order and it [was] Ana May Simbajon whom they need[ed]. Judge Esteban even uttered "bakit kasi ayaw niyang magpunta dito";6. Also, sometime in August 1998, I again went to the office of Judge Rogelio Esteban upon request of Ana May Simbajon in order for Judge Esteban to sign the approval of her voucher[;] again, Judge Rogelio Esteban refused to sign the voucher and commented that he [would] first confer with Mayor Jay Vergara before [signing] the same;7. After a week or so, I returned to the office of Judge Rogelio Esteban again upon request of Ana May Simbajon in order for said Judge to sign the approval of her voucher. Accompanying the voucher was a detail order from the office of the City Mayor with a personal note addressed to said Judge, and it was only at that instance that Judge Rogelio Esteban signed the voucher of Ana May Simbajon for the month of July 1998[;] in fact, after Judge Esteban signed the voucher, he personally folded the documents and placed [them] inside an envelope and sarcastically commented "espesyal ito."8. That I am executing this sworn statement to attest to the foregoing in support of the complaint of Ana May Simbajon against Judge Rogelio Esteban and to prove that some people are influencing Ana May Simbajon to dismiss this complaint against Judge Rogelio Esteban.12Respondent's conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Not only did he fail to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary; he even transgressed the ordinary norms of decency expected of every person. As the Court has often stressed, the conduct of a judge, whether official or private, must be beyond reproach and above suspicion. A member of the bench must not only be a good judge; he or she must also be a good person.13This is necessary so as not to erode the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary.14In the final analysis, such faith and confidence is anchored on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness that judges are expected to possess.15As we ruled inJunio v.Rivera Jr.:16All judges [o]n all levels of the judicial hierarchy, from this Court dow