Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-18566 September 30, 1963IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and ESTER MIRA BREHM,petitioners-appellees,vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositor-appellant.Pitt Vasquez for petitioners-appellees.Office of the Solicitor General for oppositor-appellant.PAREDES,J.: Finding that only legal issues are involved in the instant case, the Court of Appeals certified the same to this Court for disposition. Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth, by another man, also of the American Navy, who left the country in 1952, and never heard from since then. After the marriage, the couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila, and the minor Elizabeth had always been under their care and support of Brehm. On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given their consent to the adoption, not only to promote her best interest and well-being, but also to give her a legitimate status. They prayed that after the proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and be, for all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the rights pertinent thereto. An opposition to the petition with respect to Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that his residence in Philippines was merely temporary, same being effective only for purposes of his tour of duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him from making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code; Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being a non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction over him. A reply to the opposition was presented by petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not apply in the case, reasoning out that it covers only adoptions for the purpose establishing a relationship of paternity and filiation, where none existed, but not where the adopting parents are not total strangers to said child; that there is already a relation between the child and Brehm, created by affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code, expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, in which category petitioner Brehm falls. Petitioners contend that the records show their residence is Manila, for while Brehm works at Subic, he always goes home to Manila, during week-ends and manifested that he intends to reside in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of duty with the U.S. Naval Forces. The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court rendered judgment, the Pertinent portions of which read ... Since residence is principally a matter of intention, the Court is of the opinion that notwithstanding the nature of Petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm's coming to the Philippines, his subsequent acts, coupled with his declared intention of permanently residing herein, have cured the legal defect on the point of residence. Finally, we must consider the status of the minor Elizabeth Mira whose welfare deserves paramount consideration. Being a natural child of the petitioning wife, it cannot be in conscience be expected that when petitioners married, the mother would reduce her responsibility and her affection toward her child.... WHEREFORE, finding that the principal allegations of the petitioners are true, it is hereby adjudged that henceforth the minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural father, and is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, said minor's surname being change from "Mira" to "Mira Brehm".1awphl.nt The Solicitor General took exception from the judgment, claiming that it was error for the Court in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. The appeal, however, did not assail the right of petitioner Ester Mira Brehm, the natural mother of the minor, to adopt her. There is no question that petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm is a non-resident alien. By his own testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his status here, and no amount of reasoning will overcome the same. For this reason, he is not qualified to adopt. On this very point, We have recently declared: The only issue in this appeal is whether, not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides that The following cannot adoptx x x x x x x x x (4) Non-resident aliens;x x x x x x x x x This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines (Ellis & Ellis v. Republic, L-16922, Apr. 30, 1963). Prior to the above decision, We have also denied petitions to adopt by persons similarly situated as petitioner Brehm. Thus, in the case of Caraballo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15080, April 25, 1962, giving some reason why non-resident aliens are disqualified to adopt, We said ... Looking after the welfare of a minor to be adopted the law has surrounded him with safeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may be removed from the country by the adopter, who is not a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond the reach and protection of the country of his birth. (See also S/Sgt. Katancik, v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15472, June 20, 1962). This notwithstanding, petitioners press the argument that Brehm being now the step-father of the minor, he is qualified to adopt, in view of the provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which states The following may be adopted:(1) The natural child by the natural father(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or mother(3)A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother. We should construe, however, Article 338 in connection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly states that "The followingcannotadopt: ... (4). Non-resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand, Art. 338, Provides "the followingmaybe adopted: (3) astep-child, by the step-father or step-mother", which is merely directory, and which can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory provisions of Art. 335. Moreover, as heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confers jurisdiction to the court over the case, and before Article; 338 may or can be availed of, such jurisdiction must first be established. We ruled out the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, when the latter has a legitimate child of his own (Ball v. Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387, April 29, 1959). IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm, is hereby reversed, and his Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Labrador and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., took no part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993ALBINO S. CO,petitioner,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.The Solicitor General for the people.NARVASA,C.J.:In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00.1The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."A criminal complaint for violation ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 222was filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court inQue v.People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)3 i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check onSeptember 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment inQue v.Peopleon September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), datedDecember 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo, October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) almost one (1) year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observinginter aliathat Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows:4Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency having interpreting authority may reverse its administration interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid defense.Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction. CitingSenarillos v.Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined that theQuedoctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979.From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to this Court oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . .5The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act;Largado v.Masaganda,et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause;Larga v.Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application;People v.Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette;Baltazar v.C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27;Nilo v.Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity;Tac-An v.CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive effect;Ballardo v.Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see alsoBonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars, to wit:ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v.CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer:Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application;Romualdez v.CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"So did this Court hold, for example, inPeo.v.Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us inPeople v.Macarandang(1959) andPeople v.Lucero(1958).6Our decision inPeople v.Mapa,7reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings inMacarandangandLucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim"legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down inLuceroandMacarandangwas part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.So, too, did the Court rule inSpouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan v.Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) andDevelopment Bank of the Philippines v.Court of Appeals, et al(G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:8We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated inMongeandTupascited above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal maximlex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565 [1061]).The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized inPeople v.Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case ofChicot County Drainage Dist.v.Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.Thus, in this Court's decision inTaada v.Tuvera,9promulgated on April 24, 1985 which declared "that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." the Court said:. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth inChicot County Drainage District vs.Baxter Bank(308 U.S. 371, 374) to wit:The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.Much earlier, inDe Agbayani v.PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953]10. . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court made substantially the same observations, to wit:11. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision inOlaguer v.Military Commission No 34,12 declaring invalid criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous persons this Court, inTan vs.Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled as follows:In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.xxx xxx xxxThe trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in Municipality ofMalabang v.Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government abolished.13It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 inQue v.People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)14that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokesU.S.v.Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimesmala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been violated?" The facts inGo Chicoare substantially different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special law violated;15and it was there observed, among others, that "the defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal advice"16could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their violation.17Senarillos vs.Hermosisima,supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as inU.S.v.Go Chico,supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine ofmala prohibitashould override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costsde oficio.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC.,petitioner.MAKASIAR,J.:.This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that should be accorded primacy.1The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales.2The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law is likewise untenable.An ex post facto law is one which:.(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.4While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.Separate OpinionsFERNANDO,J.,concurring and dissenting:Concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion inImbong v. Comelec, L-32432 andGonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.BARREDO,J.,dissenting:Reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are relevant to the issues in this case, dissents, even as agrees that Republic Act 6132 is not ex post facto.VILLAMOR,J.,concurring:Concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law and dissents as to the rest.TEEHANKEE,J.,dissenting:The Court's decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11, 1970 inImbong vs. FerrerandGonzales vs. Comelec1upholding the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132. Inasmuch as I was unable to participate in the said cases,2I have expressed my contrary view in my separate dissenting opinion inBadoy, Jr. vs. Ferrer3that the challenged provision, together with the Act's other restrictions and strictures enumerated therein, "oppressively and unreasonably straitjacket the candidates as well as the electorate and gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association, and, deny due process and the equal protection of the laws."I therefore dissent from the Court's decision at bar for the same reason and considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the case ofBadoy.I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion inImbong-Gonzalesthat "(W)hile it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrongper se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of the broad law-making authority can declare certain acts asmala prohibitawhen justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that 'equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support.' "I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be construed, as endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act's sponsor, that "(T)he protection of the Constitution cannot be invoked for the right of association when the purpose is amalum prohibitumbecause such purpose would be "contrary to law" " and "(O)nce the ban (on party and organization support) is approved into law, the freedom of association cannot be invoked against it" since the Constitution decrees only that "(T)he right to form associations or societiesfor purposes not contrary to lawshall not be abridged."4Such a concept ofmalum prohibitumvis-a-vis the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos Constitution would render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time associations and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or certain activities, not wrongper seas "contrary to law" ormala prohibita. I believe that such a concept begs the question. Obviously, the word "law" in the qualifying clause "for purposes not contrary to law" does not mean that an enactment of the legislature forecloses the question with finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would regulate the purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not abridge freedom of speech and press.5#Separate