The New ‘Deliverology’

14 Years of Evolution

March 2015

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Capstone Project

MPA Programme

The London School of Economics and Political Science

Authors: 46978, 47090, 48907, 52601, 63725, 65717

Client: The Boston Consulting Group

Submission Date: 12/03/2015

Word Count: 14,826 excluding cover page, table of contents, list of tables and figures, labels

of charts, annexes and references

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Executive Summary

Since the 1980s, public sector management reforms have been increasingly focused around

improving the delivery of public services. As part of this wider trend, a more recent approach

known as ‘deliverology’ has arisen. The aim of this report is to describe the origin,

proliferation, and evolution of deliverology as a mechanism to improve public service

delivery.

At its core, deliverology emphasizes the use of targets and delivery plans with a stringent

focus on implementation as a means to drive performance improvements in critical service

delivery areas. The concept was first developed in the United Kingdom in 2001 under the

Tony Blair administration through the creation of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit; the

purpose of which was to carry out the tasks of deliverology using a target-based performance

management approach. Following its original conception in the UK, various governments

have introduced deliverology through the adoption of delivery units or similar managerial

structures. Since 2001, more than 20 formal delivery units have been created in Africa,

Australia, North America, South America, Asia and Europe.

The objective of this report is threefold:

1. Map out the evolution of the thinking around deliverology since its first development

in the UK;

2. Identify evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real improvements

in outcomes; and,

3. Survey the conditions facilitating the adoption of delivery units.

To address these objectives, the report employs a qualitative approach largely reliant on

primary research methods, including interviews and questionnaires with key deliverology

experts and practitioners. Although the report studies both current and previously existing

delivery units across the globe, four countries were chosen as focal points to provide a more

in-depth understanding. In particular, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, and

Malaysia were chosen as hallmark cases of innovation and success, often inspiring their own

distinct offshoots.

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Having thoroughly researched a wide variety of delivery units and deliverology-inspired

structures, a cross comparative analysis led to the identification of the following key findings,

each corresponding to the objectives outlined above.

First, as the concept of delivery units disseminated across the globe, it has evolved to fit a

wide variety of contexts. What began as a short-term, target-based tool to improve service

delivery outcomes has now evolved to encompass a much broader transformation

surrounding the culture and approach to public service delivery. This is especially true among

many of the newer delivery units, which stand as secondary and tertiary models,

incorporating a broader scope and function, as well as innovations.

Second, while there is no conclusive evidence of the effectiveness of delivery units, common

sense and good governance indicators imply a significant value to these units. Common sense

indicators of effectiveness include the proliferation, replication, and longevity of delivery

units. Good governance indicators suggest that the adoption of delivery units can increase

transparency, strengthen the accountability of public officials, and build necessary capacities

for cross-departmental coordination.

Finally, although delivery units have been adopted under a wide array of economic, political,

institutional and cultural circumstances, the experience of various units point to a certain set

of conditions that better facilitate their successful adoption and sustainability. Among these

are, the ongoing and active involvement of the political principal, the definition of specific

and manageable priorities and targets, a pre-existing culture of performance management,

and a conducive institutional setting.

Based on the above research, analysis, and findings, the report proposes nine

recommendations for the successful adoption and sustainability of delivery units. These

recommendations are broken down into the following three phases of adoption:

Phase One: Planning

Ensure that a performance management architecture is in place

Diagnose the reasons for adoption

Align the design with its intended outcome

Phase Two: Execution

Implement early

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Establish the right synergy with the political principal

Brand to maximize support

Phase Three: Assessment

Introduce self-assessment measures and communicate success

Re-evaluate priorities with external sources

Be flexible in order to adapt and evolve over time

While the concept and application of deliverology has certainly evolved, and will continue to

do so, it has proven itself a legitimate approach to public management, generating

considerable interest across the globe. Further, given the broad understanding of

deliverology, its openness to interpretation, and its gradual proliferation and adaptation, it is

unlikely the concept will disappear anytime in the near future.

Armed with the above findings and recommendations above, this report will help inform the

successful adoption and sustainability of deliverology in those countries interested both now

and in the future.

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Table of Content

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1

2. Scope, Methodology, and Limitations .................................................................................. 3

A. Scope ............................................................................................................................... 3

B. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 4

C. Limitations ...................................................................................................................... 5

3. Literature review .................................................................................................................... 7

4. Origin of Deliverology ......................................................................................................... 11

5. Objective I: Mapping the evolution of the thinking around deliverology since its first

development in the UK ....................................................................................................... 14

6. Objective II: Evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real

improvements ...................................................................................................................... 32

7. Objective III: Conditions facilitating the adoption of deliverology .................................... 42

8. Findings and Recommendations ......................................................................................... 50

9. Annex .................................................................................................................................. 54

A. Focal Point Country Summaries ................................................................................... 54

B. Non-Focal Point Country Summaries ........................................................................... 61

C. Table on Characteristics and Tools ............................................................................... 80

D. Interview Coding Tables and Interview Guiding Questionnaires................................. 86

1. Interview code – Delivery Unit’s heads and employees ........................................... 86

2. Interview code – Leading experts and academics ..................................................... 88

3. Interview guiding questions ....................................................................................... 89

4. Delivery unit questionnaire participants .................................................................... 91

5. Delivery unit questionnaire........................................................................................ 92

10. References .......................................................................................................................... 97

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List of tables

Table 1: PMDU areas of priority ............................................................................................. 12

Table 2: Evolution of functions of delivery units .................................................................... 24

Table 3: Indicators of unit’s impact to date ............................................................................. 40

Table 4: Main conditions facilitating the adoption of a delivery unit ...................................... 49

Table 5: Governor’s Delivery Unit areas of priority ............................................................... 57

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List of figures

Figure 1: Timeline of delivery units ........................................................................................ 15

Figure 2: Family tree of delivery units .................................................................................... 16

Figure 3: Factors motivating the inception and evolution of a delivery unit ........................... 18

Figure 4: Shared characteristics of delivery units .................................................................... 27

Figure 5: Shared tools of delivery units ................................................................................... 30

Figure 6: Key enablers for the adoption of deliverology ......................................................... 42

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1. Introduction

The evolution of modern society has seen the decline of governments as mere controlling

establishments, providing only basic protection as a form of public service, to governments

that are more service-oriented (Frost and Sullivan, 2012). With this shift, much attention has

been placed on the delivery of public services, and how that process might be improved. As a

result, public sector management reforms have been enacted in many countries across the

globe. One such reform is the introduction of public service ‘delivery units’, which aim to

drive performance in public services using a managerial approach commonly referred to as

‘deliverology’ (Barber, 2008).

Deliverology emphasizes the use of targets and delivery plans with a stringent focus on

implementation as a means to drive performance improvements in critical service delivery

areas. It first made an appearance in the early 2000s in the United Kingdom through the

development of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) under Tony Blair’s

administration. Using a target-based performance management approach, the delivery unit

aimed to transform the UK traditional approach to service delivery and increase attention to

implementation and tangible results.

Following its original conception in the UK, various governments have introduced concepts

of ‘deliverology’ through the adoption of delivery units or similar managerial structures.

Since 2001, more than 20 formal delivery units have been created in Africa, Australia, North

America, South America, Asia and Europe. These offshoots have been adapted to fit

numerous contexts, from developed to developing and centralized to decentralized countries,

and span various policy areas.

Despite the gradual proliferation of delivery units, there remain many questions regarding the

evolution of deliverology, its ability to deliver real improvements in outcomes, and the

circumstances in which it may be best adopted. To answer these questions, this report will

first provide context and background on deliverology via a literature review, followed by a

detailed account on the origin of deliverology in the UK. Next, it will address the evolution of

deliverology by identifying key influencing factors in the use and adaption of deliverology

across time and space, particularly highlighting common and diverging functions,

characteristics, and tools of delivery units in different countries. It will then explore if there is

conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of these units in producing real improvements in

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outcomes. Next, the report will present conditions which best facilitate the adoption of a

delivery approach, taking into account both the experiences of units that have persisted over

time and those that have been abolished. Finally, the report will outline general findings and

recommendations.

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2. Scope, Methodology, and Limitations

A. Scope

The main objectives of this report are threefold:

1. Map out the evolution of the thinking around deliverology since its first development

in the UK.

a. Detail the dissemination of delivery units across time and space.

b. Determine the influences of the fiscal and political environment, digital

technologies, and the rise of open data and transparency on the evolution of

deliverology.

c. Identify the common and diverging functions, characteristics, and tools used

by delivery units around the world.

2. Identify evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real improvements.

a. Identify the main challenges in assessing the effectiveness of deliverology.

b. Present empirical evidence of improvements in areas under scrutiny of

delivery units.

c. Highlight indicators of effectiveness of delivery units.

d. Analyse the main critiques presented against deliverology.

3. Survey the conditions facilitating the adoption of delivery units.

a. Analyse the experience of units from inception to their current state with the

aim of identifying factors that facilitate both the successful adoption and

persistence of units over time.

b. Identify those factors and conditions that threaten the success and longevity of

delivery units.

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B. Methodology

In order to answer Objective I, II and III the report uses qualitative methods consisting of

questionnaires and elite interviews:

- The questionnaire was designed to obtain information about the factors that motivated

the inception of the delivery unit, the characteristics and the tools used, and the impact

of transparency and open data in the work of the unit (see Annex D). The

questionnaire was sent to top and middle level management members of the delivery

unit. The response rate was 30 percent.

- Elite interviews were conducted to complement the information obtained through the

questionnaire and to acquire a deeper understanding of particular countries of interest.

In total, 22 interviews were conducted with current and former members of the

delivery units, members of organisations directly involved in the implementation of

delivery units around the world, and a variety of independent experts (see Annex D).

Four hallmark examples of delivery units were chosen as focal point countries: United

Kingdom, United States (Maryland), Australia, and Malaysia (see Annex A). These cases

represent a broad spectrum of historical and political contexts in which deliverology has been

adopted. Specifically, these countries were chosen for the following reasons:

- United Kingdom is not only the country where deliverology was first implemented, it

is also the country that has seen the largest number of transformations in the unit

itself.

- United States (Maryland) provides evidence of data-driven governance in a

decentralized context.

- Australia provides an example of both a centralized and decentralized delivery unit.

The federal unit has endured twelve years in the same or a very similar fashion

despite changes in administrations.

- Malaysia can be considered a second generation deliverology model, as it not only

expanded the scope of its activities significantly beyond those performed by the

PMDU model, but it has also served as an example for other units in developing

countries that have been inspired by the Malaysian approach.

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The remaining delivery units (see Annex B) will be used to shed light on other contexts,

particularly on the more recent inceptions of delivery units in Africa, South America, Asia

and Europe. These have been analysed under the same scrutiny as the focal point countries

above, including the collection of questionnaires from line staff and in some cases interviews.

However, for practicality and time constraint reasons these units could not be interviewed to

the same extent as the focal point countries.

Through the above research, this report will identify trends and common characteristics to

assist in the analysis of the above objectives. Together, they will be used to develop findings

and key insights to ultimately inform final recommendations.

C. Limitations

The report and analysis contained therein is limited by the following factors:

- In being a qualitative study that is highly dependent on interviews and

questionnaires, the overall analysis will be restricted by response rates and

subject to individual biases of the respondents. While the subjectivity of

statements is meant to be counterbalanced by reports of and interviews with

third parties (e.g. international donor organisation, former employees of the

units, academics and experts), in many cases it is likely that for their impact

assessment they interviewed similar people so that the potential biases persist.

- As the use of delivery units and the evolution of deliverology is a relatively

recent development, secondary academic literature is limited. Consequently,

information was largely gathered from primary sources or, where appropriate,

from third parties aiding or consulting the delivery units.

In light of the stated objectives, a quantitative analysis is not well suited for the following

reasons:

1. Some types of governments may be more inclined to adopt a delivery unit, representing a

major endogeneity issue. In particular, it is not possible to isolate the effect of the

delivery unit from the characteristics of a particular type of government that decides to

adopt this type of model.

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2. In cases where one could potentially exploit a quasi-natural experiment at the subnational

level, such as in Wales or Maryland, it is still difficult to do so as delivery units are often

linked to other simultaneous policies at the federal and state level. There are also often

significant differences in how the data is obtained, indicators used and how these compare

to each other. Once again, making it unfeasible to extrapolate the effect of the delivery

unit on service delivery from other policy interventions.

3. Besides the implementation of a delivery unit, there are many other factors that vary

across countries. It is very unlikely to find all the observables that might influence the

outcomes and include them in a regression. As a consequence, the delivery unit variable

might pick up other factors leading to an omitted variable bias.

4. Since delivery units perform different functions and have different scopes, the

independent variables in the quantitative analysis will not have a unique meaning. In the

same way, priorities vary between countries, making it difficult to create a dependent

variable that is common to all delivery units.

5. Given that, and as will be shown later on, policies as well as delivery units’ priorities

often undergo major adjustments after an administration change. As such, it is difficult to

disentangle national policy reforms from delivery units’ priorities.

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3. Literature review

Public administrations have undergone significant public sector management reforms under

the continuous aim to improve governance. The past three decades in particular have seen a

number of reforms from New Public Management (NPM) to Deliverology, reflecting the

evolving managerial thinking within the public sector as well as the role of the state in the

provision of services (Ling, 2002). These have largely been due to the impacts of various

exogenous factors affecting the public sector, such as the rise of technology and the growth of

the private sector. As each reform introduced was designed to improve on the shortcomings

of the latter, understanding the rationale behind each new iteration is important. For this

reason, this section will briefly describe the reforms leading to deliverology.

Governments are typically organised as ‘machine bureaucracies’, based on formal

hierarchical structures with strict rules and working processes (Mintzberg, 1992; White and

Dunleavy, 2010). The adoption of such an arrangement is driven by principles of democracy,

such as those of ‘impersonality, equality, and fairness’ (du Gay, 1994; Cordella and

Willcocks, 2010). However, the restrictions therein have also informed the view of public

administrations as being inefficient and overly bureaucratic, affecting citizen satisfaction with

both government and public services (Clarke, 1994).

In response, NPM emerged redefining managerial and governance practices in the public

sector in line with objectives typical of market economics (Hood, 1985; Osborne and

Gaebler, 1992; Cordella and Bonina, 2012). This private sector-driven approach was

organised to make governments more responsive, accountable, transparent, and results-

driven, as well as decentralized, efficient, and customer-oriented (Cordella and Bonina, 2012;

Currie and Guah, 2007; Gruening, 2001). It was modelled on the notion of ‘value for money’

among private organisations, emphasizing competition by providers for resources from

policymakers (Cordella and Bonina, 2012). This subsequently altered the view of citizens as

simply beneficiaries of public services to customers and consumers with the ability to choose

among different, better, and more customizable services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). The

citizen-government relationship was reimagined as a market interaction, wherein citizens

expect a degree of transparency, accountability, and quality in exchange for their tax

contributions. As such, NPM has promoted a public management culture where managerial

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efficiency supersedes the need for effectiveness in the delivery of services (Self, 2000;

Cordella and Bonina, 2012).

The focus on vertical specialization, intra-organisational rationalization, structural

devolution, professional autonomy, and performance management however also led to

distinct silos among the various ministries and agencies within an administration (Christensen

and Laegreid, 2006; OECD, 2005; Boston and Eichbaum, 2005; Christensen and Laegreid,

2001; Askim et al., 2009). As a result, a fragmented government emerged creating difficulties

in effectively addressing the increasing interdependent and complex nature of policy issues

(Mulgan, 2005; Fimreite et al., 2007; Pollit, 2003a). These so-called ‘wicked problems’,

which span various sectors and policy arenas and continue to be “cross-cutting and

multidimensional” required a different managerial approach (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007;

Alessandro et al., 2014: 1). As a result, the rise of a post-NPM reform emerged during the

mid-late nineties, commonly referred to as ‘Joined-Up Government’ (Ferguson, 2009).

Joined-Up Government (JUG) is focused on the collaboration and integration of various

entities in the delivery of public services. Its adoption is aimed “to present a single face to

those they are dealing with and operate as a unit on problems that are interrelated” (Hood,

2005: 19). While designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public

administrations, its approach in doing so differs (Cordella and Bonina, 2012; Self, 2000).

JUG aims to overcome the structural inefficiencies resulting from the decentralization of

government as well as the weaker control over service delivery due to outsourcing practices

by enhancing coordination both between ministries and across governmental levels (Cordella

and Bonina, 2012; Christensen and Laegreid, 2007; Ling, 2002). It focuses on increasing

efficiency and improving service delivery through the pooling of resources in a cost-effective

manner such as by avoiding the repetition and duplication of work across separate

governmental entities (Fimreite et al., 2012). This integrated approach promotes innovation

by bringing people together and increasing the exchange of ideas to create “seamless” public

services, thereby enhancing the citizen experience (Bogdanor, 2005; Perri et al., 2002; Pollit,

2003b; Fimreite et al., 2012).

However, increasing citizen demands for service delivery coupled with the increasing need

for collaboration across government required more accountability and a higher degree of

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control and oversight. In response, renewed1 attempts to gain central control and coordination

were made through the Centre of Government (CoG) reform during the mid-2000s

(Alessandro et al., 2013: 4; Clarke and Steward, 1997). CoG “refers to the institution or

group of institutions that provide direct support to the country’s chief executive, generally for

the political and technical coordination of government actions, strategic planning,

performance monitoring and communication of government’s decisions and achievements”

(Alessandro et al., 2013: 4). Such a reform was “deemed necessary to provide coherence to

government actions” (ibid.) especially in light of the previous two reforms which focused

more on the efficiency of an administration than its effectiveness. It focused on strengthening

the capacities available at the CoG, such as through setting clear priority goals, aligning

budgets to priorities, monitoring implementation and progress, and intervening when

necessary (IDB, 2014). However, as an inherently input focused approach, it did not directly

address concerns in the output of service delivery, and thus failed to drive tangible

performance improvements.

