Case 2013-001_Decision 01102014

8/13/2019 Case 2013-001_Decision 01102014

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C J THEOFFICIAL JUDICIAL ARM

of the

S ANGGUNIÁN NG MGA M AG-A ARAL NG MGA P ÁARALÁNG LOYÓLA NG A TENÉO DEM ANILA

TUDENT UDICIAL OURT S

ATENEO STUDENT JUDICIAL COURT

Ateneo de Manila University - Loyola SchoolsBarangay Loyola Heights, Quezon City

UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS OF Case No. 2013-001THE LOYOLA SCHOOLSPetitioner

represented by

CHIEF PROSECUTOR CLYDE Promulgated:MARAMBA, PROSECUTORS January 10, 2014BEATRIZ BEATO, ROBERTMARI IBAY, JULIA DARYLLENARZ, MAGDALENA MARIEPINEDA, JIEGO MICHAELTANCHANCO, CRISTINEMARIE VILLARUEL, SPECIAL

PROSECUTOR JAYVYGAMBOA, AND DEPUTYCLERK OF COURT PATRICKJOSEPH NG

versus

SOSS SECRETARY-TREASURERMARVIN LAGONERARespondent

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------xTO: Mr. Clyde Maramba, Chief Prosecutor (Petitioner) and Mr. Andre Miko Alazas, Lead Counselfor Mr. Lagonera (Respondent)

IN RE: Consolidated Decision on the Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Postponementof Hearing, Dismissal filed by the Respondent and; the Impeachment Complaint filed by thePetitioner on the charge of Appointment of Executive Officers and Central Board Representativeswithout due process, and the charge of Mismanagement

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ATENEO STUDENT JUDICIAL COURT DECISION 01102014

QUORUM

PER CURIAM:

Pertinent to the cause of this decision are the following:

On 2 December 2013, the Ateneo Student Judicial Court (hereinafter referred to as “the Court” for

brevity), received a consolidated impeachment complaint from Mr. Clyde Maramba, Chief Prosecutor, etal. (hereinafter referred to as “the Petitioners”, containing six (6) impeachment charges against Mr.Marvin Lagonera, SOSS Secretary-Treasurer (hereinafter referred to as “the Respondent”). The followingcomplaints were lodged against the Respondent:

Usurping the School Board Chairpersonship

Appointment of Block and Course Representatives without due process

Illegal creation of the Committee System, a structure that undermines the roles andresponsibilities of the Executive Officers and the Executive Committee and;

Corruption, related to offering a public-office position to a person, with the condition theperson changes political affiliation to the Secretary-Treasurer’s party

Appointment of Executive Officers and Central Board Representatives without due process and;

Failing to keep the records of the School Board transparent and falsification of official SchoolBoard documents in the course of the investigation.

On 5 December 2013, the Court received a list of Errata submitted by the Petitioners. The Errataretracted erroneous quoting and statements and provided the correct ones for the Petitioner’sConsolidated Impeachment Complaint.

On 6 December 2013, the Court received a Consolidated Motion for a Bill of Particulars and an Extensionof the Deadline for Reply and/or Filing of Motions filed by Mr. Andre Miko Alazas, lead counsel for theRespondent. Through the Motion, the Respondent asked for a Bill of Particulars and all evidence referredto by the Impeachment Complaints and a 5-day extension to the deadline for filing of Motions.

On 7 December 2013, the Court released its Decision regarding the Consolidated Motion for a Bill ofParticulars and an Extension of the Deadline for Reply and/or Filing of Motions. The Court ruled that theimpeachment charges already suffice as a Bill of Particulars and sent in all documents relevant to thecase. By suspending the Rules of Court Section 5.2.1, the Court, in the spirit of fairness, granted the loadof reading the 6 impeachment cases, granted a forty-eight (48) hour extension in the filing of Motions,effectively moving the deadline to 9 December 2013.

On 9 December 2013, the Court received a Motion to Dismiss filed by Mr. Miko Alazas, Lead Counsel of the

Respondent.

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On 11 December 2013, the Court dismissed four of the six impeachment charges against the Respondentfor lack of due merit and accepted the remaining two impeachment charges, as per Decision 12112013:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby dismisses the following the impeachmentcomplaints lodged against the Respondent for lack of due merit:

Usurping the School Board Chairpersonship

Appointment of Block and Course Representatives without due process

Illegal creation of the Committee System, a structure that undermines the roles and responsibilitiesof the Executive Officers and the Executive Committee and;

Corruption, related to offering a public-office position to a person, with the condition the person

changes political affiliation to the Secretary-Treasurer’s party

WHEREFORE, similarly in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby accepts the following impeachmentcomplaints lodged against the Respondent:

Appointment of Executive Officers and Central Board Representatives without due process

Failing to keep the records of the School Board transparent and falsification of official School Boarddocuments in the course of the investigation”

The Court also sent a Notice of Hearing to the concerned parties immediately after releasing thedecision.

