Canon 6.01 Case Digests

People vs Pineda

FACTS: Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte as principals in five separate cases; four for murder and one for frustrated murder. Narbasa and Alindo moved fro the consolidation of the cases into one (1) criminal case as said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. Giving a nod to the defendants claim, the respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all five criminal cases and to file one single information in case 1246, the other four to be dropped from the docket. The City Fiscal balked at the Order and sought reconsideration thereof upon the ground that more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed. The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider as he contends that the acts stemmed out of a series of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series killed more than one victim and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one.

ISSUE: WON the City Fiscal of Iligan City acted with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder instead of one for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.HELD: NO. The Highest Court ruled that upon the facts and the law , particularly Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the City Fiscal correctly presented the five separate informations and in this case, the Fiscals discretion should not be controlled. It is by no doubt, a member of the Bars duty, as provided for in Canon 6, Rule 6.01 of The Code of Professional Responsibility, to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Canon 6, Rule 6.02

Misamin vs San Juan

FACTS: Respondent San Juan deliberately admitted to have appeared as counsel for the New Cesars Bakery in a proceeding before NLRC for a case involving the violations of the Minimum Wage Law while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession, He further avers that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.ISSUE: WON the administrative case against the defendant should prosper.

HELD: The court ruled in the negative. It noted that the charges have to be dismissed for not having been duly proved. The Court, for the respondent, has to say that it would not be inappropriate for him as member of the Bar to avoid all appearance of impropriety. Certainly the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor ne justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called akin interest, is a matter that should not pass annotated. Respondent in his future actuations as member of the Bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remain unsullied.Vitriolo vs. Dasig

FACTS: This is a case for disbarment filed with this Court by high-ranking officers of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) against Atty. Felina Dasig, also an official of the CHED. The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

ISSUE: WON the disbarment case against the respondent should prosper.

HELD: Yes. The Court finds the respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office. The lawyers acts deliberately violated the Lawyers Oath and such may be a ground for disbarment, suspension and other disciplinary action. The Lawyers Oath imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The same is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Moreover, respondents attempts to extort money are violative of Rule 1.01 of said Code which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said acts also constitute breach of Rule 6.02 which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests for a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.For these violations, the Highest Court found the respondent worthy of disbarment.

Ramos vs Imbang

FACTS: This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty. Jose Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The complainant, Diana Ramos, alleges that the respondent collected from her attorneys fees while being employed by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) and that said respondent made her believe that a suit has been instituted against the Jovellanoses for which Ramos paid respondent for each appearance in court. The suit, however, has never been filed.ISSUE: WON the disbarment or suspension case against the respondent should prosper.

HELD: Yes. The Court finds the respondents acts constituted violations of Rules 1.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court further noted that lawyers are to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity and lawyers in the government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only member of the Bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. Respondents conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers. Hence, he is disbarred form the practice of law.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26222 July 21, 1967THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE JUDGE HERNANDO PINEDA of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte; and TOMAS NARBASA, TAMBAC ALINDO and RUFINO BORRES, respondents.

Dominador L. Padilla for petitioner.Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Borres for respondents.SANCHEZ, J.:Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases, four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:

On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13, 1966, directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo).1Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting, the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the assailant of double murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder with the use of bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo of a man, his common-law wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" from a pistol. Two persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by appellant Juan Mones.8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule who were asleep were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children also asleep were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders."9The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of home guards. It was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all.10 Not material here, therefore is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.12Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements of that offense robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."143. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' "15 Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited.1wph1.tAnd at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976

JOSE MISAMIN, complainant, vs.ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FERNANDO, J.:It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua, owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice. Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice. Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.

Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy "preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in an outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly good person." 2The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila and the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of evidence.The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922, the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been subsequently adhered to. 6This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force. That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied

WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on his record.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PER CURIAM:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig,[1] an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.

Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...

b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED

c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the existence of a prior registration

d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.[3]Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.[4]Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36[5] of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued,[6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.[7]Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for herself.[9]In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges.[10] A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation Unclaimed.[11]On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.

In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.[12]On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.

In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:

From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.

On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[13]At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED.

Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.[14] However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.[15]In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6[17] of said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1[20] and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] Admitted to the Bar, May 30, 1986. Per 1998 LAW LIST, p. 232.

EN BANCDIANA RAMOS, Complainant,A. C. No. 6788(Formerly, CBD 382)

- v e r s u s -Present:PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,*GARCIA,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA andREYES, JJ.

ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, Respondent.Promulgated:August 23, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xR E S O L U T I O NPER CURIAM: This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.THE COMPLAINTIn 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3] The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.[4] This happened six times and for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).[5]RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6] In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11] A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13] On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the complainant.[15]RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16] The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21] The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.[22]THE COURT'S RULING We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.[24] Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:xxx xxx xxx(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession. Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel. Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31] Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.[32] There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client)[33] nor was it given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond).[34] Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35] WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice