case digest special proceedings.docx

8/13/2019 case digest special proceedings.docx

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MARY ROSE P. CAMBEL

4thYear Juris Doctor

Special Proceedings Review

LSPU-Santa Cruz, Laguna

RULE 73

In re: in the matter of the petition to approve the will of ruperta palaganas with prayer for theappointment of special administrator, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN

GREGORIOPALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANASG.R. No. 169144

Facts:

Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized UnitedStates (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testamentshe executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio),as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.Respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed withthe a pe t i t i on fo r t he p robate o f Ruper ta s w i l l and fo r h i sappo in tment as special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners ManuelMiguel Palaganas (Ma nu e l) an d Be n ja m inGre gor io Pal aga nas (Ben jam in) , nep hew s of Rup ert a, opposed thepetition on the ground that Rupertaswill should not be probated in the Philippines but in

the U.S. where she executed it. The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting toprobate Ruper ta s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as specialadministrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in thewill; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Manuel andBenjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated willexecuted by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in thePhilippines. The CA affirmed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowedthe probate of the will. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules ofcourtd o e s n o t r e q u i r e p r i o r p r o b a t e a n d a l l o w a n c e o f t h e w i l l i nt h e c o u n t r y o f i t s execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. Thepresent case is different

f rom reprobate , wh ich re fe rs to a w i l l a l ready p robated and a l l owed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures.

Issue:

Whether o r no t a w i l l execu ted by a fo re igner abroad may beprobated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated andallowed in the country where it was executed.


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Held:

Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that ifthe decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province

where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of suchestate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, orlegatee named in the will,or any other person interested in the estate, may,at any time after the death of thetestator, petition the court having

ju ri sd ic tion to have the wi ll allowed, whether thesame be in his possess ion ornot, or is lost or destroyed.Our rules require merely that the petition for theallowance of a will mustshow, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the

ju ri sd ic tional facts ; (b ) the names,ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator ordecedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will hasnot been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody ofit. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residenceat the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or ifhe is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in suchprovince. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has alreadybeen allowed and probated in the country of its execution. In insisting thatRupertas will should have been firs t probated and allowed bythe court ofCalifornia, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind

theprocedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobateor re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country isdifferent from that probate where the will is presented for the first time beforeacompetent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rulesof Court. Contrary to petitionersstance, since this latter rule applies only toreprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. Inreprobate,the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreignprobate courtprovided its jurisdiction over the matter can beestablished.Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the

instituted heirsdo not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will,it is as good asdepriving them outright of their inheritance, since our lawrequires that no will shallpass either real or personal property unless the willhas been proved and allowed bythe proper court.

RULE 74


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UTULO v. VDA DE GARCIA (66 Phil 302)

Facts:

Juan, Patrocinio and Luzthe pendency of the administration proceedings of the fathers estate,Luz died w/o any legitimate descendants; her only forced heirs were her mother andhusband Pablo Utulo

commenced the judicial administration of Luzs estate; he askedthe court to be the administrator

was no occasion for judicial administration; and if there is, she had better right

that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of Juan

Issue:

Whether there was a need for appointment of administrator

Held:

There was no need for appointment of administratora general rule, when a person dies and fails to leave a will or he had left

one but failed to name an executor, the competent court should appoint a qualified

administrator

from the estate of the deceased, the heirs may agree in writing to partition of theproperty without instituting the judicial administration; (2) where the property left doesnot exceed P6,000, summary partition may be had without instituting the judicialadministration and the appointment of an administrator

administration or to apply for the appointment of an administrator in court it is costly,superfluous, and unnecessary since the heirs own the property from the moment ofdeath of the decedent

have standing in the proceedings of Juans estate; he could appear by right ofrepresentation

ERMAC v. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)

Facts:


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Spouses Ermac and Mariquit both died leaving a parcel of land as the onlyproperty to be inherited by heirs

MEDELO: grandson filed petition for summary settlement of the estate.

ERMAC: moved for reconsideration of the order of settlement claiming the landas belonging to him and his wife.

Issue:

W/N the approval of the project of partition was valid despite the claim of ERMACin a separate civil action?

Held:

The policy of the law is to terminate proceedings for the settlement of the estateof the deceased persons with the least loss of time.

Small estates: summary procedure dispensing with appointment of administrator

Not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just becausean heir or a third person claims that certain properties do not belong to the estate;properly ventilated in an independent action and probate court should proceed to thedistribution of the estate (subject to the results of suit).

Appropriate step: proper annotation of lis pendens.

RULE 75

FERNANDEZ v. DIMAGIBA (21 SCRA 428)

Facts:

1) Ismaela Dimagiba (respondent) submitted petition for probate of purported willof Benedicta delos Reyes as the sole heir of deceased. Later, heirs Dionisio Fernandez,et. al. (oppositors) filed opposition to the probate on grounds of forgery, vices ofconsent, laches, and revocation of the will on deeds of sale.

2) CFI found will genuine and properly executed but deferred resolution onestoppel and revocation grounds until intrinsic validity will be passed upon. Oppositorsinsisted that estoppel and revocation issues be considered but CFI overruled claim untilopportune time. Later, CFI ruled that Benedictas will was unrevoked by deeds of sale.

3) CA admitted will to probate and upheld finality for lack of opportune appeal,that it was appealable independently of issue of revocation, affirmed CFI.

Issues:


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1) W/n decree of CFI allowing probate had become final for lack of appeal?2) W/n order overruling estoppel had become final?3) w/n Benedictas will had been impliedly revoked by her deeds of sale?

Held:

1) YES, CA correct, CFI decree allowing probate is final.Finality of probate decree: A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questionsconcerning capacity of the testator and proper execution and witnessing of his last willand testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and unenforceable orotherwise. As such, the probate order is final and appealable, and it is so recognized byexpress provisions of Sec. 1 of Rule 109 (see enumeration of 6 instances when appealmay be taken in special proceedings)

2) YES, CA correct, order overruling estoppel final. Estoppel cannot be raised in

probate proceedings: The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of publicpolicy, being primarily designed to protect the testators expressed wishes , w/c areentitled to respect as a consequence of the decedents ownersh ip and right ofdispossession within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to beevaded on the pretext of estoppel. W/n the order overruling the allegation of estoppel isstill appealable or not, the defense is patently meritorious.

3) NO, revocation of will doubtful; CA correct, existence of any change from originalintent of testatrix Benedicta is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that subsequentalienations made in favor of legatee Dimagiba and she paid no considerationwhatsoever, making it more doubtful that in conveying property to legatee, testatrix

Benedicta merely intended to comply in advance with her testament, rather than adeparture therefrom.