On 14 December 2013, the Court held a pre-trial conference between the Petitioners and theRespondents. The Court officially received all evidence from both parties. The Court explained theHearing Procedures and Rules of Impeachment as well as gave both parties the chance to interact andclarify some points.

On 17 December 2013, the Court received Case Briefs from both parties, listing their witnesses for thehearing and the summary of their arguments.

On 19 December 2013, the Court received a notice from the Petitioners that they are withdrawing theimpeachment charge on Falsification of Official School Board Documents in the course of theinvestigation. The reason for doing so was not stated in their Motion. However, the Petitioners statedthat they will continue with the charge on failing to keep the records of the School Board transparent.

On 20 December 2013, the Court received a Motion to Dismiss from the Respondent’s Lead Counsel. TheRespondent prayed that the charge on failing to keep the records of the School Board transparent bedismissed for failure to ask for proper relief and for lack of cause of action.

On the same day, the Court convened as an impeachment tribunal in a public hearing to try the charge on“Appointment of Executive Officers and Central Board Representatives without due process,” with bothparties present. The Court also rejected the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that the charge on “Failure tokeep School Board Documents transparent has its own merits separate from the merits of Falsification ofofficial School Board Documents, and that impeachment is the right relief for the case.”

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The following witnesses were examined by both Petitioners and Respondents in the ImpeachmentHearing:

Jomar Villanueva, acting 4th Year SOSS SB Executive Officer and duly elected Senior AB/MA-PoSCourse Representative,

Christopher Cunanan, acting 3rd Year SOSS SB Executive Officer and duly elected Junior AB Dip IRCourse Representative,

Marvin Lagonera, Respondent and duly elected SOSS Secretary-Treasurer,

Rafael Niccolo Martinez, acting 3th Year Central Board Representative for SOSS and duly elected

Junior AB POS Course Representative, Kevin Luke Mizon, acting 4th Year Central Board Representative for SOSS and duly elected Senior

AB DS Course Representative,

Abelardo Hernandez, duly elected 2nd Year Central Board Representative for SOSS,

Louis de Jesus, former 3rd Year Central Board Representative for SOSS and;

Alyssa Nuqui, former Appointed 4th Year Central Board Representative for SOSS

On the same day, the Court announced that the impeachment proceedings would continue the next yearupon resumption of classes, upon interpretation of the provision in the 2005 Undergraduate Constitutionof the Loyola Schools (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution” for brevity), which states:

“Section 8. Powers and Responsibilities of the Student Judicial Court

(a) To sit en banc, hear, try and resolve by a two-thirds vote within three weeks any complaintinvolving the constitutionality, legality, or jurisdiction of the acts, policies, and resolutions ofSanggunian officials;” (emphasis ours),

the interpretation of the said provision being that “three weeks” amounts to twenty-one (21) regularschool days, implying that the entire impeachment complaint must be resolved by 10 January 2014.

On 23 December 2013, the Respondents, through e-mail, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion forReconsideration, stating that the Petitioners cannot prove beyond reasonable doubt the charges with thewithdrawal of the complaint regarding Falsification of official School Board Documents and that they havefailed to exhaust all administrative remedies stated in the School Board Code of Internal Proceduresbefore filing the complaint.

On 25 December 2013, the Court officially received the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration.

On 29 December 2013, the Court sent an e-mail to both parties, stating that the Decision regarding theUrgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration will be released on 5 January 2014. The Court also requestedthe Petitioners to furnish the reasons as to why they dropped the charge regarding the complaintregarding Falsification of official School Board Documents.

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On 31 December 2013, the Petitioners filed a Motion to Extend the deadline on submitting the requestedreasons. They cited that they assumed the Court was closed during the break, a large percentage ofmembers are out of the town, three out of the four days given are holidays and that they did not receivea copy of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Respondent’s legal counsel on 20 December 2013.

On the same day, the Respondent’s Lead Counsel replied to the Petitioner’s Motion to Extend, remindingthe Court that they passed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration and protested against thePetitioners’ Motion to Extend.

