Gifts, Commodities, and Social Relations: A Maussian View of ExchangeAuthor(s): James CarrierReviewed work(s):Source: Sociological Forum, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 119-136Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/684384 .Accessed: 17/12/2011 17:31Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Sociological Forum.http://www.jstor.orgSociological Forum, Vol. 6,No. 1, 1991 Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations: AMaussianViewof Exchange James Carrier1 Sociologists have drawn on anthropological studies of gift exchange systems to helpdevelop models of exchange insocial life. This paper presents arecon- sideration of the relatively neglected Maussian view of gift and commodity ex- change, drawing on both Mauss's TheGift and recent work by anthropologists who have extended hisideas.The Maussian modelillustrates the partiality of some sociological models ofexchange by showing that people,objects, and socialrelations form awholethat iscreated andrecreated in different ways when people transact with eachother in gift and commodity relations. The paper concludeswith anillustration of the utility of Mauss's model, showing howitcanextend recent sociological discussions of thesocial meaningof objects. KEY WORDS: exchange; Marcel Mauss; gifts; commodities; socialnatureof objects. INTRODUCTION Exchange isa keyaspect oflife. Many sociologists concernedwithit havedrawn inspiration from anthropology, where exchange relationsarea coreinterest. These sociologists have beenmost influenced by the treatment of exchange inMalinowski's workintheTrobriand Islands, especially his discussionoftheKula ring in Argonauts of theWestern Pacific(1922) and hismore general discussion inCrime andCustom in Savage Society (1926). For instance, heisa point ofreferenceforBlauin Exchange and Power in Social Life(1964); heis echoedin Homans's "Social Behavior as Exchange" (1958); heisinvokedinGouldner's"The Normof Reciprocity" (1960). '29 University Circle,Charlottesville,Virginia 22903. 119 0884-8971/91/0300-0119$06.50/0 ?1991Plenum Publishing Corporation Malinowski wasa polemical writer seeking to bury forevertheidea that "primitive economics"wasirrational. One way he sought todothis was byshowing thathoweverexotic theymay have appeared, Trobriand villagersengaged in exchange ina recognizable andsensible way. Their transactionsdifferedfromourown primarily becausetheircircumstances rather thantheirmentalitiesweredifferent.In doing this, Malinowski put forward a modelthat portrayed exchange "as essentially dyadic transactions between self-interested individuals, andas premised onsomekindof balance" (Parry,1986:454). Thus, inCrime andCustomhecriticizedthe Durkheimian view that people in such societiesare bestseenas social per- sonsembeddedinthe group anditsculture:"Thehonorablecitizenis boundto carry outhis duties, though his submission is notdueto any ... mysterious 'group sentiment', but tothedetailedand elaborate working of a system ... [in which there] comessoonerorlateran equivalentrepay- mentor counter-service" (Malinowski, 1926:42). The mysteries of primitive life, then, werereducedtothe ordinary give andtakeof independent in- dividuals portrayed inliberaleconomics.WhatMarxsaidof bourgeois societyappears to apply as wellto Melanesia, wherethererules "Freedom, Equality,Property andBentham. Freedom, because... [they] arecon- strained onlyby theirfreewill.... Equality, because... theyexchange equivalent for equivalent.Property, becauseeach disposesonly ofwhatis his own. And Bentham, becauseeachlooks only tohimself" (fromCapital, chap. 6, in Tucker, 1978:343). This view that exchange takes place between independent,calculating transactorsisechoedintheclassic sociologicaldescriptions of exchange. Gouldner (1960:164) saidthat understanding a giftrelationship"requires investigation ofthe mutually contingent benefitsrendered and oftheman- ner in which themutual contingency is sustained." Similarly, Blau (1964:91) definedthesesorts oftransactions as "voluntary actions ofindividuals that aremotivated by thereturns they are expected to bring and typically do infact bring fromothers." This may notbethebest way toconsider exchange. Inthis paper I present theotherclassic anthropologicalapproach, that springing from Mauss's The Gift. This work underlies Levi-Strauss's (1969: Chap. 5) discus- sion of reciprocity. Ekeh (1974) contrasts these two approaches explicitly and at length, Granovetter (1985) contrasts their general orientations more brief- ly.Recently therehasbeena resurgence of anthropological interestin Mauss's viewof exchange andanelaboration ofhisideasin light ofmore modern issues. This ismost pronounced in Melanesian anthropology, where exchange has always beenacoreconcern (see,e.g., Damon,1983; Gregory, 1980,1982; Weiner, 1985), butit appears as wellinstudies ofAfrica (e.g., 120Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations Kiernan, 1988), India (e.g.,Parry, 1986), andclassical Greece (e.g., Morris, 1986). MAUSS'SAPPROACH TOEXCHANGE Mauss approachedexchange interms ofa webof questions: Whatis thesocial understanding ofthe nature of people and their relationship with eachother?Howdoesthetransaction of objects reflectandrecreatethose people andtheir relationships? Howdoesthistransactionreflectand recreatethesocial understanding ofthenatureof objects? Becauseofits broad scope, Mauss's modelcan beusedtoaddress a number of sociologi- cal topics. MaussdidnotshareMalinowski's unitary viewthat exchange inthe Trobriands islike exchange inindustrial societies, rationalandinterested transactions by independent individuals. Instead, hesaw two different sorts of exchange. Oneis giftexchange, associatedwithsocietiessuchasthose ofeastern Melanesia, New Zealand, andthePacificNorthwest.These societiesare dominated by kinship relations and groups, which definetrans- actors and their relations and obligations toeach other.In gift transactions, objects are inalienably associatedwiththe giver, the recipient, andthe relationship thatdefinesandbindsthem.Theotherformof exchange is commodity exchange. This is associated with industrial societies, dominated by classandthedivisionoflabor. Commodity transactorsareself-inter- ested, independent individuals who exchange with people with whom they haveno enduring linksor obligations. In commodity transactions, objects arealienable private property defined primarily intermsofusevalueand exchange valuerather than the identity ofthetransactors. Although Mauss saw gifts andcommoditiesascharacteristic ofdifferentsortsof societies, somelater Maussians treat themas two kinds ofrelations coexisting, albeit perhapsuneasily, inthesame society(e.g.,Gregory, 1980; Kiernan, 1988). Inthis paper Iwill adopt asimilar approach. This modelof exchange is more than just the observation that in some societiestransactionsaremore deeply embeddedinsocialrelationsthan in others. Instead, it entails a theory of people,objects, and social relations, andthe ways they aremadeand remade, understoodandreunderstoodin everyday transactions. From this perspective,people arenot always thein- dependent,calculatingbeings ofMalinowskian individualism; they are madeand experienced that way insometransactionsbutnotinothers. Objects arenot inevitably neutral things thatarecirculatedorbartered away; they aremadeand experienced that way insometransactionsbut notinothers. Relationships arenot alwaysimpersonal undermodern 121 capitalism; they aremadeand experienced that way insometransactions butnotinothers.Social relationships,people,objects, andtransactions form an interlocking whole.If we want tounderstand any of them, wehave totake cognizance ofthe ways thatallofthemareinvolvedin creating and recreating eachother (Strathern,1988). For Mauss, "gift" hasa meaning differentfromthatofcommon usage. Therethewordcalls upimages of presents,usually nonutilitarian objects(Schudson, 1984:137; butsee Cheal, 1987),givenconsciously and withsome degree of ceremony as"a gift," thesort oftransaction analyzed indetail by Cheal (1988). For Mauss, a gift is anyobject or service, utilitarian or superfluous, transacted as part of social, as distinct from more purelymonetary or material, relations.This departs fromconventional usage inthatitincludes labor, whichcanbea gift (just asitcanbea commodity),although itisnot normally a present. In fact, in many cases it is notclear that thereis a distinction between giving an object and labor: doesthecook give themealorthelaborof preparation? This question becomesacuteinsocietieswhere people donotmakethe objects oftheir ownsubsistence. Thus gifts are more pervasive than presents, especiallyamong friends andhouseholdmembers."Gift" doesnot identify eitherthe object orser- vice itself, or theforms and ceremoniesof giving and getting. Instead, what makesa gift isthe relationship withinwhichthetransactionoccurs.If friends go out together,theymaygo inonecar:the person whodrives transports theotherasa gift, aswhatis expectedamongpeople related asfriends.The person who prepares a family's dinner gives theeffortin- volvedin preparing the meal, aswhatis expected ofthat person's mem- bership inacommonhousehold. Mauss's distinction between gifts and commoditiesresemblesanum- berofMarxian distinctions-between precapitalist and capitalist societies, betweenusevalueand exchange value, between productiveconsumption and consumptiveproduction-and some anthropologists have produced Marxian interpretations ofMauss (especially Gregory, 1982). TheMaussian approach, however, differs inits greater concern withcirculation andcon- sumption as opposed to production(Lojkine,1989), and in its greater con- cernwithsocialidentificationsand understandings of people,objects, and socialrelations. Giftand commodityexchangemay