RULE 76

MERCADO v. SANTOS (66 SCRA 215)

Facts:

Mercado filed in CFI Pampanga a petition for probate of will of deceased wifeInes Basa. Without any opposition and upon testimony of witness Gabino (attesting

witness), admitted to probate. THREE YEARS LATER, five invtervenors moved ex parteto reopen the probate alleging lack of jurisdiction. DENIED because of ex parte. Secondfiling of the motion to open the proceeding, again denied.

SIXTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE PROBATE OF THE WILL, intervenor Basa deLeon filed with Justice of Peace of San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint againstMercado for falsification or forgery of the will. Mercado was arrested. Complainantwithdrew complaint.


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THREE MONTHS later, same intervenor charged Mercado for same offense in

Mexico, Pampanga. The complaint was dismissed after investigation, at the instance ofcomplainant due to his poor health.

NINE MONTHS later, same charge against same person. This time filed by fiscalof Pampanga in Justice of Peace Court of Mexico. Case dismissed after investigationbecause will was already probated. Provincial Fiscal moved in CFI Pampanga forreinvestigation. CFI Granted.

FOURTH TIME, Mercado was arrested. Mercado filed a demurrer on ground ofprobate. Overruled. Case proceeded to trial. He filed with CA an injunction. CA issuedinjunction.

Issues:

1. Whether the probate of petitioners deceased wifes will is a bar to prosecution offorgery.

2. Whether petitioner was denied constitutional right to speedy trial.

Held:

Several foreign decisions were cited. It can go either way. Others saying that canbe impugned on ground of fraud. Sec. 306 of Code of Civil Procedure said that in anaction or special proceeding, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of thething, the will or administration or condition or relation of the person provided that onlybe a prima facie evidence of the death of the testator conclusive as to its DUEEXECUTION (Sec. 625). Sec. 625 was taken almost bodily from Statutes of Vermont.Conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world (in rem), reason whypublication is a prerequisite. Conclusive presumption that judgment or order of a courtwhen declared by this Code of Civil Procedure are conclusive. State v. Mc Glynn (U.S.case). Although in said case the information was filed by the State to set aside theprobate on forgery, we do not see difference in principle. ONLY A SUBTLEDISTINCTION between setting aside a probate decree and declaring probated will to beforgery. You would still disturb the decree.

No fixed standard and conflict of authorities so the Court chose the mostconsistent with statutory law. Here, forgery is discovered after probate and prosecutionbefore the prescription. Code provides an adequate remedy to any party adverselyaffected by probate application for relief within reasonable time but no caseexceeding SIX MONTHS after court judgment.


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RULE 77

LEON & GHEZZI v. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE CO. (90 Phil. 459)

Facts:

Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in New York leaving a willwhich was duly probate in the Surrogates Court of New York country on August 3. Theestate having been settled, the proceedings were closed. The will devised his estateand personal effects to Mercedes de Leon (residing in the Philippines) but sinceMercedes is not of sound judgments and discretion in handling of money (she is a minorat the time she became devisee), she will only be given a sum ofmoney sufficient for hercurrent needs. James Ross, the trustee, bought an annuity from Manufacturers LifeInsurance where a monthly payment of $57.60 will be given to Mercedes during herlifetime. On September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butlers will for probate in the CFIof Manila. Mercedes and the appointed administrator (Ghezzi) filed a motion for thecitation of the manager of Manufacturers Life Insurance, Manila Branch to render acomplete accounting of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed this petition for probateso that she can get hold at once of the entire amount invested in the annuity.) The courtdenied the motion.

Issues:

Whether or not the administratrix (Ghezzi) can administer the properties ofButler.

Held:

No. The general rule is that the administration extends only to the assets of adecedent found within the state or country where it was granted. Hence, the funds inquestion (annuity) are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Havingbeen invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country,Canada is the situs of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds havebeen transferred or removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the handsof the Manila branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butlers estate and is beyond thecontrol of the court because it has passed completely in the hands of the company byvirtue of the contract of annuity.

RULE 78

GUERRERO v. TERAN (13 Phil 212)

Facts:


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Guerrero, (as guardian of the minors Munoz) commenced an action againstTeran to recover the sum of P4,129.56 and costs. The amount represents the amountdue by the estate of Antonio Munoz, which Teran had been the administrator, to theminors Munoz.

The lower court found from the evidence that the estate of Antonio Munoz owed

the plaintiff the sum of P3,447.46.

Issue:

Whether Teran is liable.

Held:

No Teran is not liable.

Teran was appointed as the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez and

guardian of the minors Munoz only for the period September 17, 1901 to March 17,1902. However, from March 18, 1902 to October 6, 1906, Teran was replaced by MariaMunoz as the guardian of the minors Munoz.Therefore, Maria Munoz is responsible tosaid minors for the administration of their interest in the estate of Antonio Sanchez fromthe time of her acceptance of said appointment on March 18, 1902 up to the time of herremoval on October 6, 1906 based on the ground that she was not a resident of thePhilippines. If during this time she allowed other persons tohandle the property of herwards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the responsibility must fallupon her. However, she may have a right of action against such persons for any lossoccasioned by their negligence or corruption.

Since the record did not disclose that any of the amounts claimed by the plaintiffarose during the time while the said defendant was administering their interest therein,only the sum of P188.39 (the amount acknowledged by defendant in the lower court ashis liability)

Side issue: Appointment of Resident Administrators or Guardians

There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only asadministrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding that there is no statutoryrequirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons asadministrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of ourcourts here.

NAVAS v. GARCIA (44 Phil. 711)

Facts:


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Navas is the surviving spouse of Geronima Uy. He is contesting an order of theCourt of First Instance of Samar which appointed Jose Garcia as the administrator ofthe estate of Geronima Uy. He maintains that he should be appointed as administratorinstead of Jose Garcia.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in not appointing him as administrator.

Held:

No, the lower court did not commit an error.

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferentialrights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceasedspouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential right is unsuitable, the court may

appoint another person. The determination of a persons suitability as administrator rest,to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power ofappointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appearsaffirmatively that the court below was in error.

In the present case, it appeared on record that appellant had adverse interests inthe estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator.Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to thoseimmediately interested in the estate.

RULE 79

DOLORES B. GUICO, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants vs. PABLO G. BAUTISTA, ET.AL., defendants and appellees.

Facts:

The petitioner in this case filed a case of partition despite the existence of debtsof the decedent.

Issue:

The petitioner urges that their action for partition and liquidation may bemaintained, notwithstanding that there are pending obligations of the estate, subject tothe taking of adequate measures either for the payment or the security of its creditors. Ishis contention correct?


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Held:

No.