On 2 January 2014, the Court released its Decision regarding the Petitioners’ Motion to Extend. In the

spirit of fairness, the Court decided to grant the Petitioners’ Motion to Extend, effectively moving it to 6January 2014. The Court gave the same leniency it has granted to the Respondent’s Motion to Extend onthe Deadline for filing of Motions. As per Decision 01022014, this Court ruled:

“As it is, relief prayed for by the accused imposes an unwarranted demand on the Court to release adecision on whether to accept or reject the existing management charge without giving ample time forthe Petitioners' side to be heard, again prejudicing their rights. Time and time again the Court hasallowed the Respondent's side to be heard, as is proper. The Court only finds it similarly proper for the sameopportunity to be heard to be accorded to the Petitioners, in the interest of due process. The Court thusfinds it unbecoming for the Respondent to oppose the Motion to Extend, effectively blocking the Petitioners’opportunity to prepare their reasons within reasonable time during the holiday season, in the name of rightshe has not even specified. The right to be granted relief based on “the very nature of the motion” is tobe upheld only if the very nature of the motion is itself just and equitable. Such is not the case in this

respect for the reasons given by the Petitioners and those given above. The Respondent is reminded thatthe right to a swift decision must be executed only if said decision can be ascertained to be just andimpartial. The Court thus accepts the Petitioners' rationale for their Motion to Extend, that they were notgiven notice of the Motion to Dismiss and it is unreasonable to demand them urgent reply during the holidayseason.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion to extend the Petitioners' deadline for giving theirreasons for dropping the fraud charge from January 2 to January 5 is hereby granted. The decision onthe Respondent’s ex-parte motion for reconsideration will be released on January 6.”

On 5 January 2014, the Court received from the Petitioners the reasons as to why they withdrew thecharge on Falsification of Official School Board Documents.

On 6 January 2014, the Court released its Decision on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration.This Court rejected the Motion for Reconsideration on the grounds that the Respondent has speculated onthe reasons of the Petitioners for dropping their charge, and that the Respondent’s guilt will beestablished through preponderance of evidence, not beyond reasonable doubt as the Respondentmentioned in the Motion. The Court also ruled that the cause of action for the charge on Failure to keepSchool Board Documents transparent is distinct from the cause of action for the charge on Falsification ofOfficial School Board Documents. The Court also concluded that while the School Board Code of InternalProcedures stipulates certain administrative remedies, impeachment remains one remedy that may beadministered if the gravity of the offense is sufficient enough. The Court reiterated that the

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mismanagement charge constitutes a justiciable controversy that must be deliberated upon in theimpeachment proceedings. As per Decision 01062014, this Court ruled:

“The Court considers both the sanctions provided by the Code of Internal Procedures and the Constitutionvalid. The application of the action to the offender should be dependent on both the jurisdiction of thedocuments, the appropriateness of the sanction and the gravity of the offense...

The Court recognizes that single acts may not be split into multiple charges calling for different reliefs.However, in the mismanagement case, the Petitioner clearly stated that there are distinct causes for thetwo charges...

The causes of action are obviously distinct. The Court has previously ruled that the mismanagement case hasmerit on its own even without the causes of action and evidence provided in the fraud case and stands bythis decision. To reject the mismanagement case on the aforementioned bases provided by the Respondentwill be unjust, especially when it had been deemed substantial in the first place...

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court rejects this Urgent Ex-Parte Motion forReconsideration. The mismanagement case shall be heard in Court.”

On 7 January 2014, the Court, upon the unavailability of both parties during the scheduled periodreserved for a private trial, ruled that a physical hearing will not be held anymore due to logisticalconstraints. The Court requested both parties to submit a position paper regarding their prayer andsupporting arguments for the Charge on Failure to keep School Board Documents. The order was sent asan informal email but the formal statement on the cancellation of hearing was released on the 8th ofJanuary.

On 8 January 2014, the Court released a resolution cancelling the hearing on the mismanagement chargeon the grounds that the inability of the Court and the parties involved to convene at a common time andat a reasonable period before the 10 January deadline renders it logistically impossible to hold anotherhearing. The Court instead opted to have both parties submit written statements for use in the finaldeliberations, and the decision on the impeachment complaint would be based on all the parties’arguments and all the evidence in possession of the Court. This Court ruled via Resolution 01082014:

“WHEREFORE, the hearing set for the Mismanagement case is hereby cancelled due to logistical

constraints that render it impossible to meet with both parties at a common time. Moreover, bothparties are ordered to submit their final statements and arguments on the charge of Mismanagement by6 pm on Thursday, January 9.”

