FROM MYSTICISM TO PHILOSOPHY (AND BACK): AN ONTOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF THE ONENESS OF BEING

CANER K. DAGLI

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR

THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

JUNE, 2006

UMI Number: 3208826

32088262006

Copyright 2006 byDagli, Caner K.

UMI MicroformCopyright

All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

ProQuest Information and Learning Company 300 North Zeeb Road

P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

All rights reserved.

by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.

Copyright by Caner K. Dagli, 2006. All rights reserved.

iii

FROM MYSTICISM TO PHILOSOPHY (AND BACK): AN ONTOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF THE ONENESS OF BEING

CanerK.Dagli

Abstract

IntheearlyhistoryofIslam,philosophy,theology,andtheteachingsoftheSufis

didnotoverlapinanyimportantway,butthiswouldeventuallychange.IbnSīnā(d.1037),amongothers,providedMuslimthinkerswithalanguageformetaphysicalspeculationandwasopentomysticalideashimself.AbūḤāmidal-Ghazālī(d.1111),inrefutingphilosophicalrationalism,paradoxicallyforcedmainstreamtheologytoadoptthelanguageofphilosophy.Suhrawardī(d.1191),thefounderoftheIlluminationist(ishrāqī)tradition,madethefirstgrandattemptataphilosophicalandmysticalsynthesis.IbnʿArabī(d.1240)providedanontologyandepistemologywithinthebosomoftheIslamictextualtraditionandSufism.Iarguethattheearlydiscoursesbetweenphilosophy,theology,andmysticisminIslamsetthestageforasynthesisofphilosophicallanguage,religioussensibility,andmysticalideasinlatercenturies.

OneofthemostunstudiedfacetsofthisconvergenceistheperiodofSufismandphilosophyfollowingIbnʿArabīandleadinguptoMullāṢadrā(d.1650).Throughacloseexaminationoftheirgradualadoptionofthetechnicallanguageofontology,ItracetheattemptsoffourgenerationsofmysticstoincorporatetheprevailingphilosophicalandtheologicallanguageofIslam.IshowthattheassociationoftheschoolofIbnʿArabīwiththeconceptofwaḥdatal-wujūdwasmorecomplexthancommonlythought,sincetheearlymembersofthisschooldonotseemtotreatwujūdor“existence/being”asanimportantconceptinitsownright.ThischangesgraduallyastheseSufithinkersenterintodialoguewithphilosophyandtheologywithanincreasedlevelofsophistication.TheresultingfusionofIbnʿArabī’smysticaldoctrineswiththematureformofIslamicPeripateticphilosophypresagesthegrandsynthesisofMullāṢadrā,whobeganfromthepointofviewofphilosophyandincorporatedthemysticalworldview.Icallthistraditionofmysticsandphilosophers,“TheSchooloftheOnenessofBeing(waḥdatal-wujūd).”

iv

TableofContentsIntroduction vChapterOne:ProblemsofIdentitybetweenMysticismandPhilosophy 1ChapterTwo:WujūdandTashkīk,andtheCorrespondencebetweenQūnawīandṬūsī 36ChapterThree:Jandī’sUseofwujūdandRelatedConcepts 65ChapterFour:Kāshānī,Conditioning,andtheOntologicalArgument 74ChapterFive:QayṣarīandtheLanguageofPhilosophy 87ConcludingRemarks 114Bibliography 117

v

Introduction

Thisworkaddressestheconnectionbetweenamysticandaphilosopherwhowere

separatedbyaperiodoffourcenturies.IbnʿArabī(d.1240)1wasoneofthetoweringfiguresofIslamicmysticismandamongSufisstillbearsthetitleofal-shaykhal-akbar,“thegreatestmaster.”InrecentdecadestherehasbeenatremendousgrowthinthescholarshiponthelifeandwritingsofIbnʿArabī.Infact,itisnoexaggerationtosaythatasaresultofthescholarlyactivityofthelasttwodecadesIbnʿArabīisoneofthemostextensivelystudiedfiguresinIslamicthought.OnlyfiguressuchasAbūḤāmidal-GhazālīandIbnSīnāhavehadsimilarattentionpaidtotheirworksandinfluence.JamesMorrishasopinedthat,aswithPlatointhewesternphilosophicaltradition,allofIslamicthoughtafterIbnʿArabīcanbeseenasfootnotestohiswork.PerhapslesshyperbolicandmorerealisticistheclaimthattherehasbeennoIslamicthinkerofgreaterinfluencesincehistime. MullāṢadrāwasthemostinfluentialphilosopherafterIbnSīnā,andsomehaveconsideredhimtobethegreatestphilosopherinthehistoryofIslamicthought.AswithIbnʿArabī,inthelasttwodecadesconsiderablescholarshiphasbeendevotedtoṢadrā,withnewtranslationsofhisworkbeingpublishedonaregularbasis.Itmaynotbeimmediatelyclearwhatconnectionamysticandphilosopherseparatedbyaperiodoffourhundredyearscouldhave.ṢadrāwasaPersianwhocameoutofaShīʿīphilosophicalmilieu,aproductoftheSchoolofIṣfahān,whileIbnʿArabīwasaSunniArabmysticwhoclaimednottohavemuchtasteforphilosophy.However,manyoftheideasandfoundationalprinciplesoftheschoolofIbnʿArabīwereincorporatedintoṢadrā’sal-ḥikmahal-mutaʿāliyahandindeedcanbearguedtobethebasisofitinmanyrespects.ThisisoftenoverlookedduetotheoverwhelmingprecisionandclarityofṢadrāascomparedwiththedensityandmanifoldsymbolismofthewritingsofIbnʿArabī.Yetthetwoarelinked,asindeedarelaterSufismandphilosophyingeneral,andthislinkitwhatisatleastpartiallyaddressedinthisthesis. BetweenIbnʿArabīandMullāṢadrāthereweremanyphilosopherswhobegantoincorporatedifferentsystemsofthoughtintotheirownphilosophy.Forexample,Quṭbal-DīnShīrāzī(d.1311)wasastudentofthePeripateticphilosopherNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī(whowillbediscussedinthesecondchapter),butisalsosaidtohavestudiedwithṢadral-Dīnal-Qūnawī(alsodiscussedinthesecondchapter)andwasamajorreviveroftheIlluminationistphilosophyofSuhrawardī.AnotherexampleisʿAllāmahal-Ḥillī,anotherstudentofṬūsī’swho,besideshisrenowninImamitheologyandlaw,issaidtohavestudiedtheideasofIbnʿArabīinBaghdadwithShamsal-DīnKīshī(d.1296).AfterthetimeofDāwūdal-Qayṣarī(thesubjectofchapterfive)therewasḤaydarĀmulī(d.after1385),forwhomSufismandShīʿismweremanifestationsofthesamerealityandwhose 1Inthescholarlyliterature,hisnameappearsbothasIbnʿArabīandIbnal-ʿArabī.InhistwomajorstudiesChittickusestheformer(withthedefinitearticle“al-”)butinsomearticlesitappearswithoutitasinHistoryofIslamicPhilosophyeditedbyNasrandLeaman,whichcouldbeduetoediting.AccordingtoChittick,IbnʿArabīhimselfandhis“school”alwaysusedthedefinitearticle.TheİslamAnsiklopedisialsousesthedefinitearticle.MajidFakhry,M.Chodkiewicz,A.Schimmel,J.Morris,O.Yahia,A.ʿAfīfīandA.KnyshuseIbnʿArabī,withoutthedefinitearticle.

vi

writingsappeartoflowquiteorganicallyfromthekindofphilosophicalSufismpresentedbyQayṣarī.StillanotherexampleisIbnTurkahal-Iṣfahānī(d.1432),whoacenturyafterQayṣarīattemptedtobringtogetherPeripatetic,Illuminationist,andSufithoughtinthecontextofShīʿism. Now,whilemuchscholarshiphasbeendevotedtotheperiodleadinguptoIbnʿArabī,andtothephilosophyofMullāṢadrāitself,considerablylessattentionhasbeengiventothisinterveningperiod.Indeed,the14th-16thcenturiesstillmakeuponeofthemostunstudiedperiodsintermsofphilosophyandmysticism.AnyoneofthefourmembersoftheschoolofIbnʿArabīdiscussedinthefollowingchapterscouldbetheobjectofaseriousmonograph.Moreover,thereisamuchlargercommunityofwriterswhocouldbecalledAkbarians(followersofal-Shaykhal-Akbar)whoarenottreatedhere,suchasTilimsānī,Farghānī,ʿIrāqī,Fenari,andmanyothers.

AfterthefirstchapterinwhichIdiscussthescholarlyunderstandingofwhat“mystical”and“philosophical”meanintheIslamiccontext,ItracethedevelopmentofontologyfromIbnʿArabī’smostprominentdisciple,Qūnawī,throughtothefifth-generationdiscipleDāwūdal-Qayṣarī.Thisisbasedonacloseandcarefulreadingoftheirtexts,withfocusontheiruseofthefamilyofontologicaltermsusedintheAkbariantradition.Thisisnotastudyofaparticularthinkernorevenofagroupofthinkers.Itismeanttotracethedevelopmentofagroupofideaswhichfallundertheheadingofontology.Thustherelevantcontextforeachofthesewritersisprimarilyintellectual,notculturalorhistorical,whichistosaythatitisQūnawī’scontactwithṬūsīthatmatters,nottheparticularitiesofhishistoricalsituation. OftenindiscussingtheschoolofIbnʿArabīastaticapproachisadopted,whichistosaythatthedoctrinesoftheschool,eventhoughitsexponentscouldbeseparatedbycenturies,aretakenasafixedbodyofdoctrines.WhileitistruetosaythatthefundamentalvisionofrealityofferedbyIbnʿArabīremainsthesameintheAkbarianschoolevenuntilthepresentday,thewayinwhichthatvisionisexplainedbegantochangefromtheveryfirstgenerationofhisdisciples.Evenbeforewecometolaterhistoricaldevelopment,thereisanobviouspluralityofexpositioneveninIbnʿArabī’sownvastbodyofwritingitself,sinceitistruetosaythatIbnʿArabīhasseveraldifferentontologiesandcosmologies.Theydifferinrepresentingdifferentwaysofexpressingthesameunderlyingreality,buttheexpressioncantaketheformofthesymbolismofthealphabetorsometimesalanguageverysimilartothatofPeripateticphilosophy. Whenthesuccessivegenerationsofdiscipleswentaboutadjustingtheirstyleandcontentofexpositionaccordingtotheirstatedofunstatedgoals—forexample,makingIbnʿArabī’sthoughtmoreunderstandabletothegeneralintellectualelite—thechangesthattheymadewerenotalwaysannounced.WhenQūnawīoroneofhissuccessorschangetheemphasistheyplacedonaparticularconceptsuchastaʿayyun(identification),ormodifiedthewayinwhichtheyusedwujūd(existence)orintroducednewconceptstoexplaintheestablishedideasoftheirschool,theydonotrevealitbylettingusknowthatIbnʿArabīsaidthusandsoandthattheyfinditmorehelpfultoexplainitanotherway.Thereisneveranyadmissionorhintintheirwritingsthatanydevelopmentistakingplaceatall.Indeed,intheultimatesenseitistruetosaythatthereisno“development”becausethefundamentalinsightsarenotchanging,butthelanguageandthewaytheinsightsareofferedupdoindeedchange,andthisturnsouttobeofthegreatestsignificance.

vii

TheAkbariansareofcourseawareofwhocamefirstandknowtheirownintellectualheritage,buttheirrelationshipwiththepastisusuallyonlymentionedinopeningremarkspraisingtheirteacherorinmentioningthepositionofapredecessor.AsisusualinthehistoryofIslamicthought,quotationsandparaphrasesareoftenleftwithoutattribution.ButinthecaseoftheAkbarianswearenoteventalkingaboutcitingthepositionexplainedbyapastauthorinordertosupportorrefuteit.Iftheyhadanyconsciousnessthattheywere“improving”anypartoftheexpositionofIbnʿArabī’smetaphysics,ontology,andcosmology,theycertainlymakenomentionofit.Unlessonewereexpertinthewritingsofthisschool,onewouldbehardpressedtoidentifywhatcenturyaparticularworkwaswrittenin. ThuspartofthepurposeoftheworkathandistotracktheprogressoftheseunannouncedchangesinthewaytheAkbarianstalkedaboutoneofthemanyfieldstheycover:ontology.Thisisimportantforseveralreasons.Firstofall,thereisacommonidentification—onewhichbegancenturiesagointheIslamicworlditself—betweenIbnʿArabīandhisschoolandthephrasewaḥdatal-wujūdor“theonenessofexistence.”ThisisafacilelinkageandamisleadingoneifwewishtounderstandwheretheAkbarianschoolbeganandhowitdevelopedasfaraswujūdisconcerned.Thephrasewaḥdatal-wujūdappearsnowhereinIbnʿArabī’swritings,andappearstwicethatIknowofinQūnawī’swritings,whereitsmentionishardlymomentous.TothinkthatIbnʿArabīsomehowstartedoutwiththenotionofwaḥdatal-wujūdinhismindandthensetouttoproveitagainstotherpositionsonwujūdistomisrepresentwhatheconsideredtobeimportant.Waḥdatal-wujūdlendsitselfeasilytopolemicsandhasacertainpoeticqualitysoattractivetoIslamicauthorswhenassigninglabelstothings,butitisnotwhatIbnʿArabīfundamentallycaredabout.Theimplicationofthelabelwaḥdatal-wujūdisthatIbnʿArabīwasacompetingvoiceinthespectrumofphilosophicalvoicesonquestionsofontology.Thishecertainlywas,butnotforthesakeofcomingupwitha“correct”ontology,sinceforhimtherewasnoquestionofanytrulycorrectviewofthingsoutsideoftheprocessofspiritualrealization.Remember,IbnʿArabīwasfirstandforemost(andultimately)aSufi,andwaḥdatal-wujūdcouldbenothingmoretohimthananintellectualkeythatmightassistsomeonewhowastreadingthespiritualpath.Hismetaphysicsof“theoneandthemany”consistsofmanifoldmeditationsonthenatureofrealityandofman’srelationshipwithGod.Aswillbediscussedinthefirstchapter,hisencounterswithphilosophyonthissubjectdonotsupporttheideathateither“existence”oritsonenesswereprimaryforhim.IdonotwishtounderstateIbnʿArabī’sdoctrineof“existence,”sinceitisanimportantpartofhisthought,butitisnottheonlypartandIwouldarguenoteventhemostimportantpart.Onegoalofthisthesisistoshowthatthelabelofwaḥdatal-wujūdismoreappropriatelyappliedtothelatermembersoftheschool,especiallyQayṣarī. Second,thedevelopmentofontologyismeanttounfoldoneofthemainpointsdiscussedinthefirstchapter,namelythatthelinebetweenphilosophyandmysticismcannotalwaysbeclearlydrawn.IfweacceptIbnʿArabīaloneasarepresentativeofhisschoolofthought,thenthelinebetweenphilosophyandmysticismisrelativelyclear,butifwebringtheentiretyoftheAkbarianschoolintothepicture,thelinebeginstofadeaway.IbnʿArabīwasnophilosopherintheordinarysense,neitherapractitioneroffalsafahnorthelaterḥikmah.Qūnawīwasmuchlikehismaster,buthehadmoreofthephilosopherinhim.Kāshānīwasalreadybuildingstrongbridgesbetweenphilosophy

viii

andmysticalideas,andanewdepthoffusionbetweenthemoccursinthewritingsofQayṣarī. “WhatisIslamicaboutIslamicphilosophy?”isnotaquestionthisthesisaddressesfullybutithopefullyhelpslaythefoundationsforananswer.SufismisamultifacetedphenomenoninIslam,andsomemanifestationsofitwerealwaysmorereadilyacceptedthanothers.However,exceptinrarecasesSufismassuchisnotrejectedbyanysectorintheIslamicworld.EvenIbnTaymiyyahwasamemberofaSufiorder;hisargumentwaswithcertainvulgarizedandalsoexcessivelyspeculativedimensionsofmysticism(especiallyIbnʿArabī,whoseal-Futūḥātal-MakkiyyahhepraiseduntilhereadtheFuṣūṣ).ThetechnicalterminologyofSufismhasalwaysbeenstronglyQurʾānic,indeedarguablythemostQurʾānicofanyofthedisciplinesinIslam.SomeofthegreatestIslamicluminarieshavebeenSufisorhavespokenwellofSufism.SomeformofSufismisalmostuniversallyacceptedinclassicalIslamiccivilization. Thesamecouldnotbesaidofphilosophy,especiallyintheearlyperiod.TherewasverylittletheMuslimcontemporariesofKindīandFārābīcouldrecognizeintheirheavilyGreek-influencedwritings.ThephilosopherswerebyandlargeasmallandelitegroupwhoseIslamiccredentials,atleastintheeyesofthecommunity,werenotverystrongascomparedtothejuristsandthetheologians,andeventheSufis.ThetriumphofAshʿarismoverMuʿtazilizmandGhazālī’seffectivecritiqueoftherationalismofthephilosophersdidnotleavemuchroomforfalsafahintheemergingjuridical-theologicalconsensus(atleastintheSunniworld).Philosophywaslargelyexcluded,whileSufismwaslargelyacceptedbutwithvariableconditionsfor“orthodoxy”dependingonwhomyouasked.Taṣawwufwasbasicallyindigenous,falsafahbasicallyforeign.IfsomeoneasapttorejectmysticismasIbnTaymiyyahcanrecommendtheFutūḥāt,theplaceofSufismintheIslamicmainstreamcanreasonablybeassumed. Thefirstchapterdescribesthewayinwhichthedynamicsbetweenphilosophy,mysticism,andtheologybegantochangeinthefourth/eleventhandfifth/twelfthcenturies.TheremainingchaptersexaminecloselyonestrandofwhatIbelievetobeaconvergencebetweentheseseparatezonesinIslamicthought.Asthemysticsgrapplewithphilosophicallanguagewithincreasingsuccess,theyneverlosetheirinherentlyspiritualsensibilityandtheircontactandoccupationwiththeQurʾānandthefundamentalprinciplesoftaṣawwuf.Themostimportantpartofthisisthat,nomatterhowclosetothephilosopherstheycome,theroleofreasonneverwinsprideofplace.PartofGhazālī’sgeniuswastoassurethatreasonwouldalwaysbesubordinateeithertotherevelation(waḥy)ortotrueinspiration(ilhām),thelatterpremisedupontheauthorityoftheformer.BothcamefromGod,andpossessedaspiritualauthoritywhichhumanreasoncouldneverhave. BythetimewereachQayṣarī,wehaveasystemofthoughtstronglyrootedinSufismbutwhichadoptedasystematiclanguageofphilosophy.Aswillbediscussedinthefirstchapter,thisprocesshadalreadytakenplaceandwouldcontinuetoacertaindegreeinkalām.Qayṣarī’ssynthesisiscenteredaroundontology,thoughhedoesdiscussmatterspertainingtologicandtocosmologyasitconcernsphilosophy.IargueinChapterFivethatQayṣarī’sbasicontologicalvisionisnotdifferentinsubstanceorformfromthe“revolutioninontology”tobecarriedoutbyṢadrāthreecenturieslater.ThesignificanceofthisliesintheabsenceofanyrealbarrierinQayṣarī’swritingbetweenmattersrelatingproperlytotaṣawwufandthespiritualpathinIslam,suchasunveiling,

ix

theinterpretationofdreams,andsainthood;mattersof“theological”importancesuchasprophethoodandjinn;andanontologyexpressedlargelyinalanguageestablishedbythePeripatetics.Qayṣarī’sal-Muqaddimāt,unlikesomeofhispredecessors’work,isnotahousewithmanyrooms,somedevotedtophilosophyandmostotherstomysticism;hisisonegreatroomwithmanycornersallvisibletoeachother.Thismetaphorshouldhopefullybecomemoreclearasthediscussionofthesethinkersunfolds. ThisisneitherastudyofIbnʿArabīnorofMullāṢadrā.Theyratherformthebackground,bothprospectiveandretrospective,oftheideasdiscussedhere—retrospective,inthesensethattheAkbarianmetaphysicaltraditionfromQūnawītoQayṣarīwhichIdiscusshereisthoroughlyfoundedonIbnʿArabī’slanguageandhisvision,andprospectiveinthesensethatbythetimewereachQayṣarīthereseemstobeverylittledaylightbetweentheAkbarianexpositionofontologyandthewaḥdatal-wujūdofMullāṢadrā.ThedifferenceisthatṢadrā’sphilosophicalsystemismuchmorevastandencompassingthanQayṣarī’s,andaddressesahugenumberofissuestheAkbariansnevertouchupon.TheinfluenceoftheAkbarianschooluponMullāṢadrāisassumedratherthanproveninthisthesis,sincetodemonstratethisindetailwouldrequireaseparatemonograph.Evenifitcanbeshownthatthecommonontologyiscoincidence,theconvergenceisstillremarkableandimportantforwhatitsaysabouttherelationshipbetweenphilosophyandSufism.-TheroleofthecommentariesupontheFuṣūṣal-ḥikam Aswillbecomeclearasthisworkprogresses,muchofthematerialrelevanttothecrossoverbetweenmysticismandphilosophycomesoutofthetraditionofcommentaryupontheFuṣūṣal-ḥikamofIbnʿArabī.RecallthatIbnʿArabīwrotehundredsofbooks,someshorterthanothers,buthislargestiseasilyal-Futūḥātal-Makkiyyah,whichisakindofencyclopediaofhisideasandalsoofhisobservationsoftheSufisofhisday.Itisfullofpoetry,stories,commentaryupontheQurʾān,andmoreprosaicsubjectssuchasthesignificanceandproperpracticeofthecanonicalprayer.ItisbaseduponhisextensiveworkintheFutūḥātthatChittickhasarguedthatthephilosophicalwayofspeakingaboutthingsisonlyoneofthemanywaysinwhichIbnʿArabīappliedhispentoquestionsofthereligiousandspirituallife.ThewritingsofJamesMorrisandMichelChodkiewiczaretwoofthebestexamplesofscholarswhohavenotfocusedonthephilosophicalbuthavechosentobringoutthemoremystical,experiential,andphenomenologicalpointofview.Corbin,whoknewtheFuṣūṣwell,wasalsoanexampleofthis,butscholarshavequestionedhowtransparentlyIbnʿArabīcomesoutthroughthisscholar-philosopher’swritings.TheyhaveastheirresourceahealthyportionofIbnʿArabī’swritings,especiallythevoluminousFutūḥāt.Chittickhasbeenmorebalanced,andattheveryleasthaspaidseriousattentiontothephilosophicaldimensionofIbnʿArabī’swritingsinadditiontostudyingothervastandrepresentativesectionsofhistotalcorpus. However,itisduelargelytotheattentionpaidtothephilosophical,synthesizingdimensionoftheFuṣūṣbyQūnawīandhisintellectualdescendantsthattomanyhewasknownasṢāḥibal-fuṣūṣ,andnotṢāḥibal-futūḥāt.OneofthemostobviousfeaturesoftheFutūḥātisthatitisverylarge(severaltimesaslargeasGhazālī’sIḥyāʾ),andtomyknowledgenoonehasevertriedtowriteanythinglikeasystematiccommentaryonit.Thisislikelyduetothesheerenormityofsuchanundertakingandthefactthatthe

x

Futūḥāt,forallitscomplexitiesanddifficulties,canlargelybereadmeaningfullyonitsownbyareaderreasonablywellversedinthetraditionalIslamicdisciplines.TheFuṣūṣ,however,isarelativelyshortwork,about180pagesinthecriticaledition,anditisforthemostpartwell-nighimpossibletodecipherwithoutadeepfamiliaritywithIbnʿArabī’sotherwritings,adetailedcommentaryonthetext,and/oratraditionalteacherofthetext.Also,itisaworkthatoftengivescenterstagetodiscussionsofontologyandepistemology,andspendsalmostnotimeontheactualpracticeofthespirituallifeorthecultivationofthevirtues,atraditionalmainstayofSufiauthors.Themetaphysicaldiscussionsaregenerallypithyandnotfleshedout,andasChittickhasremarkedonIbnʿArabī’swritingsingeneral,theideasaregenerallyintheirfullydevelopedform;thereislittlepedagogyintheFuṣūṣ.Thisbrief,pithy,andesotericnaturethusmakestheFuṣūṣanidealvesselforthatoftenmostoriginalformofliteraryexpressioninIslamicintellectualhistory,thecommentary.Interestingly,inrelationtotheFutūḥāttheFuṣūṣhasservedtwoseparateandcontradictoryfunctions.Asmentionedabove,evensomeoneassensitivetothefoiblesofSufismasIbnTaymiyyahlookedfavorablyupontheFutūḥātandconsidereditsreadingtobeaspirituallybeneficialexercise.2HisobjectionstoIbnʿArabīreallystemfromtheboldand(seemingly)antinomianassertionsintheFuṣūṣ,onthebasisofwhichheexcoriatesIbnʿArabī.Themorebalancedandself-explanatoryFutūḥāt—withitsmanysectionsonthefivepillars,asceticism,andobediencetotheLaw—didnotseemtotroublehim.ButtheFuṣūṣwasanimportantstartingpointforthecenturiesofphilosophicalelaborationbegunbyQūnawīandculminating,Iwillargue,inDāwūdal-Qayṣarī.Itwaspreciselybecauseitwasbrief,difficult,andcontroversialthattheFuṣūṣbecameakindoftemplateforthephilosophicalspeculationsandelaborationsofhisschool.AFuṣūṣcommentarywaswrittenbyQūnawī,thenbyQūnawī’sdiscipleMuʾayyadal-DīnJandī,thenbyJandī’sdiscipleʿAbdal-Razzāqal-Kāshānī,thenbyKāshānī’sdiscipleDāwūdal-Qayṣarī,inacontinuouslineofspiritualandintellectualsuccession.LatercommentariesincludethoseofʿAbdal-RaḥmānJāmī3andʿAbdal-Ghanīal-Nābulusī.4 ThefamousopeningpassagefromthechapteronAdamfromtheFuṣūṣreads:

TheRealwilled,glorifiedbeHe,invirtueofHisBeautifulNames,whichareinnumerable,toseetheiridentities—ifyousowishyoucansay:toseeHisIdentity—inacomprehensivebeingthatcomprisesthewholeaffairinsofarasitispossessedofexistenceandHisMysteryismanifesttoHimselfthroughit.Forthevisionathinghasofitselfinitselfisnotlikethevisionathinghasofitselfinanotherthing,whichwillbelikeamirrorforit;indeed,HeismanifesttoHimselfinaformaccordedbythelocusseen,whichwouldnothavemanifestedtoHimwithouttheexistenceofthatlocusandHisself-disclosuretoit.5

2“AtfirstIwasamongthosewhoheldagoodopinionofIbn‘Arabiandpraisedhimhighlyfortheusefuladviceheprovidesinhisbooks.Thisusefuladviceisfoundinthepagesofthe‘Revelations’[Futūḥāt]…andsimilarwritings.Atthattime,wewereunawareofhisrealgoal,becausewehadnotyetstudiedtheFususandsuchlikebooks.”QuotedinIbn‘ArabiintheLaterIslamicTraditionbyA.Knysh(NewYork,1999),96.3Naqdal-nuṣūṣfīsharḥNaqshal-fuṣūṣ,ed.WilliamChittick(Tehran1977).ThisisactuallyacommentaryuponasummaryoftheFuṣūṣwrittenbyIbnʿArabīhimself.4Sharḥjawāhiral-nuṣūṣfīḥallkalimātal-Fuṣūṣ(Cairo,1905).5TheRingstonesofWisdom,tr.CanerDagli(Chicago,2004),3-4.

xi

Itisdifficulttoconceiveofapassagemorebafflingtotheuninitiatedreader,noronewhichissobroadinitscompass.Inorderforthispassagetobegraspedonemustknowthetechnicalmeaningof“identity,”“mystery,”“affair,”“comprehensivebeing,”“existence,”“locus,”and“self-disclosure,”whichdoesnotevenaddresstheoddgrammaticalstructureoftheoriginalArabic.Thispassageisnotatypicalinitsdensityandobscurity.Theremainderofthischaptercontainsmoreexposition,allquitedense,aboutmattersofontologyrelatingtothelevelsofrealityandthenatureof“existence.” ItistheveryfactthatsuchpassagesneedtobeexplainedthatmadetheFuṣūṣanaturalconduitfortheAkbarianstostartparticipatinginphilosophy.MostofthecommentariesupontheFuṣūṣ,startingasfarbackasJandī,beginwithanintroductionbythecommentatorwhichclearsthegroundandgivesthereaderabasisforunderstandingeverythingelsethatwillbesaidinthecourseofthetext.Jandī’sintroductioniswide-ranging,whileKāshānī’sbeginstohoneinonmorephilosophicalquestions.WithQayṣarīwehaveawork,al-Muqaddimāt,whichcanbeconsideredanindependentbook,eventhoughitwaswrittenaspreparationforhisowncommentaryupontheFuṣūṣ.ItisnotsurprisingthatmostofthesystematizingeffortstowardsamorephilosophicallanguageappearatthebeginningoftheseworksofcommentaryratherthanscatteredthroughouttheglossesonIbnʿArabī’stext,forthesimplereasonthatanintroductionisnotconstrainedbyhavingtoexplainanytext.Moreover,thefirstparagraphquotedaboveprovidesanyauthorinclinedtodiscussmetaphysicswithanalmostblankcanvas,andapaletteoftechnicaltermswaitingtobeexplainedandrelatedtoeachother.Ofcourse,mypurposehereisnottostudythedevelopmentoftheFuṣūṣcommentariesoreventhegrowthoftheschoolofIbnʿArabīasawhole,buttoexaminethewayinwhichontology,andspecificallytheuseoftheconceptofwujūd,developedfromthetimeofIbnʿArabī’sforemostdiscipleQūnawītothewritingsofQayṣarī.

1

ChapterOne:ProblemsofIdentitybetweenMysticismandPhilosophy

Thepurposeofthischapteristoexaminewhatitmeans,intheIslamiccontext,tobemysticaloresotericinrelationtowhatitmeanstobephilosophical,andtothenanalyzethesignificanceofthisdichotomy,realorapparent,infourofthemajorfiguresinthisdiscussion:IbnSīnā(d.1037),AbūḤāmidal-Ghāzalī(d.1111),IbnʿArabī(d.1240),andSuhrawardīal-Maqtūl(d.1191).Thisbroadoverviewismeanttobringtolightthereactionsofmodernscholarshiptotheallegedmysticaland/oresotericcontentofthesefiguresandtoevaluatethevalidityofvariousclaimsmadeontheirbehalfinrelationtotheiridentificationwithphilosophyormysticismorboth.Theargumentoverwhetherthereisarealoppositionbetweenthe“philosophical”andthe“mystical”isimportanttoourunderstandingofthecrystallizationoftheschoolofwaḥdatal-wujūdasitismanifestedinthethoughtofIbnʿArabīandintheTranscendentPhilosophy(al-ḥikmahal-mutaʿāliyah)ofMullāṢadrāandespeciallythelonglineofthinkersinbetween.Aswillbearguedinlaterchapters,thismetaphysicalschoolcanbeclassifiedneitherpurelyasphilosophynoraspuremysticism,ifweunderstandthesetermsastheyareoftenemployedinmodernscholarship.Moreoverthesefourthinkers,inadditiontorepresentingdifferentpossibilitiesoftheinteractionbetweenrationalphilosophyandthemysticalorspirituallife,eachhadacrucialroletoplayinlaterIslamicthought,andespeciallyintheformationofwhatwewillrefertointhisthesisastheschoolofwaḥdatal-wujūd.Laterchapterswillbeaclosestudyofhowthepeculiarwujūd-basedontologyofthisschooldevelopedoverthecenturiesbetweenIbnʿArabīandMullāṢadrā(d.1640),andhowitwasheavilyinfluencedbyallofthefiguresdiscussedinthischapter.Fornow,ourpurposeistosituatemysticismandphilosophyinrelationtoeachotherandtodescribehowthesethinkerssetthestageforwhatwouldcomelater.-DefiningMysticism

AlthoughtherearemanydefensesaffordedtofiguressuchasAvicennaandSuhrawardīagainstassociationswithesoterismandmysticism,rarelyisaworkingdefinitiongivenofwhatitmeansforanideaoramodeofexpressiontobe“esoteric”or“mystical.”1TypicalofthistrendtodisassociatephilosophyfrommysticismisthefollowingstatementofD.GutasregardingAvicenna'sphilosophicalsystem,“Itis…self-consistentandunified,andthereforefreeofanyothermysticaloresotericaspect—howeverthesetermsareunderstood—thatwouldrepresentadifferentformorbodyofknowledgeandcreateadichotomywithinthesystem(italicsmine).”2Theuseof“therefore”createsanecessarysplitbetweensomethingthatisself-consistentonone

1Speakingofpost-GhazālīIslamicthought,FazlurRahmansaid,“[M]ostleadingscholarsinthisactivity,have,throughtheirownspiritualproclivities,beenledtoemphasizetheSufiandesotericsideofthisliteratureatthecost,asIbelieve,ofitspurelyintellectualandphilosophicalhardcore,whichisofimmensevalueandinteresttothemodernstudentofphilosophy.Ihavetriedtoclarifythis…withreferencetoṢadrāwhoishardlyesotericorSufi,althoughhedoesemphasizeintellectualintuitionvis-à-vispurelylogicalreasoning,”(ThePhilosophyofMullāṢadrā,Albany,1975,vii).ConsideringthecontentofṢadrā’sworksasawhole,especiallyhisal-Shawāhidal-rubūbiyyahandtheintroductiontohismagnumopustheAsfār,thisisaboldclaim,andnoreasonisgivenastowhytheattributeofesotericorSufidoesnotapply.2D.Gutas,“Avicenna:Mysticism,”EncyclopediaIranica,III,79.

2

handandesotericand/ormysticalontheother.Thequestionablepartofthisassertionisthatthedefinitionofmysticismoresoterismisconsideredtobequiteimmaterialtothefactthatitisnotanypartoftheself-consistentorunifiedbodyofthought.Indeed,Gutastellsusthatanynormalsenseofmysticaloresoteric(“howeverthesetermsareunderstood”)willdotoplaceit.Theoppositewillbearguedhere,namelythatitiseminentlyimportanttodefinetheprecisenatureofmysticismisoneisgoingtospillmuchink—asGutashas3—inrepudiatingtheslightestinklingofthisentitycalled“mysticism”havingaplaceinanypartofAvicenna’scorpusofwritings.OverlookingtheneedtolayoutaworkingdefinitionofwhatmysticalmeansintheIslamiccontextleavespartlyambiguoustheargumentofthosewhobelievethatthemysticalelementisatbestatrespasserontheterritoryofrealphilosophy.

Tobeginwith,“mystical”and“esoteric”areWesternEuropeanwordsbothofGreek4origin,andinmodernlanguageshavebeenformedlargelywithasensibilitytothereligioustraditionofChristianityanditsownuniquemanifestationsofspirituality.Moreover,‘mystical’translatesnosinglewordfromArabicorPersian.IndiscussingmysticismintheIslamiccontext,orinevaluatingitsrole,weoughttofirstplaceourselvesinthelanguageofdiscourserelevanttotheplaceandtimes.Wehavetermssuchassulūk(traveling),ʿirfān(gnosisorknowledge),taṣawwuf,ʿishq(love),zuhhād(ascetics),ʿubbād(piousdevotees)muḥaqqiqūn(menofrealization),ʿurafāʾ(knowersorgnostics),ṭarīqah(path),bāṭin(inward),andsoforth,allofwhichhavesomethingtodowithwhatwemightrefertotodayasmysticaloresoteric.IbnʿArabīwashimselfavictimofterminology;alreadythepossessorofmysticalvisionsforseveralyears,hehadyettohearofthewordtaṣawwuforreadoneofthemajortreatisesoftheSufis.Moreover,theSufisprobablyhavehadagreatervarietyofnamesintheIslamictraditionthananyothercomparablegroup.EvenIbnʿArabīrarelycallsthemSufis;heprefersahlal-ḥaqq,al-tāʾifah,ahlAllāh,ʿurafāʾ,andmuḥaqqiqūn.ThemostexaltedofspiritualmenarenotevenreferredtobyhimasSufisatall,butasmalāmiyyah.Thephilosophersoflatertimes(afterthetimeofNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī)usuallyreferredtotheirmetaphysicalcolleaguesamongtheSufisastheʿurafāʾandalsoasmuḥaqqiqūn,whilethelatterreferredtothephilosophersasḥukamāʾandnotfalāsifah.Insomeplaces,suchasmoderndayIranandTurkey,wherethewordtaṣawwufhasgraduallytakenonapejorativeconnotation,ʿirfān(Iran)orehl-etarik(Turkey)areoftenused.Thewordssālikandsulūkareusedbyawidevarietyofwriters,fromIbnTaymiyyahtoMullāṢadrā.ItisverytypicalforMuslimwriterstosaythatSufisusedtobecalledzuhhād,andthenʿubbādandlatertookonthenameofṣūfī.Thetermṣūfīisnotuniversallyused,andwhenitisitdoesnotalwayscarrypreciselythesamemeaning.ForIbnʿArabīaṣūfīisamid-levelsaint,butforothersṣūfīistheblankettermforanyonewhobelongstoa

3Hehasdealtwiththissubjectinmanyplaces,suchashisAvicennaandtheAristotelianTradition(Leiden,1988),“IbnṬufaylonIbnSīnā’sEasternPhilosophy,”(Oriens,34:222-41);“Avicenna’sEastern(‘Oriental’)Philosophy.Nature,Contents,Transmission,”(ArabicSciencesandPhilosophy,vol.10:159-180);and“TheHeritageofAvicenna:TheGoldenAgeofArabicPhilosophy,1000—ca.1350,”inAvicennaandHisHeritageeditedbyJ.JanssensandD.DeSmet,Leuven,2002.4Originallyfrommueinmeaning“toclosetheeyes”anditsderivativeswhichmeantsecretriteorinitiation,andwhichcameintoLatinasmysterium.Eso-isaprefixreferringtosomething“within”asopposedtoexo-or“outside.”

3

ṭarīqahandfollowsashaykh.Attheveryleast,modernscholarslookingformysticalelementscannotsimplygohuntingfornamesortechnicalterms,especiallyasitconcernsthepossiblementionofSufism,becausethepresenceorabsenceofsuchtermscantellussomethingbutnoteverythingaboutagiventextoritsauthor.

IntheIslamiccontextwhatweusuallycallmysticalwecanclassifyeitherintermsofmetaphysicaldoctrineorspiritualpractice.Inthefirstsense,whichmightbecalledtheory,‘mystical’referstoacertainvisionofthenatureofthings,whichincludesourviewregardinghowwecanknowwhatweknow.Thatistosay,bothontologyandepistemologycanbecalledmystical.Intermsofpraxis,mysticaloresotericreferstoacertainsetofpracticesthatexistaboveandbeyondtheprescribedpracticesofIslamorwhichareintensifiedversionsofthesepractices,andcanincludetheindividualstates,visions,auditions,andsupernaturalexperiences(miraclesorkarāmāt)whichpeopleundergoorwitness.

Inthefirstsense,thatofmetaphysicaldoctrine,wemustbecarefulnottoequate“mystical”withthemereassertionofanonphysicalrealityandthepossibilityofinteractingwithit,foralthoughmysticsdoindeedasserttheexistenceofsuchamodeofrealityandthepossibilityofmeaningfulcontactwithit,thephilosophersdoasmuchintheirbelief,forexample,thatonecancomeintocontactwiththeActiveIntellectandachieveaninstantphilosophicalintuition(ḥads)ofthemiddletermofthesyllogism.Mysticalmustalsonotbeequatedwithnon-rational,andhereitiscrucialtomakeadistinctionbetweennon-rationalandirrational.Thebeliefintheimmaterial,non-physical,andinvisibleworldisinanycase,withfewexceptions,auniversalfeatureofIslamicbelief.Theappreciationofpoetryormusicisatleastinpartnon-rational,buttoclaimthatallmenarealsotablesisintrinsicallyirrational.Ingeneral,theoppositionofthemysticstotheuseofreasonisalmostalwaysadenialofthesupremacyofreasonovertheotherhumanfacultiesandoverdivinewrit.Neithershouldmysticalbeequatedwiththeuseofsymbolsandallegory.Alltheseabove-mentionedtraitscanbeshared,inanuncontroversialway,betweenphilosophyandmysticism.Therealfundamentaldoctrinaldifferencebetweenmysticalandnon-mysticalistheacknowledgmentofamodeofrealitywhichinitsessenceremainsinexplicablebyourpowersofrationaldemonstration,althoughreasoncanpointtoitanditneednotbecontrarytoreason.Moreover,amysticalworldviewassertsthatwithinthehumansubject—inthesoul(nafs),theheart(qalb),thespirit(rūḥ),whatevertheterminology—thereexists,atleastpotentially,apowertoknowandtoreachtruthsandrealitiestowhichthemindquareasoner-of-premiseshasnoaccess.Insuchaperspectivereasoned-outknowledgeisstillknowledge,butitisnottheloftiest,mostsureknowledge.Amysticalvisionofthingsassertsthatthetruestunderstandingavailabletomancomesfromanun-mediatedencounterwiththeAbsolute.Inrelationtothishighestwisdomtheprocessofreasoningandrationaldemonstrationcanservealaudablerole,whichistosaythatreasoningisagoodinitselfbutalsoameanstoahighergood.Thereisahierarchywithinthehumansubjectaswellasahierarchyofknowableobjects,andtheinherently‘mystical’aspectofthisisthatreasondoesnotoccupythehighestpartofthehierarchyofthesubject,andreasonedconceptsdonotholdprideofplaceinthehierarchyofobjectsofknowledge.5Theseare 5Itshouldbenotedthatby“reason”Iamreferringtoʿaqlinitsparticularsense,whatRumiwouldrefertoasʿaql-ijuzʾī(particularintellect)asopposedtoʿaql-ikullī(universalintellect).S.H.Nasrhastranslatedthefirstas“reason”andthesecondas“intellect”.Ibnal-ʿArabīusesitin

4

basiccriteriaonecanusetosituatemysticismquadoctrineormetaphysicsforourpurposesinthischapter.

Onthequestionofpraxis,someofthemethodsbywhichtheSufistraversethespiritualpathareeventodaycloselyguardedsecrets,butwedoknowagooddealofwhatthemainstaysofSufipracticeare.ThemostuniversalpracticeofIslamicmysticismisthemethodicalinvocation(dhikr)6ofdivinenamesandvariouskindsoflitaniesinvolvingGodaswellastheprophetsandotherfiguressuchastheImamsinthecontextofShi‘ism,performedeitheraloneinretreat(khalwah)orinagroupsettingwithothersfollowingthesamemethod.Dance,singing,andtheotherformsofsamāʾarealsocharacteristicofmysticalpractice.7Mostcommonistheintensificationofexistingpractices,suchasbeinginaconstantstateofablution,fastingfrequently,andperformingsupererogatoryprayerinthelatehoursofthenight(qiyāmal-layl).AsthepracticesoftheSufisareoftenthestrictadherencetopracticesoutlinedinonewayoranotherintheQurʾān,ḥadīth,andscholarlytradition,itisoftendifficulttodeterminewherecommonpietyendsandmysticalpracticebegins.Forourpurposes,inordertodefinepraxisasmysticalintheIslamiccontextthespiritualseekermusthavesomesortofguide,whetherinthefleshorsomehowinvisibleandsupernaturallikeKhiḍrorthehiddenImam,8whoactsasanobjectivecriterionandexampleforone’sspiritualprogress.InhisroleassomeoneclosertoGod,withknowledgeofthepitfallsofthespiritualpath,heguidestheseekeralongtheṭarīqahbeyondwhathewouldnormallyencounterintheuniversaltraditionorsharīʿah.Thusforourpurposesofdefiningwhatismysticalthespiritualmethodmusttakeplaceunderthedirectionofthespiritualguideormustbetheoutcomeoftheperiodoftimespentundersuchdirection—andassuming,ofcourse,thatthespiritualpracticeandconcomitantexperiencestakeplaceundertherubricofthedoctrinalparametersoutlinedabove.

Finally,itshouldbenotedthatitisnotatallnecessaryforustobelieveinmysticalclaimsatallinordertoevaluatewhetherornotsomeoneelsebelievedthem.Weneednotacceptmysticalclaimsinordertotakeothers’mysticalclaimsseriouslyandtotrytounderstandwhattheysaidinthewaytheythemselvesunderstoodit.-AvicennaandMysticism boththesesenses,whereʿaqlcanmeanboththerationalfacultybutalsotheheart(qalb)whichisthesummitofthehumansubject.BābāAfḍalalsoemploysʿaqlinthislatterunlimitedsense.Inthemoreexaltedsenseoftheterm,however,thereisnoquestionof“reasoning”whichiswhatmakesitdifferentfrom“reason”asweusuallyunderstandit.6SeeEI2“Dhikr”.SeealsoAnnemarieSchimmelMysticalDimensionsofIslam(ChapelHill,1975)especially167-78.7See“SacredMusicandDanceinIslam,”byJean-LouisMichoninIslamicSpirituality:Manifestations(ed.S.H.Nasr,NewYork,NY,1991).8“Amongthesegroups[whofollowasupernaturalmaster]theUwaysisareworthyofbeingespeciallymentioned.TheoriginofthisformofSufismgoesbacktotheYemenisaint,Uwaysal-Qaranī,whoembracedIslamwithouteverhavingseentheProphet…TheUwaysisdonotusuallyhaveahumanspiritualmasterbutreceivetheirinitiationandguidancefromthe“invisibleworld”(ʿālamal-ghayb)andmorespecificallyfromal-Khaḍir,themysteriousprophetofesoterismmentionedintheQurʾān…[T]heyhavenotestablishedaregularSufiorderbecauseoftheverynatureoftheirinitiaticaffiliation,whichisnotbasedonregulartransmissionthroughaninitiaticchain(silsilāh),”(“SufismandSpiritualityinPersia,”inIslamicSpirituality:Manifestations,218.)

5

Inthefieldofphilosophy,AvicennafirmlyestablishedthemainlineofPeripateticthoughtintheIslamicworld.Morethanthat,heestablishedthelanguagethroughwhichalmostallofphilosophyandmuchoflatertheologywouldexpressitself.ForhundredsofyearsafterAvicenna,andeventoalargedegreeamongIslamicphilosopherstoday,itbecameimpracticaltoexpressone’sphilosophicalideasinprofessionalphilosophicalcircleswithouthavingextensiverecoursetothewayofspeakingaboutphilosophicalquestionsAvicennaestablishedthroughhisworkssuchasal-Shifāʾandal-Najāt.Shihābal-Dīnal-Suhrawardī,thefounderoftheschoolofIllumination,wasanexampleofaphilosopherwhoopposedIbnSīnāonmanyimportantphilosophicalpoints,buteveninhisobjectionstothePeripateticphilosopherhemostoftenspokethroughtheverylanguageestablishedbythePeripateticsthemselves.Aswillbediscussedlater,thislinguafrancaofIslamicphilosophywasversatileandstableenoughtolaterincorporatesuchvariedmetaphysicalsystemsastheAkbarianschool,9theschoolofIllumination,andtheTranscendentalPhilosophyofMullāṢadrā.

Thereisnocontroversyamongscholars,EastorWest,astoAvicenna’sprimaryidentificationasaphilosopher(aswellasaphysician).AsthechiefexponentofIslamicPeripateticthought,hewasknowntolatergenerationsasal-shaykhal-raʾīs(“theleadingmaster”).Thereisasurprisinglyvociferousdebate,however,overtheextenttowhichAvicenna’sworkscontainmysticalideas,overtlyorsecretly,andwhetherornotAvicennahadasecretdoctrineor“truephilosophy”whichhesoughttokeephiddenfromtheworld.ThisdebatecentersaroundthestatusofAvicenna’sEasternorOrientalPhilosophy(indeedthereisdisagreementoverthisverytranslationofal-ḥikmahal-mashriqiyyah);theroleofAvicenna’smythicalallegories(seebelow);andtheallegedmysticalcontentofthelastthreechaptersofal-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt,aworkofhislaterperiod.

Firstweturntoal-ḥikmahal-mashriqiyyah.ThemostsignificantproblemhisworkofthistitlepresentstoscholarsisthatmostofithasnotreachedusandallwehavetoworkfromistheintroductionwhichissometimesreferredtoasManṭiqal-mashriqiyyīn.10TheneedtoextrapolatethecontentsofthisworkfromitsprovocativeintroductionandfromhintsinAvicenna’sotherworksdoesmuchtofuelthedebate.Somemodernscholars,amongthemHenryCorbinandS.H.Nasr,believethatal-ḥikmahal-mashriqiyyah,whichCorbintranslatedas“OrientalPhilosophy,”wasindeedadoctrineapart,anesotericandmysticalbodyofideasonlytobeunderstoodbytheeliteandonlyappropriateforthem.11DimitriGutas,amongthemostpersistentopponentsof

9Thatis,theschoolofIbnʿArabī,whosetitleofal-Shaykhal-akbargivesusthename“Akbarian.”Theyarecommonlyreferredtoastheʿurafāʾasopposedtotheḥukamāʾ,orphilosophers.ʿUrafāʾisamorespecifictermthanSufi,usuallyreferringtotheSufiswhoseactivityatleastinpartdealswithphilosophicalexplanations.10SeeS.H.Nasr,“IbnSīnā’s‘OrientalPhilosophy’,”HistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,248.11ThepositionofS.H.NasrinregardstohisunderstandingofAvicennabesummarizedasfollows:“AvicennadoesnotnegatethetenetsofPeripateticphilosophybutinterpretstheminadifferentlightsothattherationalisticUniverseoftheAristoteliansistransformedintoacosmiccathedralwhereeverysymbolconcernsmaninarealandimmediatewayandplaysaroleinhisspiritualrealization.InthismannerAvicennareachedtowardan“OrientalPhilosophy”which,ifnottakenseriouslybymostofhisOccidentalinterpreters,wasnonethelessofgreatsignificanceintheIslamicworldandpointedtothedirectionofthe“Illuminationisttheosophy”thatwastobe

6

readinganymysticaldoctrinesinIbnSīnā,tracesoutalineageforthisnotionofahiddenphilosophywhichfindsitsoriginintheinterpretationofAvicennagivenbyIbnṬufayl.AccordingtoGutas,IbnṬufaylmistinterpretsAvicenna’sprologuetohisal-ShifāʾinsuchawaysoastoleadthereadertobelievethatAvicennahadanotherphilosophywheretherealtruthlayandwhichwasonlymeantforsome.Therelevantsectionoftheprologuereads:

Ialsowroteabookotherthanthesetwo[theShifāʾandtheLawāḥiq(Appendices)],inwhichIpresentedphilosophyasitisnaturally[perceived]andasrequiredbyanunbiasedviewwhichneithertakesintoaccountin[thisbookonEasternphilosophy]theviewsofcolleaguesinthediscipline,nortakesprecautionshereagainstcreatingschismsamongthemasisdoneelsewhere;thisismybookonEasternphilosophy.Butasforthepresentbook[theShifāʾ],itismoreelaborateandmoreaccommodatingtomyPeripateticcolleagues.Whoeverwantsthetruth[stated]withoutindirection,heshouldseektheformerbook[onEasternphilosophy];whoeverwantsthetruth[stated]inawaywhichissomewhatconciliatorytocolleagues,elaboratesalot,andalludes[talwīḥ]tothingswhich,hadtheybeenperceived,therewouldhavebeennoneedfortheotherbook,thenheshouldreadthepresentbook[theShifāʾ].12

GutaspresentsAvicenna’sprologueasgivingthereaderachoicebetweentwodifferentstylesofphilosophicaldiscourse,nottwoseparatesystems.HereadstheprologueassayingthattheShifāʾisabookmeanttotakeintoaccountallpossiblepositionsandobjections,andreasonoutallconclusionsindetail.TheOrientalorEasternPhilosophy(ashepreferstotranslateitinordertoremoveanyromanticassociations),onthecontrary,issaidtostatethephilosopher’sviewsdirectlyandwithoutconciliatorygesturestowardsotherintellectualpositions.Itdoesnotpresentadifferentsetofpositions,butonlyapareddownversionofhisestablishedpositionspresentedinadifferentlanguage.IbnṬufaylinterpretsthisprologuetomeanthatAvicennabelievedthetruthtobe“somethingelse,”thatis,somethingotherthanwhatisfoundintheShifāʾ,andbelievedthatAvicennaexplicitlysaidso.

AsforthebooksofAristotle,AvicennaundertookintheShifāʾtointerprettheircontents,proceedingaccordingtoAristotle’sdoctrineandfollowingthemethodofhisphilosophy.Butinthebeginningofthebook,Avicennastatedexplicitlythatinhisopinionthetruthissomethingelse[al-ḥaqqʿindahughayrudhālika],thathewrotetheShifāʾaccordingtothedoctrineofthePeripateticsonly,andthat“whoeverwantsthetruthwithoutindirectionshouldseek”hisbookonEasternphilosophy.13

InGutas’view,IbnṬufayl’sunsubstantiatedclaimswereself-servingastheylentauthoritytohisownepistemology“inwhichmysticalvisionplayedaleadingrole.”

HenryCorbinandS.H.NasrseeinAvicenna’sOrientalPhilosophy,astheytranslateit,aprefigurationofthelatermysticaltrendsinIslamicphilosophy,especiallyasitmanifestedinthewritingsofSuhrawardīandMullāṢadrā.Nasranalyzestheprologuetotheincompleteal-Ḥikmahal-mashriqiyyahanddrawsmarkedlydifferentconclusionsabouttheroleandsignificanceofOrientalPhilosophyinAvicenna’sthought. inauguratednearlyacenturyandahalflaterbySuhrawardī,”(ThreeMuslimSages,45).12Gutas“Avicenna’sEastern(‘Oriental’)Philosophy,”160-161.13Ibid.,161.