There is no question that the law allows the partition of the estate of a deceasedperson by the heirs, extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition, without thefiling of a special proceeding and the appointment of an administrator for the purpose ofthe settlement of said estate, but this they may do only "if the decedent left no debts andthe heirs and legatees are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicialguardians". The reason is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations,there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to administer the estate forthem and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediatelyentitled.

The situation is different, however, where the deceased left pending obligations.In such cases, such obligations must be first paid or compounded with the creditorsbefore the estate can be divided among the heirs; and unless they reach an amicablesettlement as to how such obligations should be settled, the estate would inevitably besubmitted to administration for the payment of such debts. As compared to ordinarypartition, the regular estate proceedings offer the advantage of requiring all creditors ofthe deceased to disclose themselves and submit their respective claims within acomparatively short period (12 months under Rule 87, unless claims are contingent),otherwise, they are forever barred; while in ordinary judicial partitions the creditors'claims are only extinguished by the expiration of the period of extinctive prescription. Anheir, therefore, may have an interest in making sure that the share allocated to him willbe freed from invisible claims, so that creditors may not later appear and initiate the veryestate proceedings sought to be avoided, and he may properly object to an action forpartition on this ground. Unless, therefore, all the heirs are agreeable to assuming

personal liability for all the decedent's obligations, those known as well as thoseundisclosed, regular estate proceedings cannot be avoided.

Appellants claim that there is nothing that would prevent the trial court fromdirecting and ordering that the pending obligations of the estate be paid first, or that theyshould constitute as liens on the respective shares to be received by the heirs. In otherwords, appellants propose that the administration of the estate for the purpose of payingoff its debts be accomplished right in this partition suit, with either the Court performingthe duties of the administrator, or an administrator appointed to take care of such debts,as prayed for in their complaint. Obviously, an ordinary action for partition cannot be

converted into a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased, withoutcompliance with the procedure outlined by Rules 79-90 of the Rules of Court, especiallythe provisions on publication and notice to creditors.

RULE 80

JARODA v. CUSI JR. (28 SCRA 1008)


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Facts:

this case) for Carlos Abrilles estate.

was his 19% share in the co-ownership known asJuna Subdivision.

ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of the sums of P109,886.42 andP72,644.66 from PNB, which sums were not listed in his petition for administration asamong the properties left by the deceased. He alleged that these sums were depositedin the name of thedeceased but that they actually belong to, and were held in trust for,the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. The court granted the petition.

-owners of the Juna Subdivision, apower of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to "sell (or) dispose upon termsand conditions as he deems wise" the lots in the subdivision. Only after this was heissued letters of administration.

tor, Tan filed a petition with the respondent court, allegingthat the deceased was the manager of and a co-owner in the Juna Subdivision and thathe had been engaged in the business of selling the lots, and praying for the approval bythe court of the power of attorney executed by him, in behalf of the intestate estate, andappointing and authorizing himself to sell the lots. The court granted the petition.

withdrawals from PNB and 2. Approving the power of attorney.

Issue 1:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction by allowing the special administrator to withdraw the bank depositsstanding in the name of the decedent?

Held:

Yes.

In the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of aspecial administrator. (Check Sec 2, Rule 80 for powers and duties)

In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing of, theheirs of the deceased.


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and charge of the credits of the estate, but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by thespecial administrator of aprima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the bankdeposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who were allegedly claimingthe same.

sed; they, therefore, belongprima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is shown by properevidence at the proper stage, when money claims may be filed in the intestateproceedings, the special administrator is without power to make the waiver or to handover part of the estate, or what appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to otherpersons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof.

even to sell for valuable consideration property of the estate requires priorwritten notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89 of theRules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable for disposing

gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers. Admittedly, no such noticewas given, and without it the court's authority is invalid and improper.

Issue 2:

Whether or not the respondent judge acted in abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction by approving the power of attorney executed by Tan appointing andauthorizing himself to sell the lots?

Held:

Yes, the order is void for want of notice and for approving an improper contract ortransaction.

quires "written notice to the heirs, devisees,and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold" and, admittedly, administratorTan did not furnish such notice.

a trustee

herself as an individual in any transaction concerning the trust property

-contracts may be permissible but should not be made to applyto administrators of a deceased estate. A contrary ruling would open the door to fraudand maladministration, and once the harm is done, it might be too late to correct it.


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In approving the power of attorney, the court allowed Tan to be an agent orattorney-in-fact for two principals: the court and the heirs of the deceased on the onehand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the other.

e respondent Tan rendered him incapable of

independent defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. Itis highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealingwith property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers aswell as to those of the court that appointed him.

A judicial administrator should be at all times subject to the orders of theappointing Tribunal and of no one else.

RULE 81

ROXAS v. PECSON (82 Phil 407)Facts:

respondents in this case), filed a petition for the administration of Pablos estate in aspecial intestate proceeding in Bulacan.

ecial administratrix

petition for the probate of Pablos alleged will and for her appointment as executrix ofhis estate.

intestate proceedings were dismissed upon agreement of the parties.

of Natividad as special administratrix. However, since she qualified, the widow wasappointed to the position.

witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the testator. The case

is now pending on appeal.

Roxas as special administratrix or special co-administratrix

as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria


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as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to thedeceased.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction inappointing two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas?Held:

YES.

certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well asthe statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator undersection 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection orremoval of special administrator.

the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in theselection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, notwhimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

especially if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the presentcase, for according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, onlyafter the dowry andparaphernalia of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugalpartnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may be

liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach.

every action which one of them may institute to recover properties or credit of thedeceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the defense that the plaintiffhas no cause of action, because the property or credit in issue belongs to the classwhich is being administered by the other administrator, which cannot be done if theadministrator of the entire estate is only one.

As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed toadminister, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows

that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily saidestate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who isappointed to act in lieu of the general administrator.

y in granting letters testamentary or of administrationoccasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of will, or from any othercause, the court may appoint a special administrator to collect and take charge of the


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estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executorsor administrators thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81).

RULE 82

GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112)

Facts:

1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of herfour childrenGONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices.

2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband whowas receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES asco-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trustand had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and theheirs.

3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file theiropposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed theremoval of GONZALES.

4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled.It was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the twochildren as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES tomanage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate.

5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied.

Issue:

Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALESshould be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was notshown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of theRules of Court.

Held:

Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated.

1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckonedwith is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is thatthose who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of theestate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or


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mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer theestate correctly.

2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitlethem to protection from removalwithout just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides

the legal and specific causes authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a courtmust have some fact legally before it, in order to justify a removal.