On 9 January 2014, the Court received both parties’ final statements and arguments, as well as an UrgentOmnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Postponement of Hearing, and Dismissal from the Respondent.Respondent through counsel argued in said Urgent Omnibus Motion:

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“The defendant would like to argue that not having a trial at this point in the case will be extremelyprejudicial to the right of the defendant to a speedy and impartial trial. It is in the interest of thestudent body, the defendant, as well as the Court that the trial be concluded through the proper processes.The highly publicized and novel nature of this impeachment case simply cannot be ignored by the Court.Handing out a mere summary judgment on the charge of mismanagement would be to deny the defendanthis right to substantive and procedural due process. This impeachment process takes on the novelcharacter under the current situation, and public interest requires that due process of the law be followed,lest the Court be accused of railroading this entire process of impeachment. The Court should see to it thatthe defendant sees his day in Court, for ‘in all controversial questions, [the Courts should] render itsdecision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, andthe reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority

conferred upon it.’

Thus, the defendant prays that the Court reconsider its decision to cancel the trial for mismanagementand set another time and date for the trial.

However, the defense will still comply with the order of the Court to submit its substantive argumentsregarding the mismanagement case. The defense, however, submits the reply in protest of the Court’sdecision to cancel the trial and to simply decide the case in a summary proceeding. The defense stronglybelieves that the defendant should be given his day in court. The defendant is a public official, and it is inthe interest of the student body that an elected public official subjected to an impeachment case be giventhe right to defend himself and his office.”

xxx

Before us is a dual burden of deciding whether or not to reconsider our decision to cancel the hearing,and that of ruling on the two impeachment charges that remain.

Ad impossible nemo tenetur – “No one is bound to an impossibility.”

The Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Postponement of Hearing ismanifestly without merit.

The issue at hand is whether both parties should see their day in Court, for “in all controversial questions,[the Courts should] render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know thevarious issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is

inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.”

1

This Court opines that given the prevailing circumstances, i.e., the fact that a decision on theimpeachment complaint based on the two remaining charges filed against the Respondent should bereleased by 10 January 2014, and the fact that both parties were still able to present evidence andsubmit their pleadings, cancelling the hearing on the mismanagement charge was not only the propercourse of action but also the only possible recourse that the Court can take without prejudicing therights of either party.

1 Ang Tibay v. CIR and NLRC, G.R. No. L46496

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Three points must be impressed upon the Respondent:

First, cancelling the hearing does not mean that the decision will be rendered summarily to theeffect of prejudicing the Respondent’s substantive and procedural rights. In the first place, anadministrative proceeding like an impeachment case in the context of a student government settinginvolves no substantive right which protects a person’s inviolable right to life, liberty, and property.It is absurd for the Respondent to argue that his substantive rights are being prejudiced when his life,liberty, or property remain inviolate in the course of the impeachment proceedings. In no way does thepresent impeachment complaint assume the nature of a criminal proceeding, which is the proper province

for application of substantive due process of law. Also, a procedural right to a hearing per se is not aright enshrined in the active provisions of the 2007 SJC Rules of Court. The Court invokes Section5.2.1 of the said document:

“5.2.1 Acceptance of PetitionIf the Student Judicial Court decides to accept the petition, the hearing on the petition , if the courtdecides to conduct a hearing, shall be held no later than seven days after the said decision. Before comingto a decision of whether to accept the petition for review or consideration, the court shall inform theparties named and from the time the parties are informed, three days are to be given for any motions to thecourt.

The Student Judicial Court has due discretion on whether a public hearing is to be held. If a publichearing will not take place, the court will inform the parties of such and the parties will have a

maximum of five days to give their arguments to the court, depending on the notice of the court, but itshall be no less than one full day.” (emphasis ours)

It can be gleaned from the applicable procedural rules that this Court reserves full discretion on whetherto hold hearings based on the circumstances. As it is, ordering both parties to submit their evidenceand their replies, as well as the fact that these replies will be public information after the resolutionof the case at bar, ensures that the Court can “render its decision in such a manner that the partiesto the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.”2

Second , as this Court had time and time again ratiocinated, the prevailing circumstances prevent thematerial occurrence of a public hearing at a reasonable period before the deadline for releasing thefinal decision because both parties could not find a common time for such a hearing, rendering the

same a logistical impossibility. Unless the Respondent can suggest before this Court of a way on how toalter reality, the decision to cancel the hearing stands. This Court believes that a decision that resolvesthe impeachment complaint with finality and clarity is of utmost importance. Forestalling thedeliberations any further would logically mean that the Constitutional deadline must be violated. It goeswithout saying that this Court could not in good conscience violate the same Constitution it is mandatedto uphold. Nor can the other recourse be taken, that a decision not be released on the deadline,effectively dismissing both charges and letting this controversy to go unresolved in perpetua. The

2 ibid.