OpinionsFERNANDO,J.,concurring and dissenting:Concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion inImbong v. Comelec, L-32432 andGonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.BARREDO,J.,dissenting:Reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are relevant to the issues in this case, dissents, even as agrees that Republic Act 6132 is not ex post facto.VILLAMOR,J.,concurring:Concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law and dissents as to the rest.TEEHANKEE,J.,dissenting:.The Court's decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11, 1970 inImbong vs. FerrerandGonzales vs. Comelec1upholding the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132. Inasmuch as I was unable to participate in the said cases,2I have expressed my contrary view in my separate dissenting opinion inBadoy, Jr. vs. Ferrer3that the challenged provision, together with the Act's other restrictions and strictures enumerated therein, "oppressively and unreasonably straitjacket the candidates as well as the electorate and gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association, and, deny due process and the equal protection of the laws."I therefore dissent from the Court's decision at bar for the same reason and considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the case ofBadoy.I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion inImbong-Gonzalesthat "(W)hile it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrongper se, it is equally true that Congress in the exercise of the broad law-making authority can declare certain acts asmala prohibitawhen justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8(a), which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized that 'equality of chances may be better attained by banning all organization support.' "I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be construed, as endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act's sponsor, that "(T)he protection of the Constitution cannot be invoked for the right of association when the purpose is amalum prohibitumbecause such purpose would be "contrary to law" " and "(O)nce the ban (on party and organization support) is approved into law, the freedom of association cannot be invoked against it" since the Constitution decrees only that "(T)he right to form associations or societiesfor purposes not contrary to lawshall not be abridged."4Such a concept ofmalum prohibitumvis-a-vis the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos Constitution would render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the exercise of its broad law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time associations and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or certain activities, not wrongper seas "contrary to law" ormala prohibita. I believe that such a concept begs the question. Obviously, the word "law" in the qualifying clause "for purposes not contrary to law" does not mean that an enactment of the legislature forecloses the question with finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would regulate the purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not abridge freedom of speech and press.5

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-2581December 2, 1948FIDEL C. QUERUBIN,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS (Fourth Division) and FELIPE S. MAMURI,respondents.Gregorio P. Formoso for petitioner.PERFECTO,J.:Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to continue taking cognizance of the appeal in the election case of Fidel C. Querubin vs. Felipe S. Mamuri, CA2843-R, concerning the mayoralty of Ilagan, Isabela, because of the expiration of the three-month period provided for in section 178 of the Revised Election Code, which reads as follows:Sec. 178.Appeal from the decision in election contests. From any final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance in protest against the eligibility or the election of provincial governors, members of the provincial board, city councilors, and mayors, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, as the case may be, within five days after being notified of the decision, for its revision, correction, annulment or confirmation, and the appeal shall proceed as in a criminal case. Such appeal shall be decided within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken. (C. A. 357-172.)The record of the appealed case was received by the Court of Appeals on May 22, 1948. On August 23, 1948, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the three-month period provided for by section 178 of the Revised Election Code expired on August 22, 1948, and that, consequently, the Court of Appeals had lost its jurisdiction over the case, invoking to the effect the doctrine in Portillo vs. Salvani (54 Phil., 543) holding mandatory a former legal provision that "all proceedings in electoral contest shall be terminated within one year."The motion to dismiss was denied on September 15, 1948, upon the ground that the period within which appellant had to file his brief had not as yet expired.The provision of section 178 of the Revised Election Code, that the appeal in election contents be decided "within three months after the filing of the case in the office of the clerk of the court to which the appeal has been taken", the same as the provision in section 177 of the same code requiring that the trial court shall decide a protest within six months or one year from its filing when contesting a municipal or a provincial office, is directory in nature. The purpose of the law in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code is to impress the need of speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively demanded by public interest. The terms of office of elective positions are short. Any cloud as to the true result of an election should be dispelled as soon as possible.Public faith, confidence and cooperation, essential to the success of government, are jeopardized by controversies as to who have been actually chosen by the electorate. These controversies should be settled as soon as possible. Doubts as to the true expression of the will of the people in polls should be cleared out without delay. The legislative policy, as embodied in sections 177 and 178 of the Revised Election Code, of hastening the administration of justice in election contests, is aimed at making more effective the constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people. The lapse of the period of time provided for in said sections should not have the effect of defeating the purposes of the system of judicial settlement of protests.lawphil.netTo dismiss an election contest or the appeal taken therein because the respective courts, regardless of cause or reason, have failed to render final decisions within the time limits of said sections, is to defeat the administration of justice upon factors beyond the control of the parties. That would defeat the purposes of the process of law and would make of the administration of justice in election contests an aleatory process where the litigants, irrespective of the merits of their respective claims, will be gambling for a deadline. The dismissal in such case will constitute a miscarriage of justice. The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of justice.The doctrine in the case ofPortillo vs. Salvani(54 Phil., 543) should be abandoned, even as modified in the case ofCacho vs. Abad(61 Phil., 606), where it was stated that the Supreme Court "has assumed jurisdiction over a considerable number of election cases which arrived here after the expiration of the year period without any protest being made against this practice."The petition is dismissed.Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Briones, Tuazon and Montemayor, JJ., concur.Feria and Bengzon, JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 97351 February 4, 1992RAMON A. GONZALES,petitioner,vs.HON. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor General, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondents.ROMERO,J.:In the instant petition formandamusand prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, petitioner submits for the Court's adjudication the twin issues of whether or not the Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in cases he had filed in court and whether or not the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as a result of such withdrawal of appearance.Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, as a citizen taxpayer, filed the petition as a class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the subject matters involved are of common and general interest to all Filipino citizens and taxpayers as they pertain to the enforcement of a public duty and the prevention of unlawful expenditure of public funds.According to the petitioner, the Solicitor General is the counsel for the Republic and the PCGG in thirty-three (33) cases before this Court, one hundred nine (109) cases in the Sandiganbayan, one (1) case in the National Labor Relations Commission and another case in the Municipal Trial Court or a total of one hundred forty-four (144) cases.1In December 1990, the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel in said cases through a pleading entitled "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."2The pleading states:The SOLICITOR GENERAL, to this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully withdraws as counsel for plaintiff Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in the above-captioned case, with the reservation, however, conformably with Presidential Decree No. 478, the provisions of Executive Order No. 292 as well as the decisional law of "Orbos v. Civil Service Commission, et al.," (G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990), to submit his comment/observation on incidents/matters pending with this Honorable Court, if called for by circumstances in the interest of the government or if he is so required by the court.Makati, Metro Manila, December 3, 1990.(Sgd.) FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZIBP O.R. No. 289417-2.06.90The Solicitor General filed a substantially similar pleading in the cases where the Republic is a party.As a result of such withdrawal of appearance, the PCGG hired forty (40) private lawyers, nineteen (19) of whom are trial lawyers. They would receive a monthly compensation of at least P10,000.00 plus appearance fee of P1,700.00 in actual trial and/or P500.00 if trial is postponed.3Petitioner contends that since the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance was made without any reason, it implied that it was "within the absolute discretion" of said public official. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478 and Section 35 of the Administrative Code of 1987, however, mandatorily require the Solicitor General to stand in the place of, and act for the Republic and the PCGG in court. Therefore, the Solicitor General has "no discretion to reject by withdrawing" as counsel for said entities.Applying the ruling of this Court with respect to a fiscal inSta.Rosa Mining Co.v.Zabala,4the petitioner further states that: "Similarly, it is the duty of the Solicitor General to appear for the Republic and the PCGG, hence regardless of his personal convictions or opinions, he must proceed to discharge his duty (not withdraw, which is equivalent to refusal to prosecute), and let the court decide the merits of the case."5Moreover, petitioner avers that the Solicitor General cannot withdraw his appearance "with reservation" nor can he file his "comment/observation on the incident/matters" after such withdrawal because by ceasing to appear as counsel, he loses his standing in court. Unless a case involves the constitutionality of a treaty, law, ordinance or executive order for which Rule 3 Section 23 of the Rules of Court6mandates his appearance, the Solicitor General is not authorized to appear therein after his withdrawal as counsel inasmuch as he himself is not a party-litigant.Furthermore, under Section 26, of Rule 138,7the Solicitor General may not unilaterally withdraw his appearance without the consent of the Republic or the PCGG unless the court authorizes his withdrawal. Since there was no such court authority, the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance in said several cases is null and void, as it constitutes an act against a mandatory law and hence, it may be attacked collaterally. Neither may the Solicitor General withdraw on the authority ofOrbos v.Civil Service Commission8wherein this Court held:In the discharge of this task the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law. . .xxx xxx xxxThere are cases where a government agency declines the services of the Solicitor General or otherwise fails or refuses to forward the papers of the case to him for appropriate action. . .The Court finds and so holds that this practice should be stopped.To repeat, the Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, any of its agents and officials in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Theexceptionis whensuch officials or agents are being charged criminallyor are beingcivilly sued for damages arising from a felony.His servicescannot be lightly rejected,much less ignored by the officer or officials concerned.Indeed, the assistance of the Solicitor General should be welcomed by the parties. He should be given full support and cooperation by any agency or official involved in litigation. He should be enabled to faithfully discharge his duties and responsibilities as the government advocate. Andhe should do no less for his clients.His burden of assisting in the fair and just administration of justice is clear.This Court does not expect the Solicitor General towaver in the performance of his duty.As a matter of fact, the Court appreciates the participation of the Solicitor General in many proceedings and his continued fealty to his assigned task.He should not therefore desist from appearing before this Court even in those cases he finds his opinion inconsistent with the government or any of its agents he is expected to represent.The Court must be advised of his position just as well. (Emphasis supplied)The petitioner adds the following observations:9Therefore, this case militates more against the Solicitor General than in his favor. For if the government and its officials cannot reject the services of the Solicitor General, neither may the latter select the case he would represent by withdrawing in some and retaining others. For unlike private lawyers who are bound to their clients by contract and, therefore, can reject cases offered to them, the Solicitor General and PCGG are wedded to each other by statute for better and for worse. And only a divorce, through the abolition of PCGG or resignation of the Solicitor General, can untie the marital knot. Otherwise, the relationship should continue sans PCGG demurring, and the Solicitor General withdrawing. Absent such resignation or abolition, the Solicitor General has to prosecute or defend the said cases to the best of his ability.Hence, petitioner contends, the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as substitutes for the Solicitor General. Nowhere in Executive Order Nos. 1, 2 and 14 does it appear that the PCGG is authorized to hire said lawyers. Since the Solicitor General is named by law as the lawyer for all government agencies, the hiring of private lawyers by such agencies is impliedly excluded. Thus, by employing private lawyers, the PCGG is creating a public office and naming a public officer. However, in the absence of a law providing for the creation of the office of PCGG counsel, said hired