Case Law Update - ilsaap.org

S t a t e ’ s A t t o r n e y s A p p e l l a t e P r o s e c u t o r

Case Law Update

Researched and Drafted by DAVID J. ROBINSON, FOURTH DISTRICT

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

January 2014

BRIAN J. TOWNE CHAIRMAN

PATRICK J. DELFINO DIRECTOR

C a s e L a w U p d a t e January 2014

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ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

People v. McChriston, 2014 IL 115310 (January 24, 2014) (C.J. Garman) (Champaign Co.):

MSR

The Supreme Court granted defendant’s PLA to determine whether his MSR term attached to his sentence by operation of law, which would not require the trial court to have admonished him that such a term would attach to his sentence.

The Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s sentence, concluding that the language of the MSR statute was clear and unambiguous that the MSR term automatically became part of defendant’s sentence—thus, the DOC was not “adding” time to defendant’s sentence when it enforced the MSR term.

In re S.L., 2014 IL 115424 (January 24, 2014) (J. Theis) (Marion Co.):

Parental Fitness & Termination

The Supreme Court granted the State’s PLA to determine whether the appellate court erred by reversing the trial court’s unfitness finding where the State did not file a separate notice specifying the particular nine-month period upon which it was relying to prove unfitness.

The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, concluding that the State’s failure to file a separate notice pleading identifying the nine-month period or periods at issue constitutes a pleading defect, not a failure to state a cause of action, and that that the pleading-defect argument had been forfeited by respondent mother.


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People v. Hommerson, 2014 IL 115638 (January 24, 2014) (J. Freeman) (Lake Co.):

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act

The Supreme Court granted defendant’s PLA to determine whether the defendant’s failure to file a verification affidavit under 122-1(b) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act is an improper basis upon which to summarily dismiss a postconviction petition. The Supreme Court held that it was, concluding that the trial court may not summarily dismiss a petition at the first stage of proceedings solely on the basis that it lacked a verification affidavit; to do so would run afoul of the rationale that at the first stage of proceedings, the court is merely considering the substantive virtue of the claims rather that its procedural compliance.

People v. Elliott, 2014 IL 115308 (January 24, 2014) (J. Thomas) (Jackson Co.):

Statutory Summary Suspension

The Supreme Court granted the State’s PLA to determine whether the appellate court erred by vacating the defendant’s conviction because the statutory summary suspension upon which it was based had been rescinded. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, concluding that the “rescission” in the statutory summary suspension statute was prospective in nature and, therefore, defendant’s conviction in this case was proper, given that the statutory summary suspension proceedings had commenced (even though they were not finalized) at the time he was pulled over and issued a citation for driving on a suspended license.


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ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT

1st District

People v. Andrews, 2013 IL App (1st) 121623 (December 16, 2013) (J. Cunningham) (Cook Co.):

Sentencing

The defendant appealed from his sentence following his conviction for aggravated battery of a handicapped person, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly considered a factor inherent in the crime at sentencing—namely, that the victim was handicapped—(2) his sentence was excessive in light of the mitigating factors he presented, and (3) his sentencing order should be corrected to reflect the proper crime for which he was sentenced.

The appellate court affirmed and corrected the sentencing order, concluding that (1) the record did not support the defendant’s claim that the trial court considered the fact that the victim was handicapped as an aggravating factor, (2) the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing him to the maximum term of 10 years—indeed, he merely generally contended that he was being punished for demanding a jury trial in Cook County—and (3) the term “handicapped/pregnant” should be removed from the sentencing order to be replaced by the word “handicapped”.

People v. Henderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 113294 (December 17, 2013) (P.J. Quinn) (Cook Co.):

UUW

The defendant appealed from his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, arguing that his conviction could not stand because the section under which he was convicted (a loaded firearm outside of one’s home) had been rendered unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed but remanded for resentencing, concluding that although the “loaded-firearm-outside-of-one’s-home” section of the UUW statute had been found to be unconstitutional by the supreme


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court in Aguilar, the defendant’s sentence under that statute was valid under another section—namely, possession of a firearm without a FOID card—because that section was severable from the rest of the UUW statute.

People v. Coleman, 2013 IL App (1st) 130030 (December 18, 2013) (J. Mason) (Cook Co.):

Search & Seizure

The State appealed from the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, arguing that (1) because the defendant was on parole at the time, he was subject to warrantless search even if the officer did not know he was on parole and, alternatively, (2) the contraband would have inevitably been discovered through an inventory search of his vehicle.