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dilemma imposed by the Respondent on this Court of whether to violate the Constitution or to allowthe case at bar to go unresolved with clarity and finality (thereby prejudicing the rights of both thePetitioners and the Respondent) is gravely unwarranted and cannot be understated. The Court opinesthat it must base its decision on fact and on law. That is why, as per Decision 12112013, this Courtdismissed the charge on usurpation of the Chairpersonship filed against the Respondent:

“The Court accepts the Respondent’s argument that by virtue of his office as Secretary -Treasurer and thefact that the Chairpersonship is vacant, the Respondent has been acting indeed as de facto Chairperson. It isthe opinion of the Court that application of the law cannot go contrary to fact. As second-in-command ofthe School Board, and as one holding succession rights to the position under normal circumstances (i.e. notduring failure of elections), the Secretary-Treasurer is then logically presumed to be acting rightfully as de facto Chairperson.” (emphasis ours)

Whilst common sense dictates that in the absence of a Chairperson the Secretary-Treasurer must act asde facto Chairperson, common sense also states that the Court most obviously cannot violate theConstitution, nor will it allow the rights of either party to be trampled upon. The Court remainssteadfast in its commitment to the rule of law and the rendering of just and equitable judgments.

Thirdly , on a tangential note, the Court opines that it is in the greater interest of the student body tonot violate the Constitution and to resolve the issues with finality than to hold a public hearing(assuming arguendo that such is even possible at this point), which at present prove to be twomutually-exclusive options. It is a non-sequitur to assume that the public nature of the proceedingsnecessitates a public hearing. Such assertion has no basis in fact, law, or logic. The decision of this Courttakes precedence over any imaginary interest of the court of public opinion. Moreover, Respondent’sargument for public disclosure of the arguments and reasons of the decision thereof is rendered moot bythe fact that their final statements will be made public information after the verdict is given.

The matter must be laid to rest with clarity and finality without fighting impossibilities, violating theConstitution, or prejudicing the rights of both parties. As such, the Court’s ruling on the two remainingimpeachment charges are included in this consolidated decision.

WHEREFORE, the motion to reconsider the decision to cancel the trial for mismanagement and setanother time and date for the trial is denied. This Court will deliver its decision on the two remainingimpeachment charges on 10 January 2014.

xxx

Charge of Illegal Appointments of Central Board Representatives and Executive Officers

The Court sees three major points that should be put into question. First, the Court questions if theappointment of the Executive Officers and Central Board Representatives are substantial; second,assuming that these appointments were substantial or material, whether they were done legally; andthird if the appointments were made in good faith.

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On the question of substantiality, the Court separated the analysis on the appointment of ExecutiveOfficers and appointment of Central Board representatives to consider the circumstances of each type ofappointment.

To question the substantiality of the Central Board representative appointments, the Court consideredtwo things:

1. Were the acting CB representatives legally recognized by the Central Board; and2. Did the acting representatives voluntarily take the position

In the testimony of Mr. Kevin Mizon, acting 4th

year CB representative, taken December 20, 2014, hestated that he was not officially part of the roll call and minutes of the meeting during CB meetings .This was also found in Mr. Abelardo Hernandez’s, elected 2nd year Central Board Representative, writtenaffidavit that “Mr. Kevin Mizon and Mr. Polo Martinez were never recognized in the Central Boardmeetings…” Furthermore, as found in the evidence submitted to the Court, the acting CB representativesare not part of the ADMU Sanggu T55 2013-2014 Facebook group or the directory of the said group. TheCourt therefore opines that the acting CB representatives were not recognized by the Central Boardas official officers of the SOSS School Board.

In the testimony of Mr. Marvin Lagonera, he states that the appointments he made are “…to be called“volunteers” or “point-persons” until clarified with the Court.” The Court therefore believes that theacting CB representatives were in fact volunteers as the representatives were not coerced.

Given the two arguments above, the Court believes that the appointments of CB Representatives madeby the Respondent were insubstantial on the grounds that they were not officially recognized by theCentral Board and that they chose to accept the responsibility of their respective offices.

In view of the foregoing, the Court opines that these appointments were immaterial and thus there is noissue to litigate. The question of whether they were legal is now considered moot. The impeachmentcomplaint of illegal appointments of Central Board Officers is hereby dismissed.

For the appointed Executive Officers, the Court discusses three points:1. Were the acting executive officers recognized;2. What were the powers they held; and

3. Did the Respondent have final say in what it is the appointed officers did

In the testimony of Mr. Chris Cunanan, acting 3rd year SOSS Executive Officer, he mentioned that he wasrecognized by Course Representatives and by the SOSS School Board. He was also recognized by otherpeople outside the SOSS School Board. Mr. Cunanan also states that he was referred acting EO during theSOSS Plansem and Committee meetings. Based on the testimonies given by the witnesses, the Courtupholds that the appointed Executive Officers were indeed recognized as acting officers.