3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified inOLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges broughtagainst GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact thatconflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that theformer had been absent from the country for a little less than a year.

4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it wasshown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties

(sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from LandBank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be anadministrator of the estate.

5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish toreinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on thewhims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, or on the beliefof the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.

DELA CRUZ v. CAMON (16 SCRA 886)

Facts:

- Estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of two-fourths(2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario in Negros Occidental.

- The whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon long before the presentintestate proceedings were commenced

- the administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct EmilioCamon to pay the estate's two-fourths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the

crop years 1948-1949 through 1960-1961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00; and onthe rice land, P2,100.00.

- Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person.

- The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion bythe administrator but by independent action."


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- Dela Cruz the administrator appealed

Issue:

Whether the demand for rentals against Camon may be decided upon by theProbate Court?

Held:

No. It must be decided in a separate action.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental over thesubject matter herein is beyond debate. However, acting as a probate court, said courtis primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.

With the foregoing as parting point, let us look at the administrator's claim forrentals allegedly due. The amount demanded is not, by any means, liquidated.Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses. Compromise, payment, statute oflimitations, lack of cause of action and the like, may be urged to defeat theadministrator's case and should be threshed out in a full trial on the merits.

Also, Paula vs. Escay, et al., teaches us that: "When the demand is in favor ofthe administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under thecourt's jurisdiction, the demand cannot be by mere motion by the administrator, but byan independent action against the third person."6 The line drawn in the Escay casegives us a correct perspective in the present. The demand is for money due allegedly

for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him againsthis will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. We are fortified in our view bythe more recent pronouncement of this court7 that even "matters affecting propertyunder judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the courseof intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced"

RULE 83

HEIRS OF GREGOIRE v. BAKER (51 Phil 75)

Facts:

- One J.H. Ankrom died; respondent Administrator included in the estate a tractof land worth P60,000

- Petitioners Heirs of Gregoire filed a claim against the estate of Ankrom forabout P70,000, which was allowed


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- Later on the respondent administrator discovers that Ankrom had executed amortgage on the property here in question in favor of the Philippine Trust Company tosecure that company from liability on a note in the amount of P20,000.00, of the samedate, upon which it had made itself contingently liable; Two days after this mortgagehad been executed Ankrom appears to have made an assignment of all his interest in

the mortgaged property to one J. G. Jung, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for a purportedconsideration of the sum of P1 and other good and valuable considerations.

- In view of these conveyances by his intestate, the administrator presented anamended inventory, omitting therefrom the tract of 930 hectares with its improvementsthereon, the same being the land covered by the transfers above mentioned.

- The courts initially ordered the inclusion of the land considering that without itthe estate would be insolvent, but later on reversed

- Petitioners appeal, claiming that the assignment to Jung by Ankrom of the

equity of redemption of the latter in the tract of land above mentioned was affected infraud of creditors, and that it was the duty of the administrator to retain the possessionof this tract of land and thereby place upon Jung, or persons claiming under him, theburden of instituting any action that may be necessary to maintain the rights of thetransferee under said assignment.

Issue:

w/n the contentions of the petitioners are correct; what is the remedy of thecreditors?

Held:

Yes.

- The precise remedy open to the appellants in the predicament above describedis clearly pointed pout in section 713 of our Code of Civil Procedure, which reads asfollows: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor oradministrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person made in hislife-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or personal estate or of a right orinterest therein, as is stated in the preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by

license of the court, if the executor or administrator hasnot commenced such action,commence and prosecute to final judgment, in the name of the executor oradministrator, an action for the recovery of the same and may recover for the benefit ofthe creditors, such real or personal estate, or interest therein so conveyed. But suchaction shall not be commenced until the creditor files in court a bond with sufficientsurety, to be approved by the judge, conditioned to indemnify the executor oradministrator against the costs of such action. Such creditor shall have a lien upon the


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judgment by him so recovered for the costs incurred and such other expenses as thecourt deems equitable.

- The remedy of the appellants is, therefore, to indemnify the administratoragainst costs and, by leave of court, to institute an action in the name of the

administrator to set aside the assignment or other conveyance believed to have beenmade in fraud of creditors.

RULE 84

PHIL. TRUST CO. v. LUZON SURETY (2 SCRA 122)

Facts:

PICARD was appointed as administrator of the Intestate Estate of James Burt;

filed an administrators bond with LUZON SURETY as his suretysubsequentlydismissed and replaced by Philippine Trust Co.

Court issued an order for PICARD to account for an amount with the PNB as partof the inventory of the estate of Burt. PICARD was found guilty of estafa for havingdisbursed funds of the estate without authority.

Court ordered LUZON SURETY to show cause why the administrators bondshould not be confiscated.

Issue:

W/n the probate court can order the confiscation of the administrators bond?

Held:

Yes. The probate court may have the bond executed in the same probateproceeding.

A probate court is possessed with all-embracing power not only in requiring butalso in fixing the amount and executing or forfeiting the administrators bond; execution

or forfeiture of the bond- necessary part and incident of the administration proceedings

Surety is bound upon the terms of the bond of the principal, as Picard failed tofaithfully execute the orders and decrees of court, the obligations remains in full forceand effect; surety- not entitled to notice in the settlement of the accounts of the executoror administrator, privy to the proceedings against his principal.

RULE 85


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LACSON v. REYES (182 SCRA 729)

Facts:

Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of the last will and

testament of Carmelita Farlin, in his capacity as counsel for the heirs and as executorunder the will. He then filed a motionfor attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging thatthe heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal services rendered the sum ofP68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and alleged that the sum agreed upon was onlyP7,000.00 which was already paid. Lower court granted the motion.

Issue:

Whether or not Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees.

Held:

No. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction.Second, The Rules of Court provides that an administrator or executor may be allowedfees for the necessary expenses he has incurred as such, but he may not recoverattorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by the rule but suchcompensation is in the nature of executors or administrators commissions, and neveras attorneys fees. Where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it thelatter who must pay therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00can be recovered from the heirs and not from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.

RULE 86

MANUEL BARREDO vs COURT OF APPEALS,GR No. L-17863

Facts:

On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring themtheir claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from thedate of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by theadministrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim tocollect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorneysfees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favorof FaustoBarredo over the leasehold rights of Mc D nough The original lease, theextension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificateof title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also madeby the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.
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The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it afterhearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to inSection 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of

the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administratorargues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from theexpiration of the regular 6-month period.

Issue:

WON the tardy claim will be allowed.

Held:

No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficientcause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing ofcause for failure to present said claim on time.