becontrasted bydescribing the elementsthat underlie theMaussian view of gifts (seeGregory, 1980: espe- cially640). Thesearethat giftexchange is (1) the obligatory transfer of (2) inalienable objects orservicesbetween (3) relatedand mutually obligated transactors. Theseelements identify the key dimensionsinterms ofwhichtransactionsareunderstood.Thesearethe degree andmanner 122Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations ofthe obligation to transact, ofthelinkbetweenwhatistransactedand thosewhotransact it, andofthelink betweentransactors. Obligatory Transfer Transactions of buying and selling are formally free, while gift trans- actions are obligatory, albeit in a special way. In Mauss's classic formulation (1969:10-11),parties toa giftrelationship areunder"the obligation to repaygift received...the obligation to givepresents andthe obligation toreceivethem." Denying these obligations deniestheexistenceofa social relationship with theother party, and henceviolates public expectation and private belief.Giftsare freelygivenonly inthesensethatthereisnoin- stitution monitoringperformance and enforcingconformity. Thiscontradicts an important elementoftheWesternacademic view ofthe gift, "that (a) itis somethingvoluntarily given, andthat (b) thereis no expectation of compensation"(Belk,1979:100). Thus, Cheal (1988:12) says that giftgiving occurs when"the incumbents ofroles gobeyond their recognizedobligations and performgratuitous favors." Parry(1986:466) callsthis concept ofthe gift as"freeandunconstrained" the"elaborated ideology ofthe 'puregift."' Thisstresson liberality in gift transactionsis incontrasttotheconstraintandconcernfor equivalence in commodity transactions (Silver, 1990, describes the emergence ofthis distinction in the Scottish Enlightenment inthelate18th century). Inthis view, giftsrepre- sent spontaneous and unconstrainingexpressions oftheaffectionoffree and independentpeople. Noonan (1984:695)says thedonor doesnot giveby way of compensation or by way of purchase. No equivalence exists betweenwhatthedoneehasdoneandwhatis given. No obligation is imposed whichthedoneemust fulfill... . Thatthe gift should operatecoercively isindeed repugnant and painful tothe donor, destructive ofthe liberality thatisintended. Mauss's point that giving is obligatory doesnotmeanthat gifts are never free.Some are, particularly when people are creating a newrelation- ship or modifying anoldone.For example, Simmel (1950:392) saidthat thefirst giftgiven betweentwo people "hasa voluntary character which noreturn gift canhave.Fortoreturn thebenefitweare obligedethically; we operate underacoercion."Mausshimself (1969:25) describedthe preliminary gift oftheKula relationship among Trobriand Islanders as one offreedom.HesaidtheKula partnership starts witha preliminary gift, the vaga, whichis strenuously sought after by means of solicitory gifts. Toobtainthis vaga aman may flatter hisfuture partner, whois still independent, andtowhomheis making a preliminary seriesof presents. ... [O]ne cannever say whetherthe vaga willbe given inthefirst place orwhether eventhe solicitory gifts willbe accepted. 123 Gifttransactions withinstable relationships are obligatory, however. Family andhouseholdmembersare expected todo thingswillingly for othermembersandto acceptwillingly whatothermembersdofor them, as Komarovsky (1987) describesforGlentonandas Young andWillmott (1986) describeforBethnalGreen.Thosewhoareunderthis obligation are unhappy when they are deniedthechancetotransact. Thusone young man reported toBell (1969:93), "My father was hurt I think whenheknew Iwenttothebankratherthanhimforadown payment onanewcar." Similarly, Murcott (1983:182-183) foundthatthehousewivesshestudied frequently defined "cooking" ina way thatmadeittheirown obligation rather than something their husbands could do, thus protecting their ability to give inthe marriage(see also Schudson, 1984:141). The obligation to give andreceive among thosewhoare relatedtoeachotherwithin certain degrees is exemplifiedpositivelyby the strongregularities in giftgiving among kininMiddletownatChristmas described byCaplow(1984:espe- cially 1315-1317) andis exemplifiednegatively in Ellis's (1983)description ofhowtheviolentbreakdownof marriage isassociatedwiththewife's failuretocookandthehusband's failureto accept themeal.Evenwhen thereislittleaffection among close kin, they are obligated tocontinueto transact with each other, and generally they do so (e.g., Allan, 1979:94-95). Fulfilling the obligation to give doesnot discharge it; itrecreatesit byreaffirming the relationship ofwhichthe obligation isa part. Ifone neighborhelps anothermovesome stones, andiflaterthesecondloans thefirst a tool, thisdoesnot simply discharge the obligation. Italsoreaf- firmsthe neighborlyrelationship, andsoreaffirms the obligation tocon- tinueto give andreceiveinthis way (see Bulmer, 1986: especiallychap. 