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In the testimony of Mr. Jomar Villanueva, acting 4th year SOSS Executive Officer, he mentioned that as anappointed Executive Officer, he held the powers of an elected Executive Officer without votingpowers. In addition, Mr. Cunanan said that he was instructed by Mr. Lagonera to look for possiblerepresentatives to fill vacancies. The Court therefore upholds that the appointed Executive Officershad the powers similar to an elected EO except without voting powers.

In the Respondent’s testimony, he said that he had the “last say” when Cunanan looked for candidates. Itonly means that the Respondent still finalizes the appointments and that Mr. Cunanan and his fellowacting EOs were only to suggest candidates to the Respondent.

In view of the foregoing, the Court believes that the appointments of EO Representatives made by theRespondent were substantial and material on the grounds that the officers had power and wererecognized by the SOSS School Board.

We now move to the second issue, on the question of legality. The Court asks if there are extantprovisions on the Respondent’s appointment of Executive Officers.

Article XV Section 4c of the Constitution states that:

“Vacancies for the positions of School Board Secretary-Treasurer occurring after the election of FreshmanRepresentatives shall be filled by the Chairperson appointing an Executive Officer to the post, subject toconfirmation by three-fourths of the entire School Board. Vacancies of the same nature for ExecutiveOfficers shall be filled by the concerned constituency’s block or course representatives electing amongstthemselves a replacement. Officers so appointed will not enjoy succession rights.”

As can be seen in the provision above, vacancies in the position of Executive Officers can be filled byhaving the course representatives who fall under the jurisdiction of the Executive Officer vote for anExecutive Officer. This only means that there is a rule to follow in appointing Executive Officers and thatthe Respondent did not follow this.

However, the Court also questions whether the Course Representatives have met to vote on a newExecutive Officer. Given that there was no evidence stating that the Course Representatives did meet,the Court opines that no such meeting happened.

In his testimony, Respondent said that “we should refer to them as ad interim because of their beingsynonymous with point-persons.” Quoting the Respondent’s definition of ad interim taken from theSupreme Court of the Philippines’ decision in Pamantasang Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate AppellateCourt (1985)3 :

“The term [ad interim] is defined by Black to mean ‘in the meantime’ or for the time being. Thus, an officerad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absenceor temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978).

3 G.R. No. L65439

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But such is not the meaning nor the use in the context of Philippine Law. In referring to Dr. Esteban’sappointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it isused to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of thePamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the Universitywith the power of appointment is unable to act”

Because the Respondent made the appointments with the thought that they were only temporary, theCourt now questions how long “temporary” is. The Court interprets “temporary” as “until the nextelection.” In the provision above on vacancies of the School Board Secretary-Treasurer it is said that thecourse or block reps are allowed to meet and vote on the position of Executive Officer after the freshmanelections. Therefore, if after the freshman elections and the position of Executive Officer is still vacant,the next election period would be when the course or block representatives meet. Because no evidenceexists to prove that course or block representatives met to fill in the vacant positions, the Courtbelieves that these course or block representatives being the original body vested with the power tofill in the vacant positions were unable to act.

The Court therefore upholds that the appointments of ad interim officers were legal as the course orblock representatives had not convened and thus were unable to act. It only means that so long asthe next election period has not yet happened, whether it be the general elections or theblock/course rep votation, the appointed ad interim officers may stay in office.

In view of the foregoing, the impeachment complaint of illegal appointments of Executive Officer ishereby dismissed.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that these appointments were not made legally, the Court agrees with theRespondent that these appointments were done in good faith. The Court deems it logical for theRespondent to have appointed Executive Officers in order for the SOSS Sanggunian School Board tofunction properly. Given the massive failure of elections during both 2013 General Elections and 2013Freshmen & Special Elections, the SOSS School Board was occupied by less than half of the availablepositions. The Respondent cannot be faulted for making such appointments out of necessity due tothe gravity of the context. Moreover, the Respondent stated that he was merely following institutionalpractice because no ruling issued by this Court had previously deemed any ad interim appointment to beillegal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Respondent Secretary-Treasurer Marvin Lagonera is found NOTGUILTY of the charge of illegal appointments of Central Board Representatives and ExecutiveOfficers. Respondent is AQCUITTED of the impeachment complaint lodged against him.

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xxx

Charge of Failure to Keep School Board Documents Transparent as Mismanagement

Ignorantia legis non excusat – “Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”

The Court sees three major points that should be put into question. First, the Court questions if therewas correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Respondent; second, whether there wasfailure to keep the transparency and accountability of the SOSS Sanggunian School Board; and third ifthe appropriate relief was prayed for by the Petitioners.