The rise of technology, digital tools and e-government initiatives were occurring at a

simultaneous pace. Each new round of reform was subject to the increasing prevalence and

availability of technology and, in turn, its impact on government-citizen relationships. Since

2008, e-governance has become much more embraced in administrations as both an internal

and external tool to improve the administration’s work processes (Dunleavy et al., 2006).

More recently, a new approach to the provision of public services has arisen combining key

elements of NPM, COG, JUG and data-driven governance known as ‘deliverology’. In

particular, deliverology is an “approach to managing and monitoring the implementation of

activities that have significant impact on outcomes” (Barber, 2011: 32). It ensures policy

priorities are implemented across departments in such a way as to have the greatest possible

impact, maximizing coordination and effort for the achievement of desired outcomes. At its

core, deliverology is a target-driven, results-based strategy to improve public sector

performance (Gold, 2014).

1 The CoG approach is not a new phenomenon and dates back to 1916 in the UK, 1939 in the US and the 50’s

and 60’s in Latin America (Alessandro et al., 2013:4). More recently, ministries of finance or the treasure

undertook this central steering approach.

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Often carried out in the form of ‘delivery units’, deliverology is typically comprised of a

small but highly skilled staff mandated with the task of driving performance improvements in

critical service delivery areas. Primarily housed in the centre of government, near the

executive, from whom they derive either formal or informal authority, they play a distinctive

role undertaking all or a combination of the following functions (World Bank, 2010):

1. Focusing political pressure for results through progress-chasing on behalf of the

political principal;

2. Providing a simple and direct monitoring mechanism;

3. Signalling key government delivery priorities;

4. Providing a clear signal that government is holding ministers accountable for public

service delivery; and

5. Supporting innovation and coordination by various ministries, and providing a

forum for problem solving.

Taken as a whole, delivery units communicate administration priorities and work toward their

realization by enhancing efficiency and effectiveness through departmental cooperation and

the use of clear and measurable targets. While many delivery units share the traits and

characteristics described above, they can also vary in a number of ways, as will be seen in the

subsequent sections. To begin, the following section will first detail the origin of deliverology

in the UK.

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4. Origin of Deliverology

The English Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) is the first example of a delivery unit.

Former Prime Minister Tony Blair established it in 2001 under the leadership of Sir Michael

Barber. It was implemented as part of a broader process to modernize public spending,

which, in earlier years, included the introduction of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) as

part of the performance management framework (HM Treasury, 1998). PSAs where

established in 1998 setting performance targets for certain areas of government (Noman,

2008). However, at this first stage it was unclear who was responsible for delivering the

targets as public officials were not accountable for the progress and there lacked a clear plan

of how these targets were going to be achieved in the short-term.

The PMDU was originally created to alleviate these problems, as well as to prove that

changes could be made by strengthening and monitoring public service delivery in key

priority areas. It reported directly to the Prime Minister and was independent from the

Treasury and the departments with whom it worked. The main responsibilities of the PMDU

were the following: assess and report performance, provide analytical support and

recommendations that accelerates delivery capacity in departments and sustains continual

improvement, help departments to identify and remove obstacles to delivery, and develop the

performance management framework and policy on PSAs (World Bank, 2010).

The main idea behind the PMDU was that “a small, flexible, highly capable team, with the

system leader’s backing and the latitude to operate outside the line management chain, can

exercise meaningful influence over the activities of that system, no matter how vast the

bureaucracy” (Barber et al., 2010: 22). As a consequence, the unit was created with a small

team of less than 40 people coming from the Civil Service, local government, and

consultancies.

Rather than being targeted broadly towards improving all domestic policies, the Unit focused

on a small number of the Prime Minister’s key priorities. In doing so, the Unit followed one

of its main objectives, which was to have a specific, narrow, and well-defined scope, with

targets that where easy to define, measure, and monitor (for an overview see table 1).

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Table 1: PMDU areas of priority

Department Priorities

Health

Heart diseases mortality

Cancer mortality

Waiting lists

Waiting times

Accident and emergencies

Education

Literacy and numeracy at 11

Maths and English at 14

5+A*-C GCSEs

Truancy

Home Office

Overall crime and break downs by type

Likelihood of being a victim

Offenders brought to justice

Transport

Road congestion

Rail punctuality

Source: Barber, 2008.

One of the main changes in the traditional PSA framework was the introduction of delivery

plans. The PMDU asked each department to create a document outlining the strategy to

achieve the objectives established in the PSAs. The following nine key issues were identified

as required to deliver a target: accountability and leadership, project management, levers for

change, feedback and communication, timetable for implementation, risk and constraints,

interdepartmental collaboration, resources, and benchmarking (Barber, 2008). These

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documents were not published and were only used internally as a tool to plan and monitor

delivery in the different priority areas.

During the first years of implementation the role of the Prime Minister was predominant. The

Unit reported directly to him, and he was present in the majority of the meetings held with the

head of the departments. Tony Blair’s strong presence was a key factor in ensuring the

accountability and full involvement of departments in the commitment to achieve their

targets. Although departments were formally accountable for achieving their PSA targets,

there were no material incentives or sanctions in place to ensure progress against PSA targets.

The incentive to improve rested solely on personal accountability arrangements (Panchamia

and Thomas, 2014).

The PMDU provided regular delivery updates directly to the Prime Minister and gave support

to the departments through the implementation of many tools and processes, as described by

Barber (2008):

- Stocktakes: performance meetings held by the Prime Minister, ministers from

the relevant departments and key officials.

- Priority reviews: short, intense period of work intended to identify and tackle

specific delivery challenges.

- Delivery reports: confidential six-monthly report submitted to the Prime

Minister on each of his priority areas.

- PM monthly notes: briefing sent to the Prime Minister on a monthly basis,

updating on progress towards targets.

- Policy delivery trajectories: graph indicating current status compared with the

timetable for achieving performance.

- Delivery chains: step-by-step description of how the target is going to be

delivered.

- League tables: tool to predict a standardized likelihood of delivery, taking into

account the degree of challenge of the target, the quality of planning, the

implementation and performance management, the capacity to drive progress,

and the stage of delivery.

These tools and characteristics illustrate the first approach to deliverology introduced by

Tony Blair and Sir Michel Barber in 2001, and, like the concept of deliverology, they have

evolved over time and space, responding to various internal and external factors.

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5. Objective I: Mapping the evolution of the thinking around

deliverology since its first development in the UK

Since its original inception in the UK in 2001, the idea of deliverology has disseminated

across the globe, evolving to fit the various contexts in which it has been adopted. Due to this

evolution, and the modifications inherent therein, both the understanding of deliverology and

the use of delivery units has likewise evolved. Consequently, there is no singular definition of

what constitutes a delivery unit. It follows, then, that there is broad discrepancy across

experts as to how many delivery units exist in the world. For the sake of practicality and

precision, this paper employs a narrow definition of delivery units based on a minimum set of

both necessary and sufficient characteristics derived from the PMDU’s original model. These

characteristics are as follows:

Overall goal of performance improvement;

Clear definition of government priorities and objectives;

Periodic measurement and monitoring of performance improvements;

Feedback loop to the political principal; and,

Small size (relative to the number and scope of priorities being pursued).

This section will first detail the spread of delivery units adhering to these necessary and

sufficient characteristics, while recognizing that those countries identified are not meant to be

interpreted as an exhaustive list. It will pay particular attention to the factors that influenced

this dissemination, specifically those related to the fiscal and political environment and the

rise of open data and digital technology.

Having tracked the spread of delivery units chronologically and geographically, this section

will then detail the functions, characteristics, and tools used by the identified units. It is

important to note that while the definition of delivery unit employed in this paper is narrow, it

also recognises adaptations and innovations beyond those necessary and sufficient

characteristics identified above. As such, this section will specifically highlight divergences

from the original PMDU as a means of tracking the evolution in thinking and use of

deliverology.

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a. Detail the dissemination of delivery units across time and space

One fact to which there is broad consensus is that deliverology and the use of delivery units

originated in the UK. Chronologically and regionally, its dissemination appears as such:

Figure 1: Timeline of delivery units

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

The spread of deliverology can also be illustrated in terms of delivery unit implementation

families, which demonstrates more specifically the relationship between particular delivery

units, emphasizing the way in which the implementation of a delivery unit in one country can

influence its adoption in another (see figure 2).

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Figure 2: Family tree of delivery units

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

As seen in figure 2, each delivery family branch connects back to the 2001 UK model. This is

due to the fact that the PMDU was involved in each of the subsequent adaptations, either by

serving as a primary or secondary example or through more direct involvement in the

implementation of those units. The different colours emphasize the countries that have made

adaptations to the original UK model and those subsequent countries which have followed

their example.

At the request of both Maryland and Australia, for example, former PMDU members assisted

in the setup of those units sharing best practices and lessons learned2. While in the case of

Africa and Malaysia, former PMDU stakeholders working with third party organisations

served as consultants in the adoption of delivery units. For Africa, this took place through the

Africa Governance Initiative, a charity set up by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair,

which advises African countries using deliverology type methods3. Similarly, Malaysia was

introduced to the concept through the management consulting firm McKinsey and Company,

2 Interviews 1 & 9

3 Interview 22

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where Sir Michael Barber worked as a Partner, while employing the firm to help them with

their government transformation initiative4. Malaysia is of particular interest as it has inspired

second generation offshoots in both Asia and Africa, namely in Indonesia, Pakistan, and

Tanzania5. In these cases, the Malaysian model was adapted, rather than the original PMDU

model, and was the basis of inspiration and assisted in the implementation efforts.

The dissemination of delivery units across the globe demonstrates the extent to which

deliverology has resonated as a useful approach to both performance management and

improvement. This leads one to question which factors motivate its adoption and what

aspects of delivery units make them useful and sought after. The following two subsections

will explore these questions further.

b. Determine the influences of the fiscal and political environment, digital

technologies, and the rise of open data and transparency on the evolution of

deliverology

The disparity in adoption of delivery units in terms of both time and location make it difficult

to immediately identify common influencing factors. However, through primary research, a

number of factors have risen to the forefront as possible motivations for the adoption and

implementation of a delivery unit (see figure 3).

4 Interview 2

5 Puttick et al. (2014) also indicate that India receives significant help from PEMANDU in designing their own

delivery unit as well as elaborating a Big Results Now strategy.

18

Figure 3: Factors motivating the inception and evolution of a delivery unit

Source: authors’ own elaboration based on interviews and questionnaire results6.

Fiscal environment

53% of the delivery units surveyed or interviewed reported

that the fiscal environment motivated the inception of their

unit.

The fiscal environment was found to be a mixed determinant in both the adoption and

evolution of a delivery unit. During times of stagnation or negative growth, the achievement

of efficiency and effectiveness becomes a key goal of government. The idea behind this is to

avoid sacrificing quality of performance in the face of budgetary constraints, or, put more

simply, to ‘do more with less’. Equally though, during times of strong fiscal performance,

governments are tasked with ‘doing more, better’.

While initial delivery units were not intended to act as a ‘rationaliser’ or ‘cost saver’,

testimonials from interviews point to more units increasingly embracing this framework. For

6 Interviews 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 14

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Examples of

other

successful

delivery

Fiscal

environment

Demands for

transparency

Public demand

for service

delivery

improvements

Administration

priorities

Increased use

of digital

technologies

Use of open

data

Agree Not present Disagree

19

example, the Malaysian unit7 reported its delivery unit was adopted in 2009 at a time when

the country was facing a large fiscal deficit. Likewise, the Los Angeles unit was adopted in

2006 during a period of budgetary ‘windfall’, but the 2008 financial crisis precipitated deficit

projections and led the unit to shift their framework from problem solving to delivering

effective service but efficiently with less money8. While a relatively high number of units

were adopted during the peak years of the recent global fiscal crisis, 2007-2009, the financial

environment was not an impetus for adoption, as a ‘cost-cutting’ framework undermines

cooperation, but instead serves as an influence on priorities.

Units adopted in Latin America provide an alternative fiscal rationale, however. As countries

that adopted delivery units in the region were experiencing growth rate, a member of the

IDB9 suggested that, in the face of strong fiscal performance, the focus of these countries was

rather to ‘do more, better’. A member of the Australian Cabinet Implementation Unit (CIU)10

echoed this rationale, noting as a motivator ‘delivering on time’ and in the process using

funds responsibly. Equally, the PMDU was founded during the dotcom bubble in an

economically prosperous time, which lent more support for Barber’s (2008) design of a unit

separate from the treasury to ensure agency cooperation. However, subsequent iterations of

the PMDU were seemingly impacted by the global financial crisis, as priorities were

expanded to include various macro-economic priorities11

.

Political Environment

86% of the delivery units surveyed and interviewed

identified public demand for service delivery improvements

as motivating their inception; similarly, 73% reported

administration priorities as a cause for the inception of

their unit.

As stated in the literature review, a large impetus for the adoption of delivery-focused

reforms was citizen demand for improved public services, which shapes the political climate.

7 Interview 2

8 Interview 11

9 Interview 21

10 Interview 1

11 Interview 5

20

A representative12

specifically identified a “deep public dissatisfaction in areas such as crime,

corruption and education”. Consequently, each of these areas was adopted as a primary

priority of the delivery unit.

Related to citizen demand for improved performance and outcomes, some politicians have

been influenced to create delivery units as a means to demonstrate the fulfilment of party or

campaign promises. A member of the Indonesian unit13

suggested that the President at the

time, Yudhoyono, established the Unit during his second term in a persistent effort to carry

through with his campaign pledges. In this sense, delivery units and the priorities which they

advance serve as proof that the politician or political party is tackling politically salient

issues, while the measure of target achievement communicates their success in doing so.

Digital technology

It had a strong impact on the evolution of the model, but a

mixed impact on the adoption, with only 33% of units

surveyed or interviewed reporting these tools as an

influencing factor for their inception.

The rise of tools associated with digital technologies has influenced the evolution of the

delivery unit model by creating a new arena in which government and citizens can interact.

Social media and other digital platforms provide both an upward and downward mechanism

of external communication, which delivery units may employ as a tool to accomplish core

functions. Upward in the sense that citizens can now report problems to the delivery unit as

opposed to the departments directly, which may be otherwise incentivized to withhold such

information to protect themselves. For instance, through Indonesia’s Public Participation and

Information System, the Delivery Unit gathers feedback from citizens through the use of

mobile phones to express complaints on services, which in turn aids in the Units monitoring

capabilities14

. Other countries have turned to telephone communication, as exemplified by the

presidential hotline in South Africa (see Annex B).

12

Survey respondent 7 13

Interview 13 14

Interview 13

21

The downward mechanism, on the other hand, allows units to publically communicate

priorities and report their performance. To this end, several units such as the Maryland and

Los Angeles unit have established web-based performance dashboards where they publish

target progress in real time. Other communication mechanisms deployed by units, include the

use of Facebook and Twitter accounts as seen in Malaysia15

, and the use of an online

platform provided by the Government Digital Service in the UK’s Implementation Unit16

.

Such measures have enhanced both transparency and accountability. However, as Harris and

Rutter (2014: 79) point out: “Governments have adapted to (…) using digital platforms, but it

is not clear they are as yet as effective at using these as methods for listening as well as

broadcasting”.

While these digital technologies may not be a contributing factor for adoption, they have had

an influence on the evolution of the model. Upward and downward digital technologies give

a delivery unit informal leverage over agencies and departments by making them accountable

to not just the unit but also the public, an incentive for ‘buy-in’. This enhances units’ capacity

to meet core functions while increasing public trust through transparent and accountable

governance. It is, thus, likely more delivery units will employ these digital technologies as

the tool allows functions to be met.

Open Data & Transparency

71% of units surveyed or interviewed cited demands for

transparency had motivated the inception of their unit,

while 50% reported using open data as a tool.

The use of open data has increased with the rise and proliferation of the Internet and greater

public demands for transparency, leading to adoption of open government initiatives. In this

context, open data is a type of online platform that will contain large electronic government

datasets and allow users to freely use, reuse and distribute this government data; this can be a

mode for transparency (StateStat, 2014).

15

Interview 2 16

Interview 6

22

Similar to the tools of digital technologies, open data can be a mechanism for getting more

‘buy-in’ as it incentivizes citizen and civil society participation, a crucial factor as delivery

units do not “work in a vacuum in government”17

. In fact, open data can be seen as a tool

used by both delivery units and citizens. As a way of signalling a transparent and open

government, some delivery units aggregate data sets to measure advances made in public

service provisions, later publishing these datasets, often in relation to the progress made on

targets. In turn, citizens, in theory, can use such data to track the performance of government,

once again serving as an accountability mechanism and strengthening the unit’s credibility18

.

Such is the idea behind Indonesia’s Open Government partnership. While these

programmatic tools would seemingly promote transparency and open governance, the public

value of such tools will depend greatly on what is published and the degree to which the

datasets and websites hosting them are “user-friendly”19

. As such, this may necessitate a

digital tool, such as a performance dashboard, to help synthesize the results in ‘layman's

terms’ as the Maryland Delivery Unit does with their StateStat dashboard. Further, the

availability of such data constitutes a sort of ‘point-of-no-return’ character of governance, in

that, once published, it is hard for the system to become less transparent again20

. Despite this

concern, delivery units are increasingly turning to and prioritising data-driven governance as

a primary tool to enhance service delivery and government transparency (for a more detailed

explanation of the expansion of data-driven governance in the US please see page 23).