lawyers are usurpers or intruders whose acts may be challenged in a collateral proceeding such as an action for prohibition.Similarly, petitioner asserts, prohibition will lie against the Commission on Audit considering that any payment for the services of the PCGG-hired lawyers would result in an unlawful expenditure of public funds. Stressing the need to preserve thestatus quountil the determination of his rights as a citizen and taxpayer, petitioner prays for the issuance of temporary restraining order.Acting on the petition, however, the Court required the respondent to file their respective comments on the petition without granting the prayer for a temporary restraining order.10In its comment, the Commission on Audit (COA) alleges that it has not allowed the disbursement of funds to pay for the services of PCGG-hired private lawyers. It points out the fact that under COA Circular No. 89-299 dated March 21, 1989, the COA has withdrawn the pre-audit of transactions entered into by national government agencies pursuant to the constitutional provision that the COA has the exclusive authority to "define the scope of its audit and examination, to establish the techniques and methods required therefor."11Neither has the COA allowed in post-audit the disbursements of funds in payment of the services of the hired private lawyers. Moreover, under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986, the hiring of private lawyers by government agencies and instrumentalities is prohibited unless there is prior written conformity of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the written concurrence of COA.For its part, the PCGG, through Commissioner Maximo A. Maceren and lawyer Eliseo B. Alampay, asserts in its comment that the scope of its authority under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14 is broad enough to include the authority to engage the services of private lawyers, if necessary, for the fulfillment of its mandate. While such authority is not expressly stated in said executive orders, "it must be deemed necessarily implied in and subsumed under the expressly enumerated powers of the Commission."12The PCGG contends that its power under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 14 to "file and prosecute all cases investigated by it" includes "the grant of discretion to the Commission in determining themannerof filing and prosecuting its cases including the matter ofwho,in particular, will control and supervise the prosecution of said cases." The phrase "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies" simply means that the Solicitor General is called upon to render assistance to the PCGG and whether or not such discretion is required by the Commission is a matter of discretion on its part. Such provision does not preclude the PCGG from engaging the services of private lawyers in the same way that it is "clearly authorized to hire accountants, appraisers, researchers and other professionals as it performs its functions." Since, upon the dictates of legal and practical necessity, it has hired lawyers in the United States and in Switzerland, "it may similarly hire Filipino lawyers in prosecuting its Philippine cases."13The PCGG further asserts that the hiring of private lawyers is "not anultra vires"act but a "means by which (it) can effectively exercise its powers." It emphasizes the fact that it hired private lawyers "only afterthe Officer of the Solicitor General had unilaterally withdrawn its appearance" for the PCGG in the various pending PCGG-instituted cases. Its own Litigation Division, which was constituted after the Solicitor General's withdrawal, is "sorely undermanned" but it has to contend with "affluent and influential individuals and entities" who can "afford to hire skilled lawyers and organize vast litigation networks." The PCGG tried to seek the assistance of the Department of Justice and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel but only the former sent two additional prosecutors to handle its cases.14The PCGG clarifies that its powers are circumscribed not only by the executive orders aforementioned but also by the inherent police power of the State. By hiring private lawyers, it was merely trying to assist the President of the Philippines in protecting the interest of the State. As such, it was acting as analter egoof the President and therefore, it was the Executive which determined the necessity of engaging the services of private prosecutors. Contending that "overwhelming necessity" impelled it to hire private lawyers, the PCGG avers that inasmuch as the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Philippine National Bank may engage the services of private lawyers, with more reason may it be allowed to hire private prosecutors after it was abandoned by the Solicitor General in the prosecution of the ill-gotten wealth cases. Consequently, "the Solicitor General's withdrawal of assistance is tantamount to his tacit approval of the PCGG's hiring of private prosecutors in replacement of the solicitors handling the said civil cases."15The PCGG concludes that the reasonableness of the compensation for its hired lawyers can hardly be questioned considering the expertise of said lawyers and the complexity of the cases they would be handling for the PCGG. Thus, the prayer for a preliminary injunction must be denied otherwise "the harm that would be done would be far greater than the perceived mischief petitioner seeks to prevent."16Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez inhibits himself from appearing in this case "considering that as far as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG for brevity) is concerned, the subject is a closed matter among the OSG, the PCGG and the Courts."17In the comment filed by Assistant Solicitor General Edgardo L. Kilayko and Solicitor Iderlina P. Pagunuran, the OSG sets out at length the history of the PCGG from its creation until the filing in the Sandiganbayan of thirty-nine (39) "prima faciecases" for ill-gotten wealth against former President Marcos and his cronies. As suits and countersuits stemmed from the original thirty-nine (39) civil cases, "the OSG had been put to a tremendous task and thus invariably in urgent need of being consulted or informed by the PCGG of the facts and circumstances material to the prosecution and progress not only of the original 39 civil cases, but also of all kinds of "incidents."Nonetheless, the OSG lawyers faced the challenge and the odds if only to live up to their task as "the best lawyers there are in the country." The OSG further explains:18On many a time, however a time, however, the lack of the above-mentioned consultation or information resulted in situations that rendered the OSG unavoidably incapable of performing its functions and duties as Lawyer of the Government, not only as mandated upon it by law and as spelled out inOrbos v.CSC,G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, but also in consonance with its office motto: "Integrity In Advocacy."Once the OSG argued before the Sandiganbayan that an asset was under sequestration, only to be informedby the adverse partywaving a document before the Sandiganbayan Justices that the sequestration had earlier been lifted, with a PCGG resolution, the document, to boot (Razon case). Then, again, OSG argued, even before this Honorable Court, that an ill-gotten asset had "mysteriously" disappeared, only to be informed by the Honorable Court, that a PCGG Commissioner had earlier by resolution authorized the disposition of the asset (COCOFED case). All the instances need not be enumerated here, as they are not meat and substance, even as OSG is rendered thereby a laughing stock in its professionalism.As to matters that are of great pith and moment, suffice it to say that the recent Benedicto "compromise" agreement, not to mention the SMC-UCPB Compromise settlement, issub judiceor under advisement not only of the Sandiganbayan but also of this Honorable Court in separate "incidents," and suffice it to state that the relationship, obtaining between the Government offices/agencies and the Office of the Solicitor General as counsel, is not at all like one that simply would obtain between private client and private lawyer in private practice, although constant consultation and advice aresine qua nonin both types of relationship. The relationship is rather one, created as it is by law, where imposed upon OSG is the responsibility to present to the courts the position that will uphold the best interests of the People, the Government and the State,albeitthe same may run counter to its client's position or route of action. At any rate, the PCGG through nationwide TV broadcast and print media, publicly announced that PCGG had disposed with or otherwise did not need the legal services of the Lawyer of the Government, and thus OSG descended, not the unmerited remark of having "abandoned" the ill-gotten wealth cases, but the time-honored principle ofimpossibilium nulla obligatio est,i.e.,there is no obligation to do impossible things (Lim Co Chui v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 463), without in any way casting any aspersion on the moral integrity of any Commissioner or PCGG official, as made clear by the Solicitor General to the President in a meeting with PCGG.Hence, in the light of all the foregoing circumstances, at rock-bottom precisely so as not to prejudice "the interest of the Government" (Orbos), the Solicitor General withdrew as counsel for PCGG in all said cases by filing a notice of "Withdrawal of Appearance with Reservation."In arguing that the instant petition should be dismissed, the OSG contends that this case has become moot and academic as this very Court had resolved to allow the withdrawal of appearance of the Solicitor General in all the cases pending before it "with reservation, conformably with PD No. 478, Executive Order No. 292, as well as the doctrine laid down in 'Orbos v.Civil Service Commission, et al.,'G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, . . ."19For its part, the Sandiganbayan had also resolved that "the appearance of the Solicitor General is deemed withdrawn to be substituted by the PCGG's legal panel."20The OSG maintains further that the instant petition does not present a case and controversy as the petitioner himself does not even have a "court standing" and a "litigable interest." All the petitioner seeks is an "advisory opinion." The OSG asserts that the "incident" (referring to the Solicitor General's withdrawal of appearance) should be distinguished from that inJPC Enterprise, Inc.v.Court of Appeals, et al.,21wherein the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) decided to appear for itself because the law names the Minister of Justice only as itsex oficiolegal adviser while by itself it can file suits and institute proceedings and engage external expertise in the fulfillment of its tasks. However, since the APT has no personality of its own, it should have appeared through the Solicitor General. The OSG argues that said "adversarial incident" is not present in this case.In his reply to the comments of the PCGG and the OSG, the petitioner insists that although as between the Solicitor General and the PCGG, this case may have been rendered moot and academic, as between him on the one hand and the Solicitor General and the PCGG on the other hand, a "real controversy" still exists and the issues raised herein have not ceased to exist either. Moreover, a judgment of prohibition andmandamuswould have a "practical legal effect and can be enforced."22Citing Miguel v.Zulueta,23andTaada v.Tuvera,24petitioner asserts that he has a standing in court because where a question of public right is involved and the object of themandamusis the enforcement of a public duty, the relator need not show any legal or special interest in the result of the proceeding. It is sufficient that, as a citizen, he is interested in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.The petitioner rebuts the PCGG's contention that its power to hire private lawyers may be implied from its expressly enumerated powers. He asserts that since P.D. No. 478 mandates that "the Solicitor General as law office of the government with the duty to appear for the PCGG," no implication from the express powers of (the) PCGG can stand against the language of P.D. No. 478. On the other hand, the law regarding the PCGG and that regarding the Solicitor General should be harmonized.25The Court considers these pleadings sufficient bases for resolving this petition and, on account of the importance and imperativeness of the issues raised herein, the filing of memoranda by the parties is dispensed with.We shall, first of all, confront a preliminary issue interposed by the OSG whether or not this case has been rendered moot and academic by this Court's resolution granting the Solicitor General's motion to withdraw appearance as counsel in the several cases pending herein. It should be clarified that the resolutionhadto be issued with the national interest in mind. Time was of the essence and any hedging on the part of the PCGG and/or its counsel could, not merely set back but prejudice, the government's all-out efforts to recover ill-gotten wealth.Notwithstanding the ostensible mootness of the issues raised in a case, this Court has never shirked from its symbolic function of educating bench and bar by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts, doctrines and rules.26More so, if the case is of such magnitude that certain legal ambiguities must be unravelled for the protection of the national interest.27To allow the transcendental issue of whether the OSG may withdraw its appearance in a cluster of cases of national import to pass into legal limbo simply because it has been "mooted" would be a clear case of misguided judicial self-restraint. This Court has assiduously taken every opportunity to lay down brick by brick the doctrinal infrastructure of our legal system. Certainly, this is no time for a display of judicial timorousness of the kind which the Solicitor General is untimely exhibiting now.Accordingly, we confront the issue conscious of their far-reaching implications, not alone on the instant case but on future ones as well, which the OSG will surely be called upon to handle again and again.The resolution of the first issue laid down at the beginning of thisponenciahinges on whether or not the Solicitor General may be compelled bymandamusto appear for the Republic and the PCGG. This issue is best resolved by a close scrutiny of the nature and extent of the power and authority lodged by law on the Solicitor General.At this juncture, a flashback on the statutory origins of the Office of the Solicitor General is in order. Incorporated in Act No. 136 dated June 11,190128providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine Islands was Chapter III entitled "The Attorney General." Section 40 states:There shall be an Attorney-General for the Philippine Islands, to be appointed by the Philippine Commission . . .The catalog of his duties includes the following:He shall prosecute or defend therein all causes, civil and criminal, to which the Government of the Philippine Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a party . . .29Section 41 further provides:There shall be an officer learned in the law to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of all his duties, called the Solicitor-General who shall be appointed by the Commission . . . In case of a vacancy in the office of Attorney-General, or of his absence or disability, the Solicitor-General shall have power to exercise the duties of that office. Under the supervision of the Attorney-General,it shall be the