7

Ofnoteisthepassagewhichreads,“Andwehavenofearifwerevealtothephilosopherssomethingotherthanwhatwehavewrittenforthecommonpeople—thecommonpeoplewhohavebecomeenamoredofthePeripateticphilosophersandwhothinkthatGodhadnotguidedanyonebutthemorthatnoonehasreachedDivineMercybutthem.”Theitalicizedpassage,onemightspeculate,couldbetheactualsourceofIbnṬufayl’sclaimthat“thetruthissomethingelse”thanwhatisfoundintheShifāʾ.AfterbemoaningtheslavishloyaltyofPeripateticphilosopherstooldideas,admittingthatheconformedtothemannerofspeakingestablishedbytheGreeks,andrevealingthathe“oftengainedknowledgefromnon-Greeksources,”Avicennasays,“Undertheseconditions,welongedtowriteabookcontainingtheimportantaspectsofrealknowledge…Wehavecomposedthisbookonlyforourselves,thatis,thosewhoarelikeourselves.Asforthecommonerswhohavetodowithphilosophy,wehaveprovidedintheKitābal-Shifāʾmorethantheyneed…”14

NasroutlinesthevariousopinionsofscholarsastothepreciseidentityoftheOrientin“OrientalPhilosophy.”HestatesthatGoichonidentifieditwiththemedicalschoolofJundishapurwhilePinesidentifieditwithBukhara.LouisGardetbelieveditsignifiedamorePythagoreanandPlatonicasopposedtoAristotelianphilosophy.ThemostirksometheoryforscholarssuchasGutasistheoneelaboratedbyH.Corbin,whobelievedthattheOrient(mashriq,literally“placeofsunrise”)designatedtheworldoflighttowhichthespiritjourneys,andassuchdoesnothaveanygeographicalsignificance.CorbinsawSuhrawardī’sḤikmatal-ishrāq,towhichweshallturnlater,asbeinginpartacontinuationoftheOrientalPhilosophyofAvicenna.AgainstthisGutasbringstobearthefollowingpassagefromSuhrawardīregardingthefragmentsonlogicfromal-Ḥikmahal-Mashriqiyyah:

Thequires[karārīs]whichAvicennaattributedtotheEasternersareextantseparatelyinunboundform.AlthoughheattributedthesequirestotheEast[Khurāsān],theyarethesameasthepreceptsofthePeripateticsandcommonphilosophy.Theonlydifferenceisthatheoccasionallyalteredtheformofexpression,orproceededincertainCorollaryissuesinasomewhatindependentwaywhich,however,neitherdeviatesfromhisotherbookstoanyappreciabledegree,norestablishestheFundamentalPrincipleoftheEastwhichwasfoundedatthetimeofthesagesintheeraofChosroes.15

GutaspointstothisasanexplicitrepudiationbySuhrawardīofapedigreeinAvicennaforhisownilluminationistphilosophy.ButCorbinhadalreadyansweredthisobjection,notingthatwecanshareSuhrawardī’ssurprisethatthereisnothingespecially“Oriental”inthesequires.“Wetooinourturncanreadthem…andfeelthesameastonishment,temperedbythefactthattheLogicbywhichtheḤikmatal-ishrāqisprefacedwould,ifdetachedfromtherestofthebook,exhibitnothingspecificallyOrientalexceptthethesesexpresslyputforthasIshrāqī.”16GutashasmademuchofthenatureofthisintroductorysectiononlogicintheḤikmatal-ishrāq,butasCorbinstates,“[T]heconnectionsproclaimthemselveselsewhere.”NodoubtheisreferringtothefollowingpassageofSuhrawardī:

14Nasr,“IbnSīnā’s‘OrientalPhilosophy’,”248-9.15Gutas,Avicenna,118.16HenryCorbin,AvicennaandtheVisionaryRecital,NewYork,1960,40.

8

WhenIbecameacquaintedwiththeRecitalofḤayyibnYaqẓān,inspiteoftheadmirablespiritualsentencesandtheprofoundsuggestionsthatitcontains,Ifounditlackinginilluminationsdisplayingthesupremeexperience—thatis,theGreatOverwhelming(Qurʾān79:34)—thatiskeptinthetreasuryoftheDivineBooks,depositedinthesymbolsoftheSages,hiddenintheRecitalofSalamānandAbsālcomposedbythenarratoroftheRecitalofḤayyibnYaqẓān.ItisthemysteryuponwhichthestationsoftheSufisandofthemastersofmentalvisionareestablished.ThereisnoreferencetoitintheRecitalofḤayyibnYaqẓānexceptattheendofthebook,whereitissaid:itsometimeshappensthattheSolitariesamongmenemigratetowardHim,etc.TheninmyturnIwishedtorelatesomethingthereof,intheformofarecitalIhaveentitledtheRecitaloftheOccidentalExile,forsomeofournoblebrothers.17

Corbincomments,“ForanyonewhowishestoarriveataconcreterepresentationofthepositiverelationshipbetweenAvicennaandSuhrawardī,perhapsnobetterexerciseinmeditationcouldbeadvisedthatthathereadtheRecitalofḤayyibnYaqẓānandtheRecitaloftheOccidentalExileinsuccession.”18BywayofthisquotationwecanturntoAvicenna’smythicalallegories,whichCorbinreferstoas“visionaryrecitals.”AvicennawaswellacquaintedwiththeGreektraditionofpoeticsandrhetoric,andlikeAristotlebeforehimdiscussesthemasvalidformsofhumanself-expression,withdifferingmeansandgoalsofcommunicatingideas.Rhetoricandpoeticscanbothbeusedtopersuadeotherstoadopttrueideas,butinandofthemselvestheycannotprovideacoherentproofofthetruthstheypointto;onlyrationaldemonstrationintheformofsyllogisticreasoningcanaccomplishthat.Avicennanotonlydiscussestheroleofallegoryandallegoricalinterpretation,butalsoexplicitlyoutlineshisowntheoryofallegoryasitrelatestophilosophicaldiscourseandnotablyasitrelatestothephenomenonofprophethood(nubuwwah).Tostatethisbriefly,theloftiesttruthsattainablebymancannotbetransmittedtojustanyone.Thecommonfolk(al-ʿawāmm)wouldnotbeabletounderstandthephilosopher’sproofsandwouldinfactbeharmedbythemandbesentintoerroriftheyheardthem.Intrinsictothestateofimperfectmenistheinabilitytodealwithpureintelligibles;theycanonlyunderstandtheirexperienceintermsofconcrete,sensibleobjectsandstates.Anythingelsewillcauseconfusionandpsychologicaldamage.Itisforthisreasonthattheprophetmustcommunicatetopeoplethroughtheuseofsymbols(rumūz),becausethecommonpeoplewilltakethesymbolsattheirfacevaluewhiletheelite—theenlightenedphilosophers—willunderstandthetruesignificanceofthesymbolandwillseebeyondittothepureintelligibletruththatreallymatters.AvicennaclaimedthatPlato,Socrates,andPythagorasunderstoodthisneedtocoverthetruthinsymbolsandsigns,andthat“PlatosoblamedAristotlefordivulgingwisdomandmakingknowledgemanifestthatAristotlesaid,‘EvenifIhavedoneso,Ihavestillleftinmybooksmanyapitfallwhichonlytheinitiatedamongthewiseandlearnedcancomprehend.’AndhowelsecouldtheprophetMuhammad(mayGod’sprayersandpeacebeuponhim)havebroughtknowledgetotheuncouthnomad,nottomentionthewholehumanrace,sincehewassentamessengertoallofthem?”19

17Ibid.,42.18ibid.,43.19PeterHeath,AllegoryandPhilosophyinAvicenna(IbnSīnā),Philadelphia,1992,151.

9

Thisruleforbiddingthecastingofpearlsbeforeswineisnotlimitedtotheprophets,asAvicenna’sreferencetoPlatoandAristotleshows.Thephilosophertoohasadutytomouldhismodeofdiscoursetosuittheintellectualcapacitiesofhisaudience.ScholarssuchasGutasconsiderthisconsiderationforthecapacityofnon-philosopherstobethesolemotivationforAvicenna’scompositionofhisallegories.Infact,“theallegoricalmethodofcommunicationisinferiortothedemonstrativeandexpositorybecauseitissuitedforandaddressedtoinferiorminds.”20GutasdelineatesthreebasicmodesofexpressionemployedbyAvicennainhisworks.Thefirstconsistsoffulllogicalexpositionandexplicitdemonstrativereasoning.ThismakesupthebulkofhiswritingandisthemethodemployedinsuchmajorworksastheShifāʾandtheNajāt.Thesecondisthemethodofallegory,whereideasareconveyedusingmythicalsymbolsandoftentoldintheformoftheinteractionoflivingcharacterswithoneanother.ThisisthemethodemployedinworkssuchasSalamānwa-AbsālandḤayyibnYaqẓān.Thethirdmajorcategorymakesuseofthe“indicative”method,whichisrelatedtothefullydemonstrativemethodexceptthatinsteadofdisplayingthedemonstrationforalltoseeitveilsit,asitwere,inordertoimpeltothestudenttoreasonoutphilosophicalsolutionsonhisown.Themajorexampleofthismodeistheaforementionedal-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt,or“RemarksandAdmonitions.”21

However,inallofthesemodesofexpression,Gutasasserts,thereistobefoundnosecretdoctrinewhatsoever.EverythingAvicennaeversaidorwrotewasanexpressionofthesameexactbodyofknowledge.Heonlydifferedinhisstyleandmodeofexpression,butthesearewell-explainedbyhisowntheoryoflogic,poetics,rhetoric,andallegory.Moreover,Avicennaonlyresortedtosymbolisminordertoprotectthemassesfromtheharmthatwouldbeinflicteduponthemweretheytobeexposedtophilosophicaltruthsintheirpurestform.Asymbol,contrarytoCorbin’sloftyinterpretationofit,22isnotsomethingusedtorepresentatruthorrealitythatcouldnotbeexpressedotherwise,butisratheraninferiormethodofcommunicationmeantforinferiorminds.Thismeansthatasamatterofprinciplethereisnotruthorrealitythatisnotexpressibleorattheveryleastunderstandableintermsof“establishingFundamentalPrinciplesandWorkingOuttheCorollariesbysyllogisticmeans.”23GutasconcludesthatalthoughAvicennahadonlyonebodyofknowledgehedidinfactbelieveintheprincipleofwithholdingit,sinceheexplicitlystatesthataphilosopheroraprophetmustdosoaccordingtothecircumstances.BeforehimFarābī,towhomAvicennahasrecourseinhisowntheoryofallegory,believedthatPlatoprohibitedtherecordingofmanyofhisteachings,fearingthattheywouldbediscoveredbytheunworthy.However,accordingtothisaccountputforthbyGutas,becausehefearedthatthetruthshediscoveredwouldbelost,“heselectedsymbolsandallegorieswiththepurposeofrecordinghissciencesandphilosophyinsuchawaythatonlythosedeservingofthem,andthoseworthyofcomprehendingthem,woulddetectafterinquiries,research,

20Gutas,Avicenna,302.21SeeS.C.Inati,RemarksandAdmonitions(al-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt),Toronto,1984.22HequotesCorbinasdefiningasymbolinthefollowingway,“Symbolistheretoannouncesomethingwhichcannotbeexpressedotherwise:itistheonlypossibleexpressionofthethingsymbolized;allegoryisamoreorlessartificialfigurationofgeneralitiesandabstractionsthatcanbeperfectlyexpressedandknownbyotherways.”Avicenna,299.23Ibid.,234.

10

examination,andassiduousapplication.”24FarābīthengoesontoexplainthatAristotleseeminglydepartedfromthismethodbygoingtogreatlengthstoexplaineverythingindetail,butthisissoonlyinappearance.FarābīcontendsthatAristotlerenderedthings“inaccessible,cryptic,andintricate”bymixingupsyllogisms,leavingoutcertaintermsofsyllogisms,andinotherwaysarranginghiswritingsuchthatonlytruephilosophicaladeptswouldreallygraspwhathewassaying.

ThereasoningofGutasjustoutlinedabovewouldseemtoindicatethatAvicenna’spositiononallegoryisthatphilosophicaltruthmustnotbelostandsomustberecordedandtaught,butatthesametimeitmustbehiddenfromthemultitudeofpeople,andnotonlymustitbehiddenbutthecommonmassesmustnotevensuspectthatsomethingisbeinghiddenfromthem.AccordingtoGutas,thisisthebasisforAvicenna’s“philosophicalpraxis.”Now,wemayacceptwithhimthatAvicennadiddescribeatheoryofwithholdinginformation,butitdoesnotfollowfromthisthathenecessarilyfollowedthroughwiththistheoryinhisownwritings.Indeed,itisdifficulttoseethatAvicenna’ssolereasoninwritingallegoriesorchoosingastylethatwasnotclear-cutanddemonstrativeconsistedinnothingotherthanprotectinghimselffromtheignorantmassesandprotectingtheignorantmassesfromhim.TheproblemisthatifindeedAvicenna’sbodyofknowledgeisoneandself-consistent,andifhischoiceofdifferingstyleswassolelyamatterofdifferingmodesofexpression,thenofwhatbenefitisittowriteaphilosophicalallegorywhenallofyourideasarelaidoutindetailedworkstowhicheveryonehasopenaccess?TowhatpurposewouldAvicennaveilhisideasinallegorieswhenhisargumentsandthebulkofhisphilosophicalassertionsexistintheirexplicitforminotherworkssuchastheShifāʾ?IsnotoneoftheconditionsdescribedinAvicenna’sowntheorythatthosefromwhomthetruthisbeinghiddenshouldhavenoinklingthatsomethingisbeingkeptfromthem?Ifthedivinerevelationfollowsthewayofsymbolisminsteadofstatingthegreattruthsinadirectandphilosophicalway,thenitcanatleastmaketheclaimofbeingconsistentwiththeneedsofcommonpeopleincommunicatingwiththemthroughallegoryandsymbolism.OnecansuggestherethatAvicenna’stheoryofinterpretationandallegoryhasmoretodowithhisunderstandingoftheroleofrevelationandprophethoodthanwiththecompositionofhisownworks.TheargumentthatAvicennaonlywroteinallegoryandwith“indications”inordertohidehismessagefromthemassesandtodrivehisstudentstomakephilosophicaldiscoveriesoftheirownisweakenedbytheexistenceofAvicenna’sotherworks,suchastheShifāʾ,wherethisruleisnotheldtoatall.Itisthephilosophicalequivalentofshuttingthestabledoorafterthehorsehasgotout.PeterHeath,inhisworkonAvicennaandallegory,25suggeststhatAvicenna’sowntheoryofrhetoricandwithholdingknowledgefromtheunworthyisnotenoughtoexplainthenatureandfunctionoftheallegoricaltreatises.HeacknowledgesthemeritofGutas’position,basedasitisonananalysisoftextsandAvicenna’sowntheory,andindeedheprefersittoGoichon’sspeculationthatAvicennacomposedḤayyibnYaqẓānasakindofleisurelyexercisewhilehewasimprisonedforfourmonthsatthecastleofFaradān.Forhim,neitherthecontextnorthecontentofthetreatisesuggestanythingofthesort,althoughGoichon’sanalysisisvaluableinthatitshowstheclosecorrespondencebetweentheideasandstructureof

24Ibid.,228.25Seenote18above.

11

Avicenna’sexpositoryworksandhismythicalorallegoricalones.26Heathattemptstomakesenseoftheallegoriesintermsoftheverypossibilitiesinherentinthisformofexpressionandwithdueconsiderationtothelimitations,asheseesit,inthemodeofrationaldemonstration.TryingtosituatetheroleofallegoriesinrelationtoAvicenna’sotherworks,hestates,“Morality,understoodasanintellectualframeworkthatdirectstheactionsoftheindividual,isnotanethicalbutratherametaphysical,evenananagogic,concernforAvicenna,hencehislackofinterestintheareaofpracticalphilosophyandthepaucityofhisexplicitlyethicalwritings.”27Philosophyhasthepurposeoffirstmakingsenseofwhatthecorrecthumanendsareandthenofmotivatinghumanbeingstopursuethoseends.ThefirstpurposeisaccomplishedbyAvicennathroughlogicandmetaphysicsandthemodeofexpressionbestsuitedtothem,namely,rationaldiscourse.“BoththesubjectinvolvedandtheparametersofAvicenna’straditionofphilosophicaldiscourserendereditimpossibleforhimtorepresentconcretelytheabstractprogressoftheindividualhumansoulinthemotionlesshereafter.”28Becauseofthislimitationinexpressingthetrueveritiesofmaʿādoreschatology,“Avicenna…wasimpelledbyhisownintensevisionofittoseek,oratleastexperimentwith,moreprecise,moreimmediate,andmoreevocativeformsofexpression.”29HeathagreeswithGutasthattheallegoriesdonotexpressanesotericormysticaldoctrine,buthedisagreeswiththepremisethatallegoryandsymbolismarefundamentallyinferiormodesofexpressionthatcanonlyserveapedagogicalorencryptingfunction.ItisnotmerelythatinḤayyibnYaqẓān“Hayy”reallymeans“activeintellect”orthatonecansimplyreplaceatalkingcharacterwithaphilosophicalconcept.Rather,allegoryandmetaphorhaveanintrinsicadvantageovertechnicalphilosophyinsomerespects,andhavetheabilitytocircumventthelimitationspresentedbyrationaldiscourseinordertoconveycertaintruthstothehumansoul.This,accordingtoHeath,doesnotrenderthecontentesotericormystical,butgivesitanimmediacythatrationaldiscourselacksbyitsverynature.Itfulfillsafunctionthat“encompassesneithergreaternorlessertruth-value”thanhisotherstylesofwriting.

Heath’sinterpretationissatisfyinginthatitquestionstheroleofAvicenna’stheoryofrhetoricandinterpretationinhisownwriting,andgivesanexplanationoftheroleofallegorywhichisquiteinkeepingwithourowncommonsensenotionsoftheuniqueinsightsprovidedtousbydiversemodesofexpression.ItisindeedhardtobelievethatAvicennatrulybelievedthatevenapopulationofpurephilosopherscouldlivesolelyonrationaldiscourseandsyllogisticintuition.

ThefinallocusofdisagreementovermysticismandphilosophyinvolvesthefinalthreechaptersofAvicenna’sal-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt.Asmentionedabove,thisisaworkofthelaterpartofAvicenna’slifeandiswritteninatersestylewherephilosophicalpointsaremadewithouttheusualdiscussionanddebatefoundintheShifāʾ.TheIshārātwastheobjectofacommentary(actuallyanextendedlinebylinecriticism)bytheFakhral-Dīnal-Rāzī,andlaterboththeoriginaltextandthecommentaryofRāzīweretogethercommenteduponbyNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī,whothroughthiscommentarydidmuchto

26SeeA.M.Goichon,LerecitdeḤayyibnYaqẓān,Paris,1959.27Heath,Allegory,161.28Ibid.,162.29Ibid.,163.

12

revivePeripateticphilosophy.30ThetitlesofthethreechaptersinquestionareFīʾl-bahjahwaʾl-saʿādah,Fīmaqāmātal-ʿārifīn(themostSufi-soundingofthetitles),andFīasrāral-ayāt,underasectiontitleofal-Taṣawwuf,althoughthisisonlyaninterpretivetitle.Noneoftheoriginalmanuscriptshaveit.31OftheIshārātGutassays,“ThereisnoseparateKnowledgepresentedhere,“esoteric”or“mystical;”itistheKnowledgeoftheAristoteliantraditionasintegrated,systematized,andrepresentedbyAvicenna.”32Theopposinginterpretation,thatthereisamysticalelementinthiswork,isbaseduponpassagessuchasthefollowing,inwhichIbnSīnāspeaksofdegreesofknowledgeandthensays:

Andtherearethendegreeswhicharenotfewerthanthosethatwentbefore.Weprefertobebriefconcerningthem,becausespeechcannotunderstandthem,discussioncannotunfoldthem,anddiscourseaboutthemcanuncovernothing,unlikeimagination.Whoeverwishestocometoknowthem,lethimascendthedegreesandbecomeoneofthepeopleofvision(mushāhadah)andnotconversation(mushāfahah),oneofthosewhoreachthespring(ʿayn)andnotthosewholistentolore.33Orthefollowing:Verily,theknowers(ʿārifūn)possessstationsanddegreesbywhichtheyaredistinguishedfromothersinthelifeofthislowerworld.Itisasthoughtheywerewearingtheirbodiesasgarments,havingleftthemanddivestedthemselvesofthemtogototheholyworld.Therearethingshiddeninthem,andtherearethingstheymanifest.Therearesomewhodenythem[thethings]andsomewhomagnifythem,andwewilltellyouaboutthem…KnowthatinthestoryofSalamānandAbsālthatSalamānisalikenessforyou,andthatAbsālisalikenessofyourdegreeofknowledge[ʿirfān],ifyouareamongitspeople.Sounlockthesymbolism,ifyoucan.

ThereisalsotheuseofSufiterminologyinthispartoftheIshārāt.Forexample,Avicennareferstotheclassificationofzāhid,ʿābid,andʿārif,whichisastandardtripartiteclassificationofdegreesofspiritualrealizationamongSufis:

Hewhorenouncesthepleasuresanddelightsoftheworldhasthespecialnamezāhid(ascetic);hewhodevoteshimselftoworship—standinginprayer,fasting,andthelike—hasthespecialnameʿābid(devotee);hewhomovestotheholyempyrean(jabarut)throughcontemplation,[moving]evertowardstheilluminationsofthelightoftheRealwithinhismystery(sirr)hasthespecialnameʿārif(knower,orgnostic).Herewealsohavetheuseofthewordsirrmeaning“secret”or“mystery.”In

SufiterminologyreferstothemostinwardpartoftheheartorsoulwhichisthesupremeseatofconsciousnessandtheplacewheremanisabletohavehisconnectionwithGod,anditispreciselyinthissensethatAvicennausesit.Inotherpassageshespeaksoftalṭīf

30See“KhwājahNaṣīral-DīnṬūsī:thephilosopher/vizierandtheintellectualclimateofhistimes,”inHistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,527-584.31Gutas,“Avicenna’sEastern(“Oriental”)Philosophy,”164-165.32Gutas,Avicenna,311.33al-Ishārātwa’l-tanbīhat(Qom,1960),90.

13

al-sirrliʾl-tanabbuh,34…sirruhuʿanal-ḥaqq,35inziʿājuhubi-sirrihiilāʾl-ḥaqq.36HealsomentionsdhikrortheremembranceofGodsayingal-ʿārifshujāʿ…kayfalāwa-dhikruhumashghūlbiʾl-ḥaqq.“Theknoweriscourageous…andwhyshoulditnotbeso,seeingthathisrememberingisoccupiedwiththeReal/Truth?”37Healsospeaksofthemurīdorspiritualseeker:

Thefirstlevelofactivityfortheknowersistherestlessnessofdesire(hammal-irādah)orhimmah.Thisisthelongingtoattachtothestrongestrope.38So,hismystery(sirr)ismovedtotheholyinordertoreachthespiritofattainment.Aslongasheisatthislevelheisamurīd(desirer).

Anotherexampleishisbriefmentionofwaqtorthespirituallydecisivepresentmomentofexperience.39ItisnotamatterofdisputethatAvicennausedSufiterminologyinthispartoftheIshārāt;thequestionisthewayinwhichhedidso.AccordingtoGutasAvicennausesSufivocabularysuchasiradāhandwaqt“inanefforttoincorporateitsreferentsalsointohisphilosophicalsystem,muchashehaddoneearlierwithothermanifestationsofthereligiouslife.”Itdoesnotseem,however,thatintheIshārātAvicennaisbringingtheSufitermstoheelunderhisownwayoflookingatthings.Rather,hetreatsthesubjectsofasceticism,devotion,andtherenunciationoftheworldwithsympathyandmuchthewayaSufiwould.Thesetermsdoindeedappearinaworkwhichalsodealswithlogicandmetaphysics,butthatdoesnotmeanthattheywereincorporatedintothesystem.Inordertomakesuchanassertionitwouldhavetobeshownthathetookthesetermsandthenre-infusedthemwithastrictlyphilosophicalsignificance,whichwedonotfindinreadingtheseunusuallastthreechaptersoftheIshārāt.

Oftheninthchapter,Fakhral-Dīnal-RāzīstatesinhiscommentarythatAvicenna“arrangedinitthevarietiesoftheknowledgeofthesufis(ʿulūmal-ṣūfiyyah)inawaythatwasbothunprecedentedandunsuperceded.”40Gutasinterpretsthisasmeaningthe“varieties”or“grades”ofknowledge,not“sciences”oftheSufisasismaintainedbyMarmura.41Itisunclearthatthischangesanythingsubstantively,sinceʿulūmisstillinconstructwithal-ṣūfiyyah.IfAvicennaiswritingabouthowmuchSufisknow42insteadofhowtheyknowit,thisseemstohavelittleeffectongaugingAvicenna’sopinionsofSufis.

Gutas’objectionstoassociatingAvicennawithmysticalideasorproclivities,andsimilarobjectionsbyotherscholarsconcerningotherthinkers,stemlargelyfromanimpoverishedandsomewhatapriorihostileviewofwhatmysticismorSufismintheIslamiccontextreallyis,orevenwhatitclaimsforitself.Inthisviewtherecanbenooverlaporgiveandtakebetweenwhatislabeledas“rational”andwhatis“mystical.”

34Ibid.,380.35Ibid.,370.36Ibid.,390.37Ibid.,393.38AreferencetoQurʾān31:22.39Ibid.,394.40Gutas,“Avicenna’sEasternPhilosophy,”16441M.Marmura,“PlottingthecourseofAvicenna’sthought,”JOAS,111[1991],342.42MajidFakhryidentifiesʿārifintheIshārātwith“mystic”inhisAHistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,NewYork1970,160.

14

FromGutas’defenseofAvicenna’s“rationalsystem”onewouldgettheideathatSufismdemandsmuddy,incoherent,andirrationalthinking.TopointoutthatAvicennahimselfneverusesthewordṣūfīintheIshārāttellsusnothing,sincetaṣawwufwasnot,atthetimeofAvicennaoreventoday,theonlyrecognizedtermusedtorefertothosepeopleandideaswhichwewouldrefertoas“mystical”ordealingwiththeactualpracticeofaspiritualdiscipline,whomwetodaymightplaceundertheblanketterm“sufi.”IfAvicennaadmitsthelevelsofknowledgeoftheSufis,asGutassuggests,thenhemustaccepttheirknowledgeclaims(oratleastsomeofthem)aswell,anditissomewhatself-servingtosaythathetheninterpretsittofitintohisownsystemandthusneverallowsofanythingmystical.Ifadoctrineisinterpretedtosuchapointthatitceasestobeitself—andanintrinsicaspectofSufismisthatrationalthinkingisnottheonlywayofknowing—thentowhatavailisclaimingtorecognizeitsvalidity?43IfAvicennaadmitsonlyonewayofknowinghecouldnotpossiblyadmitthevalidityofSufism,butifheadmitsonlyonewayofrationallyknowingthenhecanacceptSufism,sinceSufismdoesnotdenytheplaceofreasonorsyllogism.BeneaththesurfaceofGutas’objectionsistheapparentbeliefthattheacknowledgementofanything“mystical”obliteratesthevalidityorrealityoftherational,butthereisnoobjectivereasontobelievethatthisisso,orattheveryleast,noreasoningisgiven.44

-TheCaseofAbūḤāmidal-Ghazālī

HerewewillbelimitingourfocustolookingatGhazālī’sfunctionascriticand/orpractitionerofphilosophyandspokesmanformainstreamSufism.Whateveritsothereffectsmayhavebeen,Ghazālī’srefutationofthephilosophers’assertionsregardingvarioustopicsinhisTahāfutal-falāsifah(TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers),45andparticularlythoseofAvicenna,hadadevastatingeffectuponthelegitimacyofpurelyrationalspeculationoutsideofthecontextoftherevealedtradition.Atthesametime,hisIḥyāʾʿulūmal-dīn(RevivalofReligiousLearning)andotherworkssuchasal-Munqidhminal-ḍalāl(DeliverancefromError)46gavetremendoussupporttothedoctrinesandpracticesofthemysticsandofcoursetheirparticularclaimstosuperiormodesofknowing.However,inpartbecauseofthetremendoussuccessofboththeseendeavors,accusationsofinconsistencyandofchanginghismessagetosuitdifferentaudienceshavedoggedGhazālīdownthroughthecenturiestoourpresentday,andthisquestionofwhetherornotGhazālīhadasecretdoctrinehasmuchtodowithhisrealpositiononcertaindoctrinesofthephilosophers,andhencewiththerelationshipofmysticismtophilosophyafterhim.InordertounderstandGhazālīinthisregarditisnecessarytofirstgraspexactlywhathisquarrelwiththephilosopherswas,andsecondtolookatwhat

43“Avicenna,however,didmaintainthevalidityofSufism,justashemaintainedthevalidityofothermanifestationsofIslamicreligiouslife,butheinterpretedit,justasheinterpretedthem,intermsofhisownsystem,”(Gutas,“Avicenna:Mysticism,”EncyclopediaIranica).44TheacceptanceofmysticisminAvicennaisnotlimitedtotheCorbin-Nasr‘school.’“NineteenthcenturyEuropeanscholarsthoughtthathismysticismwasextraneoustohisphilosophy,butfurtheracquaintancewithhiswritingsmakesitclearthatthisisnotso.Hismysticismandhisphilosophyconstituteasingleintegratedsystem.”W.M.Watt,IslamicPhilosophyandTheology,Edingurgh,1985,75.45TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.TranslatedbyM.Marmura.Utah,1997.46DeliverancefromError,RichardMcCarthy,Louisville,KY,1999.

15

Ghazālīhimselfhadtosayaboutwithholdingknowledgeandpassingonsecretknowledgefromonepersontothenext.

AccusationsofinconsistencywereleveledatGhazālīquiteearlyinphilosophicalcircles.AspartofhisresponsetoGhazālī’sattackonthephilosophers,AverroesaccusedGhazālīofcriticizingtheemanationistviewsofthephilosophersinhisIncoherenceofthePhilosophersonlytoechothoseverysameviewsinhisMiskhātal-anwār(TheNicheofLights).47IbnṬufayl(thesamewhosawasecretdoctrineinAvicenna,itshouldberemembered)defendedGhazālībyaccusingAverroesofmisinterpretingGhazālī’slanguagetobeemanationistpurelyandsimplyinthemannerofAvicenna.AmongotherthingstheargumentwithrespecttoTheNicheofLights48centersaroundabeingGhazālīreferstoasal-muṭāʿ,or“theobeyedone,”bywhoseauthoritytheangelsmovethecosmos,whichnodoubtwasseenasbeingsuspiciouslysimilartotheIntellectofAvicenna’ssystem.WattwentsofarastopositthatthispartoftheNichewasnotauthentic,sinceGhazālīcouldneverhaveespousedsuchadoctrineandremainedconsistentwithhiscriticismofemanationismintheInchoherence.49

ItcanbearguedthatGhazālīonlyassumedtheroleofmutakallimasafunctionofhisfameandprestige,notwishingtoinflictoverly-esotericdoctrinesonthemasses,whowouldinevitablytakewhathesaidquiteseriously.50InfactoneofthemostfrequentrefrainsintheIḥyāʾarestatementstotheeffectof,“Wecouldsaymuchmoreaboutthis,butyouwouldnotbeabletounderstandit.”InthissenseGhazālī’smysticismwasoftenequivocal,takingintoaccounthisroleasapillarofthecommunityandanauthorityamongthescholarsofthetraditionalsciences.

DidGhazālītrulyhaveasecretdoctrineheespousedamongstaninnercircle,adoctrineherepudiatedinpublicinhisroleaspillarofthescholarlycommunity?WasheapublicAshʿaritebutaclosetNeoplatonist?ForthepresentmomentwhatcannotbedoubtedisthatGhazālīdidhaveasensibilitytowhathewouldsayopenlyandwhathewouldkeeptohimself.Thefollowingpassageisveryrepresentativeofhisperspectiveonthisquestion:

47Gairdner,W.H.T.“al-Ghazālī’sMishkātal-AnwārandtheGhazālīProblem”(DerIslam5:133),aswellas,al-Ghazālī’sMishkātal-Anwār(“TheNicheforLights”),Lahore,1952.48Mishkātal-anwār,ed.Abū’l-ʿAlāʾʿAfīfī,Cairo,1964.49“Inthelightofpresentscholarshipthesoundestmethodologyistoconcentrateonthemainworksofundoubtedauthenticityandtoacceptotherworksonlyinsofarastheviewsexpressedarenotincompatiblewiththeformer.”“al-Ghazālī,AbūḤāmid,”EI2.Hisfullerargumentisfoundin,“AForgeryinal-Ghazālī’sMishkāt?”JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,1949,5-22.50“Wemustrecall[Ghazālī’s]ownclearanddecisivedisclaimersaboutthelimitsoftheologicaldiscourse,forheisuncompromisingonthepointthatthesoleutilityofthekalāmliesinexplicatingthecreedofthecommonbelieversandindestroying,throughdialecticalargumentation,hereticalinnovationstothecreed.Itsrealandonlypurpose,then,isofaprotectivenature;hence,itspractitionersaretoberegardedasintellectualbodyguardsordogmaticpolicemenratherthanasexplicatorsofthetruthwhodelveintotherealitiesofthings.Indeed,asa‘science’(ʿilm)or‘craft’(ṣināʿah),thekalāmisthoroughlyinappropriateforanykindofspeculativeinvestigationintotheverities,hesays,andisforeverrestrictedtothelevelofcommonbelief.Seekingal-Ghazālī’scandidopiniononthetruenatureofthings,intheIhya’andelsewhere,wearetoldinnouncertaintermstofishinotherwaters.”TimothyGianotti,al-Ghazālī’sUnspeakableDoctrineoftheSoul:UnveilingtheEsotericPsychologyoftheIḥyāʾ,Leiden,2001,10.

16

[T]otheextentthattheheartcomesclosetothethresholdoftheTruth,Hisveritieswillglimmerwithinit.Butthereisnowayto[gettothisstation]savethroughthe[spiritual]disciplinewhoseexplicationcomesinits[own,rightful]placeandthroughknowledgeandinstruction.ThesearethescienceswhichcannotbewrittendowninbooksandofwhichnothingisspokenbytheoneuponwhomGod—beheexalted—hasbestowedhisblessings,exceptwithhis[own]folk…whoarethosehavingashareinit.[Thecommunicationofthesesciencescanoccurboth]bywayoforalteachingandbywayofsecrets.Thatisthehiddenknowledge,which[theProphet](mayGodblesshimandgranthimsalvation)meantbyhisstatement,“verilyofknowledgethereis[something]akintotheoutershapeofthehiddenthing;onlythefolk[possessing]thegnosisofGod—beheexalted—knowit.Iftheyuttersomethingofit,onlythosewhoaredeludedaboutGod—beHeexalted—will[remain]ignorantofit.SodonotscornalearnedmantowhomGod—beHemighty,sublime—hasnotscornedhimsincetohimHegave[theknowledge].51

ItmightbeaskedwhysomeonewithapastoralconcernsuchasGhazālīwouldevenmentiontopeoplethatthereexistsaknowledgeofwhichtheyareunworthy.ThosewhotrulyknowneednotreadaboutitinGhazālī’sbooks,sincetrueknowledgewouldbringwithittheawarenessthatotherpeoplewouldnotunderstandit,orworse,wouldbeharmedbyit.Similarly,thosetowhomGodgrantednoknowledgemightonlybeputoffandscandalizedbythenotionthatthereisasecret,morevalidknowledgeouttherewhichisbeingdeliberatelykeptfromthem.Hestates:

[Perhaps]theamount…whichwehave[already]mentionedwouldhavebeenbetterleft[unwritten],sincethewayfarerbelongingtothispathdoesnotneedtohearitfromsomeoneelse.Andtheonewhoisnotfollowing[thispath]doesnotbenefitfromhearingit;indeedmaybehewouldsustainsomeinjurybecauseof[hearing]it,sincethatwouldbequeathbewilderment[to]himinasmuchashewouldhearsomethingthathedoesnotunderstand. However,thereisabenefitin[suchanexperience]:namely,hisbeingliberatedfromthedeceptioninwhichheis[submerged].Indeed,maybehewouldcometobelievethatthematteris[far]greaterthanhehadsupposedit[tobe]andhadimaginedit[tobe]byreasonofhisshort-sightedmind,hislimitedimagination,andhisembellishedargumentation.[Andmaybe]hewouldalsocometobelievewhatwastoldtohimoftheUnveilings,aboutwhichthesaintsofGodreport.52

Inshort,evensomeonewhodoesnotgraspthehigherspiritualpossibilitiesofknowledgemightbejoltedoutofhisspiritualtorporbyexposuretosuchknowledge,oratleasttoitswrittenvestiges.Hethenmightgoaboutthebusinessoftryingtoacquirethisincommunicablewisdomonhisown,acknowledgingthestationofthesaintsandtheprophetsandthevalidityoftheirspecialknowledgeandthenhimselfmakinganattempttobecomeworthyofabestowalofunderstandingandvisionbyGod.

51Ibid.,55.52Ibid.,59.

17

TofurtherunderstandthisdebateaboutwithholdingknowledgeitneedstobenotedthatGhazālīwasoftennotattackingthesubstanceofcertainphilosophicaltenets,butthemethodbywhichtheywerearrivedat.

Inotherwords,al-Ghazālī’sfamousandoftenbrilliantrefutationsofIbnSīnā’spsychologicalandeschatologicaldoctrinesturnouttobemeticulousexpositionsofthefactthatsuchbeliefsarenotdirectoutcomesofdemonstrativenecessity.Thus…theTahāfutdoesnotalwaysdirectlyattackthephilosophicaldoctrinesperseorevenentertainquestionsoftruth,foritwasneverwrittentoaffirmorestablishbelief;ratheritwasdesignedtoshaketheproudfoundationsoftheAvicennianpositions,whichwereinhismindleadingsomeintellectuallycuriousMuslimsintodangerouswaters.”53

AsanexamplehequotesGhazālī,“Thereisnothinginwhat[thephilosophers]havementionedthatmustbedeniedintermsoftheReligiousLaw.FortheseareobservedmatterswhichGod,exaltedbeHe,hasordainedtorunahabitualcourse.Weonlywantnowtoobjecttotheirclaimofknowingthesoultobeaself-subsistingsubstancethroughrationaldemonstration.WedonotofferagainsttheirclaimtheobjectionofonewhodeemsthistoberemotefromthepowerofGod,theexalted,orperceivesthattheReligiousLawhasbroughtforththatwhichiscontrarytoit.Indeed,wewillperhapsshowthattheReligiousLawgivescredencetoitin[our]detailingoftheexplanationsoftheresurrectionandtheAfterlife.Wedeny,however,theirclaimthatreasonaloneindicatesthisandthatthereisnoneedinitfortheReligiousLaw.”54

ThismightpartlyexplainwhyscholarssuchasWatthadsuchadifficulttimeacceptingthe“emanationist”hierarchydescribedinTheNicheofLights.IfweunderstandGhazālī’scritiqueofphilosophytobeanattackanddisavowalofallofitssubstanceapartfromlogicandmathematics(whichheacknowledgesasneutralasregardsreligion)thennaturallyanydoctrineGhazālīespousessimilartothedoctrinesofthephilosopherswillseemtobeacontradictionorconfusion.Someofthemisunderstandingherenodoubtstemsfromtheunfortunatetendencytoassumethatanydoctrinethatresemblesanexistingphilosophicalideamusthavesomesortoffiliationwiththatidea.Thus,anydescriptionofrealityintermswhichareevenvaguely“emanationist”orshowinganontological-causalhierarchyiseasilyclassifiedas“ArabicNeoplatonism.”Infact,Wattseemstogivenomiddleground;forhim,tothedegreeGhazālīheldaviewincommonwiththeNeoplatonistshewasinfluencedbythemandhencewouldcontradicthimselfinbeingcriticalofthem.BuchmanarguesthatTheNicheofLightsisafundamentallyQurʾānictextinthesensethatitderivesfromthescripturesofIslamanddoesnotgoagainstthedoctrineoftawhid.ItismeantasaguidetoMuslimstopracticetheirfaith

53Ibid.,11.54Ibid.,98.OnthenuancesofGhazālī’srejectionofphilosophyseealsoJulesJanssens,“al-Ghazālī’sTahāfut:IsitreallyarejectionofIbnSīnā’sphilosophy?”JournalofIslamicStudies,12(2001),1-17,aswellasOmerAlper,“Gazālī’sviewofthePhilosophicalTradition:WasHeReallyAgainstPhilosophy?”İstanbulÜniversitesiIlāhiyatFakültesiDergisi,vol.4,87-107.AhmadDalāl(“GhazālīandthePerilsofInterpretation,”JOAS,122:4,773-787)presentsGhazālīaspossiblyambivalentwhenitcomestocompetingknowledgeclaims,wantingtosecuretheroleofreasonagainsttheBāṭiniyyahbutsubordinatingitasagainstthephilosophers.

18

withgreaterpurityandunderstanding,andifitcontainsideasthathappentoparrelelcertainNeoplatonicnotionsasespousedbythephilosophersthistakesnothingawayfromitsowninnersenseofIslamicprovenance.ArgumentsovertheallegedNeoplatonicnatureofcertainpassagesofthisworkhave,inhisview,obscuredGhazālī’sfundamentalgoalinwritingit,namelytooutlinebasicpsychologicalandcosmologicalprinciplestoMuslims.

Indeed,farfrombeingaveiledimitationofNeoplatonicdoctrines,TheNicheofLightswasoneoftheearliestworkstoaddressphilosophicallywhatwouldcometobeknowninIslamicmetaphysicsastheimaginationalworld(ʿālamal-khayāl)ortheworldoflikeness,sometimestranslatedastheworldofimages(ʿālamal-mithāl).Ghazālīspeaksoftheworldbetweenpurespiritsandtheworldofbodies,saying,“Knowthatthelow,dense,imaginalworldbecamefortheprophetsaglass,anicheforlights,apurifierofmysteries,andaladdertothehighestworld.Throughthisitcomestobeknownthattheoutwardsimilitudeistrueandbehinditisamystery.”55ThisimaginationalworldasanontologicallevelofrealitywouldlaterbedevelopedinincrediblefullnessbyIbnʿArabīandthenincorporatedsystematicallyintothephilosophyofMullāṢadrā.InTheNicheofLightstheemphasisisplacedmoreontheroleoftheimaginationasoneofthepowersandresourcesofthesoulanditsfunctionasanessentialpartofthespirituallife.

Moreover,asitsnamemightindicate,TheNicheofLightsoftenspeaksoflightsasametaphysicalentityandindeedarrangeslightsinanangelichierarchy,almostacenturybeforeSuhrawardīdevelopedhisownsophisticatedhierarchyofangelsandmetaphysicsoflightsanddarknesses.

Knowthatithasbeenunveiledtothepossessorsofinsightsthatthelightsofdominionarelikewiseonlytobefoundinahierarchy[ʿalātartīb],andthatthelight“broughtnear”[referringtoangelsin4:172]istheonethatisclosesttotheFurthestLight.Hence,itisnotunlikelythatthelevelofIsrafilisabovethatofGabriel;thatamongtheangelsisonewhoisthemostnearbecauseofthenearnessofhisdegreetotheLordlyPresence,whichisthesourceofalllights;thatamongtheangelsisthefurthest;andthatbetweenthetwoaresomanydegreesthattheycannotbecounted.Theonlythingknownaboutthesedegreesoflightisthattherearemanyofthemandthattheirhierarchyderivesfromtheirstationsandtheirranks.56Andthefollowing:[T]heworldinitsentiretyisfilledwithbothmanifest,visuallightsandthenonmanifest,rationallights…Thelowlightsflowforthfromoneanotherjustaslightflowsforthfromalamp.Thelampistheholypropheticspirit.Theholypropheticspiritsarekindledfromthehighspirits,justasalampiskindledfromalight.Someofthehighthingskindleeachother,andtheirhierarchyisahierarchyofstations.ThenallofthemclimbtotheLightoflights,theirOrigin,theirFirstSource.ThisisGodalone,whohasnopartner.Allotherlightsareborrowed.TheonlytruelightisHis.EverythingisHislight—or,rather,Heiseverything…[T]hereisnolightexceptHislight.57

55TheNicheofLights,ed.D.Buchman,Utah,1998,34.56Ibid.,14.57Ibid.,20.

19

HereisnottheplacetospeculateconcerningtheextenttowhichSuhrawardī,sofamousforhismetaphysicsoflight,wasinfluencedbyGhazālīinhisconceptionoflight,sincethetendencytoseelightasametaphysicalentitywasnotuniquetoGhazālī.58Rather,itisimportanttonoteherethattherewereprefigurations,insomeoneasearlyandsignificantasGhazālī,ofsuchfoundationaldoctrinesoflaterIslamicphilosophyasthelevelofrealitybetweenspiritandbodyandthemetaphysicsoflight.Thesepassages,moreover,occurinthepassagesofTheNicheofLightswhichwereneveranobjectofcontroversy.

Aswasmentionedbefore,Ghazālīdidnotattackallofthedoctrinesofthephilosophersasbeingintrinsicallyfalse.Rather,hewishedtoshowthattheywerenotnecessarilytrueastheywerepresented.Hisprimarymotivationfordoingsowasafirmlyheldbeliefthatnohumanbeingcouldhaveknowledgeregardingthethingsthephilosophersclaimtoknowoutsideofthecontextoftherevealedtradition(sharʿ).Ghazālīwasinnowaydefactoordejureagainsttheuseofreasonandlogic.59ItwasGhazālīhimselfwhobroughtAristotelianlogicintothescienceofkalām.ForGhazālīkalāmwasusefulasadefensiveweaponagainstaccusationsfromtheoutsideandasamedicineforthementalsicknesscreatedbyrationalskepticism.60However,trueknowledgemusttranscendallpossibilityofdoubt,andthuseventheloftiesttruthspresentinphilosophyandkalām,anditisthepracticeofthespirituallifeinthecontextofthetruths—andfromtheSufiperspective,thegracesorbarakah—ofthereligionthatthejourneytothestationoftrueknowledgeispossible.Otherwisekalāmwastobeavoided,asitonlyhadworthinthepresenceoftheologicalattackorreligiousdoubt.61

Ghazālī’sambivalentattitudetowardskalāmisalsodisplayedinhislackofinterestinlayingdownaspiritualizedmetaphysicalsystemofhisown.EvenwherewhatmightbecalledSufimetaphysicsisdescribedinTheNicheofLights,itisinthecontextofanexhortationforthespiritualtravelertocleansehisheartandascendfromtheworldofvisiblethings(ʿālamal-shahādah)tothetreasuresoftheunseenworld(ʿālamal-ghayb).Hismagnumopus,theIḥyāʾ,isanextendedmeditationonthepracticeofthe

58FortheparallelsbetweenGhazālī’smetaphysicsoflightandthemuchmoredevelopedsystemofSuhrawardī,seeJ.Walbridge,TheWisdomoftheMysticEast,“Ghazālī,theGhostatSuhrawardī’sFeast.”NewYork,2001,54-7.59GhazālīcomposedatreatiseonAvicennianlogicentitledMiʿyāral-ʿilmfīʾl-mantiq(Beirut,1964).FormoreonGhazālī’sviewsonlogicseeMichaelMarmura,“GhazālīandDemonstrativeScience,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,Oct1965,183-204,and“Ghazālī’sAttitudetotheSecularSciencesandLogic,”EssaysinIslamicPhilosophyandScience,ed.G.Hourani,Arberry1975.60“[M]oreoftenthannotal-Ghazālī’s[intheTahafut]arguesfromanAsharitetheologicalbaseandaffirmsAshʿaritetheologicalpositions.Butthisishisprerogative.Whenhedoesthis,hedoesitaspartofhisendeavortorefute.HedoesnotdevelopatheologicalsystemintheTahāfut.”(M.Marmura,TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.Provo,Utah,1997,xxiii).Seealsohis“GhazālīandAshʿarismrevisited,”ArabicSciencesandPhilosophy,vol.12(2002),91-110,whereheneatlyoutlinestheroleofkalāmforGhazālī.61“Itisclearthatal-Ghazālī’sbasictheologicalsystemisfundamentallyincompatiblewiththetraditionalteachingoftheAshʿariteschool.Hisrejectionofkalāmasasimplisticdisciplinethatisinadequateeithertotheachievementofgenuineintellectualunderstandingortotheattainmentofhigherreligiousinsightisclearfromthoutset.”RichardFrank,al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,Durham,1994,87

20

piouslifefromitsbasicstoitsmostspiritualdepths,butitisnotaworkofmetaphysicsorcosmology.62Kalāmwastobeemployedinthisregardtotheextentnecessaryforthesociety,asafardkifāyahorgeneralizedcollectiveduty,buttrueknowledgecouldonlycomeintheimmediateandlivedencounterbetweenmanandGod,andthiswassomethingnorationalproofs—neitherfromthephilosophersnorthetheologians—couldprovide.

InthisdissertationitisassumedherethatinoppositiontokalāmGhazālīdidhavewhatRichardFrankcallsa“highertheology,”63whichwaswhathetrulybelievedbutwhichhedidnotthinkeveryoneneededtoknoworcouldunderstandiftheyheardit.Ghazālī’simpatiencewithkalāmisdemonstratedeasilyenough,asishisnuancedstancevis-à-visthephilosophers.AddtothisthemetaphysicalvisionexpressedinTheNicheofLightsIbelieveitisquitereasonabletoassumethatGhazālītailoredhismessageaccordingtohisaudience,hismaincriterionindoingsobeingthespiritualeffectitwouldhaveontherecipient,ratherthanconsistency.Ghazālī’s“highesttheology”wascontainedintheteachingoftheSufis,andinasenseeverythingelsehetaughtcouldbesubordinatedtoit.InthisrespectGhazālīrepresentsapossibilityoftheunionbetweenvariousseeminglyincompatiblestreamsofthought,aunionwhichwouldbeexploredbymanyothersintheensuingcenturies.Ofhisactualimprintonthenatureofphilosophyandkalāmmorewillbesaidintheconclusionofthischapter.-IbnʿArabīandPhilosophy

IbnʿArabīlivedatatimewhenthetraditionofPeripateticphilosophyhadalreadybeenwellestablished,afterFarābīandIbnSīnāhadwrittentheirworksandevenafterGhazālīhadattemptedtorefutethemandIbnRushdrosetodefendIbnSīnāinordertofurtherextendthetraditionofPeripateticphilosophy.Infact,oneofthemostnoteworthymeetingsearlyinIbnʿArabī’slifewaswithIbnRushdhimself,whenIbnʿArabīwasonlyfifteenyearsoldbutwasalreadyknowntohaveachievedacertainlevelofmysticalknowledge.ThephilosophersoughtoutameetingwiththeyoungmantoaskhimabouthisexperiencewithmysticalknowledgeandisreportedtohaveleftthemeetingsomewhatrattledbyIbnʿArabī’sresponsestohisquestions.64IbnRushdwaswell 62[Ghazālī]leavesuswithquestions,unansweredandseeminglyunanswerable…Forexample,thesoul’simmateriality—socentraltoIbnSīnā’spsychologyandeschatology—hasnowherebeenaffirmedordeniedwithinthecontextofal-Ghazālī’sesotericformulations…Ouroneandperhapsonlyremainingchanceforclarificationontheseandotherquestionsistoventureintothemalakūt,theworldoftheUnseen,whichisthehome“world”oftheheartandthetheatreinwhichtheheart“witnesses’itssupremeexperienceofUnveiling…”Gianotti,14.63al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,76.64‘AsI[IbnʿArabī]entered,thephilosopher[IbnRushd]rosefromhisseatandcametomeetme,showingmeeverypossibletokenoffriendshipandconsiderationandfinallyembracingme.Thenhesaidtome:“Yes”.Iinturnrepliedtohim:“Yes”.ThenhisjoyincreasedashesawthatIhadunderstoodhim.Butnext,whenImyselfbecameawareofwhatitwasthathadcausedhisjoy,Iadded:“No”.ImmediatelyAverroestensedup,hisfeatureschangedcolorandheseemedtodoubthisownthoughts.Heaskedmethisquestion:“Whatkindofsolutionhaveyoufoundthroughilluminationanddivineinspiration?Isitjustthesameaswhatwereceivethroughspeculativethought?”Irepliedtohim:“Yesandno.Betweentheyesandthenospiritstakeflightfromtheirmatterandnecksbreakawayfromtheirbodies.”Averroesturnedpale;Isawhimstarttotremble.Hemurmuredtheritualphrase,“thereisnostrengthsaveinGod”,because

21

knownatthistime,anditwouldseemthatthiswouldhavebeenIbnʿArabī’sfirstimportantencounterwithamajorfigureofIslamicphilosophy,butfromIbnʿArabi’spointofviewthemeetingwasmoreofaneventforthephilosopherthanforthematuringyoungmystic.ThedevelopmentofIbnʿArabī’spersonalengagementwiththetraditionofphilosophyisactuallynotveryeasytodiscern,whichissurprisingconsideringthethousandsofpagesIbnʿArabīwroteonsubjectswhicharetheverystuffofphilosophicalspeculation. TheintellectuallandscapepresentedtoIbnʿArabīcanbesaidtohaveconsistedbyandlargeofthefollowingelements:theQurʾān,ḥadīth,andthetransmittedsciencestowhichtheygaverise;thewritingsofthevariousschoolsofdogmatictheology(kalām);PeripateticphilosophyinthetraditionofKindī,Farābī,IbnSīnā,andIbnRushd;theadabtraditionofpoetryandothernon-sacredliterature;andthewritingsoftheSufisincludingGhazālī.IbnʿArabīwastrainedinthesciencesoftheQurʾānandtraditioninal-Andalūsbysomewellknownfigureswithinmainstreamcircles,beginninginSevillein1182.HisengagementwiththeQurʾānandḥadīth,especiallyintheFutūḥāt,leavelittledoubtthathewasthoroughlyfamiliarwiththemandwiththelearnedtraditionsurroundingthem.HisK.Muḥādarātal-abrāralsomakesclearthathewasinterestedinotherkindsofliteratureanddeemeditworthwhiletostudyallmannerofwritingsfromfablestothesayingsofkings,frompoetrytoancientchronicles.Initheincluded“allkindsofliterarystories(adab),sermons,proverbs,unusualanecdotes,chroniclesoftimesgoneby,thelivesoftheAncientsandtheProphets,thehistoryofkingsbothArabandnon-Arab,noblevirtues,marvelousstories,traditionsIhavebeentoldaboutthebeginningofthingsandthecreationofthisworld…aswellassometalkwhichisentertainingandamusingwhilenotservingtounderminereligion…”Addasstates,“Herewearefacedwithaclassicexampleofabookofadab—aliteraryworkaimedatbeinginstructive,funnyanderuditeallatthesametime,anddestinedforafairlybroadreadershipofudabāʾ,orliterati.”65 ItisthoughtthatIbnʿArabī’sstudyofthemanualsofSufismactuallybeganquitelate,sometwelveyearsafterhebeganpracticingthespiritualpath.In586hefirstcameintocontactwiththeRisālahofAbū’l-Qāsimal-Qushayrī,66whichwasoneoftheclassicsofSufism,andofitsaid,“IhadneverheardanythingwhatsoeveraboutQushayrī’sRisālah,oraboutanyotherworkofasimilarkind;Ididnotevenknowthemeaningoftheterm‘taṣawwuf’.”Thischanged,ofcourse,asevidencedbyIbnʿArabī’squotationsofSufiwritersinhisworks.Hisresponsestoquestionsposedbyal-Ḥakīmal-Tirmidhī67onthesubjectofwalāyah(sainthoodor“friendship”withGod),forexample,

hehadunderstoodmyallusion.’QuotedfromClaudeAddas,QuestfortheRedSulphur,Cambridge,37,accordingtowhomthisconversationtakesplaceinthecontextofadebateoverthenatureofbodilyresurrection.65RedSulfur,100.66SeeRichardGramlich,Das Sendschreiben al-Qusayris über das Sufitum (Stuttgart, 1989) andPrinciplesofSufism,trans.B.R.vonSchlegell,Berkeley,1992,bothstudiesofQushayri’sfamousRisālah.67SeeTheConceptofSainthoodinEarlyIslamicMysticism:TwoWorksbyal-Ḥakīmal-Tirmidhī,BerndRadtkeandJohnO’Kane,Richmond,Surrey,1996.