17

Interview 9 18

Interview 9 19

Interview 10 20

Interview 9

23

The expansion of Data Driven Governance in the United States

The stat dashboard, StateStat, for the Governor’s Delivery Unit in Maryland developed from

earlier innovations by the New York City Police Department, CompStat, and by then

Baltimore Mayor O’Malley’s CitiStat. These programmes are not alone in the data driven

governance approach. In the United States, many state, city, county, and other government

institutions have begun to embrace open data and rely on digital tools as a mechanism for

encouraging transparency and accountability, government capacity building, and increasing

civic participation. In particular, the country has seen the proliferation of open data portals,

which are online platforms that allow users to freely use, reuse and distribute government

data, as well as ‘stat programmes,’ which are external oriented performance management

programmes with measurable goals, data-driven analysis, regular meetings and/or

assessments, and follow-up (Drees, 2014). In total, 39 states and 46 cities and counties in the

US have open data portals, and some examples include Colorado’s OpenColorado, Alameda

County Data Sharing Initiative (in California), and Dallas Open Data portal (White House,

2015). Stat programmes are far fewer with approximately 8 across different levels of

government, including LouisStat in Louisville (Kentucky), Alaska’s Stat Programme in the

Governor's Office of Management and Budget, and Align Arapahoe in Arapahoe County,

Colorado (Maryland StateStat, 2014). Further, adopting a Stat programme does not

necessitate the adoption of an open data portal, but many do, as San Mateo County California

did. Other governments may adopt an open portal and at the very least provide a performance

measurement dashboard or a monthly ‘report card’ as Chicago’s Performance Metrics does.

While others more closely resemble the delivery unit model. Results Washington (in

Washington state) has both an open data portal and a Stat programme, but is closer to a

delivery unit with standardized output focused targets, a clear feedback loop to the political

principal, and a strategic framework to give value to data driven performance measurement

(Results Washington, 2014). As evidenced, these different data driven governance initiatives

come in many forms, but all have an aim toward a more open and transparent government.

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

24

c. Identify the common functions, characteristics and tools used by delivery units

around the world, highlighting deviations from the original PMDU

Functions

In order to understand the characteristics and tools used, it is important to understand the

functions delivery units undertake. While monitoring and improving performance to ensure

progress against goals remains the core function, the tasks of delivery units have broadened

significantly (see table 2).

Table 2: Evolution of functions of delivery units

Source: authors’ own elaboration based on Harris and Rutter (2014), Alessandro et al.

(2014: 7) and James and Ben Gera (2004).

Type of function Examples

Common core function

Monitoring and improving

performance to ensure

progress against goals

All countries

Additional functions

Long-term policy

development and strategic

management

Sierra Leone, Rwanda,

Tanzania, Malaysia,

Pakistan, UK II, UK III,

Ontario

Short-term policy advice and

support Australia, Ontario

Co-ordination and managing

the politics of delivery

Australia, Maryland, Brazil –

Minas Gerais, Ontario and

Pernambuco, UK II

Gathering input and

communicating results to

increase accountability

Rwanda, Malaysia,

Maryland, Los Angeles,

Indonesia, Netherlands

25

In the ‘archetype’ of a delivery unit, heads of government had specific issues or areas of

improvement, often derived from their platforms or currently salient issues, which they would

turn into priorities together with the delivery unit. However, more recently, delivery units

also have a broader stake in long-term policy development and strategic management. For

example, the Rwandan Government Action Coordination Unit is directly involved in the

National Leadership Retreat and the National Dialogue Council meetings, where the

country’s senior leadership sets the targets for the next year. Sierra Leone’s Strategy and

Policy Unit stands as a good example, responsible not only for implementing and monitoring

progress of President Koroma’s ‘Agenda for Prosperity’, but also for providing strategic

policy advice as well as continuous support21

.

Short-term policy advice and support concerns the planning as well as the implementation of

best practice examples of policy making. The Australian CIU, for instance, provides

ministries with implementation guidelines and toolkits highlighting best practices to assist

them in improving their implementation strategies22

. Other units, such as the US

Performance Improvement Council, also use internal capability building as a way to

holistically improve on delivery and implementation issues across the government23

.

Delivery units are also increasingly coordinating efforts and managing the politics of delivery

across departments. Due to their position at the centre of government, along with their

growing focus on national level priorities, they are well suited for the role. For example, in

Liberia, the President’s Delivery Unit fosters coordination of priorities by securing

compliance of ministers, improving internal policy cohesion, and resolving disputes24

.

In the various cases, delivery units are more actively soliciting input at stakeholder meetings

as a way to increase legitimacy when enacting reforms. This increased focus on

communication can be internally driven to promote coordination across stakeholders, or for

external purposes to connect government to citizens. Such efforts are aided by the rise of ‘big

data’ and tools to collect and analyse large amounts of it. This allows units to more broadly

identify systemic gaps or problems and direct priorities toward addressing them. For

example, both the Maryland Unit and the Unidad Presidencial de Gestión de Cumplimiento in

21

Interview 22 22

Interview 1 & 15 23

Interview 12 24

Interview 22

26

Chile specifically aim to align external communication with outward accountability by

publishing and maintaining information on progress (e.g. performance dashboards) online25

.

Whereas, those units with a more internally focused communication function, such as the

Welsh Delivery Unit and the CIU in Australia, use communication to strengthen intra-

government transparency and inward accountability26

.

Characteristics

As detailed in the beginning of this section, a certain set of characteristics was identified as

being necessary for the delineation of the term ‘delivery unit’. This list was determined by

identifying characteristics present in the first PMDU that have persisted and are common

across all subsequent delivery units. Necessary for meeting a unit’s functions, these

characteristics describe the focus of the units (mission, priorities, targets, and tools) as well as

their physical attributes (size and location). The following figure displays a broader set of

characteristics based on the original PMDU and subsequent adaptations as well their

prevalence across the units researched:

25

Interview 9 26

Interview 1

27

Figure 4: Shared characteristics of delivery units

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

At its core, as given by its very name, a delivery unit must aim to improve the delivery and

performance of government services. A delivery unit’s commitment to improving service

outcomes is demonstrated through the priorities it sets and the functions it undertakes to meet

them. In the PMDU model, heads of government specify a narrow set of performance

improvement areas based on their administrative platform. These translate into the priorities

that delivery units will advance with departments to meet pre-determined targets.

Priorities set in the original PMDU were fairly narrow and department-specific27

. While some

units today continue this tradition, such as the Maryland unit, an increasing number of

delivery units (for example the UK, Australia, Malaysia, and many of the African delivery

units) use much broader priorities that are standardised across departments to reflect national

27

Interview 19

0

5

10

15

20

25

Involvement ofExecutive Office

Periodic performancereport routines

Targets - Output

Separate fromTreasury

Strong participation ofhead of Government

Small size < 50Delivery plans

Priorities -Department specific

Dichotomizedvariables

Priorities -Standardized

Targets - Input

Yes No Information not available

28

priorities28

. For instance, macroeconomic and socioeconomic issues of focus might include

promoting economic growth, improving infrastructure, or lowering poverty.

Further, in addition to expanding upon the scope, priorities are no longer exclusively set by

the head of government. For example, in Malaysia problems and possible solutions are

identified through ‘Cabinet Workshops’ (Gold, 2014). Regardless of whether or not the head

of government personally sets the priorities directly, an essential characteristic of a delivery

unit is that the head of government be directly linked through a feedback loop. This feedback

loop provides the head of government with highly accessible information and constant

assessment of the progress being made on executive priorities, allowing him or her to give

input or course correct when necessary. For the unit, the feedback loop provides ‘the ear of

the executive,’ bestowing an air of authority for the work the unit is conducting29

.

Being located at the centre of government is an additional characteristic that provides a

delivery unit with a high degree of leverage in monitoring those departments with which it

works. Taken in conjunction with its close relationship with the executive, these two

characteristics are the primary sources from which delivery units derive their power,

legitimacy, and authority.

Equally, the institutional location of the delivery unit within government is imperative, in

which it is crucial that the unit be seen as separate from the treasury. As most delivery units

are output-focused and rely on trust and department buy-in, it would be detrimental to be

perceived as a sanctioning or policing unit (Barber, 2008). This underpins why delivery units

are almost always not associated with ‘input decisions’, or those decisions that determine

departmental resources. This is because if departments believe that their performance in

meeting targets will determine funding decisions, they may be less cooperative in working

with delivery units. In other words, this can create an adversarial dynamic where departments

then behave secretively, or even engage in gaming behaviour, both of which activities will

greatly hinder or undermine the work of the delivery unit.

An equally important characteristic that affects a delivery unit’s effectiveness is the staff size.

Delivery units often employ a small and highly skilled staff, taken from both the public and

private sectors. ‘Small’, however, is a relative concept, in that the staff size should be small

28

Interviews 8, 1, 4 and 22 29

Interview 17

29

proportional to the size and scope of the priorities, and functions being performed by the unit.

For example, while Malaysia’s staff of approximately 130 could be seen as large30

, especially

when compared to the under 50-person staff size of the first PMDU, the staff size is

proportional to their responsibilities. The Malaysia unit is responsible for advancing a large

number of nation-wide priorities whereas the PMDU was only responsible for 14 department-

specific priorities. Nonetheless, more delivery units deploy a smaller staff as a way to

maintain flat hierarchies and efficient processes. It fosters a ‘SWAT mentality’ and mitigates

the threat of ‘mission creep’, wherein an overload of responsibilities or work that is too broad

can undermine the capabilities of a unit, rendering them ineffective31

. Such was the case in

the Netherlands, which was staffed by only four individuals working part-time on 74

priorities32

.

Tools

Beyond the tools discussed on page thirteen, particularly in the earlier description of the

original PMDU, a number of tools have been adapted and even created since the first PMDU.

The following figure displays these various tools and the prevalence of their use across

investigated units:

30

Interview 2 31

Interview 17 32

Interview 14

30

Figure 5: Shared tools of delivery units

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

The use of graphs indicating the current progress against the pre-agreed timetable for

achieving performance targets, known as policy delivery trajectories, witnessed an adaptation

when implemented in some countries. While being exclusively used for internal purposes in

the original model, various countries have opened up this tool in different forms to the public

in an attempt to increase external transparency. The StateStat dashboard used by the

Maryland delivery unit is an illustrative example. The dashboard allows citizens to track

progress against the targets (almost in real time) and check whether indicators are ‘on track’,

‘progressing’ or have ‘insufficient progress’33

. Similar mechanisms can be found in Malaysia

as well as in Chile.

As previously discussed, recent years saw the rising use of digital technologies and open data

with media platforms used by government as an interaction space with the public. This has

resulted in the new and innovative use of public and social media platforms by delivery units,

33

Interview 9

02468

101214161820

Executive regular (monthly,bi-yearly, ...) notes

Priority reviews

Policy delivery trajectories

Open data in outsidecommunication

Delivery chains

Deep dive reports

League tables

Policy labs

Yes No Information not available

31

most commonly providing a stage for citizens to voice public service delivery concerns. For

instance, citizens can share pictures of issues with public works or problems with the

infrastructure, providing a mechanism for “on the ground” monitoring to crosscheck the

information provided by the ministries, as evidenced in Indonesia34

. While not all units have

such outward orientation, this real time reporting of issues increases responsibility of

government to citizens, which, if done properly, enhances trust and credibility between

citizens and the unit 35

.

Another relatively recent tool are deep dive reviews, which are typically one or two months

long projects with the relevant departments aimed at tackling particularly difficult bottlenecks

in high-priority goals (Mullin, 2014). Gold (2014: 18) notes this “(…) involves intensive

fieldwork, discussing findings with stakeholders, and generating an action plan that is

monitored”. Found in the UK Implementation Unit, Australia and Brazil, this tool involves an

intensive research with line staff while engaging stakeholders on the process and delivery

plans36

.

Finally, the several delivery units have established policy labs, which are sessions that last six

to eight weeks and “(…) bring together delivery experts (including frontline practitioners) to

solve program and service delivery problems (…)” (Gold, 2014: 18). These also include the

development of Open Days, and international seminars, and have been adopted in Malaysia,

Tanzania, and the UK.

34

Interview 13 35

Interview 21 36

Interview 6

32

6. Objective II: Evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in

producing real improvements

a. Challenges establishing effectiveness

Providing substantiated evidence of the effectiveness of deliverology in producing real

improvements has consistently been a challenge for public servants and academics alike. The

empirical research conducted highlights a structural and a methodological challenge. The

structural challenge consists of two dimensions: internally delivery units often do not keep a

‘success record’ and externally leave the credit of improvements to the relevant departments.

Internally, as units are often so closely tied to the political principal and have a constrained

staff, there is limited time or necessity to outline clearly (by establishing a counterfactual)

that the unit led to a success. As an interviewee explained37

:

These people work such hectic days; they are under a lot of pressure. They

have very long days. They try to make things happen, so any resource they

have they devote to doing that. (…) I haven’t seen many cases were they

actually devote people and time to document what they did or started

documenting it from the beginning. In most cases they tried to build a legacy

of their unit once they are leaving office.

Externally, delivery units cannot or should not claim responsibility for successes because

they formally or informally agreed to not take credit for the results they help to deliver

(Barber, 2008). As institutions that support and help departments to improve their work, these

units are supposed to have a backstage role and allow the departments they liaise with to take

credit on any progress achieved38

. This arrangement is critical for “buy-in” from departments

working with delivery units. As a current member of the UK Implementation Unit39

points

out: “Demonstrating success is a very difficult thing to do, not because there is no success to

point out, there is lots. It is because there is either an explicit or implicit contract between you

37

Interview 21 38

Interview 17 39

Interview 7

33

and the departments you work with, implying that any success is their success not your

success (…)”. While this arrangement is necessary for the successful functioning of a

delivery unit, at the same time, it paradoxically places the delivery unit at a disadvantage

when asked to provide evidence of their effectiveness. This is a key challenge inherent in the

deliverology model.

The methodological challenge refers to the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship

between deliverology and improvements in public service outcomes. As deliverology is often

adopted as part of broader public management reforms, outcomes are likely to be influenced

by them, making it difficult to see real effects of the adoption of a delivery unit. Moreover,

“[b]ecause it is ‘hard to see the benefits of a problem avoided’, it will always be difficult to

quantify the precise value add that agencies and units at the centre of government offer

departments” (Gold, 2014: 34). Units working on public service delivery improvement and

performance management will struggle to establish a counterfactual for outcomes produced

in the absence of their unit40

. A White House Office of Management and Budget (2011: 91)

report points to this dilemma: “(…) performance measurement is a critical tool managers use

to improve performance, but often cannot conclusively answer questions about how outcomes

would differ in the absence of a program or if a program had been administered in a different

way”.

While attempts at quantitative assessments have been made, they do not isolate the effect of

the delivery unit and cannot be extrapolated to other contexts, as the results lack external

validity. In this respect, a former member of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit41

stated:

(…) it is important to be clear that a lot of conversations in government

about demonstrating impact do not mean to show the attribution to the unit.

You can look at the numbers and see if they are going in the right direction,

but that is not evaluation; there is no counterfactual. And in any event, how

do you show that it was the effect of the delivery unit, the effect of the work

of the leading departments, or the effect of external factors? In the world of

policy making nobody has yet been able to do an experiment (…).

40

Interview 18 41

Interview 5

34

Indeed, without a counterfactual to serve as a way to disentangle conflating results, delivery

units cannot account for potential confounding factors that may lead to a spurious

relationship between a delivery unit’s effectiveness and improvements in outcomes. An

illuminating example of this problem comes from the Governor’s Delivery Unit and their

StateStat counterpart in Maryland, US. The unit asserts as evidence of their effectiveness that,

despite the great recession, they recovered 144,000 jobs since February 2010 and fulfilled

97.3% of their goals (StateStat, 2014). As Hayward (2013) contends: “However, there is no

way to know the true correlation between StateStat42

activity and jobs recovered and it’s

conceivable the state’s other actions including last year’s [2012] tax hikes on the wealthy

actually impaired job growth”.

b. Empirical evidence of improvements in areas under scrutiny of delivery units

Due to the challenges outlined, there are no quantitative assessments of the effectiveness of

delivery units. However, there is some research on policy areas under the scrutiny of delivery

units. Bevan and Wilson (2013) compare education and health43

outcomes in England and

Wales, in a difference-in-differences approach before and after the 2001 reform (until 2005).

While in the case of education the authors evaluate the effect of the abolition of school league

tables in Wales, in health they examine the effect of the introduction of the Star rating

system44

for hospitals in England. The authors conclude that the Welsh model45

led to worse

reported outcomes in education (examination performance at age 16) and health (reduction of

hospital waiting times).

Despite the robustness of the results46

, the research assessed the effect of differences in

policies for schools and hospitals and not the direct effect of the PMDU itself. Even though

the unit was a main factor in elaborating new approaches to health and education, it is

impossible to disentangle the effects of the unit and of the policy changes at that time.

42

For the relationship between Maryland’s Delivery Unit and StateStat, please see Annex A. 43

As a result of the devolution, Wales and England had similar policy objectives but created very different

models of governance, especially in education and health (Bevan and Wilson, 2013). 44

The Star rating system gave NHS trusts a score from zero to three stars based on performance. 45

For the trust and altruism model see Le Grand (2003). 46

According to Bevan and Wilson (2013) the parallel-trends assumption is strong, given the countries’

proximity in models of governance, funding and organisation before the change.

35

Bevan (2014) and Bevan et al. (2014: 115) assess health outcomes in the four countries of the

UK from 2001 to 2010 by examining the different policies implemented as a result of the

devolution and conclude:

Within the limitations of the performance information available across the

four countries over time before and after devolution, it does not appear that

the increasing divergence of policies since devolution has been associated

with a matching divergence of performance. (…) Where we do have

comparable data, there are no material differences in performance (…).

Where there were material differences in the past, improvements over time

have narrowed differences so these are now relatively small.