especial duty of the Solicitor-General to conduct and argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court, in which the Philippine Government is interested, and the Attorney-General may, whenever he deems it for the interest of the Philippine Government, either in person conduct and argue any case in any court of the Philippine Islands in which the Philippine Government is interested or may direct the Solicitor General to do so. (Emphasis supplied)Six months later, a law was passed reorganizing the Office of the Attorney-General and providing for the appointment of the said official and the Solicitor General by the Civil Governor and for an increase in their salaries. Their duties remained basically the same.30In the meantime, Act No. 222 was passed on September 5, 1901 providing for the organization of, among others, the Department of Finance and Justice which embraced within its executive control the Bureau of Justice.31Under Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1917, the Bureau of Justice is specifically constituted "the law office of the Government of the Philippine Islands and by it shall be performed duties requiring the services of a law officer."32Its chief officials are the Attorney-General and his assistant, the Solicitor General.33As principal law officer of the Government, the Attorney-General shall have authority to act for and represent the Government of the Philippine Islands, its officers, and agents in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.34In 1932, the office of the Attorney-General was phased out and his functions were assumed by the Secretary of Justice.35Subsequently, the Bureau of Justice came to be known as the Office of the Solicitor General,36headed by the Solicitor General.37Parenthetically, these institutions were patterned after the Office of Attorney-General, created by the First U.S. Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which called for a "meet person, learned in the law, to act as Attorney-General for the U.S."38When the Department of Justice was established in 1870, the position of Solicitor-General was created as an assistant to the Attorney-General.39Over a century later, their respective positions and functions remain the same. The Attorney-General of the United States, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, is now the head of the Department of Justice.40In the same manner, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, is appointed to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his duties.41In contrast, the Solicitor-General of the Philippines, emerging from the shadow of the Attorney-General and later, of the Secretary of Justice, has come to his own. On July 20, 1948, Republic Act. No. 335, amending Section 1659 of the Administrative Code, bestowed on him the rank of Undersecretary of a Department. Subsequently, a series of amendatory laws designed to enlarge the complement of the Office of the Solicitor General was enacted42until on June 4, 1974, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, its pivotal role in the government became clearly defined and delineated.During the martial law years, President Ferdinand E. Marcos leaned heavily on his Solicitor General to provide legal underpinnings of his official acts. Reflective of the tremendously enhanced power of the official and the position was Executive Order No. 454 enacted on September 23, 1975, conferring upon the Solicitor Generalthe rank of a member of the Cabinet"with all the rights, honors and privileges pertaining to the position." Said executive order was superseded by Executive Order No. 473 dated August 12, 1976 "making the Solicitor Generala member of the Cabinet."These executive orders were capped by Executive Order No. 552 dated August 14, 1979 elevating the OSG into a Ministry with the same powers and functions defined in P.D. Nos. 478 and 1347.P.D. 478 became, as it were, theMagna Cartaof the Office of the Solicitor General. After the change of administration, or on July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 292 instituting the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General is described as an "independent and autonomous office attached to the Department of Justice." Headed by the Solicitor General, "who is the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government," the Office shall have a Legal Staff composed of fifteen (15) Assistant Solicitors General and such number of Solicitors and Trial Attorneys "as may be necessary to operate the Office which shall divided into fifteen (15) divisions.43Among its powers and functions are the following which are relevant to the issues:Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. The office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations.The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.(Emphasis supplied.) It shall have the following specific powers and functions:(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.(2) Investigate, initiate court action, or in any manner proceed against any person, corporation or firm for the enforcement of any contract, bond, guarantee, mortgage, pledge or other collateral executed in favor of the Government. Where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the Philippines, the Solicitor General may employ counsel to assist in the discharge of the aforementioned responsibilities.xxx xxx xxx(8) Deputize legalofficers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal Officers with respect to such cases.(9) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the Government for such service, assistance and cooperation as may be necessary in fulfilling its function and responsibilities and for this purpose enlist the services of any government official or employees in the pursuit of his tasks.Departments, bureaus, agencies, offices, instrumentalities and corporations to whom the Office of the Solicitor General renders legal services are authorized to disburse funds from their sundry operating and other funds for the latter Office. For this purpose, the Solicitor General and his staff are specifically authorized to receive allowances as may be provided by the Government offices, instrumentalities and corporations concerned, in addition to their regular compensation.(10) Represent, upon the instructions of the President of the Republic of the Philippines in international litigations, negotiations or conferences where the legal position of the Republic must be defended or presented.(11) Act for the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion , affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require; and(12) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.44In thus tracing the origins of the Office of the Solicitor General to gain a clear understanding of the nature of the functions and extent of the powers of the Solicitor General himself, it is evident that a policy decision was made in the early beginnings to consolidate in one official the discharge of legal functions and services in the government. These took the form mostly of representing the Government in various legal proceedings.The rationale behind this step is not difficult to comprehend. Sound government operations require consistency in legal policies and practices among the instrumentalities of the State. Moreover, an official learned in the law and skilled in advocacy could best plan and coordinate the strategies and moves of the legal battles of the different arms of the government. Surely, the economy factor, too, must have weighed heavily in arriving at such a decision.It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be gathered from the term "shall," which is invariably employed, from Act No. 136 (1901) to the more recent Executive Order No. 292 (1987).Under the principles of statutory construction, so familiar even to law students, the term "shall" is nothing if not mandatory.In common or ordinary parlance and in its ordinary significance, the term "shall" is a word of command, and one which has always and which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is generally imperative or mandatory. It has the invariable significance of operating to impose a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or when public interest is involved, or where the public or persons have rights which ought to be exercised or enforced, unless a contrary intent appears.45The presumption is that the word "shall" in a statute is used in an imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different interpretations if sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in the context which will justify a different meaning.46Exactly what is the signification of the mandate for the OSG "torepresentthe Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigations or matter requiring the services of the lawyer?"To "represent" is standing in place, supplying the place, or performing the duties or exercising the rights, of the party represented; to speak or act with authority on behalf of another; to conduct and control proceedings in court on behalf of another.47The decision of this Court as early as 1910 with respect to the duties of Attorney-General well applies to the Solicitor General under the facts of the present case. The Court then declared:In this jurisdiction, it is thedutyof the Attorney General "to perform the duties imposed upon him by law" and "he shall prosecute all causes, civil and criminal, to which the Government of the Philippines Islands, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity, is a party . . ."48Being a public officer, the Solicitor General is "invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public."49Another role of the Solicitor General is an officer of the Court, in which case he is called upon "to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner that a special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the administration of justice."50In one case where a fiscal manifested before the trial court that he would not prosecute the case in court for insufficiency of evidence after his motion to dismiss had been denied, this Court granted a petition formandamusto compel him to prosecute the case. We declared:Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the Court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor . . . In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State . . . This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligations to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.51Undoubtedly, the above arguments apply equally well to the Solicitor General who is sought to be compelled to appear before the different courts to ensure that the case of the Republic of the Philippines against those who illegally amassed wealth at the expense the people maybe made to account for their misdeeds and return said wealth.Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started,52our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suit either with or without stipulations with other party.53Abandonment of a case, however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reason for the discretion given him is not unlimited.54Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal. Such are reflected in its policies, thus:The discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause. Although as member of the bar, the Attorney for the United States is an officer of the court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the Government, and it is as an officer of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there shall be a prosecution in a particular case. . . .55The first executive order ever issued by President Aquino on February 28, 1986, created the PCGG. It announced the government's policy of recovering all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates. It charged the PCGG with the "task of assisting the President" in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth, investigation of "such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign" to it, and the adoption of safeguards to ensure that corruption may not be again committed with impunity.This issuance was followed by Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986 freezing all assets and properties of Marcos, his family and cronies; prohibiting their transfer, conveyance, encumbrance or concealment, and requiring all persons in and outside of the Philippines who are in possession of said properties to make full disclosure of the same to the PCGG.On April 11, 1986, the PCGG promulgated its Rules and Regulations. A pertinent provision states:Sec. 10. Findings of the Commission. Based on the evidence adduced, the Commission shall determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the asset, property or business enterprise in question constitute ill-gotten wealth as described in Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2.In the event of an affirmative finding, the Commission shall certify the case to the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance with law. Business, properties, funds, and other assets found to be lawfully acquired shall be immediately released and the writ of sequestration, hold or freeze orders lifted accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)Thereafter, or on May 7, 1986, Executive Order No. 14 defining the jurisdiction over cases involving such ill-gotten wealth was issued, it contains the following provisions:Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Presidential Commission on Good Government,with the assistance of the Solicitor General and other government agencies,is hereby empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it under Executive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986, and Executive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its finding.Sec. 2. The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof.Sec. 3. Civil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with Executive Order No. 2 dated March 12, 1986, may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied).All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other conclusion but that under the law of its creation and the complementary Rules, the law office of the PCGG, as it is for the rest of the Government, is the Office of the Solicitor General. Although the PCGG is "empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it" under Executive Orders No. 1 and 2, it does not thereby oust the Office of the Solicitor General from its lawful mandate to represent the Government and its agencies in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of power to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate such power and turn over the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers whom it may decide to employ. In those instances where proceedings are to be conducted outside of the Philippines, the Solicitor General, continuing to discharge his duties, may employ counsel to assist him,56particularly because he may not be licensed to appear before the courts in a foreign jurisdiction.Under its own Rules and Regulations, specifically the provision aforequoted, the PCGG certifies to the Solicitor General the cases for which it had found reasonable ground to believe that certain assets and properties are ill-gotten under Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2. The Solicitor General shall then proceed "in accordance with law."Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand.After filing a case, he may even move for its dismissal in the event that, along the way, he realizes that prosecuting the case would not serve the government's purposes. In other words, because he was appointed to the position on accoun