4, presenting theworkof Abrams). Commodity relations are different. There, transacting as one ought dis- solvesthe obligations that link the parties. Thisreflects thecultural under- standing that freeand independent people bind themselves only temporarily when they contract totransact commodities.The purchaser is obligated to pay thesellerforwhatis bought, butthat paying endsthe obligation and dissolves the relationship: buyer and seller oweeachother nothing and can go their own ways. Indeed, there is the assumption that actors should engage in commodity transactions onlyifthey arefreeand independent ofeach other, for only thenwill they befreeofundueinfluenceandsoableto protect theirowninterests. Butwith gift relations people should give and receive only if they are not independent ofeachother. Doubtless, ifone party toa giftrelationship feels regularly andun- justly slighted, heor she will consider ending the relationship. But this does notmeanthatthetransactor is calculating debtsand credits, emotionalor material - Gouldner's mutually contingent benefits, Blau's expected returns, 124Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations orMalinowski's equivalentrepayment orcounterservice. Instead, the repeated imbalanceitselfmarks a repeated violationofthe obligation to give, receive, and repay inthat relationship, andhencemarks theendof the relationship asithadbeen. Openlyending sucha relationship is just aformal recognition thatthe relationship has already ended. Thus, Mauss dissents from the view that transactors typically are free- lyactingindependent individuals who give because theyrationally expect an equivalent returnorinorderto spontaneouslyexpress their personal sentiments. Peoplemay behavethis way insome situations, but gift trans- actionscannotbe explained intermsofeconomicoremotionalin- dividualism, howevermuch theymay have important economicand emotionalcorrelatesand consequences. WhenI prepare amealfor my family ithasanemotionaldimension:it expresses thefactthatIlove my wifeand child; ithasaneconomicdimension:wecaneatbetterforless athomethaninarestaurant.Butemotional expression andeconomic utility are not adequateexplanations of why I cook, what eachofusthinks of it, orthe relationships thatlinkustoeachotherandtothemeal. Inalienable Objects ThesecondelementoftheMaussianmodelisthat gifts arein- alienable, "aretosomeextent parts of persons"(Mauss,1969:11). In- alienably linkedtothe giver, the giftgenerates and regenerates the relationship between giver and recipient. The manyeveryday objects that married partners buy for each otheras part ofthe routine of keeping house continually remindthemofeach other, andsoaffirmandrecreatethe relationship thatlinksthem.In contrast, the commodity is alienated; it bearsnosubstantial relationship tothe person whosoldit. (Lojkine [1989:149] makesthe point thatthisistruer ofmaterial commoditiesthan ofintellectual property andservicestradedas commodities.) InMauss's interpretation, thebondbetween person and thing in societiesofthe gift is strong and hence inalienability is pronounced. (A case of pronouncedinalienability inmodern society, treatedas archaic, isin McCracken's, 1988: chap. 3, description ofLois Roget andher family heir- looms.) Becausethe degree ofassociation between object and person will vary according tosituationsand societies,however, inalienability doesnot meanthatthe giver always hasthe right toreclaim the object orthatsuch a right couldbeexercised in practice. Nordoesitmeanthatthe recipient neverhasthe right to dispose ofthe object. Theexistenceofthe ability to recover a gift and ofother possible rights and typical practices are empirical questions. Whatis important isthat people think ofthe object as bearing 125 the identity ofthe giver andofthe relationship betweenthe giver andthe recipient. Thelinkbetween object,giver, and recipient is particularly visible whenformal giftgivinggoeswrong, whena gift is rejected. Around Christmas everyyearnewspaper articles appear onwhattodowithun- suitable gifts (e.g., NewYork TimesNews Service, 1988), evidencethat dis- posing of useless objects that were acquired as gifts causes an embarrassment that noonewould feelabout disposing of useless objects that were acquired as commodities, suchas boring paperback booksorsourmilk. Thisisbecause rejecting the giftrejects aswellthe giver andthe giver'srelationship tothe recipient. Thisis apparent inextremeformin Caplow's observation (1984:1314) ofamarkedassociationinMiddletown between open criticism ofa spouse's Christmas gift andlater rejection of the spouse in separation ordivorce.Mauss's point(1969:10) that"to give something is to give a part ofoneself"is expressed by the unhappy parents whowrotetoMiss Manners, anadvice columnist, oftheir"concern when a gift[to anadult child] ofhand-woven place matswas opened andheld up tothe wallpaper toensurethat