The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) an unlawful search of a vehicle cannot subsequently be justified because, unbeknownst to the police, the owner or operator of the vehicle happened to be on parole, and (2) any argument the State had related to “inevitable discovery” was forfeited as it was not presented below.

People v. Taylor, 2013 IL App (1st) 110166 (December 18, 2013) (J. Pucinski) (Cook Co.):

Evidence / UUW

The defendant appealed from his conviction of AUUW for carrying a firearm without a valid FOID card, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by admitting certain narcotics evidence, (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay evidence pertaining to body armor, (3) without that body armor evidence, the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) the UUW statute is facially unconstitutional.

The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) the narcotics evidence was relevant to explain the police officers’ conduct in the investigation leading up to the defendant’s arrest, (2) the lay witness testimony regarding the body armor was admissible because an expert is not required where the testimony is helpful to the fact


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finder, (3) because the body armor evidence was admissible, the defendant’s reasonable doubt argument had to fail, and (4) the FOID requirement section of the UUW statute was severable and was not facially unconstitutional.

People v. Crawford, 2013 IL App (1st) 100310 (December 16, 2013) (J. Delort) (Cook Co.):

Batson / Leach

The defendant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault as to eleven women and attempt (first degree murder and aggravated criminal sexual assault) as to a twelfth victim. DNA evidence linked defendant to all the victims.

The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) the State did not err in its race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge and therefore a Batson hearing was unnecessary, (2) the evidence of defendant’s guilt as to a particular victim was sufficient, (3) defendant was not denied a fair trial and the State’s closing was not problematic, (4) defendant was not denied his right to confrontation under Leach where the autopsy was performed by one medical examiner and recounted at trial by another.

People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (1st) 111116 (December 13, 2013) (J. Gordon) (Cook Co.)

Due Process

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, armed robbery and home invasion at a bench trial. The defendant appealed, solely on the claim of being denied due process of law when the trial court based its finding of guilt upon a mistaken recollection of testimony from defendant’s expert witness.

The appellate court reversed, concluding that the failure of the trial court to recall and consider evidence that is crucial to a criminal defendant’s defense is a denial of a defendant’s due process. Where the record affirmatively shows this failure in the judgment process, the defendant did not receive a fair trial.


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People v. Barnes, 2013 IL App (1st) 112873 (December 18, 2013) (J. Mason) (Cook Co.)

Evidence

A jury convicted defendant of aggravated battery of a child. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) permitting the State to use the 4-year-old victim as an exhibit to show his scars, (2) allowing the State to present evidence of liver contusions on the minor that were not proven to be part of the crimes charged, and (3) barring him from questioning the child’s mother regarding her arrests for prostitution and DCFS removing her children from her custody.

The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that (1) the court erred by permitting the State to use the 4-year-old victim as an exhibit to show certain scars (too prejudicial), (2) the court improperly permitted the State to present evidence of the liver contusions where no evidence was presented that defendant caused those contusions, and (3) no err occurred when the court barred defendant from questioning the child’s mother regarding her arrests for prostitution and DCFS removing her children from her custody.

People v. Toy, 2013 IL App (1st) 120580 (December 20, 2013) (J. McBride) (Cook Co.)

Proportionate Penalties

Defendant appealed from the first stage denial of his postconviction petition, arguing that the 15-year firearm enhancement to his aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause because armed violence based upon a sexual assault contained identical elements but those offenses had different penalties.

The appellate court vacated defendant’s sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault and remanded for the imposition of a new


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sentence that did not include the 15-year firearm enhancement as it violated the proportionate penalties clause.

People v. Barghouti, 2013 IL App (1st) 112373 (December 20, 2013) (J. Neville) (Cook Co.)


Defendant appealed from the trial court’s first stage dismissal of his postconviction petition. In reviewing the trial record, the appellate court “encountered” an obvious error by the trial court that defense counsel had failed to brief in his initial brief on appeal. The appellate court thereafter ordered the parties to brief that issue. The State responded that it was not the appellate court’s place to request such a briefing. The appellate court reversed based upon the issue it discovered and took the State to the “woodshed” for questioning its neutrality.

J. Hyman specially concurred, writing separately to take issue with the State’s assertion that the court “stepped outside its proper role as a neutral arbiter.”

J. Mason specially concurred merely to point out that justice was served where defendant’s codefendant received the same second-stage hearing in a separate case.

People v. Williams, 2013 IL App (1st) 112693 (December 26, 2013) (J. Lavin) (Cook Co.)