22

formamajorchapterintheFutūḥāt.HealsofrequentlymentionsothermajorSufiwriterssuchasGhazālī,Niffarī,68Sulamī,69AbūṬālibal-Makkī,70andothers.71 Butwhatwashiseducationinscholastictheologyandphilosophy?Fromthestartitisimpossibletoknowwhichtextshemayormaynothaveread,asherarelyquotesanyphilosopherexplicitly,preferringtorefertopositionsinageneralwaywhenhedoesmentionphilosophersortheologians,andreferringtopeoplehecallsahlal-naẓar,whichitwouldseemcanmeaneitherphilosophersortheologiansdependingonthecontext.AsfarasgleaningIbnʿArabī’ssourcesfromhisownwritingsbylookingforsimilarwordingandthemesfromworksextantinhistime,thisisaratherquestionableapproachconsideringthesheervolumeofIbnʿArabī’swritingandhiswillingnesstoemployanyandallpossiblemodesofexpressionwhendiscussingcosmologyandmetaphysics.“Itisnolongerpossible,asitwasinthetimeofM.Schreiner,torefertotheLiberdecausisortheTheologyofAristotleandthusintimatethatIbnʿArabīhadreadthemwhenhespokeofthePureGoodortheidentityofknowledge,theknower,andtheknown.Allthiswasgeneralknowledgeinhistimesharedbyallintellectuals...Hemayverywellhavereadthoseworks,iftheywereaccessibletohimandhehadbeenlookingforthem,butunlessheindicatesthatmuch,proofthathedidwouldrequireunambiguousidentificationofaccuratequotations.”72 AninterestingincidentoccurredwhenIbnʿArabīpickedupacopyofFarabi’sArāʾahlal-madīnahal-fāḍilāhwhichwasontheshelfatafriend’shouse.Uponencounteringapassagewhichheremembersas,“Wemustspeculateonhowtopositagodintheworld,”usingilāhinsteadofAllāh,IbnʿArabīwasrevoltedandsaid,‘HedidnotsayAllāh!”andreturnedthebooktoitsowner.73ThisisonlyhowIbnʿArabītellsit,forasRosenthalpointsoutneitherilāhnorAllāhappearanywhereinthatwork.IbnʿArabīeitherrememberedthewrongwordoractuallyreadfromadifferentwork.Thathewouldgothetothetroubleofrecountingthisincidentmighttellussomethingabouthisopinionofthephilosophers’method,towhichwewillturnbelow,but“thequotedpassagedoesnottellusmuchabouttheextentofIbnʿArabī’sacquaintancewiththeavailablephilosophical-politicalliterature.”74Somewhatsurprisingly,theonephilosophicalworkthatIbnʿArabīspecificallyquotesisSirral-asrār(Secretumsecretorum)bypseudo-Aristotle.Itwasabookonpoliticswhichalsomixedin“science,superstition,andmagic.”75IbnʿArabīconsideredittobeagenuineworkofAristotle

68MuḥammadibnʿAbdal-Jabbāral-Niffarī(d.965),bestknownforhisK.al-MawāqiforBookofSpiritualWaystations.69Muḥammadibnal-Ḥusaynal-Sulamī(d.1021),animportantearlySufiauthor,perhapsbestknownforhisṬabaqātal-ṣūfiyyah.70MuḥammadAbūṬālibal-Makkī(d.996),authorofoneofthebestknownearliesttreatisesonSufism,Qūtal-qulūb.71InhisTheSelf-DisclosureofGod(pp.371-386),ChittickdiscussesIbnʿArabī’sviewsoncertainimportantSufissuchasRābiʿahal-ʿAdawiyyah(d.801)andʿAbdal-Qādiral-Jīlānī(d.1166).72FranzRosenthal,“IbnʿArabībetween‘Mysticism’and‘Philosophy’,”Oriens,vol.31(1988),18-19.73RedSulphur,108.74Rosenthal19.75Ibid.,25.

23

addressedtoAlexander,anditformedthebasisofhisownK.al-tadbīrātal-ilāhiyyah.76Overall,onewhosearchesthroughIbnʿArabī’scorpusforadetailedengagementwiththephilosophersandthephilosophicalliteratureofhisdaywillfindonlyshortfragments.Hisdiscussionsofthephilosophersandtheirpositions,whentheydooccur,haveanad-hocquality.77

Onthequestionoftheacquisitionofknowledge,IbnʿArabīdividesmenintogroups,andassignssuperioritytothedegreethataman’sknowledgeisbasedondirectvisionasopposedtoreason.IbnʿArabīhasseveralnamesforthisdirectknowledge,whichsometimeshaveapeculiartechnicalsignificanceoftheirownbutwhichoftenrefertonon-discursiveknowledgeoftherealitiesofthings.Forexample,mushāhadahistobedistinguishedfromruʾyahwhenoneiscomparingthetwo,butwheneitherofthemisusedaloneinapassagesuchwordsasruʾyah(vision),mushāhadah(witnessing),kashf(discovery,unveiling),andfatḥ(opening)arereferringtomoreorlessthesamekindofexperience.ThefollowingpassagefromIbnʿArabī’sFuṣūṣal-ḥikamistypicalofhisattitudetowardsphilosopherswhenitcomestoconsequentialknowledge:

Noneofthemenofknowledgehavediscoveredthisknowledgeofthesoulexceptthegodly,namelytheMessengersandtheSufis.Asforthecompanionsofreasoningandthemastersofthinking—namelytheancientsandthetheologiansintheirtheologicaldiscussionsconcerningthesoulanditsquiddity—nonehavediscovereditsreality,andmentalreasoningwillnevergrantit.Whosoeverseeksknowledgeofitbywayofmentalreasoningdoessoinvain.Sucharecertainlyamongthosewhoseeffortsleadthemastrayinthelifeofthislowerworld,thinkingthattheyaredoingsomethinggood.78Whosoeverseeksthisaffairthroughotherthanitsproperwayshallnotobtainit.79

ThissentimentisexpandeduponinapassagefromtheFutūḥātdescribedbyAddas:[H]e[Ibnal-’Arabi]describesintheformofallegorythesimultaneousascension(miʿrāj)oftwoindividuals:oneofthemabelieverwhowalksinthefootstepsofaprophet,theotheraphilosopherwhoreliesonhisfacultyofreasontoleadhimtothetruth.Whearasthemanoffaithhashisprophettoguidehim,thephilosopherclaimshecanaccomplishthecelestialjourneyonhisown.Therestofthestoryiseasytoguess.Ineachofthesevenheavenstheyarriveattheprophetisgreetedbytheprophetwhoresidesthere,whoinitiateshimintoitssecretsandtransmitstohimitsspiritualknowledge.Asforthephilosopher,heisreceivedbytherulingangeloftheheaven,whoonlyimpartstohimaportionofthecosmologicalknowledgecorrespondingtothatparticularsphere.Whenhearrivesattheseventhandfinalheaven,theheavenofAbraham,thephilosopher

76al-Tadbīrātal-ilāhiyyahfīiṣlāhal-mamlakahal-insāniyyah,ed.ḤasanʿĀsī,Beirut,1993.77IntheFuṣūṣal-ḥikam,forexample,hetouchesontheperennialIslamicquestionofthenatureofGod’sattributes,inthiscaseknowledge.However,hesimplyrefersto“thetheologian”andmakesnoclarificationastowhetherhemeanstheAshʿaritesortheMuʿtazilitesorsomeotherview(TheRingstonesofWisdom,CanerDagli,Chicago,2004,24).ElsewherehecomparestheviewsoftheAshʿaritesandtheSophists(al-ḥusbāniyyah),butinanalmoststylizedwaythatmakesthemusefulonlyasacontrastforhisownposition,inthiscaseasregardstheonenessormanynessoftheworld’ssubstanceorjawhar(Ringstones,135-6).78Qurʾān18:104.79TheRingstonesofWisdom,135.

24

findshimselfpreventedfromcontinuingonhisjourney;heistoldthathemustretracehissteps,beconverted,andfinallyperformalloveragainthejourneywhichwasmadebythemanoffaith—whocontinuesonhiswayuntilhereachesthethresholdoftheDivinePresence.80

ForIbnʿArabīthesatisfactionoftheoreticalcompletenessonesometimesfindsinaphilosophicalortheologicalsystemisinactualityanimposterforthetrue“tasted”knowledge(ʿilmal-dhawq)thespiritualaspirantshouldbeaimingfor.Theangelsinthemetaphorquotedaboverepresentthepurelyintellectualcapacitiesofman,whichcapacitiesaremoreoverinandofthemselvespartialandblindtotheirownlimitation.81Incontrast,theprophetofeachsphereisasymbolandactualizationofconsummatespiritualguidance.InIbnʿArabī’svisionofthingseachprophetisalsoaperfecthumanbeing,al-insānal-kāmil,whounliketheangelisnotlimitedinhisspiritualunderstandingandcanguidetheseekerthroughthemysteries.ForIbnʿArabīthepurelyspeculativephilosopherwhohashadnoexperiencebeyondthejugglingofconceptsinhismindisthevictimofaself-inflictedfraud.

InthiscontextofthelimitationsofspeculativephilosopherswecanlookbacktoGhazālī,whoseconversionfromskepticismtofaithindeedhadeverythingtodowiththerelationshipbetweenphilosophicalspeculationandmysticalexperience.IbnʿArabīmentionsGhazālīacoupleofdozentimesintheFutūḥāt,anddemonstratessomedetailedknowledgeofhispositionsonvariousquestions,buttheyalmostalwaysrefertomatterspertainingtothespirituallifeandnotspeculativephilosophy.InIbnʿArabī’seyesGhazālīis,ultimately,oneoftheSufis,althoughheiscriticalofhiminsomerespects.HereferstohimasthegreatinterpreterofSufismtothegeneralityofMuslims,andplaceshimamong“ourshaykhs.”HecitesGhazālīasanexampleofleavingtheworldlylife,whichmeanshewasacquaintedwithhislifestoryandhisstrugglewithspeculativethinking.82HementionshisacquaintancewiththeIḥyāʾandwiththeKimiyā-yi-saʿādātandashortworkofhisontheBāṭiniyyah.83TwicehemakesmentionofGhazālī’s“bestofbothworlds”argumentinadditiontoareferencetohispositiononwhetherornotprophethoodisearned.84Outsideofacuriousstatementwhereheisplacedamongtheahlal-naẓar85Ghazālīoccupiestheplaceofavenerableifsomewhatlimited86expositorofSufism.ThisisnoteworthybecausebythetimeofIbnʿArabī’swritingitishardtoimagineanyotherSufiwhohadmoreimportantthingstosayabouttherelationshipofspeculativephilosophytomysticalexperience,andwhowasaswellknown,asGhazālī.

80RedSulphur,106.81Theangelsarethevariousfacultiesofthisform[oftheworld]…Eachofthesefacultiesisveiledandcannotseeanythingsuperiortoitself.(Ringstones,5)Bycontrast,arealizedhumanbeingcontainsthepossibilityforknowingGodinacompleteandtotalwayaccordingtoIbnʿArabī,afeatnotevenanangelcanaccomplish.82al-Futūḥātal-Makkiyyah(Bulāqedition,Cairo1968)1:27483Ibid.,1:334.84Ibid.,1:552,2:345,2:3respectively.85Ibid.,4:416,disapprovingofhismethodnodoubtwhenGhazālīiswearinghismutakallimhat.86IbnʿArabīplaceshim,alongwithal-Muḥāsibī,amongthe“commonality”oftheSufis(Futūḥāt1:590)

25

IbnʿArabīpointstohimasanexampleofthepitfallsofpursuingspeculativephilosophyandmysticism:

Someofwhatthe“unlettered”realizehasbeenrelatedfromAbūHamidal-Ghazālī,thespokesman[mutarjim]forthepeopleofthispath.“WhenIdesiredtojointheirway…Iretreatedintomyselfandwithdrewfrommyrationalconsiderationandmyreflection.Ioccupiedmyselfwithinvocation,andaknowledgewaskindledinmewhichIhadnothad.”

InthispassageGhazālīgoesontoexplainthateachtimehethoughthehadachievedahigherlevelofknowledgehewouldreflectuponitandrealizethatitwasstillsomewhatpolluted,althoughitwaspurereachtimehetried.Heconsideredhimselftohavereachedahigherstationthanspeculativethinkers,but:

“IdidnotreachtheleveloftheTribe[i.e.theSufis]inthat.Icametoknowthatwritinguponwhathadbeenerased(maḥw)isnotthesameaswritinguponthatwhichhasnotbeenerased…ThatistheunletteredpersonwhoseGod-givenknowledgeisnotprecededbyanyreflective,outwardknowledge.HencethatGod-givenknowledgecomestohimmoreeasily.”87

IbnʿArabīgoesontoexplainthateventhosewhoareabletoleavethescaleofphilosophyatthedooruponenteringthespiritualpathwillbepreoccupiedwiththescaleevenastheypursuetrueknowledgeandbeheldbacktoadegreebecauseofit.Thebestoptionwouldbetosomehowsmashthescale;IbnʿArabīadmitshehasneverseenanyoneactuallydothis,thoughhemaintainsthatitisnotimpossible.Ghazālī,aperfectexampleofthespeculativethinkerwhohadascendedtheheightsofconceptualunderstanding,88camefacetofacewithitsvacuity,bringingaboutacrisisafterwhichheascendedthespheresofknowledgethroughspiritualguidanceinsteadofphilosophyorkalām,muchlikethephilosopherintheaforementionedallegory.89 ButtowhatdegreeisIbnʿArabī’sownworkanextensionorcontinuationoftheprojectbegunbyGhazālītofirmlyimplantthetheoryandpracticeofSufismwithinthemajorityintellectualtradition,to“indigenize”itinthemajorityworldofkalāmandfiqh?90Asnotedabove,IbnʿArabīcallsGhazālīamutarjimorinterpretivespokesman 87Futūḥāt2:645.88OneofGhazālī’sclaimswasthathehadlearntallofphilosophyandmathematics,andhewasofcoursealreadyamasterofthetraditionalreligioussciences.HealsomentionsthathewasthoroughlyacquaintedwiththewritingsoftheSufisevenbeforeheembarkedonhisownspiritualjourney.89IbnʿArabīdidnotequatefaylasūfwithsomeoneoutsidethepale.Inoneinstance,forexample,heemploysthephrasefaylasūfislāmī,or“Islamicphilosopher,”nodoubtasopposedtoanon-Islamicphilosopher,Futūḥāt2:12490“[al-Ghazālī]wastheleaderinIslam’ssupremeencounterwithGreekphilosophy—thatencounterfromwhichIslamictheologyemergedvictoriousandenriched,andinwhichArabicNeoplatonismreceivedablowfromwhichitdidnotrecover.[AndH]ebroughtorthodoxyandmysticismintoclosercontact;theorthodoxtheologiansstillwenttheirownway,andsodidthemystics,butthetheologiansbecamemorereadytoacceptthemysticsasrespectable,whilethemysticsweremorecarefultoremainwithintheboundsoforthodoxy”(Watt,TheFaithandPracticeofal-Ghazālī,13).DespitethefactthatWatt’sstatementaboutwhathecalls‘Arabicneoplatonism’ishardlytrueinallpartsoftheIslamicworld,thePersian-speakingareasbeinganexample,andsettingasidetheambiguousmeaningof‘orthodoxy’whentalkingaboutkalāmandtaṣawwuf,thisappraisalisfaithfultoGhazālī’simportanceinIslamicintellectualhistory.Itisall

26

fortheSufis.91OneofIbnʿArabī’smostfrequentpreoccupationsandoneofhismostoriginalcontributionsishistreatmentoftheworldbetweenspiritsandbodies,theworldoftheimaginationormundusimaginalisasHenryCorbincalledit.92Asdiscussedabove,Ghazālīwasinfactapioneerintreatingofthisdimensionofrealityinhiswriting,especiallyinTheNicheofLights.93

UnlikeIbnʿArabī,Ghazālīwasamemberofthescholarlyestablishment—indeedpossiblyitspreeminentmemberatthetime—whobecameaSufi.IbnʿArabī,forhispartastheSufiwhobecameanestablishedauthor,hadtheluxuryofpresentingSufismwithoutconcerninghimselfwiththeneedsofnon-Sufis.Indeed,inthisrespectthetwoarelikemirrorimagesofeachother:Ghazālīmasteredthetheorybeforemasteringthepractice,whileIbnʿArabīhadconsiderablemysticalexperiencebeforehavinganysystematicideasaboutit.PerhapsthisispartofthereasonwhyIbnʿArabī’sapproachtophilosophyissodifferentfromGhazālī’sanddoesnotappeartotakethelatter’sasanintellectualstartingpointforhisown(IbnʿArabī’s)engagementwithit.IbnʿArabī’scriticismsofthephilosophersandtheologiansarescatteredhereandthereinhisworks,whichisquiteinkeepingwithhisgeneralstyleofwriting.Indeed,“[g]enerallyspeakingitisimpossibletodisengageIbnʿArabī’spositiononfalsafahfromhisviewsonkalām.Heusuallylumpstogethertheauthoritiesinbothtraditionsandreferstothembysuchtermsas“thepeopleoftheory”or“consideration”(ahlal-naẓar),“therationalthinkers”(al-ʿuqalāʾ)and“thepeopleofthought”or“reflectivethinkers”(asḥabal-fikr).”94IbnʿArabīdoesnotseemtohaveagreatinterestindeconstructingthedoctrinesofthephilosophersfromwithin,asGhazālīdidinhisTahāfut,andevengoingsofarastomakesurehisreadersunderstoodphilosophybeforereadinghiscritiquebycomposingakindoftextbookofPeripetaticphilosophy,Maqāsidal-falāsifah.95Instead,IbnʿArabīexplicitlystates,“Wearenotoneofthosewhowouldreportanystatementsofthesages(ḥukamāʾ)orthestatementsofothers(likethem).Inourbook[theFutūḥāt]aswellasallourotherbooks,wesetdownonlytheresultsofrevelation[kashf]anddictatesofthe

themoreremarkable,then,thatIbnʿArabīconsidersGhazālītobeacommonSufi(ʿāmmah),notoneoftheelite.AmongSufisitwasinfactAbūḤāmid’syoungerbrotherAḥmadal-Ghazālīwhoisconsideredtohaveattainedahighermysticalstation,andsomehaveevenspeculatedthatAḥmadwasatonetimehisolderbrother’sshaykh.91InFutūḥāt2:290hementionsGhazālīasoneof“ourshaykhs”.In4:107hementionsthetheologiansandothersbutcountsGhazālīamongtheṢūfiyyah.92Ipreferimaginationaltoimaginal,asthelattertermdoesnottiebackstronglyenoughtotherootwordimagination,askhayālīdoestokhayāl.93“Therootkh-y-l,fromwhichkhayālisderived,isemployedasingletimeinarelevantmeaningintheKoran.IntellingthestoryofMosesandthesorcerers,theKoransaysthatthesorcerersthrewdowntheirstaffs,whichpromptlyturnedintoserpents.Asaresult,Moses“wasmadetoimagine,bytheirsorcery,thattheirropesandstaffsweresliding”(20:16).Thetermisusedinasimilarsenseinasimilarnumberofhadīths.Thesefewinstancesweresufficienttoallowal-GhazālītoprovidedetaileddiscussionsofimaginationasanIslamicconcept,justasal-FarābīandAvicennahademployedthetermlargelyonthebasisofGreeksources.”W.Chittick,TheSufiPathofKnowledge,116.94W.Chittick,“IbnʿArabī,”inHistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,500.95Asisoftennoted,thisworkhadtheperhapsunintendedconsequenceofmakingtheviewsofthephilosophersmorewidelyaccessible.Maqāṣidal-falāsifah,ed.SulaymānDunyā,Cairo,1960.

27

Truth.”96Itshouldnotbethought,however,thatIbnʿArabīsawnovalueinengagingphilosophyandtheology.Indeed,heclearlyknewsomethingaboutthemanddevotedmanypagestodefendinghisownviews.Buthedefendedthemonhisowntermsandusedtheirterminologyandmethodsonlyinsofarastheywereusefulrawmaterialsfortheconstructionofhisownintellectualedifice.97 ComparingGhazālīandIbnʿArabīinthiswaycanshedlightuponthesomewhatdistantrelationshipIbnʿArabīhadwiththetheologicalandphilosophicalestablishment.Thesearetwothinkers,twoSufis,whointheirmainepistemologicalviewswereincompleteagreement,98butwhereasGhazālīsawfittosystematizeandassumetheroleofpedagogueforSufisandnon-Sufisalike,IbnʿArabī’srelentlessinsistencethatreasonisinadequatetothespiritualneedsofmanresultedinaconsummate‘unsystem’thatchewedthroughtheologicalandphilosophicalconceptslikesomanychangesofclothes.BecauseIbnʿArabī’sworkisinfactsomethingmorelikeafamilyofoverlappingontologicalandcosmologicalsystems,heisnotamenabletoacreativeengagementwithsystematicphilosophers,noraretheywithhim.InorderforasystematicthinkertobeabletowrestlewithIbnʿArabī’sinsightsitisnecessarytopluckoutoneofthesesystemsormetaphysicalapproachesanddealwithitonitsown.LaterIwillarguethatthisispreciselywhathappenedinthecenturiesfollowingIbnʿArabī’sarrivalontheintellectualscene,anditishowhebecamesofamouslyassociatedwiththedoctrineofwaḥdatal-wujūd,aphraseheneveremployedhimselfinanyofhiswritings.Thishappenedlargelythroughhisintellectualdescendantswhowillbediscussedlater,whotakentogetherwith 96QuotedfromRosenthal,8-9.97Thefollowingpassageisillustrativeofhisview,“Don’tletyourselfbeturnedoff,whenyoucomeacrossaproblemthatwasmentionedbyaphilosopheroramutakallimoraspeculativescholar[ṣāḥibnaẓar])inanydisciplineofknowledge,tosuchanextentthatyouwouldsayaboutthepersonwhomentionsitandwhoisatrulyinsightful(muḥaqqiq)Sufithatheisaphilosopher,justbecausethephilosopher(faylasūf)mentionedthatveryproblemanddiscusseditandbelievedit.(Anddon’tsay)that(theSufiwhodiscussesit)deriveditfrom(thephilosophers),orthathehasnoreligion,becausethephilosopherwhohadnoreligion(andwasnoMuslim)statedit(earlier).Don’tdothat,friend!Itwouldbeaninconsequentialargument.Fornotallthephilosopher’sknowledgeisuntrue,andthatparticularproblemmayjustinvolvesometruthhepossesses…Ifyou(attackatrulyinsightfulSufiby)sayingthathehearditfromthephilosopher(inoralinstruction)orreaditinbooksofthephilosophers,itcouldbeyouspeakfalselyandshowignorance.Thefalsehoodwouldbeyoursaying“heheardorreadit,”sinceyoudidnotobservethatdirectly.Theignorancewouldbeyourfailingtomakeadistinctionbetweentruthanduntruthwithregardtothatproblem.Yourstatementthatthephilosopherhasnoreligiondoesnotmeanthateverythinghepossesses(inthewayofknowledge)isuntrue.Everyintelligentpersonwouldperceivethatrightaway.”Ibid.,12.98A.A.ʿAfīfīmisunderstandsIbnʿArabī’smetaphysicsinafundamentalway(attributingtohimaradicalpantheism,andgoingsofarastousethephrasewaḥdatal-wujūdwhichwasneverusedbyIbnʿArabī),andsaysthatGhazālī’scomesclosetoIbnal-’Arabi’svisionbutisnotinfullagreementwithit.(Mishkātal-anwār,ed.Abū’l-ʿAlāʾʿAfīfī,Cairo,1964,16).Actually,ʿAfīfī’sdescriptionofGhazālī’smetaphysicsisidenticalwithIbnʿArabī’snotionofGodbeingtheonlyrealitythereis.ThepassageiswhereGhazālīsaysthat“AlllightsareborrowedandthereallightisHisalone,andeverythingisHislight…RathernothinghasanexistenceexceptHim…”ʿAfīfīisrightaboutGhazālī,butnotaboutIbnʿArabī.ThispassageistakenfromAbdulHaqAnsari,“TheDoctrineofDivineCommand:AStudyintheDevelopmentofGhazālī’sViewofReality,”IslamicStudiesvol.xxi(1982),1-47.

28

IbnʿArabīhimselfcametobeknownbysomeastheAkbariyyahorAkbarianschool,afterIbnʿArabī’scurrenttitleamongSufisofal-shaykhal-akbaror“theSupremeShaykh.”

-TheRoleandSignificanceofSuhrawardī

Shihābal-DīnAbūal-FutūḥYaḥyāibnḤabashibnAmīrakal-Suhrawardī,alsoknownbyhistitleShaykhal-ishrāq(theMasterofIllumination)isafigurewhocannotgounmentionedinadiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenmysticismandphilosophy,bothbecauseofthecontroversysurroundinghisownviewsandbecauseoftheimmenseinfluenceSuhrawardīwouldexerciseoverlaterIslamicphilosophy,especiallytheSchoolofIsfahanandMullāṢadrā.Hewascontroversialeveninhisownday,andhisoutspokenviewscombinedwiththepoliticalsituationofthetimesledtohisexecutionatthehandsofnolessthantheAyyubidsultanSalāḥal-Dīn.99Thisledtohisbeingreferredtoasal-Suhrawardīal-Maqtūloral-Shaykhal-maqtūl(“theexecuted”). IncontrasttothecaseofAvicenna,thereisanunmistakableSufiandmysticalelementinSuhrawardī’sworkasawhole.ThequestionamongscholarsofSuhrawardīisoneofthepervasiveness,importance,andscopeofthismysticism.WhenwasSuhrawardīwritingfromamysticalpointofview,andhowimportantordecisiveisthatpointofviewinrelationtohisentirecorpusofwritings?AswithAvicenna,modernscholarshiponSuhrawardīhasgravitatedaroundtwopolesinjudgingtheplaceofmysticismwithinhislargerintellectualproject.MuchofthepioneeringworkonthesubjectwascarriedoutbyHenryCorbin,whoissaidtohavebeenintroducedtoSuharwardībyhisteacherLouisMassignon.CorbinreceivedfromhimacopyofḤikmatal-ishrāqwiththeadvicethathewouldfindwhathewaslookingforwithinitspages.100CorbinpaidagreatdealofattentiontoSuhrawardī’smetaphysicsoflightanddarknesswhilegivingshortshrifttohislogic.HiscriticaleditionsofSuhrawardī’sworksinfactleaveoutthesectionsonlogicaltogether,andheleavesoutthephysicsofḤikmatal-ishrāq.HesawSuhrawardīprimarilyasamysticalthinker,amanifestationofatraditionofsaintsandsagesreachingbackevenbeforetheadventofIslam.Suhrawardīwasnottobeassociatedwiththefalāsifah,butwiththeenlightenedSufis,theMagiofancientPersia,Plato,andevenHermes,whomSuhrawardīreferredtoas“thefatherofthephilosophers.”101CorbinsawSuhrawardī’sthoughtasacontinuation,inpart,ofthe“Oriental”philosophyofAvicenna,inSuhrawardī’scasereferringtoitasOriental“theosophy,”whichwasmeanttobeatranslationofḥikmahilāhiyyahbutwhichcriticshavestrenuouslyobjectedtobecausethetermislinkedwiththemuchlatertheosophicalmovementintheWest.Corbin,andNasrafterhim,preferredtheterm“theosophy”inordertodistinguishtheideassolabeledfrom‘ordinary’philosophyandsincetheterm“wisdom”inEnglishdoesnotcarrythesameresonanceasḥikmahinArabicorḥikmatinPersian.Thishasbeenamajorstickingpointamongscholarsinthefield,suchasJohnWalbridgeandHosseinZiai,whowrite,“Theuseofrenderingslike‘theosophy’and 99OnthecircumstancesofhisdeathseeJ.Walbridge,TheLeavenoftheAncients:SuhrawardīandtheHeritageoftheGreeks,NewYork,2000,201-210.100SeeWalbridge,Leaven,223.101Forthehistoryoftheinfluences,realorimagined,ofIslamicandpre-IslamicfiguresuponSuhrawardīseeJ.Walbridge,TheWisdomoftheMysticEast:SuhrawardīandPlatonicOrientalism.NewYork,2001

29

‘oriental’indicatethefundamentallymythologicalfocusofCorbin’sinterestsandinterpretations.”102ForthosesharingtheperspectiveofCorbinandNasrsuchasMehdiAminrazavi,103thePersianallegoriesofSuhrawardī,whichoftendescribethejourneyofthesoulfromthelandofdarknesstothelandoflightandofteninvolvemeetingsbetweenspiritualmastersandnovicedisciples,areofequalimportancetoSuhrawardī’slogicalandPeripateticworks(writteninArabic)andcanevenbesaidtoshowthetrueheartofSuhrawardī’smotivationinhisentirecorpusofwriting.104(Morewillbesaidonthemeaningof‘Peripatetic’inregardstoSuhrawardībelow.)TheyemphasizethefactthatSuhrawardīconsideredthatSufissuchasal-Ḥallāj,Sahlal-Tustarī,andBayazīdBisṭāmī—noneofwhomhadanythingtodowithdiscursivephilosophy—werethetruephilosophers,andthatPeripateticthinkerssuchasAvicennaandFarābīdidnotpossess“onethousandth”105ofwhatthoseSufisdidwhenitcametotrueknowledge. TheothermajorpositionconcerningmysticisminSuhrawardī,heldbysuchscholarsasJohnWalbridgeandHosseinZiaiaswellasIranianscholarssuchasthelateMehdīHāʾirāYazdī,statesthattheallegoriesare“primarilyelementaryandsemipopularworksandnotcentraltotheIlluminationistphilosophy.”TheyconsiderthelogicalandmetaphysicalcritiquewhichSuhrawardīcarriedoutagainstthePeripateticstobeacoreconstituentinhisoverallthoughtandnotsimplyanecessarycorrectiontoclearthegroundformysticalexperienceandakindofdogmaticmythology.TheypointoutthatthelaterIranianphilosophicaltraditionalmostalwaysapproachedtheworksofSuhrawardībydiscussingthemusingAvicennianterminologyandbaseditsdiscussionofhimonhiscritiqueofPeripateticlogic,epistemology,andmetaphysics.TheygosofarastosaythatoftenwhatSuhrawardīreferstoas“primaryimmediatelyknownpremises”inscience,whichgoesbacktoAristotle’sPosteriorAnalytics1.1-2,usingsuchtermsasdhawq,al-ḥikmahal-dhawqiyyah,andal-ʿilmal-ḥudūrī,isnothingmorethan“intuitivephilosophy.”Discursivephilosophy,referredbytermssuchasbaḥth,al-ḥikmahal-baḥthiyyah,andṭarīqal-mashshāʾīn,andtheaforementionedintuitivephilosophytogetherformtwohalvesofperfectphilosophyinSuhrawardī’seyes.“Thecombinationofdiscursiveandintuitivephilosophyintooneconsistentsystem—thephilosophyofIllumination—wasSuhrawardī’smajorachievementintheeyesofmedievalbiographersandcommentatorsonIlluminationisttexts.”106Theycontendthattheaforementionedtermsreferringtointuitivephilosophydifferwhentheyareusedinatechnicalcontext,andbelievethatintuitivephilosophyistoooftentakentomean“mysticalexperience.”

102J.WalbridgeandH.Ziai,ThePhilosophyofIllumination,xix.103MehdiAminrazavi,“TheSignificanceofSuhrawardī’sPersianSufiWritingsinthePhilosophyofIllumination,”TheLegacyofMediaevalPersianSufism,ed.LeonardLewisohn,London,1992,259-283.104OnthistopicseealsoRichardIanNetton,“TheNeoplatonicSubstrateofSuhrawardī’sPhilosophyofIllumination:FalsafaasṬasawwuf,”TheLegacyofMediaevalPersianSufism,ed.LeonardLewisohn,London,1992,247-260.ForNetton,themergingofphilosophyandmysticisminSuhrawardīisnotevenatopicofdebate.Seeespecially258-259.105SeeLeavenoftheAncients,228.ThevisionofAristotledeclaresPlatospecificallytohavebeenpossessedofcompleteknowledge,whereasnotasingleIslamicphilosopher(beforeSuhrawardī,presumably)hadachievedthis.106ThePhilosophyofIllumination,xx.

30

Thiscriticismisunclearontwocounts.First,whatismeantbythestatementthattermssuchasʿilmal-ḥudūrīdifferinatechnicalcontext?Doesitmeanthatinsomeplacesitrefersto“primaryimmediatelyknownpremises”andinothersto“mysticalexperience”?Secondly,whatismeantby“mysticalexperience”heresuchthatitnecessarilyfallsoutsidetheboundsofthetwohalvesofSuhrawardī’sperfectphilosophy?InhisreviewofAminrazavi’sbookonSufism,Walbridgestatestheproblemquitewellbyaskingthequestion“whetheritishiscriticalphilosophythatisimportantorhisSufism,or,consequently,whetherhispeculiarmetaphysicsoflightshouldbereadmoreasphilosophyormysticism(italicsmine).”ThereisadichotomyassumedinthisstatementthatWalbridgeandotherswhoaskthesamequestionneverseemtoacknowledgeorseektoclarify.NeitherdoesWalbridgementioninhiscriticismofRazavi,whoholdstheCorbin-Nasrview,thathe(Razavi)doesnotbelievethattheviewwhichplacesprimacyonSuhrawardī’s“mystical”dimensionexcludesornegatestheimportanceofhisdiscursiveengagementwithPeripateticphilosophy.ElsewhereWalbridgeasserts,“ThePhilosophyofIlluminationisphilosophy,notmysticism;Suhrawardīconstructsrationalproofsofhisintuitionsbothforthesakeofhisowncontinuedcertaintyandcorrectinterpretationofthoseintuitionsandfortheguidanceofthosewithouttheexperience.”107ButonecouldsayasmuchaboutmanyofthewritingsofIbnʿArabīandhisschool.Theytooclaimtoderivetheirfundamentaltruthsfromdirectexperience,buttheyacknowledgethepossibilityofcomingdowntoearth,asitwere,torelatesomethingofwhattheyhaveseeninacoherentandlogicalfashion,albeitlimitedinrelationtotheexperienceitself.InthesamepassageWalbridgeclaimsthatSuhrawardīsawrationaldemonstrationastheguarantorofmysticalexperience,thatinordertobecompletethemysticmustbeabletocomedownfromthetopofthemountaininorderto“withthetoolsofsurveying,establishdistances,directions,andaltitudes.”Thisisamisunderstanding,itwouldseem,ofSuhrawardī’sgeneralbeliefthatapersonwhohasbothmysticalandrationalunderstandingoftheloftiesttruthsissuperiortosomeonewhohasonlythedirect,non-rationalkindofunderstanding.Suhrwardiplaceshimselfinthefirstcategory,andhencewouldinthisrespectbesuperiortoBayazīdal-Bisṭāmī,whodidnotpossesstheabilitytodiscussandconveyhisexperienceofrealityinaphilosophicallyunderstandableway.ButthisconfusionresemblestheaccusationsleveledagainstIbnʿArabīthathebelievedthesaint(walī)tobesuperiortotheprophet(nabī).Inactuality,whathesaidwasthatwalāyahwassuperiortonubuwwah,andhencetheProphetwasthegreatestofsaintswhilealsobeingaprophet,butwithinhispersonthewalāyahwassuperiortothenubuwwah.ForSuhrawardī,withinthepersonofthetruephilosopherthedirectknowledgeissuperiortothediscursiveknowledge,butinsofarasamanhasbothkindsofknowledgeheissuperiortothemanwhohasthedirectmysticalkindonly. ThatSuhrawardīdidnothimselfdrawanystrictdistinctionbetweenmysticalexperiencesandphilosophyismadeclearfromhisKitābal-talwīḥātwhereherecountsamysticalvisionhehadofnoneotherthanAristotle,whoimpartstoSuhrawardīthetruthsofknowledgebypresence(al-ʿilmal-ḥudūrī)andtherealityofthePlatonicIdeas.108ItisAristotlewhotellshimthatSufissuchasBayazīdal-BisṭāmīandḤallājarethetrue

107J.Walbridge,TheScienceofMysticLights,42.108SeeLeavenoftheAncients,225ff.

31

philosophers,notthePeripatetics.Regardlessoftheactualsourceofthisvision,ittellsusthatforSuhrawardītruephilosophyandtruemysticalinsight,farfrombeingviewedintermsofaneither/oroption,wereinseparable.OneintroducesanartificialandunnecessaryschismintoSuhrawardībyforcingthereadertomakeachoicebetweenphilosophyandmysticism.ItisasseriousanerrortodismissthemysticaldimensionofSuhrawardīasitistopassoverhisphysicsandlogic.IfavisionofAristotlecelebratingḤallājandbelittlingtheaccomplishmentsofPeripateticphilosophydoesnotgiveusanindicationoftheplaceofsupra-rationalandmysticalelementsinSuhrawardī’sthought,thenwhatcan?Acoherentlogic,physics,andmetaphysics,nomatterhowwelldevelopedandsimilarinlanguagetothePeripatetictradition,caninnowaynegatetheprideofplacewhichSuhrawardīgivestodirectsupra-rationalexperience.ForSuhrawardītherewasnocontradiction,andifwearetotakehisownclaimsseriouslyweshouldnotattempttoforceacontradictionintoouranalysisofhiswritings.Indeed,hementionshisreasonforwritingdowntheWisdomofIlluminationinhisintroductiontoḤikmatal-ishrāq,whichhisfriendshadbeenimploringhimtosetitdowninwriting:

[Y]ouwentonmyfriends…beggingmetowriteyouabookinwhichIwouldtellwhatIhaveobtainedthroughmyintuition(dhawq)duringmyretreatsandvisions.Ineveryseekingsoulthereisaportion,beitsmallorgreat,ofthelightofGod.Everyonewhostriveshasintuition,beitperfectorimperfect.

Dhawq,whichliterallymeans“taste,”isatechnicalterminIlluminationistphilosophymeaningthe“directapprehensionofthequidditiesofthings,”109butitcanhardlybecalledanaccidentthatitisalsoaSufitermreferringtothedirectperceptionandexperienceofathingasopposedtoconceptualknowledgeaboutit.Moreover,thewordforretreathereiskhalwah,anotherSufitermforatimeofextendedisolationfordhikr.Thus,wehaveinSuhrawardīexplicitmentionofanepistemologywheredirectmysticalexperienceisthetruestknowledge,aswellasacknowledgementofthefactthattheinsightsofhisphilosophyaretheresultofasceticismandreligiousdevotion,notofmerecogitation.110-SettingtheStagefortheSchoolofWaḥdatal-wujūd

Theimportanceofthefourfiguresdiscussedinthischapterisnotlimitedtotheirusefulnessasexamplesofthecontroversybetweenphilosophyandmysticism.Indeed,farfrommerelyembodyingadifferentdimensionofthedebatebetweenrationalandclaimsofsupra-rationalknowledgeandunderstanding,eachofthesefigureshadacrucialintellectualroletoplayinthecrystallizationoftheschoolofwaḥdatal-wujūdwhichoccurredinthecenturiesofIslamicphilosophyandSufimetaphysicsleadinguptothegreatsynthesisofMullāṢadrā.Tracingouttheontologicaldimensionofthisgradualcrystallizationandsynthesis,asitconcernstheconceptsofwujūdandtashkīk,willoccupyusintheremainingchaptersofthisdissertation.ButinconclusionletusoutlinetheimportanceofourthinkersandtheroletheyhadtoplayinsettingthestagefortheAkbarianschoolandforMullāṢadrāandhispredecessors. 109ThePhilosophyofIllumination,169.110“Itiscrucialtorealizetheimportanceofasceticismandpracticalwisdomtotheishraqidoctrineasawhole,eventhoughthisiscontrarytosomeofthelaterinterpretersofSuhrawardīwhoputmoreemphasisonhisintellectualandphilosophicalaspects.”Aminrazavi,SuhrawardīandtheSchoolofIllumination,53

32

ItisprobablymostreasonabletoassumethatAvicennahimselfwasnotamysticorSufi,althoughitseemsequallyclearthathewaswell-acquaintedwiththemanifestationsofSufisminhisday,andthatatleastinhisIshārātheexperimentedwithincorporatingSufiterminology,seeminglyadmittingtheprovisionalvalidityoftheSufiperspective,quiteapartfromany“incorporation”intohissystem.Moreover,thethemesandtenorofhisphilosophicalallegories,thoughtheextenttowhichtheywereinspiredbyactualmysticalbeliefsormotivationsremainsdebatable,neverthelesseasilydovetailintomysticismproperlyspeaking.Forexample,SuhrawardīsawAvicenna’sallegoriesasanimperfectdepictionofthespiritualquest,andtheyinfactinspiredhimtocomposehisown,ostensiblymoreperfect,spiritualallegories.WhatisofgreatestimportancehereisnottodeterminetheextenttowhichAvicennaheldorespousedmysticaldoctrines,sinceitwouldseemthatthetextualevidenceallowsustosayneitherthatheconsideredmysticismtobenonsensenorthathewassecretlyamysticalpractitionerwithaclosely-heldesotericdoctrine.Rather,itistheconceptualandlinguisticframeworkwhichAvicennabequeathedtolatergenerationsofIslamicphilosophersandSufidoctrinalthinkerswhichmakeshimsosignificantintermsofthelaterschoolofwaḥdatal-wujūd.WhateverthelevelofAvicenna’sownmysticism,hiscorpusofwritings,includingtheallegoriesbutespeciallyworkssuchastheIshārāt,constitutedawayofspeakingaboutmetaphysicsandcosmologywhichhadtheinherentprecision,scope,andflexibilitytobeassimilatedbylaterthinkerswhowerethemselvesmuchmoreovertlymysticallyminded.111ThisisnottosaythatthephilosophicallinguafrancaAvicennaestablishedwasinherentlyorpredominantlymystical,ratherthatitsowncharacteristicsasasystemofwords,concepts,andmodesofexpressionprovidedlatergenerationsofmysticallymindedthinkerswithastartingpointandwithmanyofthebuildingblockswithwhichtoassembletheirownmetaphysicalsystems.ThisAvicennianheritageisseenclearlyintheworksofSuhrawardī,inthelaterschoolofIbnʿArabīfromthetimeofDāwūdal-Qayṣarī,inthepredecessorsofMullāṢadrāandthenfinallyinṢadrāhimself,nottomentionthewholehistoryofkalāmafterhim.ThatAvicennahimselfbegantointroduceSufiterminologyintohisworkinthelaterpartofhislife—apointonwhichallscholarsagree—isrepresentativeofwhatwouldhappentohiswayofspeakingaboutphilosophicalquestionsduringtheensuingcenturies.

111“IbnSīnā’smysticalwritings,especiallyal-Ishārāt,werearichsourcefromwhichnotonlyIbnTufayl,butlaterphilosophersandsufisborrowedheavily,evenwherenoacknowledgmentofthatismade,asinthecaseofIbnBajjaorIbnʿArabī”(S.Inati,IbnSīnāandMysticism,London,1996,66).ThoughnotagreeingwiththeassertionofIbnSīnā’sintrinsicmysticalcontent,P.Heathlargelyagrees:“AlthoughitistruethatAvicenna’selaboratetheoryofemanationbecameamajorsourceandmodelforallaltertheorists,hisownreactiontotheothertrends[i.e.thetendencytomysticism,thetheoryofal-insānal-kāmil,andthetheoryofcosmiccorrespondences]wouldhavebeenlessthanaccommodating.WhateverterminologyhemighthaveborrowedfromSufisminlateryears,Avicennawasnoadherentoftheconceptofsupernaturalmysticism.Suchanapproachgoesagainsttherationalismuponwhichhefoundedhiswholephilosophy…ItisoneoftheironiesofAvicenna’slegacythat,antagonisticashewastothesetrends,histhought(bothlogosandmuthos)wasnonethelessadopted,adapted,andsubsumedbytheirlaterexponents.Infact,itwouldbepossibletoarguethatitwasonlythisprocessofassimilationandincorporationthatkeptthephilosopher’sideasalivethroughtheensuingcenturies”(AllegoryandPhilosophyinAvicenna,186-7).

33

ButhereitcanbesaidthatGhazālīandAvicennahadacommonroleinchangingtheparametersofmetaphysicaldiscourseinIslam.R.Wisnovskyargues,forexample,thatalthoughGhazālīisgivenmuchcreditforchangingthenatureofSunnikalāmandmakingitsproblemsverysimilartothoseofthephilosophers,thischangewasalreadytakingplaceduringAvicenna’sgenerationandwasdueinparttoAvicenna’sowncontribution.OnemajorchangewasthemetaphysicalshiftthatmadeGod’score“meta-attribute”tobeexistence(wujūd)insteadofeternality(qidam),andwhichmadetherelationshipofwujūdtomāhiyyahthemainepistemologicalquestion.BeforeAvicenna,themainconceptsusedtodiscussGod’sessenceandHisqualitieswerethenotionsofeternality(qidam)andtheircomingtobeintime(ḥudūth).112InthecenturyorsoafterAvicenna,someprominenttheologiansbegantorefertoGodaswājibal-wujūd.Ghazālī’steacheral-JuwaynitookthestepofassertingthatGod’seternalityandnecessitywereco-implied,whileGhazālīhimselftookthefurtherstepofsayingthatnecessityofexistenceisbasic,eternalitybeingderivativeofthisexistentialnecessity.113Suchchangeswereemblematicoftheincreasinglevelofcomfortthatphilosophy-warytheologiansneverthelesscametofeelwiththelanguageofphilosophy.114 Ghazālī’seffect,however,wasmuchmoredirectandobviousthanAvicenna’swhenitcametoreshapingthephilosophical-theologicaldiscourse.Bymakingthecriticismofphilosophysuchacentralpointofhismetaphysicalwritings,bygivingaclearpresentationofPeripateticdoctrines,andbygivinganuancedpositionaboutwhichaspectsofphilosophycouldbeconsideredcorrect,incorrect,orneutralasregardsreligion,GhazālīpermanentlyplantedphilosophyontotheIslamicintellectuallandscape.Thus,intakingphilosophytotaskforthesakeoffaith,heforcedkalāmtocometogripswithphilosophy.AsMarmuraputsit,“Afteral-Ghazālī,noIslamictheologianworthhissaltavoideddetaileddiscussionofthephilosophicaltheoriesal-Ghazālīhadcriticized.Kalāmthereafterbecame,asithadneverbeenbefore,thoroughlyinvolvedwiththe

112“Inthecaseofepistemology…pre-AvicennianSunni-kalāmdistinctionsbetweenthreemeanstoknowledge—perception(ḥiss),report(khabar),andspeculation(naẓar)—andbetweentwotypesofknowledge—acquired(muktasab)andapriori(ḍarūrī)—wereeclipsedbypost-AvicennianSunni-kalāmdistinctionsbetweenthetwomostbasicobjectsofknowledge—essence(māhiyyah)andexistence(wujūd)—andbetweenthreemodesofknowledgeofknowledge—necessary(wājib),possible(jā’izormumkin)andimpossible(mustaḥīlormumtaniʿ).Asfor…theproofsofGod’sexistence,thepre-AvicennianSunni-kalāmdistinctionbetweenGod’sbeingeternal(qadīm)andtheworld’sbeingoriginated(muhdath)cededgroundtothepost-AvicennianSunni-kalāmdistinctionbetweenGod’sbeingnecessaryofexistenceinitself(wājibal-wujūdbi-dhātīhi)andtheworld’sbeingpossibleofexistenceinitself(mumkin[orja’iz]al-wujūdbi-dhātīhi).Andinthecaseof…God’sonenessandattributes,pre-AvicennianSunni-kalāmdebatesovertheprecisenatureofthedivineattributes’eternality(qidam)weresupercededbypost-AvicennianSunni-kalāmdebatesovertheprecisenatureoftheattributes’necessity(wujūb).”RobertWisnovsky,“OneAspectoftheAvicennianTurninSunniTheology,”ArabicSciencesandPhilosophy,vol.14(2004),65-100.113Ibid.,91-95.114ItshouldalsobenotedthatAvicennawaslikelyhimself,indevelopinghismetaphysics,respondingtosalientissuesbeingdiscussedinkalāmcircles.ForafulldiscussionofthepossibleantecedentsofAvicenna’scoreconcepts,seeR.Wisnovsky,Avicenna’sMetaphysicsinContext,London,2003,chapters8-9.

34

theoriesofthefalāsifa.”115Inattackingthe“proudfoundations”ofAvicennianthoughtinthejudiciousmannerhedid—keepingmuchofitsmannerofspeakingaboutthingsifnotitsconclusions—heremovedsomeofthebarrierbetweenkalāmandphilosophy.Ifkalāmhadpreviouslybeenanarmoftherevealedtradition,thankstoGhazālī,Avicenna,andothertheologians,thisarmwasabletoreachintothedomainofphilosophyintact—andsimilarly,philosophywasgivenanopeningintotheworldoftherevealedtradition. Moregenerally,throughtheargumentshemadeagainstthepurelyrationalunderpinningsofAvicennianthought,Ghazālīinsuredthatnosystemofthoughtbasedsolelyonthereasoningpowersofhumanbeings,independentofthetruthsofthereligioustradition,wouldevertakeholdintheIslamicworld.HemayhaveallowedAristotelianlogic(withcertaincriticisms)andmathematicstobeadoptedasmorallyneutraltoolsforallkindsofvalidknowledge,butafterGhazālīnoconceptualsystemcouldsurviveinIslamifthesummitofthehierarchyweretobeoccupiedbythereasoninganddiscursivepowersofthehumanintelligence.Moreover,throughworkssuchastheIḥyāʿandtheNicheofLights,Ghazālī’salsopushedthephilosophicalandmetaphysicaltendenciesamongthinkersintheIslamicworldtowardscomingtogripswithrevelationandthe“supernatural”truthclaimsofthemystics.Ghazālīcreatedanenvironmentinwhichitbecamedifficultifnotpracticallyimpossibletoevaluatetheclaimsofsystematicrationalthinkers—betheytheologians,philosophers,ormystics—outsideoftheauthorityandlegitimacywhichcouldonlybebestowedbytheQurʾānicandprophetictradition.116OnewasthusleftwithasituationinGhazālī’swakewhereitwasincreasinglydifficulttoputforthapurelyPeripateticorrationalistsysteminisolationfromthedemandsoftherevealedtradition,whileatthesametimethosewhohadstyledthemselvesthedefendersandupholdersofthefaithwereforcedtoadoptmanyoftheconceptualmethodsofthephilosopherswhomtheyattacked. IbnʿArabīwasthefirstmajorthinkerinIslamtocombineathoroughgoingconcernwiththeQurʾān,ḥadīth,andthepracticeofthepiouslife(hisFutūḥātcontainsthousandsofpagesonthespiritualsignificanceofthefivepillars,forexample)withacomprehensivemetaphysicalandcosmologicalvision.HepaidlittleheedtothesystematizingeffortsofAvicenna,andperhapsknewnothingabouthisoldercontemporarySuhrawardī,buthelaidoutapowerfulandcompellingontologyoftheoneinmanynessandthemanyinoneness(tobediscussedlater),whichwashugelyinfluentialamonglaterthinkersallthewayuptoṢadrā.ItwasIbnʿArabīwhodemonstratedthatamysticalpointofviewcouldhavesomethingtosayaboutalltheareastouchedonbyphilosophyandtheology,andinfactclaimedthatonlythroughasystemthattookasitspinnaclethedirectencounterbetweenmanandGodcouldrationalthinkingassumeitsproperplaceinhumanknowledge.TheAkbarianschoolafterhimtooksomeofthemorephilosophicalandsystematicaspectsofhiswritingandoverthecenturiesrefinedthemintoalanguageandconceptualhierarchywhichreachedaheightofphilosophicalpolishwiththewritingsofDāwūdal-Qayṣarī.ThemetaphysicsoftheAkbarianschool,nomatterhowsimilarinlanguagetothelargebodyofIslamic 115TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,xv-xvi.116NodoubtGhazālīwouldhaveapprovedofmuchofIbnʿArabī’sdoctrine,althoughhewouldhavequarreledwithhiscompletelackofconcernforexposingesoterictruths,especiallyinabooksuchasFuṣūṣal-ḥikamwhichcanbedownrightprovocativeinitsboldinterpretationsoftheQurʾānandtheroleoftheProphet.

35

philosophy,wasfirmlyrootedintheQurʾān,ḥadīth,andorganizedorinstitutionalSufism. Becauseofthehomogenizationofthelanguageofdiscoursetoonewheretherootconceptswerewujūd,māhiyyah,wujūb,imkān,amongstothers,Sufisofametaphysicalbentwouldhavelittlechoicebuttosomehowcometogripswiththislanguageofdiscourse,inmuchthewaySuhrawardīdideventhoughhisphilosophicalvisionwassodifferent.ThiswastrueoftheschoolofIbnʿArabī,althoughtheeffectwasnotimmediate.Aswasmentionedearlier,IbnʿArabīdidnotconformhimselfovermuchtotheideasofthephilosophersandtheologians,whomhelumpedtogetherasahlal-naẓarasopposedtopossessorsofdirectillumination.However,philosophicalconceptsmostdefinitelymaketheirappearanceinhiswritings,andundertheinfluenceofphilosophicalconceptshisdescendantsbringSufismclosertothephilosophicaldiscourse,thewayGhazālīhadalreadydoneforkalām.Thisprocesswillbedescribedindetailinthenextchapter. Suhrawardī,unlikeIbnʿArabī,didnotoperateprimarilyinauniverseofQurʾānicsymbolismandthushasasomewhatalienqualityinrelationtotheQurʾānandḥadīth.Rather,hestrovetoexplainavisionofthingsthatsoughttobemoreopenlyperennialanduniversal.Hisuniquecontributiontophilosophywastoattempttoenshrinetheepistemologyofthemysticsinasystematicphilosophicaldiscourse.UnlikeIbnʿArabī,heaimedatsystematizationandconsistencyinthemannerofthePeripatetics,eventhoughhispremisesandhisconclusionswerevastlydifferentfromAvicenna’s.ItwasimpossiblethatSuhrawardīcouldhavehadthewideanduniversalappealofIbnʿArabī,ashisIslamiccredentialswerenotstrongenough—atleastinhiswritings—andhissystemdoesnotoperatecomfortablyinthecontextofthescripturaltradition.Suhrawardīwastheearliestthinkertostrivetocreateacompletesystem—thatis,aconceptuallycoherentonewithaworkingtechnicalvocabularytogoalongwithitsvisionofreality—thatcombinedthefundamentalsupra-rationalclaimsofmysticismwiththereasoned-outrigorofphilosophy.Hewastremendouslyinfluentialindeterminingtheissueslaterphilosophywouldfocusupon.LaterIslamicphilosopherswouldtendtoclassifythinkersintermsofwhethertheyconsideredessencetobebasic(aṣālatal-māhiyyah,Suhrawardī)orexistence(aṣālatal-wujūd,theAkbarianschoolandMullāṢadrā),anditwasSuhrawardī’scritiqueofAvicenna’streatmentofwujūdwhichbeganthisprocess,atleastintheeyesoflaterIslamicphilosophers.Ṣadrā,whodepartedfromSuhrawardīonfundamentalquestions,arguablyowedmuchtohimintermsofthewayhespokeaboutthingsinhisphilosophy.

36

ChapterTwo:WujūdandTashkīk,andtheCorrespondencebetweenQūnawīandṬūsī

Inthischapterwewillbegintoseehowmysticismandphilosophyinteractedanddevelopedastheyconcernontology,andspecificallyastheyrelatetotheconceptsofwujūd(existence)andtashkīk(equivocality),aswellasthoseconceptsdirectlyrelatedtothem.Thisstudyislimitedtoontology,althoughtheinfluencesandinteractionsbetweenmysticismandphilosophyarenotlimitedtoontology,butincludeepistemology,cosmology,ethics,andeventheunderstandingofQurʾānandḥadīth.ThefirstpartofthischapterisadiscussionoftashkīkandwhatitmeanttoMuslimphilosophers.ThisisfollowedbyasectiondealingwiththeapproachtoontologyoftheAkbarianschoolingeneralbutspecificallyofIbnʿArabī’sgreatestdiscipleandstudentṢadral-Dīnal-Qūnawī,withadetailedanalysisoftheconceptofwujūdandrelatedconceptsastheyareusedinhiswritings.ThisisfollowedbyadiscussionofthecorrespondencebetweenQūnawīandhisPeripateticShīʿīcontemporaryNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī,1anexchangeofideaswhichshedsmuchlightonhowtheSufimetaphysiciansandthephilosophersviewedeachother’sideas.

Ṣadral-DīnMuḥammadb.Isḥāqb.Yusufal-Qūnawīal-Rūmī(d.673/1274)wasoneoftheforemostdisciplesofIbnʿArabī,2andwascertainlythemostnotableasfarasthepracticeofmetaphysicalexpositionwasconcerned.3IbnʿArabībecamefriendswithQūnawī’sfather,Majdal-DīnIsḥāq,andthetwotraveledtogethertoAnatoliain601/1204-5.Qūnawīwasbornin1210,anditissaidthatIbnʿArabīmarriedhismotheraftershehadbeenwidowedbyhisfather.QūnawītookovertheroleoftrainingdisciplesafterIbnʿArabī’sdeathin1240,amongthemʿĀfīfal-Dīnal-Tilimsānī(d.1291),amajorSufiinhisownright.

FiveyearsafterIbnʿArabī’sdeath,QūnawītraveledtoEgyptwherehegaveoralcommentaryonIbnal-Fārid’spoemNaẓmal-sulūk.HecontinuedthiscommentaryallthewaybacktoKonya,andhisdiscipleSaʿīdal-Dīnal-Farghānīcollectedhisnotesinbookform,entitledMashāriqal-darārī,whichlaterappearedinArabicunderthetitleMuntahā’l-madārik.HewasfollowedinthistraditionofcommentingonIbnal-Farid’spoetrybyKāshānīandbyQayṣarī.ThiscombinationofAkbarianmetaphysicsandArabicSufipoetryisalittleknownandlittlestudiedaspectofSufismintheWest.

QūnawītaughtḥadīthinKonya,andamonghisstudentswasthephilosopherQutbal-DīnShirazi(d.1311),themostprominentofṬūsī’sstudents.Inadditiontobeingthefriend,son-in-law,anddiscipleofIbnʿArabī,hewasfriendswithhiscontemporaryinKonyaJalālal-DīnRūmī.QūnawīdidinitiatedisciplesintoSufism,butnotallhisstudentswerehisdisciples,forexampleFakhral-DīnʿIrāqī.ʿIraqīwrotea

1SeeH.Dabashi,“KhwājahNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī:ThePhilosopher/VizierandtheIntellectualClimateofHisTimes,”inHistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,527-84.2ForanaccountoftheijāzahQunawīreceivedfromIbnʿArabī,andthebookshestudiedwithhim,seeGeraldElmore,“Sadral-Dīnal-Qunawī’sPersonalStudyListofBooksbyIbnʿArabī,”JournalofNearEasternStudies,56:3(1997),161-181,whichalsodiscussesIbnʿArabī’sownbibliographyofhisownworks,theFihristal-mu’allafat,whichwaswrittenforQunawī.3SeeWilliamChittick,“TheCentralPoint:Qunawī’sRoleintheSchoolofIbnʿArabī,”JournaloftheMuhyiddinIbnʿArabīSociety,xxxv(2004),25-45.Foramorecompletebiographicalaccount,seehis,“TheSchoolofIbn‘Arabi,”(TheHistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,511-14).

37

workcalledLamaʿāt4inPersianfollowingthestyleofAḥmadGhazālī’sSawāniḥ,5inspiredbyQūnawī’steachings.FarghānīwasinitiatedinthelineofShihābal-DīnʿUmaral-Suhrawardī(d.1234).

Qūnawīwasineverysenseapractitioneroftaṣawwuf,andhisstartingandendingpointwasthespiritualpath,buthewasalsointimatelyfamiliarwiththeideasofthephilosophers.6HeisgenerallyconsideredthemostimportantfigureindeterminingwhattheheritageofIbnʿArabī’swritingswouldbetotherestoftheIslamicworld.Theworks7ofQūnawīwhichwewillprimarilybediscussinginthissectionareKitābal-fukūkfīasrārmustanadātḥikamal-Fuṣūṣ,acommentaryontheFuṣūṣal-ḥikam;hiscommentaryupontheFatihahentitledIʿjazal-bayānfītaʾwīlummal-Qurʾān;hismajorworkonmetaphysicsMiftāḥghaybal-jamʿwaʾl-wujūd,usuallyshortenedtoMiftāḥal-ghayb;andhisphilosophicalcorresponencewithṬūsīpublishedunderthetitleMurāsalātbaynaQūnawīwa-Ṭūsī.-TashkīkasaPhilosophicalConcept

InFarābī’sK.al-Ḥurūfthereisapassagethat,thoughnotmentioningequivocality(tashkīk)explicitly,neverthelessoutlinesakindofrelationshipbetweenacertainclassofthingswhichisneitherconventionalsynonymynorconventionalhomonymy.Hewrites:

Itisproper[ifyoudesiretoknow](sic)thesecategoriesthatyouhaveknowledgeofthosethingswhosenamesagree(muttafiqahasmāʾuhā),thosewhichareunivocallynamed(mutawāṭiʾahasmāʾuhā),andthosewhichareintermediatebetweenthosewhicharesimilarlynamed(homonymous)andthosewhichareunivocallynamed.Thesearethosethingswhichbearthesamenameandwhichareattributedtodifferentthingsbyvirtueofsomethingwhichtheyallbearinmutualresemblance,withoutthosethingstowhichthisentityisattributedbeingnamedbyitandwithoutthatoneentitybeingnamedwiththenameofthosethings.8

AsFazlurRaḥmānpointsout,theclassicalAristoteliantraditionhadmadeadistinctionbetweenunivocallyapplicableand“equivocallyorambiguously”applicableuniversals. 4DivineFlashes/Fakhral-DīnʿIrāqī.TranslatedbyWilliamChittickandPeterLamborn(NewYork,1982).5SeeSawāniḥ:InspirationsfromtheWorldofPureSpirits,translatedbyNasrollahPourjavady(NewYork,1986).6QunawīwasalsoacontemporaryandfriendofJalālal-DīnRūmī,whowasayoungercontemporaryofIbnʿArabī.EvenwiththelinkthatQunawīcouldhavetheoreticallyprovided,however,itdoesnotseemthatthetwomysticalgiantshadanyeffectoneachother’sideas.SomehaveconcludedthatthoughRumiwasinfactfamiliarwithIbnʿArabī’sideashedidnotentirelyapproveofthem.SeeMehmetDemirci,“SadreddinKoneviileMevlanaCelaladdin’inMunasebetleriHakkinda,”D.E.UIlāhiyatFakültesiDergisiVI(1989)159-171.7AcompletelistingofhisworksandmanuscriptsistobefoundinOsmanErgin,“Sadreddinal-QunawīveEserleri,”ŞarkiyatMecmuası,2(1957),63-90.ForadiscussionregardingtheauthenticityofworksattributedtoQunawī,andforabriefaccountofhislifeandhisspiritualandintellectualacquaintances,seeWilliamChittick,“TheLastWillandTestamentofIbnʿArabī’sForemostDiscipleandSomeNotesonitsAuthor,”SophiaPerennis,4:1(1978),43-58(alsoavailableonthewebsiteoftheMuhyiddinIbnʿArabīSociety).8Kitabal-huruf,ed.MuhsinMahdi,Beirut1970,71.

38

Anexampleofthefirstis“man,”whichcanbesaidofallhumanbeings,andanexampleofthesecondis“soul,”whichcanbesaidofanimalsouls,humansouls,celestialsouls,etc…9ThepassageinFarābīisanacknowledgementthatbetweenunivocality(“man”beingpredicatedofZaydandʿAmr)andsynonymy(“man”and“humanbeing”)athirdwayofpredicationwhichpossessesaspectsoftheothertwomustexist.Unlike“man”thereisamultiplicityintheunqualifiedconceptof“soul,”suchthatitstillretainsitsrealmeaningbutbyitsverydefinitionispredicatedofdifferentlevelsofthings,atleastintheclassicalconceptionof“soul.” ThewordtashkīkappearsasearlyasIbnSīnāinthephilosophicalsenseofgraduatedornon-univocalpredication,suchasthepredicationof“luminous”ofthesun,alantern,andacandle.ForexampleintheMetaphysics(ilāhiyyāt)ofK.al-Shifāʾ,10IbnSīnāsays,“‘One’canbesaidequivocally(biʾl-tashkīk)ofmeaningsthatcoincideinbeingactuallyundividedinthemselves.However,inthismeaningthereexistspriorityandposteriority.”Then,settingasidetheonenessofattribution(ʿarḍ)suchasthestatement,“ZaydandIbnAbdullahareone(i.e.thesame,wāḥid),”IbnSīnāsays,“Asforthatwhichisoneinitself,itcanbeoneingenus,11oneinspecies,oneindifferentia,oneinaffinity(munāsabah),oneinsubject(mawḍūʿ),oroneinnumber.”Thusonecancorrectlybepredicatedinallthesewaysandyetnotmeanthesamething.Inanothersection,entitled“OnPriorityandPosteriority,andonComingToBe(ḥudūth)”hesays,“Priorityandposteriority,eventhoughtheycanbesaidinmanyways,canappeartogetherinonethingbymeansofequivocality(ʿalāsabīlal-tashkīk).Thishappenswhentheprior,insofarasitisprior,hassomethingtheposteriordoesnothaveandtheposteriorhasnothingthatthepriordoesnothave.”12Hethenoutlinesvariouswaysinwhichathingcanbeprior,suchasbeingpriorinspaceorintime(something’sbeingcloserorhappeningfirst);orbeingpriorinthewaybeing-a-bodyispriortobeing-an-animalintermsofsubstance(jawhar);orbeingclosertothePrimeMover,asachildisinrelationtoanadult.Inallcasesofprioritythereisameaningpossessedbythepriorthingwhichisnotpossessedbytheposteriorthing,whilethepriorthingpossesseseverythingthattheposteriorthingpossessesofthatmeaning.Intermsofbeing-a-substanceananimalmustfirstbeabody,andintermsofcomingfromthePrimeMoveranadultmustfirstbeachild.Thepointhereisthattheterm“prior”appliestoallofthesebutnotinthesameway.Itcanbesaidofthemequivocally,whichmeansthatachildcanbeclosertothePrimeMover,butcanalsobeclosertoaperceiverspatially,andcanalsoarrivehomeearlier.Inallcasesthechildis“prior”butthetermisusedequivocally.

9F.Raḥmān,ThePhilosophyofMullāṢadrā,34.HepointsoutthatlaterMuslimPeripateticsdidnotadoptthisviewandinsteadfocusedontheparticularinstancesofanessence.Whenblacknesschanges,thereisnodifferenceintheblackbutratheranewspeciesofblackcomesintoexistencewhiletheothergoesoutofexistence.10K.al-Shifa’Ilāhiyyat3:2,97-98oftheMadkuredition.11Icanonlyassumethereisamisprinthere.Insteadofminhu(wa-minhual-wāḥidbi’l-jins)itreadswa-huwa,whichcouldbemistakenforoneanother.Ireaditasapartofthelistoftypesofonenessandreadminhu.12K.al-Shifa’Ilāhiyyat4:1,163-164.

39

Itranslatetashkīkas“equivocality”andmushakkakas“equivocal,”althoughothershavetranslateditas“gradation”or“analogicalgradation”13or“systematicambiguity.”14Therearetwofactorstoconsiderindiscussingandtranslatingthisimportantconcept.First,tashkīkisawordthatbelongsinalogicalgroupwithtawāṭuʾor“univocality,”andtheconceptofthisgradationinpredicationisoftendiscussedinphilosophicaltexts,sousingtheprefix“equi-”workswellwiththerelatedconceptwhichusestheprefix“uni-.”Second,andperhapsmoreimportant,isthequestionofthederivationandmeaningoftheworditselfinArabic.IfwedosomethingassimpleaslookinLane’sLexicon,weseethatshikākare“tentsarrangedinarow”;ashakīkahis“aparty,sect,ordistinctbodyorclass”;shakkūʾ-l-arḥāmmeans,“Theymadetherelationshipstobecloselyconnected”;shakkacanalsomean,“Hewasmade,orasserted,tobeconnectedtothelineageofanother”;shakaktuhumeans,“Idrewandjoined,oradjoined,it[toanotherthing]”;shakkal-thawbmeans,“He(thesewer)madethestitchholesfarapart[insewingagarmentorpieceofcloth].”Thusinadditiontothemeaningofdoubtanduncertainty,thetrilateralrootsh-k-kcarriesasenseofthingsarrangedinarow,aclass,oragrouping,butalsoofjoiningthingstogethersuchaslineagesandeventhreadthroughagarment. WenoticethattashkīksharesthetafʿīlformwithsuchcoreIslamicintellectualconceptsastawḥīd,tanzīh,andtashbīh.Suchwordshavealwaysbeenchallengingtotranslateowingtothefactthattheydenotesomethingstaticaswellassomethingdynamicatthesametime.Tawḥīd,forexample,meansbothonenessandthedoctrineofoneness(ofGod),whilealsoreferringtothesubjectiveactofmakingone,ofdeemingathing(specifically,God)tobeone.ThesameholdstruefortheincomparabilityorsimilarityofGod;tanzīhandtashbīharebothdoctrinesaswellasmentalacts.Ifweviewtashkīkinthesameway,wecanproduceadefinitionwhichmightread,“Thestatusofathingbeinguncertainortheactofdeemingathingtobeuncertain.”FazlurRaḥmānappearstorelyheavilyonthissensewhenrenderingtashkīkas“systematicambiguity,”aproblematictranslationtosaytheleast.Butwhatofthepossibilityofapplyingthetafʿīlformtotheword’sothermeanings?Applythetafʿīltotheaforementionedexamplesandonecouldreasonablyproduce,“Thefactofathingbeingarrangedinrows,classes,orgroups,ortheactofdeemingthemtobeso,orthefactofathingorthingsbeingcloselyconnectedandtheactofdeemingthemtobeso.”Itiscertainlynotthesenseofdoubtorambiguitythatisbeingusedinthewordmushakkakahor“lattice,”forexample. Suchadefinitionoftashkīkappliesverywelltoitsphilosophicalusage,namelyasinglerealitythatisyetsomehowtousarrangedinvariousgroupingsormodeswhilebeingconnectedbytheveryfactofbeingindividualinstancesofthatthing.ForthePeripateticsitremainsadescriptionofakindofpredicationthatstandsbetweenunivocalityandindividualnaming.ItdidnotappeartobeaverycrucialconcepttoFarābī,IbnSīnā,ortheircontemporaries,andinanycasewasnotapartoftheirmetaphysics.Aswewillseeagainbelow,theirunderstandingofthingsplacedtashkīkmoreintherealmoflogic,specificallypredication.ItappearsthatitisatthetimeofNaṣīral-DīnṬūsīthatthetermtashkīkinitsphilosophicalsensereallymakesastrongentranceontothephilosophicalscene,whenṬūsīreliesheavilyontheconcepttorebut 13SeeforexampleSeyyedHosseinNasr,Ṣadral-DīnShīrāzīandhisTranscendentTheosophy(Tehran,1997),107-8.14SeeforexampleF.Rahman,ThePhilosophyofMullāṢadrā(Albany,1975),34.

40

someofthechallengesofFakhral-Dīnal-RāzītoIbnSīnā’sal-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt,aswellastoanswerthequestionsposedtohimbyQūnawī,asweshallseelaterinthischapter.-Ṭūsī’scommentsontashkīkintheSharḥal-ishārāt

IncommentingonapassageintheIshārātwhereIbnSīnādescribeshowaquidditycanbethecauseofaquality—aswhen(thecapacityof)reason(nāṭiqiyyah)canbethe“cause”for(thecapacityof)wonderment(mutaʿajjibiyyah),whichistosaythattheessenceofonenecessitatesorimpliestheessenceoftheother—Ṭūsīspeaksofwujūdasbeingaqualityalso,butwiththemajordifferencethatquiddityexistsbyreasonofwujūd.Qualitiescanariseasaresultofquiddity,orqualitiescanarisefromeachother,butexistencecannotarisefromeither.Ṭūsīmakesitclear(p.39)thatquidditytakingonexistenceasaquality(ittiṣāfal-māhiyyahbiʾl-wujūd)isapurelyconceptualmove.Itdoesnotactuallyhappenconcretely,unlikeforexamplewhenabodytakesonthecolorwhite.Aquiddityquareceptacleforexistenceisathinginourminds.Ṭūsīnotesthistoforestallanyappealtoaninfiniteregress,whereaquiddity’sexistencewouldbeprecededbyitsownexistence.Thisistosay,ifthequidditytakesonexistenceasaquality,thenitmustfirstexist,andwouldthusalreadypossessexistenceasaquality. Fahkral-Dīnal-Rāzī,Ṭūsī’s“worthycommentator,”takesthisrelationshipbetweenquiddityandexistenceasproblematic,asitimpliesthattheexistencebelongingtoGodandtheexistencebelongingtosomeparticularthingareofequalstatus.Ifthisisso,Rāzīargues,justastheexistenceofathingis“attributedto”(ʿāriḍ)15itsquiddity,sotooistheexistenceofGod“attributedto”Hisquiddity.Followingthroughonthisreasoning,then,eitherthestatusoftheexistenceofparticularthingsrisestotheleveloftheNecessaryinExistence(wājibal-wujūd)—orthestatusoftheNecessaryfalls—ortheuseofthewordwujūdisonlyhomonymy(ishtirāklafẓī),andthereisnocommonmeaningbetweenitsuseinconnectionwithGodanditsuseinconnectionwithcreatedorcontingentthings. Ṭūsī’sanswertothisobjectionreliesontheconcepttashkīk.Anexampleoftruehomonymyisthewordʿayninitsvariousseparatemeaningsof“eye,”“spring,”and“identity.”Whenitcomestopredicationsthatoccurequivocally,meaningaccordingtotashkīk,themeaningofthepredicationisthesamebut“notuniformly”(lāʿalāʾl-sawāʾ).Thus“continuous”canbesaidbothofagivendimensionandoftheobjectpossessingthedimension;“one”canbesaidbothofsomethingthatistotallyindivisibleandofthat

15InEnglish,therelationshipofjawhartoʿaraḍhasusuallybeenexpressedas“substance”and“accident,”andsomehavesuggested“coincident”forthelatterasitfollowstheoriginalmeaningoftheGreekmoreclosely.Theʿaraḍofasubstanceissomethingwhich“happenstobe”inthatsubstance,andsomightnotbeinit,aswith“laughing”inrelationtoman.Itissurelynoaccidentthatʿaraḍalsocarriesthemeaningof“tohappen,”buttranslatingitthisway,thoughitissatisfyingphilosophically,turnsouttobetroublesomeduetothederivativesofthewordinArabic.Whenaqualityisʿāriḍtoajawhar,itexpressestheactofsomethingbeingbroughtintorelationshipwiththatsubstance,aswhenwesaythatlaughteris(happenstobe)inaman.Inthisactthesubstancethenbecomesma‘rud.Thisisdifficulttoexpresswith“accident”or“happenstobe”butispossiblewith“attribute.”As“substanceandattribute”isalsoareceivedwayofexpressingthisrelationship,Iwilloftenuseittoexpressjawharandʿaraḍ,althoughonealsorunsintothedangerofconfusingthetermwithṣifah,sometimestranslatedas“attribute.”

41

whichisdivisibleinsomerespectotherthanthatwhichmakesitone;“white”canbesaidofsnowandivoryindifferinglevelsofintensity.“Existence”containsthepossibilityforbeingpredicatedintheallthewaysjustmentioned.Existence“occursin”(wāqiʿʿalā)“cause”and“effect,”wherepriorityorposteriorityisthedistinguishingfactor.Italsooccursin“substance”and“accident,”thelevelofprimacyordependencebeingthedistinguishingfactor.Itoccursinthe“stable”and“dynamic,”intensityandweaknessmakingthedifference.Itoccursinthe“necessary”andthe“contingent,”thedifferencebeingmadeupofallthedifferencesjustmentionedabove. Inthecaseofsuchpredication,thatthingwhichunitesthequidditiesofthevariousthingscannotbeanintrinsicpartofthequiddityofthosethings.“White,”asweknowit,isnotpartoftheessenceofsnoworivoryintrinsically.Atbest,whatwecall“white”isanentailmentofthequiddityofsnoworivory,butitisnotacauseorconstitutive(muqawwim)partofit.Inthecaseofthecolorwhitethereasonisthepotentialinfinityofcolorsoreventypesofcolorsthatcanpossiblyexist.Predicationthatisgraduatedorequivocalisthustheresultoflinguisticorconceptuallimitations.Wecouldnotpossiblycomeupwithanameforeverycolorthatbelongstoeveryobjectintheworld,butwecanamelioratethisproblembyunderstandingthat“white”canbepredicatedofsnowandivoryinaspecialwaythatisneitherunivocalitynormerehomonymy. Thesameprincipleholdsforthequalityofexistence.WesaythatGodexistsandthatthemanythingsintheuniverseexist,butthereisnowayofassigningadifferentnametoeachandeveryexistencebelongingtoeachquiddity.Justaswhiteisusedforconvenience’ssakeinthecaseofivoryandsnow,soexistenceisusedbothforthenecessaryandforthevariouscontingentthings.Tashkīkorequivocalitydoesnotapplytothequidditiesofcontingentthings—aboutthisṬūsīisemphatic—buttotheexistencesorgeneralexistenceconnectedtothosequiddities.Thephilosopherscanrightlysaythatexistenceappliestothenecessaryandthecontingentwiththesamemeaningbecausedifferentrealitiescansharesomeofthesameentailments--aswiththecaseofivoryandsnow.Inthiscase,thereissomethingcommonenoughtothe“exists”inthestatements“Godexists”and“Zaydexists”tomakewujūdormawjūdsomethingmorethanacommonlocution;thereisacommonmeaningaswell,butnotanidenticalmeaning. Thereisanobjectiontostatingthequiddity-existencerelationshipinthisway,however.Forone,Rāzīobjects,thephilosophersstatethattherealityofthenecessaryexistence(God)isunknowabletohumanminds,buttheyalsoclaimthattheycanperceiveHisexistenceapriori.Yet,inthecaseofatrianglethephilosopherssaythatweknowtherealityofatrianglewithoutknowingwhetherornotitexists.Here,thephilosophersareclaimingthattheydonotknowtheexistence,buttheyknowthereality.Startingfromthesetwoexamples,wherethe“knowability”oftherealityoressenceorquiddityisseparatedfromtheknowabilityofitsexistence,theimplicationisthatGod’srealityissomethingotherthanHisexistence. Ṭūsī’sreplytothisisthatwhatweperceiveisnotGod’sparticularandindividualexistence,whichsetsHimapartfromanyandallotherexistences.Weperceivetheabsoluteexistencewhichisentailedbythatindividualexistence(al-wujūdal-muṭlāqalladhīhuwalāzimli-dhālikaʾl-wujūd[al-khāṣṣ]),andwhichisalsoentailedbyallotherexistences.Thislatterexistence,sometimescalled“generalsharedexistence”(al-wujūdal-ʿāmmal-mushtarak),istheexistencethatisknowableapriori,andknowingitdoes

42

notmeanthatweknowGod’sreality(ḥaqīqah),becauseknowingwhatisentailed(lāzim)bysomethingdoesnotmeanweknowwhatitisanentailmentof(malzūm).Otherwise,byperceivingthisabsoluteexistencewewouldperceivetheindividualexistenceofeachandeverything,whichisnotthecase.Thecrucialstephereistheconceptualseparationofthisabsoluteexistence(inthesensethatthiswordisusedinabsolutenumber,meaningunqualified)fromtheindividualexistenceeachexistingthing,includingGod,has.ThedifferenceforthePeripateticsisbetweensomethinggeneralandconceptualontheonehand(existenceingeneral)andrealandconcreteontheother(therealexistenceofathing,itsindividualbeing).Ṭūsīisclearthatexistenceisnota“speciesnature,”(ṭabīʿahnawʿiyyah)becausesuchanatureisfoundineachindividualofthatspeciesunivocally(biʾl-tawāṭuʾ),unlikeexistencewhichisfoundinthingsequivocally(biʾl-tashkīk). -AkbarianOntology

Althoughthisisastudyofwujūdandrelatedconcepts,inordertounderstandtheAkbarians’usageofwujūditiscrucialtofirstunderstandtheiruseofthetermsʿaynandtaʿayyun,andinsodoingprovideakindofprimerofAkbarianmetaphysics.ʿaynhasmanymeaningsinArabicandisusedinmorethanonewaybytheAkbarians,butforourpurposeswewillfocusonitsmetaphysicalandphilosophicalsenses.First,anʿaynissimplyasomething,tothepointthatChittickconsidersthissensetobebasicallysynonymouswithshayʾor“thing.”Itisindeedanon-specificlabelthatcanbeappliedtoanythingwhatsoever,beitGodormaterialobjects.ThusinthewritingsoftheAkbariansweencountersuchtermsasʿaynkhārijiyyah,ʿaynthābitah,andʿaynmawjūdah.Foranygivenobjectintheuniversetherearefundamentallytwowaysoflookingatitasanʿayn.First,ifitexistsasanobjectinspaceandtime(thisisnotlimitedtothematerialworld,butappliestotheintermediateworldorʿālamal-mithālaswell)itiscalledanʿaynkhārijiyyahorʿaynmawjūdah,anexternalizedorexistentʿayn.Secondly,ithasanʿaynthābitah,afixedorimmutableʿayn,whichisdefinedastheformoressenceofthatobjectinGod’sknowledge.Theykeyideahereisthatthereisreallyonlytheonething,theoneʿayn,butitisbeingviewedfromtwodifferentperspectives. Asamatterofgeneralusage,however,whenthetermʿaynappearsaloneitisusuallyreferringtotheimmutableʿayn,theforminGod’sknowledge.Inthissenseithasthemeaningofauniversalorparticulararchetype,one’sinmostreality.Whenusedwithafīasinfīʾl-ʿaynitmeansanythingthatisobjectivelyrealoutsideofthemindoftheobserver,usuallyinthecreatedrealmbutnotnecessarilyso.Thusitcanalsoberenderedbytheterm“concrete.”Ichoosetotranslateʿaynas“identity”becauseinitstechnicalsenseanʿayncanalsobespokenofasanessence,or“whatitis”ofathing,verymuchlikeidentity.Also,itdovetailsnicelywiththemeaningofʿaynas“identicalwith.”16 Taʿayyun,atermnotveryimportanttoIbnʿArabīhimselfbutusedasacentraltermbeginningwithQūnawī,17isawordusedbytheAkbarianstodescribethestagesbywhichthepureEssenceorSelf(al-Dhāt),whichisaboveeventhedistinctionbetweenGodandtheworld,becomesorisseenasbeingtheGodoftheworldwithallHis

16IdiscussthisquestionmorefullyinTheRingstonesofWisdom,xvi-xx.17SeeW.ChittickTheSufiPathofKnowledge(NewYork,1989),83.

43

qualitiesandattributions(ṣifāt,nisab),thentheGreatSpirit,theUniversalSoul,theworldofspirits,theworldofimagination,andfinallytheworldofbodies.TheEssence/Selfistheleveloflātaʿayyun,ofno-taʿayyun,whileGodasLordandCreatorrepresentsthefirsttaʿayyun,andsoforthuntiltheworldofbodies,whichisthefinaltaʿayyunofseveral.Iattemptheretolimitmyselftowordssuchas“successive”becauseoneshouldbecarefulnottousewordssuchas“become”whenspeakingoftaʿayyun,becausetaʿayyunisnotfundamentallyanactoratransformationbutreallyrepresentstheintrinsicdimensionsofultimatereality. Chitticktranslatesʿaynandtaʿayyunasentityandentification,whichwouldinmyowntranslationresultinidentityandidentification,andthisturnsouttoworkreasonablywell.Ifwesetasidepartoftheidiomaticuseof“identity”inmodernEnglish,weseethatitdoesagoodjobofdescribingthesuccessivelevelsoutlinedabove.Asʿayncarriesthesenseofspecificityandparticularization,thentaʿayyunwouldmeanathing’s“becoming”orbeingdeemedspecificandparticular.ThefirsttaʿayyuniswhenweidentifytheDivineRealityastheGodwhoisLordandCreatoroftheworldwithHisinfinitequalities.Thisisaspecificationorparticularizationinrelationtothepuredhāt,whichownsnospecificityorparticularizationwhatsoever.Ifsomehavetranslatedthistermasdeterminationorauto-determination,itisbecauseofthissenseofdelimitingandspecifyinginrelationtosomethingwhichisitselfbroaderinscope.TheSelf/Essenceisnotidentifiedordeterminedbecausethemomentyouidentifyitordetermineit(i.e.makeajudgmentaboutit)youarealreadyatthelevelofthefirsttaʿayyun.Itshouldbekeptinmindthatthischoiceoftranslationisproblematicbecausetheuseof“identity”and“identification”canleadtoanexcessivelysubjectivereadingofawordwhichisnotlimitedtotheactofasubjectpointingtoanobjectandsaying,“Thatissuchandsuch.”Translatingʿaynas“identity”workswellforIbnʿArabī,butitbecomesproblematicinthelaterschoolwhichusestaʿayyunextensively,andthusthetranslationofthetermpresentsproblemsinthelaterschoolnotfoundinIbnʿArabī’sownworks.Thereaderisaskedtoalwayskeepinmindthetechnicalsenseof“identification”asatranslationfortaʿayyun. WhentheAkbariansspeakoffayḍ(emanation)itisinreferencetotheprogressionoftheselevels,andoftwomainontologicaldivisionsinparticular.TheHoliestEmanation(al-fayḍal-aqdas)resultsintherealizationofformsinGod’sknowledge,whicharenomoreorlessthanHisknowledgeofHisownNamesandQualities.Thesecond,orHolyEmanation(al-fayḍal-muqaddas)istheexistentiationorexternalizationoftheseforms(theimmutableidentities)intotheworld,thusmakingthemʿaynmawjūdahorʿaynkhārijyyah.Thisprocessordifferentiationoflevelsisalsospokenofintermsofself-disclosure(tajallī),thefirstbeingtheinvisibleself-disclosure(tajallīal-ghayb)andthesecondbeingthevisibleself-disclosure(tajallīal-shahādah).Theseconceptsdescribe,inessence,howwegofromonelevelofidentificationtoanother.Asweshallhaveoccasiontosee,emanation(fayḍ),self-disclosure(tajallī),manifestation(ẓuhūr,iẓhar),existentiation(ījād),andevenidentification(taʿyīn,taʿayyun)areoftenusedinterchangeably,withaparticulartermbeingusedtoemphasizeacertainaspectoftheontologicalrelationshipofthingstoGod.

44

-Qūnawīandthephilosophicaltreatmentofwujūdandrelatedconcepts

ForQūnawīwujūdisseenontheonehandasthewujūdofwhatwouldcometobeknownaswaḥdatal-wujūdbutwhichforhimwaswujūdal-ḥaqq,theUltimateRealitywhichisthebasisof,indeedis,allthingsinamysteriousway.Ontheotherhand,wujūdisusedtoexpressthemanifestationandself-disclosureofGodintherealmofcreation.Thatistosay,besidesdenotingultimaterealityassuchitisusedtoexpresstheprogressionofthevariousidentificationsandthegrandcircleformedbymovingfromthepureinwardtothepureoutwardandbackagain.Inthissenseitisusedbasicallyasasynonymofkhārijīorexternal,orassomethingalreadyself-disclosedoremanatedatthesecondlevelspokenabove,andistheoppositeofʿadam(non-existence),asmawjūdisofmaʿdūm.Butoftennon-existenceisnotusedintheordinarysenseof“nothingness.”Non-existencecanmeantheabsenceofmanifestation,whereexistenceisdefinedastherealmofcreation,oftheworldormāsiwāʾllāh,“whatisotherthanGod.”Thatis,non-existencecanbethatwhichisyet-to-bemanifestfromtheMindorKnowledgeofGod,andalsothatwhichwillneverbemanifested,butisnot“nothing.” AmajorpartofwhatmakesthetreatmentofwujūdamongtheAkbarianssointerestingandsoimportantisthateveninasingleworkonasinglepagetheusagevacillatesbetweenthesensesabove.ConsideringhowcloselyidentifiedthisparticularschoolofSufismiswithaparticulardoctrineofwujūd,thisturnsouttobenosmallquestion.Inthefirstsense,wujūdisthatoneindivisibleUltimatewhichisthesolepre-occupationoftheSufis,whethertheycallitwujūd(Akbarians),ʿishq(Rūmī,AḥmadGhazālī),orsomethingelse.Itis,despiteitsconnectionwithotherphilosophicaldefinitions,aprimarilymysticalconceptinthisusage.ItisalsothesensewhichgetsSufisintothemosttroublewiththeircritics,whoarescandalizedbythenotionthatdonkeydroppingshaveanykindofidentificationwiththeexistenceofGod.18ThesecondsenseinwhichQūnawīuseswujūdistheordinarysenseofexistencewithoutthemetaphysicallyextendedideaoftotaloneness.Usedinthisway,wujūdsimplymeansthefactofsomethingbeingexistentorevencreated,althoughQūnawīrarelydiscusseshismetaphysicsintermsof“creation.” EarlyinMiftāḥal-ghayb,Qūnawīstatesthatthesubjectmatterof“knowledgeofthedivine”(al-ʿilmal-ilāhī),i.e.metaphysics,iswujūd,thewaythesubjectmatterofgeometryismeasurement.Thenhetellsusthattheprinciples(mabādīʾ)ofsuchaninvestigationaremadeupofconceptions(taṣawwur)andassents(taṣdīq),thus(atleastpartially)framinghisdiscussiontobeinlinewiththewayphilosophersmightapproachtheproblem.Itisnotamannerofapproachingtheproblemfoundinhismaster’swritings.However,talkofconceptionsandassentsandthestudyofbeingquabeingseemtoberestrictedtotheopeningpages.Thetenoroftheremainderofthebookisnotanunfoldingofhisanalysesofthesephilosophicalconceptsastheyapplytohisownmetaphysics.Itseemsasthoughheopenswithanodtothephilosophers,andindeeddoesprovideamoresystematicdiscussionofmetaphysicsincomparisonwithhismaster,butinQūnawī’smetaphysicalwritingswhatweencounterisreallyamoreorderly,pedagogicalversionofIbnʿArabī,withmanyofthemyriadoftopicsIbnʿArabītouches

18ForahistoryofpolemicsforandagainstIbnʿArabī,seeAlexanderKnysh’sbook,IbnʿArabiintheLaterIslamicTradition.Albany,1999.

45

oninhisownworksleftout.Qūnawīdropstheshaṭḥ(ecstaticsayings)andtriestobesystematic,somethinghismasterrarelydid,butevenwiththischangeneithertheworkofthemasternorthatofhisdisciplecanbeclassifiedinastrictsenseasfalsafahoreventhelaterḥikmah.Qūnawī’swritingsare,however,clearenoughandconsistentenoughasabodyofthoughttobeabletoenterintotheworldofIslamictheologyandphilosophy,whoselanguagebasedaroundessence/quiddity(dhāt/māhiyyah),existence(wujūd),necessity(wujūb),andcontingency(imkān)hadalreadybeenfairlywellcrystallizedbyQūnawī’stime,asdiscussedinthepreviouschapter. InMiftāḥal-ghaybweactuallydoencounterthephrasewaḥdatal-wujūd,whereQūnawīstatesthattheoneness(waḥdah)thatamanperceivesinhimselfisnotlike“theonenessofexistence.”Heonlyhastheabilitytoviewhimselfassomerealitythatpossesses,asoneofitsqualities,wujūd(muttaṣifahbiʾl-wujūd),alongwithotherqualitiessuchaslife,knowledge,andwill.19Theunityoronenessheperceivesisseenintermsofamultiplicity,notwithrespecttoitsunity.Hereheusesthetermaḥadiyyahinsteadofwāḥidiyyahorwaḥdah,theformerinvokingforAkbariansunityassuchwhilethelatteristheunityofsomemultiplicity.Henceaḥadiyyahisthelevelofno-taʿayyunwhilewāḥidiyyahisthelevelofthefirsttaʿayyun,theunityoronenessofthedivinequalities.20Interestingly,waḥdatal-wujūdisnotexpandeduponassomegrandmetaphysicalaxis-concept.AsIunderstandit,Qūnawīissimplymakingadistinctionbetweentheonenessofamultiplicity(man’sparts),andtheonenessbelongingtotherealityofexistence,whichisreallynoneotherthanGod’sreality,andishencetrulyone. Itisnotreally“theonenessofexistence”asadoctrinetobedefendedwhichprimarilyconcernsQūnawī.Rather,heisoccupiedwithwujūdal-ḥaqq,theexistenceoftheReal(God)butwhichcanalsomean“trueexistence.”Sowhatisthiswujūdal-ḥaqqanditsrelationshiptoallthings?“ExistenceasitconcernstheRealisidenticalwithHimself(dhātihi).Asitconcernseverythingelseitissuperadded(zāʾid)toitsreality(ḥaqīqah).Therealityofeveryexistentisareferencetotheattribution/relationofitsidentificationinitsLord’sknowledge,beginninglesslyandendlessly.”21FromonepointofviewthisistheveryfamiliartheologicalandphilosophicalnotionthatonlyGod’sexistenceisintrinsictoHimself,whileallotherthingscaneitherexistornotexistwithouttherebyintroducinganyabsurdities.GodmustexistornotbeGod,henceheisnecessaryinexistence(wājibal-wujūd),theseotherrealitiesQūnawīreferstobeingonlycontingent(mumkin).Thephrase“attribution/relationofitsidentificationinitsLord’sknowledge”(nisbattaʿayyunihifīʿilmirabbihi)meansitsrelationshiporitsplaceasanidentity(ʿayn)amongotheridentitieswithinGod’sknowledge—thisbeingtheverydefinitionofanimmutableidentityorʿaynthābitah.Thepassagegoesontosaythefollowing,“ThesearecalledimmutableidentitiesintheterminologyofthemenofrealizationamongtheFolkofGod.Theyarecalledquiddities(māhiyyāt),knownobjects(maʿlūm),non-existents(maʿdūm),andimmutablething(al-shayʾal-thābitah)byothers.”22 AlthoughIsaidthatQūnawī’swritingshouldneverbemistakenforfalsafahintheordinarysense,thislattermoveatinterchangingtermsisasignificantexampleofbridge-buildingbetweentheAkbarianmodeofexpression(identity,identification)and 19Miftāḥal-ghayb20.20Ibid.,20.21Ibid.,20.22Ibid.,20.

46

thoseofotherschoolsofthoughtwhichdealwiththesamekindsofthings,notablyphilosopherswhocallthisentityorsimilarentitiesquiddities(mā-hiyah,aquiteliteraltranslationoftotiesti,or“whatitis”).Thisnotionofexistencespreadingthroughoutquiddities,insteadofidentities(aʿyān),ismentionedafewtimesinQūnawī’scommentaryuponthechapterofAdam.Forexample,hediscussesthestateofthequidditiesbefore“thespreadingthroughoutofexistencethatisemanateduponthemandtheirentailments.”23(Thisconceptof“spreadingthroughout”(inbisāṭ)willbemorefullydiscussedlater.)Healsomentionsthe“non-existentquiddities,”24meaningthattheessencesinGod’sknowledgeareinastateofnon-manifestation;accordingtothefamousAkbarianadage,theimmutableidentiesorquiddities“haveneversomuchasbreathedthescentofexistence(lātashammurāʾiḥatal-wujūd).”Elsewherehementionsthe“onenessofeverythinginrespectofitsreality,whichisnamed‘quiddity’and‘immutableidentity,’andwhichreferstotheattribution/relationshipofathingidentifiedeternallyinReal’sknowledge.”25TheReal’sknowledgeisanattributionoftheSelf,oraself-qualitywhichisnotseparablefromwhatisqualified.Later,linkingquidditywithimmutabilityQūnawīspeaksofthe“quiddityimmutableinknowledge(al-māhiyyahal-thābitahfīʾl-ʿilm),”26againreferringtoGod’sknowledgeofHimself.FortheAkbariansimmutability(thubūt)isatechnicaltermusuallyreservedfortheidentitiesinGod’sknowledge. ThefactthattheAkbarianssoreadilyinterchangethephilosophicalterm“quiddity”for“identity”issignificantasṢadrāwilllatermakethesameinterchangeinthereversedirection.IbnʿArabīalmostalwaysused“identity”torefertotheformsinGod’sknowledge,althoughhewouldsometimesuse“essence”(dhāt)27or“reality”(ḥaqīqah)instead.ItshouldbenotedthattheAkbarianshaverecoursetoseveraldifferentwaysoftalkingaboutessences[whicharenotparticularlyphilosophicalintheirtone].Inthepair“existenceandlevel”(wujūd,martabah)existencereferstotheverybeingofthings,especiallywithrespecttoallthingsbeingultimatelyoneinGod.“Level”evokesthehierarchyofthisbeingorexistence,fromtheworldofbodiesallthewayuptotherealmoftheimmutableidentitiesinGod’sknowledge.Although“level”wouldseemtoonlyevokethegeneralontologicalstrataofreality,thewayitisusedbytheAkbariansalsoallowsittorefertoathing’sindividualplaceinthehierarchyofexistence,namelyitsownshareinexistence.“Reality”isanothertermoftenusedinatechnicalsensetomeanathing’sessenceoridentity.Especiallyinrelationtothecreatedorder,the“realities”ofthingsarereallynoneotherthantheirimmutableidentities,pureforms.Thatbywhichself-disclosureoremanationormanifestationtakeplaceisathing’sreality.Theselatterterms—tajallī,fayḍ,ẓuhūr—areusuallyassociatedwiththe“existenceside”ofthings,whileḥaqīqahisusuallyassociatedwithʿayn,dhāt,māhiyyah,orthe“essenceside”ofthings.

* * *Asstatedabove,IproposetwomainsensesinwhichQūnawīemploysthetermwujūdandrelatedconceptsinhiswritings.First,heuseswujūdinitssenseofpurebeing,wujūd 23Kitābal-fukūk189.24Ibid.,226-227.25Iʿjāzal-bayān135.26Ibid.,195.27SeeforexamplethechapteronṢāliḥinTheRingstonesofWisdom,p.120,whichreads,“Itsimmutableessenceinitsstateofnon-existence…”

47

baḥtorwujūdmaḥḍ,themysteriousentitywhichissomucheverythingandnothingthatitisnotevenanentity.Secondly,heuseswujūdasadesignationmeaningmanifestation,comprisingthecreatedorderfromspirits,downthroughsouls,andendinginbodies.TherefollowsexamplesdrawnfromQūnawī’sworksdemonstratinghisusageofwujūdandrelatedconceptsinontologyastheyapplytothesetworangesofmeaning.I.TheOneMystery:ExamplesfromQūnawīA.as“existence”(wujūd)

ForQūnawīGodis“thepureexistence(al-wujūdal-maḥḍ)inwhichthereisnodistinction,andHeistrulyoneandinHisregardmultiplicityisinconceivable.”28InMiftāḥal-ghaybhegoesontosay,“Wesay‘oneness’forthesakeofassertingincomparabilityandformagnification.Itisnot[meantto]alludetotheunderstandingof‘oneness’asordinarilyconceivedbyveiledminds.”29Thoughhepointsoutthatwhatanordinarypersonthinksofas‘one’doesnotdojusticetowhatheisspeakingof,neverthelessQūnawīusesonenesstoexpresshismessage.Godistheoneexistence,wearetold,butwemustbeopentothefactthatour‘one’iswronginthiscontext.30Heisnotmerelyoneinthenumericalsenseofnotbeingtwoorthree,butisatrueunity,usuallyreferredtobyAkbariansasaḥadiyyahinsteadofwāḥidiyyah,thelattertermbeingtreatedasakindoflessprofoundunitythatembracesmultiplicity. Againspeakingaboutwaḥdatal-wujūdQūnawīstates,“Theoneexistenceattributed(ʿāriḍ)tocreatedcontingentthingsis,inreality,notsomethingdifferentfromthetruehiddenexistence,uncoupledfromidentitiesandplacesofmanifestation31exceptbyattributionandfiction.”32Themultiplicityoftheoneexistenceisonlyapparent,andcomesfromthesideofthe“placesofmanifestation,”i.e.,fromthepointofviewofmultiplicityandmanifestationitself.Hegoesontonotethattheuseofwujūdisanimpreciseone,butheuseditinsofarasitwasthemost“generalizedattribute”forthethingsaboutwhichhewastalking.Theuseofthisterminologydoesnotstemfromthefactthat“itcorrespondstohowthingsactuallyare”(lāannadhālikaismunmuṭābiqunliʾl-amrifīnafsihi).HecomparesittotheuseofthedivinenamestheLightandtheManifest.Nevertheless,hesays,suchlanguageis“approximateandpedagogical”(taqrībanwa-tafhīman).Itissignificantthatthisappearstobeasfarasheiswillingtogoindefiningwujūdasatotalizingconcept. LaterinMiftāḥal-ghaybhesays,“Thedifferenceperceivedbetweenvariousexistencesandtheoneexistencestemsfromthedifferentiationofreceptiverealitiesinbeing(kawniyyah).Itisnotduetothedifferentiationofexistenceinitself,norisitduetothefactthattherearemanyexistenceswhoserealitiesdiffer.Indeed,thereisonlythe

28Miftāḥal-ghayb19.29Ibid.,19.30ThisisnotanunfamiliarconceptualmoveinIslamiccircles.WhenitcomestoGod’squalities,theAsharitesgiveasimilarsounding,“Hesees,butwedonotknowhow.”ThedifferenceisthattheSufisbelievethatthereisapotentialforahumanbeingtoreallyknowwhathemeanswhenhesaysthatGodisone,unlikethecaseforGod’squalitiesamongtheAsh‘arites.31Areferencetocreatedthingsasplaceswherethedivinequalitiesappear.32Miftāḥal-ghayb21.Izutsuusedthewordfiction,thewayinlawonesays“legalfiction,”toexpressthetermi‘tibar,meaningsomethingwhichispurelymentalandhasnoobjectivereferent.

48

oneexistencewhichmanifestsbyreasonofthedifferentiationofthereceptacles’realities…”Laterhestates,“Soreflectonthis…insofarasGodisonesinglepureexistencewhoisneithergrasped,norknownencompassedbyvisionandknowledge;andinsofarasheisanexistencemanifestintheidentitiesofexistentthings.ThroughitandinaccordancewithittheReal,theidentities,necessity,andcontingencyareknown.”33 InK.al-fukūkQūnawīmentions“theexistentialorigination[ofthings]fromtheEssence-Unseenandabsoluteencompassingexistence(al-ghaybal-dhātīwaʾl-wujūdal-muṭlaqal-iḥāṭī)”.34ThisisinthecontextofacommentaryonthenatureofexistentiationinthechapterofṢālihfromtheFuṣūṣal-ḥikam.Herethesupremelevelofal-ghaybal-dhātī,whichisthehighestwayatwhichwecanspeakaboutGod,isidentifiedwithexistenceasabsoluteandall-encompassing. InIʿjazal-bayānhestatesthatthe“absoluteunseen”(al-ghaybal-muṭlaq)isthedivineessenceandselfhood(huwiyyah),35andisnoneotherthanpurelightandpureexistence.36Againinthesameworkhesays,“Theworld,initstotality,isalocusofmanifestationforpureexistence(wujūdbaḥt),andeachexistentinitsidentificationisalsoalocusofmanifestation.”37 InapassagewhereQūnawībeginswithananalogytothehumanself,whichisonebutfromcertainpointsofviewcanbeseenasmultiple,headdstheanalogyof

33Miftāḥal-ghayb59.34Kitābal-fukūk,240-1.35Chittick,forexample,translatesthistermas“he-ness,”whileothershaveusedvarioussynonymsforessencesuchas“ipseity”(Goichon).“[T]histranslationisjustifiedandevensuperiorbecausethepronounhuwainArabicisnotstrictlyconfinedtothethirdperson.Thenotionofathingitself,ofbeingnoneother,isoneoftheusesofhuwainArabic.Forexample,huwahuwaliterallymeans‘itisit,’butreallymeans,‘Thisisthethingitself.’ItisthisreflexiveshadethatislostwhenhuwsorhuwiyyahistranslatedasHeorHe-ness.Ipseityliterallymeans“Itself-ness,”whichIthinkismoreelegantlyrenderedinEnglishbySelfhoodinsteadofusingaLatinateterm.HuwaisisusedtoindicatetheunconditioneddivineEssence,beyondtherelationshipof“I”and“Thou,”whichistosaybeyondduality,andbecausethedivinedhātcanalsoberenderedasSelf—thedhatofathingislinguisticallyandphilosophicallythethingitself—therenderingofhuwaasSelfisinkeepingwithinterchangeability,fromonepointofview,ofal-Dhāt(Self,Essence)andHuwa(He),theformerusedmoreoftentoexpressthephilosophicalideawhilethelatterismeanttoexpressthemystery.Thenotionofselfisnotrestrictedtothefirstperson,sincefirstwouldimplysecondandthird;rather,pureselfhoodisbeyondrelationalityasisthemetaphysicalconcepthuwa.Huwadoesnotcarryastrictlythirdpersonsignificance.ThefollowingquotefromAmīrʿAbdal-Qādirishelpful,whereisisinterpretingaQurʾānicversethatcontinsthepronounhuwa,whichhesaysreferstoGod:Huwaisnotusedhereasathirdpersonpronoun(theabsentperson)whichisgrammaticallyrelatedtoafirstperson(onewhospeaks),andtothesecondone(onetowhomonespeaks)[forthiswouldimplyamultiplicity,whichisinfinitelytranscendedbythemetaphysicalhuwa].Allahdidnotsayla-anā“certainlyI,”forthepronounanahasadeterminativecharactersinceitimpliespresence.(TheSpiritualWritingsofAmīrʿAbdal-Qādir,tr.MichelChodkiewicz,Albany,NY,1995,46).(CanerDagli,TheRingstonesofWisdom,Chicago,2004,128).36Iʿjāzal-bayān149-150.37Ibid.,210.

49

breath,andthateachletterisreallynoneotherthanthebreath.Likewise,“Allindividualexistentialidentities…arenotdistinctfrompureexistence.”38 TowardstheendofIʿjāzal-bayān,followingapoemwhichquotestheQurʾānicverseAllthingsperishbutHisFace,39Qūnawīisdiscussingthemultiplicityofexistentthings.TheyarenotdistinctfromGod’sexistenceexceptinsofarastheyare“identifications”ofit.40Theexistenceweascribetothemisreallynothingotherthanthe“clothing”ofGod’stasksorlabors(shaʾn)withHisexistence.Thislattertermisnoteasytotranslate,andIhaveused“task”aschosenbyChittick.IbnʿArabīuseditinreferencetotheQurʾānicverse,AndeachdayHeisuponsomelabor(shaʾn)(Arberry).41Theirmultiplicityderivesfromthe“particularities”(khuṣūṣiyyāt)concealedintheunseenofGod’sSelfhood(ghaybhuwiyyatihi). TheseexamplesdrawnfromQūnawī’swritingsaremeanttoshowthathewascomfortableusingexistencetoexpresstheultimatereality,butaswewillseebelow,itisnotanecessarytermforexpressingthisreality,norisittheonlyonewhichisusedtodoso. B.aslight(nūr),mercy(raḥmah)

Thoughnotpurelyandsimplysynonymouswithexistence,nūr(light)andraḥmah(mercy),thelatterwhichisoftenusedtogetherwith“breath”asin“theBreathoftheAll-Merciful,”canhaveasimilarscopeand“fundamentality”(whatlaterphilosopherswouldcallaṣālah)andoftencarryatrueontologicalstatusfortheAkbarians.Likeexistence,theycanbeusedinmorethanoneway,especiallytosignifytheoneall-embracingmysterypresentinallthings. Lightisanaturalmetaphysicalconcept,andaswesawinthepreviouschapteritwasemployedbyGhazālīandSuhrawardītoexpresstheverystuffofreality.ItwasalsousedextensivelybyIbnʿArabī,whichshouldnotbesurprising.AlthoughwecanbesurethatQūnawīwasinfluencedbyhismaster’streatmentoflight,thecasesofGhazālīandSuhrawardīarenotasclear.AssomeonelearnedinphilosophyandSufismitishardtoimaginethatQūnawīhadnotreadoratleastcomeacrossGhazālī’sNicheofLights.AsforSuhrawardī,thereactuallyexistsacopyofhisPhilosophyofIlluminationcopiedoutinQūnawī’sownhand.42OnecanspeculateastowhatkindofimportanceQūnawīascribedtoSuhrawardī’swork,butinhisownwritingsthereisnoevidencethatQūnawī’streatmentoflightisnotwhollyfromwithinIbnʿArabī’scorpusandQūnawī’sownphilosophicalwork.BetweenhisfriendshipwithRūmī,hisstudyofphilosophy,apparentlybothPeripateticandIlluminationist,andhisstudyofḥadīth,Qūnawīcertainlyhadhisfingersinmorethanonepie,buthereallyonlyexplicitlyacknowledgesadebttoIbnʿArabīasfarashisownwritingaboutmattersofmetaphysicsandspiritualityisconcerned.

OnthesubjectoflightQūnawīsays,“Truelighthasthreeotherlevels.Oneofthemisapartnertopureabsoluteexistence(al-wujūdal-maḥḍal-muṭlaq).”43Here 38Ibid.,212.39Qurʾān28:88.40Iʿjāzal-bayān511.41Qurʾān55:29.42SeeW.Chittick,“Thelastwillandtestament,”47.43Kitābal-fukūk226-227.

50

Qūnawīisdiscussingtherealityandsymbolismoflight,especiallyasitrelatestoknowledge.However,atitshighestlevelevenlight,whichisusuallyassociatedwithmanifestationandwiththeattainmentofhigherknowledge,isonalevelwiththeultimatelevelofexistence.Thecommonalitybetweenlightandexistencerelatestoknowledge,andconsistsoftheunveilingordiscovery(kashf)ofsomethinghidden.Inthecaseofexistence,“Sinceit[existence]isreallyoneandhasvariousmultiplethingsattributedtoit,oneknowsthattherearemanyentitiesofvaryingreceptivity.Inthiswayexistencebecomesameansofknowingthenon-existentquiddities(al-māhiyyātal-maʿdūmah).”Becauseoftherealonenessofexistence,quidditiesarenon-existent,andindiscoveringthetruerealityofexistencewediscoverthatthisisso.Hegoesontosay,“Neitherexistence,knowledge,orlightaredifferentiatedfromoneanother,inthatnoneofthem,withrespecttotheironenessandabsoluteness,canbeseenorperceived.Indeed,thereisno44multiplicityamongtheminthepresenceofessence-oneness.”45 Whatwecalllightandexistencebecomedifferentiatedfromoneanotherinthemodesofmanifestation.“Thedifferencebetweentruelight(al-nūral-ḥaqīqī)andthatwhichisnamedpureexistence(al-wujūdal-maḥḍ)consistsofthis:existenceappearstoourfacultiesofperceptionthroughthereceptivityofnon-existentidentifiedobjectsofknowledge(al-maʿlūmātal-maʿdūmahal-mutaʿayyinah)inGod’sknowledge.Asfortruelight,itcanonlybeperceivedinanexistentlocusofmanifestation(maẓharmawjūd).Shortlythereafterhereasserts,“Pureexistence(al-wujūdal-maḥḍ)cannotbeperceived.”46Again,inIʿjāzal-bayānhesaysthatGodis“sheer(baḥt)existenceandpure(khāliṣ)light,”47andlater,“Knowthatexistencespreading-throughout(al-wujūdal-munbasiṭ)islight”48(seebelowfordiscussionof“spreading-throughout”).OfcourseQūnawībelievesthatallthingsarecomprisedwithintheonereality,whetherthatrealityiscalledexistenceorlight.However,insofarasexistenceandlightarenotmeresynonymsofoneanother,itcanbesaidthattheyrepresentthatsamerealityfromdifferentpointsofview,orfromdifferentconceptualstartingpoints.Atthehighestlevel,thereisnomultiplicityandhencenodifference,butatthelevelofsuccessiveidentifications(taʿayyun)indeedthemeaningofexistenceandlightareindeeddifferent,andthesamewouldholdtrueformercyasanontologicalentity.

Theuseofmercy(raḥmah)asanontologicalconceptisveryparticulartotheAkbarianschool,andisamajorthemeinIbnʿArabī’sFuṣūṣal-ḥikam,forexample.49Mercyisnotjustaqualityofthings;inasenseitistheveryrealityofthingsbecausetheveryrealityofGodisMercy,asshownbythedivinenameal-Raḥmān.ThesymbolismoftheBreathoftheAll-Merciful(nafasal-Raḥmān)isoneofthemostimportantmetaphysicalthemesinallofIbnʿArabī’swritings.Godismercy(whichcanbewell-translatedasloveinthiscontext)withinhimself,buthealsogivesofthismercythrough

44Therearetworeadingshere,onewiththe“no”takenout,butfromthecontextitisclearthatthecorrectreadingis“nomultiplicity.”45Thatistosay,thetrueonenessoftheEssenceorSelf(dhāt).Tousetheadjectivalform“essential”totranslatedhātīwouldbemisleadinginthiscontextandisusuallynotthebestwaytotranslatethisterm.46Kitābal-fukūk228.47Iʿjāzal-bayān144.48Ibid.,193.49FormoreonIbnʿArabīonmercyseeTheRingstonesofWisdom,105-6,177-82,219-24.

51

thedivineBreath.Justaswordsarewhollymadeupofbreathandaresustainedonlysolongasthebreathisthere,sotooarecreatedthingsdependentuponthebreathofGod—indeedarenothingbutthebreathofGodfromonepointofview.

InMiftāḥal-ghaybQūnawīsays,“TheAll-Merciful(al-Raḥmān)istheonepure(baḥt)existence.TheLight(al-Nūr)isGod’sNamewithrespecttoHisownmanifestationandthemanifestationofotherthingsbyHim,meaningthatlightisluminousinitselfandilluminatesnon-luminousthings.Lightistheformofabsolute/unqualifiedexistence.”50Again,laterhestatesthattheAll-Merciful(al-Raḥmān)isthenamefortheformofdivineexistencewithrespecttoitsmanifestinginandofitself.HereQūnawīcallstheresultof“Iwantedtobeknown”(aḥbabtuanuʿraf)the“existentialformmanifestedinandofitself.”51 Againonmercy,inIʿjāzal-bayān,hestates,“Mercyisthesameasexistence.”52Laterhemakesreferenceto“thegeneralexistentiatingmercyofal-Raḥmānwhichencompasseseverythingbythegeneral(muṭlaq)receptivityofcreatedcontigententities.”53InK.al-Fukūkheexplainsthatmercyisthesameasexistence,andal-Raḥmānisthesameasal-Ḥaqqduetoits(Iassumethelatter)beingexistence.HesaysthatthisiswhywhenthemountingofthedivineThroneismentioned,itisonlythenameal-Raḥmānthatisused.54Laterhementionsthegeneralmercy(al-raḥmahal-‘ammah)whichencompasseseverythingbythegeneral(muṭlaq)receptivityofcreatedcontingententities.Theselatterarelikemirrorsforexistence’smanifestation.55InIʿjāzal-bayānQūnawīstatesthat“theReal’sself-disclosuresreachtheworlduponeachbreath,andinthetruestsenseareonlyoneself-disclosure,manifestingtoit[theworld]asafunctionoftherecipients,theirlevels,andtheirpreparednessand56identifications.57C.as“spreading-throughout”(inbisāṭ)and“flowing-through”(sarayān)

TwoconceptswhichcomeuprepeatedlywheneverQūnawīisdiscussingtheessentialidentitybetweenmanyexistencesandtheoneexistence,orthemannerinwhichthebreathofGodgrantseverythingitsexistence,orthewaylightunfoldsintheuniverse,areinbisāṭ(spreading-throughout)andsarayān(flowing-through)—thatis,thespreading-throughoutandflowing-throughofexistenceinparticular.Inbisāṭisalmostsynonymouswithtajallīandfayḍ,representingtheprocessbywhichexistenceisbestoweduponthingswhicharestillonlypotentiallyexistent,namelytheimmutableidentitiesorquidditiesinGod’sknowledge.Moretechnically,itreferstotheall-embracingmysteryoftheoneexistence,notfromthepointofviewofitsabsoluteonenessinitself,butinsofarasitistheonenessthatmakesthemultiplicityofexistencetrulyoneandapparentlymany.Thatistosay,whentalkingabouthowallthingsarereallytheoneexistence,theterminbisāṭisakeytogiveusperspectiveonthemysteriousOne,topointusinthedirectionofviewingitasmany-as-one.

50Miftāḥal-ghayb62.51Ibid.,40.52Iʿjāzal-bayān511.53Ibid.,265.54Kitābal-fukūk205.55Ibid.,221.56This“and”doesnotappearinthetext,butitdoesnotmakesenseotherwise.57Iʿjāzal-bayān137.

52

Sarayānisusedsimilarly,butcarrieswithitthesenseofsomethinghappeningwithinexistentthingsasopposedtobeinggiventothem.BothinbisāṭandsarayānbecomeveryimportantforṢadrā’sontologyandhiscosmology.TheformerisusedinṢadrā’sal-wujūdal-munbasiṭ(“existencewhichspreads-throughout”)58inmuchthesamewayQūnawīusesit.Itrefers,nottotheabsolutelyunifiedexistenceassuchnortotheexistenceofmultiplicity,buttotheoneexistenceinasmuchasitistheveryexistenceofthemanyexistences.Ṣadrāusessarayāntorefertowujūdbutespeciallytothewaynature(ṭabīʿah)ispresentinthingsandoperatesasthemeansbywhichmotiontakesplaceinthecreatedorder. WithrespecttoinbisāṭandsarayānitisusefultorecallthatforQūnawītheultimaterealityissometimescalledthepresenceofunionandexistence(ḥaḍratal-jamʿwaʿl-wujūd).59“Thefirstoftheknown,named,anddesignatedlevelsisthelevelofunionandexistence.Somemenofrealizationcallittherealityofrealities(ḥaqīqatal-ḥaqāʾiq),thepresenceofunity,thestationofunion,andsoforth.Itisviewedintwoways,firstwithrespecttotheaforementionedunion(jamʿ),itsall-embracingness,anditsoneness,andsecondwithrespecttoitsbeingnothingotherthantheaforementionedrealitieswhichitencompasses.”60Hegoesontosaythatthepresenceofunionandexistenceiscalledthefirstlevelofwitnessing/manifestation(shahādah)inrelationtotheaforementionedabsoluteunseen,andisalsoidentifiedwiththeBreathoftheAll-Merciful(seebelow).61Itakethistomeanthattheabsoluteunseenisthedivineessenceconsideredwhollyinandofitself,whilethisfirstidentificationasQūnawīcallsithereisthatsameabsolutebutconsideredwithrespecttoitsbeingtheveryexistenceandrealityofallcontingentandmultiplethings.Thatistosay,withthepresenceofunionandexistencewearethinkingaboutthe“spreadingthroughout”ofultimateexistence. Thusthedesignationofunionandexistenceismeanttocapturethenatureofthesupremerealitybothasimpenetrableoneness,completelyItselfandthuscompletelyOther,andasmysteriouslytheveryexistenceofallthingsweknowwhileweareinthestateofmultiplicity.Thefirstreceivesthelabel“union,”whilethesecondreceivesthelabel“existence.”ItisinthislatterrespectthatQūnawīusestheterms“spreadingthroughout”(munbasiṭ)and“manifest”(ẓāhir)todescribeexistenceasitappliestocontingentthings.Furthermore,thisexistenceisaself-disclosure(tajallī)flowinginorpenetratingthrough(sārī)therealitiesofcontingentthings.Boththetermsmunbasiṭ(“spreadingthroughout“)andsārī(“flowingin/penetratingthrough”)arefrequentlyusedlaterbyṢadrātodenotetheverythingQūnawīisdiscussinginthispassage.AgaininthesameworkQūnawīmentions“theflowingthrough(sarayān)ofexistencespreadingthroughout(munbasiṭ)therealitiesofexistents.”62Herethe“realities”aretheessencesoridentitiesofthings.AswasmentionedaboveintheFukūk,thenotionofexistence

58F.Rahmantranslatedthisas“expansiveexistence”(ThePhilosophyofMullāṢadrā,85-86).59Miftāḥal-ghayb27.60Ibid.,35.61InIʿjāzal-bayānp.99,thepresenceofunionandexistenceiscalled“thepresenceofunion,existence,hiding,andrevealinganditholdsthemiddleplace.”Hesaysthatmanownsthispresence,andIunderstandbythisthatthismustrefertoman’sstationasthemicrocosmoftheuniverse.Otherwise,itwouldbeinconsistentwiththeontologicalstatusgivento“thepresenceofunionandexistence”intheotherpassagesmentionedabove.62Miftāḥal-ghayb118.

53

spreadingthroughout(inbisāṭ)quidditiesismentionedafewtimesinthechapterofAdam.Here,Qūnawīisdiscussingthestateofthequidditiesbefore“thespreadingthroughoutofexistencethatisemanateduponthemandtheirentailments(lawāzim).”63 InIʿjāzal-bayānQūnawīstatesthatrealitiesandspirits(ḥaqāʾiq,arwāḥ)havecertaindeterminationsbyvirtueoftheirmereidentitybutalsobyvirtueofthe“existentialself-disclosurewhichflowsthroughthem”64(al-tajallīal-wujūdīal-sārīfīhā).Laterhelikenstheactofwritingtothespreading-throughoutofexistentiallight(inbisāṭal-nūral-wujūdī)onasheetofpaper,inwhichtheformsofexistentsareidentified(taʿayyana).65Relatingthisideatotheconceptofmercyhestates,“Hisbeingnamedal-Raḥmānreferstothespreading(inbisāṭ)ofHisabsoluteexistencethroughoutHismanifestedlabors…Mercyisthesameasexistence,andal-RaḥmānistheReal(al-Ḥaqq)withrespecttoHisbeinganexistencespreadingthroughout(munbasiṭ)everythingthatmanifestsbymeansofit(i.e.existence).”66 Speakingtothemysteryofexistentiation-in-general(muṭlaqal-ījād),heanswerstheself-posedqueryastothereasonforexistence:Itisforthesakeoftheperfectionwhichdependsuponthemanifestationand“emanatedflowing-through”(al-sarayānal-mufḍā).67Then,whenaskinghimselfabouttheoriginandreturnofthings,hesaysthatexistenceisacircle,andthatthiscirclebyvirtueofthecompletenessitengendersattainstotheflowing-throughexistence(al-wujūdal-sārī).68Thatistosay,toachievethestatewhereGod’srealityistheveryrealityofmultipleotherrealitiesisitselfaperfectionthatcanonlyberealizedthroughthemanifestationofexistence,throughtheactofcreation.ThisisoneofIbnʿArabī’scentralthemesinhismetaphysics,namelythatGodwouldbelimitedifhewereonlyabsolute.ItisincomprisingboththeabsoluteandtherelativethatGodisfullyGod.D.Isthereequivocality(tashkīk)inQūnawī?

Theseideasofinbisāṭandsarayān,relatingastheydotothesimultaneityofmanynessandonenesswithintherealityofexistence,naturallybringupthequestionofjusthowwecantalkaboutmanynessinonenessbeyondjustsayingthatthisisthecase.ThisquestionwouldbecomeamajorpartofṢadrā’smetaphysics,andhewoulduseahighlydevelopedconceptoftashkīktodescribehowoneexistencecanapparentlycomprisemanyessenceseachhavingtheirownexistence.Forhimthisequivocalnatureofexistencewasaconcretefactaboutthingsinthemselves,notanactofmentalanalysisaboutthegeneralconcept“existence.”QūnawīalsosubscribestoawayofthinkingaboutexistencewhichismetaphysicallythesameasṢadrā’sinthesensethattheybothholdtoasingleexistencewhichisapparentlymultiple,butonnooccasiondoesQūnawīmakereferencetotashkīk(aconcepthewasdefinitelyfamiliarwith,aswillbeseenfromhiscorrespondencewithṬūsībelow)asawayoftalkingabouthowtosituatetheapparentlymanydifferentrealitiesweencounterwithintheoneexistence.

63Kitābal-fukūk189.64Iʿjāzal-bayān166.65Ibid.,203.66Ibid.67Miftāḥal-ghayb117.68Ibid.,118.

54

InIʿjāzal-bayānhestates,“Allthethingsweperceivewithourintellectual,mental,imaginational,andsensorialfacultiesare,eachandall,nothingmorethansimple,uncoupled(mujarrad)69realitieswhichareclothedwiththeoneindividualexistence.Theymanifestofthemselves.70However,someofthemaredependent(tābiʿ)uponothersintermsofmanifestation,determination,encompassment,andattachment.Thelatterarecalledindependent(matbūʿ)…[andare]realities,causes,andintermediariesbetweentheRealandthatwhichisdependentupontheminexistence….Thedependentarecalledpeculiarities(khawāṣṣ),entailments,accidents,qualities,states,attributions,effects,conditions,andthelike.”71Hegoesontosaythatindeed,thingssuchasmanifestation,existentiation,form,relationality,priority,posteriority,substance,accident,independence,anddependenceareactuallymeanings(maʿānīmujarradah)andintellectualattributions(nisabmaʿqūlah).Whensuchthingsare“clothedintheoneexistencebywhichtheymanifest”theyarethusclothedindifferingrelationshipsofpriority,scope,dependence,anddetermination(ḥukm),entailment(luzūm),etc…Thismeans,forexample,thatinasubstance-accidentrelationshipsuchas“laughingman,”laughingdependsuponmanforitsexistence,oronecouldsaythatlaughingisaqualityofman.However,bothmanandlaughingareessencesormeaningsthattakeontheoneexistence,differingonlyintheirplaceintheontologicalhierarchy.Thisallresultsfromthe“spreadingthroughout”(sarayān)ofunifieddivineexistentialunion(al-jamʿal-aḥadīal-wujūdīal-ilāhī).72 Towardstheendofthefinalquotationhelinkssarayānwiththedifferentiationofexistencehewasjustdiscussing.WhenQūnawīdividesuptheoneexistenceintermsofpriorityandposteriority,orintermsofindependenceanddependenceasinthecaseofsubstanceandaccident,orintermsofcauseandeffect,encompassment,etc…heisusinglanguagewhichṢadrāwouldusecenturieslaterinhisexpositionoftashkīk,butQūnawīdoesnotdevelopthisideafurther.Forhim,itisaquestionofmakingsenseofappearances.Hedoesnotattempttoexplainitintermsofaconceptsuchastashkīk,whichwouldhavebroughtinotherimportantquestionssuchashowexistenceistheprincipleandobjectofdifferentiation.Ṭūsīdoesnotdothis. InarelatedwayinMiftāḥal-ghaybheisdiscussingthelevelsofcontingencyintermsofexisentiation(ījād).Otherfactorsmentionedherearepriorityandposteriori(taqaddum,taʾakhkhur)andconditionality(shurūṭ).Thingsarearrangedinahierarchywithinthedivineknowledgeinaccordancewiththeirreceptivityto“existentialidentification”(al-taʿayyunal-wujūdī).73Later,hestates,“Therealityofhierarchy(tartīb),whichentailstherealityofpriority,posteriority,andrelativeintermediation(al-

69Philosophicallymujarradusuallyreferstoaformonitsown,notinsomematter.Itcanbetranslatedasuncoupled.InthiscaseQunawīismostlikelynottryingtoevokethislimitedsense,sincethetakingonofexistenceisnotexactlythesameasaformappearinginsomesortofmatter.Heistryingtosaythatthingsare,beforetheyaregrantedexistence,pureessenceswithinGod’sknowledge.70AccordingtoIbnʿArabī’snotionoftheimmutableidentities,outwardexistenceisalreadyapartoftheiressence.GodsimplysaysKun!andtheyexistbyvirtueofwhattheyare.SeeTheRingstonesofWisdom,119-20.71Iʿjāzal-bayān127.72Ibid.,128.73Miftāḥal-ghayb32.

55

tawassuṭal-nisbī),islikeeachidentityentailingitsstates.”74Qūnawīgivesspecialnoticethatthisisoneofthemostimpenetrableofmysteries.ThehierarchyexistsalreadyinGod’sknowledgeofHimself,whichistosaythatattheleveloftheimmutableidentitiestheseidentitiesalreadyhaverelationshipswithoneanotherwhichsetthemintoahierarchy.Whentheidentitiesaremanifestedasoutwardexistence,orcreation,thishierarchybecomesactualizedandthustherelationshipsofsubstanceandaccident,causeandeffect,priorandposterior,allcomeintobeing. Again,althoughfromtheseobservationsofthenatureofexistenceonecouldtakeananalysisafewstepsfurtherandarriveataconceptoftashkīk,Qunawidoesnotdoso.Whatheisdescribingcanalsobedescribedbytashkīk,andthetwoarenotcontradictory,meaningthattheunderlyingontologyisthesame:oneexistenceappearinginmanymodes.II.Wujūdassignifyingthecreatedorder

Asmentionedatthebeginningofthissection,onecandiscerntwomainsensesinwhichexistenceanditsrelatedconceptsareusedbyQūnawī.Thefirst,themysteriousoneexistencewhichissimultaneouslyallthings,hasjustbeendiscussed.Thesecondconsistsofthoseinstanceswhenexistenceandrelatedconcepts,especiallythederivativeconceptofexistentiation(ījād),areusedtorefersimplytothestatusofathingexistinginthecreatedorderasopposedtobeingwithinGod’sknowledgeorstateofnon-manifestation.Inthecaseofexistentiationitisquiteclearwhytheconceptsignifiestherealmofcreationandmanifestation,sincethenotionof“makingtoexist”(awjada)clearlymeansthatsomethinggoesfromonestatetoanother,andinthemetaphysicsoftheAkbarianschooltheonlyrealoptionintermsofchangingsomething’sstateintermsofitsexistenceistomakeanimmutableidentityinGod’sknowledgemanifestintheworld.ItisatermwhichappearsfrequentlyinQūnawī’swritings,andalwayscarriesthissenseofthemanifestationofimmutableidentitiesfromoutoftheKnowledgeofGodtotheworldofcreation,andindeedisoftenfoundtogetherwithmanifestation(ẓuhūr,iẓhār)anditsderivatives. However,fortheconceptsofexistence,existent(mawjūd),andexistential(wujūdī),moreclarificationisneeded.Letusbeginwiththederivativeword“existential.”Forexample,intheFukūkQūnawīspeaksof“existentialemanation”(al-fayḍal-wujūdī)75Healsomentionsthemysteryofthejourneyof“existentialandunseenself-disclosurefromtheSelfhood’sunseenness(al-tajallīal-wujūdīal-ghaybiminghaybal-huwiyyah)seekingtheperfectionofirradiation”.76Thisdoesnotseemtofitwithmygeneralargumenthereaboutthenatureofthequalifierwujūdī,butnoticeherethatinordertoexpressthemeaningofnon-manifestationthewordwujūdīneedsthequalifierghaybī.LaterhespeaksoftheFirstIntellectasthefirstexistential(wujūdī)andexistentiating(ījādī)cause(sabab),andasaconditionforthe“raisingup”ofthehouseofexistence.77 74Ibid.,47.75Kitābal-fukūk195Fayḍ,usuallytranslatedasemanation,isoneofthefamilyoftermstheAkbariansusetodescribethecomingoutofrealityfromnon-manifestationinGod’sknowledgeintothecreatedorder.Itisoftenusedsynonymouslywithtajallī(self-disclosure).76Kitābal-fukūk205.77Ibid.,211.

56

Indiscussingthesymbolismofwritingandspeaking,thepaperandthebreathcorrespondto“thespreadingthroughofthe‘generalexistentiallight’(al-nūral-wujūdīal-ʿāmm)totheBreathoftheAll-Merciful”whereinarefound“theformsofexistentobjectsofknowledge(ṣuwaral-maʿlūmātal-mawjūdah).”78Hegoesontosaythatthenthingsenterintoexistencewhichhadpreviouslynotbreathedtheairof(lit.“smelled”)existence,thefamousphrasefromIbnʿArabī(mashammatrāʾiḥatal-wujūd).InIʿjāzal-bayānQūnawīsaysthattheworldisthegreatbookinrelationtothe“existentialidentities”(al-aʿyānal-wujūdīyyah),whicharelikewordsandletters.79Usingarelatedsymbolismheisspeakingofthevariouspresencesasbooks,andthenmentionsthe“existentialdifferentiatedlevels”(al-marātibal-wujūdīyyahal-tafṣīliyyah).Heretheexistentialityispairedwithunfolding,bothsignifyingthatweareintherealmofmanifestation,ofcreation.Thelastlevelisẓāhiral-wujūdor“whatismanifestofexistence.”Individualexistents(mawjūdāt)arelociofmanifestationforthedivinenamesandqualities.80Helaterlikensthespreadingoutoflettersandwordsonsomeone’sbreathtothespreadingoutofexistentsonGod’sbreath,andtheir“identificationintheexistentialhierarchy/levels”(taʿayyunfīʾl-marātibal-wujūdīyyah).81 Inapassagewhereheisdiscussingthenatureoflight,Qūnawīstatesthattherearetworelationshipsordeterminationsinlight,whichheidentifiesherewithknowledge.Theyaretheoutward(ẓāhir)andtheinward(bāṭin).The“existentialandvisibleforms”(al-ṣuwaral-wujūdīyyahal-mashhūdah)areunfoldingsoftheoutwarddetermination.Theinwardisthemeaningorspirit(maʿnā)oflight,whichhealsocallsthe“meaningofmanifest/outwardexistence.”82 Itisclearthatthesenseoftheword“existential”asQūnawīusesitinthesepassagescannotbetakenasadirectadjectivalderivativeofhismostprofoundunderstandingofthewordexistence,thewayforexamplethemeaningofimaginational(khayālī)canbederiveddirectlyfromimagination(khayāl).InQūnawī’susage“existential”doesnotsimplymean“pertainingtoexistence”or“ofexistence”purelyandsimply,becauseaswehaveseenabovehisconceptofexistenceismuchmoreembracingandfluidthantherangeofmeaningfor“existential”whichwecangleanfromthepassagesmentionedabove.Inthesequotations“existential”meansmanifestedorevenconcrete.Itispairedandassociatedwithself-disclosure,unfolding(tafṣīl),83 78Miftāḥal-ghayb97.79Iʿjāzal-bayān105-6.80Ibid.,99.81Ibid.,211.82Ibid.,154.83TafṣīlandijmālareimportantconceptsintheAkbarianschool.Theyrepresentontologicalstatesofthingsinthevariousdegreesofmanifestation.Forexample,inrelationtotheirstateinthepresenceoftheimmutableidentities,theessencesofthingsintheFirstIntellectaremufaṣṣalorunfolded.Onecouldalsotranslatetheseasexplicitandimplicitprovidedtheyareunderstoodproperly.LatermembersoftheschoolwouldrefinetheseconceptssuchthatessencesintheGreatSpiritwouldbemujmalinrelationtotheessencesintheUniversalSoul,althoughbothrepresentastateofexistenceabovetheworldofimaginationandtheworldofbodies.Thephilosopherswouldmakethissamedivision,exceptthattheywouldcalltheformertheFirstIntellectquaijmāl(ʿalāṭarīqal-ijmāl),andthesecondtheFirstIntellectquatafṣīl(ʿalāṭarīqal-tafṣīl).

57

manifestation,form(ṣūrah),andlight,allofwhicharemeanttoindicatethecomingoutintothecreatedorder.84Itwouldappearthatthenominalwujūdallowsofbeingmodulatedtoincludebothordinaryexistenceasweknowitandtheprofoundsinglemysterycomprisingallthings,butwhenitcomestoemployingtheadjectivewujūdī,theordinarysensecreepsinanddominatestheusage.Inanycasethetermmawjūdisneverusedtoindicateanythingbuttheparticularexistenceofsomething.GodisneverreferredtoasamawjūdintheAkbarianschool.-Knowledgeexistenceandconcreteexistence

Itisalsoworthwhiletopointoutthedistinction,socentraltoAkbarianmetaphysics,betweenknowledgeexistence(al-wujūdal-ʿilmī)andconcreteexistence(al-wujūdal-ʿaynī).Thequalifier“knowledge”referstoGod’sknowledge,andhencetheimmutableidentities,whichareformspresentinGod’sknowledge.“Concrete”refersthentotheseidentitiesaftertheyhavebeenbroughtoutofGod’sknowledge.Itcanbemisleadingtotranslatethistermas“concrete,”sincefortheAkbarianstherealitiesinGod’sknowledgeareobjectivelyrealandinasensemorerealthanthe“concrete”existents.“Knowledge-”isnotthesameas“mental”becausethedifferencebetweenmentalexistenceandconcreteexistenceisthatbetweentheknowingsubjectandanobjectoutsideofhim;itisadifferencewithincreation.Thoughitcansometimesbeambiguousbecauseitcanalsobeusedlike“mental”(dhihnī),fīʾl-ʿilmistypicallymeanttodenoteadifferencebetweencreationandarchetype,inthatGod’sknowledgeisnotpartofcreation,whileourknowledgeis.God’sknowledgeisneverreferredtoas“mental”ordhihnī.Confusionalsoarisessincefīʾl-ʿaynisusedoppositebothofthem. Forexample,inMiftāḥal-ghaybhementionsthe“bringingout”(ibrāz)fromthepresenceofknowledge(ʿilm)tothepresenceofconcreteness(ʿayn).85InthesameworkhetalksaboutthemanifestationoftheobjectsofGod’sknowledge(maʿlūmāt,i.e.theimmutableidentities)intermsofgoingfromknowledgeexistence(al-wujūdal-ʿilmī)toconcreteexistence(al-wujūdal-ʿaynī).86Healsomentionsherethatthisprocesscannotberealizedexceptinsomematterorother. Indescribingthelevelsthatahumanbeingpassesthroughintheprocessofspiritualattainment,hementionsthecomingoutofknowledgeexistenceintoconcreteexistence.Priortoexistentiation,anybeingisin“theunseen,knowledge-,existentialpresence,”andits“existentiation”referstoGod’swillbeingdirectedtoitsidentityintheformofmanifestation(ẓuhūr).87Noticeherehowwujūdisusedinnon-manifestandmanifestsenses. InapassagediscussedaboveQūnawīsaysthattherearerealitieswhichareproperlyspeakingdependentorfollowothers.Whentheyenterintoconcreteexistence,theseformerlypuredisembodiedmeaningsbecome,forexample,theaccidentsofsubstances,orqualities,orentailmentsofthings.88

84ItisworthnotingthatQunawīalsouseswujūdītomeanthesameaspositiveorsubstantial.Forexample,hesaysthatarelationshipisdifferentfroman“existentialentity”(amrwujūdī)(Iʿjāzal-bayān,344).85Miftāḥal-ghayb97.86Ibid.,93.87Ibid.,104-5.88Iʿjāzal-bayān128.

58

III.ThePhilosophicalExchangebetweenṬūsīandQūnawī QūnawīandṬūsīwerecontemporariesanddiedwithinayearofeachother.Theirphilosophicalcorrespondence89isimportantbecauseQūnawīwassuchamajorchannelfortheteachingofIbnʿArabī,andbecauseṬūsīwasamajorreviverofthetraditionofPeripateticphilosophy,especiallythroughhiscommentaryuponIbnSīnā’sal-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt.ThecorrespondenceconsistsofaletterwrittenbyQūnawītoṬūsīposingagroupofphilosophicalquestions,followedbyareplybyṬūsī,andfinallyafinalletterofQūnawīcommentingonṬūsī’sreplies.Theletterswerehighlycordialandmutuallysympathetic,andbothmentookpainstopraiseoneanother.QūnawīnotedthatṬūsī’sfamehadspreadthroughouttheworldandthathewastheforemostphilosopherofhisage.Hehadwantedtomeethimbutsincehecouldnothedecidedtobeginacorrespondence.ṬūsīinturnspeakshighlyofQūnawī’sspiritualstation“inglowinglanguage,whichonemightexpectfromoneofQūnawī’sdisciples,butwhichoneissurprisedtoseecomingfromthegreatestphilosopherandoneofthemostpowerfulpoliticalfiguresoftheage.”90QūnawīshowsarespectforPeripateticphilosophyanddemonstrateshisknowledgeofit,whileṬūsīshowsrespectfortheinsightsoftheSufisandanunderstandingoftheirdoctrines.Thecorrespondencetouchesonmanyquestions,includingthenatureoftheOne,emanation,substanceandattribute,formandmatter,andthenatureofquiddities.InthissectionIwillbefocusingontheircommentsregardingtherealityofexistenceandthewayṬūsīandQūnawīaddressthequestionofhowexistenceispredicatedofGodandthingsatthesametime.

InhisquestionstoṬūsīQūnawīwrites:Everythingtowhichtheintellectual,mental,imaginational,andsensorialperceptionsattach—collectivelyorindividually—isnothingmorethanuncoupledrealities(ḥaqāʾiqmujarradah)combined(taʾallafa)withasingleindivisibleexistence.Thustheymanifestin/tothemselves.However,inmanifestation,determination,91scope,andattachment,somearedependentuponothers.Thoseuponwhomothersaredependent(matbūʿ)becauseoftheaforementionedpriority(taqaddum)arecalledrealities,causes,andintermediariesbetweentheRealandwhatdependsuponthem…Thedependentarecalledcharacteristics(khawāṣṣ),entailments(lawāzim),attributes(ʿawāriḍ),qualities(ṣifāt),states(aḥwāl),

89AcriticaleditionhasbeenpublishedtogetherwithanintroductionanddiscussionbyGudrunSchubert,Annäherungendermystisch-philosophischeBriefwechselzwischenSadrud-Dīn-iQonawiundNaṣīrud-Dīn-iṬūsī(al-MurāsalātbaynaṢadral-Dīnal-QunawīwaNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī),Beirut1995.Schubertdiscussesthetextin,“TheTextualHistoryoftheCorrespondencebetweenṢadral-DīnQunawīandNaṣīral-DīnṬūsī,”ManuscriptsoftheMiddleEast,3(1998),73-78.ThecorrespondenceisalsodiscussedbyWilliamChittick,“MysticismversusPhilosophyinEarlierIslamicHistory:Theal-Ṭūsī,al-QunawīCorrespondence,”ReligiousStudies17:1(1981),87-104.SeealsoNihatKeklik,IslamDunyasindaTesevvufveFelsefeArasandakiHesapla� malar,SadreddinKonavi-NasireddinṬūsīFelsefeleri,IstanbulÜniversitesiEdebiyatFakültesi,1962(DoctoralThesis).ThelatterarguesthatṬūsīwasnottheactualaddressee,althoughChittickandSchubertandothershavenotdoubtedthathewas.90Chittick,“MysticismversusPhilosophy,”101.91“Determination”ishowItranslateḥukm,animportanttermbutverydifficulttocaptureinEnglish.SeeTheRingstonesofWisdom,xxi-xxii.

59

conditionedentities(mashrūṭāt)andthelike.Whentheserealitiesareconsideredbereft(mujarrad)ofexistenceandoftheconnectionofeachwiththeother,withnonebeingrelatedtotheotheratall,theybecomeemptyofname,quality,attribute,formanddetermination.Theyareempty[ofthem]actually,notpotentially.Toaffirmaname,anattribute,oraquality—throughcompoundingorasasimplex,inmanifestationorinhiddenness,inperceptionandbeingperceived,inuniversalandparticular,independentandtheobjectofdependence,andthelike—to92uncoupledrealitiescanonlybemadeafact(ṣaḥḥa)andappearinthefirstplacethroughtheapplicationofthedeterminationofexistencetothem;butthis[occurs],inthesecondplace,withrespecttoanidentificationofexistence[whichtakesplace]bymeansofamanifestationinandinaccordancewithsomelevel…throughtheconnectionofthedeterminationsofeachtotheother,andthroughthemanifestingoftheeffectofonewiththeotherthroughexistence.93Aswasdiscussedintheprevioussection,inspeakinginsuchtermsQūnawīis

describinganontologyofoneexistenceandmanyquiddities,thoughnotusingequivocality(tashkīk)orthephrasewaḥdatal-wujūdtoexplainit.Hereducesallobjectsofexperience(“everythingtowhich…perceptionsattach”)topureforms(“uncoupledrealities”),whicharethenseenascombinedwithexistence,andindoingsoheisstatingthedoctrinewhichlaterAkbarians,especiallyQayṣarī(chapter5),wouldarticulatebyspeakingofmanyquidditiesandtheoneexistence.Hereferstothemas“uncoupledrealities,”buthecouldjustaswellhavesaidessence(dhāt),quiddity(māhiyyah),or,usinghismorenativeterminology,immutableidentity(ʿaynthābitah).Hebuildsthispassageuponthefundamentalessence/existencemodel. Hegoesontoexplainthattoactuallycallanobjectsomething,toidentifywhatitis,itinfactmustexist—mustpossesswujūd(“…canonlybemadeafactandappearinthefirstplacethroughtheapplicationofthejudgment(ḥukm)ofexistenceto[it]”).However,thefactofanessencehavingexistenceisitselftheresultofexistencebeing“identified”(taʿayyun)—thatistosay,limitedorqualified—intovariouslevelsandmodes.Thisiswhattheconvolutedwordingofthesecondpartofthepassageismeanttoexpress.Wefirstperceiveessences,butthoseessencesarewhollyderivativefromanexistencewhichwemaynotcorrectlyperceive.Itisanontologywhereessencesareuncoupled(mujarrad,hereusedperhapsinaratheridiomaticsenseof“pure”or“noneotherthan”)andremainonlyessencesuntilexistenceinasensegivesthemlifeandgivesrealitytoalltheirqualitiesaswellastheirinteractionswitheachother.

Later,however,Qūnawīcomesbacktoexistence,andthistimewishestoexplorewithṬūsījustwhattheramificationsareofdealingwiththeconcept“existence”asapredicateofthings(“Godexists,”“thismanexists,”etc…).Specifically,howdoesexistenceasasingleconceptrelatetoessence?Hewrites,“Itisclearthattheconceptofexistence,withrespecttoitsidentificationinourintelligence,isasingleconcept.Now,thisconceptassuch,withoutanyregardforwhatisotherthanit,mustnecessarilybeattributed(ʿāriḍ)toathing’squiddity,ormustnecessarilynotbeanattributeofathing’squiddity,ormustnotnecessarilybeeitherofthetwooptions.”94 92“Toaffirmaname…touncoupledrealities,”isbrokenupbyalongparentheticalstatementsetoffbydashes.93al-Murāsalāt37-38.94Ibid.,96-97.

60

Qūnawīexplainsthatinthefirstcase(“necessarilyattributedtoathing’squiddity”),existencewouldbeamereattributeofGod’srealityandnotbeintrinsicandessential.Inthesecondcase(“necessarilynot…anattributeofathing’squiddity”),onecouldneverhaveacasewheresomeexistence/existent(shayʾminal-wujūdāt)wouldbeattachedtoanyquiddity,thusdisallowingthatacontingentquidditywouldactuallyexist.Or,everyquidditywouldexistnecessarilyinthesensethatexistencewouldbethesameasitsreality;thentheconceptofwujūdwouldceasetobeasingleconceptbecauseofthemultiplicityofquiddities.Recallthatinthissecondcaseexistenceisneveranattributeofaquiddity,whichisanotherwayofsayingthattherearenosuchthingsascontingentquiddities;thatmeanseithertheyneverexistortheymustexist.Inthethirdcase,God’sexistenceisuniqueinbeingnecessary,buttheremustbesomethingthatdifferentiatesHisexistencefromcontingentexistences.Theresultsofthiswouldbeakindofdependenceuponthedifferentiatingfactor,leadingtothecontradictorynotionthatGodisnecessaryinHimselfandnecessaryowingtosomedifferentiatingfactor.

InhisresponsesonthissubjectṬūsīsays,Termswhichhaveonemeaningandaresaidofmanythingsareoftwosorts:Thefirstiswhenthatconceptisthesameintheindividualsofthatgroup,suchas“humanbeing”inZaydandAmr…andthesetermsarecalledunivocal,anditsdetermination,withrespecttowhatisimpliedbytheconcepts,isthesame…Thesecondsortiswhentheconceptisnotthesameintheseveralinstances.Rather,insomeitispriororposterior,stronger,ormore,suchas“white”forsnowandivory,or“existence”forsubstanceandattribute.Inthissortitdoesnothavetobethatthenecessaryimplicationswillbethesame;indeedtheymaydiffer.Forexamplethename“light”appliestosunlight,moonlight,andfirelight.Sunlightnecessarilybringsaboutthedisappearanceofnight,unliketheothers.Existenceisofthislattersort.Inthenecessaryitisself-subsistingwithoutitsbeingmadetheaccidentofaquiddity,andinthecontingentitismadetobetheattributeofaquiddity.95

Existence,theconceptofwhichappliestothenecessaryandthecontingentthroughtashkīk,isanintellectualentity,forwujūdcannot,concretely,occurinthingsthatshareinit.Thisentityissaidofthenecessaryexistencewhichisself-subsistinginitsessenceandwhichisnotmadeanaccidentofaquiddity,andalsosaidofotherexistents.Whentheirexistenceisconsideredinthemind,itiscontingentandnotnecessary.Thenamewujūdappliestothemandtothenecessaryas“Zayd”appliesinhisconcreteexistenceaswellashisname.Thatexistenceisanintellectualentity.Necessaryexistenceisunknowninitscoreandreality.Thisintellectualexistenceisunderstood(yuʿqal)fromit/Himinaqualifiednegativeway.96

[God’s]beingtheoriginofwhatisotherthanHimisduetohisconcrete,necessaryexistence(al-wujūbal-ʿaynī),notduetotheexistencesaidofHimand

95Ibid.,97-98.96Ibid.,99.

61

ofwhatisotherthanHimthroughtashkīk,whichrationalthinkersspecifynegatively(bi-qaydsalbī)97”“‘Distance’and‘body’areusedforwhatfallsunderthemunivocally,unlikewujūdwhichissaidofthingsthroughtashkīk.98

OneofṬūsī’skeypointsisthat“theexistenceusedforexistentsthroughtakhkīkisatthelevelofgenus,andisqualifiednegativelyuntilitisspecific[toone],andisatthelevelofdifferentia.”IncommentingonQūnawī’seither/oraboutwujūdbeingintrinsicorextrinsictoGod,hesays,“Thisisanallusiontohisconcreteexistencewhichcannotbegraspedbyanyintelligence.99

Generalsharedexistenceisnotrealizedexceptintheintelligence,asisthecaseforany“generallyshared”entity(amr).Aconcretethingdoesnotoccurinmultiplethings.Ifitwereineachofthosethings,itwouldnotbeathinginitselfbutwouldbe[many]things.Ifitisinthetotalitywithrespecttoitsbeingatotality,andiffromthisperspectivethetotalityisasinglething,itdoesnotoccur,then,in[many]things.Ifitisinthetotalitymeaningitisdividedinitsindividuals,thentherewillbeapartofthatthingineachone,notthethingitself.Ifitisneitherinanindividualnorinthetotality,itdoesnotoccurinthem.Inshort,itsoccurringinwhatisotherthanitselftakesplaceonlythroughitsbeingpredicatedofthatother.Predication…takesplaceonlyintheintelligence.Generalsharedexistencecanonlybeintellectual(ʿaqlī).100

Ṭūsī’sremarkslargelyspeakforthemselves.Hisresponseisbasedonhisgeneraltheoryofequivocalpredicationdiscussedearlier.Hesaysthatwhileexistenceisindeedasingleconceptitisnotsoinaunivocalway,norinawaythatismerelyhomonymous.OnethusdoesnotrunintoanyoftheproblemswhichQūnawīpredictsifexistenceistakenasasingleconcept.AsaconceptexistenceisnotconstrainedtoapplytoGodandthingsinexactlythesamewayinallpossiblerespects,becauseofequivocality,andthustheuniquenessofGod’sexistenceremainsintact. ThesecondmajorpointinvolveswhatṬūsīsometimesreferstoasgeneralsharedexistence(al-wujūdal-ʿāmmal-mushtarak),whichisapurelymentalentitywithnoconcretecorrespondenceoutsideofthemind.Astheitalicizedsentencenotes,noconcretethingcanbepresentinmultiplethingsinarealway.Itwilleitherbeakindofpluralityofthingssuchasafamily,andhencenotconcretelyasinglething,oritwillbedividedupamongthingslikepiecesofapie.Itisthisgeneralexistence,thismentalcategory,whichispredicatedofthingsequivocally.WhenitcomestoGodorNecessaryExistence,acleardemarcationmustbemadebetweenGod’sindividualconcreteexistence,whichisanimpenetrablemysteryunknowablebythehumanmind,and“generalexistence”asitappliestoGod.ItisthelatterwhichismeantwhenthePeripateticssaythatGod’sexistenceisknowableapriori.Ashesays,itisknownfromtheunknowableexistenceina“qualifiedandnegative”way.However,itisbyvirtueofGod’sownindividualexistencethatHeistheoriginofthingsandtheirindividual 97Ibelievethe“which”referstotheformer,notthelatter98al-Murāsalāt100.99Ibid.,102.100Ibid.,107-8(italicsmine).

62

existences.The“generalsharedexistence”isnotthemediumbywhichthiscausationoccurs,althoughmentallyitisthatwhichissharedbothbyGodandbyindividualexistents.

ComingbacktoQūnawī,hesaysofṬūsī:Asforhiscommentsregardingthenameappliedtoanyrealitythatissharedandwhichdiffersinbeinginathingmorestrongly,moreprior,moreintensely,ormoreprimarily:allthisrelatesback,intheviewofthemenofrealization(muḥaqqiqūn),tothemanifestation—notthemultiplication—takingplaceinthemanifestingreality,bethatreality“knowledge,”“existence,”orsomethingelse….Therankingandvariegationfoundbetweenitsmanifestationsisthemanifestingentitywhichdemandstheidentificationofthatrealityinsofarasitisanidentificationandmanifestationdifferentfromitsidentificationinsomethingelse.Thereisnomultiplicity,partitioning,ordivisionoftherealityassuch.101

Surprisingly,thisishisonlycommentontashkīk,despiteṬūsī’streatmentofit.Hedoesnotseeminterestedinpursuingthesubjectofequivocalpredicationanyfurther,rather,hebringsbackthefundamentaltruthforhimthatthereisnorealmultiplicityinthefirstplace.Itisonlyanillusioncreatedbythe“identifications”ofexistence.Whyhepassesoverequivocalityisunclear.DidhenotunderstandṬūsī’spoint,orisitapolitedismissalofanunconvincingidea?Thetextdoesnotprovideareadyanswer.

Thefollowingpassagesbringinepistemology,butaresignificantintermsofontology,aswewillsee:

TheidentificationoftheRealasbeingone,orthatHeisthesourceofallexistents,orthatHeislackinginanymultiplicityorpartnershipwithanythinginexistence,orthatitisimpossiblethatHeshouldhaveaquidditybeyondHisexistence:noneofthiscanbeafactexceptwithregardtoHisidentificationintherealmofcosmicintellection(al-taʿaqqulal-kawnī).102BycosmicintellectionImeantheintellectionoftheRealbywhatisotherthantheReal…Intellectionsofthissortare[never]freeofthecharacteristicsoflimitationandmultiplicitywhichhaveadetermininginfluenceonone’sintellection.[Thislatter]necessarilyimprintstheobjectofintellectionwithinit[i.e.theintellection]asdeterminedbythelocusofimprinting,evenifthelocusisspiritual(maʿnā).Whatcommonmeasurecantherebebetweentheintellectorandtheintellected?103

Anyqualifiedidentificationenclosestheunqualified[things]identifiedwithinit.Thesoundintelligencejudgesthatthisidentificationisprecededbynon-identification(lā-taʿayyun).WhenamanofrealizationsaysthattherealityoftheRealisunknownbuttheknowledge(maʿrifah)ofHimisattained,hedoesnotmeanbythatthattheRealhasarealitybeyondHisexistence.AllhemeansisthatwhentheintellectionoftheRealisconsideredas(iʿtibār)disengagedfromexistentialandrelational-notional(iʿtibārī)multiplicityandfromqualifyingintellectionsandidentificationsresultingfromHisbeingintellectedbyanotherthing,Heisunqualified(muṭlaq)by[any]identification,beitthroughattribution,

101Ibid.,166.102Kawnherereferringtotheworldofgenerationandcorruption,thecreatedworldofspaceandtime,theobjectbroughtintoexistencebythedivine“Be!”103al-Murāsalāt142-3.

63

determination,orrelation,affirmativelyornegatively.Thisistheunqualified-ness(iṭlāq)oftheEssence,notqualifiedinanyway(biamrma)byanypercipient.Onedoesnot,inthisrespect,affirmthatHeistheSourceorthatHeemanatesexistence.Rather,theaffirmationofexistencetothatnon-qualification(iṭlāq)isthesameasitsnegationinrelationtoit,whichistosaythatHeisunqualified(muṭlaq)bybeingenclosedinanattributeordetermination,beitnegativeorpositive,oraunionofthetwo,oratotaltranscendingofthetwo(tanazzuhʿanhuma)…WhenamanofrealizationholdsthepositionthatHisrealityisunknown,allhemeansbythatisthattheReal,byvirtueofthisaforementionednon-qualification(iṭlāq)isnotidentified/ableinintellection,doesnotdiscloseItselfatanylevel,andisnotapprehendedbyanypercipient. …Therelationofquiddityis[tobeunderstood]inthisway,notthatHehasaquidditybeyondhisexistence.…TheidentificationoftheRealasbeingoneisanotionsubsequent(tālī)tothenon-identificationandnon-conditioning.104

InthesetwopassagesitisclearthatQūnawīisnotwillingtostraytoofarfromhisSufifundamentals,anddoesnotwanttogivethehumanintelligencetoomuchcreditforbeingabletoanswerthesekindsofquestionsinastandardphilosophicalway.Inanimportantsense,thesepassagesrelatetoepistemology,tellingusthatnomatterwhatthehumansubjectperceivesorthinksitperceives,anyperceptionofGodinanyrespectwillalwaysinvolvesomelimitationorqualificationofGod’stotalreality.“Cosmicintellection”meanshereanactofknowledgethatoriginatesfromwithinthecreatedorderandishenceconstrainedbytheconditionsofthatcreatedorder. Thereisasubtlepointthatheismaking,however.HeissettinghimselfapartfromṬūsī’spositionthatwecanknowthe“generalexistence”whenitcomestoGodbutthatwecannotknowHisownindividualexistence.WhentheSufis(“menofrealization”)makeasimilarsoundingstatementthatGod’srealityisunknownbutthatHecanbeknowninacertainway,thisisnotmeanttodrawalinebetweensome“generalexistence”and“individualconcreteexistence.”Thekeyistheconceptofno-identification(lā-taʿayyun)whichhesaysshouldbeapparenttoanyonewithasoundintelligence.Thatistosay,thefactofvariouskindsofidentification(taʿayyun)impliesarealityofwhichtheyareidentifications,whichwoulditselfbenon-identified.Thisnon-identity—theSupremeEssence,theSelf(al-dhāt—isbeyondalldualitiesofknowerandknown,subjectandobject,andisbeyondanysortofqualificationorlimitation.Thustoargueoverexistenceatthislevelisakindofphilosophicalredherring,astheattributionordenialofexistencetothisnon-identifiedessenceisanon-starter:itallowsofnoqualifications,attributions,ordenialsatall. Thereisafundamentaldifferenceinontologyhere,andattherootofthisdifferenceisthewayinwhichQūnawīandṬūsīsituatetheultimatemysteryofGod.ForṬūsī,whatismysteriousisnotthewayinwhichonecanpredicateexistenceofallthingstogetherwithGod,sincethatissimplyamatterofunderstandingthenatureofequivocalpredication.Neitheristhereagreatmysteryintheindividualexistenceofthings.Thereareessences,andtheseessenceseitherexistortheydonotexist,logicallyspeaking.Therealindividualexistenceofaparticularthingisneversaidtobefundamentally

104Ibid.,143-4.

64

unknowable,forexample.TherealmysteryofexistenceforthePeripatetics,asmentionedbefore,isthesingle,individualexistenceofGodwhichHesharesinnowaywithanythingelse,althoughitistheoriginandcauseofotherexistentthings. FortheAkbariansthemysteryofexistenceisnotatalllimitedtoGodthecreatorandoriginofthings,butpervadesandpenetratesanythingthatissaidtoexistatall.Becausetheyareinsistentthatinrealitythereisonlyoneexistencebehindtheillusionofmanythings,thereisanunknowabilitythatispresentineverything,notonlyinGod’sindividualexistence.TheseparationbetweenconceptandrealityforṬūsīistheseparationbetweentheaprioriknowablegeneralexistenceontheonehand,sharedbyGodandthingsbutreallyonlyamentalabstraction,andtheparticularandconcreteexistenceofGodontheother.FortheAkbarians,thedifferencebetweenconceptandrealityrunsthrougheverything.Theideawehaveofhowthingsexistandpossessrealityisnotthewaytheyreallyareatall.Inreality,theyaremanifestationsofasinglereality,thoughinourmindsweassignthemeachtheirown,autonomousexistence. ItisbecausehelocateshismysteryonlywithintheconcreteexistenceofGodasseparatefromthingsthatṬūsībelievesthathisreasoningabouttheimpossibilityofasinglethingbeingsharedamongmultipleinstancesholdstogether.FromonepointofviewQūnawīwouldnotdisagreewithhim,becauselogicallyasingleconcretethingcannotbeinseveralotherconcretethings.However,asshouldbeevidentfromQūnawī’sbroadstrokesagainstcommonnotionsofexistenceandknowledge,thereisnoproblembecausethereareconcreteindividualsonlyfromthepointofviewoftheworld.Thisiscritical,becauseinAkbarianmetaphysicsthereisneveranassertionthatsomeobjectorotheruniteswithGodorbecomesonewithHim,meaningthatthecreaturecanneverunitewiththeCreator.TheargumentmadeisthatfundamentallytheseparationofCreatorandcreatureissupersededandovercomebytheultimaterealityoftheSelf,fromwhosepointofviewthereisonlytheSelf.

65

ChapterThree:Jandī’sUseofwujūdandRelatedConcepts

Muʾayyidal-DīnibnMaḥmūdal-Jandī(d.1292)wasthestudentofQūnawīaswellasthefirstmemberoftheAkbarianschooltoauthorwhatcouldbetermedafullcommentaryupontheFuṣūṣal-ḥikam,entitledsimplySharḥfuṣūṣal-ḥikam.JandīhailedfromthetownofJandinKhurāsān,nearFarghāna,althoughtheexactdateofhisbirthandthedetailsofhisearlylifearenotknown.HegivesaspiritualautobiographicalaccountinhisNafḥatal-rūḥwa-tuḥfatal-futūḥ,wherehetellsofhisinitialaquanitancewithSuficirclesandhiseventualdedicationtotheSufiwayoflife.HeleftJandandbecamethepupilofQūnawīforaperiodoftenyears.BeforeQūnawī’sdeathJandīwenttoBaghdadwhereheassumedthefunctionofQūnawī’ssuccessor.Jandīwasindeedhisdisciple,butthereisnoevidencethatJandīinturnbecamean“initiatingmaster”tocontinuethelinefromIbnʿArabīandQūnawī.LaterhewenttoSinopandwrotetheaforementionedNafḥatal-rūḥatthebehest,itissaid,ofawomanwhowasinterestedinSufism.Thedatesgivenforhisdeathvaryfrom1292to1301,andtheplaceofhisdeathisnotknown.1

JandīwrotebooksbothinArabicandinPersian,andhiscommentaryupontheFuṣūṣwasaresultofhisstudyingthetextcloselywithhismasterQūnawī.HeclaimedthatQūnawī’steachingwasnotsimplyoral,butthatQūnawī“tookspiritualcontrolofhisunderstanding”2andtaughthimthemeaningofthebookinaninstant.ThiswasalsothewayQūnawīclaimedtohavelearnedthebookfromIbnʿArabī.Hiscommentaryisgenerallyconsideredtobethemostinfluentialoverall,evenifothershavebeenstudiedmorewidely.ThecommentariesofKāshānī,Qayṣarī,andʿAbdal-RaḥmānJāmīalldrawsignificantlyfromJandī’swork.AmongtheOttomans,MehmetYazıcıoğlu(d.1451)wroteacommentaryonJandī’scommentaryentitledal-Muntahā.HisNafḥatal-rūḥhasbeenpublished,andafewofhisworksexistinmanuscript,whileotherswhichareattributedtohimhavenotcomedowntous.TherehavethusfarbeennostudiesofJandīorhisthoughtinWesternlanguages.