it was a perfect colormatch....It was, but our hearts werein our throats." These parents go ontoask theobvious question: doesthis mean"a rejection ofusorour values?" Your children, MissManners replied,"ought atleasttoconcealfrom you eventhe pos- sibility that your presentsmight notmatch their tastes" (Martin, 1988). Be- causethe gift isatokenofthe giver's concernand affection, ratherthan just abundleof impersonal utilitiesinthe way thatcommodities are, the recipient cannot simply throw it out (e.g.,Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg- Halton, 1981:66). Justasthe objectgiven asa gift is inalienable, soitis unique. As Mauss (1969:25) saidofKula valuables, they "are notindifferent things; they aremorethanmerecoins.... [They] havea name, a personality, a past, and evena legend attached to them." It is this individuality that makes these valuable, asdistinct fromabstract bearers ofvaluelike money(Loj- kine, 1989:166-156). Evenan ordinary object becomes unique whenitis given asa gift becauseitismarked by thetiethatlinksthe giver and recipient toeach other, and by theoccasionofthe given. AsBaudrillard (1981:64)puts it, "onceithasbeen given-and becauseofthis-itisthis object and notanother. The gift is unique, specified by the peopleexchang- ing it and the unique momentofthe exchange." The gift that is lost cannot be replaced, forthe replacement wouldbeacheat.It wouldnot really be the same, andthe recipient would know, evenifit wereasecretfromthe giver. In contrast, in commodityrelationshipspeople thinkof objects as abstract bundlesofutilitiesandvaluesthatare precisely not unique. The 126Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations company envelope that islostcan be replaced by getting anotherfromthe supply room, forinthis situation thetwo envelopes are thesame.In other words, objects in commodity relationsare "fungible," a legal termthat means capable of replacing or beingreplaced by anotheritem meeting the requisite definition.The buyer ofathousandbarrelsofBrentcrude oil, anounceof gold, a Baby Ruth candy bar, issatisfiedwith any itemthat meetsthe requisite criteria, becauseeachis freely substitutable withinits classandhenceis fungible. This, after all, isa goal ofmass production andthebasisof productadvertising andmail-order catalogues. Thedistinction between unique and inalienable gifts and fungible and alienablecommodities parallels another important distinction-thatbe- tweenthe way wethinkabout people in gift relationsandin commodity relations.In gift relations people are thought oforidentifiedintermsof their fundamental, inalienableattributes and relationships, andhenceare unique. Brothersarebrothersbecauseoftheir verybiological substance (as ourcultureunderstandsthese things) andneithercanbe replacedby anyone else.Ontheother hand, in commodity relations people areiden- tifiedintermsofalienableattributes. The buyerpays the person behind the counter, notbecauseof any alienableattribute orlink withthe buyer, butbecausethat personoccupies a position inan organization. That posi- tionis alienable, becausethe person can quit, be promoted or fired, and stillbethesame person. Ifanewface appears behindthe counter, the buyer will transact with thenew person and nottheoldone.In commodity relationsitisnot onlyobjects thatare fungible; people are fungible too. Thus, in giftrelationships people and objects are thought ofas being unique and inalienably linkedtoeachother:"the objects arenevercom- pletelyseparated fromthemenwho exchange them; thecommunionand alliance they establish are well-nigh indissoluble" (Mauss,1969:31). Onthe other hand, in commodity relationships the people and objects are fungible andalienable: they arelinkedtoeachotherinno enduring personalway. The consequence isthatcommoditiesarealienatednot only fromthe people who transact them, but even from the people who own them. Private property, the form of ownership ofan object in a commodity system, speaks notofa"close relationship between person and thing," says Daniel Miller, butof"abstract relationship between anonymouspeople and postulated objects" (Miller,1987:120-121).Anyperson canown any thing. Whilethe object as property may cometo be inalienably linked with its owner, owner- ship per semarks neitherthe object with the personhood oftheowner nor the person withthe identity ofthe property. Oncethe purchase ofa commodity is completed, the object trans- actedisalienatedfromthe people whowere part ofits past. The buyer can destroy it wantonly, consume it, oruseit tocreate wealth, all without 127 regard forthoseinvolvedinthe commodity'sproduction orinthetrans- actioninwhichitwas purchased.Alternatively, the inalienability ofthe giftgives the giver a continuing claimonthe object, inextremecasesa claimonwhateveraccruestothe recipientthrough theuseofthe object. Thus, inafamous passage Mauss reported thewordsofaMaoriinform- ant, Tamate Ranaipiri.Ranaipiri said,If yougive mea valuableitemthat Ithen give tosomeone else, andifthatother person then reciprocates withasecond time, I must return that seconditemto you, for itembodies the spirit ofwhat yougave me.IfIfailtodo so, "I might becomeillor even die,"' (Mauss,1969:9).