Aside from the aforementioned studies, some units (or third parties assessing the work of

these units) merely compare pre- and post-intervention outcomes without establishing

counterfactuals or causality. The three UK units provide a good example of this assessment.

As mentioned, the initial PMDU had a very limited and clear scope. Each one of the targets

had precise measures and improvements in each of these areas were tracked continuously47

.

By 2005, 80% of the targets were met, while the rest showed increases (Regan, 2014).

Measurement of outcomes has been a consistent part of the UK PMDU. Although after 2007

the number of priorities increased and a more sophisticated approach to target setting was

taken, not all of the priorities had specific targets. In that sense, under the second iteration of

the PMDU, a more ‘fit for purpose’ approach to motivating and engaging delivery systems

was adopted48

. This set of metrics and trajectories was used to monitor whether progress was

on track and to ensure early intervention. The unit performed an analysis to understand what

interventions accelerated progress49

.

The Implementation Unit50

measures effectiveness in a three step process: “The basic

measurement, step one, is if whatever you have done has positively influenced the thinking of

what we call centre of government (…). We should be reaching level one 100% of the time,

and we do. Level two is that we can demonstrate impact; that we can show that our

inspections change the work of the leading department or the lead delivery agency of that

47

Interview 19 48

Interview 4 49

Interview 4 50

Interview 7

36

issue (…). Level 3 is the real world impact (…).” However, this information is not publicly

available.

Another example for this type of assessment was conducted in Pakistan and Tanzania51

.

Barber (2013) reports that after having implemented the ‘deliverology’ methodology in

Pakistan between 2011 and 2013, 1.5 million more children were enrolled in schools, their

attendance was at over 90% and 81,000 new teachers were hired. However, Todd et al.

(2014) highlight that these effects cannot be interpreted causally. Similarly, with Tanzania

they (ibid: 8) stress that despite it being too early to attribute the increases in educational

attainment in 2013 to the BRN52

, “it is clear that BRN has created a window for change in the

Tanzanian education system”.

While this is only a selected sample of evidence, it is important to keep in mind that these are

self-reported differences in outcomes provided by units themselves, so they are subject to

potential misreporting and time-variant heterogeneity. Furthermore, while the quantitative

evidence provided has a high degree of internal validity, its external validity is small,

rendering the approach inappropriate for our attempt to conduct a universal assessment of the

effectiveness of deliverology.

c. Indicators of effectiveness of delivery units

While there is strong, albeit not robust, evidence from delivery units, few and largely

inconclusive empirical evidence from academia exists on the effectiveness of delivery units

in improving outcomes. Interviewed experts and public servants, instead, point to qualitative

indications of the success of deliverology in producing improvements in outcomes. As such,

this report has identified ‘common sense’ as well as ‘good governance’ indicators.

Common sense indicators: proliferation, replication, and longevity

Common sense indicators of effectiveness and success include proliferation, replication, and

longevity. This stems from the idea that it is unlikely delivery units would have persisted and

51

In both cases, third parties assessed the effect of deliverology as an approach, as at that point these countries

did not have fully institutionalised delivery units. 52

The link between deliverology and the BRN (Big Results Now!) can be found in Todd et al. (2014).

37

inspired replications elsewhere if they were not seen as value adding by those who have

implemented them (see table 3). As the White House Office of Management and Budget

(2011: 73) reports: “Outcome-focused performance management can transform the way

government works, but its success is by no means assured. The ultimate test of an effective

performance management system is whether it is used, not the number of goals and measures

produced”.

As shown in figure 1, delivery units have spread over five continents and more than 20

countries, suggesting a growing consensus and support for an institution that monitors the

internal performance of government entities and ensures the efficient and effective delivery

of priorities. As stated by an interviewee53

: “With the increasing acceptance of the unit and its

work, there seems to be a greater understanding on the need of the unit and this can be seen

as an assessment of how the unit improves outcomes”. This is not restricted to the top-level

of government with departments and ministries replicating the model. For example, “a few

departments have set up project management or similar units to improve and monitor their

own implementation activities and we [the CIU] do quite a lot of work with those counterpart

units to improve the implementation of new and existing measures” (Hamburger, 2007: 219).

Indonesia has also established performance management branches at the ministry level to

monitor more frequently performance54

. The adoption of these smaller units can therefore be

seen as further proof of the necessity and usefulness of delivery units.

Some adaptations to the political, economic and social environment were so successful, that

their structure and approach has been replicated elsewhere. Malaysia’s model, defined by a

strong citizen participation as well as its cooperative use of new and innovative ways to

define targets and push for results (e.g. policy labs, Open Days Initiative), has itself served as

a unit worth replicating by Tanzania, Pakistan and Rwanda (Puttick et al., 2014: 79). Similar

considerations apply to Maryland’s Unit. Following earlier innovations such as CompStat,

the unit spearheaded a push for data-driven governance that has been adopted by other cities

and states in the US (see box in Objective I).

53

Interview 13 54

Interview 13

38

Longevity, particularly ‘surviving’ administration changes, especially when an opposition

party gains control of government is an indicator of effectiveness. The Australian CIU, for

example, has persisted over twelve years despite four prime ministerial changes55

. Moreover,

these administrational changes involved prime ministers from both the liberal and the labour

party56

. As outlined before, the UK PMDU after having undergone changes in the Brown

administration was eventually abolished in 2010. However, the coalition government, after

having given autonomy back to the departments, realised the importance of having a unit in

the executive overseeing the implementation of certain government priorities and introduced

the Implementation Unit in 201157

. This unit follows a slightly different philosophy but has a

similar set-up as well as functions and methodologies used by the PMDU58

.

‘Good governance’ indicators: transparency, accountability, and capacity-building

In terms of efficiency, the value added by deliverology results from the impacts its adoption

has on the workings of governance: it can increase transparency, strengthen the

accountability of public officials, and build necessary capacities for cross-departmental

coordination.

Deliverology cannot be thought of as a panacea to the ills of government, but rather as a

mechanism for more responsive governance that allows for “catalysing opportunities for

public sector culture change” (Todd et. al, 2014: 8). Publicising performance information,

delivery and implementation units provide opportunities for more transparent and

accountable governance. As an interviewee59

explained: “When releasing information or

making it publicly available, delivery units tend to do so in an attempt to increase

transparency and to build credibility of what they do as well as raise their accountability”.

The White House Office of Management and Budget (2011: 74) further explains:

Transparent, coherent performance information contributes to more

effective, efficient, fair, and responsive government (…) promotes

55

Interview 15 56

Interview 15 57

Interview 7 58

Interview 5 59

Interview 9

39

public understanding about the actions that government is working to

accomplish, but also supports learning across government agencies,

stimulates idea flow, enlists assistance, and motivates performance

gain. In addition, transparency can strengthen public confidence in

government, especially when government does more than simply

herald its successes but also provides candid assessments of

problems encountered, their likely causes, and actions being taken to

address problems.

Likewise, publicising information with the aim of increasing transparency induces an upward

spiral and leads to lock-in effects. Thereby, binding government to keep or increase the level

of responsiveness, and establishing a cultural change within the public administration.

Equally, delivery units necessitate inter-governmental coordination, which builds government

capacity to detect and respond to issues and gaps early on. As governments “do not work in

isolation to improve outcomes,” units create formal settings for communication and

coordination between inter-governmental entities (ibid: 75). An interviewee60

explained that

inter-agency coordination is often necessary for goals to be reached, as targets may require

the attention of more than one agency. For instance, ending childhood hunger by 2015, one of

the sixteen Strategic Goals of the Maryland Delivery Unit requires the collaboration of

multiple departments, including the Department of Education, Department of Human

Resources, and Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, as well as private and non-profit

partners. Without coordination and open communication facilitated by the bi-weekly

meetings and follow up on the part of the unit, reaching the goal would be more challenging,

particularly given the isolated nature of government bureaucracies. This built-in collaboration

inherent in deliverology transforms government’s ability to tap into reservoirs of capacity

beyond one bureaucratic office. It builds agency capability to answer questions and address

problems on their own, and even help sister agencies solve problems in the future61

.

60

Interview 17 61

Interview 12

40

Table 3 below provides a survey of the indicators detailed that have had an impact to date.

However, this is only a snapshot of the units. For a more detailed description of

functionalities of these examples, please see the annex.

Table 3: Indicators of unit’s impact to date

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

d. Overview of the main critiques presented against deliverology

Despite self-reported improvements in outcomes and ‘common sense’ as well as ‘good

governance’ indicators of effectiveness, various questions remain as to the nature and extent

of such improvements. In particular, the PMDU’s target-focused approach to monitoring

performance has led to various concerns about potential gaming behaviours in reporting

improvements.

Indicators of

impact to date

United

Kingdom

Maryland,

United States Australia Malaysia

Empirical

evidence and

self-

assessment

Bevan (2013,

2014) and Bevan

et al. (2014) and

unit’s self-

assessment

Unit’s self-

assessment

Unit’s self-

assessment

Unit’s self-

assessment

Common

sense

indicators

Longevity

(albeit rebranded

after

administration

change);

proliferation of

model in other

contexts

Proliferation and

replication of

model

Longevity

(endured three

administration

changes)

Proliferation and

replication of

model

Good

governance

indicators

Accountability,

and capacity

building

Accountability,

transparency,

and capacity

building

Accountability,

and capacity

building

Accountability,

transparency, and

capacity building

41

In the case of the PMDU, there were three potential gaming effects identified: the ratchet

effect, the threshold effect and the distortion or manipulation of reported results (Hood,

2006). The first refers to the expected tendency to restrict performance to below ones

capability in order to avoid receiving higher targets in the following year (Hood, 2006: 156).

The threshold effect, on the other hand, relates to the use of uniform targets that lead to a

lower incentive for ministries to excel, which may “encourage top performers to reduce the

quality or quantity of their performance to just what the target requires” (ibid.). The third type

of gaming behaviour represents the manipulation of reported results (ibid.). This was

particularly visible in the UK National Health System, where the focus on meeting waiting

time targets for emergency room patients resulted in an increased waiting time for patients

with minor injuries as well as of patients waiting in ambulance cars just outside the hospital.

Furthermore, according to Hood (2006: 517), performance data has been inconsistent with

reports produced by public audit bodies. For example, “two studies found a gap of some 30%

between the levels of performance over waits in hospital emergency rooms in England as

reported by providers and independent surveys of patients” (U.K. Commission for Health

Improvement, 2004; Healthcare Commission, 2005).

The use of target-based mechanisms to monitor performance can therefore lead to unwanted

side-effects by providing incentives to those scrutinized to engage in strategic behaviours.

The English experience with gaming incentives in the health and education sector, and

critiques of performance targets in US education62

context have led the model away from a

purely target-driven system to milestones or mixed approaches such as in the Australian

CIU63

and the Malaysian PEMANDU64

respectively.

62

See Russo, 2010 63

Interview 1 & 15 64

Interview 2

42

7. Objective III: Conditions facilitating the adoption of deliverology

Delivery units have been adopted under an array of economic, political, institutional and

cultural circumstances. However, the implementation of these units has been met with

various challenges that point to the requirement of certain preconditions for successful

adoption. Taking into consideration the experience of units that have sustained, as well as

those that have been abolished, this section will highlight the main conditions that may better

facilitate the adoption of a delivery unit in a given country. While these conditions facilitate

the adoption of deliverology, and subsequently delivery units, they are still highly context-

specific as there is no ‘one-size fits all’ approach to adopt this philosophy.

Figure 6: Key enablers for the adoption of deliverology

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

a. Involvement of the head of government

As delivery units are situated at the very centre of the government, they are closely tied to the

head of government (e.g. executive or political principal). For this reason, certain institutional

43

and political arrangements of the public administration, predominantly of the executive

office, may be decisive enablers for the successful adoption of a delivery unit. As units work

in close collaboration with and for the political principal while also serving as a bridge to

other governmental entities, the role of the head of government is a critical feature. Strong

political power as well as the involvement and support of the political principal are factors to

take into account when adopting a delivery unit. These factors are also essential for the unit’s

success upon implementation.

Strong political power from the head of government is of high importance for the adoption of

a delivery unit. In particular, the ability to exert leverage over ministries is essential for

increasing accountability and committing the ministries to the delivery unit’s work. As such,

institutional and political arrangements that limit the amount of political power of the

executive make it more challenging, if not largely impossible, for a delivery unit to be

adopted successfully. The rather weak political power of the head of government was one of

the main obstacles faced by the now dissolved Dutch Delivery Unit. As reported by a former

member of the unit65

, “the Prime Minister in the Netherlands is not as powerful as in other

countries. He cannot sack ministers, for instance. He is described as primus inter pares [first

among equals]; he is the chairman of the meetings but he cannot force ministers to do

anything (…) he is the boss in name, but he has no power to enforce decisions”. According to

the interviewee66

, a main takeaway point from the Dutch experience is that delivery units

need to be “centralised, have independent staff and have a lot of political power behind it,

because otherwise it is not going to work”.

In addition to a strong head of government, it is equally important that the leader is actively

involved and fully supports the work of the unit. This form of commitment not only includes

the formal endorsement of the unit’s work but also a real pledge to increase transparency, the

use of data and measurements to inform policymaking, and a focus placed on

implementation. The involvement of Tony Blair was essential for the initial implementation

of the PMDU, and his personal patronage and involvement of the delivery unit were vital for

sustaining the unit (Barber, 2008). The unit not only reported directly to Blair but he was also

65

Interview 14 66

Interview 14

44

present in the majority of meetings held with ministry leaders67

. This strong presence was a

key factor in ensuring the accountability and full involvement of departments in the

commitment to achieve their set out targets68

. Similarly, the role of the executive in the

Indonesian, Malaysian and Maryland units was equally critical in their establishment and

development of the necessary “buy-in” across departments. As expressed by an interviewee69

,

such close association with the Indonesian head of government elicited a sense of ‘reputation

at stake’ across ministries, creating a greater degree of collaboration and support of the units

work.

b. Compatible management styles

Another enabler for the successful adoption of a delivery unit deals with the managerial style

of the political principal. A delivery unit imposes a rather different style ‘to doing business’

within public administrations. As such, it is easier for a unit to be adopted when the political

principal has a managerial style that is compatible with the delivery unit being implemented.

In particular, a political principal should have a results-driven mind-set and value the use of

targets. While the managerial style is important for the relationship with a delivery unit, it

also assists in the dissemination of such values throughout the broader public administration.

With a wider support of the managerial values evoked by delivery units, the adoption of such

units will be met with less resistance and thus be more successful. As an interviewee

detailed70

, the managerial style of President Sebastian Piñera was vital to the implementation

of the later dissolved Chilean delivery unit. From the onset, Piñera managed with a clear

results-based vocation, emphasizing efficiency and diligence in order to improve public

service (Dumas et al., 2013).

Equally important, the style of management is a condition that also facilitates the

sustainability of a unit, which is particularly crucial following a change in government. The

managerial transformation of the PMDU under Gordon Brown provides an illustrative

example. Under Prime Minister Brown, cultural change, capability building and increased

intra-governmental work became an added focus of the delivery unit leading to a less strong

67

Interview 3 68

Interview 19 69

Interview 13 70

Interview 21

45

top-down approach than under the original PMDU 71

. As an interviewee72

asserts, there was a

change in the scale and focus from the first to the second iteration of the PMDU, with a new

framework created in 2007 including 30 cross-departmental PSAs. In light of such

government changes, for delivery units to persist through them, they must remain flexible in

their design to adapt to managerial changes under different leaders.

c. Culture of performance management

An additional key condition that facilitates the implementation of a delivery unit is a

regulatory architecture of results-based goals and performance indicators. As highlighted

earlier, the UK PSAs framework provided a necessary architecture for measuring and

monitoring performance. Likewise, Australia prior to the adoption of its CIU had

noneconomic, central coordination units, as well as utilized results-based goals and

performance indicators that eased the delivery unit’s adoption (Dumas et al., 2013).

Similarly, the Maryland Unit had grown out of a performance metric monitoring programme,

StateStat, which is a data-driven management approach. Evidence from developing countries

underscores the necessity of a results-based architecture; as demonstrated by ‘ground work’

initiatives such as the Roadmap in Pakistan, the 150 Day Plan in Liberia and the BRN in

Tanzania and Malaysia (see Annex B).

d. Pre-existing data infrastructure

The pre-existence of a data culture and infrastructure including the continuous collection of

statistics and other measurement tools is an important first step for laying the groundwork for

delivery units. Due to their size and scope of work, however, delivery units usually do not

collect or produce data themselves, instead they rely on other sources of information for data,

such as independent government agencies or monitored departments. The availability of such

information is essential for the unit to be able to do its work, as it is necessary for tracking

progress. When adopting a delivery unit, having a reliable data infrastructure already in place

is a major advantage73

. As the interviewee74

detailed, this has been a challenge for delivery

71

Interview 4 72

Interview 6 73

Interview 7 74

Interview 7

46

unit adoption in developing countries, as illustrated with Kenya’s Accountability and

Delivery Unit. In particular, priority identification becomes difficult without a clear sense of

progress and the areas falling behind. Correspondingly, the credibility of the data available is

crucial for defining measurable outcomes and monitoring progress as weak or falsified data

will distort results or make progress monitoring a daunting task.

e. Institutional setting

De-Centralization

The more recent evolution of deliverology, particularly in the United States, has shown that

delivery units may be more easily implemented at the state or city level. This seems to be

particularly relevant for large countries or those in which local government has a strong

presence and role in the provision of public services to their constituencies, such as those

under federal systems like the United States, Australia, and Canada. In these cases, regional

and municipal governments may be better equipped to improve service delivery and

implementation issues; as, “buy in” for a delivery unit may be greater, making it easier to

adopt75

. Especially in policy areas with shared responsibilities at the Federal and the State

level, delivery units will struggle to increase effectiveness, as the implementation is

dependent on multiple departments usually at varying jurisdiction levels76

. This makes

delivery chains less clear and holding agency leaders accountable significantly more difficult.