InthepreviouschapterweexaminedhowQūnawītookthemetaphysicsofIbnʿArabīandattemptedtomoulditintoanontologyandepistemologythatcouldenterintodialoguewiththeprevailinglanguageofIslamicmetaphysicalthought.Foralltheirmerits,Qūnawī’sattemptsatsystematizationareonlyapartialsuccessatbest,ifweholduphisuseofcentraltermssuchasexistenceandexistential(wujūd,wujūdī)tothestandardofaphilosophersuchasṬūsī,andhisintellectualsuccessorswoulddepartfromhiswayofspeakingaboutthings.Insteadofrestatingtheirmasters’expositions,eachofthesuccessivethinkersintheAkbarianschoolmaketheirownoriginaladditions,andspeakabouttheirsubjectmatterinsignificantlydifferentways.AswesawwithQūnawī,forJandīthetermwujūddoesnotactasanindispensableaxisforhismetaphysics,andindeedothertermsareequallyandoftenmoreimportant.Infact,notonlydoesheemploywujūdinanon-centralway,butthewayheinwhichhedoesnotusewujūdisdifferentthanQūnawī,ifonecanbepermittedtospeakthisway.ThisdifferencebecomesapparentfromtheveryfirstpageofhiscommentaryupontheFuṣūṣ. 1See“Cendi,EbūAbdillāhMüeyyidüddinb.Mahmūdb.Sāidel-Cendi”İslamAnsiklopedisi,foralistofmanuscriptsandattributedworks.SeealsoW.Chittick,“TheSchoolofIbnʿArabī,”HistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,517-18.2Chittick,517.

66

-Theuseofanniyyah3andhuwiyyah

AmongthetermsJandīmentionsintheopeningpagesofhisworkareanniyyahandhuwiyyah,whichalongwithwujūd,mawjūd,shayʾ,etc.makeupthesetofcentralontictermsinArabicphilosophicaldiscourse.Anniyyah4andhuwiyyah5cameoutofthetranslationsofAristotle’sMetaphysicsandthePlotinianwritingsattributedtoAristotleunderthenameTheTheologyofAristotle,alsoknownasLiberdecausis.AnniyyahisformedfromtheGreektotior“thatness,”meanttosignifythedifferencebetweenwhatathingis(totiesti)andthatitis.ItisaveryearlyArabictermwhichbecamelessimportantinlatercenturiesbutwhichplayedasignificantroleinthephilosophyofKindī,Farabi,andAvicenna.InMaqāṣidal-falāsifaGhazālīusedanniyyahwithmāhiyyahtomakethepointthatGod’sexistenceisnotseparatefromHisessence,althoughhedoesnotusetheterminTheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers,nordoesAverroesinhisresponse.IntheTheology,theGreekonandeinaiareconsistentlytranslatedbyanniyyah,althoughthesametermsintheMetaphysicsaresometimestranslatedbyhuwiyyah.ThetermisrarelyusedinanyimportantwayineitherIbnʿArabīorQūnawī.

IntheArabictranslationoftheTheology,huwiyyahisusedtotranslatetheGreektautosor“identity,”asopposedtoghayriyyahfortheGreeketeposor“otherness.”“Identity”and“otherness”aretwoofPlotinus’fiveintelligiblecategories,anniyyah(“being”or“thatness”)beingathird.HuwiyyahwasalreadyusedbyKindī,whowentsofarastoformatafaʿʿalaverb“tahawwā”outofthepseudo-maṣdarhuwiyyah.Forhimitseemedtocarrythesenseofsubstance,or“athingsubsistingbyitself.”Farabiopposedhuwiyyahtomāhiyyahinthecontextofansweringfirstthequestionofwhatathingis(māhiyyah)andthenansweringwhetheritis(huwiyyah).Thatistosay,themāhiyyahdoesnottellusanythingaboutthestatusofthehuwiyyah,adistinctionwhichwouldlaterbecomeuniversalizedinthedistinctionbetweenmāhiyyahandwujūd.InIbnSīnāitseemstocarrythesenseofsubstance,moreparticularlythesubjectasopposedtothepredicate,whichistosayinthesubstance“man”thehuwiyyahreferstothesubstancethatcanallowofseveralpredications,butnottothosepredicationsthemselves.IbnRushdthoughthuwiyyahwascoinedinordertoavoidtheambiguousnatureofthewordmawjūd,whichhadthemeaningof“finding”notfoundintheGreektoon.TheLatinrenderingsofhuwiyyahareidquodest,essentia,andidentitas.Itshouldbenotedthatthephraseusedtoexpressidentityinthesenseof“itself”(oautosandtoauto)inArabicishuwahuwaorhiyahiya,literally“itisit”.

Unlikeanniyyah,huwiyyahisacentralandubiquitoustechnicalterminmostAkbarianwritings,andlikemostimportanttermsinthisschoolitisdifficulttotranslate.BecauseIuse“identity”forʿaynandIfindthatChittick’srenderingof“he-ness”canbringupthird-personconnotationsinEnglishnotpresentintheArabic,Ichoosethe

3Thistermisreadasinniyyahbymany,butmuchofthescholarlyliteratureusesanniyyah,whichIuseconsistentlythroughout.4SeeS.vanderBergh,“Anniyyah,”inEI2.DavidBurrellinhis“AvicennaandGreekPhilosophy”(Mélanges,v.17:53-66,1986)alsocitesMarieThérèsed’Alverny,“Anniya-Anitas”(MélangesoffertsàEtienneGilson,Paris,1959,59-91)andRichardFrank,“Theoriginofthephilosophicaltermanniyya”(MuséeLavigerieCahiersdeByrsa6,Paris,1956,181-201).5SeeA.M.Goichon,“Huwiyyah,”EI2.

67

translationof“selfhood.”6Goichonpreferred“ipseity,”whichisnothingotherthantheLatinateversionof“selfhood,”butIfindthattheAnglicizedtermismoreexpressiveoftherangeofmeaningofhuwiyyahinIbnʿArabī’sthought.ThisisimportanttonotebecausetheproblemoftranslatinghuwiyyahconceptuallyasselfhoodrunsintothetranslationofananiyyahoranaʾiyyahasI-ness,atleastwhilereadingJandī.Derivedfromanameaning“I”or“me,”thislatterterm,asweshallsee,ismeanttobesomehowopposedtohuwiyyah.ForJandī,tosay“I”isalreadytoassume“thou”andhenceaseparationandduality.Huwiyyahismeanttoexcludeanyrealseparationorduality.Itishopedthatusing“selfhood”forhuwiyyahand“I-ness”forananiyyahwillpreservethisdistinctionbetweendualityandidentity.Tomakethingsmorecomplicated,theuseofanniyahtogetherwithanāʾiyyahisclearlymeanttobeakindofwordplaywhichopposesthetruebeingorsubstanceofanniyyahtoanāʾiyyah,whichissimilarlywrittenandspoken.

LetuslookathowJandīconcretelyusestheseterms.Intheopeningpageshepraisesandglorifies“Hisgreatselfhood(huwiyyah)andsplendidbeing(anniyyah),”andsaysthat“theinwardnessofHisSelfhoodismanifestthroughHisI-ness(anāʾiyyah).”7Hecontinues:

TheidentificationofHisIdentityisHisbeing(anniyyah),andtheinwardofHisinwardnessisHisessence-ness(dhātiyyah).TheoutwardofHisinwardisHisI-ness,andtheoutwardofHisoutwardisHisdivinity(ilāhiyyah).Thevisibility(shahādah)ofhisoutwardnessisHislordliness(rubūbiyyah)andreality(ḥaqīqah),andtheoutwardnessofHislocusofmanifestationisthatoverwhichHeislord(marbūbiyyah)andHiscreation(khalqiyyah).AlltheserelationshipsareimplicitinHisreality.8

Thisisadensepassagetobesure,butunderstandableinlightofAkbarianmetaphysics.God’sI-nessisHisfirstidentification(taʿayyun),ortoputitanotherway,itisGodtheCreatorandLordasopposedtoGodtheEssence/Self.ItistheI-nessbecauseitrepresentsGod’sbeing“I”inrelationtotheworldwhich,fortheLordandCreator,isanobject—inotherwords,a“thou.”This“I”isthefirstmanifestationofthesuprememysteryofthehuwiyyah(selfhood)mentionedinthesamesentence.Asfarasessence-nessorbeing-an-essence(dhātiyyah)isconcerned,itisequivalenttotheselfhoodorhuwiyyahhere.Tosaythatthe“outwardofHisoutward”ishisilāhiyyahordivinityislikelytiedintoIbnʿArabī’simportantassertionintheFuṣūṣandinotherplacesthatinorderforGodtobeagod(ilāh)HemusthavesomethingoverwhichHeisgod—anobjectofdivinity(maʾlūh).TherelationshipofdivinitywiththeobjectofdivinityimpliescreationandhencetheexteriorizationofwhatispresentwithintheknowledgeofGod,metaphysicallyspeaking.TherestofthepassagethenexpandsuponGod’srelationshipwiththeworld. ItisactuallyonlyafterapageorsothatJandīevenmentionswujūd,andhedoessoaftermentioningtheproperrelationshipofGodtomultiplicityandoneness,absolutenessandrelativity,temporalityandeternity,andonlythenmentionsthat,“Hisexistenceisself-substistent(qayyūm);itneithercomestoexistnorismadetoexist.”Thustheentirefirstimportantmetaphysicalintroductionintheworkiseffectively 6ForadiscussionofselfhoodseeChapter2,note34.7Muʿayyidal-Dīnal-Jandī,Sharhfuṣūṣal-ḥikam,ed.Jalālal-DīnĀshtiyānī,Mashhad,1982,3.8Ibid.

68

lackinginanyimportantreferencetoexistenceasaphilosophicalconcept,andinsteadreliesoninwardnessandoutwardness,aswellasvariousdegreesofselfhoodandidentity,toexplaintheunderlyingrealityoftheuniverse.Thisisnoteworthybecauselatercommentators,especiallyQaṣarī,beginwithexistencerightaway.

Thereareotherpassageswherethetechnicalusageofthesetermsisnotalwayssoeasytofollow:

[TheReal]isidenticalwithoutwardwitnessedexistenceitselfinHisbeinginward,becauseHeisidenticalwiththeinwardandtheoutward…ByHisdifferentitated,outwardbeing(anniyyah)thatisidentifiedthroughthebeings(anniyyāt)ofexistentthingsHeknowsandpraisesHisinward,unseen,individual(ʿaynī)selfhoods…Eventhoughtheidentities(aʿyān)arethemeanings(maʿānī)oftheselfhoods(huwiyyāt)oftheseI-nesses(anāniyyāt),theyaretheformsofthebeings(anniyyāt)oftheunseenessence.9

HeexplainsherethatthelociofmanifestationaretheformsoftheseI-nesses(anāniyyāt).InthissamepassagehesaysthatthrougheachimmutableidentityinGod’seternalknowledgeGodknowsandpraisesthelociofmanifestation“inexistence.”Notethatwujūdisonlyusedinreferencetomanifestation,andisindeedabsentintheentirediscussionotherwise.

Thesetermsalsoappearinpoeticform:HisSelfhoodsustainstheperishingofmyselfhoodAndIam,byHim,inHim,naughttoanyoneMybeing(anniyyah)perishedinaninvisibleEmbracing,EssenceSelfhood10

Inanotherpassage,whereJandīassignsontologicalsymbolismtovariouslettersoftheArabicalphabet,weencounterthefollowing:

Itthenisfreeofeverythingentailedbyexistence—namelylife,knowledge,will,power—anditsattributions,entailments,attributes,consequents;andalso[freeof]itsself(nafs),itsidentity(ʿayn),itsselfhood(huwiyyah),anditsanniyyah.11

IhavesometimesfounditdifficulttokeeptrackofJandī’smetaphysicalreasoninginthesepassages,especiallythelastonewherethetermsarerattledoffinsequence(“identity…selfhood…being”).Whensuchtermsashuwiyyahandanniyyahareusedthiswaytheprecisemetaphysicalargumentsarehardertoperceive.Settingasidetheiruseinpoetry,asintheexampleabove,onegetstheimpressionfromtheprosethattheseterms,asisoftenthecaseinAkbarianwritings,areheavilydependentoncontextandusage.Itispossibletouseanniyyahinsuchawaythatitrepresentssomethingmoreinwardormoresubstantial,butputittogetherwithhuwiyyahandsuddenlyanniyyahbecomesthatwhichismoreoutwardandhuwiyyahthemoretrueandmoresubstantial.Notonlydoesthepoet’sselfhoodperishinthedivineselfhood,butthepoet’sbeing(anniyyah)alsoperishesinthepoet’sselfhood.Thedifferencecanbehardtofollow,atleastforthisreader.

Aswithwujūd,andformostconceptsusedinametaphysicalway,theAkbarians(atleasttheearlyones)dependlessontheprecisecontentofaphilosophicaltermand 9Ibid.,20.10Ibid.,55.11Ibid.,52-53.

69

moreontherelationalitybetweenthetermstobringouttheimpliedmetaphysicaldistinction.Thus,termssuchashuwiyyahandanniyyaharebothwhatmightbecalledfundamentalontologicalconcepts,likewujūdandḥaqīqah.ItwouldbefalsetosaythatallsuchtermsinAkbarianwritingscanmeananythingwewantthemtomean,becausetheydoindeedhaveaprecisemeaning,butthisprecisionoftendependsonthepresenceofotherconcepts.Thereareseveralkindsofḥaqīqah,severalkindsofwujūd,andseveralkindsofhuwiyyah,andalthoughthesetermsarenotsynonymoustheycansometimesrefertothesamethingdependingonhowtheyareused.Thatistosay,theycanattimespointtotheverysamemetaphysicalreferent,buttheypointtoitfromdifferentplaces.

IbelievethatsomeoftheambiguityinherentinthewritingsofIbnʿArabī,Qūnawī,andJandīstemsfromthefactthatphilosophicaldiscourseis,forthem,anadoptedmodeofwriting.Rememberthattheywerefirstandforemostmeninterestedinthepracticeofthespirituallife,andthatphilosophicalexplanationwasabranchofthatpractice.Theiruseofphilosophicalideas—eventhoseideasmostcloselyassociatedwiththeirschool,aswasthecasewithʿayn—wasoftenanexerciseintryingtobuildbridgestothelargercommunityofmetaphysicalthinkers.Fromthestandpointofsomeonereadingthesetextsseveralcenturieslater,itseemsclearthatanimportantpartoftheAkbarians’audiencewasmadeupoftheircolleaguesinthephilosophicalandtheologicalcamps.

IfinditunlikelythatmenasintelligentasQūnawīandJandī,nottomentionIbnʿArabī,couldnothavebeenmoresystematicintheirexpositions,inthemannerofthePeripateticsforexample,iftheyhadwantedto.TheywerefamiliarwiththeworksofthephilosopherssuchasIbnSīnā,andiftheywereinterestedinafull-fledgedconceptualsystemthatstoodonitsowntheycouldhaveproducedone,orattheveryleasttheywouldhaveproducedsomethingmuchdifferentthantheworkswhichhavecomedowntous.Touseacounterexample,Suhrawardīwasveryinterestedinconstructingsuchasystem,andevenwithhisquiteobviousmysticaltendencieshislevelofsystematizationgoesfarbeyondanythingfoundintheearlyAkbarianschool.InSuhrawardīwehaveverycleardefinitionsoftermsandconcepts,andindeedanalternativelogicandepistemologymeanttoreplacePeripetaticthought.TheearlyAkbariansdidnotseeminterestedinoverturningPeripetaticthoughtsomuchasturningitsrawconceptualmaterialandmodeofdiscoursetotheirownpurposes.-Taḥaqquq Buildingonwhatwassaidaboutwujūdabove,itisnotsurprisingthatJandīusesotherontictermswherehemighthaveusedwujūd.OnoneoccasionJandīspeaksofthingsobtainingtheir“realization”(taḥaqquq)intheiridentitiesthroughexistenceandexistentiation,12andlaterhehasthistosay:

Knowthat‘reality’canbevalidlyusedasageneralappellationforanythingthathasrealization(taḥaqquq).Now,thereisarealitywhoserealizationisfromitself(bi-dhātihi),andthisistherealityoftheReal.But,therecanbearealitywhoserealizationisnotfromitself,butwhoserealizationisbasedonwhatisrealizedinitselfandfromitself.Thiscanbeinknowledge,inconcreto,insomeofthelevels

12Ibid.,126.

70

ofexistenceorinallofthem,perpetuallyornon-perpetually—orinonemomentratherthananother.Therefore,theappellation‘reality’isvalidfortheRealandforcreation,andforattributions,relationships,substancesandaccidents—ifwesaythatcreationhasrealizationorthat‘reality’canbeoneormany,unconditionedorconditioned.13

Taḥaqquq(“realization”),likeidentification(taʿayyun),isemployedbyJandīasaconcepthereatleastasfundamentalaswujūd.Aswasmentionedpreviously,taḥaqquqisacentraltermfortheschoolofIbnʿArabī,especiallysincethenamemostcharacteristicallyusedbyIbnʿArabīforthemenofthehighestspiritualrealizationismuhaqqiq,or“onewhorealizes.”Usuallyḥaqīqahisusedtodenoteathing’sessenceorimmutableidentity,buthereitseemstodenote,togetherwithtaḥaqquq,anythingthatisreal.-Existenceassignifyingmanifestationandcreation

AswesawwithQūnawī,oftenwhenusingthewordwujūdJandīisdenotingexternalizedrealityasopposedtoinward,non-manifestedreality.Letuslookatsomeexamples:

InaparagraphdiscussinghowtheworldofbodiesglorifiesGod,Jandīuseswujūdonseveraloccasionsassignifiersofthecreatedworld.ThesebodiesglorifyGod“inthemselvesandintheirexistences.”Hethenmentionstheexistentialityspecifictouniversalbodily-ness(al-wujūdīyyahal-khasisahbiʾl-jismiyyahal-kulliyyah).Alsointhissectionaretheexistences“oftheworldofcreationandgeneration”(al-wujūdātal-khalqiyyahal-kiyāniyyah).14Thislatterterm,kiyān,recallsIbnSīnā’ssamʿal-kiyān,whichreferstothegeneralnotionofphysics,thefirstthingsonehearsintheworldofexistencesuchas“body,”“essence,”“existence,”etc.Itisrelatedtokawn,whichphilosophicallyisoftenpairedwithfasādtotranslatetheGreeknotionoftheworldofgenerationandcorruption.InIbnʿArabī’smetaphysics,kawnhasasimilarmeaningofreferringtothecreatedorder,althoughmorebasicforhimisthemeaningofthatwhichresultsfromGod’scommandintheQurʾānKunorBe!ThisismentionedlaterwhereJandīspeaksofGodasbeing“theemanatorofexistence,[emanating]overthekiyānīquiddities.”15

Inthoseinstanceswheretheadjectival“existential”(wujūdī)isused,inalmostallcasesitbringswujūdtothelevelofmanifestation,creation,andmultiplicity.“Existential”doesnotcarrywithitthesenseoftheone,absoluteexistencetheAkbarians(includingJandī,seebelow)talkabout.Inadiscussioncomparingthenatureoftheworldasawholewiththenatureoftheperfecthumanbeing,Jandīofferstwopointsofview,thefirstinvolvingthe“existentialunfolding(tafṣīlwujūdī)intheworld,namelytheindividualinstances(mufradāt)ofexistence.”16Thisissetagainst“theunityofunion.”Elsewherehenotesthatstandingoppositepureonenessis“existentialandattributionalmultiplicity”(al-kathrahal-wujūdīyyahwaʾl-nisbiyyah).17InbothoftheseinstancesJandīplacesonenessorunityononeside,andplaces“existential”ontheother.Ifwe 13Ibid.,154.14Ibid.,22.15Ibid.,37.16Ibid.,24.17Ibid.,44.

71

assumethat“existence”pertainstocreationandmanifestation,thismakessense.ConsiderthatJandīdescribesGodascomprisingbothunityandonenessontheonehandand“theexistentialandrelative(nisbī)multiplicity”ontheother.18Moreover,thedivineessenceisfreeofthe“existentialmultiplicityofthenames”(al-kathrahal-wujūdīyyahal-asmāʾiyyah),andhelatercallsit“theattributionalandexistentialmultiplicity”(al-wujūdīyyahwaʾl-nisbiyyah).19Thisisaquitedirectoppositionbetween“oneness”and“existence”fromamemberofaschoolknownfor“theonenessofexistence.”

Thenthereistheuseofexistentialwhencouplednotwiththestateofmultiplicitybutwiththeprocessofemanationormanifestation.Forexample,hespeaksof“theemanating,generous,existentialmercy”andthe“existentialemanation”uponthesoulsandspirits.20Theimmutableidentitiesreceivetheconcreteexistentialemanation(al-fayḍal-wujūdīal-ʿaynī),21whichismetaphysicallythesameastheideathatthereisaself-disclosureofexistenceoverthequiddities,22thelatterbeingphilosophicalinitsterminology.

Encounteringaphrasesuchas“theexistentialemanationandthegenerouslight”23iscommonwhenreadingJandī.Inthiscasetheterms“existential”(wujūdī)and“generous”(jūdī)areoftenpairedpoetically,denotinganoutward,manifestingtendency.

ReinforcingthenotionofexistenceasoutwardorcreatedisthesymbolismoftheBreathoftheAll-Merciful(nafasal-Raḥmān),amainstayofAkbarianthoughtandprevalentinJandī’swritings.ManypagesoftheFuṣūṣcommentaryaredevotedtothesymbolismofthealphabet,wherehedrawsacomparisonbetween“theformsofvisibility’sletters(al-ḥurūfal-shuhūdiyyah)”and“existentialwords(al-kalimātal-wujūdīyyah).”24Recallthatshahādahisusuallypairedwithghayb,thelatterreferringtotheunseenandtheformerthatwhichisseenormanifested.Also,“KnowthatexistenceistheoutwardoftheBreathoftheAll-Merciful,”and,“TheBreathoftheAll-Mercifulisthematterofallexistentialletters.”25Itakethewordmatter(māddah)tobeclearlyindicativeofthecreatedorder.-ExistenceastheTrueOneinMany AlthoughtheuseofexistencetoexpressthedualitybetweentheworldandGodispresentinJandī,themoreprofounduseofexistencetodenotethemysteriousonenessthatencompassesallrealityisalsoprevalent.Forexample,byvirtueoftheexistencemanifestthroughallandinall,Godisidenticalwithall(kawnal-ḥaqqbi-ʿtibaralwujūdal-ẓāhirbiʾl-kullfīʾl-kullʿaynal-kull).26“Theonetrueexistence”manifestsinmultiplicityinsuchawaythatitisaquiddityineachquidditythewaycolorisacolorineachcolor,thoughitisunconditionedinitself.27WhenJandīmentionstheonetrue

18Ibid.,65.19Ibid.,90.20Ibid.,70.21Ibid.,138.22Ibid.,80.23Ibid.,134.24Ibid.,46.25Ibid.,60.26Ibid.,23.27Ibid.,46.

72

existence,itisoftenintertwinedwith“identification”(taʿayyun):“Theidentificationsofthetrueexistenceandthebranchingout(tanawwuʿ)ofitsself-disclosureanditsmanifestationinthereceptaclesofthenever-endingcontingentsis[itself]neverending.”28Andagain,“Identificationisaforminthatwhichisidentifiedthroughthatidentificationandinit.Ithasnoexistencewithoutsomethingbeingidentifiedinit,”29or,“Thefirstidentification,withoutrespecttothatwhichisidentifiedbyitandinit,namelythetrueexistence(al-wujūdal-ḥaqq),isonlyarelationship(nisbah)whichhasnorealizationwithoutthatwhichisidentifiedbyitandinit.”

Also,likeQūnawī,Jandīmakesuseoftheconceptofnon-identification.Forexample,hesaysthatGod

praisesHimselfinvirtueofHisownindividualandnon-identifiedSelfhood(huwiyyatihial-ʿayniyyahwaʾl-lā-taʿayyuniyyah)andHisabsolutenessandtheunseennessofHisessence…Thepraise,thepraiser,andthepraisedareunitedinthisstation,anditcannotbeconceivedthatthereshouldbeadistinctionbetweenthem.30

Herehealsostates,likeQūnawī,thatthefirstidentification,initsveryreality,pointstothefactthatitisitselfprecededbynon-identification(lā-taʿayyun).Thatistosay,whatisidentifiedoridentifiable(māyataʿayyanu)comesfromthatwhichisnot.InthepreviouschapterweencounteredQūnawī’suseofthephrasenon-identification(lā-taʿayyun),whichisthelevelofsupremerealityindependentevenofthedistinctionbetweenEssenceandattributes,andevenbetweenGodandtheworld.

Crucialtotheunderstandingoftheonetrueexistenceisthenotionof“level”discussedinthepreviouschapter,“Thelevelsqualevelshavenoexistenceexceptthroughtheidentificationshierarchicalizedinthem[thelevels]existentially,bywhichthey[thelevels]aredistinguishedfromthatwhichisidentifiedbythemandinthem.”31TheleveloftheRealisthe“necessityofexistence”whilethelevelofcreationis“theidentificationofexistenceinalllevels”inaccordancewithvariouskindsofcausation,needfulness,andcommandments.32Inanotherinstancehementionsthe“spreadingthroughout”(heresarāyahinsteadofsarayān)ofexistenceinthelevels,and“theoneexistence”bywhichthingsaremademanifest,existencetherebymanifestingbyandinthosethings.33Elsewherehediscusses“thetrueexistenceflowingthroughtherealitiesofexistents,”34andsaysthatattheleveloftheReal(ḥaqq)existenceisRealandatthelevelofcreation(khalq)existenceiscreation.

Inthelastchapterwesawhow“level”wasoneinafamilyoftermsdenotingtheessence-orquiddity-dimensionofreality,signifyingitsplaceinthehierarchyofexistenceasopposedtoexistenceassuch.Thisconceptualpairismentionedinthefollowingpassage:“Godisthebeginningandendofexistence….ItstartsfromHimandendswithHim.Heisthereceptacleinvirtueofhismanifestationandbeingalocusof

28Ibid.,127.29Ibid.,43.30Ibid.,18.31Ibid.,42.32Ibid.,26.33Ibid.,136.34Ibid.,43.

73

manifestation(ẓāhiriyyah,maẓhariyyah)andHeiswhatisreceivedinvirtueofHisinwardnessandHimself(ʿayn)…Everythingfallsbetweenexistenceandlevel.Levelisthelocusofmanifestation,andthatwhichisidentifiedbyitistheoutward,true,inwardexistence.”35Speakingofman,“The‘affair’(amr,meaning“everything”)isencompassedinhisself,intermsofexistenceandlevel.”36Theentirenotionoftheidentitybetweentheoneandthemanydependsontheonenessofexistenceandthemultiplicityoflevelsoridentifications,whatlaterphilosopherswouldcallmodes(naḥw)ordimensions(wajh). WethusseeinJandīacontinuationofthegeneraltenorofQūnawī,althoughhistasteforphilosophicaltermsissomewhatdifferent.Althoughheusesphilosophicalterminology,itisnotclearthatJandīactuallydoesmuchtoadvancethemovementoftheAkbarianschooltowardsamorephilosophicalsynthesis.Theconceptofexistenceadaptstothecontext,retaininganeverydaysenseofconcrete,createdexistencewhenusedwithoutqualification,butbeingextendedtomeantheoneultimaterealitywhenthesituationcallsforit.Indeed,aswithhismasterQūnawīJandī’sworkisgearedtowardsmakingaconceptualopeningtowardsAkbarianideasforthoseoutsideoftheirschoolandtoprovidethemselveswithacreativewayofengagingwiththeirownworldview.Asweshallseeinthefollowingtwochapters,thewaytheAkbariansexplaintheirontologywillqualitativelychange.

35Ibid.,139.36Ibid.,129.

74

ChapterFour:Kāshānī,Conditioning,andtheOntologicalArgument

Kamālal-DīnʿAbdal-RazzāqibnAbīʾl-GhanāʾimMuḥammadal-Kāshānī(d.1335)1wasastudentofJandīandwouldlaterbecometheteacherofQayṣarīinthefieldofIbnʿArabī’smetaphysics.KāshānītracedpartofhisspirituallineagetoShihābal-Dīnal-Suhrawardī.HefrequentedSuhrawardianmastersinKāshān,Shirāz,andBaghdad.ItislikelythathebecameamemberoftheschoolofIbnʿArabīafterthedeathofhismasterʿAbdal-ṢamadibnʿAlīal-Natanzī.BythetimewereachKāshānītheschoolofIbnʿArabīhasalreadystartedtobecomeakindofmeta-order,notitselfprovidingspiritualinititationbutexistingasaspecialdimensionwithinexistingorders.Thuslaterthetitleakbarī2woulddenotenotfollowersofaseparatespiritualorasceticdisciplinebutsomeoneidentifiedwiththeschoolofIbnʿArabī,whichmightalsoincludeclaimstoadirectspiritualinfluencefromtheIbnʿArabīhimself,inhisfunctionnotasmetaphysicianbutasagreatsaint.

LikehispredecessorsKāshānīwrotecommentariesonimportantSufiworksnotstrictlyintheschoolofIbnʿArabīsuchashiscommentaryontheManāzilal-sāʾirīnofʿAbdullāhal-Anṣārīal-Ḥarawī(d.1089).KāshānīwasalsotheauthorofaSuficommentaryupontheQurʾān,althoughforalongtimetheworkwasattributedtoIbnʿArabīandwasknownuntilrecentlyasTafsīrIbnʿArabī.3ForthefirsttimeintheAkbarianschoolhetriedtosystematizeanddefinethetechnicaltermssoimportanttounderstandtheAkbarianwritingsinworkssuchastheIṣtalāḥātal-ṣūfiyyah,laterexpandedunderthenameRashḥal-ẓulālfīsharḥalfāẓal-mutadāwilahbaynaarbābal-adhwāqwaʾl-aḥwāl,andtheLaṭāʾifal-iʿlāmfīishāratal-ilhām,whichcombinethegeneralmysticaltermsemployedbymostSufistogetherwiththeparticularmetaphysicalandcosmologicaltermsuniquetotheschoolofIbnʿArabī.HewroteaworkonspiritualchivalryentitledTuḥfatal-ikhwānfīkhaṣāʾiṣal-fityān,inkeepingwithhisbackgroundintheSuhrawardiyyahorderanditsemphasisonfutuwwah. However,aswasthecaseforhispredecessors,muchoftheimportantmaterialasitconcernsontologyandmetaphysicsandtheSuficontactwithphilosophyappearsinKāshānī’scommentaryupontheFuṣūṣal-ḥikam.4Herewehavethefirstfull-fledgedattemptatakindofmetaphysicalprimeratthebeginningofthecommentarywhichprovidesthereaderaphilosophicalframeworktoproceedwiththestudyofthetext.The

1FormorebiographicalinformationseeSüleymanUludaǧ,“Kā� ānī,Abdürrezzāk,”IslamAnsiklopedisi;D.B.Macdonald,“ʿAbdal-Razzāqal-Kāshāni,”EI2;WilliamChittick,“TheSchoolofIbnʿArabī,”HistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,518.2TheworksofMichelChodkiewiczbringoutthisdimensionoftheAkbariantradition.SeehisAnOceanWithoutShore:IbnʿArabī,theBook,andtheLaw(NewYork,1993),1-18.3SeePierreLory,LescommentairesésotériquesduCorand’ápresʿAbdal-Razzāqal-Qāshānī,Paris,1991;also,M.Valsan,“LecommentaireésotériqueduCoranparAbdu-r-Razzākal-Qāchānī,”Etudestraditionelles,LXX(1969),255-64.4ThisworkformsamajorbasisforT.Izutsu’sstudyofIbnʿArabīinhisSufismandTaoism(Berkeley,1984),althoughinthiscaseKāshānīisonlyusedinordertounderstandtheFuṣūṣ.InadditiontostudiesonhisQurʾāniccommentary,J.vanEsshaswrittenonKāshānī’sTuḥfatul-iḫwān,“DieTuḥfatul-ihwandesʿAbdurrazzāq-iKāšānī,einFutuvatnāmaderĪlḫānidenzeit,”ẒafarNāme,MemorialVolumeofFelixTauer,ed.R.VeselyanE.Gombar,Pragne,1996,85-99.AmorecompletebibliographycanbefoundintheİAarticle.

75

introductoryremarksarerelativelyshortandmanyofthemostimportantcommentsKāshānīmakesdonotappearintheseopeningremarksbutinthefirstpartofthecommentaryuponthetext.Onecanperhapsseehere,however,akindofprototypeforthemasterpieceofphilosophyandmysticismthatKāshānī’sstudentQayṣarīwouldplacebeforehisowncommentaryupontheFuṣūṣ. InKāshānī’scommentarywefindanewlevelofsophisticationandanincreaseinthephilosophicalemphasis.Forexample,onpracticallythefirstpageKāshānīdescribesthedivineSelf(al-dhāt)asbeing“pureexistencequaexistence,notconditionedbynon-identificationandunconditionedbyidentification(al-wujūdal-baḥtminḥaythuhuwawujūdlābi-sharṭal-lā-taʿayyunwalābi-sharṭal-taʿayyun).”5ThisisperhapsthefirstinstanceoftheusageintheAkbarianschoolofthischaracteristictypeofphilosophicalconditioning(bi-sharṭ,lābi-sharṭ)meaningtobelimitedtoortobequalified,ornottobelimitedtoornottobequalifiedby,dependingonhowitisused.HereKāshānīissayingthattheSelfispureexistenceneitherbecauseitisthisorthat,norbecauseitisnotthisorthat;rather,itistakentobeaboveallsuchqualificationsanddualities.ThisisnotadeparturefromtheAkbarianpositionintheleast,butitisadifferentwayinwhichthemetaphysicalperspectiveisexplained.-Theconditioningof“existence,”theAkbarians,andthe“Pahlavī”Philosophers

InhisworkonSabzawarī’smetaphysics,whichisreallyabookonwhatmightbecalledtheschoolofMullāṢadrāingeneralorthe“Pahlavīphilosophers,”Izutsugivesusavaluablediscussiononthematureformofthelanguageofconditioningmentionedabove,asitappliestoontologyandtotheclassificationofessences:

Every‘quiddity’canbeconsideredinthreedifferentaspects:(1)as“purified”(mujarradah)or‘negativelyconditioned’,(2)as‘absolute’(muṭlaqah)or‘non-conditioned’,and(3)as‘mixed’(makhlūṭah)or‘conditionedbysomething’. A‘quiddity’inthestateofthenegativelyconditioned(bi-sharṭlā)is‘quiddity’consideredinitspurity:astateinwhicheverythingelse,includingeventhe‘existence’ofthe‘quiddity’,whetherexternalormental,iseliminatedfromtheconsciousness.The‘quiddity’quaitself,as,forexample,theconceptof‘animal’qua‘animal’,aloneisrepresentedinthemind,withnothingelseassociatedwithit.Ifwerelatesomeotherconcepttoa‘quiddity’inapurestate,forexample,theconceptof‘rational’,theresultcanonlybeacombinationoftwodifferentandindependentelements.Theoriginalconceptcannotthenbepredicatedofthecomposite.‘Animal’plus‘rational’issomethingmorethanpure‘animal’,andthelatterisnotpredicableoftheformer. Inthestateofthe‘non-conditioned’(lābi-sharṭ),a‘quiddity’isrepresentedinanambiguousortotallyindeterminateway.A‘quiddity’inthisstateisfree;itmayormaynotbeassocitatedwithsomethingelse.Ifwerelatesomeotherconcepttoa‘quiddity’insuchastateofindetermination,theresultingcombinationisaperfectunity.Theoriginalconceptcanstillbepredicatedofthisunity.‘Animal’plus‘rational’is‘man’;andanimal,ofcourse,ispredicableof

5Sharḥfuṣūṣal-ḥikam,Qom,1991(basedontheEgyptianlithographededition),4.

76

‘man’.A‘quiddity’atthisstageisinitselfnotyetactualizedorspecified;itisstillindeterminatesothatitcanbepredicatedofmanydifferentthings. Inthestateof‘conditioned-by-something’[(bi-sharṭshayʾ)],a‘quiddity’isconsideredalreadyassociatedwithsomeotherconcept;e.g.‘animal’plus‘rational’.‘Animal’inthisstateisconsideredasalreadyactualizedandspecified.Thatistosay,‘animal’hereisnotconsideredqua‘animal’;ratheritis‘animal’insofarasitisassociatedwith‘rational’,i.e.qua‘man’…6

Thistripledivisionaccordingtoconditioningcanalsobeappliedtoexistenceaswell,insofarasexistencecanbehandledasaconceptoressence(quiddity)inthemind.AgainIzutsu:

Thehigheststage,i.e.theAbsoluteinitstranscendentalabsoluteness,istherealityof‘existence’inthestateof‘negativelyconditioned’.TheAbsolute,inotherwords,ispure‘existence’,i.e.therealityof‘existence’initsabsolutepurity,awayfromallpossibledeterminationsandlimitations.Itis‘existence’inthestateofpureandabsolutetranscendence. Inthenextstage,thatofthe‘non-conditioned’,‘existence’isinastateoffreedetermination,readytomodifyitselfintoanydeterminateformwhatsoever.Inthisstateiscomprisesinpotentiaallpossible‘existents’withinthesphereofitsunity.Itisherethat‘existence’isunityandmultiplicityatoneandthesametime.Thisisthestageof‘unfoldedexistence’andthe‘breathofMercifulness’. Attheloweststage,thatoftheconditioned-by-something,‘existence’appearsasalreadydeterminedthiswayandthat.Thisontologicallevelisthatofconcreteindividualexistents.Therealityof‘existence’hereisatthefarthestremovefromitsoriginaltranscendentalpurity,havingbecomeassociatedwithsomethingelse,i.e.‘quiddities’. Asaresultofthisdiscussionweobtainthefollowinghierarchyofstagesof‘existence’accordingtothePahlavīphilosophers:

I‘Existence’as‘negatively-conditioned’(al-wujūdbi-sharṭlā)II‘Existence’as‘non-conditioned’(al-wujūdlābi-sharṭ)III‘Existence’as‘conditioned-by-something’(al-wujūdbi-sharṭshayʾ)7

IfwereadKāshānī’sstatementaboutsupremeexistencecarefully,wenoticethatforhimnegativelyconditionedexistenceisnottheultimatestageatall.Rather,hisstatementthat“pureexistencequaexistence[is]unconditionedbynon-identificationandunconditionedbyidentification”soundsmorelikethesecondstageofthephilosophers,thatof“non-conditioned”(al-wujūdlābi-sharṭ).Recallthatidentification(taʿayyun)canbeseenasequivalenttobringingpureexistencetogetherwithsomeessence,whichiswhatconditioningorsharṭinthetripartitedivisionmeansinthiscontext.Thatistosay,“identification”means“existenceasthisorthat,”orasaparticularessenceorquiddity,whetherthatessenceorquiddityis“God”asthedivinityoftheworldorsomeparticularexistentwithintheworld.ThuswhenKāshānībanishesidentificationfromthescene,heiseliminatingthepossibilityofpackingtruerealityintoanysortofcontainer,andwhen

6ToshikoIzutsu,TheConceptandRealityofExistence(Tokyo,1971),145-6.7Ibid.,146-7.

77

hethenbanishesnon-identificationor“identity-lessness”,heeliminatesthepossibilitythattruerealityisotherthanwhatthosesamecontainershold.Inshort,Godisunconditionedevenbynon-conditioning.Asopposedtonegativeconditioning,wherethephilosophersaysnotoeveryessence,andunlikeconditioned-by-somethingwherethephilosophersaysyestoanyvalidparticularexistent,innon-conditioningthephilosopherissayingbothyesandno,orneitheryesnorno. ConsideringhowsimilartheAkbarianschoolandMullāṢadrā(whomIzutsugroupswiththe“Pahlavī”philosophers)areintheirmetaphysics,thisisnounimportantdivergence.ItisespeciallysignificantsinceIampositinginthisthesisthattheAkbariansandṢadrāformacontinuumasfarasontologyisconcerned.Izutsuwasnotblindtothisdifference,althoughhespentonlyafewsentencesonit:

TheSufiviewimpliesapeculiarunderstandingoftheterm‘non-conditioned’.Theytakethetermtomeanabsolutely‘non-conditioned’thusdenyingeventheconditionofbeing‘non-conditioned’.Theconceptof‘non-conditioned’understoodinthiswayconstitutestheverysourceofthetripledivisioninto‘negativelyconditioned’,‘non-conditioned’—asunderstoodintheordinarysense—and‘conditionedbysomething’.‘Unfoldedexistence’can,inthisview,onlybe‘existenceasnon-conditioned’,understoodintheordinarysense,thatis,‘existence’asconditionedatleastbybeing‘non-conditioned’.8

Weoughttobeginbyrememberingthatthephilosophers,eversinceAvicenna,basedtheirontologyaroundwujūd,andwrangledwithitastheirprimaryconcept.AsinheritorsofthePeripateticlanguageofexistence,werethephilosophersinfluencedinawayfromwhichtheSufiswereimmune?Althoughthisisnotastudyoftheontologyofthephilosophersassuch,itisworthspendingsometimeonitsbasicoutline.Ṣadrā’sdoctrineofexistenceisbuiltupon1)itsfundamentality(aṣālah);2)itsoneness(waḥdah);and3)itsequivocality(tashkīk).Existenceisfundamentalbecauseitisthebasisofanythingandeverything,andistheconceptwhichexplainseverythingandisexplainedbynothing.Itisonebecausealltheparticularexistencesweseearereallymodalities(anḥāʾ)andlevels(marātib)oftheoneultimatereality.Thisnaturallyleadstothedoctrineofequivocality(tashkīk),whichallowsustopredicatetheoneexistencetrulyofmany(apparently)differentthings.SomuchforthebriefoutlineofṢadrā’sprinciplesofwujūd. AsIzutsucorrectlypointsout,inthissystemofexistence“betweenthehighestandthelowestthereisanuninterruptedlineofcontinuance.”9Thatistosay,theconceptualmovementfrom“absolute”to“non-conditioned”to“conditioned”—asoutlinedabove—doesnotinvolvewhatonemightcallanontologicaldiscontinuity.Theconceptofwujūd,accordingtoitsmostloftyunderstanding,ismeanttoencompasseverythingthatthemetaphysicsofPahlavīphilosophersiscapableofspeakingabout.Nothing,atleastconceptually,issupposedtosupercedeitordriftoutsideofitscompass.Atoneendofthespectrumaretheindividualexistentthingsandtheirindividualessences,whileattheotherendistheoneindivisiblereality.Itisasthoughthemindweremovingaprismacrosswhitelight,unfoldingarainbowatoneangleandthenslowlycongealingthosecolorsbackintowhitelightastheanglechanges.Thewhite

8Ibid.,148-9.9Ibid.,145.

78

lightisabsoluteexistence,whilethecolorsareconditionedexistence.However,therangeofmovementoftheprismiswholeandcontinuous,withnobreaks,asisourunderstandingoftheconceptualgradationfromconditionedtoabsoluteexistence. AsIhavetriedtodemonstrateabove,thefollowersofIbnʿArabī,atleastuntilKāshānī,didnotconstrainthemselvesbyattemptingtoturnexistenceintoanall-explainingkeytounlockallofontology.Atbesttheytookthephilosophicallycommon-senseunderstandingofexistenceandsometimesextendedittoencompasstheultimaterealityoftheDivineEssenceorSelf.IfQūnawī’sexplanationofexistencewasnotfleshedoutsystematicallyinthemannerofaphilosopher,thiswouldnothavebotheredhimovermuch,sincetheworditselfcouldonlybe“approximateandpedagogical”.Inanycase,heandhissuccessorJandīseemedmorecomfortablerelyingonidentification(taʿayyun)asaconceptmoreinkeepingwiththeirownmetaphysicalspirit. Now,“identification”asunderstoodbytheAkbariansdoesinfactinvolveadiscontinuity.Theprocessofemanationorcreation,ifweunderstandthisintermsofidentification,canbeviewedascontinuous.FromtheformsinGod’sknowledge,tothoseformsintheGreatSpiritorFirstIntellect,tothoseformsintherealmofcreation,wecandiscernakindofontologicalcontinuityconsistingofthosesuccessivestagesofidentificationortaʿayyun.Thediscontinuityinthemetaphysicsofidentificationconsistsinthe“change”fromnon-identification(lā-taʿayyun)tothefirstidentification.InthesystemofIbnʿArabīnoteventhedivinity(ilāh)escapesidentificationsince,aspointedoutabove,inordertobeanilāh(notalwaystranslatedwellby“divinity”)thereneedstobeamaʾlūhsomewhere.Tospeakinmorecontemporaryterms,thepersonalGodcanonlybeapersonalGodbecauseHeissoforusandfortherestofcreation.ThispersonalGodisthedivinityofthefirstidentification,whoisnoneotherthantheimpersonalGodbutwithadifferenceinrelationorattribution. Thisrealmofidentificationfromnon-identificationisotherwiseexpressedbytheschoolofIbnʿArabīintermsofimagination(khayāl).Intermsofthehumanbeing,thefacultyofimaginationliesbetweenthefacultyofbodilysenseperceptionandthespiritualfacultyortheintellect.Itistheaspectofthesoulincontactwiththecorrespondingimaginationalaspectofthecosmos.Thatistosay,intheworldatlargethereisarealmbetweenthatofpurespiritandpurebodycalledthecosmicimagination.Theaspectofimaginationinthesoultogetherwiththerealmofimaginationintheworldatlargemakesuptheworldofimagination(ʿālamal-khayāl),whichhasitsplaceinthestrataofrealityalongwiththeworldofbodiesandtheworldofspirits.10 However,thereisabroadermeaningofimaginationforIbnʿArabīwhichgoesfarbeyondthisparticularmodeorsliceofreality.Theworldofimaginationasacosmicdivisioniscalledthequalifiedimagination(al-khayālal-muqayyad),orwhatwemightcallimaginationinalimitedsense.Absoluteorunqualifiedimagination(al-khayālal-muṭlaq)isnoneotherthantheentiretyofallpossibleidentifications—imaginationinthebroadestsense.Inthissenseof“imagination,”everythingotherthanthepureSelfisimagination,meaningthatitisillusoryinsomerespect.EventhepersonalGodor 10Thesoulasimaginationiscalledthecontinuousimagination(al-khayālal-muttaṣil)becauseitisconnectedtotherestofthehumanbeing’sfacultiesinakindofverticalarray.Thecosmicimaginationiscalledthediscontinuousimagination(al-khayālal-munfaṣil)becauseitisnotstrictlyspeakingconnectedtothehumanbeing,althoughthehumanbeingscanperceiveitthroughtheirimaginationalfaculty.

79

divinitydoesnotescapebeingpartofthisgrandimagination.BecausetheultimaterealityofthingsisthatonlytheSelfisreal,anythingthatimpliesdualityorothernessmustbe,atleastinpart,an“imaginedthing.”Noticethatthisdefinitionofunqualifiedimaginationisnotsynonymouswiththeworldas“whatisotherthanGod”(māsiwāʾllāh),becausetheGodin“whatisotherthanGod”isthegod/divinityoftheworld(ilāh),orCreator.BoththeCreator(khāliq)andcreature(makhlūq)areincludedinthemetaphysicalconceptofabsolute/unqualifiedimagination.11 ThisinclusionofthedivineinarelativizingconceptsuchasimaginationisanotabledifferencebetweentheAkbarianand“Pahlavī”systems.Inthephilosophicalschemaofconditioningthereisnoconceptualdivisioninabsoluteexistence(al-wujūdal-muṭlaq)whichcorrespondstothedistinctionbetweenontheonehandtheGodwhoiswithintheuniversalimaginationandontheotherhandGodtheSelf.IntheTaoistsystem,forexample,theultimatereality(theTaowhichcannotbetalkedabout)isspokenofnotaspurebeingbutasnon-beingorbeyond-being.Forthephilosophers,iftheyaretohavethesamemetaphysicalconclusions,mustbeabletousetheirconceptofexistencetoincludewhatfortheTaoistsisbeyond-being,fortheVedantistspureĀtmā,andfortheAkbariansnon-identification.

Buttherearetwoproblemswiththishypothesisasstated:1)TheAkbariansoftenspeakofultimaterealityaspureexistenceand2)thephilosophersrecognizetheinherentlimitationsoftheconceptofexistence.

Asforthefirstpoint,Ihavetriedtoarguethatthe(early)Akbarianswerenotoccupiedwithsettingupexistenceassuchasamother-conceptuponwhichtohangallotherconcepts.ItisasthoughtheyrecognizedthefactthattheirfellowintellectualsweretalkingabouttherealityofthingsintermsofexistenceandtookthatconceptasfarasitwouldgoinordertofitthewaytheysawtheworldandGod.Thus,God’sexistencewouldhavetobesuperlativeineveryrespect,beingpure,incorruptible,andperfectlyunified.Moreover,itwouldhavetohavesomekindofidentitywithallthings,orratherallthingswouldhavetohavesomekindofidentitywithGod’sexistence.ButtheAkbarianswouldnotthensaythat,havingdescribedGodintermsofexistence,wehavesaidallweneedtosayaboutGodphilosophically.Thus,thereisnoprobleminreadinganAkbarianpassagethatdescribesGodaspureexistence,whileknowingthatwithinthatpureexistenceofGodtheyrecognizethatthepersonalGodandthepureSelfhaveadifferentmeaning.Thatfactthatthelanguageofwujūd(existence)maynotbeabletodojusticetothisdistinctiondoesnoterasethefundamentalinsightthatGodasilāhorgod/divinityispartoftheuniversalimagination.Butitshouldberecognizedthatthisisanimportantdifferencebetweenthemandthephilosophers,inthesensethattheAkbariansdonotpresumetomakeeverythingexplainableintermsofwujūd.Ifthisconceptisnotenough,theyareperfectlycontenttomoveontoanothermoreusefulidea,andusuallydo;theexampleofself-disclosure(tajallī)isasalientexample.

Now,thisdoesnotmeanthatthephilosophersdonotrecognizethissamedistinctionwithinthedivinerealitythattheSufisdo,butwhenwelookwefindthatthey 11Thisextendedunderstandingofimaginationcorrespondsexactly,inmyview,tothenotionofmāyāinthemetaphysicsofHinduAdvaitaVedānta.AswiththeAkbariansystem,assoonasweleavetheSelf(Arabicdhāt,Sanskritātmā),wehaveenteredintotherealmofillusionandunreality,andthefartherwejourneyfromtheSelfthefartherweenterintothatillusionandunreality.

80

locatethediscontinuityinadifferentway.Forthephilosophers,oneofthemajordefiningfeaturesoftheirontologyandepistemologyisthedifferencebetweentheconcept(mafhūm)andreality(ḥaqīqah)ofexistence.Thisdistinctionisfoundational,anditiswherewecanfindthediscontinuityrepresentedbytheAkbarians’shiftfromtherealmofidentificationtonon-identification.Thesum-totalofeverythingthephilosophershavetosayaboutexistence,eventheloftiestmetaphysicsoftheunityandequivocalityofexistence,isstillobviouslyatthelevelofconcepts.Theirargumentissimplythatasaconcepttheirideaofexistencecorrespondsbestandmostperfectlytotheobjectivefactofexistence.However,totrulyunderstandtherealityofexistence,notjusttheidea,goesradicallybeyondthinkingcorrectlyaboutitsconcept.Incomparisontowhatahumanbeingcanfullyrealize,amentalunderstandingofexistenceisinherentlyandirredeemablyinadequate,usefulthoughitmaybeatitsownlevel.Onlythroughspiritualrealizationcanthehumansubjecttrulyknowandexperienceexistence.

Iwouldthusarguethatthemetaphysicsofexistenceelaboratedbythephilosopherswasforcedtorecognizethatsomethingbeyondeventheloftiestunderstandingof“existence”wasnecessarytotrulyacknowledgetheultimaterealityofGod.UnliketheAkbarians,whocouldcapturetheentiretyofdualisticreality(includingthepersonalGod)intheideaofuniversalimagination,thephilosopherswereself-limitedbytheirmetaphysicsofessence-existence.Theyaresaved,asitwere,bytheirassertionoftheincommensurabilityoftheconceptandrealityofexistence.Evenifthereisnoexplicitconceptsuchasnon-identificationorbeyond-being,thereisstillarecognitionthatthereissomethingbeyondourideaofbeingorexistence,andthatindeedthissomethingcanonlybeexperienced,notspokenabout.

* * *Ofcourse,thisentirediscussionbeganfromthedivergencebetweenthe

Akbariansandthephilosophersastotheultimatelevelofexistence:isitthewujūdofbi-sharṭlā(negatively-conditioned)orthewujūdofneithertaʿayyunnorlā-taʿayyun(neitherconditionednornegatively-conditioned)?Ifwewishtopreservethefundamentalsimilarityinmetaphysicalvisionbetweenthesetwoschools,wemustthenshowhowthelevelofnon-conditioningforthephilosophersisdifferentfromwhatKāshānīistalkingaboutwhenhediscussesthatwhichisconditionedneitherbyidentificationnorbynon-identification.

Thesecondstageofconditioning,calledal-wujūdal-munbasiṭ,whichIzutsutranslatesas“unfoldedexistence”andwhichIhavebeentranslatingas“spreading-throughoutexistence,”isdescribedbyIzutsuas“apureluminousradiationfromthesourceofLight.Thebeamoflightisstillpure,i.e.simple;itisstillaunitaryreality.Inaddition,however,itcontainsinitselfthecapacityforoverflowingandpouringoutinalldirectionssothatitmaybechanneledininfinitelydiverseways.Theologicallythisstratumistheself-revealingGod.”12

InAkbarianmetaphysicswhatIzutsuhasjustdesribedistheBreathoftheAll-Merciful(nafasal-Raḥmān)orUniversalNature(al-ṭabīʿahal-kulliyyah).Justashumanbreathhasthecapacitytovehicleallhumanspeech,sotoodoestheBreathofGodcontaintheentiretyofcreationwithinitself.This,however,issomethingdifferentthanwhatKāshānīisgettingat.His“neitherthisnorthat,neithernotthisnorthat”realityis

12ConceptandReality,147.