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, andthe same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not meanthat the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed bythe court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate courts discretion in allowing a claim afterthe regularperiod for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not onlyclaim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing theclaim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of thepapers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now

deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by thepetitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgageembodying the instant claim,(as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by theJapanese military authorities.)

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, becauseunder Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit abelated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.

MELGAR v. BUENVIAJE (179 SCRA 196)

Facts:

Balla and driven by Domingo Casinswerved to the left lane and collided head-on with a Ford Fiera (a service jeep) ownedby Mateo Lim Relucio and driven by Ruben Lim Relucio coming from the oppositedirection. The bus swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on with anotherpassenger bus owned by Benjamin Flores and driven by Fabian Prades. Felicidad Balla


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and Domingo Casin died on the spot. Drivers Ruben Lim Relucio and Fabian Pradesalso died.

of Fabian Prades, filed a complaint against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla for

damages. The spouses Prades alleged that Casin drove in a reckless and imprudentmanner which was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the incident which resulted tothe death of Fabian Prades, and that the estate of deceased Felicidad Balla should beheld liable for damages, since Felicidad Balla allowed her driver Casin to driverecklessly and not observing the required diligence in the selection and supervision ofher employee, despite her presence in the passenger bus.

icidad's children moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that thecomplaint states no cause of action against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect tohold the children liable for the alleged negligence of their deceased mother. They saidwhat was proper was to sue the estate of said deceased person inasmuch as the last

portion of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court means that the creditor shouldinstitute the proper intestate proceedings wherein which he may be able to interpose hisclaim. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Important note: there were no intestateproceedings to settle Felicidad's estate.

motion to admit amended complaint together with an amended complaint, amending thetitle of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla asrepresented by the children named in the original complaint. The court issued an orderdenying the MR and admitting the amended complaint. Felicidad's children then filed apetition for certiorari assailing the denial of the MTD.

Held:

SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and upheld the assailed order.

Under Section 5 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, actions that are abated by deathare:

(1) All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express orimplied, whether the same be due, not due or contingent;

(2) All claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of thedecedent; and

(3) Judgments for money against the decedent (Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 959[1962]).

It is evident that the case at bar is not among those enumerated. Actions fordamages caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant survive the death of the latter.


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The action can therefore be properly brought under Section 1, Rule 87 of the

Rules of Court, against an executor or administrator. The rule provides:

Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor oradministrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interestthereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions torecover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the state, or to enforce alien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real orpersonal, may be commenced against him.

The point of controversy is however on the fact that no estate proceedings existfor the reason that her children had not filed any proceedings for the settlement of herestate, claiming that Felicidad Balla left no properties.

RULE 87

WARNER BARNES v. LUZON SURETY (95 Phil 924)

Facts:

-Plaintiff, Warner, Barnes & Co., filed a complaint in the CFI against defendant,Luzon Surety, for the recovery of P6000, plus costs and P1500 for attorneys fees. Thebasis for the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga asadministratrix of the Interstate Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in Special Proceedings No.

452of the CFI of Negros Occidental.

-The complaint alleges that plaintiff had a duly approved claim against the estateof P6,485.02; that administratrix violated theconditions of her bond (i.e. failed to fileinventory, failed to pay approved claim of plaintiff, failed to render a true and justaccount of her administration); and that defendant, as surety failed to pay plaintiffnotwithstanding the latters demand.

-CFI rendered a summary judgment sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiffP6000, P900attys fees + costs.

Issue:

[1] W/N the lower court has jurisdiction to pass upon the liability of defendantunder the bond in question.

[2] W/N plaintiff should first file a claim against the estate of the deceasedadministratrix, in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.


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Held:

[1] Defendant contends that the lower court had no jurisdiction to pass upon itsliability under the bond in question, because it is only the probate court that can hold asurety accountable for any breach by the administratrix of her duty.

-Court held that although the probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture orenforcement of an administrators bond, the same matter may be litigated in an ordinarycivil action brought before the Court of First Instance.

-Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the bond isexpressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of thedeceased Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly inhis name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.

[2] Defendant alleged that plaintiff should have first filed a claim against the

Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga in conformity with Sec.6 of Rule87 providing that where the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with anotherdebtor, the claim shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor,without prejudice to the right of the state to recover contribution from the other debtor.

-Apart from the fact that this defense was not pleaded either in a motion todismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it appears that even as the presentcomplaint was filed, there were no proceedings for the administration of her estate.Where there are no proceedings for the administration of the estate of the deceasedadministrator, the creditor may enforce his bond against the surety which bound itself

jointly and severally in the case where the bond was filed.

RULE 88

AGUAS v. LILEMOS (5 SCRA 959)

Facts:

Francisco Salinas and spouses Felix and Maria Aguas filed a complaint forrecovery of damages from Hermogenes Llemos averring that Hermogenes served themby registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice that thesame would be submitted to the said court of Samar on February 23, 1960 at 8: 00a.m.; that in view of the copy and notice served, plaintiffs proceeded to the court fromtheir residence in Manilaaccompanied by their lawyers, only to discover that no suchpetition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court,so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them mentalanguish and undue embarrassment.

Before defendant can answer the complaint, he died. The plaintiffs amendedtheir compliant to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss


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which was granted by the court on the ground that the legal representative, and not theheirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being forrecovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claimfiled therein.

Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint?

Held:

NO

Rule 87 provides for actions that are abated by death are: (1) claims for funeralexpenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and(3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied".

None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants. It is not enough that the claimagainst the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express orimplied" which according to Leung Ben vs. O'Brien includes all purely personalobligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Rule 88 on the other hand enumerates actions that survive against a decedent'sexecutors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personalproperty from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recoverdamages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages underthe last class.

RULE 89

PAREDES v. MOYA

Facts:

Petitioner Severino Paredes sued his employer, August Kuntze, for collection ofseparation and overtime pay in the CFI-Manila. Paredes prevailed, and Kuntze

appealed to the CA. Kuntze died pending appeal and was substituted by theadministratrix of his estate. The CA dismissed the appeal for the administratrixs failure

to file the printed record on appeal, and the record of the case was remanded. Paredesfiled a motion for execution, so the provincial Sheriff of Rizal levied on the properties of

August Kuntze. Paredes was the highest bidder at the auction sale conducted by theSheriff. In spite of a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution filed by the Administratrix stillpending resolution, Paredes sold the property to co-petitioner Victorio Ignacio.


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Respondent Court (Judge Moya) set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriff's Saleand Public Auction of the property without prejudice to the filing of the judgment as aclaim in the proceedings for settlement of the estate of the deceased.

Issue:

W/N the CFI correctly set aside the Writ of Execution and the Sheriffs Sale andPublic Auction.

Held:

YES. In the case of a money claim where the defendant dies while appeal ispending, the appeal should not be dismissed; it should continue, but the deceaseddefendant should be substituted by his legal representativeexecutor or administratorof the estate. If the lower court is affirmed, the plaintiff must go to the probate court foran order directing the executor or administrator to satisfy the judgment. The CFI thatoriginally rendered the judgment has no power to order its execution and levy on theproperties of the deceased because the same are already in custodia legis in theprobate court where administration proceedings for the settlement of the estate of thedeceased defendant are already pending (see Section 21, Rule 3)

If the defendant dies after final judgment has been rendered by the CFI, as in thecase at bar, the action survives. The appeal should proceed with the deceaseddefendant being substituted by his legal representative. This would prevent a uselessrepetition of presenting anew before the probate court the evidence already presentedin the CFI on the validity of the claim. Consequently, contrary to respondents' claim, the

judgment against the deceased Kuntze became final and executory; it was not arrestedby his death.

It was error on the part of the plaintiff Paredes, now one of the petitioners, tohave the money judgment in his favor executed against the properties of the deceasedKuntze.

The proper remedy of Paredes should have been to file his claim in theadministration proceedings of the estate of the deceased defendant Kuntze because allclaims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses andexpenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against thedecedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice to the creditors.


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The respondent court correctly nullified the order of execution pursuant to thejudgment, which became final and executory, and the corresponding levy on executionand the public auction sale.

The judgment for money against the deceased stands in the same footing as allclaims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses andexpenses for the last sickness of the decedent, (1st sentence, Sec. 5, Rule 86 of theRules of Court), Rule 86 of the Rules of Court), although the validity of the money claimcovered by a judgment against the decedent which has already become final andexecutory can no longer be litigated in the court where administration proceedings forthe settlement of the properties of the deceased are still pending, unlike the othermoney claims whose validity may yet be challenged by the executor or administrator.

The writ of execution was not the proper procedure for the payment of debts andexpenses of the administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order theadministratrix to make the payment; and if there is no sufficient cash on hand, to orderthe sale of the properties and out of the proceeds to pay the debts and expenses of theadministration.

The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against theestate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claimbefore the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay theamount thereof.

To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court ofFirst Instance of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-2360, Dec. 29, 1949, thus: . . . a writ of executionis not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and

expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale ofpersonal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts orexpenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage.The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administratorand with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in thePhilippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or

mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7,should be complied with. Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees orheirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior tosettlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is laterascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the courthaving jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle theamount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person


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shall contribute, and may issue executionif circumstances require" (Rule 39, section 6;see also Rule 74, section 4;). And this is not the instant case.

The same rule must be applied in connection with money judgments against thedeceased that have already become final, such as the money judgment in favor of

Paredes. No writ of execution should issue against the properties of the deceased. Theclaim for satisfaction of the money judgment should be presented in the probate courtfor payment by the administrator.

The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestateproceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to theestate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until saidproperties have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendencyof the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legisand the proper procedure is not toallow the sheriff, in the case of court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the

court for an order to require the administrator to pay the amount due from the estateand required to be paid. In this jurisdiction, a void judgment or order is in legal effect no

judgment or order. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Beingworthless, it neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claimsflowing from it are void.

RULE 90

DE JESUS VS. DAZA

Facts:

Justina S. Vda de Manglapus purchased from Sixto de Jesus and NataliaAlfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the rights, interest, and participation of the said Sixtoand Natalia in the testate estate of Gavino de Jesus, particularly, the two parcels ofland. These parcels of land were assigned to Sixto and Natalia as their shares in thesame testate estate based on the project of partition duly approved by the probatecourt. The sale was also approved by the probate court.

After learning of the aforesaid sale, petitioners instituted an action in the CFI ofBatangas for legal redemption against respondent Vda. de Manglapus. While the lattercase is pending appeal, Vda. de Manglapus in the estate of the deceased Gavino deJesus asked the CFI of Batangas to order the provincial sheriff of said province to takeimmediate possession of the parcels of land in controversy, which was in thepossession of the petitioners, and to deliver them to her afterwards. The petition wasgranted and delivery was subsequently made by the sheriff.


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Issue:

W/N the respondent judge, presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction to orderthe delivery of the possession of the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent Vda. deManglapus within the same estate proceeding and not in an independent ordinary

action.

Held:

YES (this case is based on the old rules of court). From the admitted fact that theprobate court had already approved the project of partition without any reservation as topayment of debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowances to thewidow, or inheritance tax, it would appear that the estate was ready for distribution,pursuant to Rule 91, section 1 (now Rule 90 section 1). Neither party has made anyrepresentation to the contrary in this case.

The very fact that petitioners lodged an action for legal redemption with the Court ofFirst Instance of Batangas by commencing a civil case carries with it an implied butnecessary admission on the part of said petitioners that the sale to respondent Vda. deManglapus of the shares of Sixto and Natalia was valid. The sale was duly approved bythe probate court. By the effects of that sale and its approval by the probate court thepurchaser stepped into the shoes of the sellers for the purposes of the distribution of theestate, and Rule 91, section 1 (now Rule 90 section 1), confers upon such purchaser,among other rights, the right to demand and recover the share purchased by her not

only from the executor or administrator, but also from any other person having the samein his possession.

It is evident that the probate court, having the custody and control of the entireestate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same estateproceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power andfunction of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiringthe parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commenceand litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question that if the executor oradministrator has the possession of the share to be delivered the probate court would

have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to deliver thatpossession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or equitable, fordenying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the same estateproceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession of "any otherperson," especially when "such other person" is one of the heirs themselves who arealready under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same estate proceeding.


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1This case is also assigned under Rule 90 Section 1-3. There is no discussion relevantto Rule 89 section 8-9.

RULE 91

(Section 1)

THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., VS. COLEGIO DESAN JOSE, INC., ET AL.

Facts:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court which denied the petition forescheat filed by the said petitioners, with the costs against the latter.

This case was commenced in the said by a petition filed by the petitioners inbehalf of the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, wherein they claim theHacienda de San Pedro Tunasa by the right of escheat.

Issue:

W/NCOLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL. may be parties to the case?

Yes.

W/N the land is proper subject of escheat?

No.