On the question of correspondence, the Court considered the following points:

1. Did the Secretary-General contact the Respondent and ask for the minutes of meetings and all otherpertinent documents and;2. Is there any precedence on the Secretary-Treasurer’s act of not furnishing official minutes of meetingto the Secretary-General?

In Mr. AJ Elicaño’s affidavit, he states that the Respondent attended an orientation session for thenewly elected officers following the Freshman & Special Elections on 16 August 2013. During Mr.Elicaño’s presentation, he specifically stated his policy with minutes, which were to be submitted tohim on the first Monday of every month at 9:00 AM. Furthermore, Mr. Elicaño states that he has yet to

receive any minutes from the Respondent. The Court acknowledges that Mr. Elicaño indeed gavespecific deadlines for the minutes in his presentation.

In the Respondent’s Final Statement submitted to the Court on the night of 9 January 2014, theRespondent claimed that Mr. Elicaño never asked him for any minutes whether via traditional means oronline means and that the only recorded instance of reminding the Respondent was done on 13 December2013, while the Respondent was on a Leave of Absence.

The Secretary-General has had correspondence with the Secretary-Treasurers and had promulgatedspecific rules that he claims were followed by all other Secretary-Treasurers save the Respondent. Thepresentation slides given during the orientation explicitly show that the Secretary-General asks forthe minutes of the meetings and expects them to be sent on certain days.

In the affidavits of Ms. Kayla Patricia Torres and Mr. Brian Chua, both former Secretary-Treasurers of theSOSS Sanggunian School Board, both state that the minutes of meetings and other pertinent documentsof the SOSS Sanggunian School Board were never collected by the Secretary-General. The Respondentbelieves that this institutional precedence due to the lack of specific provisions in the School Board CIPregarding these administrative matters should excuse the Secretary-Treasurer for non-submission ofdocuments. However, Secretary-General Elicaño collects the minutes of meetings, among otherdocuments, from the School Board Secretary-Treasurers. He also has specific policies with regards to theminutes, which was mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The Court believes that institutional

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precedence does not apply here because the current Secretary-General decided to collect theminutes as an exercise of his constitutional powers and his responsibilities. This is given by Article VII,Section 2 of the Constitution:

“C. The Secretary-General1. To be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Sanggunian2. To take charge of the daily and administrative affairs of the Sanggunian3. To assist the President in the implementation of the Sanggunian’s Code of InternalProcedures4. To be the official custodian of all records and papers of the Sanggunian, in coordination with SchoolBoard Secretary-Treasurers

5. To serve notices and take charge of the correspondence of the Sanggunian6. To disseminate information about the activities and affairs of the Sanggunian7. To prepare the agenda of meetings of the Board after due consultation with its members8. To advise the President on matters of general administration9. To create such additional units as may be necessary to discharge specific functions of the position10. To perform such other functions the Board or President may so direct” (emphasis ours)

Given that the Secretary-General indeed asked the Respondent to furnish him with copies of theminutes and documents and that institutional precedence is overruled by the Secretary-General’sexercise of his responsibilities and the promulgation of a specific set of guidelines regarding thetransfer of documents, the correspondence between the Secretary-General and the Respondent isvalid. Institutional precedence in this case cannot exonerate the Respondent because he was clearly

supposed to be informed of provisions of the Sanggunian School Board Code of Internal Procedures andhave been informed of his duties by the Secretary-General.

On the question of whether the Respondent failed to keep the School Board transparent and accountable,the Court considered the following points:

1. What importance do the minutes and documents of the School Board hold?2. What are the implications of failing to send these documents?

Minutes, attendance reports, and other documents reflect the status of the School Board. To quote thePetitioner’s Final Arguments for the case, “These documents are clear representation of the activitiesand agenda of the School Board.” These documents are considered public information, which the

constituency of the SOSS School Board has an interest in. The content of these documents will influencehow the officers act towards the fulfillment of certain goals and upholding of the thrusts determinedby the School Board. The content of these documents directly affect the lives of their constituents. Disclosure of these documents to higher bodies and the public enables checks and balances to be done onthe School Board.

The argument of the Prosecution was that failing to send in these documents to the Secretary-General,the Respondent has disabled the Central Board from performing checks-and-balances on the SchoolBoard. The act of submitting documents to a higher body signifies that the officer is responsible not

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only for the process of submission, but for the actions recorded in the documents. The Respondentdenied the School Board of assistance and evaluation from the Central Board. Without documents, theCentral Board or any other body cannot validate the acts and policies of these officers. While the SchoolBoard is an autonomous body, the monitoring of other bodies contributes its well-being. By denying thisessential function of the Central Board, it also cannot fully fulfill its duty to keep the whole Sangguniantransparent and accountable.