81

nottheBreathoftheAll-MercifulorUniversalNature.TheBreathoftheAll-Mercifulisawell-definedideainAkbarianthought,andthe“neitherconditionednornon-conditioned”ideaisneverpartofittomyknowledge.

Moreover,thereistheproblemthattheconceptof“identification”isacentralpartofKāshānī’sdivisionofrealityintostrata,aconceptwhichisnotapartofthephilosophers’mannerofspeaking.Theyframethedivisionintermsofqualificationorlimitation,not“identification”,thelatterbeingapeculiarlyAkbarianterm.CanwesetthisdifferenceasideandsimplycomparetheSufisandthephilosophersbyvirtueofthecommonlanguageofconditioning(sharṭ)?Ibelieveweshouldnot,orattheveryleastshouldexaminethequestionfirst.

Itisinfacttheconceptofidentificationwhichmakesthedifference.RecallthattheAkbariansandthephilosophersinvestthemselvesintheconceptofexistencedifferently.AconclusionwecandrawfromKāshānī’sstatingthatGodispureexistence,andthatHeisconditionedneitherby“identification”or“non-identification,”isthatexistence(wujūd)comprisesboththerealmofidentificationandnon-identification.Thatistosay,thetruerealityofexistencecomprisesboththeundifferentiatedandpureSelfbeyondanyrelationality,andthepersonalGod.Ofcourse,sincefromtheperspectiveofthepureSelfthereisonlytheSelf,thismeansthatthetruerealityofwujūdcomprisesanythingandeverything,althoughwemightnotseeitthatwayinourordinaryexperience. Sofar,sogood,sincethissoundsexactlylikewhatthephilosopherssay.WearestillleftwithhowtomakesenseofthefactthatbothKāshānīandthephilosophersaremakingexistencethesupremething,butaretalkingaboutitslightlydifferently.AsImentionedabove,thephilosopherslackaconceptcorrespondingtothedifferencebetweenGodtheidentifiedandGodthenon-identified,transferringthisdifferencetothedistinctionbetweentheconceptandrealityofexistence.Becauseoftheirconceptof“identification”,theSufisareabletoextendtheirunderstandingoftheconceptof“existence”toexplicitlycompriseboththeidentifiedandthenon-identified.Ifmyanalysisofthephilosophersiscorrect,thentheirconceptof“existence”doesnotactuallygototheconceptualrealmtheSufiscallnon-identification.However,theirrealityofexistencecertainlymust.-Kāshānī,thePeripatetics,andtheOntological“Proof” The“existencequaexistence”mentionedearlieristhecentralconceptofKāshānī’smetaphysicalintroduction.ThiswujūdminḥaythuhuwawujūdistoKāshānīnoneotherthantheNecessary,andisneithersubstancenoraccident.AlthoughKāshānīdoesnotelaborateupontheconceptofsubstanceandaccidentasitappliestoGod,itissomethingQayṣarīwillenlargeuponinhisProlegomena.Expandinguponhispoint,hestatesthatanythingotherthanexistencequaexistenceispurenon-existence(ʿadamṣirf),andcallsthisnon-existenceano-thing(lā-shayʾ).Purenothingnessornon-existencecannotbeareceptacle(qābil)forexistence.Contrarily,pureexistencedoesnotneedsomethingelsetoexist,asitexistsinitself(mawjūdbi-dhātihi). ThisisanotableinstancefortheAkbarianswherethemeaningoftheword“existence”or“exists”comesintoplaywhendiscussingontology.Previously,inQūnawīandJandī,themodesofwujūdwereindeeddiscussed,butnotinawaythatmadetheunderstandingofmetaphysicsdependupontheanatomyofthewordorconcept.That

82

istosay,thisfundamentalonticunit,wujūd,wastakenasakindofgiven.Whetherorhowsomethinginfactexistswasdiscussedbythemmoreorlessintermsofindependenceordependence,meaningthattheywereparsingouthowinfacttheexistenceofthingscomestobefromtheexistenceofGod,buteventhentheuseoftheword“existence”isonlyaninadequateapproximationtotherealityitself.WhatKāshānīissayinginhisshortstatementregardingpureexistenceisthatinusingtheterm“pureexistence”wearetalkingaboutpreciselywhatthistermsignifiesinandofitself,nothingmoreorless.Godisthatentity“whosetaskitis”(minshaʾnihi)toexist.Thequestionofpriorityoragreatchainofbeingisnotinplayhere;recallthathebeginsbysayingthatthepureSelfisnotthisorthat,nornotthisornotthat.Kāshānīisprovidingthephilosophicalideaofexistenceassuchasanentrytoconceptualizingthisutterlyself-subsistententity,thedivineSelf.ThisisdifferentfromotherphilosophicalproofsfortheexistenceofGod,orproofsregardingthenecessityofHisexistence,whichbeginfromthingsandproceedtotheoriginalentityassourceonpainofanunacceptableinfiniteregressorcircularity.Kāshānī’smentalmoveistonotthinkaboutanythingatall,exceptofcoursethathecannotavoidmakingthereaderthinkabouttheideaofexisting. Thisappearstobeakindofontological“proof,”ormorecorrectly“reasoning,”asopposedtothecosmologicalprooforreasoningwhich,asstatedabove,startswiththingsandthenproceedstotheirsourceortothatwhichliesbeyondthemontologically.Ofcourse,KāshānīwasnotthefirsttousesuchanargumentintheIslamiccontext.TobyMayerarguesthatIbnSīnāhadhisownversionoftheontologicalproof,althoughsomehavearguedthatthiswasreallyjustanewformofthecosmologicalproof.13WhetherIbnSīnā’sproofiscosmologicalorontologicaldoesnotchangethefactthathisviewofwujūdisfundamentallydifferentfromKāshānī’soranyoneelse’sintheschoolofIbnʿArabī.ForIbnSīnāandthePeripatetics,thefinalresultofanysuchproofwillbeaNecessaryExistent(wājibal-wujūd)whoseexistenceisstillsomethingdifferentthanthemultipleexistentstowhichitgivesrisethroughcreationoremanation.NecessaryexistenceissomethingpossessedbyGodalone,andinnowaydoesthisparticularandspecialnecessaryexistenceextendtoanythingelsewecanthinkof.AsṬūsīsays,theideaofageneralizedexistenceencompassingallexistencescanneverleavetheplaneofthemind.Now,thereisadegreetowhichtheAkbarianssharethisviewregardingnecessaryversuscontingentexistence.Forthemthisdivisionisvalidinsofarasitappliesthelogicalanalysisoftheobjectsofoureverydayexperience.WithinthedualitybetweentheworldandGoditisperfectlyvalidtosaythatthisisnecessaryandthatiscontingentorimpossible.However,necessaryandcontingentarereallyafterthefactclassificationsweusetomakesenseofourownideasabouttheworld.Itismorecorrecttospeakofexistenceassomethingsoself-subsistentandnecessarythateverythingotherthanitisactuallynothingatall:thereisno“otherofit”inthefirstplace.Weonlythinkthereisbecausewearetrappedinanillusion. OnceagainitbecomesclearthatthefundamentalmysteryatworkisdifferentfortheAkbariansthanforthePeripatetics,andthisaffectstheoutcomeoftheontologicalproofaswell.TheclassicalEuropeanversionoftheontologicalproofhadtheperfectionofGodasitsbasis,14whileIbnSīnābasedhis,characteristically,onthenecessityofGod. 13Foradiscussionofthispointandasurveyofthoseonvarioussidesoftheargument,seeTobyMayer,“IbnSīnā’s‘Burhānal-ṣiddīqīn’,”JournalofIslamicStudies12:1(2001),18-39.14Mayer,37.

83

ThusIbnSīnā’sproofwouldbedifferentfromthosearisingfromtheEuropeanmilieu,butwillalsobedifferentfromanythingresemblinganontologicalproofcomingoutoftheAkbariantraditionbecauseoftheirfundamentallydifferentmetaphysics. Thedistinctionbetweenanontologicalproofandacosmologicaloneisthatthelatterbeginsfromthecosmos,takingthenatureofthecosmosanditsinabilitytostandaloneaswhatitisasanindicationofsomethingwhichgivesrisetoitandwhichdoesstandaloneaswhatitis.ForIbnSīnā,thecosmologicalproofsleadustoaNecessaryBeingwhogivesrisetothecosmosbutwhoseexistenceisfundamentallydifferentthantheexistencebelongingthecosmos.TheresultofthecosmologicalproofforIbnSīnāoranyPeripateticistheveryGodtheyspeakofintherestoftheirphilosophy—necessary,andwithallHisattributesandperfections,butseparatefromthecosmos. TheproblemwithtryingtousethedistinctionbetweencosmologicalandontologicalproofstounderstandAkbarianmetaphysicsisthattheveryseparationanddistinctionmadebetweenthecosmosandGodisseenasbeingpartlyunreal,unlikethePeripateticswhoseeitasbeingperfectlyreal.Thusanyproofwhichstartsfromthecosmos,reasoningfromtheimpossibilityofaninfiniteseriesofexistentsorthenecessityforsomethingwhichgivesexistencetoanessencewhichcouldorcouldnotexist(tarjīḥ,givingpreponderance),andendswiththesourceofthisseriesorthebestowerofexistencetotheessence,willstillendupwithacreativeoremanatingGod.However,aswehaveseen,boththecosmos(time,space,infiniteseries,non-necessaryessences,etc.)andthepersonalGodarepartofabsoluteimagination.ThetraditionalcosmologicalproofsthusdonotbringustotheSupremeRealityoftheSufis,buttoitsfirstself-determinationor“identification.”Suchaproofwouldbeillusionleadingtoillusionintheultimatesense,althoughwithintherealmof(absolute)imaginationthecosmologicalproofswouldhavevalidityinsofarasthedistinctionbetweenGodandtheworldisrealandnotillusory.Thisdistinctionhowever,isdependentlyreal—dependentupontheSupremeSelfinwhichthereisnodistinctionandwhichiswhollyself-sufficientandindependent. ForKāshānī,aswesawabove,existenceisthatwhichdoesnotneedsomethingelsetoexist,asitis(bydefinition,itwouldseem)existentinitself(mawjūdbi-dhātihi).Ingeneralthispureexistence(wujūdṣirf)isdescribednegatively.Itisneithersubstance,noraccident,becauseofthelimitationsandparticularizationssuchnotionsentail.Asubstanceissomethingthat“hasaquiddityotherthanexistence,bywhichitisdistinctfromotherexistents.”Anaccidenthasthesamelimitation,andadditionally“itneedsanexistentsubjecttodwellin.”

AnythingotherthantheNecessaryiseitherasubstanceoranaccident,andexistencequaexistenceisnototherthanthenecessary.Anyconiditionedexistenceisexistentthroughit[i.e.theNecessary].Indeed,itisItwithrespecttoreality,differingwithrespecttoidentification.Thereisnothing“other”withrespecttoreality.Itsexistenceisidenticalwithitsveryessence,sinceanythingotherthanexistencequaexistenceispurenon-existence(ʿadam).Initsbeingdistinctfromnon-existenceexistencedoesnotneedsomeentificationofnegationtopreventthetwosharinginsomething.Thiswouldbetodenytheabsurdityoftheirbeingcommontosomething,sincenon-existenceispurenothing(lāshayʾ).Itdoesnotreceivenon-existence,sinceotherwiseafterthisreceptiontherewouldbeanon-existentexistence.Likewise,purenon-existencedoesnotreceive

84

existence.Ifeitherallowedofitscontrary(naqīḍ)itwould,withrespecttoitsactuality,beitscontrary,andthisisabsurd.

Receptivityrequiresmultiplicity,andthereisnomultiplicityintherealityofexistencequaexistence.Indeed,thereceptacleforbothconsistsintheimmutableidentitiesandtheirstates,immutableintheintellectworld.Theymanifestthroughexistenceandarehiddenthroughnon-existence.Anythingthatexiststhroughexistenceisnotidenticalwithexistence,andthusisnotexistence.Otherwise,whenitexistedtheexistencewouldhaveanexistencebeforetheexistingofitsexistence.Existenceisitselfexistent,soexistenceisitself(ʿaynuhu).Otherwise,itsquidditywouldbeotherthanexistenceandwouldnotbeexistence.Otherwise,whenitexisteditsexistencewouldhaveanexistencebeforeexistence,andthatisabsurd.Thus,existenceinitselfnecessarilyexistsonitsown,notthroughanotherexistence.Itiswhatmakesallotherexistentssubsist,becausetheyexistthroughexistence.Therewouldotherwisebepurenothing.Itisinitselfbeyond-needofeverything,andallareneedfulofit.15

Indeed,itseemsthatKāshānī’smainthrustisthatpureexistenceisthatwhichisnotnothingness(ʿadam),andwhichis“notnothing”ineveryconceivableway.Thusanythingthatpartakesofprivationorlimitationisnothinginsomewayandhenceisnotpureexistence.Iusetheword“nothing”insteadofnon-existencebecauseKāshānīhimselfglosses“purenon-existence”(ʿadamṣirf)as“no-thing”(lā-shayʾ).Thisnaturallybringsupthequestionofthingswhichdoexistbutwhichdonotseemtonecessarilyexist.EventheAkbariansdistinguishbetweennecessary,contingent,andimpossibleexistence.Themodalitiesinvolvedinmust,may,andcannotexistdonotreallyapplytotheSelfinitself.TheyonlyapplytoquidditiesandtoGodwhoseexistenceispartofHisessence/quiddity. Inanycase,somethingwhichmayormaynotexistcouldnotbepureexistence,sinceexistenceisessentiallyexistent.Clearlytheobjectsoftheworldarecontingentlyexistent,andanAkbarianwouldthusreasonthattheyarenotpureexistence.Thiswouldappeartobethebeginningofakindofcosmologicalproof,butitisquestionablewhetherthisisevenapossibilityfortheAkbarians.WhenKāshānīsaysthatsomeexistentisnotpureexistence,his“isnot”isnotthesameasthe“isnot”inaPeripateticproofthatmightread,“TheNecessarybeingisnotpartoftheseriesofcontingentbeings.”ForKāshānī,sayingthatsomeexistentisnotthepureexistenceis,fromonepointofview,anepistemologicalstatementaswellasanontologicalone,becausehismetaphysicsdemandsthebasicidentityofthemanyintheone,theoneinthemany.Ifweviewsomeexistentthingonitsowninaccordancewithordinaryhumanexperience,itisnotpureexistence,butifallexistenceisultimatelyoneandiscoterminouswiththerealityoftheSelf,thenthatsameexistentisnotwhollyotherthanpureexistenceeither. Atthispointitneedstoberecalledthatintheusualformsofthecosmologicalproofoneistalkingaboutexistentsandnotexistence,thedifferencebetweenmawjūdandwujūd.ForthePeripateticsthereisnoimportantdifferencebetweenthesetwo16concepts,forindeedthemanyexistentsofthecosmospointtoGod,whoisalsoexistent 15Sharḥfuṣūṣal-ḥikam,4.16HenryCorbindiscussesthequestionofmawjūdandwujūd,esseandens,inhisimportantintroductiontohistranslationofMullāṢadrā’aK.al-Mashāʿir,LeLivredePénétrationsMétaphysiques(Paris,1964),62-85.

85

albeitinadifferentway.Godisnecessaryofexistence(wājibal-wujūd),allotherthingsbeingcontingentofexistence(mumkinal-wujūd),buttheycanallbecalledexistent.TheAkbarians,however,almostneverspeakaboutthepureexistent,butofpureexistence.ItisinfactoneofthegreatcontributionsoftheAkbarianstoIslamicmetaphysicaldiscoursetomakeanimportantdistinction,atleastintheirconventionalusage,betweenwujūdandmawjūd.TheAkbariansusemawjūdor“existent”asadescriptionofafact,namelythefactofbeingorhavingexistence.“Existence”istherealityitselfthatisbeingdelineated. ForthePeripatetics,Godismawjūdnecessarily,andtheworldismawjūdcontingentuponGod.Thephrasewājibal-wujūddescribesjustthat.Whenthephraseisshortened,itisthe“necessary”thatiskeptandthe“existence”dropped,aswhenonereferstoal-Wājib,meaningGodas“theNecessary.”TheexistenceinvolvedisuniquetoGod,andtheexistenceofthingsisuniquetothem.Aswesawinthefirstchapter,theprimacyof“necessity”(wujūb)asacoremetaphysicalconcernregardingthenatureofGodsupersededapreviousemphasisplacedon“eternity”(qidam)versuscomingtobe(ḥudūth),butinbothcaseswearetalkingaboutqualifiersthatdesignatethestatusofanexistentthing,notexistenceassuch.Anytalkof“existenceassuch”forthePeripateticsispurelymentaloutsideofagivenindividual.WecanisolatetheexistenceassuchofanindividualorofGod,butitwillbethatthing’sorGod’sparticularexistence;otherwiseitwillbethatgeneralcategoryof“existence”thathasnoobjectivecounterpart,aswasdiscussedatlengthinthepreviouschapter.Aparticularbeingisnotexistentthroughexistenceassuch,butratherthroughitsownparticularexistence. BecauseoftheepistemologicaldimensionsofAkbarianthought,whichassumethatourperceptionofseparateexistenceforeachandeverythingisinasenseunreal,the“existence”inanytypeofontological-styleargumentisgoingtobedifferent,andmustbeso.Indeed,evenacosmological-typeargumentisgoingtobedifferent,becauseanystepsleadingfromthecontingenttothenecessary,orfromtheimperfecttotheperfect,willbeasepistemologicalasontological.Ratherthanfollowthetrailwithintherealmofmultiplebeingstoarriveoutsideofthatrealm,wearefollowingthetrailtofindthetruenatureofthosemultiplebeingsthemselves. ButisKāshānītryingtoproveGod’sexistenceanywhereinthisreasoning,implicitlyorexplicitly?Ibelievethat,attheveryleast,whatheistryingtoshowisthatanycoherentaccountofexistenceandofGod’sexistencehastosomehowtakeintoaccounttheveryconcept“existence.”Existentandexistencearetakentobetwodifferentthings,theformertotallysustainedand“constituted”bythelatter.Ifexistenceistrulyoneandindivisible,Kāshānīissaying,bothinconceptandintheobjectiveworld,itcanonlybeexistenceandneveranythingelse.Itisnotexistentsometimes,non-existentatothers,sincepurenothingnesscanneverreceiveorbecomeexistence.Itisthebusinessofexistencetoexist,byitsverynature.Nothingelsecanmakethisclaim. Theepistemologicalelementcomesinsincewehavetoharmonizetheclaimthatexistenceneverdoesanythingbutexistwiththeexperienceofmanythingswhichseemtosometimesexistandatothertimesgooutofexistence,andwhichinanycasecandoeitherwithoutabsurdity.Thetreeexistsnow,butdidnotexistbefore.Ifithasexistencenow,thenwhatisthestatusofthatexistence?Sinceexistencedoesnotbecomenothingness,andneitherdoesnothingnessbecomeexistence(sincenothingcannotbecomesomethinglogically),itmustbethatthetree’sexistenceisnotquitewhatit

86

appearstobe.Otherwisetheideaof“existence”fallsapart.ThesolutionforKāshānīisthattheexistenceofthetree,asanobjectthatisouttherebyvirtueofitsownexistence,isillusory,andthatthetreeissomehowamanifestationofone,unchangingexistence. Ifanontologicalproof“deducesfrom…aninnateconceptofexistence…theobjectiverealitycorrespondingthereto”,17thenthereisindeedsomethingoftheontologicalproofinKāshānī.However,whatit“proves”islimitedtothescopeoftheconceptofexistence,nomatterhowbroadandall-encompassingtheconceptisunderstood,andaswehaveseenbeforetheAkbarianslimited“existence”toanapproximateandpedagogicaltoolforunderstandingthings.WhatIbelievewecansayisthattothedegreethatanontologicalproofispossibleandvalidfortheAkbarians,itmustbeofthekindthatKāshānīprovides.Thatistosay,itwillnotonlyarriveattheexistenceofGod,butwillnecessarilyarriveattheconclusionthatallexistenceisreallytheoneexistence.Withoutthislatterconclusion,theKāshānīwouldsay,yougetasituationwhereexistencebecomesnon-existenceandexistencebecomesexistence,whichislogicallyimpossibleforthesetwoconcepts.

* * * InthischapterwehaveexaminedonedimensionofKāshānī’streatmentofontology.Hetakes“existence”beyondthedualusageweobservedinQūnawīandJandī,where“existence”alternatedbetweenthemeaningofmanifestationontheonehandandexpressionofthemysteriousunityontheother,andtriestomakesenseofthemysteriousunityofexistencebylookingattheveryconceptofexistenceitself.WhereQūnawīandJandīmadedeclarationsabouttheonetrueexistence,Kāshānītriestoprovidearationalargumentastowhyexistence,evenattherationallevel,demandsthatourunderstandingofitultimatelyleadtooneindivisibleexistence.Thislevelofengagementwithproperlyphilosophicalmodesofdealingwithontologyarenotoftenreflectedinhislargerbodyofwritings.WhenonereadsmorefullyinKāshānīonefindslanguageandusageverysimilartohispredecessorsQūnawīandJandī,especiallyintheuseoftheconceptofidentification(taʿayyun)andlevelsofinwardnessandoutwardness.Indeed,thereasoningaboutexistenceinthefirstpartsofhisFuṣūṣcommentarydoesnotundergirdmostofhiswritingsonmetaphysicalquestions,buthiscontributiondoesrepresentarealadvanceintheunderstandingbetweenphilosophyandmysticism.InthenextchapterwewillseehowDāwūdal-Qayṣarīwilltakethisunderstandingevenfurther.

17FrithjofSchuon,LogicandTranscendence(NewYork,1975),59.

87

ChapterFive:QayṣarīandtheLanguageofPhilosophy Dāwūdb.Maḥmūdb.Muḥammadal-Rūmīal-Qayṣarī1wasbornapproximatelyintheyear1260A.D.inthecentralAnatoliantownofKayseri,inthegeographicalcenterofpresent-dayTurkey,whencecomeshisnameal-Qayṣarī.Littleisknownabouttheearlylifeofthismajorintellectualfigure.HebeganhisscholarlyeducationinKayseri.AtsomepointhespentseveralyearsstudyinginEgypt,butitisunclearexactlywhenheleft,withwhomhestudied,orwhenhereturnedtoAsiaMinor.HestudiedattheTokat-NiksarNiẓāmiyyahschoolunderMuḥammadibnSartakal-Marāghī,whowasastudentofNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī’sfamousMarāghahobservatorywhileitwasstillunderthedirectionofṬūsī’sson.Morethananobservatory,Marāghahwasacenterofhigherlearningwheremathematicsandphilosophywerestudied.ItisthoughtthatduringhistimewithIbnSartakQayṣarībecameintimatelyfamiliarwiththephilosophicalwritingsoftheGreeksandsuchIslamicthinkersasIbnSīnā,Ṭūsī,andAbūʾl-Barakātal-Baghdādī,inadditiontogainingknowledgeofotherintellectual(ʿaqlī)sciencessuchasmathematics.IthasalsobeenthoughtbysomethathewasadirectdiscipleofṢadral-Dīnal-Qūnawī,butthisishighlyunlikely,sinceQayṣarīisnotknowntohavegonetoKonyatostudy,andconsideringtheagesofthetwomenhewouldhavebeentooyoung.HewasinfactthedirectstudentofʿAbdal-Razzāqal-Kāshānī.WeknownodetailsofthemeetingbetweenQayṣarīandKāshānī.ItisKāshānīwhomQayṣarīmentionsashisteacherintheSufipathintheprefacetohisowncommentary. In1336SultanOrkhānGhāzīappointedQayṣarītoheadthefirstOttomanschoolsystem.Heservedinthispostuntilhisdeathin1350,teachingthetraditionalIslamicsciences,fromlawandexegesistotopicsinlogicandphilosophy,allthewhilecomposingsomeofthemostprofoundandimportanttreatisesintheAkbarianschool,themostfamousofwhichisMaṭlaʿkhuṣūṣal-kalimfīmaʿānīFuṣūṣal-ḥikam(IntroductiontoSpecialTerms:TheMeaningofTheRingstonesofWisdom),whichishisaforementionedcommentaryuponTheRingstonesofWisdomofIbnʿArabī.OtherworksofQayṣarīincludecommentariesuponal-Qaṣīdahal-tāʾiyyahandal-Qaṣīdahal-mīmiyyah(TheWineSong)oftheSufipoetIbnal-Fāriḍ.HealsocomposedaseminaltreatiseonthenatureoftimeentitledNihāyatal-Bayānfīdīrāyatal-zamān(TheUtmostExpositionoftheUnderstandingofTime).OthertreatisesincludeaRisālahfīʿilmal-taṣawwuf(TreatiseontheScienceofSufism),aRisālahfīmaʿrifatal-maḥabbahal-ḥaqīqiyyah(TreatiseConcerningKnowledgeofTrueLove),theAsāsal-waḥdāniyyahwa-mabnāʾl-fardāniyyah(FoundationsofOnenessandtheStructureofSolitariness),andTaḥqīqmāʾal-ḥayāhfīkashfasrāral-ẓulumāt(ExplanationoftheWaterofLife,asitConcernstheUnveilingofDarkness). TheinfluenceofQayṣarīspreadthroughoutAnatoliaandbeyondinhisowntime.HiswritingshadagreatimpactontheintellectualtraditionoftheOttomanempire,includingsuchfiguresasMollaFenari,2andIsmailBursevi.3ThroughQayṣarītheideas 1SeeMehmetBayraktar,“Davud-iKayseri.”İslamAnsiklopedisi,Istanbul,1994,vol.9,32-35,andal-Rasāʾill-Dāwūdal-Qaysarī,ed.MehmetBayraktar,Kayseri1997,3-22.2MuḥammadHamzatal-Fanārī(d.1430-1)whowroteamajorcommentaryuponQunawī’sMiftāḥal-ghaybentitledMiṣbāḥal-uns(ed.MuḥammadKhwājāwī,Tehran1995or1996),andwasthefirstOttomanjuristtobecalledshaykhal-Islām(Şeyhülislam).3IsmailHakkiBursevi(d.1724-5),whowroteapopularcommentaryupontheFuṣūṣ.

88

oftheAkbarianschoolgainedanearlyfootholdintheOttomanworld.Theshaykhal-IslāmIbnKemāl(d.1534)issuedfatwāsdeclaringtheorthodoxyandlegitimacyofSufismingeneralandIbnʿArabī’sschoolinparticular.HiscommentaryuponTheRingstonesofWisdomwasuseduntilthetwentiethcenturyintheOttomanschoolsystemtoteachthemetaphysicsofIbnʿArabī.HisinfluencewasalsogreatinthePersianintellectualtradition.QayṣarīiscitedofteninworksoftheShiʿitetheologianHaydarĀmulī,andhisideascanbeseenclearlyinthewritingsofMullāṢadrā,especiallyhismoreʿirfānīor“Gnostic”writingssuchasal-Shawāhidal-rubūbiyyah.AmongtheArabs,ʿAbdal-Ghanīal-Nābulusī4andAmīrʿAbdal-Qādiral-Jazāʾirī5wereinfluencedbyQayṣarī.

TheProlegomena(al-Muqaddimāt)isthefirstpartofQayṣarī’sMaṭlaʿkhuṣūṣal-kalim,6whichisfollowedbyalinebylinecommentaryuponthetextofIbnʿArabī’sTheRingstonesofWisdom.Althoughitclaimsnomorethanthestatusofintroductoryremarkstoacommentaryonanotherwork,theProlegomenaisitselfamasterpieceofSufimetaphysics.Ithasinfactbeenoccasionallyclassifiedasaseparatework,butthisseemsunlikelyconsideringtheprefacegiventoitbyQayṣarīandtheunceremoniousconclusion.IntwelvechapterstheProlegomenacoverstheentirecycleofʿirfān,orgnosis,beginningwiththemostbasicmetaphysicalprinciples,expandingupontheminadiscussionofcosmologyandcosmogenesis,andconcludingwithdiscussionofspiritualanthropologyandtheexperiencesofthemysticaltraveler.Unliketheworkwhosecommentaryitismeanttointroduce,theProlegomenaissystematicandpedagogical,writtenlargelyinaphilosophicalstyle,employingstockphilosophicalvocabularyalongsidesymbolsandtermsdrawnfromrevelationandtradition.Thelanguageisclearandunambiguous,withouttherebysacrificingtheprofundityofthesubjectsaddressed.

* * *

InQūnawī,Jandī,andKāshānīwesawincreasinglysystematicprimersforthemetaphysicsoftheAkbarianschool,butinallofthesecasestheinitialimpetustoprovideasystematicsynthesiswassoonerorlaterdissipated.EvenKāshānī,whohadgivenarelativelyrationalandphilosophicalaccountofexistenceinthefirstpartsofhiscommentaryupontheFuṣūṣ,didnotgive“existence”orstrictlyphilosophicalideasthesameprideofplaceinhisotherwritingssuchashisglossaryofSufiterms.Also,theremainderofhiscommentaryupontheFuṣūṣdidnotsustainthephilosophicaltoneofitsopening IarguethatQayṣarīisreallythefirstmemberoftheAkbariantraditiontoenterfullyintotherealmofphilosophicaldiscourse,asamasterofsynthesisbetweentheideasoftheʿurafāʾandtheḥukamāʾ.HisProlegomenaisnotonlyphilosophicalinitscontentbutalsoinitspresentation,anachievementofbothintellectualvisionandpersuasivepedagogy.ThisisnottodenytheintellectualachievementsoftheearlierAkbarians,but 4ForadiscussionofhisconnectiontoIbnʿArabīseeElizabethSirriyeh,SufiVisionaryofDamascus:ʿAbdal-Ghanīal-Nābulūsī,1641-1731(NewYork,2004),18-38.5SeeM.Chodkiewicz,TheSpiritualWritingsofAmīrʿAbdal-Kader(NewYork,1995).6Thereareseveraleditionsofthiswork.QuotationsarefromtheeditionofMuḥammadḤasanSāʿidī(Tehran1995).IalsousedBayraktar’seditionofal-Rasāʾil(Prolegomenaonly)andJalāl-al-DīnĀshtiyānī’sedition(Maṭlaʿkhuṣūṣal-kalimfīmaʿānīFuṣūṣal-ḥikam,Tehran1984).

89

simplytoemphasizethecraftsmanshipthatisevidentinQayṣarī’swork.Althoughthisisonlyasubjectiveappraisal,onefeelstheeffectsofIbnʿArabī’spenchantfornon-linearexpressioneveninhisintellectualsuccessors.ChitticksaidthatIbnʿArabī’sideasalwaysappearedfullyformed,withnolead-inorbuildup,andalthoughthewritingsofQūnawī,Jandī,andKāshānīwerecertainlymorefriendlytothenewreader,theywerestilldifficultofaccesstothenon-specialistinSufism.IthinkitisfairtosaythatthisisoftentrueevenwhentheAkbariansaremakinggoodfaitheffortstoreachouttothephilosophersandtheologians. Qayṣarī’sworkisnoteworthyforaclaritythatremindsoneofthewritingsofṢadrācenturieslater.ThisnodoubthaseverythingtodowithQayṣarī’sintentioninwritingtheProlegomena:toprovidetheseriousstudentadoseofpreparationbeforetakingonthestudyofthenotoriouslydifficultFuṣūṣal-ḥikam.Aswillbecomeclear,however,Qayṣarī’smostimportantcontributionisnotpedagogicalbutphilosophical,andhebridgestheconceptualspacebetweenthephilosophersandtheSufismoresuccessfullythananyhaddonebefore. TheProlegomenabeginswithalonganddetaileddiscussionofexistence.Existenceisanalyzedandcommentedonmethodically,withanotablephilosophicalapproachthatisnotaspresentinourpreviousauthors.Itbeginsfrontandcenterandremainsso,notonlythroughtheendoftheProlegomenabutthroughoutQayṣarī’sentirecommentaryontheFuṣūṣandinhisotherworksaswell.-ViaNegativa

TheProlegomenaconsistsoftwelvechapters,beginningwithachapteronexistence,followedbychaptersonvariouslevelsofreality.Thelaterchaptersdealmorewithintegratingtheinsightsaboutthenatureofthingsofferedintheearlychapterswithadiscussionoftheprogressionofthespirituallife,thenatureprophecyandsainthood,andeschatology.Naturally,thechapteronexistencewillconcernusprimarilyhere,althoughtherearerelevantpassagesinotherpartsoftheProlegomenaandinQayṣarī’sothertreatisesaswell.

Qayṣarībeginsbydescribingexistenceapophatically,andassumesthatwearealreadyfamiliarwithvariouskindsof“existence.”

ChapterOne:Onexistence,andthatitistheReal. Letitbeknownthatexistenceassuchisneitherexternalexistencenormentalexistence,sinceeachisonekindofexistence.Existenceassuch,notconditioned,isnotqualifiedbybeingunqualified,norisitqualifiedbybeingqualified.Itisneitheruniversalnorparticular,neithergeneralnorspecific.Itisnotoneinthesensethatonenessisaddedto(zāʾid)itsessence,andneitherisitmany.Thesethingsareentailedbyitbyvirtueofitsvariouslevelsandstations,whicharespokenofinGod’sBookwiththewords,Hewhoraisesthedegrees,thePossessoroftheThrone(23:15).Anditisunqualifiedandqualified,universalandparticular,generalandspecific,oneandmany.ItisallofthesewithoutitsEssenceandRealitybeingtouchedbychange. Existenceisnotasubstance,becausethatiswhatexistsexternallyandinasubjectoraquidditywhich,whenitexists,isindependentofasubject.Existenceisnotlikethat,becauseitwouldthenbelikeallotheridentifiedsubstances,in

90

needofanexistenceaddedtoitself,andinneedoftheentailmentsofthatexistence. Norisexistenceanaccident,becausethatreferstowhatexistsinasubject,oraquidditywhich,whenitexists,isfoundinasubject. Now,existencedoesnotexistinthesensethatithasexistenceaddedtoit,andcertainlynotinthesensethatitexistsinasubject.Rather,itsexistentiality(mawjūdiyyah)isbasedonitsentityandessence,notsomethingelsewhichdiffersfromitintellectuallyorexternally.Furthermore,ifitwereanaccident,itwouldsubsistinasubjectthatwasitselfalreadyexistent.Thiswouldentailthatathingprecedeitself,andmoreovertheexistenceofthesetwothingswouldbeaddedtothem.Existencecannotbeadded(zāʾid)toitself.Owingtothefactthatitismoregeneralthanthesetwothings,existenceispartoftheirdefinition,andisthereforeotherthanthem. Norisexistencesimplyanobjectofconsideration,asisbelievedbywrongdoers,sinceexistenceisrealizedinitself,independentlyofthosewhoconsideritand,needlesstosay,independentlyoftheiractofconsideringofit.Thecaseisthesameintellectuallyorotherwise.RecallthattheProphetsaid,“Godwas,andnothingwaswithHim.”….Existenceisnotaqualityintheintellectinvolvingexistence…liketherelationshipofnecessitytoanecessarything,norofcontingencytoacontingentthing…. Nothingismoreevidentthanexistence,neitherinbeing(anniyyah)norinrealization,somuchsothatwesaythatitisself-evidentlyknown(badīhī).Yet,itisalsothemosthiddenofthings,bothinitsquiddityanditsreality.TheProphet,whoknewmorethananycreature,spoketruthfullywhenhesaidinhissupplication,“TheydonotknowTheeasThoushouldstbeknown.”7

ThisfirstandseminalpassageintroducesustoQayṣarī’stheoryofexistence.Hebeginswithanegativedescriptionofexistence,butthenegationalreadyincludesdivisionssuchas“mental”(dhihnī)and“external”(khārijī)existence.Qayṣarīdidnotinventtheseterms,andwasnotthefirsttousethem,butheintroducesthemherefromtheverybeginningandthetermswillcontinuetobepartofthefabricofhisexposition.Aswewillsee,thisisonlyoneofmanyconceptuallineshedrawstosystematicallydivideuptheconceptofexistence. ItisnosurprisethatQayṣarīnegates“substance,”“accident,”“general,”and“particular”fromexistence,buthedispenseswiththemnowonlytoreintegratethemelsewhere,asisquitetypical(seebelow).Ingeneralhedevelopsthethemethatapparentmultiplicitymaskstrueunity.Godisnotanyofthethingslistedinthispassage,yetmysteriouslyallofthesethingsareaspectsofthedivinerealitywithoutthatrealitybecomingmultiplebecauseofthatidentity.

HecontinuesthethinkingoftheAkbarianschoolonthestatusofexistenceassomethingexistent,i.e.existencedoesnotexistbyvirtueofsomethingelse,butexistsbecauseexistingiswhatitis.Ifitdidnotexistitwouldbesomethingelse,notexistence,whichwouldbelogicallyabsurdaccordingtothisreasoning.

7Prolegomena,13-14.

91

WhereQayṣarīdoessomethingdifferent,however,atleastfromtheAkbarianperspective,istogosofarastosaythatexistenceisself-evident(badīhī),meaningitdoesnotneedtobeexplainedbysomethingelseinordertobeknown.Ofcoursehefollowsthisbypointingoutthattheself-evidentdimensionofexistenceisonlythebeginning,andthattherealityisthegreatestofmysteries.Thisisimportantbecausetheself-evidentnatureofexistenceisamajorparameterinphilosophicaldiscussions,andbecomesespeciallysointhethinkingofṢadrā. Butarenottermssuchas“being”(kawn)and“realization”(taḥaqquq)alsoself-evident?Thefollowingpassageshedslightontheuseofwujūdassomething“self-evident”:

Existenceisnotatermthatmeans“being,”“actualization,”“realization,”or“immutability,”ifbythisoneissimplyreferringtotheverbalnoun(maṣdar),becauseifso,itwouldnecessarilybeanaccident.Ifbythesetermsonemeanswhatismeantbythewordexistence,thenthereisnoargument,aswhentheFolkofGodrefertotheworld’sexistenceas“being”(kawn).Noneofthesetermswouldthenbeasubstanceoraccident,asubjectwehavealreadydiscussed. Existence is not known with respect to its reality, though it is known with respect to its thatness (anniyyah). Verbal definition would have to be based on something more well-known than existence in order to yield knowledge. Now, existence is necessarily more well-known than “being” and the others.8

Whyis“existence”moreself-evidentthanthese,andwhyisitnotalsoanaccident?ThisisnotexplicitlyexplainedbyQayṣarī,althoughthekeyclueisgivenbythephrase“ifbythesetermsonemeanswhatismeantbythewordexistence.”Thisisdifferentthansaying,forexample,“Ifbythesetermsonemeansexistence,thenthereisnoargument.”Thereissomethingthatthewordexistencesignifies,andthatiswhatisself-evident,obviously,sincethewordwujūddoesnotexistinotherlanguagesbuttheself-evidentthingdoesexistbyvirtueofbeingself-evident. Thisstilldoesnottelluswhywujūdshouldhaveprideofplaceoverkawnandtaḥaqquq,amongothersuchterms,whenitcomestobeingself-evident.IhavetriedtoargueintheprecedingchaptersthattheearlyAkbarians(IbnʿArabī,Qūnawī,Jandī)gavenosuchprideofplacetoexistence,intermsofself-evidentness,inanyfundamentalsense.Indeed,thenotionofbeingself-evidentbecomesespeciallyusefulafteronebeginstoinvestimportanceintheconceptofexistenceitself,asKāshānīdidinhisontological-stylereasoningaboutexistence.WhatIbelieveQayṣarīisdoingisweddingmetaphysicalinsighttophilosophicalconvention.TheIslamicphilosophicalandtheologicaltraditionhadlongsincechosenwujūdasitscentralonticidea,leavingbehindothercontenderssuchasanniyyahandhuwiyyahtoasecondaryposition.InGreekorEnglish,thepresenceofthecopulagives“being”and“is”anaturalfundamentality,sincetheyareinextricablybuiltintothelanguage.Butwujūdisnot“builtin”inthesameway.Itisfairtosaythatitsclaimtobeingasignifierofthatself-evidentthingistheproductofphilosophicalusageandagreementasmuchasanythingelse,andthisisatleastpartofthereasonwhyitbecomesthemetaphysicaltermforQayṣarī.Hecallstheself-evidentthing“whatismeantbyexistence”andalsoallowstermssuchaskawntomeanthesamethingiftheyareusedproperly,whichamountstosayingthatthetermissecondarytothe

8Ibid.,17.

92

self-evidentmeaning.Thismeaningcanbesignifiedbytermsotherthanwujūd,asQayṣarīhimselfadmits.Thisismorethanthemalleabilityofwordsintheordinarysense.Icannotsay,“Iceisfrozenmilkifby‘milk’onemeans‘water’,”sincethisisjustanabuseoflanguage.Theapparentinterchangeabilityofkawn,wujūdandtaḥaqquqisnotlikethat,becausetheyaretechnicaltermscreatedtosignifyacertainmeaning;theirtechnicalsignificance(fīʾl-iṣtilāḥ)iswhatmatters,nottheiridiomaticusage(fīʾl-lughah). Qayṣarī’sadoptionofwujūdinthisway,andhisrecognitionthatothertermscanindeedmeanthesamething,showsthatthereisapracticalaswellasphilosophicalelementtohisphilosophy.Thephilosophicalelementconsistsofthediscussionsoftheunity,fundamentality,perfection,etc.ofexistence(whichwillbediscussedbelow),whilethefactthatthesediscussionsareindeedaboutexistenceisthepracticalelement.-ViaPositivaandtheMysteryofExistence NaturallyQayṣarīspendstimedescribingexistencecataphatically,andthisdimensionofhisontologyismorestronglyimbuedwiththenotionofthemysteryofidentificationbetweentheoneandthemany.HedoesnotwaverinusingwujūdtoidentifyGod,unlikehispredecessorswhowouldhavementionedwujūdandthenmovedontootherideaswithinthespaceofaparagraphorevenasentence.HispositivedescriptionsarealsoareminderthatQayṣarīseeshisontologyasbeingfundamentallyQurʾānic,notrationalistic.Thefollowingaresomeexamplesofhispositiveontology:

Existenceispuregoodness.Whatsoeverisgoodcomesfromexistence,andis[good]throughit.Itsubsistsbyitselfforitself,becauseitstandsinnoneedofsomethingoutsideofitself.ItistheSelf-Subsistentimmutableinitelf,andgrantsimmutabilitytowhatisother[thanitelf]. Ithasnobeginning.Otherwiseitwouldstandinneedofanexistingcause,foritwouldthenbeacontingent.Neitherdoesithaveanend.Otherwiseitwouldbeanattributeofnon-existence,andwouldthusbequalifiedbyitsoppositeorwouldhavetoundergoatransformation.Itisbeginningless(azalī)andendless(abadī).AndHeistheFirst,theLast,theInward,andtheOutward(57:3).ThisissobecausewhatevermanifestsintherealmofwhatiswitnessedorlieshiddenintheworldoftheunseenultimatelyreturnstoHim.AndHehathknowledgeovereverything(57:3).ThisissobecauseHeencompassesallthingsinHimself….9 Existenceisasinglerealitywhereinthereisnomultiplicity.Themultiplicityofitsmanifestationsdoesnotimpingeonitsbeingoneinitself.Itsidentificationanddistinctionsarebasedonitself,notsomethingaddedtoit.Thereisnothinginexistencethatisotherthanexistence,wheresuchathingcouldparticipatewithitinsomethingorbedistinguishedfromitbysomethingelse.Thisdoesnotimpingeonthetruththatitsrealitymanifestsinitsidentifiedlevels.Indeed,itistheprincipleofallidentificationsoftheNamesandQualities,andistheoriginofallthelociofmanifestationinknowledgeandinidentities.Itpossessesaonenesswhichdoesnotstandoppositemultiplicity,anditistheprincipleofthatonenesswhichdoesstandoppostitemultiplicity.ThisonenessisidenticalwithitsfundamentalUnity.TheonenessoftheNameswhichdoesstand

9Ibid.,16

93

oppositemultiplicity,andwhichistheshadowofthatoneness,isalsoidenticalwithUnityfromacertainaspect.Weshallsoongiveanexplanationofthis,ifGodsowills….10 AndthuswhenyouknowthatexistenceistheReal,youknowthesecretofHeiswithyouwhereveryouare(57:4).AndWearenighertoHimthanyou,butyoudonotseeUs(56:85).…Andinyourselves;what,doyounotsee?(51:21)AnditisHewhoinheavenisGod,andonearthisGod(28:84).GodistheLightoftheheavensandtheearth(24:35).AndGodencompasseseverything(4:126).“Iwillbehisvision,hishearing…”11ThenthereisthemysteryintheProphet’swords,uponhimbepeace,saying,“Ifyouloweredarope,itwouldalightuponGod.”Theseareseveralamongthemysteriesofunity,spokenofthroughthelanguageofsymbolism….12

-“Existence-as-fundamental” UptothispointwehaveseenhowQayṣarī,inkeepingwithAkbarianthinking,hasestablishedthatultimaterealityisnoneofthethingsweknow,andyetmysteriouslyeverythingweknowisidenticalwithultimatereality.InwhatfollowsIaimtoenlargeuponvariousfacetsofQayṣarī’sdoctrineofexistence.Here,althoughhedoesnotmakementionoftheword,whatQayṣarīisdiscussing,inthecontextofrelating“essence”to“existence,”iswhatlaterphilosopherswouldcallaṣālah,orfundamentality:

Whetheritbeintheintellectorexternally,nothingcanberealizedexceptthroughexistence.Initselfitencompassesallthings,andallthingssubsistbyit.Wereitnotforexistence,nothingthatiswouldbe,neitherintheintellectnorexternally.Existencegrantsthingstheirsubsistence;indeed,existenceisthoseverythings.Itdisclosesitselfbyitsvariouslevels,andthusitisthattheformsandrealitiesofthingsaremanifestinknowledgeandconcretely.Wecallthesequidditiesandimmutableidentities,subjectsweshalldiscussinthethirdchapterofthisbook,ifGodsowills.

Thereisnointermediatebetweenitandnonexistence,justasthereisabsolutelynointermediatebetween“existent”and“nonexistent.”Therealquiddity—whichisintermediatebetweenitsproperexistenceanditsnonexistence—andnotionalabsolutenesshavenoactualrealization(fīnafsal-amr).Whatwearetalkingaboutisthatwhichdoesactuallyhaverealization…. Existenceassuchisone.Itisimpossiblethatanotherexistenceshouldberealizedoppositeexistence.Itisthroughexistencethatoppositesarerealizedandlikeobjectsgiventheirsubsistence.Indeed,itisexistencethatismanifestintheformsofoppositesandintheformsofallotherthings.Existencethusnecessarilyleadstotheunionofcontradictories,sinceonecontradictorycallsforthenegationoftheother.Thedifferencebetweenthetwosidesresidesintheintellect;inexistence,allaspectsareunified.Manifestation,hiddenness,andindeedalloftheopposingqualitiesofexistencealldisappearintheSourceofexistence.Thereisnodifferenceexceptintheintellect….

10Ibid.,1611Bukhārī81:3812Prolegomena,18-19

94

Negativequalities,thoughtheystemfromnonexistence,alsostemfromexistenceinacertainrespect.Withrespecttointellectualexistence,allthedistinctaspects[ofthings]areidenticalwiththeothers.Becausetheyareunifiedinexistenceitself(ʿaynuhu)theyarealsounifiedintheintellect,sincewereitnotfortheirexistencethereintheywouldnothavebeenunified.Theabsenceoftheirunification(ijtimāʿ)inexternalexistence—whichisonekindofunqualifiedexistence—doesnotnegatetheirunificationinexistenceassuch.Itneverallowsofdivisionorseparationintoparts,neitherexternallynormentally,owingtoitssimplicity.Itpossessesneithergenusnorspecificdifference,andthereforepossessesnologicaldefinition.13

HeisimmutableinHimself,andgrantsimmutabilitytowhatisotherthanHimself,andtowhomthedivinenamesareattributed.ItisHetowhomtheprophetsandthesaintsinviteus.HeguidescreationtoHisEssence,andthroughHisprophetsinvitesHislociofmanifestationtotheveryquintessenceofunionandthelevelofHisSelfhood.ThroughtheirspeechHetellsusthatinHisSelfhoodHeiswitheverything,andthatinHisRealityHeiswithalllife.Moreover,HehasmadeusrememberthetruththatHeisidenticalwiththingsbysaying,AndHeistheFirst,theLast,theInward,andtheOutward,andHehathknowledgeovereverything.HeisidenticalwiththingsbyvirtueofHismanifestationinthegarmentsofHisNamesandQualities,inthetwoworldsofknowledgeandidentity.Yet,HeisotherthanthingsbyvirtueofthehiddennessofHisEssence,byvirtueoftheQualitiesthatmakeHimtranscendentbeyondanythingthatmightcallfordeficiencyanddeterioration,bybeingsethighabovelimitationandidentification,bybeingsoholyastoremainuntouchedbythemarksofcomingtobe(ḥudūth),14byHisengenderingandexistentiatingallthings,andbythefactofHisbeingconcealedfromthingswhilebeingmanifesttothem. Hebringsthingstonon-existenceintheGreaterResurrectionthroughthemanifestationofHisUnity,andthroughvanquishingthembywithdrawingtheiridentificationsandmarksofoccurrence,andbymakingthemnothing.WereadofthisinGod’sBookwhereHesays,WhoseistheKingdomthisday?ItisGod’s,theOne,theVanquisher(40:16),andalsowhereHesays,AllthingsperishsaveHisFace(28:88).IntheLesserResurrection,it[i.e.thisbringingtonon-existence]consistsofHisself-transmutationfromtheworldofwhatiswitnessedtotheworldoftheunseen,orfromoneformtoanotherwithinasingleworld….15

Inlatercenturiesphilosopherswouldtendtounderstandthehistoryofphilosophyintermsofthequestion:whatismorefundamental,existenceoressence?Ṣadrāwasthegreatchampionofaṣālatal-wujūd,whileitissaidthatSuhrawardīwasthefounderofthetraditionofaṣālatal-māhiyyah.Thisisonlytrueinasense,sincethisclassificationintotwodifferentbrandsoffundamentalitybecametypicalonlymuchlater.EvensayingthatIbnSīnāupheldexistence-as-fundamentalwouldbelikesayingthatAristotlewasanti-Darwinist,whichisperfectlytruefromonepointofviewbutactuallymisleading.Thus, 13Ibid.,14-15.14Thequalityofbeingcreatedintime,asopposedtoeternity(qidam).15Prolegomena,17-18.

95

althoughquiteclearlyQayṣarīcouldbecalledanupholderof“existence-as-fundamental,”hecertainlydoesnotframeitthatwayandinnowayarguesagainstanyotherestablishedpositiononthequestion.

For“existence-as-fundamental,”allessences/quidditiesareultimatelyexplainableanddependentuponexistenceforeverythingtheyare;essencesarenothingbutdifferentmodesorlevelsofexistence,andhavenorealityontheirown.Upholdersof“quiddity/essence-as-fundamental”see“existence”asaconceptwithoutanyrealcontent,andplacetherealityandexplanatorypoweronthesideofessence.ForQayṣarī,theclaimisquitedirect:allthingshavetheirrealizationandsubsistencethroughexistence.Moreover,oppositionandrelationalityarethemselvesbasedontheoneexistence,eventhoughoppositesapparentlydemandeachother’sabsenceornon-existence.Theapparentopposition,realatitsownlevel,isresolvedintotheoneexistenceofwhichtheoppositesaremodalitiesormanifestations.

Qayṣarīalsoextendsthis“fundamentality”intoepistemology.Knowledge,likeanyotherqualityofGod,isnotseparatefromGod’sexistence,andindeedbecauseofthefundamentalonenessofexistenceallknowledgeisactuallyGod’sknowledge.Fromthepointofviewofindividualknowers,then,knowledgeisdependentinadirectwayuponexistence:

Anysubjectthatknowscanonlyknowthroughthemediationofexistence.Existenceisprimaryinthis.Indeed,allperfectionsareentailmentsofexistence.AlloftheQualities,suchasLife,Knowledge,Will,Power,Hearing,andSight,subsistbyexistence.ExistenceistheLiving,theAll-Knowing,theWilling,thePowerful,theHearing,andtheSeeinginItsEssence,notthroughtheintermediationofsomeotherthing.Itisthroughexistencethatallthingsareassociatedwiththeirperfections.Indeed,itisexistencethatmanifests—throughitsself-disclosureanditsself-transmutation—indiverseformsthroughtheformsofthoseperfections.Itthusbecomesdependentupontheessences,fortheytooareparticularexistencesthatdisappearatthelevelofUnityandmanifestatthelevelofOneness.16 QuidditiesaretheformsofHisperfectionsandthelociofmanifestationforHisNamesandQualities.Theyarefirstmanifestinthepresenceofknowledge,theninthepresenceofidentities,allbyvirtueofHisloveformanifestingHissignsandraisingHisbanners.Theyaremultiplewithrespecttotheforms,andyetHeremainswhatHeis,inHistrueUnityandinHiseternalperfections.HegraspstherealitiesofthingsthroughthatbywhichHegraspstherealityofHisEssence,notthroughsomethingelsesuchastheFirstIntellect,becausethoserealitiesareidenticalwithHistrueEssence,althoughtheyareotherthantheEssenceintermsofidentification.ThatwhichisotherthanHimdoesnotgraspHim.WereadofthisinGod’sBookwhereHesays,VisiongraspethHimnot,butHegraspethallvision(6:103),andwhereHesays,TheycomprehendHimnotinknowledge(20:110),andwhereHesays,TheymeasurenotGodwithHistruemeasure(6:91),andwhereHesays,GodwarnsyouthatyoubewareofHim;andGodis

16Ibid.,16.