Majoritarian - Representative system

In addition, from an institutional perspective it may be easier to implement delivery units

under majoritarian representation systems rather than under proportional ones. As the latter

tend to result in the formation of coalition governments thereby limiting the power of an

elected political principal, the implementation of a delivery unit will be more difficult, as

previously discussed with the case of the Netherlands (Duverger, 1959)77

. Therefore,

75

Interview 12 76

Interview 12 77

Shepsle (2010: 217) explains that political conflict is more muted in majoritarian systems, stating, and “(…)

there is typically a single majority party [that] can get on with the business of implementing its agenda.

Legislatures elected by PR reflect rather than resolve political conflict in advance, depending upon post-

election parliamentary politics – coalition for example – to discover the means for resolution.”

47

countries with institutional contexts that lend themselves to the weakening of the head of

government and the sharing of power may not be well suited for delivery units and the

adoption thereof.

f. Credibility and subsidiary role

The principal asset of delivery units lays with information gathering and collaborative

relations with other members of the government involved in the delivery chains. The

ministries involved including their ministers and the treasury need to support and trust in the

work carried out by the delivery unit in order to make its adoption successful. In other words,

there must be a general consensus within government for a deliverology approach and agency

like the delivery unit. As demonstrated in Australia, the CIU was created through the general

backing of the cabinet, not just the Prime Minster. In fact, in this case, the Prime Minister at

the time had to be convinced of the unit’s benefits by the cabinet78

. Such wide support creates

an environment conducive for the adoption of a delivery unit and promotes cooperation of

ministries once the unit is implemented. If this condition is not fulfilled however, ministers

will not cooperate and the impact of a delivery unit will be insignificant. Similarly, one of the

interviewees highlighted the importance of there being collective commitment to the

government priorities and the importance of investing in the setting of priorities at both

political and official levels79

.

g. Definition of specific and manageable priorities and targets

Two conditions that undermine the sustainability of a delivery unit are having an excessive

number of priorities and defining priorities that are difficult to monitor and measure. Even

though the scope of the unit varies considerably among the different countries, a delivery unit

that aims to oversee all areas of government will face difficulties in adopting and sustaining

the model. There has to, instead, be a balance between the size of the delivery unit and the

scope and number of priorities considered.

78

Interview 1 & 15 79

Interview 4

48

Likewise, if the priorities are not properly defined this will stall progress. According to a

former member of the Dutch delivery unit80

, the way in which priorities were defined was

one of the most important causes of its failure. With approximately 80 policy objectives

spanning every ministry as well as ill-defined priorities, the measurement and monitoring of

progress was a challenging task. This made the work of the unit even more difficult than

normal during its initial years of implementation.

h. Knowledge sharing

The proliferation of delivery units in the last ten years has also been driven by the

involvement and support of external organisations. International organisations, such as the

World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have been key in helping countries

to set-up their units either through monetary funding, technical know-how or other forms of

advisory services. Private actors, such as the Tony Blair Africa Governance Initiative or

different consultancies (often with advisory roles with former heads of delivery units) have

also been instrumental in the creation of units, through providing assistance on best practices,

priority and target identification or laying the groundwork for a delivery unit to be later

adopted81

. These organisations have been of major support in the adoption process of units

particularly in Asia, Africa, South America and Eastern Europe.

Accordingly, if a government wants to implement a delivery unit to improve public service

delivery, it is important to count on third-party support to smooth the learning curve of the

entire process. As shown in the Malaysian case (Annex A.4), complementary to the adoption

of deliverology, PEMANDU developed the BRN philosophy82

. This allowed them to

improve and adopt the major lessons provided by former members of the original PMDU. As

indicated, the PEMANDU model proliferated so that current staff have been supporting and

providing advice to other countries (Pakistan, Tanzania and South Africa).

80

Interview 14 81

Interview 22 82

Interview 2

49

Table 4: Main conditions facilitating the adoption of a delivery unit

Role of the

head of the

government

Compatible

managerial

styles

Culture of

performance

management

Pre-existing

data

infrastructure

Institutional

settings

Credibility

and subsidiary

role

Definition of

priorities and

targets

Knowledge

sharing

Involvement

and support of

the leader

Results-driven

mind-set

Regulatory

architecture

conducive to

performance

management

Previous

experience with

goals and

performance

measures

De-centralized

Trust to ensure

buy-in from

departments

Priorities that

are clear and

can be

measured

Human

capital to set-

up the unit

Value the use

of targets and

measurement

Cultural shift

toward

performance

thinking

Majoritarian -

representative

systems

Make sure

people are

invested

Less

emphasis on

targets

Technical

assistance

Unit’s ability

to adapt to the

political

principal

Fit between

number of

priorities and

staff

Source: authors’ own elaboration.

50

8. Findings and Recommendations

This report has systemically detailed the evolution of thinking around deliverology since its

first development in the UK, identified evidence of its effectiveness in producing real

improvements, and presented those conditions which best facilitate the adoption of a delivery

unit. Several over-arching findings follow from this analysis corresponding to each of the

three report objectives.

First, in reference to the question of evolution explored in Objective I, this report found that

while delivery units began in the UK as a short-term, precise tool to improve service

outcomes, their use has evolved to encompass a much broader understanding of deliverology.

Their implementation increasingly seeks to induce not only a transformation in outcomes, but

also in the very culture of and approach to public service delivery. As such, the original

delivery unit model of quick-wins and a strong reliance on narrow output targets has been

replaced by one with broader scopes, less emphasis on targets, and a greater commitment to

transparency.

Despite this evolution, and the modifications to delivery units inherent therein, this report

identified a minimum set of both necessary and sufficient characteristics common across

delivery units. Derived from the PMDU’s original model, these characteristics include: an

overall goal of performance improvement; a clear definition of government priorities and

objectives; periodic measurement and monitoring of performance improvements; a feedback

loop to the political principal; and a small size, relative to the number and scope of priorities

being pursued.

The dissemination of deliverology and the delivery unit model as described above are

underpinned by several factors. First, as illustrated in figure 2, its propagation can be grouped

into delivery unit families, in which the implementation of a delivery unit in one country can

be seen to influence its adoption in another. Replication of the model is often accompanied by

a sharing of ‘best practices’, either by countries already possessing delivery units or third

party organisations with an expertise in the area. This has created second generation models,

such as the Malaysian PEMANDU, some of which have subsequently inspired their own

offshoots. Additionally, the adoption of delivery units has also been inspired by domestic

51

political and economic factors, wherein the implementation of a unit is undertaken in

response to citizen demands, campaign promises, or budgetary considerations.

Objective II addressed the effectiveness of delivery units and found that, while there is no

robust evidence of either effectiveness or ineffectiveness, common sense and good

governance indicators demonstrate an intrinsic value of delivery units. These indicators

include the proliferation, replication, and longevity of delivery units, as it is unlikely they

would persist or inspire replications elsewhere if they were not seen as value adding by those

who have implemented them. Likewise, they are seen to enhance good governance by

increasing transparency, strengthening accountability, and building necessary capacities for

cross-departmental coordination.

Finally, Objective III identified several conditions that better facilitate the successful

adoption and sustainability of a delivery unit. These include the ongoing and active

involvement of the head of government, compatible management styles between the delivery

unit and the political principal, the definition of specific and manageable priorities and

targets, a pre-existing culture of performance management, pre-existing data infrastructure,

and a conducive institutional setting. However, it is important to note, there is no singular

way to adopt the deliverology approach nor is there a uniform delivery unit design. Context

must always be considered. Further, delivery units are not always the answer. It may be the

case that a mixed or hybrid model of deliverology is more appropriate.

The above findings led to the identification of a number of notable insights and trends, which

frame nine recommendations for governments or leaders that are considering adopting

deliverology. These recommendations are broken down into the three phases:

Phase One: Planning

● Ensure that a performance management architecture is in place – Having a pre-

existing architecture conducive to deliverology ensures the readiness of public

officials in adopting a delivery unit or similar form of deliverology. Establishing

performance management and measurement frameworks, such as public service

agreements, creates the necessary momentum to see through the adoption of a

delivery unit from beginning to end.

52

● Diagnose the reasons for adoption – It is highly important administrations possess a

clear understanding of the problems deliverology is meant to address. Accurately

identifying these problems beforehand will reveal the suitability of deliverology and

inform its purpose if deemed appropriate.

● Align the design of the unit with its intended outcome – Understanding the intended

outcome of deliverology will ensure its appropriate design, and thus enhance its

effectiveness once implemented. Particularly, the number and capacity of staff should

be proportional to the unit’s stated priorities and should reflect a diverse background,

to include practitioners with field experience. One possible way to achieve this is

through the introduction of a civil servant rotational programme.

Phase Two: Execution

Brand a delivery unit to maximize support – Building an inclusive brand that goes

beyond that of the political principal creates broader departmental buy-in and

increases its likelihood of persistence through administration changes. This might be

accomplished through a stronger association with outcomes as opposed to a specific

leader.

Implement early – Early implementation of a unit within the political principal’s term

will maximize the time a unit has to demonstrate results and institutionalize its place

in government. Additionally, it will give the concept of deliverology more time to

permeate government, increasing its ability to transform the culture of and approach

to public service delivery more broadly.

Establish the right synergy between the unit and principal – Ensuring the

management style of the unit is compatible with that of the political principal is

important to the sustained and active involvement of the principal. This is necessary

not only for the momentum of the unit, but for its authority and leverage in enacting

change.

53

Phase Three: Assessment

● Introduce self-assessment measures and communicate success – The adoption of

self-assessment measures increases the transparency, credibility, and accountability of

units. It also provides the unit tangible results demonstrating its effectiveness in

improving service delivery outcomes, which can then be used to communicate success

and reinforce value.

● Iteratively re-evaluate priorities – The iterative re-evaluation of priorities using the

input of both internal and external experts will increase citizen and stakeholder buy-in

of priorities and lend authority to the work being conducted by the unit. Additionally,

it will ensure the priorities being pursued by the unit remain salient to public sector

discourse, thus maintaining the relevance of the unit itself.

● Be flexible in order to adapt and evolve over time – Given the many challenges and

changes delivery units face over time, their longevity often relies on their capacity to

regularly reinvent themselves to meet the evolving needs and issues of public service

delivery. This is especially important at times of administration or priority changes.

Since its original conception in 2001, both the concept and application of deliverology have

significantly evolved. In its fourteen years of existence, deliverology has proven itself a

legitimate approach to public management, generating considerable interest across the globe.

Given its broad understanding, its openness to interpretation, and its continued proliferation

and adaptation, this trend is likely to continue. For those countries interested in such an

approach, the above findings and recommendations will support the successful adoption and

sustainability of deliverology.

54

9. Annex

A. Focal Point Country Summaries

The following summaries of focal point countries are structured in a similar manner. They

include a discussion of when the units where created, under which political principal, and the

reasons behind its motivation. The summaries proceed to describe the deviations and

adaptations of the unit in comparison to the original UK PMDU in order to shed light on the

evolution of deliverology over time.

1. United Kingdom: Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (2005-2010) (Abolished) and

Implementation Unit (2011-current)

Four years after its implementation, the PMDU underwent its first transformation. Several

factors were crucial for this transformation. In the beginning of 2004, Tony Blair had less

time to focus on the public service agenda and his involvement subsequently decreased.

Consequently, his presence in the unit was no longer as central as it was in the beginning.

Around the same time, the Public Accounts Select Committee (PASC) highlighted some key

weaknesses with the regime, particularly the potential space for gaming and other perverse

behaviours. Additionally, by 2005 most of the initial defined targets were reached, and new

objectives had to be defined. Under this context, the unit was restyled to distance itself from

the initial target-based system, and changing and increasing the number of priorities under its

control while developing a new approach to cross-departmental working.

In June 2005, Sir Michael Barber resigned after 4 years heading the PMDU and was replaced

by Ian Watmore. Two years later, Watmore similarly left the Unit and Ray Shostak was

appointed as the new head. Under the leadership of both Watmore and Shostak, the scope of

the unit increased, the approach was turned towards performance management, the presence

of the Prime Minister was diminished, and a new tool was put in place: capability reviews

(Panchamia and Thomas, 2014).

55

In 2007 the comprehensive spending review established a new framework with 30

government priorities. In contrast to the previous framework, these priorities covered most

departments (including the Department of Energy and Climate Change, Department for

Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Department for International Development),

cutting arcoss departmental boundaries. As a result, the unit changed its focus, improving

“(…) capability building and cross-government learning on delivery i.e. knowledge

management; encouraging departmental delivery units; and running SRO network and

training (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014). The worked of the unit started moving from

delivery chains to delivery systems, having a more comprehensive approach to delivery, and

including additional relevant stakeholders (Shostak, 2011). The PSA framework was also

reformed. Each PSA had a single delivery agreement and new PSAs were underpinned by

153 measures, only a third of them accompanied by argets (Panchamia and Thomas, 2014).

Despite the major changes made in 2006, the new 2010 UK coalition government abolished

the PSA/PMDU framework, and increased focus on efficiency and transparency. Structural

Reform Plans were created shifting the emphasis from outcomes to inputs. Despite this initial

abolitionists approach, the coalition government decided to set up an Implementation Unit

(IU) in the Cabinet Office in 2011. The objective of this unit was “to oversee implementation

across Government, support departmental capability and provide informed, hard-hitting

advice on specific implementation issues to those at the top (…) The IU works to an agenda

set quarterly by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Although it regularly

undertakes rapid analysis to meet ministerial needs, the IU’s main work is to undertake six to

eight week ‘deep dive’ reports that aim to get right to the bottom of thorny implementation

issues” (Mullin, 2014).

The worked performed by this new unit built on many of the processes and techniques first

developed by the PMDU, and it is similar in size and composition. In addition, “despite the

government’s championing of a broad transparency agenda, the UK’s Implementation Unit –

just like the PMDU before it – remains concerned with internal transparency and

accountability. The Unit’s analysis is never made public” (Gold, 2015). Beyond these

similarities, the approach of the IU is still slightly different. Recommendations are built in a

collaborative way and deep dive reports are shared with the departments. The scope of the

Unit is broader than the PMDU, and it has a more fast-moving implementation agenda. In

addition, the new unit delivers Business Plans, presents Government’s to-do list of policy

56

commitments and implementation milestones, and reports progress to the public in real time

(Mullin, 2014).

2. United States: Maryland Governor’s Delivery Unit and StateStat

In 2007, Governor O’Malley of Maryland established StateStat, a performance measurement

and management tool to assess state government public service delivery. Designed and

modelled after CitiStat, (an open data dashboard that Governor O’Malley established as

Mayor of Baltimore in 2000), StateStat adopts a data-driven management approach to

increase accountability, transparency, and efficiency. Using an open data portal, the StateStat

monitors or ‘stats’ independent agencies in Maryland, tracking their progress each month. To

support the mission and functions of StateStat, in 2008 O’Malley formed the Governor’s

Delivery Unit, a unit that is responsible for StateStat and aims to “define indicators and

targets for the Governor’s strategic priorities” (Dorotinsky and Watkins, 2009).

Modelled closely to the UK’s Prime Minister Delivery Unit, the Governor’s Delivery Unit

began by adopting a similar approach with an output-driven focus, a small 9-person team

located in the Governor’s Office, and the strong participation of the political principal.

Expanding slightly on the PMDU model, the Governor’s Delivery unit developed 4 target

areas under the broader sectors of opportunity, security, sustainability, and health. Under

these target areas, the unit set sixteen strategic priorities (see table 6), based on the priorities

outlined by the O’Malley Administration, which they monitor using a ‘traffic light’ system.

The traffic light system is a process by which the unit publishes online whether the

performance level of each priority is either ‘on track’, ‘progressing’, or has made ‘insufficient

progress’. This allows for transparency, and as the unit purports, it gives Maryland citizens

the ability to “[…] view and interact with our data anytime through our Open Data Portal and

track the progress we are making towards the Administration's 16 strategic goals” (Governor

O’Malley’s Delivery Unit, 2014).

The unit’s open government approach, with its embracement of open data and digital tools,

presents a significant divergence from the PMDU model. Relying on digital monitoring

techniques, StateStat and the Governor’s Delivery Unit team monitor agency performance on

a monthly basis with meetings held bi-weekly to review and discuss progress. The process

begins with agencies submitting monthly updates on the goals being tracked to StateStat. The

StateStat team, in turn, produces an executive view dashboard of performance for the

57

Governor, which is also used for the bi-weekly meetings. All this data is then published

online and used to update the StateStat performance dashboard (Dorotinsky and Watkins,

2009). According the Delivery Unit, prior to the meetings, the team “analyzes the data to

identify trends, conducts site visits and meets with agency staff to evaluate programs. The

analysts turn this analysis into detailed 'Executive Briefing Memos' shared with the 'StateStat

Panel', including the Governor, prior to each meeting” (Governor O’Malley’s Delivery Unit,

2014).

Table 5: Governor’s Delivery Unit areas of priority

Area Delivery Unit Priorities

Opportunity

Jobs

Education

Skills

Veterans

Security

Violent crime

Violence against woman and children

Homeland security

Sustainability

Bay restoration

Transit ridership

Energy efficiency

Renewable energy

Greenhouse gases

Health

Childhood hunger

Infant mortality

Substance abuse

Preventable hospitalization

Source: Governor O’Malley’s Delivery Unit, 2014.