The Respondent argues that non-submission of the minutes did not harm the School Board in anyway. It is expected that the officers of the School Board have better access to these documents, andindeed, they are not harmed in a tangible way. However, the School Board itself is harmed in another

way. It has damaged the transparency and the accountability of the School Board.

The Respondent has failed to perform his responsibility to correspond with the appropriate officialwho indeed has the mandate to receive needed documents from the Respondent, which he did notfulfill. Respondent failed to live up to the standards of transparency and accountability expected ofSanggunian officers.

On the question of whether the Petitioner sought the appropriate relief for the charge ofmismanagement, the Court yet again stands by its ruling that the charge of mismanagement is indeedan impeachable offense but may be sanctioned in accordance with the provisions of the School BoardCIP. The Court recognizes the gravity of impeachment as a sanction while recognizing that the extantprovisions of the School Board CIP with regard to sanctions have yet to be applied. In the original

petition, the Petitioner prayed for “appropriate sanctions” against the Respondent for themismanagement case. The Court can then apply what it believes to be appropriate according to the factsand arguments of this case. The Petitioners prayed for the appropriate relief regarding the case.

The Court agrees with the Respondent who successfully argued that the non-exhaustion of alladministrative remedies is fatal to an impeachment complaint. The Court upholds basic principles offairness and justice as is necessitated by procedural due process of law. It is very clear then that theRespondent does not deserve to be impeached. As such, however, the Petitioners never specified theMismanagement charge to be an impeachment complaint, although impeachment remains a viableremedy for the Respondent’s offenses.

It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that it is just and equitable to enforce the appropriate

administrative remedies as provided for by law to rectify the Respondent’s transgressions withoutimpeaching him.

The Sanggunian School Board Code of Internal Procedures specifies the appropriate penalties:

“ Section 66. The following penalties shall be imposed on the violator:i. First offense: - written reprimand by the President (or the Vice President, if the President is at fault) tobe posted in the message board of the room; - written apology addressed to the President (or to the Board,if the President is at fault)

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ii. Second offense: - written reprimand by the President (or the Vice President, if the President is at fault)to be posted in the message board of the room; - written apology addressed to the President (or to theBoard, if the President is at fault); - mandatory work for the Office of the Secretary General (or theOffice of the Finance Officer, if the Secretary-General is at fault)iii. Third and succeeding offenses: - written reprimand by the President (or the Vice President, if thePresident is at fault) posted in the Sanggunian bulletin board; - written apology addressed to the StudentBody; - filing of impeachment case against the violator” (emphasis ours)

Given that, as the Petitioners have successfully argued, the offenses were grave and were committedrepetitively, the Court avers that the proper sanctions to be applied are the following:

Written reprimand from the President of the Sanggunian, to be posted in the Sanggunian BulletinBoard (or any other extant medium to publicly inform the student body)

Mandatory work for the Office of the Secretary-General (the nature of which shall be specified bythe Secretary-General)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Respondent Secretary-Treasurer Marvin Lagonera is foundGUILTY of the charge of failing to keep the School Board Documents transparent as mismanagement.Respondent is ACQUITTED of an impeachment complaint but is to suffer the penalties stipulatedabove.

Summary of the Decision/Ruling

WHEREFORE, the motion to reconsider the decision to cancel the trial for mismanagement and setanother time and date for the trial is denied.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Respondent Secretary-Treasurer Marvin Lagonera is found NOTGUILTY of the charge of illegal appointments of Central Board Representatives and ExecutiveOfficers. Respondent is AQCUITTED of the impeachment complaint lodged against him.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Respondent Secretary-Treasurer Marvin Lagonera is foundGUILTY of the charge of failing to keep the School Board Documents transparent as mismanagement.Respondent is ACQUITTED of an impeachment complaint but is to suffer the following penalties:

Written reprimand from the President of the Sanggunian, to be posted in the SanggunianBulletin Board (or any other extant medium to publicly inform the student body)

Mandatory work for the Office of the Secretary-General (the nature of which shall be specifiedby the Secretary-General)

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SO ORDERED.

Roy Lambert Guerra, Chief Magistrate

Danielle Joanna Gaite, Magistrate for Audit

Lorenzo Pepito, Magistrate for Human Resources

Ryan Gregory Nicolas, Magistrate for External Affairs

Aldwin Segismundo, Magistrate for Project and Operations Management

Case 2013-001_Decision 01102014

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Transcript of Case 2013-001_Decision 01102014