(Thispassage has sparked considerable debate.See Sahlins, 1974: chap. 4, and therebuttals of Lojkine, 1989:155- 156, and Parry, 1986:462-466.) Although commoditiesare anonymous, not everything we buy isa perfectcommodity,whollyimpersonal. Somedobeara personalidentity. Works of design, art, andcraft fallmost easily intothis category, anditis appropriate that theyusually bearthemaker's nameormark. The special relationship ofcreatorand object is recognized in patent and copyright law, as wellasin continuing claims that creators shouldhave a say in what they createevenafteritissold:artistsandwritersshouldhavea say in theuseoftheir art, architectsshouldhavea say intheextensionor modificationoftheir buildings, and soforth (see,e.g., Morrison,1988; this point isextendedin Lojkine,1989). The point thata giftrelationship involvesinalienable objects, while a commodityrelationship involvealienableand impersonalobjects and even people, leadstoamore generalpoint. Mausssaid (1969:46) that theevolutionof society involvesan increasing cultural separation ofob- jects from people andsocial relationships: "Weliveina society where thereisamarkeddistinction...between things and persons." With this evolution, peopleincreasingly thinkof objects intermsofabstract and impersonal framesof value, particularlyexchange value, ofwhich money is the definitive,anonymous marker. In theextremeformofcom- modity transaction, thecirculationof capital,onlyexchange valuemat- tersandtheactual object thatistransactedisimmaterial:a check, a bank draft,cash,debentures, andelectronicinterbanktransferforthe sameamountall arethesame.Thisdoesnotmeanthata customerseek- ing aloafofbreadwillbesatisfiedwith anycommodity ofan equal cashvalue.Thecustomeris increasingly concerned,however, withthe exchange valueoftheloafofbreadandis increasingly able, and predisposed, toreduceallloavesofbreadtothis single measureof value: money cost. This, after all, isthe point ofconsumer-oriented 128Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations reformslikeunit pricing infoodstores: products ofdifferent qualities arereducedtotheuniformmeasureof penniesperpound.Money is the great leveler, good forall debts, public and private. AndasMarx observedin Capital,"every one knows, ifheknows nothing else, that commoditieshaveavalue-formcommontothemall....Imeantheir money-form"(Tucker,1978:313). Inthis sense, inthisorientation toward exchange value, thetransactorsareindifferenttotheconcrete identity ofthe object usedtomeetan obligation. Relatedand MutuallyObligated Transactors I turn now tothelast elementof gift relations: transactors are related interms oftheirinalienable attributes, and as part ofthat relationship are obligated to give, receive, and repaygifts in appropriateways. Inother words, gift transactors arenotindividuals whoaredefined independently oftheirsocial relationships, butsocial persons definedin significant ways by theirinalienable positions inastructure ofsocialrelationsthatencom- passes them (Bernstein, 1971; Turner, 1976). Thisis whyParry says that forMauss"It isnotindividuals but...moral persons who carry onex- changes" (Parry, 1986:456; see Mauss, 1985). In societiesdominated by gift exchange thestructure of kinship typically provides thebasisfor people's identities,relations,and obligations. Inindustrial societiesdominated by commodity relationsthestructure ofthehouseholdand family, andtoa lesserextent friendship and neighborhood,typically doesthese things (Bar- nettand Silverman,1979; Schneider,1979, 1980). In commodity relations peoplemay alsobelinkedand obligated to each other, butthese linkages are very differentfromthoseof gift rela- tions.Because commoditysystems reston"thesocialconditionsofthe reproduction of things" (Gregory,1980:641), the parties to commodity transactionsaredefinedandlinked by their complementarypositions in the system of production and distribution, whichisto say theclass system andthedivisionoflabor. Thus, they arelinkedtoeachother only inan abstract and general sense. Culturally thetransactionbetween buyer and sellerreflects nothing fundamentalabout either, butbears only ontheir accidentalandalienable aspects. Thefailuretomake mortgagepayments may meanthatthebank willseizethedefaulter's property torecoverits money, butthebankhasnoclaimonthedefaulterasafreeandinde- pendentperson.Similarly, completing the mortgage contractdoesnotbe- stow upon thecustomer or thebank (or any ofthe people who work there) 129 the right tomakefurther claims upon each other, however much they may come away with goodopinions ofeachother.Thisdistinctionunderlies Lojkine's