Held:

The sworn petition which gave rise to the proceeding is based upon theprovisions of section 750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the English text ofwhich reads:

SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies intestate without heirs. When aperson dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippines Islands,leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president and municipalcouncil of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an inhabitant ofthese Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of theIslands, may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a petition with the Court of FirstInstance of the province for an inquisition in the premises

SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. If, at the time appointed for thethat purpose, the court that the person died intestate, seized of real or personal property


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in the Islands, leaving no heirs or person entitled to the same and no sufficient cause isshown to the contrary, the court shall order and decree that the estate of the deceasedin these Islands, after the payment of just debts and charges, shall escheat

Escheat, under sections 750 and 751, is a proceeding whereby the real and

personal property of a deceased person become the property of the State upon hisdeath without leaving any will or legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action contemplated bysection 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but a special proceeding in accordance withthe said section. The proceeding, as provided by section 750, should be commenced bypetition and not by complaint.

In a special proceeding for escheat under section 750 and 751 the petitioner isnot the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right orinterest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise and interest and necessaryparty and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case theColegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material

interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; and the former because it claims to bethe exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claim to be the lesseethereof under a contract legality entered with the former.

According to the allegations of the petition, the petitioners base their right to theescheat upon the fact that the temporal properties of the Father of the Society of Jesus,among them, the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, were confiscated by order of theKing of Spain and passed from then on to the Crown of Spain. If the hacienda de SanPedro Tunasan,, which is the only property sought to be escheated and adjudicated tothe municipality of San Pedro, has already passed to the ownership of theCommonwealth of the Philippines, it is evident that the petitioners cannot claim that the

same be escheated to the said municipality, because it is no longer the case of realproperty owned by a deceased person who has not left any heirs or person who maylegality claim it, these being the conditions required by section 750 and without which apetition for escheat should not lie from the moment the hacienda was confiscated by theKingdom of Spain, the same ceased to be the property of the children of EstebanRodriguez de Figueroa, the Colegio de San Jose or the Jesuit Father, and became theproperty of the Commonwealth of the Philippines by virtue of the transfer under theTreaty of Paris, alleged in the petition.

RULE 92

GONZALES v. AGUINALDO (190 SCRA 112)

Facts:

1. In the intestate proceedings of the deceased Ramona Gonzales, two of herfour childrenGONZALES and OLBES were appointed as co-administratrices.


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2. Later on, while GONZALES was in the US to accompany her husband whowas receiving medical treatment there, OLBES filed a motion to remove GONZALES asco-administratrix on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trustand had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and theheirs.

3. An order was issued requiring GONZALES and other parties to file theiropposition. The other child of the deceased, Fabis, was the only one who opposed theremoval of GONZALES.

4. Thereafter, the letters of administrator granted to GONZALES was cancelled.It was held that although it would be in the best interest of the estate to have the twochildren as administrators, since GONZALES was presently absent and left OLBES tomanage the estate, there should be now only one administrator of the estate.

5. The motion for reconsideration of her removal was subsequently denied.

Issue:

Whether the order cancelling the letters of administration granted to GONZALESshould be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was notshown to be anchored on any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 82 of theRules of Court

Held:

Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. GONZALES reinstated.

1. In the appointment of the administrator, the principal consideration reckonedwith is the interest of the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is thatthose who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of theestate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence ormismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer theestate correctly.

2. Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitlethem to protection from removalwithout just cause. Hence, section 2 of Rule 92 provides the legal and specific causes

authorizing the removal of an administrator. Thus, a court must have some fact legallybefore it, in order to justify a removal.

3. IN this case, the removal was not based on any of the causes specified inOLBES motion. Neither was there a determination of the validity of the charges broughtagainst GONZALES. On the other hand, the removal was based on the fact thatconflicts and misunderstandings existed between GONZALES and OLBES and that theformer had been absent from the country for a little less than a year.


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4. Contrary to the bare allegations of failure to manage and incompetence, it was

shown that despite being in the US, GONZALES continued to perform her duties(sending a letter of authorization to OLBES to receive interests accruing from LandBank). Also, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an

administrator of the estate.

5. Reliance by the lower court on the fact that 2 of the 4 heirs do not wish toreinstate GONZALES is misplaced. Removal of an administrator does not lie on thewhims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the beliefof the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.

RULE 93

UY AND JARDELEZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose. His sonTeodoro upon learning that a real estate property of his parents was about to be sold,filed a petition in court claiming that there was a need for the appointment of a guardianto administer his fathers properties due to his present physical and mental incapaci ty. Afew days later, Gilda, the spouse of Ernesto filed a petition regarding the declaration ofincapacity of Ernesto, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugalproperties and authorization to sell the same. According to her, medical treatment andhospitalization expenses were piling up, thus requiring the need to urgently sell realestate property. The lower court granted Gildas petition, declaring Ernesto

incapacitated and authorized her to assume the role of administrator of the conjugalproperties and sell real properties. Pending the motion for reconsideration filed byTeodoro, Gilda was able to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal properties toher daughter Glenda. The lower court subsequently approved the deed of absolute sale.However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, who suffered a

stroke that rendered him comatose, may assume sole powers of administration of theconjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of landwith the approval of the court in a summary proceeding.

Held:

Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply in the case at bar. When the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, the proper remedy


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is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The spousewho desires to sell real property as an administrator of the conjugal property mustobserve the procedure provided for in Rule 95 of the Rules of Court, not the summary

judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules ofCourt. A notice of the petition was not served to the incapacitated spouse. Neither washe required to show cause why the petition should be granted. Absent an opportunity tobe heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.

RULE 94

PAVIA vs. DE LA ROSA

Facts:

The deceased Pablo Linart e Iturralde named as executor Francisco Granada eIturralde. In said will Carmen Linart y Pavia was made the only universal heir. Owing tothe death of the testator, Jose de la Rosa was substituted as executor and tookpossession of the property of the estate. Rafaela Pavia, in her own behalf and asguardian of Carmen, executed a power of attorney I behalf of Jose de la Rosa. Jose dela Rosa accepted the power of attorney and proceeded to administer the estate in acareless manner resulting in loss and damage to Carmen. Later Jose de la Rosa diedleaving as his only heirs Babiana and Salud de la Rosa. Babiana and Salud received

and accepted from the estate of Jose the inheritance without benefit of inventory andreceived and divided among themselves, as such heirs, all of the estate. Babiana andSalud were then sued by Carmen through Rafaela to recover the losses sustained byCarmen due to Joses mismanagement of the estate.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of the suit against Babiana and Salud was proper?

Held:

No. In accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Act No. 190, it isunderstood that testate or intestate succession is always accepted with the benefit ofinventory, and the heirs, even after taking possession of the estate of the deceased, donot make themselves responsible for the debts of the deceased with their own property,


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but solely with that property coming from the testate or intestate succession of thedeceased.

The Code of Civil Procedure now in force makes necessary the opening of atestate or intestate succession immediately after the death of the person whose estate

is to be administered, the appointment of an executor or administrator, the taking of aninventory of the estate, and the appointment of two or more commissioners for theappraisal of the properties of the estate and deciding as to the claims against suchestate.

