Case Study:Lessons learned from the assistance to the 2010

Earthquake in Haiti

Kae YanagisawaJICA

October 22, 2015

Damage

Earthquake in HaitiJanuary, 2010

M 7.2 in richter scaleDepth of the epicenter ： 10km 　　　

Distance from the caiptal :17km

212,000 persons were killed 300,000 persons were injured

Government buildings were destroyed,Killing government officials

PKO (MINUSTA) headquarter building was Destroyed, killing SRSG and 8 Chinese

UN POL officers

Earthquake in ChileFebruary, 2010

M 8.8Depth of the epicenter: 35km 　　　　

Distance from the Capital :300km

528 persons were killed

JICA

Haiti before the disasterPolitically, Supported by the UN stabilization mission (MINUSTAH), after long years of dictatorship and political turbulance. National military and police were under re-organization with the support of MINUSTAHEconomically, Poorest country in the Western hemisphereIn addition, Infrastructure had already been damaged by hurricanes in previous years.

A typical case of “fragile state”

Challenges to international humanitarian assistance

• Weak leading role of the government• Security concern Even before the earthquake, safety and security were at stake. UNDAC team requested every SAR team to arrange force protection.• Logistic difficulties The international airport was the sole entry point and controlled by the US Air Force. Due to congestion, many relief teams made a detour via Dominican republic.

Japan’s engagement

•A civilian medical team (JDR team) was deployed, succeeded by a medical unit of the JSDF (JDR team), and then, Japan Red Cross (NGO)

•The Government of Japan decided to participate in the MINUSTAH to assist recovery and reconstruction and deployed engineering corps of JSDF

Cluster Meeting

UNOCHA DPKOUS

GovernmentUN CMCoord

Officer

In NY In Washington DC

UN CMCoord Officer

US Southern Command

UN CMCoordTeam

Joint Operations and Tasking Centre

Foreign military

Foreign military

Foreign militaryCivilian HA

organization

Civilian HA organization

Civilian HA organization

In Miami

In Port au Prince

Humanitarian Exchange Magazine

Coordination framework

Lessons learned

• Coordination among “enlightened” humanitarian workers, both civilians and militaries, was made relatively well.

But without the strong presence of the Haitian Government

• Overall, response was rather chaotic because of the influx of unregulated assistance.

Some NGOs were believed to be there just to show their presence to donors for fundraising. Some 1,800 rescue workers were on the scene, but their

size and capability were uneven. Some medical care did not fit local conditions and was not sustainable.

Changes brought by the lessons

•USAR coordination cell was devised as sub-component of UNDAC team to further facilitate coordination among SAR teams.

•Classification and standardization of foreign medical teams are in progress, with a proposal of registration and monitoring on the ground.

They were tested during the earthquake in Nepal.

Fragility and disasters•Weak governance of Haiti resulted in - lack of disaster prevention and preparedness - inefficient response - prolonged recovery• Cholera outbreak and political tension further

exacerbated the situation and delayed the recovery

Nevertheless, international assistance should be provided to support the Government, not replace it.