point(1989) that in societiesofthe gift, gift relations are oriented tothemobilization and command of labor, while in capitalist societiescom- modity relations generally have beenorientedtothe mobilization and com- mandof objects. Ihavedescribedhow commodity transactorsarefreeandinde- pendent, while gift transactors are related and mutually obligated. Although weassumethatcertainkindsof relationships fallintooneoranother category, thereare important exceptions. For example,although wethink thatmarried peopletypically arerelatedand mutually obligated, we agree that someare not: thosein a marriage of convenienceare a prime example. Conversely, we generally see people intheir jobs as freeand independent, and we expect people to change jobs much more freely and self-interestedly than theychangespouses. Wethinksome people are different, however. For example, weseeartists as having a"vision" or "gift" thatbindsthem totheir work. Likewise, some people inmundanefieldsseethemselvesas boundtowork that is an expression oftheir inalienable identity. A striking example is providedby an entrepreneur, Hawken (1987:9), who says that hestartedahealth-foodstorebecauseofhiscore biologicalbeing. Hindered by asthma sinceI was six weeks old, Ihad begunexperimenting with my dietanddiscovereda disquieting correlation.WhenI stoppedeating thenormal Americandietof sugar, fats,alcohol,chemicals, and additives, Ifeltbetter....I wasleftwithamost depressing conclusion:ifIwantedtobe healthy, I'dhaveto becomeafoodnut.Ibidafondfarewellto my junk foods.... Ofcoursethenotionofa calling(e.g., Weber, 1958: chap.2)points toan older bond between work and worker. Like Hawken's explanation, however, itis important to distinguish betweenthesortofworkonedoes (calling or occupation) and the specific institution in which -andthe specific people withwhom-onedoesthework (job). Most people,especiallywage workers, aremuchless likely tobeboundtotheir jobs thantotheiroc- cupations. Whilea giftrelationship entailsinalienable identitiesand obligations, thetransactions withinitarenotthe unproblematic consequence ofthose identitiesand relationships. Instead, thetransactions createandmaintain them.For most people inindustrial society, thecore relationships that link them inalienably toothersarethoseofhouseholdand family, andwesee transactionascentraltothese relationships. Thisismostobviousinmar- riage. The couple must transact, must give and takein an appropriate way, for doing socreatesacommunal existence, astructure that encompasses 130Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations anddefinesthetwo people andmakesthem"moral persons" withinthe marriage (Mansfield and Collard, 1988). In fact, the give and takeandthe creationofa"we" that combinesand redefinestwoindividuals is, insome regards, more important thanthe legal formof marriage. The rights to "palimony" by ade factospouse(Oldham and Caudill, 1984) andtoin- heritance by children born outof wedlock (Anderson,1987) show that such relationshipsgeneratelegalrights and obligationsindistinguishable from thoseinformal marriage. Transactionsareeven important in creating relationsof parenthood. Schneider argues(1984) thatinmostsocieties parentage isnot just anex- pression ofthe consequences ofsexual intercourse; the relationship con- tainstransactionalelementsaswell.AsBarker (1972:585)put itinher analysis ofthe give andtakebetween parents andtheirolder children, in thesetransactions "material goods and physical services are translated into lastingrelationships." WhileAmericansseekinrelationsas reflecting biological substance, they alsoseethemas reflecting acodeofconduct that cannotbe ignored: "under certain conditionsthehierarchical relation- ship betweensubstanceandcodefavors substance, whileunder othercon- ditions...itiscodewhich... takes precedence"(Schneider,1979:159). For example,parents canbehaveso poorly towardtheirchildrenthata courtwillseverthe relationship. Atthesame time, a couple can adopt a child, andif they behave well, they canbecome just like parents tothe child.Insuch cases, thecodeofconductisinvokedto modify theoverall understanding ofthe relationship between particular adultsandchildren. Thus, the relationship between gift transactors is inextricably linkedtothe transactionsthattake place within it, forthosetransactions express and recreatethe relationship, andthustheidentitiesofthe people andeven the objects thatare encompassedby it. CONCLUSIONS Much ofthe work using The Gift has echoedthe way Mauss saw gifts and commoditiesas characterizing entire societies, and much ofinterest has beenwrittenofthe systemicproperties ofsocietiesofthe gift andofthe commodity(e.g.,Gregory, 1982; Lojkine,1989). Here,however, Ihave preferred tosee gifts andcommoditiesas defining sortsof relationships within capitalist societies, even though thedominanceof commodity rela- tionsmeansthat gifts inthesesocietieshave different meanings from those insocietiesofthe gift(see,e.g.,Parry, 1986:458; Gregory,1980). Thisdif- 131 ference,however, is, in important ways, quantitative rather than qualitative. Gift giving doesoccur in capitalist societies, just as buying and selling occurs in societiesofthe gift (Mauss, 1969:20; Carrier and Carrier, 1989: especially 156-159). Therefore gifts andcommodities represent notexclusive categories, but polesdefining acontinuum. Many gift transactions contain anelementofalienationand individualism, just as many commodity trans- actions are tinged by mutual obligation (e.g., Dore,1983; Granovetter, 1985). This perspective offersmorethana theory of exchange. It isas well a theory of transactions, objects,people, andsocial relations, andofthe variationswithinandthelinksbetweenthese things. Asa consequence, itis an approach that facilitatesa reorientationtoward a number ofareas ofinterestto sociologists. I will conclude by illustrating thisreorientation briefly with regard tothesocialnatureof objects, an importantaspect ofstudiesofconsumerculture (e.g., Baudrillard,1981; Campbell, 1987; McKendricket al, 1982),advertising(e.g., Ewen,1976; Foxand Lears, 1983), andmaterialculture (e.g.,Forty, 1986;McCracken,1988;Miller, 1987). Generally, writersinthesefieldsrelatethe way people think ofob- jects to general cultural meanings andsocial structures, muchasVeblen argued inhis theory of conspicuousconsumption. Thisisclearestinthe manysemiological studiesof advertising, whichfocusonhow people in- terpret an objectbylinking ittothecommon symbols withwhichitis associatedintheadvertisement (see Leisset al., 1986). In semiological termsthe commodity(thesignifier) becomes charged withthe meaning oftheassociated symbols(thesignified), andsobecomesa sign. This orientationalso appears instudiesofconsumerculture.For instance, Williams (1982:71)argues that displays inParisian department storesin thesecondhalfofthe19th century sought toendowwareswith "glamor, romance,and,therefore, consumer appeal"by cloaking themwithexotic imagery. Here, as in studiesof advertising, the meaning of objects derives fromtheirassociationwithcommon symbols of exoticism, sexuality, wealth, orthelike. Mauss'smodel suggests, however, thatthereismoreinvolvedthan general cultural meaning.Objects derive identity or meaning fromthe specific personal relationships in which they are transacted or in which they feature.A particular variety ofwine may havea general cultural meaning, butwhenwedrinkitatdinneritalsohasan identity thatreflectsour relationship witheachother. Thus, objects existintwodistinct spheres that mayoverlap in par- ticularcases.Oneisthe sphere ofthe commodity, the sphere oftheim- personal meanings that have concerned students of advertising and material 132Carrier Gifts,Commodities, andSocialRelations andconsumerculture.These meanings canbe important, evenforsome- thingseemingly so personal asthe ways individuals definethemselvesand their position in society(see,e.g., Baudrillard, 1981; Miller, 1987). But even though peoplemay usethemtodefine themselves, these meanings are part of impersonal framesofreference (Schudson,1984:210-218). In addition, however, objects exist ina second, more personalsphere, madeoftheweb of personal relationsinwhicheachofusisboundand through whichwe transact gifts witheachother.These gifts beara general cultural meaning, but they alsobearthe particular personalmeaning ofthe relationship in which they are transacted. This is expressed most succinctly by one woman, who explained to Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton(1981:143) the meaning shesaw in someofthe objects that people had given toher: "love coversitallbecausethe people whohave given themtomelovemeor they wouldn'thave given mesuch things." To grasp fully thesocialnature of objects istoconsiderthedifferent ways that objects exist, andthedif- ferentsortsof relationships andtransactionsinwhich they are involved, fortheseentaildifferent meanings andidentities. Thisbrief concluding discussionofthesocialnatureof objects showshowtheMaussianmodellinks people,objects, andsocialrela- tions.Theseelementsarenot static, for they createandrecreateeach otherintransactionsovertime.Wecannot separate the objects from the people whotransactthemandthesocial relationships inwhich they are transacted, just aswecannot separate the relationship fromthe people whoare in it, the objectsthey transact, and the ways they transact them.Andthisisastrueofthe personal and enduringrelationships of the family asitisofthe impersonal andtransient relationships ofthe supermarket andthe factory. Becausenoelementis prior to any other, theMalinowskian assumption that exchange is "essentiallydyadic trans- actionsbetween self-interested individuals... premised onsomekind ofbalance" (Parry,1986:454) is inappropriate. 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