The extrajudicial division of an estate among heirs of legal age without theintervention of the courts will take effect only in accordance with the terms andconditions provided in sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Pursuant to the provisions contained in Part II of this code the only entity that can

lawfully represent a testate or intestate succession of a deceased person is theexecutor or administrator appointed by the court, charged to care for, maintain, andadminister the estate of the deceased.

The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his right and title,but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment of the debts of same, and theadjudication of the residue of the estate of the deceased, and in the meantime the onlyperson in charge by law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtoris the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.

From the above it appears evident that whatever may be the right of action on

the part of Rafaela Pavia and the minor, Carmen Linart, the latter represented by theformer as guardian, as to the obligations assumed by Jose, now deceased, it must beprosecuted against the executor or administrator of the estate of said deceased Jose,whose executor or administrator is at this time the only representative of the estate orintestate succession of said deceased.

RULE 95

UY AND JARDELEZA V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza suffered a stroke which left him comatose. His sonTeodoro upon learning that a real estate property of his parents was about to be sold,filed a petition in court claiming that there was a need for the appointment of a guardian


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to administer his fathers properties due to his present physical and mental incapacity. A

few days later, Gilda, the spouse of Ernesto filed a petition regarding the declaration ofincapacity of Ernesto, assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugalproperties and authorization to sell the same. According to her, medical treatment andhospitalization expenses were piling up, thus requiring the need to urgently sell realestate property. The lower court granted Gildas petition, declaring Ernestoincapacitated and authorized her to assume the role of administrator of the conjugalproperties and sell real properties. Pending the motion for reconsideration filed byTeodoro, Gilda was able to sell a parcel of land belonging to the conjugal properties toher daughter Glenda. The lower court subsequently approved the deed of absolute sale.However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, who suffered a

stroke that rendered him comatose, may assume sole powers of administration of theconjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of landwith the approval of the court in a summary proceeding.

Held:

Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply in the case at bar. When the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, the proper remedyis a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court. The spousewho desires to sell real property as an administrator of the conjugal property must

observe the procedure provided for in Rule 95 of the Rules of Court, not the summaryjudicial proceedings under the Family Code.

The trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules ofCourt. A notice of the petition was not served to the incapacitated spouse. Neither washe required to show cause why the petition should be granted. Absent an opportunity tobe heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.

RULE 96

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JESUSFELIANO andANUNCIANO FELIANO

G.R. No. 162421

Facts:

Sometime in 1964, Rurfino Cabales died leaving behind a parcel ofland in Southern Leyte to his wife, Saturnina and six children, namely, Bonifacio,


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Francisco, Alberto, Albino, Lenora, and Rito. On 1971, the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the property to Dr. Corrompidowith a right to repurchase within eight (8) years. On 1972, prior to theredemption of the property, Alberto died leaving behind his wife and son, Nelson,herein petitioner.Sometime later and within the redemption period, the said brothers and

theirmother, in lieu of Alberto, tendered their payment to Dr.Corrompido.Subsequently,Saturnina, and her four children, Bonifacio, Albino, Franciscoand Leonora sold thesaid land to Spouses Feliano. It was provided in the deed ofsale that the shares of Ne ls on an d Ri to , be in g mi no r at th e t i me of th esale, will be held in trust by thevendee and will paid upon them reaching theage of 21.

In 1986, R i to rece ived the sum o f 1 ,143 pesos f rom theSpouses Feliano representing his share from the proceeds of the sale of the

property. It was only in1988, that Nelson learned of the sale from his uncle, Rito. Hesignified his intentionto redeem the property in 1993 but it was only in 1995 that he fileda complaint for redemption against the Spouses Feliano. The respondent Spousesaverred that the petitioners are estopped from denying the sale since: (1) Rito alreadyreceived hisshare; and (2) Nelson, failed to tender the total amount of the redemptionprice. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favour of Spouses Feliano on the ground thatNelson was no longer entitled to the property since, his right was subrogatedby Saturnina upon the death of his father, Alberto. It also alleged that Rito had no moreright to redeem since Saturnina, being his legal guardian at the time of the sale was

properly vested with the right to alienate the same. The Court of Appeals modified thedecision of the trial court stating that the sale made by Saturnina in behalf of Rito andNelson were unenforceable.

Issue:

Whether o r no t the sa le made by a l ega l guard ian (Saturn ina)in beha l f o f the minors were binding upon them.

Held:

With regard to the share o f R i to , t he con t rac t o f sa le wasva l id . Unde r Section 1, Rule 96 Aguardian shall have the care and custody of theperson of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estateonly. x xx Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power ofadministration of the minors property. It does not include the power ofalienation which needs

judicia la u thor i t y . Thus, when Satu rn ina , as l ega l gua rd ian o f pe t i t ione


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r R i to , so ld the latterspro indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legalauthority to doso. Accordingly, the contract as to the share of Rito wasunenforceable. However, whe n h e re cei ved the pro cee ds of t he sale , hee f f ect i ve l y ra t if ie d i t . Th is ac t o f ratification rendered the sale valid and bindingas to him. With respect to petitioner Nelson, the contract of sale was void. He

was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners werenot his legal guardians; rather it was his mother who if duly authorized by thecourts, could validly sell his share in the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelsonretained ownership over their undivided share in the said property. However, Nelsoncan no longer redeem the property since the thirty day redemption period has expiredand thus he remains as co-owner of the property with the Spouses Feliano.

RULE 97

FRANCISCO V. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Feliciano Francisco was the duly appointed guardian of the incompetentEstefania San Pedro. Pelagio, a first cousin of Estefania petitioned the court for theremoval of Feliciano as the guardian and his appointment instead. Pelagio claimed thatFeliciano failed to submit an inventory of the estate and render an accounting. The courtordered the retirement of Feliciano as guardian due to his old age and required him tonominate a replacement. The court thereafter granted the execution pending appeal of

its decision and appointed Pelagio as the new guardian despite the fact that he was fiveyears older than the previous guardian. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision ofthe lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion by orderingthe removal of Feliciano as guardian due to his advanced age.

Held:

The lower court correctly ordered the retirement of Feliciano as guardian. Aguardianship proceeding is instituted for the benefit and welfare of the ward. In theselection of a guardian, the court may consider the financial situation, the physicalcondition, the morals, character and conduct, and the present and past history of aprospective appointee as well as the probability of his being able to exercise the powers


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and duties of guardian for the full period during which guardianship will be necessary.Feliciano, at the age of 72 cannot fulfil the responsibilities of a guardian anymore, asevidenced by his delay in accounting and inventory of the wards property. To sustain

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