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3. Australia: Cabinet Implementation Unit

The Australian Cabinet Implementation Unit (CIU) was established in 2003 within the

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet in order to ensure “committed and effective

delivery of key Government policies” (DPMC, 2014). A significant feature of the Australian

unit in comparison to other delivery units worldwide is its rather long existence spanning

eleven years despite changes in government. Then Prime Minister Hon John Howard

established the unit in order to make the delivery of Government policy a priority within the

Australian Government and create a Public Service system that was “admired just as much

for its ability to deliver policy as for its capacity to develop it” (DPMC, 2013; Terrell, 2006).

Moreover, the CIU was created by a general backing of public officials in the executive and

less so by the prime minister83

. The CIU was established under a conservative government

that had already served almost three consecutive terms in office, during which time it had

become frustrated by the unevenness of policy implementation and implementation issues,

the fragmented information and reporting on policy progresses provided to the Cabinet and

its decision-makers, as well as various clear policy failures (Wanna, 2006).

Much like the UK’s initial PMDU, the CIU focuses on providing support and advice to the

Prime Minister and the Cabinet on the development, implementation, and delivery of the

Australian Government’s strategic priorities. Specifically, this includes providing the Prime

Minister and the Cabinet with regular progress reports and working towards developing and

promoting best practices in implementation across government through its focus on capability

building and implementation assessments (DPMC, 2013; Truswell and Atkinson, 2011). In

particular, the latter is a significant point of divergence of the CIU from the PMDU. Under

Director Peter Shergold, the CIU emphasized a more collaborative approach towards

implementation reviews and emphasized the importance of implementation thinking and

review rather than the discipline of detailed performance reporting and measurement of

targets (Wanna, 2006). With its focus on monitoring and reviewing policy and programme

deliveries, three broad types of work were pursued: ensuring better implementation

information to the Cabinet during the decision-making stage, following up decisions to track

delivery progress, and helping change the way people thought about and planned for policy

related implementation (DPMC, 2013). The focus was, therefore, on using funds responsibly

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to deliver services on time84

. Despite its rather long existence, the CIU has remained

particularly small with only around fifteen highly skilled staff, all of which, for the most part,

are internal public servants. This is another deviation from the Barber Delivery Unit model,

which broadened in scope and increased in staff size.

Over the years, the CIU has developed itself through the evolvement of its role in the Cabinet

and operations as well as, for the most part, consolidated itself as both a necessary and

desired part of the Cabinet and its functions and processes. This is especially true since 2010.

In particular, the CIU saw a substantial increase in not only its scope and activities but also in

its role as an advisory board on implementation. For example, the CIU is currently involved

in the development and delivery design of particular initiatives (DPMC, 2013). Furthermore,

and especially during the years from 2006 to 2010, the CIU adapted away from the UK

PMDU model by incorporating a focus on public service capability building through

implementation toolkits and guides to aid in the development and assessment of

implementation plans (DPMC, 2013). This required a greater emphasis on individual

department’s implementation capacities (DPMC, 2013). Moreover, the CIU is unique in its

focus on the collaboration of departments and has played a role in connecting departments,

agencies, and policy-makers through the publishing of reports covering examples of best

practice, guides, and toolkits. This has been supported as an effort to improve the provision of

public services by bridging the expertise of staff cross-departmentally (DPMC, 2013).

4. Malaysia: Performance Management and Delivery Unit

The Performance Management and Delivery Unit was established in September 2009 under

the department of the Prime Minister. Originally set as an internal consultancy, it was created

to help achieve and support the implementation of an ambitious government programme:

Malaysia’s National Transformation Programme (Puttick et al., 2014: 73).

PEMANDU was tasked to support different ministries within the national government to

develop innovative solutions in public service delivery. One interesting feature is that the

Prime Minister decided to explicitly include the private sector to achieve the ultimate goal of

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the programme, which is to transform Malaysia into a high-income country by 2020

(PEMANDU, 2013). Complementary actions will be developed by government, through the

Government Transformation Programme (GTP) alongside the private sector parallel

programme, the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP).

Unlike many other delivery units, the number of people working for the PEMANDU was

relatively high, with close to 150 people on staff. Another differentiating feature was the

appointment of a former private-sector executive, most known for leading the rapid

transformation of Malaysian Airlines from a company with substantial losses into a profitable

business (Puttick et al., 2014).

There are two key innovations introduced by PEMANDU. First, the creation of ‘Delivery

Labs’, which bring together a range of key stakeholders and experts to work intensively to

draw up detailed, practical solutions to delivery issues. Second, the introduction of ‘Open

Days’, which the government uses to communicate its change programme to thousands of

attendees, thereby gaining citizen buy-in (Iyer, 2011: 11). PEMANDU has also made efforts

to promote its approach and methods internationally, holding seminars attended by a number

of African and Asian governments. These international awareness raising efforts led directly

to Tanzania’s adoption of the ‘Malaysian approach’ in February 2013 with the launch of its

‘Big Results Now!’ programme.

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B. Non-Focal Point Country Summaries

1. Albania: Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit

The Albanian Government has recently placed great effort on achieving a more efficient and

transparent government, for which it has undergone various structural changes across more

than 150 government organisations (Prizen Post, 2014). Partly due to its candidacy for

accession into the European Union, the Prime Minister’s Office has been focused on moving

towards an innovative and forward-thinking government with the capacity to deliver public

services in a more effective and efficient manner, as well as to increase its accountability to

both its citizens and the European Union (Cani, 2013). As a result, the Prime Minister’s

Office created the Albanian Delivery Unit in 2014 under Prime Minister Edi Rama, which

was largely inspired by the UK PMDU. In addition to the Prime Ministers Delivery Unit,

they introduced a ‘Delivery Unit Network’ with delivery units in each ministry in order to

ensure a constant focus on results of priorities and performance management (Cani, 2013).

As former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair largely advised Prime Minister Rama, the delivery

unit is said to have many of the same features of the PMDU, both institutional and

procedural, (Prizren Post, 2014). However, it is so far unclear whether it will have any

significant deviations from the UK’s model (Prizren Post, 2014). Additionally, the World

Bank has also been involved in the unit’s development through Albania’s membership in the

‘Global Network of Delivery Leaders’, headed by Tony Blair (World Bank, 2015). Together

they are help PM Rama set the country’s short, medium, and long-term priorities, provide

technical support, and assist with the unit’s set-up (Prizren Post 2014).

2. Brazil: Minas Gerais State Office for Strategic Priorities

Created at the state level, the Minas Gerais State Office for Strategic Priorities was formally

established on January 2011. Located in the city of Belo Horizonte, in the State of Minas

Gerais, this unit was part of several innovations implemented by the state government in

2003 (Escritorio de Priodades Estrategicas [EPE], 2011, p.7).

62

This unit has the objective to collaborate with other government agencies to achieve the

priorities defined by the Government of Minas. The strategic areas defined are education,

social protection, employment quality, and citizenship. Additionally, the unit contributes to

the development of innovative projects, such as Startups and Entrepreneurship Ecosystem

Development and DataViva, a visualization tool to monitor priorities.

The state government decided to start presenting the Cuaderno de Indicadores (Indicators

Notebook) as a tool to communicate its overall performance regarding the objectives defined.

The 2009 annual document contained 104 indicators, which was later modified to 79 in the

2014 version (EPE, 2014).

3. Brazil: Secretariat of Planning and Management

In 2007 the newly elected Pernambuco Governor took office, and identified several problems

regarding government delivery. Gradually, he created a team to design a new management

model (Alessandro and Lafuente, 2014). As part of this model, a new institutional structure

was originated. In 2011, the government of Pernambuco decided to implement a performance

management unit within the government, for the purpose of coordinating the medium- and

long- term planning process, to decentralize government actions, and to develop public

modernization programmes.

This Secretariat took notice of public seminars conducted in 2007 which were meant to

identify the strategic objectives and priorities for the Pernambuco government. To this end,

the unit gathered inputs from the rest of the government agencies to develop a Strategy Map

for the 2012-2015 period, which contained the definitive priorities. Aiming to 2015, twelve

strategic objectives were defined in a wide range of sectors to promote civil society and fight

inequality.

The Pernambuco unit differentiates from the PMDU model in the sense that they have a large

number of personnel. More than 100 analysts work within the institution across 4 areas: the

Executive Secretariat of Planning, Budgeting and Fundraising, the Executive Secretariat of

Results Management, the Executive Secretariat for Management Model Development, and

the Executive Secretariat of Strategic Management. Another interesting feature is that the unit

is in charge of a monetary fund. This fund is given to the Pernambuco cities to carry out

63

projects not only to improve municipality capacities, but also for rural and urban

infrastructure, health, education, and other public service areas.

4. Chile: Delivery Management Presidential Unit (Abolished)

As part of several initiatives adopted by President Sebastian Piñera at the beginning of his

term in 2010, the Chilean Government created the Delivery Management Presidential Unit.

Inspired by the original UK PMDU, the incoming administration set a government plan with

strong results-oriented characteristics (Rios, 2012).

The main objective of the unit was to ensure that Presidential goals and priorities were

achieved. They defined and prioritized eight strategic areas: growth; employment; public

security; education; health; poverty; democracy, state modernization and decentralization;

and reconstruction. Accordingly, the unit was responsible for setting a permanent system of

evaluation and control to periodically inform the President of the progress of the priorities.

In addition to the UK PMDU’s original features, the Chilean unit also established the

following four pillars: focus on a reduced number of maximum priority areas; the definition

of specific and concrete goals; well-defined accountability mechanisms within each Ministry

accompanied with advisory and feedback regarding performance; and the establishment of a

results-oriented culture along government. Unlike the UK PMDU, this unit was allocated

under the Coordination Division, independent of the Ministry of the Presidency.

5. India: Delivery and Monitoring Unit

In an effort to ensure the effective implementation of the principal programmes, initiatives,

and iconic projects of his administration, the former Prime Minister of India, Manmohan

Singh set up a delivery unit within his office in July 2009.

Similar to many other delivery units, the DMU objectives were to achieve effective

government delivery by constantly monitoring government actions and projects (The Hindu,

2009, para. 2). Additionally, the unit was responsible for informing the Prime Minister

64

quarterly of the overall progress of the priorities, identifying possible bottlenecks, and

communicating progress to the general public.

One particularly innovative feature of the DMU was the requirement that each ministry begin

publishing results under the “DMU reports” section of the DMU webpage. This initiative

expanded upon the original PMDU model by increasing external transparency by allowing

the general public to access results across ministries.

6. Indonesia: Central Delivery Unit

During the beginning of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second term in 2009, he

created the President’s Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight. During his

first term as president, he faced various challenges in attempting to work on the pledges he

made to his country during his election campaign, which were to develop Indonesia’s

infrastructure, strengthen education, reduce poverty, accelerate bureaucratic reform and

increase business investment (Scharff, 2013). However, he also had an understaffed policy

office and too few advisors with the capability to think strategically about policy decisions.

As such, he set up a unit to assist with implementation monitoring in order to keep projects

on track (Scharff, 2013). This unit was soon disbanded by the legislature, however, as the

then Vice President thought it was a threat due to political divides (Scharff, 2013).

The reestablishment of a delivery unit during Yudhovono’s second term reflected his

continued effort to carry through with his campaign pledges85

. The President chose Kuntoro

Mangkusubroto to lead the unit, who had “earned national respect and international stature

for managing reconstruction work” in the provinces affected by the devastating tsunami of

December 2004 (Scharff, 2013).

The unit Yudhoyono created was modelled after the UK PMDU and was set up around the

same time as those in Malaysia and South Africa (Scharff, 2013). However, all three adopted

variations of the original UK model. Similar to the UK’s unit, it helped set priorities, keep the

president informed of ministry progress toward meeting those priorities, and identify and

resolve “bottlenecks” (Scharff, 2013). However, unlike the UK’s delivery unit, which did not

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present results to the cabinet as part of its primary role, Kuntoro presented results to the

president at all cabinet meetings (Scharff, 2013). Moreover, the delivery unit checked

progress on a quarterly-basis, replacing the previous annual monitoring practice, in order to

detect errors and monitor implementation more often and thus improve them more

quickly. The initial months of the unit’s existence were focused on helping the ministries

reach targets already in their plans but not yet completed. This provided the opportunity to

build working relationships with ministries and help introduce the unit’s methods across

government.

7. Jamaica: Performance Management and Evaluation Unit

As part of a comprehensive plan to modernise the Cabinet Office, the Jamaican government

conducted a strategic review in 2006 to revisit the role, functions, and authority of the

Cabinet Office. It also examined its relationship with the rest of the Government

(Government of Jamaica, Cabinet Office [JCO], 2008). This modernisation plan contained

several initiatives to facilitate management of the Cabinet office. Among those measures was

the creation of a unit to monitor the overall performance of the Jamaican Government. It was

named Performance Management and Evaluation Unit.

8. Kenya: Accountability and Delivery Unit

The Accountability and Delivery Unit in Kenya was established in late 2014/early 2015 by

President Uhuru Kenyatta with the strong involvement of Tony Blair and his Africa

Governance Initiative. While its institution seems to quite closely mirror that of the PMDU,

especially its functions, its name highlights some important alterations to the model.

As outlined by the president of Kenya, the unit helps the Government to fulfil campaign

pledges made during elections. Its key functions are policy coordination, monitoring, and

governance (The Office of the Deputy President, 2015). Its key projects are the Konza

Techno-city, the Lamu Port South Sudan and Ethiopia Transport corridor, (the pipeline

66

component), road accidents and media monitoring, and the coverage of Cabinet Secretaries

(The Presidency of Kenya, 2015).

The delivery unit is responsible for following up with ministries to ensure execution and

maintain deadlines. It accomplishes this through use of targets, which allow the unit to

identify those ministries or departments lagging behind. Its goal, then, is to intervene in order

to overcome bottlenecks and improve performance (ibid.). However, rather than

concentrating solely on the ministries and departments, the unit includes all stakeholders

involved in the implementation of projects.

A second important adaptation, also reflected in its name, is the importance of outward

communication. As President Kenyatta stressed: “Communicating what is being done is as

good as capturing what is being delivered’’ (ibid.).

9. Liberia: President’s Delivery Unit

Inspired by the PMDU model, the President’s Delivery Unit (PDU) in Liberia was founded in

2009 and shares many characteristics with the original model with, for example, a sharp focus

on public service delivery improvement and location in the centre of government. However,

it deviates from the model with a strong internal orientation and focus on intra-governmental

coordination. As the African Governance Initiative (2011) details, Liberia’s ‘150 day plan’

coordination effort had been both inefficient and underdeveloped at the onset of President

Sirleaf’s second term, but benefited a lot from the involvement of the PDU in structuring

cooperation. In an attempt to strengthen this cooperation and as a signal to the general public,

the president made her ministers sign performance contract to increase personal

accountability (Executive Mansion, 2012).

Despite the PDU’s orientation on internal processes and delivery, the responsiveness of the

government of Liberia, particularly the PDU, to external actors significantly increased

(Africa Governance Initiative, 2011). As the Africa Governance Initiative notes, a critical

report published by the citizen initiative Liberia Media Centre (LMC) half way through the

‘150 day plan’ led to a re-focussing of ministries and an increased involvement of the PDU

on the priorities and in the process, both in internal coordination and external communication

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(ibid.). This type of flexibility and responsiveness to expert advice has helped the unit

continually progress.

10. Los Angeles, United States: Innovation and Performance Management Unit

Founded in 2006 under Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, the Performance Management Unit

began by tracking the initiatives, objectives and performance of city departments to ensure

they were aligned with the administrative priorities of the mayor (Villaraigosa, 2009).

Advised by Mckinsey & Co., the unit incorporated some features of the original UK PMDU,

but designed the unit to fit their purposes. For instance, the unit was unit was located in the

executive office (in this the case the mayor), but initially was used for more internal

coordination purposes; as an interviewee explained, the unit was the mayor’s “secret

weapon”86

. Further, the unit was founded during a period of budgetary ‘windfall’, and

initially focused on problem solving with output-based targets.87

However, the 2008

financial crisis precipitated deficit projections, which led the unit to shift their framework to

include thinking on more efficient delivery and began working more closely with the

Mayor’s budget team.88

Under Mayor Eric Garcetti, the unit was rebranded in 2013 to the Innovation and

Performance Management Unit (iPMU), where transparency and data driven processes were

incorporated into the strategic framework. With a five person staff, the unit maintains an open

data portal and works as expert consultants to city departments, liaising with department

leaders to monitor performance systems (Robbins and McFarland, 2014). The unit does not

actively take credit for improvements, but points to other success. Robbins and McFarland

(2014) report: “By tracking and analyzing data from the city’s 311 call center (…) the city

maximized staff resources and dramatically improved service. The average 311 call wait time

dropped from 5.9 minutes in February 2013 to 0.6 minutes in February 2014.”

As the city of Los Angeles is decentralized, the unit acts more of a problem-solving network

within the public administration, taking a backstage role in supporting the work of

departments. This backstage role helps to garner ‘buy-in’ by departments, as does the unit’s

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Interviewee 11 87

Interviewee 11 88

Interviewee 11

68

civil society rotational programme, where departmental experts rotate through the iPMU.

This has helped the unit withstand administration changes as they have positioned themselves

as more of an established arm of the public administration89

.

11. Netherlands: Central Delivery Unit

The Dutch PMDU, founded in 2007 under Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, closely

follows the UK PMDU model in its institutional set-up. It was first implemented in a positive

economic environment with the primary objective of improving effectiveness of government

and making public investment more efficient in the delivery of public service outcomes. Four

years after its creation, the unit was dismantled when Mark Rutte became Prime Minister in

201190

.

The Dutch unit was small compared to other units around the world. It had only two partially

dedicated senior advisors working for the unit 20% of their time supported by small research

staff. They used most of the tools developed in the first iteration of the UK PMDU, including

a traffic light system pointing out progress and setbacks in 74 priority policy areas. Unlike the

UK PMDU, however, the information produced by the unit was published and shared with

the parliament and other public bodies91

. Consequently, ministers and departments faced

great political pressure to meet targets, which led them to lobby for the right to determine

their own targets, usually setting them to be as easy to achieve as possible (Institute for

Government, 2011).