Accountability

Defendant appealed from his accountability (first degree murder conviction), arguing, in pertinent part, that the trial court erred by convicting him of accountability following a bench trial. The appellate court reversed defendant’s accountability conviction, replacing it with an aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction, concluding that the State failed to present evidence that defendant agreed in advance to commit the crime for which it claimed he was accountable.


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People v. Anguiano, 2013 IL App (1st) 113458 (December 26, 2013) (J. Epstein) (Cook Co.)


Defendant appealed following the second-stage dismissal of his postconviction petition; defendant was represented by private counsel. The appellate court affirmed, holding that counsel’s performance was sufficient in this case but also concluding that (1) Rule 651(c) does not apply where counsel is retained at the first stage and (2) defendant was entitled to a reasonable level of assistance (just like a pro se defendant). In so holding, the appellate court rejected the rationale of the court in Csaszar, which had held that defendants who retain counsel in postconviction proceedings are not entitled to a reasonable level of assistance under the Act.

People v. Jones, 2013 IL App (1st) 113263 (December 31, 2013) (J. Palmer) (Cook Co.)


Defendant appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of his successive postconviciton petition, arguing that the court erred by finding that he had forfeited (by procedural default) certain issues when he filed his first postconviction petition. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court was not obligated to grant defendant’s motion to file a successive petition where his grounds for cause and prejudice were issues that had been forfeited.

People v. Reed, 2013 IL App (1st) 113465 (December 31, 2013) (P.J. Hyman) (Cook Co.)

Surveillance Privilege

Defendant appealed from his drug-possession conviction, arguing that the trial court denied him his right to confront witnesses against him when it denied him the surveillance location of the only officer who saw him possess the narcotics. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in


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enforcing the surveillance privilege where, at an in camera review, the court heard information sufficient to sustain the State’s burden that the privilege applied.

People v. Burns, 2013 IL App (1st) 120929 (December 31, 2013) (J. Reyes) (Cook Co.)

UUW

Defendant appealed from his UUW conviction, arguing that following Aguilar, his conviction for UUW as a felon in possession should be reversed. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that the portion of the UUW statute that criminalized possession of firearms by felons was severable and it was conduct that fell outside of the second amendment’s protections.

People v. Johnson, 2013 IL App (1st) 122459 (December 31, 2013) (P.J. Gordon) (Cook Co.)

Reasonable Doubt

Defendant appealed from his conviction on retrial based upon an accountability theory (his codefendant had earlier been acquitted of the ultimate act of firing the fatal shot), arguing, in pertinent part, that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellate court reversed, concluding that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that double jeopardy attached. As part of its disposition, the appellate court excoriated the State for it closing statements, which included (1) the State’s reference to his codefendant “duping” his jury into acquitting him, (2) the State’s claim that an acquittal in this case would be tantamount to legalizing drive-by shootings, and (3) comparing the defendant to Nazis.


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People v. Morrow, 2013 IL App (1st) 121316 (December 31, 2013) (P.J. Gordon) (Cook Co.)


Defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his motion to file a successive postconviction petition, arguing that he demonstrated cause and prejudice by showing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a second-degree murder instruction. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that because trial counsel’s failure to request a second-degree murder instruction was trial strategy, counsel was not ineffective and, therefore, defendant could not demonstrate prejudice for purposes of his successive petition.

2nd District

People v. Love, 2013 IL App (2nd) 120600 (December 19, 2013) (P.J. Burke) (Lake Co.):


Defendant appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of what the court characterized as defendant’s successive postconviction petition, arguing that the petition should have been reviewed as an initial postconviction petition where the trial court should have characterized his initial filing as a 2-1401 petition. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) the trial court did not err by characterizing the initial filing as a postconviction petition and (2) the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to file a successive petition where defendant merely sought to rehash the same issues.

J. Schostok specially concurred, opining that the majority’s reliance on Cruz was misplaced.


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3rd District

People v. Weaver, 2013 IL App (3rd) 130054 (December 19, 2013) (J. Lytton) (Henry Co.):

Search & Seizure

The defendant appealed from his conviction for cannabis trafficking, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the “faint odor” of cannabis emanating from his backseat did not give the officers probable cause to search his trunk. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that although previous appellate court decisions had referred to the “strong odor” of cannabis emanating from vehicles, the “faint odor” of cannabis was sufficient to give officers the requisite probable cause to believe cannabis was located in the vehicle.

People v. Nelson, 2013 IL App (3rd) 120191 (December 19, 2013) (J. McDade) (Whiteside Co.):

Reasonable Doubt

The defendant appealed from his conviction on four counts of telephone harassment, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he performed a voluntary act, given that his expert testified that he made the calls as part of an involuntary “tic” caused by his Tourette’s syndrome.

The appellate court reversed, concluding that although acts performed pursuant to complex tics by persons with Tourette’s syndrome are not always involuntary, the uncontroverted expert testimony in this case showed that no rationale trier of fact could have concluded that the defendant performed voluntary acts in placing the offensive telephone calls.


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4th District

People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (4th) 130146 (December 18, 2013) (J. Pope) (Vermillion):

Evidence

The State appealed from the trial court’s order suppressing statements the defendant made during his custodial interrogation. The appellate court reversed, concluding that section 103-2.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—which bars the State from introducing a defendant’s statements because part of the recording of the statements is without audio—did not bar the statements in this case because (1) the State overcame the presumption of inadmissibility under the statute and (2) the State established that the statements were voluntary and reliable.

People v. Patterson, 2013 IL App (4th) 120287 (December 19, 2013) (J. Knecht) (Sangamon):

Other-Crimes Evidence

The defendant appealed from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly admitted other-crimes evidence in the form of (1) unredacted police interviews, (2) statements that he used knives and guns, and (3) testimony from two women that he had previously assaulted them.

The appellate court affirmed, concluding that (1) taken in context, the police interviews were not inadmissible or prejudicial other-crimes evidence, (2) the comments regarding guns and knives were interwoven into the narrative of events proceeding the murder and redacting them would have created confusion, (3) the testimony from two women that he had previously assaulted was admissible to prove absence of mistake.


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People v. Evans, 2014 IL App (4th) 120619 (January 22, 2014) (J. Knecht) (McLean):

Batson

Defendant appealed from his delivery-of-a-controlled-substance conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to find that the State peremptorily struck two prospective jurors on the sole basis of their race in violation of Batson. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction, concluding that because (1) the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of voir dire testimony showed that he may have had additional information about the potential juror, and (2) the side-by-side comparison to another juror indicated a discriminatory purpose, defendant was entitled to a new trial under Batson.

In re Raheem M, 2013 IL App (4th) 130585 (December 10, 2013) (J. Pope) (Vermillion):

Juvenile Sentencing

Defendant-minor appealed from his conviction and sentence for aggravated battery of a teacher and disorderly conduct. The appellate court affirmed but remanded for resentencing, concluding that (1) the evidence showed that the teacher suffered bodily harm when one of the chairs that defendant threw hit the teacher, but (2) the trial judge failed to consider the least restrictive alternative at sentencing.

J. Steigmann dissented, opining that although the sentencing hearing in this case was “lacking,” the appellate court should not consider issues that were not presented to the trial judge at sentencing, as the appellate court had previously stated in Rathbone and Montgomery.

5th District

No new cases of consequence.


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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Fields v. Wharrie, No. 13-1195 (January 23, 2014) (J. Posner)

Prosecutorial Immunity

The Seventh Circuit took a case in which two Illinois prosecutors claimed absolute immunity. The court rejected the prosecutors’ claim of absolute immunity—which protects prosecutors from civil claims for acts committed within the scope of their employment as prosecutors—because soliciting a witness to testify falsely was not within that scope of employment. A prosecutor cannot retroactively immunize himself from such conduct by claiming that the tort was not “completed” until trial, when, of course, he would be immune from that tort.

J. Sykes concurred in part and dissented in part, opining that although the prosecutors did not enjoy absolute immunity, qualified immunity applied—which applies “unless the acts violated a ‘clearly established’ constitutional norm[]”—because the act of soliciting false testimony at the investigation stage did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights (although it may have violated the witness’ at the time). Instead, that violation did not ‘mature’ until trial, at which point the prosecutor enjoyed full immunity because he was acting “quintessentially” as a prosecutor.


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Index: Page:

Accountability 8

Batson 6, 14

Due Process 6

Evidence 5, 7, 13

Fitness & Termination 2

Juvenile Sentencing 14

Leach 6

MSR 2

Other-Crimes Evidence 13

Prosecutorial Immunity 15

Proportionate Penalties 7

Reasonable Doubt 10, 12

Search & Seizure 5, 12

Sentencing 4

Statutory Summary Suspension 3

Surveillance Privilege 9

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act 3, 8, 9, 11

UUW 4, 5, 10


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