12. Ontario: Strategy and Results Branch

As part of a more comprehensive approach to improving the delivery of public services in

Canada, the Ontario Province established the Ontario Strategy and Results Branch in 2008

under Premier Dalton McGuinty (Gold, 2014). Located in the Ontario Cabinet Office, the

branch was initially tasked with both tracking key performance indicators and leading a

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Interview 14 91

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number of flagship inter-ministerial policy initiatives (Gold, 2014). Although closely

resembling a delivery unit, the latter task of the branch overrode the results monitoring work

and the unit can therefore be seen as constituting much more than a traditional delivery unit.

In particular, it relates to its larger role on strategic planning and advice on key initiatives and

priorities of the province as well as facilitating policy capacity building (Gold, 2014). As

such, the Branch resembles more of an advisory board and its role with the head of

government may be more on an informal basis than under the various other delivery units

(Truswell and Atkinson, 2011). However, its focus on the outcome aspect of service delivery

through tangible performance management tools can be seen as following the deliverology

approach. The Branch created a comprehensive effort to improve the delivery of services in

Ontario by increasing internal transparency and accountability, improving coordination and

cooperation, enhancing efficacy and effectiveness (Gold, 2014). In ensuring heads of

government are provided with up-to-date information on progress made on key service

delivery priorities, the early detection of gaps and delivery issues can be better observed

(Gold, 2014). In this way, the Ontario Strategy and Results Branch mirrors the work of other

delivery units.

13. Pakistan: Performance Delivery Unit

Founded in 2013, Pakistan’s Performance Delivery Unit was largely inspired by Malaysia’s

PEMANDU and the UK PMDU. Spearheaded by Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif

and advised by Sir Michael Barber, the success of deliverology educational reforms in the

Punjab province of Pakistan helped garner support for the creation of the unit at that national

level. The unit’s adoption was to ensure implementation of the government’s policies initially

in four main areas: energy and investments in the power sector, modernizing infrastructure,

employment generation and housing (Jabri, 2013). However, education later also became a

priority policy.

As both the Malaysia and UK model inspired the Pakistan unit, it combined various features

from the two. The unit, however, has involved to fit its context, and relies more on

adaptations from the Malaysian unit, such as involving both the public and private sectors

through a well-defined process in devising policies and making them achievable (Todd et al.,

70

2014). As the nascent unit advances, it may include more innovations from second -

generation models, like policy labs or open days, as Malaysia began, or develop their own.

14. Queensland: Implementation Unit, Department of Premier and Cabinet

(Abolished)

The now dissolved Queensland Implementation Unit was established in March 2004

following the re-election of Premier Peter Beattie’s Labour government for a third term in

office (Hamburger, 2007). The unit stemmed from the weakness and criticism of inaction of

Beattie’s government during the second term, in which Beattie identified implementation as

one of their main weaknesses (Tiernan, 2005) In light of the revealed disconnect between

cabinet decisions and on the ground service delivery, the unit served part of a more general

organisational restructuring of the Department of Premier and Cabinet (Tiernan, 2005;

Hamburger, 2007). As a result, was focused on changes to “(…) ensure Cabinet decisions

were being implemented in a timely manner and that election commitments were being acted

upon” (Tiernan, 2005). The Queensland unit was largely inspired by both the UK PMDU and

Australia’s CIU in finding ways to improve monitoring and oversight through a focus on

implementation (Tiernan, 2005). However, the unit did not survive administration changes,

and was dissolved shortly after Beattie left office in 200792

.

In light of the criticism and policy programme failures suffered during previous terms, the

unit outlined its responsibility to address the following four key areas. The first was to

support the government’s agenda setting processes with the unit preparing the statement of

priorities at the start of each term. The initial policy priorities focused on improving health

care and strengthening services to the community, realizing the Smart State through

education, skills and innovation, protecting children and enhancing community safety,

managing urban growth and building Queensland’s regions, protecting the environment for a

sustainable future, growing a diverse economy and creating jobs and last, deliver a responsive

government (Tiernan, 2005). In turn, these priorities shaped policy development, budget

allocation decisions and provided a framework for planning and reporting processes across

government (Tiernan, 2005). The second function of the unit was to clarify expectations of

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what is to be achieved during the term at both Ministerial and agency level and ensure

ownership and responsibility for delivery is clear, third monitoring performance and

implementation and last, reporting to the Cabinet on achievements and the status of major

initiatives (Tiernan, 2005). Moreover, Beattie was selective in who was involved in the unit

and ensured it was to remain small with around fifteen staff, much like at the national level in

Australia. In particular, the Australian CIU became influential to Beattie in that he too

focused on the promotion of front-end consideration of implementation issues in order to help

with capacity building and development of the Queensland public sector (Tiernan, 2005).

Although the Queensland Unit largely mirrored that of the UK PMDU and the Australian

CIU, a few adaptations did occur. For example, in contrast to most delivery units, the

Queensland Implementation Unit was located not at the Cabinet Office but rather within the

Policy Division. This was pushed forward by Beattie in order to avoid being too close to the

Cabinet yet close enough to exert considerable influence yet also be highly tied to the rest of

the Policy Divison’s work (Tiernan, 2005). This also according to the initial founders of the

unit, ensured that the adequate skills and expertise needed were retained and not fragmented

across the Queensland Government (Tiernan, 2005). This therefore focused on heightening

the collaboration and integration across departments, which more closely resembles the CIU

than the PMDU. Moreover, in order to avoid potential criticism of the sensitivity of the unit

on building and maintaining strong trusting relationships with agencies, the Queensland unit

unlike most other delivery units did not deal directly with government agencies but rather

created a single point of contact through the existing network of Portfolio Contact Officers

from the four specialist units of the Policy Division (Tiernan, 2005).

15. Romania: Central Delivery Unit

Established in the 2014 under the leadership of Prime Minister Victor Ponta, Romania’s

Central Delivery Unit aims to “embed results-oriented practices in the public sector and to

help achieve selected priority outcomes” (World Bank, 2013). Located in the exuctive office,

the unit closely resembles the UK PMDU model, following the deliverology approach of a

narrow set of priority policies. The Prime Minister along with the unit’s staff selected four

priority policy outcomes, including: energy sector reform, public procurement reform, job

creation with a focus on youth employment, and tax administration.

72

Nonetheless, the unit is still very much a ‘work in progress’ with the World Bank extensively

assisting its set up and providing technical assistance. This includes: assistance in identifying

priority outcome indicators and associated delivery changes; establishing the institutional

framework for improving policy implementation and delivery of government priorities;

creating a monitoring system and indicators for tracking progress on the delivery of selected

priorities; developing the institutional capacity for monitoring and communicating with

relevant stakeholders on progress; assessing the present delivery process and possible

bottlenecks; and, assisting in the preparation of delivery plans and provide operations support

(World Bank, 2013). It is clear that the unit is still in its initial planning phase, and will need

time before it reaches the implementation phase of adoption.

16. Rwanda: Government Action Coordination Unit

As part of a bigger cooperation and consultation with Tony Blair’s Africa Governance

Initiative, the Government Action Coordination Unit (GACU) was founded in 2008 under

president Kagame, and closely follows the archetype of the PMDU. The GACU focussed

primarily on education, crime, health and transportation, with former PMDU staff providing

direct advice and policy analysis regarding the priorities (Iyer, 2012). Aside of its

performance contracts responsibilities (called ‘inihigo’), planning and evaluation as well as

the preparation of quarterly and annual reports, the GACU mirrors the delivery unit in

Liberia, albeit more effective, as they are involved in the day-to-day operations such as

preparations of cabinet meetings (Africa Lead, 2014). As Iyer (2012) details, the creation of

the GACU was also in response to reducing similar positions in different ministries,

streamlining service delivery and therefore reducing doubling up work and wasting talent

The unit diverges from the original PMDU model with its coordination efforts and broader

stake in long-term policy development and strategic management. For instance, it is the unit’s

responsibility to prepare the National Leadership Retreat and the National Dialogue Council

meetings, bringing together government’s senior leadership to set priorities for the next year

and discuss the country’s progress toward achieving the goals of Vision 2020. Vision 2020

aims to transition the “country from a landlocked, post-conflict country onto a sustainable

73

development path” (Iyer, 2012: 2). In this light, the unit can be seen as its own distinct brand,

not just monitoring public service delivery, but also providing strategic policy advice as well

as continuous support for intra-governmental coordination efforts.93

17. Sierra Leone: Strategy and Policy Unit

Sierra Leone’s Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU) was established in 2008 and only loosely

follows the original PMDU model. The unit was largely assisted by third parties such as

receiving initial funding from UNDP as well as assistance from the AGI in enhancing policy

analysis and coordination (Simson, 2013)94

.

Unlike in Rwanda, where the GACU was accompanied by a Strategy and Policy Unit to “help

ministries identify a limited set of priorities that they could realistically achieve and prepare

policy and option papers for the president and ministers” (Iyer, 2012: 4), Sierra Leone’s SPU

embedded this function within its scope of work. For this reason, its focus lays not only on

supporting implementation and monitoring and evaluating outcomes across the government

but also on giving strategic policy advice, analysis and coordination of these priorities. In

addition, the SPU is also responsible for the implementation of the ‘Agenda for Prosperity’

(formerly the ‘Agenda for Change’, the President’s vision document) (Government of Sierra

Leone, 2012).

As the African Centre for Economic Transformation (2010: 3) notes, there have been several

issues that potentially limited the impact of the SPU. Regarding its organisational set-up, the

staff selection process in the SPU as well as its project character undermined its credibility

and raised concerns of sustainability (ibid.). As Acasus, (2012) notes, the broad focus on all

22 ministries made it impossible to affect change, as there were great differences regarding

cooperation and information provision. After a reform in 2010 in which the Unit refocused its

efforts down to six priorities (and one project within each priority), the unit obtained its first

results. Regarding its administration and management, the African Centre for Economic

Transformation furthermore (2010: 4) argues, that reporting directly to the president limits

93

Interview 22 94

For an overview on this case see Scharff (2012).

74

intra unit collaboration, that the SPU’s project manager role has been insufficiently defined

and that there was a lack of performance evaluation of the unit itself (ibid.).

Furthermore, Acasus (2012) points out the infrequency of meetings with the President

leading to stocktakes being insufficiently regular leading to a lack of accountability for

delivery. However, these were ironed out after the reform in 2010. Moreover, the SPU’s

exclusion from cabinet proceedings restricts its ability to delivery policy analysis,

coordination and implementation support as well as limiting its technical abilities in

addressing concerns raised by stakeholders. These factors together with discontent over the

self-evaluation process hinders effectiveness and leads to low buy-in (ibid.). As there seems

to be no clear plan on the nature of future funding of the SPU, this remains a crucial threat to

the unit’s sustainability (ibid.). In addition to this, Acasus (2012) points out that the

relationship of the staff at the beginning consisting of highly senior and experienced

government employees fostered a more hierarchical rather than collaborative culture. In

response, the 2010 reform also changed the staffing relationships in order to focus on more

collaboration.

18. South Africa: Department Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

The South African Delivery Unit, known as the Department of Planning, Monitoring and

Evaluation (DPME), is among the few in our comprehensive list that institutionally most

closely matches the ‘archetype of a delivery unit’. Founded in 2010 by president Zuma, the

unit is responsible for responding to a few carefully selected areas of blockages in delivery,

mostly within the education and health sectors (The Presidency, 2009).

While the DPME focuses on areas that are concerned with the monitoring and evaluation of

government priorities as well as internal management practices and frontline service delivery,

the DPME’s strong focus on the integration of citizens in the process of doing so through

citizen-based monitoring and the presidential hotline is important to mention. In particular,

citizen based monitoring can be perceived as an attempt to improve public accountability and

service delivery by encouraging citizens to monitor and report on service delivery

(Department Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014). This feedback can in turn provide

the unit with the ability to take corrective action and communicate outcomes to all

75

stakeholders (ibid.). In an attempt to increase the responsiveness and interaction of citizens

with the government, President Jacob Zuma also established the Presidential Hotline in 2009.

It aims at providing strong systems of complaint management to strengthen the trust between

citizens and government and has increased the number of complaints received by phone, mail

or letters from 75,873 in 2009 to 179,326 in 2013 (ibid.).

There are various albeit slight, deviations of this unit to the original PMDU. First, the DPME

in managing the delivery chain as well as reporting back to the president, pays not only close

attention to the output and outcomes of activities but also to their inputs. In praxis, this means

that especially when negotiating delivery agreements between the institutions and agencies

involved, a focus has to be placed on the described roles and responsibilities as well as

timelines and budgets (The Presidency, 2009). Second, while the unit has a subdivision

responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of service delivery outcomes, it also has a

subdivision aiming at measuring, monitoring and evaluating the institutional performance of

provincial departments against predefined internal objectives and targets (Department

Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014).

19. Tanzania: President’s Delivery Bureau

Tanzania’s President’s Delivery Bureau (PDB), founded in 2013 under President Kilwete,

closely resembles the PMDU model in its institutional set-up. However, rather than being

directly influenced by the African Governance Initiative (AGI), the PDB can be seen as a

‘second generation’ delivery unit, being predominantly influenced by the successful

Malaysian model. Furthermore, the delivery unit started out as a singular project or within the

context of a larger project, similar to those in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The unit was staffed

with primarily senior government officials and unlike the various other African delivery

units; the PDU follows more closely the PMDU in that its functions do not include

coordination of the Cabinet. Moreover, the PDB monitors and reports progress on the ‘Big

Results Now!’ (BRN) initiative directly to the President, Vice President, Minister of Finance

and all six BRN ministries and Permanent secretaries (DfID, 2014). A unique aspect of the

Tanzanian case is that all six BRN ministries have their own Ministerial Delivery Units

(MDUs), each responsible for monitoring and reporting on the ministry’s BRN plan as well

as supporting delivery capacity through problem solving and analysis (ibid.).

76

In particular, President Kilwete started the BRN initiative in February 2013. As the Africa

Platform (2014: 1) put it, the BRN is a “system of development implementation, best

described as a ‘fast-track people-centred growth marathon’ [focussing] on six priority areas

articulated in the Tanzania National Development Vision 2025: energy and natural gas,

agriculture, water, education, transport and mobilization of resources”. In order to yield the

desired results, the Tanzanian government received an eight-week coaching session

(‘Delivery Lab’) by the Malaysian PEMANDU to design and implement a delivery unit

suited for Tanzanian demands and context. As Todd, Martin and Brock (2014) point out, the

BRN aims at “operating in a new, more open and accountable way [by] focussing on

delivering tangible results in priority sectors”. Todd, Martin and Brock (ibid.) highlight in the

context of the Education Delivery Lab, that while enrolment at primary and secondary levels

increased in recent years, passing rates in fact decreased – henceforth this was made a priority

in the Education Delivery Lab and targets were formulated accordingly.

20. Thailand: Office of the Public Sector Development Commission

The delivery unit in Thailand, known as the Office of the Public Sector Development

Commission, is largely in accordance with the original delivery approach developed by Sir

Michael Barber and implemented in the UK. This is especially striking, as after the PMDU

the OPDC is the second oldest delivery unit having been founded in 2002. As the head of the

unit in 2009, Thosaporn Sirisumphand, emphasized in his speech at the United Nations

Public Service Day Celebration in 2009, the public sector reforms should counteract

economic recessions and “prescribe an implementation framework, objectives, strategies and

measurements in order to achieve better service quality, rightsizing, high performance and an

open bureaucracy through public participation” (United Nations, 2009: 1). He highlighted

that the Public Administration Act of 2002 was a ‘citizen-centred’ initiative, aimed at

changing values, paradigms and “the working culture of the public sector to resolve […]

problems more effectively and satisfy public needs” (United Nations, 2009: 2).

The public service delivery reform consisted of three broad initiatives. First, a results-based

management (RBM) system which aimed at promoting efficient and effective implementation

by defining the vision, mission, objectives, strategic issues, as well as a strategy to reach

them (Sathornkich, n.d.). Second, following a ‘customer first principle’, Thailand attempted

77

to streamline administrative processes and achieve higher customer satisfaction by reducing

service delivery time, introducing ‘one stop shop services’, modern e-facilities as well as

locating Government Counter Services in areas of high convenience (such as Malls) (United

Nations, 2009). Third, in an attempt to increase public participation, bureaucratic processes

were opened up and citizen initiative was encouraged to increase transparency and

accountability.

Given its early emergence, it is unlikely that the OPDC could have relied on learning’s on

best practices from the PMDU. In fact, as described earlier, the OPDC started as a results-

based management initiative and only later on took on characteristics more in line with

delivery units in order to streamline administrative processes and increase accountability.

21. United States: Federal Performance Improvement Council

The Federal Performance Improvement Council (PIC) was established by law under

President Bush in 2007, and later codified, under the GRPA Modernization Act of 201095

.

According to the act, agencies are required to publish their strategic and performance plans

and reports (White House Office of Management and Budget, 2011). The aim is to create a

more highly connected network of planning and performance information. However, as the

council is constrained by the decentralized nature of the US public administration, they

employ a type of problem solving network. The PIC advances their goals by supporting

agencies in the planning and review of projects, strengthening the framework of projects,

helping to achieve results, and building capabilities. It is the emphasis placed on this last

point that distinguishes it most from the original deliverology model.

The council itself is composed of Performance Improvement Officers from each of the 24

federal agencies, and is chaired by the Office of Management and Budgeting (OMB) Deputy

Director Beth Cobert96

. The council functions as the hub of the performance management

network. It works closely with the OMB to create and advance a new set of Federal

Performance management principles, refine a government-wide performance management

95

Interview 12 96

Interview 12

78

implementation plan, and identify and tackle specific problems as they arise97

. Finally, it

increases intra-agency coordination in two ways. First, it serves as home for Federal

communities of practice, which develop tools and provide expert advice and assistance to

their Federal colleagues. Second, it addresses broader governance issues and works to

advance progress on high-priority problems requiring the action of multiple agencies.

22. Wales: First Minister’s Delivery Unit

Inspired by the English PMDU, the Welsh First Minister’s Delivery Unit was created in

September 2011 and aims to improve delivery in Welsh Government’s policy objectives

through the use of measureable and transparent targets (First Minister of Wales, 2011).

Comprising of no more than seven members, the unit reports directly to the First Minister of

Wales. In terms of scope, the Delivery Unit focuses on programmes, projects and policies

that contribute to particular priority areas as set out by the First Minister. In particular, “these

are jobs and growth, supporting the most vulnerable in society, and programmes that will

contribute to the improvement of educational attainment” (Welsh First Minister’s Delivery

Unit, 2014).

Even though it shares many characteristics with the English PMDU, the scope is considerably

broader and supports cross-departmental work on crosscutting implementation and policy

issues. Similar to the initial English PMDU, the Unit is an inward facing team and

submissions to ministries are for internal use only and therefore not published (First Minister

of Wales, 2011). However, evaluation reports, statistical releases and summaries of decisions

submitted by ministries themselves, are available to the public (Welsh First Minister’s

Delivery Unit, 2014).

97

Interview 12

79

23. World Bank: World Bank Delivery Unit and Global Network for Delivery

Leaders

Current World Bank President, Jim Yong Kim, established the President's Delivery Unit

(PDU) at the beginning of 2014 in order to monitor the Bank’s performance and provide a

forum to identify planning or implementation issues related to institutional priorities (World

Bank, 2014). In specific, the PDU has two goals: to reduce extreme poverty and to build

shared prosperity. In order to achieve these goals, the PDU defined a range of thirteen

indicators across three primary categories: operations, finances and solutions (World Bank,

2014).

In addition, the World Bank has also been extensively involved in assisting countries in the

set-up of delivery units either through monetary funding, technical know-how or other forms

of advisory services such as in the case of Romania. Moreover, the World Bank has also set

up the ‘Global Network of Delivery Leaders’ together with the Office of Tony Blair in 2013

in order to share knowledge on best practices of service delivery (World Bank, 2015). In

particular, the network comprises of the following countries: Albania, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti,

Malawi and Senegal (World Bank, 2015). In the case of Albania, this led to the creation of a

delivery unit towards the end of 2013 (Cani, 2013; Kamarck, 2013; European Commission,

2014).

80

C. Table on Characteristics and Tools

UK

-

PM's

Delivery

Unit

UK

-

PM's

Delivery

Unit

UK

-

Implementa-

tion Unit

Wales

-

First

Minister’s

Delivery

Unit

US

-

Maryland

-

Governor's

Delivery unit

Australia

-

Cabinet

Implementa-

tion Unit

Australia

-

Queensland

-

Implementa-

tion Unit

Malaysia

-

Performance

Management

and Delivery

Unit

Romania

-

Delivery

Unit

Date 2001 2005 2011 2011 2008 2003 2004 2009 2014

Essential Characteristics

Placed in the Executive

Office X X X X X X X X X

Participation of the head of

government (Top-down) X O O O X X X X X

Periodic performance

report routines (Bottom-up) X X X X X X X X X

Small size < 50 X X X X X X X O X

Priorities - Department

specific? X X X X X O - O O

Priorities - standardized? X O O X O X - X O

Targets - Output? X X X X X X X X X

Targets - Input? O O O O O O O O O

Dichotomized variables

(Reached yes or no) X X O X - - - X O

Separate from Treasury X O O X X X X X O

Aiming to achieve service

improvement X X X X X X X X X

81

Tools

Stocktakes X X X X X X X X X

Priority reviews X X X X - X - - X

Executive regular

(monthly, bi-yearly, ...)

notes

X X X X X X X X O

Policy delivery trajectories X X X - X X X X X

Delivery chains X X X - - X - - X

League tables X - O - - - - - O

Open data in outside

communication O O X O X O O X O

Deep dives O O X - O X X - X

Policy labs O O X O O O O X O

Factors impacting the

inception of the delivery

unit

Open data / transparency O - X X X O O - O

Fiscal environment O - X - - O - - X

Digital technologies O - X - X O O - O

Political climate O - X - - X X - X

Source: authors’ own elaboration based on interviews, questionnaires and official documentation.

82

Chile

-

Unidad de

Gestión del

Cumpli-

miento

Brazil

-

Minos

Gerais

-

Escritorio de

Prioridades

Estregicas

Pakistan

-

Performance

Delivery

Unit

Indonesia

-

President's

Delivery

Unit

Thailand

-

Office of the

Public

Sector

Develop-

ment

Commission

South Africa

-

Department

Planning,

Monitoring

and

Evaluation

Liberia

-

President's

Delivery

Unit

Rwanda

-

Prime

Minister's

Coordination

Unit

Sierra Leone

-

Strategy and

Policy Unit

Date 2010 2011 2013 2009 2002 2010 2009 2008 2008

Essential Characteristics

Placed in the Executive

Office X X X X X X X X X

Strong participation of the

head of government (Top-

down)

X X X X X X X X X

Periodic performance report

routines (Bottom-up) X X X X X X - X X

Small size < 50 X X - X - X X X X

Priorities - Department

specific? X X X X O X X X X

Priorities - standardized? O X - O X O O X O

Targets - Output? X X X X X X X X X

Targets - Input? X O O O O X O O O

Dichotomized variables

(Reached yes or no) X O - X X X X X X

Separate from Treasury O X X X X X X X X

Aiming to achieve service

improvement X X X X X X X X X

83

Tools

Stocktakes X X X X - X - O X

Priority reviews X X X X - X - X X

Executive regular (monthly,

bi-yearly, ...) notes O X X X X X X X X

Policy delivery trajectories X X - X X X - - X

Delivery chains X X - X - X - X X

League tables O X - O - X - - X

Open data in outside

communication O X - X X X X O X

Deep dives X X - X - X - - -

Policy labs O O X O O O O O O

Factors impacting the

inception of the delivery

unit

Open data / transparency X X - O X X O O X

Fiscal environment O X - X X X - - -

Digital technologies O O - O X X - - -

Political climate X X - X - X - - -

Source: authors’ own elaboration based on interviews, questionnaires and official documentation.

84

Albania

-

Prime

Minister’s

Delivery Unit

India

-

Delivery and

Monitoring

Unit

Canada

-

Ontario

-

Strategy and

Results

Branch

Jamaica

-

Performance

Management

and

Evaluation

Unit

Brazil

-

Pernambuco

-

Secretariat of

Management

and Planning

Kenya

-

President’s

Delivery Unit

Netherlands

-

Central

Delivery Unit

Tanzania

-

President

Delivery Unit

Date 2014 2008 2008 2008 2011 2014 2007 2013

Essential Characteristics

Placed in the Executive

Office X X X X O X X X

Strong participation of the

head of government (Top-

down)

X X X X - X O X

Periodic performance report

routines (Bottom-up) X - X X X X X X

Small size < 50 X - X - O X X X

Priorities - Department

specific? - - - X O X O X

Priorities - standardized? - - - O O O O O

Targets - Output? X - X X X X X X

Targets - Input? O - O O O O O O

Dichotomized variables

(Reached yes or no) - - - X X - X X

Separate from Treasury - X X X X X X X

Aiming to achieve service

improvement X X X X X X X X

85

Tools

Stocktakes X - X X X X X O

Priority reviews - - X X X - - X

Executive regular (monthly,

bi-yearly, ...) notes - X - - X X - X

Policy delivery trajectories - - - - X - X O

Delivery chains - - - X - - - X

League tables - O - O O - - O

Open data in outside

communication - X - O X - X O

Deep dives - - X O - - - X

Policy labs - - O O X - - X

Factors impacting the

inception of the delivery

unit

Open data / transparency - - - O O - - -

Fiscal environment - - - O X - X -

Digital technologies - - - O O - - -

Political climate - X X X X - - -

Source: authors’ own elaboration based on interviews, questionnaires and official documentation.

86

D. Interview Coding Tables and Interview Guiding Questionnaires

1. Interview code – Delivery Unit’s heads and employees

Number of

interview Country Name of unit

Position within

unit

Date of

interview

(dd/mm/yyyy)

1 Australia

Cabinet

Implementation

Unit

Current top-

level

management

23/02/2015

2 Malaysia

Performance

Management

and Delivery

Unit

Current middle-

level

management

17/02/2015

3 United

Kingdom

The Prime

Minister’s

Delivery Unit

(I)

Former senior

advisor to a

Minister

11/02/2015

4 United

Kingdom

The Prime

Minister’s

Delivery Unit

(II)

Former top-

level

management

24/02/2015

5 United

Kingdom

The Prime

Minister’s

Delivery Unit

(II)

Former middle-

level

management

10/02/2015

6 United

Kingdom

Implementation

Unit

Current middle-

level

management

05/12/2014

7 United

Kingdom

Implementation

Unit

Former top-

level

management

06/02/2015

8 United States of

America

Maryland’s

Delivery Unit

Former top-

level

management

17/12/2014

9 United States of

America

Maryland’s

Delivery Unit

Former top-

level

management

04/02/2015

10 United States of

America

Results

Washington

Current top-

level

management

17/02/2015

11 United States of

America

Innovation and

Performance

Management

Unit (Los

Angeles)

Current top-

level

management

05/03/2015

12 United States of

America

National

Performance

Current top-

level 05/03/2015

87

Improvement

Council

management

13 Indonesia

President’s

Delivery Unit

for

Development

Monitoring and

Oversight

Current middle-

level

management

06/01/2015

14 Netherlands Central Delivery

Unit

Former top-

level

management

13/02/2015

Please note: transcripts of the interviews are available upon request.

88

2. Interview code – Leading experts and academics

Number of

interview Country Organisation Position

Date of

interview

(dd/mm/yyyy)

15 Australia

Australia

National

University

Professor 15/02/2015

16 Australia Griffith

University Professor 19/02/2015

17 United

Kingdom

Institute for

Government Researcher 06/02/2015

18 United

Kingdom

London School of

Economics Professor 03/02/2015

19 United

Kingdom

Management

Consultancy

Current middle-

level

management

29/01/2015

20 United States

of America

The Education

Delivery Institute

Current top-

level

management

30/01/2015

21

Latin America

The Inter-

American

Development

Bank

Consultant 28/01/2015

22

Africa

Tony Blair’s

Africa

Governance

Initiative

Current top-

level

management

20/02/2015

Please note: transcripts of the interviews are available upon request.

89

3. Interview guiding questions

Please note, that these are just guiding questions and are not to be considered a rigid

structure.

1. What motivated the inception of your delivery unit? Was it inspired by the example of

other delivery units, be that within (from national to local, for example) or outside of your

own government?

2. What are the main objectives of the delivery unit and how are they accomplished

(monitor, measure, evaluate, enforcement, etc.)? How big is your unit?

3. Has the delivery unit evolved/changed since it was created? If so, what are the main

characteristics that have changed? What are the tools that have changed?

4. What is the relationship between the Unit and other members of the Government, such as:

the executive office/head of government, the treasury/budget making authority and the

ministries? Are there delivery plans? Who is responsible for them?

5. Does your unit use output or input targets? If so, do you use binary targets, i.e. can the

attainment of the target be definitively determined as attained or not attained?

6. Do you have department-specific or standardized priorities across departments?

7. Have any of the characteristics just discussed been instrumental to the unit’s success?

How so?

8. Of the following tools, which were present in your delivery unit?

Tools Present Not

Present

Regular performance meetings (Stocktakes)

Short, intense period of work intended to identify and tackle specific

delivery challenges (Priority reviews)

Executive regular (monthly, bi-yearly, ...) notes

Graph measuring performance (Policy delivery trajectories)

Step-by-step description of how the target is going to be delivered

(Delivery chains)

League tables: tool to predict a standardized likelihood of delivery

(League tables)

Use of public media to communicate (open data in outside

communication)

Deep dive’ reports that aim to get to the bottom of thorny

implementation issues

Any additional tools that you consider viable for your unit?

90

9. Has the implementation of your delivery unit led to improvements in outcomes? How do

you prove your unit is responsible for these improvements? How are these improvements

measured or assessed?

10. Was your delivery unit implemented in a centralized or decentralized context? Did this

impact its success, work, or focus and how so?

11. Was there a push or demand for open data/transparency from the unit? If so, was this for

an internal (government) or external (public) audience? Or both? If so, how did this

impact the workings of the delivery unit and the tools used?

12. Has digital technology had an impact on the work, tools or messaging efforts of the

delivery unit and how so?

13. What were the biggest challenges faced by your delivery unit? How were they overcome?

(ex: Has the unit unintentionally led to undesired outcomes (perverse incentives and

gaming behaviours)?

14. Did the fiscal environment impact the delivery unit and in what way?

15. Did fiscal austerity increase the need for the delivery unit or pose a danger to the unit?

16. Did the political climate have an impact on the delivery unit and in what way? For

example, this could be in terms of the political affiliation of the administration, changing

administrations, administration priorities.

17. Can you think of important considerations to make when adapting or adopting the use of

a delivery unit in a new context?

18. Additional comments or insights to offer on your delivery unit?

91

4. Delivery unit questionnaire participants

Number of questionnaire Country Organisation

1 Indonesia

President’s Delivery Unit

for Development

Monitoring and Oversight

2 Chile Unidad de Gestión de

Cumplimiento

3 South Africa Department of Planning,

Monitoring and Evaluation

4 Brazil – Minos Gerais Escritorio de Prioridades

Estregicas

5 United Kingdom Implementation Unit

6 Romania Delivery Unit

7 Malaysia Performance Management

and Delivery Unit

8 Sierra Leone President’s Delivery Unit

Additionally the following units have filled out a questionnaire. While they are not

delivery units by our definition, they follow in the philosophy of deliverology

9 Colombia

Sistema Nacional de

Evaluación de Gestión y

Resultados

10 Washington State – United

States of America Results Washington

Please note: questionnaire results are available upon request.

92

5. Delivery unit questionnaire

1. To what extent have the following factors motivated the inception of your delivery unit?

Factor Not

present

Strongly

Agree Agree Disagree

Strongly

disagree

Examples of other successful

delivery or implementation

units motivated the inception

of our unit.

Austere economic climate

(the need to increase the

efficiency and effectiveness

of public service delivery in

the face of budgetary

constraints and fiscal

austerity) motivated the

inception of our unit.

Demands for transparency of

performance improvement

efforts or outcomes

motivated the inception of

our unit.

Public demand for service

delivery improvements

motivated the inception of

your unit.

Administration priorities (as

publically declared by an

executive in government,

such as during a campaign or

in political party

publications) motivated the

inception of your unit.

The increased use of digital

technologies, which allow

administrations to shift

services online and enable

citizens to follow up on

improvements, motivated the

inception of your unit.

Any additional factors that

have motivated the inception

of your unit?

93

2. On a scale from ‘Not important’ to ‘Very important’, how important are the following

characteristics to the success of the delivery unit in improving public service outcomes

(if they are present at all)?

Characteristics

Not

Impor-

tant

Negli-

gible

Not

present

Impor-

tant

Very

Impor-

tant

Placed in the Executive Office

Strong participation of the head of

government

Periodic performance report

routines

Small size (<50)

Department-specific priorities

Standardized priorities across

departments

Output-based targets

Input-based targets

Clear separation from any budget

making authority

Binary targets (attainment of target

can be definitely determined as

achieved or not)

Any additional characteristics that

you consider viable for your unit?

3. On a scale from ‘Not important’ to ‘Very important’, how viable are the following tools

in the operation of your delivery unit to improve public service outcomes (if they are

present at all)?

Tool

Not

Impor-

tant

Negli-

gible

Not

present

Impor-

tant

Very

Impor-

tant

Regular performance meetings

(Stocktakes)

Short, intense period of work

intended to identify and tackle

specific delivery challenges (Priority

reviews)

Executive regular (monthly, bi-

yearly, ...) notes

Graph measuring performance

(Policy delivery trajectories)

Step-by-step description of how the

94

target is going to be delivered

(Delivery chains)

League tables: tool to predict a

standardized likelihood of delivery

(League tables)

Use of public media to communicate

(open data in outside communication)

Deep dive’ reports that aim to get to

the bottom of thorny implementation

issues

Any additional tools that you

consider viable for your unit?

4. Has the implementation of your delivery unit led to improvements in outcomes?

Yes No

If yes, please elaborate what these improvements are and how you measure them.

5. If the answer to the last question (Has the implementation of your delivery unit led to

improvements in outcomes?) was 'No', how likely was it that this was caused by one of

the following factors?

Highly

unlikely Unlikely

Indiffe-

rent Likely

Highly

likely

Time for the policies to be

effective was too little yet.

Time for the policies to be

effective was too little as

priorities changed with new

government /administration.

Ministries / Departments

under scrutiny had their

own target (which were

divergent from ours).

95

Economy worsened so that

our priorities became less

important.

Our delivery unit was

staffed with too few people.

Our delivery unit was

inexperienced.

Additional factors of

importance.

6. Does your unit use open data as a tool for enhancing government transparency?

Yes No

If yes, please elaborate which you use.

7. If so, is this for an internal (government) or external (public) audience/use?

Internal External

Would you please elaborate what internal and external means in this context?

8. Has digital technology had an impact on the work, tools or messaging efforts of the

delivery unit?

96

Yes No

If yes, please elaborate.

9. Additional comments or insights on your delivery unit?

97

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