96

gentlewithHisservants(3:27).HehaswarnedHisservants,outofsympathyandcompassion,tonotwastetheirlivesintryingtoattaintosomethingimpossible.17

Insayingthatknowledgedependsuponexistence,Qayṣarīiscreatinganintersectionbetweenepistemologyandontology,averitableprecursorofṢadrā’sstatementthatknowledgeisthepresenceofexistencewithoutveil.InamoregeneralsensewhatQayṣarīissayingisthatthereisnosuchthingasaquality,beitofGodorofparticularthings,thatisnotknownthroughexistenceandwhichisnotthroughexistence. God’s“grasp”orperception(idrāk)ofthingsisnecessarilynothingotherthanHisEssence,fromtheAkbarianperspective.Hedescribesquiddities(whichheusesinterchangeablyherewithidentities,seebelow)asbeingmanifest“inknowledge”whichisnoneotherthanGod’sknowledge.God’sknowledgeisasinglereality,andHedoesnotknowthroughquidditiesbecausetheveryrealityofquidditiesisconstitutedbyHisknowledgeofHimself.ThemysteryisthatallofGod’sknowledgeofthingsisreallynoneotherthanHisknowledgeofHimself,sincetheessenceorquiddityofeverythinghasasitsrootadivinename. Ihavebeentryingtoarguefortheimportanceoftheintersectionbetweenknowingandbeing,betweenepistemologyandontology,fortheAkbarians.Before,theinsightthatourperceptionofthingsmaskedtheirunderlyingidentityinformedtheideasaboutthebeingofthosethingsinrelationtothedivinereality.Thatistosay,theearlierAkbariansmouldedtheirdiscourseaboutexistencetotheirknowledgeclaimsabouttheonenessunderlyingmultiplicity.Here,Qayṣarīhastakenthedoctrineoftheonenessofexistencetoitslogicalconclusionandtheresultantontologynowdeterminestheformoftheepistemology,inthestatement,“Anysubjectthatknowscanonlyknowthroughtheintermediationofexistence.”-Light

ExistenceispureLight.Itismanifestinitself,andisalocusofmanifestationforwhatisotherthanitself,sinceitisbyexistencethatallthingsareperceived.Itilluminatestheheavensoftheunseenandspirits,aswellastheearthofbodies,becauseitisthroughexistencethattheyexistandarereal.Itisthewellspringofallspiritualandbodilylights,anditsrealityisnotknowntowhatisotherthanitself…. Thegeneralexistencethatspreadsovertheidentitiesinthepresenceofknowledgeisoneofexistence’sshadows,makingitrelativebyitsgenerality.Likewise,mentalexistenceandexternalexistencearetwoshadowsofthisshadow,reinforcingitsrelativity.ThereisreferencetothisinGod’sBook,DoyounotseehowyouLordextendeththeshadow?HadHesowilledhewouldhavemadeitstill(25:45).18

AlthoughitwouldseemthatQayṣarī’suseofLighttodescriberealityisnotnew,whatisdifferentisthatQayṣarīisnotsayingthatGodislight,butthatexistenceislight,andthedifferenceisimportant.RatherthanmakingexistenceandlighttwoconceptsbywhichGodisdescribed,existenceisgivenprideofplaceandlightisusedasasymboltopointtoitstruenature.Asasymbol,lightrepresentsthatwhichisluminousandthatwhich

17Ibid.,18.18Ibid.,17.

97

illuminates.Forontologythatmeansthatexistenceisbothwhatweknowwhatweknowby.Qayṣarīexpandsuponhisthoughtsastotheself-evidentnatureofexistenceintermsofbeing“betterknown,”orintermsofitsdefinition.Becauseofwhatexistenceis,ithasnodefinition(seebelow),inthatexistenceistheexplanationforeverythingandisexplainedbynothing.Thatmeansthatthetermsofanydefinitionwouldbewhollydependentuponexistenceandhencethedefinitionwouldbecircularatbestandultimatelymeaningless. Althoughthelightsymbolismismystical,itisputattheserviceofaphilosophicalideaandhencebecomesphilosophicalitself.Needlesstosay,thelightsymbolismheredoesnotevenapproachthatofSuhrawardī,norisitexactlythesame.Thefirstideaisexistenceastheprimeconcept(“existenceispurelight”),followedbytheusageofmysticalsymbolismtomakethepointthatexistenceisself-evidentinaphilosophicallymeaningfulway,notonlyintermsofspiritualexperience.-NecessityandContingency(wujūb,imkān)

Existenceisnecessaryinitself.Ifitwerecontingentitwouldhaveanexistentiatingcause,whichwouldentailathingprecedingitself….19Anythingthatiscontingentallowsofnon-existence.Innorespectdoesabsoluteexistenceallowofit,forexistenceisnecessaryinitself.Letnoonesaythattheexistenceofacontingentthingallowsofnon-existence,forwesaythat“theexistenceofacontingentthing”isareferencetoitsactualizationintherealmofexternalsanditsmanifestationtherein.Itisanaccidentoftrueexistence,revertingbacktoexistencewhentherelationalityiseliminated,notwhenthecontinentthingitselfiseliminated.Moreover,thatwhichallowsofsomethingmustremainwithwhatisallowedof,butexistencedoesnotremaintogetherwithnon-existence.Thatwhichallowsofnon-existenceisthequiddity,notitsexistence.Letnoonesay,“Ifyoumeantosaythatnon-existencecannotbeascribedtoexistence,weagree,butwhythenisitnotpermissibleforexistencetodisappearandvanishinitself?”Wesaytothisthatnon-existenceisnotathing,suchthatitcouldbeascribedtoquiddityorexistence.Whenwesaythataquiddityallowsofnon-existence,wemeanthatitallowsofhavingexistencewithdrawfromit.Thisisnotpermissibleasconcernsexistence,forifitwasitwouldrequirethatexistencebetransformedintonon-existence.Moreover,thepossibilityofitsnon-existencewouldthenbeanecessaryaspectofitsessence,butexistenceinescapablyandessentiallyrequiresitself,aswehavesaid.Asinglethingcannotrequireitselfaswellasthepossibilityofitsownnon-existence.Itsdisappearanceisthereforenotpossible.Inreality,thecontingentthingdoesnotceasetoexisteither,butbecomeshiddenandentersintotheinwardfromwhenceitbecamemanifest.Hewhoisveiledbelievesthatitceasestoexist,andimaginesthattheexistenceofthecontingentthinghasceasedtoexistaswell.Thisstemspurelyandsimplyfrompostulatingthatexistencehasindividualsresembling,forexample,theindividualsofmanintheexternalrealm.Thisisnotthecase,forindeedexistenceisasinglerealitywhereinthereistobefoundnomultiplicity.

19Ibid.,19.

98

Wespeakofitsindividualswithregardtoitsbeingputintorelationwithquiddities.Therelationisanobjectofthought,possessingnoindividualsthatcouldceasetoexistordisappear.Indeed,itistherelationthatdisappears.Itsdisappearancedoesnotnecessitatethattheexistenceceasetoexistordisappear,forthiswouldnecessitatethattherealityofexistencebetransformedintotherealityofnon-existence.Thedisappearanceofexistenceinafundamentalmannerispreciselyandinescapablynon-existence,andthisisclearlyerroneous.20

Asmentionedinthepreviouschapter,theAkbariansdoindeedusetheideasofcontingencyandnecessitytotalkaboutGodandtheworld,buttheirmetaphysicalvisionofexistenceobligesthemtocometodifferentconclusionsaboutthesecategories.Forthephilosophersandthetheologians,necessitymeansthatGodexistsnecessarily,whileallotherthingsmayormaynotexist.Toputitanotherway,nothingintheessenceorquiddityofthingssaysanythingaboutexistingornotexisting,whileGod’sessenceorquiddity(ifoneallowsGodtohaveaquiddity)istoexist.Ofcourse,toacertainextenttheAkbariansmustagree,butasItriedtoshowinthelastchapter,theymustunderstanditinafundamentallydifferentway.Qayṣarīfusestheconceptsofnecessityandcontingencywiththeself-evidentnatureof“existence”asthatwhichexistsandmustexist.Thatistosay,hereinterpretswhatitmeanstosaythatGodnecessarilyexistsandtheworldcontingentlyexistsinlightoftheAkbarianassertionthatthereisonlyoneuniqueexistencewhichcannotpossiblynotexist. Actually,onthequestionofnecessityQayṣarīdoesnotgiveusverymuch.Rather,hisdescriptionofGodasNecessaryhasmoretodowiththefactthatGodistheonetrueexistencethatisidenticalwithallthings,byvirtueofHisqualitiesofmanifestation.MuchmoreinterestingforourpurposesisQayṣarī’sdiscussionofcontingency.Hesaysthatthecontingentthing(mumkin)allowsofnon-existence,thisbeingtheverydefinitionofcontingency,buttheexistenceofthethingdoesnotallowofnon-existence.21Theexistenceofacontingentobjectis,forhim,aquestionofmanifestationandtheactualizationofarelationship.“Thatwhichallows”(qābil)and“thatwhichisallowedof”(maqbūl)canberenderedasreceptacleandcontent,andQayṣarī’sargumentisthatwhenareceptaclereceivessomecontent,itabideswiththatcontent.Existencecannotreceivenon-existence,butaquidditycan,becauseaquiddityisnotanexistentialthingbutanattributeorrelationship. Inreality,whenacontingentthingcomestobeandthenceasestobe,itdoesnotreallyceasetoexist(i.e.haveexistence)but“hides”intheinwardnessfromwhenceitcame.Inanycase,non-existenceisnotathingsuchthatitcanbeattributedtosomething.EchoingKāshānī,Qayṣarīsaysthatexistencecannothavethepossibilityfornon-existenceasapartofwhatitis,sinceitwouldleadtothelogicalabsurdityofathingrequiringbothwhatitisandwhatitisnot.ThekeytounderstandingQayṣarī’sconceptionofcontingencyistheerror,asheseesit,ofpostulatingthatexistencehasindividualsthesamewaythat“man”hasindividualsintheexternalworld.Thisorthat 20Ibid.,22-3.21ItisprobablethatQayṣarīisformulatinganon-existenttheoreticalpositionhere(atimehonoredpracticeinIslamicthought)soastomakehisownpositionclearer.Philosophicaltextsarequiteclearthatthecontingencyofathingreferstothestatusofitsquiddity,notitsexistence.Indeed,thosethingswhichactuallyexistaresaidtoexistnecessarily,butthisis“necessitythroughanother”(wujūbbiʾl-ghayr).

99

“existent”or“existence”isreallyouractofrelatingexistencetoaquiddity,andhenceisonlyanobjectofthought.Anobjectofthoughtcannotconcretelyexistorceasetoexistbecauseitisnotconcrete.Indeed,noindividualthingreallycomestobeorceasestobeassuch,becausethenotionofanindividualthingisentirelyconditionedbyourthought. Putindifferentterms,whatisreallycontingentaboutthingsintheworldisnottheirexistence,buttheirmanifestation.Somethingthatwashiddenandinwardisnowmanifestandoutward,butthisdoesnothaveanything(really)todowithitsexistenceforQayṣarī.Tothedegreethatexistenceisinvolvedincomingtobeandceasingtobe,oneisunderanillusion.Wehavehereanexampleofanontologycollidingwithaconceptualdivisionthatdevelopedwithinthematrixofadifferentkindofontology.Thatistosay,thediscourseof“necessity”and“contingency”inintellectualcircleswasbasedupontheseparationbetweenGodasanexistentontheonehandandtheworldasanexistentorcollectivityofexistentsontheother.WhatisatplayforQayṣarīisnotbeing(ontology)butourperception(epistemology).Somethingischanging,butitisnotexistence;or,attheveryleast,thechangeisnotonethatrequiresanythingtoreallyexistafternothavingexisted.-Homonymy,Synonymy,andEquivocality

RecallthatṬūsīdevotedconsiderableattentiontotheconceptoftashkīkandbelieveditsolvedimportantquandariesaboutthepredicationof“existence”ofbothGodandthings.WesawthatQūnawīwasnotconvincedbytheargumentfromtashkīkordidnotconsiderittobeterriblyimportant,althoughhedidsometimesmakeuseoftheconcepthimself.BothJandīandKāshānīobviouslyknewofit,butdidnotmakemuchimportantuseofit.WeseeQayṣarīspeakingatgreaterlengthaboutequivocalityandtherelatedconceptsofhomonymyandsynonymy,butatfirstreadingonemaybesurprisedatwhatheactuallysays.FirstIquotethepassagesrelevanttotheseideas,followedbyananalysis.

Abranch:Sinceexistencedoesnothavetrueindividualswhicharedistinctfromthe

realityofexistence,itcannotbeageneralattributeofthem.Moreover,ifitwereageneralattributeofthem,itwouldeitherbeasubstanceoranattribute,andwehavealreadymadeclearthatitisneithersubstancenoraccident.Also,existenceassuchispredicatedofrelativeexistences,becausewecanvalidlysay,“Thisexistenceisexistence.”Betweenanysubjectandpredicatestheremustbesomethingwhichunitesthemandsomethingwhichdistinguishesthem.Whatunitesthemhereisnoneotherthanexistence,andwhatdistinguishesthemisnoneotherthantheveryquiddity.Itisthusclearthatexistenceassuchistrulythesameasrelativeexistences.Otherwise,itwouldhavetonotbeexistence.Ouropponentthinksmuchoftheproductsofhisintelligence,exceptthathewillusetheterm“existence”forboththemandexistenceassuchhomonymously,whichisclearlyincorrect.

Letitnotbesaidthatexistencedoesnotoccurinitsindividualsequally,foritoccursintheexistenceof“cause”and“caused”throughpriorityandposteriority,intheexistenceof“substance”and“attribute”throughprimacy/priorityorlackthereof,andintheexistenceofthe“static”and“non-static”throughintensityandweakness.Itisthussaidofthemequivocally

100

(tashkīk).Thatwhichissaidequivocallyisneithertheveryquiddityofathingnorapartofthatthing.Ifonemeanstosaythatpriorityandposteriority,primacy/priorityandthelackthereof,andintensityandweaknessarewhattheyarewithrespecttoexistenceassuch,wesaythatthisisincorrect,becausethesearerelationalthingswhichcannotbeconceivedofwithoutoneanother,andbecausethatwhichissaidequivocallyissaidwithreferencetouniversalityandgenerality.Now,existenceassuchisneithergeneralnorspecific.Ifonemeanstosaythatthesethingsareconsequents(lāḥiq)ofexistencebyvirtueofquiddities,thenthatiscorrect.However,thisdoesnotentailthatexistenceassuchisthatwhichissaidofthemequivocally,sincetothinkabouttheattributions(maʿrūḍāṭ)isnottothinkaboutexistence. ThisistheverythingsaidbytheFolkofGod,fortheysaythatexistence,withrespecttoitsdescentthroughthelevelsofbeings,itsmanifestationinthethoughtsofcontingentthings,andthemultiplicationofintermediaries,becomesincreasinglyhidden,itsmanifestationsandperfectionsweakening.Withrespecttoitsrecovery/ascent(qallah),itsluminosityintensifiesanditsmanifestationstrengthens,itsperfectionsandqualitiesbeingmanifest.Itismoreproperlysaidof(iṭlāq)thestrongthantheweak.Tofullyrealizethis,youmustknowthatexistencehaslociofmanifestationintheintellectjustasithaslociofmanifestationexternally.Amongthemarethegeneralentitiesandtheuniversals,whichhavenoexistenceexceptintheintellect.Itisonlybyvirtueofthatintellectualmanifestationthatexistenceissaidequivocallyoftheindividualsthatonerelatestoquiddities. Itisforthisreasonthatexistenceisspokenofasanobjectofthought,becauseassuchitisnotsaidofthemequivocally;rather,itissaidofthembyvirtueofbeingapredicable,intellectualuniversal.Thismeaningdoesnotnullifyitsbeingtheveryquiddityofitsindividualsbyvirtueofitsnaturaluniversal.Thevariegationamongtheindividualsofexistenceoccurs,notinexistenceitself,butratherinthemanifestationofitsspecialcharacteristics,suchascausativeness(ʿilliyyah)andcausedness(maʿlūliyyah)inthecaseofacauseandsomethingcaused,byitssubsistinginthecaseofasubstanceandnotsubsistinginitselfinthecaseofanaccident,andduetotheintensityofitsmanifestationinwhatisstaticandtheweaknessofitsmanifestationinwhatisnon-static…. Thisisenoughforonewhopossessesdiscernmentwhenitcomestothissubject.HewhosevisionhasbeenilluminatedbyGod,whounderstandswhathasbeensaid,andwhodevoteshimselftoitsstudywillhavenotroubleinfendingoffthedoubtscausedbyhisimagination,norincounteringfalsearguments.

ItisinGodwhomweseekhelp,andinHimdoweplaceourtrust.22

Wehavealreadysaidthatallperfectionisassociatedwiththingsbytheintermediationofexistence.Existenceisexistentinitsessence.HeistheLiving,theKnowing,theWilling,andthePowerfulinHisEssence,notthroughsomequalitysuperimposeduponthisEssence.Otherwise,inorderfortheseperfectionstoemanatefromHim,Hewouldstandinneedofsomeotherlife,knowledge,

22Prolegomena,23-5.

101

will,andpower,becauseathingcanonlyemanatefromthatwhichisqualifiedbythatthing.Whenyouknowthis,youwillknowwhatismeantbysayingthatHisQualitiesareidenticalwithHisEssence,andHisRealitywillshowitselftoyou.Indeed,youwillknowthatitisthisthatismeant,andnotthatthelife,knowledge,andpowerthatemanatefromHimandwhichareentailmentsofHimareidenticalwithHisEssence.Thisideahascometodominateovertheunderstandingofsomepeople,andalthoughitmaybetruefromonepointofview,neverthelessatthelevelofUnityallidentificationsperish,andthereinremainsneitherqualitynorqualifiedobject,neithernamenornamed;allthatremainsistheEssence.Now,atthelevelofOneness—theleveloftheDivineNamesandQualities—thereistobefoundqualityandqualifiedobject,nameandnamed.Thisisthelevelofdivinity.ItisthesameaswhenwesaythatHisexistenceisidenticalwithHisEssence,meaningbythisthatHeisexistentinHimself,notthroughanexistencethatemanatesfromHim,foritisHisveryEssence.ThusLife,Knowledge,Power,andalltheotherpositiveQualitiesareunified,justasqualityandqualifiedobjectareunified,atthefirstlevel.Theintellectjudgestheretobeadifferencebetweenthesetwointheintellectjustasitjudgestheretobeadifferencebetweenqualityandqualifiedobjectintheintellect,althoughtheyareunifiedinexistenceitself.Thatistosay,theintellectjudgesthatKnowledgeisdistinctfromPowerandWillintheintellect,justasitjudgestheretobedistinctionbetweengenusandspecificdifference.InexistencethereisnaughtbuttheEssenceofUnity,justasthegenusandspecificdifferenceareonethingintheexternalrealm,thatis,aspecies.ItwasonthispointthatthePrinceoftheFaithful,ʿAlī,mayGodhonorhiscountenance,said,“PerfectsincerityliesindenyingHimqualities.” Atthesecondlevel,KnowledgeisdistinguishedfromPower,andPowerfromWill;thustheQualitiesbecomemultiple.ThroughtheirmultiplicitytheNamesandtheirlociofmanifestationbecomemultiple,andtheDivinerealitiesaredistinguishedfromoneanother.TheEssencereceivestheappellationsofLife,Knowledge,Power,andtheotherQualities,asdoestherealityentailedbytheEssencewithrespecttoitsbeingdistinctfromItintermsof“homonymy”(ishtirāklafẓī).23Thisissobecausesuchrealitiesareaccidentsinonerespect,beingeitherpureactsofrelationorbeingatruequalityinvolvinganactofrelation.Fromanotherpointofviewtheyaresubstances,asinthecaseofuncoupledthings,sinceItsknowledgeoftheiressencesisidenticalwiththeiressencesinacertainrespect.SuchisthecaseforLifeandPower.ThatEssenceistoomajestictobeasubstanceoranaccident. TherealityofwhatismeantaboveshallbecomemanifestforhetowhomismanifestthetruththattheDivineSelfhoodflowsinallsubstances—theQualitiesbeingidenticalwiththesesubstances—andtowhomismanifestthereasonwhytheserealitiesareuniqueexistences.TheEssenceofUnityisabsoluteexistence.Therelativeistheabsolutewithanidentificationrelatedtoit.Itcanalsobesaidthattherelativeresultsfromtheself-disclosuresoftheAbsolute.Inthiscase,theyaresaidoftheserealitiesandtheEssencethrough“synonomy”

23Literally“sharingthesameterm”.ThismeansthatthisrealitydiffersfromtheEssenceinitsquiddity.

102

(ishtirākmaʿnawi)24equivocally,andaresaidoftheindividualsofaspecies—suchastheidentificationsinknowledge,forexample—univocally.Theserealitiescanbesuchastobeneithersubstancenoraccident,beingeternalandnecessary;orcontingentsubstancesthatcometobe,ortheattributeswhicharedependentuponthesubstances.25Itallowsofneitherintensificationnorweaknessinitself,becausethesetwo[things]areinconceivableoutsideofanentitythatdwellsinsomethingstatic,suchaswhiteandblackindwellingintwoloci,orinsomethingnon-staticwhichpurposestowardssomeendconsistingofincreaseordiminution,suchasmotion.Increase,diminution,intensity,andweaknessoccurinit(wāqiʿʿalā)inaccordancewithititsmanifestationandhiddennessinsomelevel;anexampleofsomethingstaticinitselfbeingabody,andanexampleofsomethingnon-staticinitselfbeingmotionandtime.26

Inanotherofhistreatises(Asāsal-waḥdāniyyahwa-mabnāʾl-fardāniyyah),hewritesthefollowingabouttashkīk:

“Existence”issaidof(iṭlāq)variousmeaningshomonymously(ishtirāklafẓī),someofthemattribute(ʿaraḍ)andsomeofthemneithersubstancenorattribute.Itissaidofattainment(ḥuṣūl),manifestation(ẓuhūr),andrealization(taḥaqquq).Recallthatonesaysofathing,“itexists”(wujida)or,“itisrealized”(taḥaqqaqa)whenitexistsorisrealized.Itismanifestinthevisibleworldafterhavingbeenattainedintheinvisibleworld—theworldofuncoupledentities,theworldofspiritsthatistheworldofimages,sinceallspiritshaveformstherein.Accordingtothismeaning,“existence”issaidsynonymously(ishtirākmaʿnawī)ofallexistentsequivocally.Itis[also]saidoftherealitybywhichmental,externalandotherkindsofexistenceareconstituted/subsist(yataqawwamu).Thatexistenceisthetrueexistencewhichsubsistsby/constitutesitself,andgivessubsistencetowhatisother[thanitself].Thereisnodoubtthat“attainment,”“realization,”and“manifestation,”are[ofthecategoryof]attribute(ʿaraḍ),andthattherealitywhichsubsistsbyitselfandlendssubsistencetoeverythingotherthanitself—substancesandattributesandtheirknowledge-andconcreteexistences—isneithersubstancenorattribute.27

IfoneassumesthattheheartoftheontologylaterexpoundedbyMullāṢadrāisinessencethesameasthatoftheAkbarianschool,itwouldbereasonabletoexpectthatwhenoneofthemembersofthatschoolbegantomakeserioususeoftheconceptofequivocalityinhisontology,itwouldlooksomethingverymuchlikeṢadrā’suseofit.Againstthisbackground,ourfirstcauseforpuzzlementmightbeQayṣarī’sassertionthat

24Forexample,byvirtueofexistencebeingone,therealityofknowledgeisone.Inthestatement,“AisknowledgeandBisknowledge,”knowledgeisnotonlyacommonterm(ishtirāklafẓī)butacommonmeaning(ishtirākmaʿnawī).Thequidditiesaredifferentbuttherealityisone.Itsbeinggradated(mushakkak)doesnotnullifyitsoneness.25Prolegomena,27-9.26Ibid.,15-16.27Bayraktar,al-Rasāʾil,154.

103

“existenceisspokenofasanobjectofthought(iʿtibārī),becauseassuchitisnotsaidofthem[differentmanifestations]equivocally;rather,itissaidofthembyvirtueofbeingapredicable,intellectualuniversal.”ThissoundssuspiciouslysimilartothePeripateticpositiononexistence,whichasṬūsīmadeclearmorethanonceonlyallowstheequivocalpredicationofexistenceifthat“existence”isthegeneralconceptinthemind,nottheconcretethingitself.ThisisechoedbyQayṣarī’s“predicable,intellectualuniversal.”Butthisisthesamewriterwhojustsaid,“Existenceassuchistrulythesameasrelative(muḍāf)existences.” ThekeytounderstandingQayṣarī’sapparentagreementwiththePeripateticsonthesubjectofequivocalityisthequalifyingphrase“assuch”(minḥaythuhuwa,orminḥaythuhuwawujūd).Thereareanynumberofwaystorenderthis,suchas“existencequaexistence”or“existencewithrespecttoexistence,”but“existenceassuch”worksinmostcases.Qayṣarīagrees(inpart)withṬūsīthatexistenceassuchcannotbethethingyoupredicateequivocallyofmanythings,buttheiragreementisaccidentalandonlyshowsthecontrastintheirunderlyingvisionsofontology.Qayṣarīwantstoprotectexistenceassuchfromequivocalpredicationbecauseexistenceis,inreality,one,whileṬūsīwantstoprotectexistencefromthesamepredicationbecauseexistenceis,inreality,notone.AsweobservedinthediscussionofpredicationbetweenṬūsīandQūnawī,andintheontologicalproofinKāshānī,thecrucialdifferenceinparsingQayṣarī’sviewsontashkīkandwujūdfromthePeripatetics’view—whichisIbelieverepresentedfaithfullybyṬūsī—isthestatusofexistenceaseitheroneconcreterealityormanyconcreteandirreduciblerealities. ItisinterestingthatQayṣarīreasonsthatequivocalpredication,performedcarelessly,willactuallynullifyhisdoctrinethatallexistencesareactuallytheoneexistence,forṬūsīalsoreasonsthatthiswouldextendaproperlymentalideaintoaconcreteone.Qayṣarīinsistsontheintegrity“existenceassuch”anddoesnotallowequivocalpredicationofitbecauseforhimitisnotexistencequaexistencethatisequivocalorgradated(mushakkak),butexistencequaquiddity.Inthepassagequotedabove,hedisallowstheideathatpriorityandposteriority,strengthandweakness,andsimilarsubdivisionsarepredicableofexistenceassuch,butheallowsitsolongasonemeans“consequentsofexistencebyvirtueofquiddities.”Quidditiesareobjectsofthought(iʿtibārī)orasIzutsumightsay,“fictional”entities,whichistosaythattheyaresomehowtheresultofmentaloperationsperformeduponexistence.The“existence”producedbythismentaloperationisonehalfoftheontologicalpairexistence-quiddity,anditistothismentalpairthatequivocalpredicationapplies. Now,strangelythereisabifurcationinQayṣarī’slanguageaboutthedifferentmodesofexistence.“Substanceandattribute”or“causeandcaused”arequalificationsthatseemtohaveadifferentstatusforhimthan“manifest/apparentandhidden”or“inwardandoutward”(ẓāhirandbāṭin).Thelatterconcepts,familiartousthroughoutthewritingsoftheAkbarianschool,appearinQayṣarītohaveanexplanatorypoweroverthemorephilosophicalideasofsubstance/accident,priority/posteriority,andthelike.Existence“manifests”concretelyandmentally,whichisthetrueexplanationfortheconceptualdivisionofexistenceintothesevariouskinds.Ifwetranslateẓuhūras“appearance”ratherthan“outwardness”or“manifestation”wecanperhapsunderstandwhyQayṣarīmightgiveitadifferentstatus.Tospeakaboutthewaysomethingappearstousistoaskaquestionaboutepistemology,notontology.Thatistosay,itisbyvirtue

104

ofthewaythattheoneexistenceappearstousthatwearriveatthequidditiesof“substance”and“accident”andotherslikethem,andnotonlythesegeneralcategoriesbutthequidditiesofallparticularthings. ThiswouldbequiteinkeepingwithmygeneralcontentionthatAkbarianontologyhingesuponitsepistemology.Theequivocalpredication(biʾl-tashkīk)ofthingssuchassubstance,priority,andcauseisdependentuponourperceptionoftheoneexistenceasmanyexistences,andinthissenseconsistsoffalseattributionsbaseduponafalseperception.However,whenQayṣarīspeaksofexistence’s“perfections”and“appearance”tous,itseemstobeassumedthattheexistencewhose“luminosity”strengthensorweakensalongwithitsperfectionsisthatvery“existenceassuch”whichistrulyone,whereastheexistencewhichdividesupintosubstance,cause,etc.isnotexistenceassuchbutamentaluniversal.Thecentralproblemofperceptionarisesonceagain:whatwethinkofasbeingdistinctentitiesarenotultimatelyseparate.

Thisirreducibleaxiomof“theoneinthemany”inAkbarianthoughtguideseverythingtheycansayaboutontology.IbelieveQayṣarīallowsforamoresymbolicmodeoflanguage—anagogicalperhaps—inspeakingabouttheperfectionandluminosityofexistenceappearingtous,butstickstohishighlevelofintellectualrigorwhenhebringsthediscussionbacktotraditionalphilosophicalcategoriessuchassubstanceandcause.Thissymbolicmode,whichissimilartohispredecessors,isperhapsannouncedbyhissayingthat,“ThisistheverythingsaidbytheFolkofGod,”namelytheSufis,notthephilosophers(ḥukamāʾ).Ithinkthissymbolicmode—oremphasisuponthe“mystery”ofexistence—isimplicithere,becauseQayṣarīdoesnotannouncethatheischangingthemannerinwhichheistalkingaboutequivocalpredication.Rather,heusesthenotionofappearance(ẓuhūr),aconceptintimatelytiedupwithperception,tomakesureweassignequivocalpredicationtothe“intellectualuniversal”andnottotherealityitself.Ifweareclearthatwhatwethinkweperceive(themany)isnotthetruereality(theone),thenwecanuseequivocalpredicationproperly,assigningitto“existenceasuniversalconcept”andnot“existenceassuch.”

Butaproblemarises,becausethewayQayṣarīdiscusseshomonymyand

synonymymaymodifywhathesaidaboutequivocalpredicationabove.AtthelevelofUnity(aḥadiyyah),whichisthelevelofnon-identificationdiscussedinthepreviouschapterandinearlierchapters,questionsofpredicationdonotarisebecauseoneassertstotalnon-dualitybydefinition.Atthelevelofoneness(wāḥidiyyah),orthefirstidentification,thepersonalGod,distinctionsappearbetweenGodandtheworldandalsobetweenGod’svariousqualities.ThequalitiesofLife,Knowledge,andPowerarepredicatedoftheEssencequaEssence,buttheyarealsopredicatedoftheNamesandQualities.AccordingtoQayṣarī,inthispredicationonlytheterm(“Powerful,”“Living”)isthesame(ishtirāklafẓī),forthemeaningisdifferent.Inthiscase,QayṣarīisviewingtheNamesandQualitiesaskindsof“attributes”(aʿrāḍ),i.e.ofsomesubstance,becausetheyareeitherpurelyrelationalorhavesomekindofrelationality(iḍāfah)inthem.

Fromanotherpointofview,however,“power”and“knowledge”andsimilarrealitiesaresaidoftheEssence/SelfandthedivineNamessynonymously(ishtirākmaʿnawī)andequivocally(biʾl-tashkīk).ThebasisforthispointofviewisthedivineSelfhood’s(huwiyyah)flowing-throughout(sarayān)allsubstancesanditsbeingthoseverysubstances,orthefactthatthingsresultfromtheself-disclosureofthedivineSelf.

105

Inthiscasetherealities(thingslikepower,knowledge,andlife)canbesaidofboththeEssence/Selfandotherthingsequivocallyandwithacommonmeaning.Moreover,theycanbesaidofothersubstancesandaccidentsinthesameway.

InthesecondquotationQayṣarīspeaksof“existence”itselfbeingpredicatedasacommontermofthingslike“attainment”and“realization”,andIassumewhathemeansisthatweoftenusetheword“exists”thewayweuse“isrealized”.Thenhespeaksabouthowexistenceissaidofallthings,asabove,asacommonmeaning(ishtirākmaʿnawī)equivocally(tashkīk).Ifwethinkofindividualexistentsasarisingfromhigherlevelsofreality,andultimatelyfromthetrueexistencewhichsubsistsonitsown,wecanthenpredicate“existence”equivocallyasacommonmeaning,andnotonlyacommonterm.

ThesearetheonlyinstancesinwhichIcanfindQayṣarītalkingaboutishtirāk(commonality,eitherverbalorinmeaning)inpredication,whichisintimatelyrelatedtothenotionofequivocality.VerbalcommonalityisusedinthecaseofdivineQualitieswhentheseQualitiesseenasattributes(ʿaraḍ).WhentheQualitiesareseenasconceptuallyseparatefromtheEssence/Self,theappellation“Living”isusedforeachofthembutthemeaningisdifferent;hencetheverbalcommonality.ButwhentheQualityisseenasbeingadimensionoftheEssence/Self,asaresultoftheSelfhood(huwiyyah)flowingthroughoutthings,thentheappellationalsocarriesthesamemeaningbutinadifferentway;hencethecommonmeaningwithequivocality,i.e.gradesofpredicationofthesamequality.

IhavedifficultyunderstandingwhatQayṣarīmeansinsayingthat“existence”issaidofattainment,realization,andmanifestationverbally(ishtirāklafẓī),exceptthatthismeansthatthesearewordsweordinarilyequatewith“existence”butwhicharenotthesame,sinceexistenceismorefundamental.Thusthe“existence”weequatewith“attainment”(ḥuṣūl)isonlyverballycommonwithtrueexistence;themeaningoftrueexistenceisdifferent.FromthewayQayṣarīspeaksofcommonmeaning(ishtirākmaʿnawī)Iunderstandthatthereneedstobeaspecialwayinwhichexistence(orsomeotherpredicate)isusedinorderforittobethesamemeaningthatispredicatedofseveralthingsequivocally.

Inthelaterformulationofthenotionofequivocality,asinMullāṢadrā,therearetwosensesoftheconcept.Oneisequivocalityorgradationinpredicationwherethatwhichdistinguishesthingsisdifferentthanthatwhichmakesthemthesame.Thisis“general”equivocality,andanexampleofitwouldbetheexistenceoftwomenwheretheyhave“existence”incommonbutaredistinguishedbyotherfactors.Anotherkindofgradationorequivocalityoccurswhenthatwhichdistinguishesthingsfromeachotheristheverythingthattheyshareincommon.Thisiscalled“special”equivocality.Light,forexample,differsinitskindsandintensitiesofluminosity,butluminosityisalsowhattheyhaveincommon.AsthiswouldbeappliedtoexistenceinṢadrā’sthought,theconcept“existence”waspredicatedinthegeneralmode,whiletherealityofitwaspredicatedinthespecialmode.Thismeansthatconceptuallywemakeaseparationbetweentheexistencepropertoatreeandtheexistencepropertoarock,andinourmindsconsiderthesetwoexistencestobeseparate,buildingourdistinctionontheiressences(treeness,rockness).Inreality,however,existencebeingexistenceiswhatmakesatreeatreeandarockarock,andessencesarejustformsweassigntothemanifoldmodesofexistence.

106

Thequestion,then,iswhetherwecanobservethisdistinctioninQayṣarī.CertainlyQayṣarīdoesnotformulateafull-fledgeddoctrineofequivocality,anddoesnotmakeasmuchuseofitashetheoreticallycouldhave,althoughhedoessomuchmorethanhispredecessors.Ishis“predicationthroughequivocalcommonmeaning”(biʾl-ishtirākal-maʿnawīʿalāsabīlal-tashkīk)thesameasthelaterphilosophers’“specialequivocality”?Ibelievethatmustbewhatheissaying,althoughhedoesnotsayitaselegantlyandsystematicallyasitwillbesaidmuchlater.Imakesenseofitinthefollowingway:WhenQayṣarīdeniesthatexistenceassuchissaidofthingsequivocally,hemustmeanequivocalityinthegeneralsense,i.e.thesenseinwhicheachindividualobjectissaidtohaveexistencebutwherethedistinguishingfactorisnotexistenceitselfbutotherattributes.Thisisreallyjusttheordinaryconceptofexistence,andwhenweapplyitequivocallytomanythings,thisgradationinpredicationdoesnotstemfromexistenceitselfbutfromtheessencesofthosethings.Whenheusestheideaofcommonmeaningsaidequivocallyofthings,hemustmeanequivocalityinthespecialsense,becauseinbothcaseshementionsthisequivocalityinthecontextoftheonetrueexistence,itsself-disclosure(tajallī),oritsflowing-throughout(sarayān).Thisisnottheordinaryconceptofexistence,butitstruereality,whichistheveryrealityofallotherperceivedexistences.

IthinkQayṣarīdoesnotusetashkīkoftenenoughandclearlyenoughtocategoricallysaythathecompletelyanticipatedṢadrā’sdoctrine,butastrongargumentcanbemadethathedid.Heseemstorecognizethedifferencebetweenequivocalpredicationofasitrelatestoageneralconceptandequivocalpredicationasitrelatestothetruereality,andhedoessointheframeworkofacknowledgingthatexistenceisone,fundamental,andself-evident,allhallmarksofṢadrā’sontology.-LanguageofPhilosophyoverMysticalIdeas Notonlydoesthephilosophicallyunderstoodconcept“existence”takecenterstageforQayṣarī,butheadoptsmodesofexpoundinghismetaphysicsinwhichphilosophicalterminologyandconceptualdevicesactuallydisplacetraditionalAkbarianstructures.HealsoconsciouslycomparesthecategoriesofSufismwiththoseofphilosophy,andimpliesthatthevisionofrealitytheyexpoundisfundamentallythesame.InthefollowingpassageQayṣarīadoptsanewwayofgivinganaccountofthelevelsofreality,whichwouldotherwisehavebeenpresentedas“identifications”oreven“presences.”

Referencetosomeoftheuniversallevels,andtheterminologyoftheFolkofGodwhentheyspeakofthem: Whentherealityofexistenceisconsideredwiththeconditionthatnothingelsebewithit28,itisreferredtobytheFolkasthelevelofUnity,whereinalltheNamesandQualitiesdisappear.ThislevelisalsocalledtheUnionofUnion,theRealityofRealities,andtheCloud. Therealityofexistencecanalsobeconsideredasconditionedbysomething.Whenitisconsideredconditionedbyallthingsentailedbyit,betheyuniversalorparticular,itisthebearertheNamesandQualities.Thisisthelevel

28I.e.negativelyconditioned

107

ofDivinity(ilāhiyyah),referredtobytheFolkasOneness(wāḥidiyyah)andtheStationofUnion.ThislevelisreferredasthelevelofLordshipwhenitisconsideredwithrespecttotheNames’lociofmanifestation(i.e.theidentitiesandrealities)attainingtotheperfectionsthatcorrespondtotheirpreparednessintheexternalrealm. Whentherealityofexistenceisconsideredneitherconditionednornegativelyconditioned,itiscalledtheSelfhoodthatflowsinallexistentthings. Whentherealityofexistenceisconsideredconditionedbytheimmutabilityofknowledge-realmformstherein(i.e.intherealityofexistence),itistheleveloftheNamestheInwardconsideredinanabsoluteway,29theFirst,theKnowing,andtheLordoftheimmutableidentities. Whentherealityofexistenceisconsideredconditionedbyonlytheuniversalsofthings,itistheleveloftheNametheAll-Merciful(al-Raḥmān),LordoftheFirstIntellect(al-ʿaqlal-awwal),whichlatterisreferredtoastheTabletofDecree(lawḥal-qaḍāʾ),theMotheroftheBook(ummal-kitāb),andtheExaltedPen(al-qalamal-aʿlā).Whenitisconsideredconditionedbytheuniversalsthereinbeingfixedandexplicit(mufaṣṣal)particulars,withoutbeingveiledfromtheiruniversals,itistheleveloftheNametheCompassionate(al-Raḥīm),LordoftheUniversalSoul(al-nafsal-kulliyyah).ThislatterisreferredtoastheTabletofOrdainment(lawḥal-qadar);itisthePreservedTablet(al-lawḥal-maḥfūẓ)andtheEvidentBook(al-kitābal-mubīn).Whenitisconsideredconditionedbytheexplicitformsbeingdifferentiatedparticulars,itistheleveloftheNamestheEraser,theAffirmer,theGiverofLife,andtheGiverofDeath,LordoftheImprintableSoul(al-nafsal-munṭabiʿ)intheuniversalcorporealbody(al-jismal-kullī).ThisImprintableSoulisreferredtoastheTabletofErasureandAffirmation(lawḥal-maḥwwaʾl-ithbāt). Whenitisconsideredconditionedbybeingarecipientforthespiritualandcorporealspeciesforms,itistheleveloftheNametheRecipient,LordofUniversalHyle(al-hayūlāal-kulliyyah),whichlatterisreferredtoasthebookinscribedandtheparchmentunrolled(52:2-3).Whenitisconsideredconditionedbybeingabletoeffectandbeeffected,itistheleveloftheNametheAgent,whichwealsorefertoastheExistentiatorandtheCreator,LordofUniversalNature(al-ṭabīʿahal-kulliyyah).Whenitisconsideredconditionedbythespiritualanduncoupledforms,itistheleveloftheNametheKnowing,theElaborator,andtheDirector,Lordoftheuniversalintellectsandrationalsouls. Whatisreferredintheterminologyofthephilosophersas“uncoupledintellect”(ʿaqlmujarrad)30isreferredintheterminologyoftheFolkofGodas“spirit,”andthusonecallstheFirstIntellecttheSacredSpirit.Whatthe

29Muṭlaq.“Absolute”isoftenusedinthesamesensethatonespeaksof“absolutenumber,”thatis,notsubjecttoanyrelationorrelativity.Thiswordcanalsobetranslatedas“non-delimited”or“non-determined.”Itisbasicallysynonymouswithbeingnegativelyconditioned,whereasbeingconditionedissynonymouswithbeingconsideredtogetherwithorinlightofsomethingelse,i.e.,asrelative.WereadlaterthattheNametheOutwardcanalsobeconsideredquaitsrelationtootherNames.30Uncoupledreferstotheseparationofformfrommatter.Uncoupledspiritsarecompletelyfreefromthematerialpoleofexistence.

108

philosopherscall“uncoupledsoul”theFolkcall“heart,”sincetheuniversalsareexplicitinthissoul,andthissoulwitnessestheminidentity.Whentheysay“soul,”theyarereferringtotheanimalimprintablesoul. Whentherealityofexistenceisconsideredconditionedbythesensorialformsoftheunseen,itisthelevelofNameoftheGiverofForms,Lordoftheabsoluteandrelativeimaginalworlds.Whenitisconsideredconditionedbythesensorialformsoftherealmofwhatiswitnessed,itistheleveloftheNametheManifestconsideredabsolutely,andtheLast,Lordoftheworldofthekingdom. ThelevelofthePerfectManreferstotheunionofalllevels,[both]divineandoftherealmofbeing(kawn),oftheuniversalandparticularspiritsandsouls,andofthelevelsofnatureallthewaydowntothefinaldescentofexistence.ItisalsoreferredtoastheleveloftheCloud.Itcorrespondstothelevelofdivinity,andthereisnodifferencebetweenthemexceptthroughbeingLordandbeingvassal.ThatiswhyheistheVicegerentofGod.Whenyouknowallofthis,youwillknowthedifferencesbetweenthelevelsofdivinity,oflordship,andofbeing.31

AsIhavetriedtoemphasizeinthepreviouschapters,thenotionof“identification,”whichisnotaverycentraltermforIbnʿArabī,becomesanimportantconceptbywhichhissuccessorstrytocontructtheirmetaphysics.WhatstrikesusaboutQayṣarī’sexpositionofthevariousmodesorlevelsofrealityisthattheentirepassageismissinganyreferencewhateverto“identification”.Hediscussesidentificationlater,buttheseuniversallevelsareheredescribedinthelanguageofsharṭor“conditioning.”“ExistenceconsideredconditionedbyB”translates“al-wujūdidhāakhadhtabi-sharṭB”.Ibelieveacorrectwayofrenderingitmightalsobe“existencequaB,”suchthatidhāakhadhtaʾl-wujūdbi-sharṭshayʾcouldmean“existencequasomething.” ThetechnicalvocabularyusedhereisAkbarian(identities,names,immutability,selfhood),butthestructureintowhichQayṣarīputsthetermsisdifferent.InJandīorQūnawī,wecouldbecertainthatanysuchexpositionwouldbebasedonthevariouslevelsofidentificationstemmingfromthesupremenon-identification.InthepreviouschapterwesawhowKāshānīusedthissamelanguageofconditioningtodescribethenatureofsupremeexistence,buteventhereitwasintimatelytiedupwiththeconceptofidentification.Qayṣarī’smovementawayfromthattypicalAkbarianlanguageismorecomplete. Wenoticehereagaintheinseparabilityofepistemologyandontology.Ratherthandescribeaprocessofidentifications(taʿayyun)happeningtoexistencedetachedfromaknowingsubject,Qayṣarīadoptstheperspectiveofapercipientencounteringtheonerealityofexistenceindifferentways.Bymodulatinghisreasoningthroughvariousqualitativewaysofseeingexistence(quaimmutability,quaallthings,quaneithernothingnoranything,etc.),hereaffirmshisfundamentalprinciplethatexistenceisasinglerealitywhichisbrokenupintolevelsandkindsbyamentalactadequatedtoexistence’sself-disclosures. Qayṣarīalsotellsusinthispassage,innouncertainterms,thatphilosophers’uncoupledintellectisthesameastheSufis’spirit,theuncoupledsoultheheart,andsoonforotherterms.Otherdefinitionsofthesetermscanexist;forexamplelaterphilosophers

31Prolegomena,25-27.

109

wouldspeakonlyoftheintellect,thesoul,andthebody,wheretheintellectisbifurcatedintotwoconceptsotherwisereferredtoas“intellect”and“(uncoupled)soul,”andwhere“soul”referstotheanimicsubstancethatispartofspaceandtime.TheSufis,fortheirpart,canhardlybecalledconsistentintheirdescriptionofthehierarchyoflevelsofheart,intellect,spirit,etc.Thisdoesnotnegatethepointthattheunderlyingstructureisexactlythesame.Thatistosay,eveniftheterminologyshifts,theSufisandthephilosophersareabledescribethesamebasicontologicalhierarchy.Ifby“spirit”and“heart”Iamreferringtotwodimensionsofthesinglerealitythephilosopherscall“intellect,”thenitissimpleenoughtodescribethisfact,sinceitisenoughtosaythatthisthingisuncoupledfromeitherpsychicorbodilymatter,andthatthislevelofuncouplednessfurtherdividesintouniversalsandparticulars.Thetwodifferentconceptualhierarchiesdivideupthesamepieindifferentways.Theslicesarenotidentical,putwhenputtogetherthewholeis.Thereareotherexamplesofthisinterchangeabilityofterminology:

KnowthattheDivineNamespossessintelligibleformswithinGod’sKnowledge,becauseGodknowsHisEssenceforthesakeofHisEssence,andknowsHisNamesandQualities.Theseknowledge-forms,withrespecttobeingidenticalwiththeEssenceself-disclosedinacertainidentificationandspecificrelationship(nisbah),bearthenamefixedidentities.IntheterminologyoftheFolkofGod,theyaresonamedwhethertheyareuniversalorparticular.Amongthephilosophers,theuniversalsamongthemarecalledquiddities(māhiyyah),whiletheparticularsamongthemarecalledselfhoods(huwiyyah).ThequidditiesaretheuniversalformsoftheNames,formsidentifiedinthepresenceofKnowledge,thisbeingaprimaryidentification.32

ThisquotationappearsattheheadofQayṣarī’sthirdchapterintheMuqaddimāt,whichisdevotedtoanexplanationoftheimmutableidentities(al-aʿyānal-thābitah).AfterdescribingthemintheAkbariantermsofHolyEmanation(al-fayḍal-aqdas)andHoliestEmanation(al-fayḍal-muqaddas),hethenbeginstoexplainthenatureoftheidentitiesintermsofnecessity,contingency,andimpossibility.Thatistosay,hetreatsthemasthoughheweretalkingaboutquiddities,whichaccordingtohimheis:

With respect to thepossibilityor impossibilityof theirexistence in theexternalrealm, the identities can be divided into two groups. The first consists ofcontingent things, while the second consists of impossible things. This secondgroup can be further divided into two groups. The first consists solely ofpostulations made by the intellect, such as “God’s partner,” “the union ofcontradictories,”“thepresenceofoppositesinacertainsubstrateorlocus,”andsoforth. These are imaginary, resulting from an intellect polluted by imaginings.God has knowledge of this sub-division by virtue of His knowledge of theintellect, the imagination (wahm), and that which is a consequent of them—namely, the imagining of that which has neither existence nor identity. ThatintellectandimaginationshouldpostulatethemdoesnotoccurbyvirtueofthesenotionshavingessencesorformsofNamesintherealmofknowledge…. Thesecondconsistsof thosewhicharenotsimplypostulationsmadebythe intellect, and which are indeed fixed aspects of objective reality (al-amr fīnafsihi),existentintherealmofknowledge,entailedbytheEssenceoftheReal,

32Ibid.,45.

110

becausetheyareformsoftheNamesoftheUnseen,peculiartotheInwardwithrespect to itsbeing theoppositeof theOutward. TheInwardhasanaspect thatcomes together with the Outward, and an aspect that does not. The first is thedomainparticulartocontingentthings,whilethesecondisthedomainparticulartoimpossiblethings. OftheseNamestheShaykhsaid,“AsforthoseNamesfallingoutsideofthedomainofcreationandrelationships,noneknowthembutHe,becausetheyhavenoconnectionwithbeing(akwān).”TheProphetmadereferencetotheseNameswhenHesaid,“OrwhomThouhasttakenuntoThyselftoknowThineunseen.”SincetheseNamesintheiressenceyearnfortheinwardandfleetheoutward,theyhavenoexistencetherein.TheformsoftheseNamesareknowledge-existencesforwhichqualificationbyconcreteexistenceisimpossible.Theoreticalthinkersareunawareofthissub-division,fortheintellecthasnoaccesstoit.Thelikesoftheseideascanonlybeattainedfromthenicheofprophecyandsanctity,andfromfaithinbothofthem.33

ThusQayṣarīisusingthemodaldivisionofquiddities,butmodifiesittoincludeacategorythephilosophers(theoreticalthinkers,ahlal-naẓar)donot.Somethingwhichisimpossible-to-exist(mumtaniʿal-wujūd)isordinarilythoughtofasthatwhichislogicallyabsurd,suchastwoabsolutebeings,orasquarecircle.TheotherkindofimpossibilityQayṣarīispositingisnotlogicallyabsurdbutmetaphysicallyuntenable.Asquarecirclecouldneverberealatanylevelandhencecouldnotexist,becauseitisinherentlyabsurd,butwhatQayṣarīispointingtoisanessencewhichisperfectlyrealbutwhichdoesnotexistforus.Itisimportantthatitdoesnotexistintheexternalrealm(fīʾl-khārij),butexistsasaforminGod’sknowledge,whichistosay,itisawayinwhichGodhasknowledgeofoneofHisownqualitiesornames.Thereare,however,NamesofGodwhichonlyGodknowsandwhichnooneelsewilleverknow,inthesensethatGod’srelationshipwiththeworlddoesnotexhaustHisreality.“Metaphysicallyuntenable”heremeansthatitissimplynotthenatureofGodandofthisworldthatweshouldeverexperiencetheseNames. ItthusfollowsthatbecauseoftheiruniqueontologytheAkbariansalsomustinevitablymodifythelogicthatdevelopedinthecontextofPeripateticthought,whereunmanifestedNamesofGodwerenotpartofthesystemfordecidingwhatisnecessary,orcontingent,orimpossibleinitsexistence.Wearriveattheordinaryknowledgeoftheimpossibleinapositiveway;sinceweknowwhatacircleandsquareareandthatathingcannotbeboth,ourknowledgeofthisotherkindofthingwhichcannotexist(externally)comesvianegativaandthroughrevelation.Wedenythatitcanexistonthebasisofametaphysicalprinciplethattherearecertainmysterieswhichareunavailabletous.

Qayṣarīthenmovesontodividetheidentities,whichagainheistreatingasquiddities,intosubstanceandaccident.Heintroducesthediscussionhere,althoughhehasbeenmentioningsubstanceandattributethroughouthisdiscussionofexistence,andhewillinfactbedevotingthenextfullchaptertoadiscussionofthem:

Contingentidentitiescanbegroupedintosubstancesandaccidents.Thesubstantialidentitiesarealldependedupon,whiletheaccidentalidentitiesarealldependent.Thesubstancesconsistsofthosethataresimpleandspiritual,suchas

33Ibid.,45-6.

111

theuncoupledintellectsandsouls;thosethataresimpleandcorporeal,suchastheelements;thosethatarecompoundedintheintellectbutnotintheexternalrealm,suchasthesubstantialquidditiescomposedofgenusandspecies;thosethataresimpleintheexternalrealmbutnotintheintellect,suchassimplecorporealbodies;andthosethatarecompoundedinbothrealms,suchasthemembersofthethreekingdoms.Allsubstantialandaccidentalidentitiesarefurthergroupedintotheidentitiesofexaltedgenera,intermediategenera,andlowlygenera.Eachoftheseisdividedintospecies,thespeciesintoclassesandindividuals.34

Thisisfairlystandard,andcouldhaveappearedinmostbooksofphilosophyandtheology,atleastonceonegetspasttheuncoupledspirits.Typically,however,heextendsthediscussionofsubstancewhiletryingtoremainwithinthephilosophicallycoherentconceptofit.Hismodificationoftheideaofsubstanceisbased,again,onAkbarianontology:

Thosewhicharedependedonaresubstances,whilethosewhicharedependentareaccidents.Existencebringsbothtogether,sinceitisexistencethatself-disclosesintheformofeach.Substancesareunifiedintheveryquintessenceofsubstance,whichisasinglereality,alocusofmanifestationfortheDivineEssencewithrespecttoItsSelf-subsistence(qayyūmiyyah)anditsReality.Similarly,accidentsarelociofmanifestationfortheQualitiesthataredependentuponIt.NotethefactthattheEssenceisalwaysveiledbyQualities.Likewisesubstanceisalwaysenclosedbyaccidents.JustastheEssenceconsideredwiththeadjunctionofoneofItsQualitiesisaDivineName,bethatNameuniversalorparticular,sotoodoessubstance,whenconsideredwiththeadjunctionofauniversalmeaning,becomeauniquelocusofmanifestationforauniqueuniversalName,andisindeedidenticalwithit;withtheattributionofaparticularmeaningitbecomesaparticularsubstance,suchasanindividual.JustasthecomingtogetherofuniversalNamescanbegetotherNames,sotoocanthecomingtogetherofsimplesubstancesbegetothersubstancesthatarecompoundedofthem.JustassomeNamesencompassothers,sotoodosomesubstancesencompassothers.JustastheMothersoftheNamesarelimitedinnumber,sotooarethegeneraandspeciesofsubstanceslimitedinnumber.JustastheramificationsoftheNamesareinfinite,sotooareindividualsinfinite.IntheterminologyoftheFolkofGodthisrealityiscalledtheBreathoftheAll-Merciful(nafasal-Raḥmān)andUniversalHyle.ThatwhichisidentifiedbyitandbecomesexistentwecalltheDivineWords.…Substance,withrespecttoitsreality,isselfsamewiththerealitiesofsimpleandcompoundsubstances.Itistherealityofrealities.TheyalldescendfromtheWorldoftheEssence’sUnseentotheworldofthesensorial[and]witnessed.Itismanifestineachworldinawayappropriatetothatworld.35

Inanearlierchapter,QayṣarīprovidesawayoflookingattheNamesofGodwhich,whilenotdirectlyphilosophical,isneverthelessadmirablyclearinitspresentationofwhattheseNamesmeanfortheAkbarians.

34Ibid.,47.35Ibid.,57-8.

112

KnowthatbetweeneachpairofopposingNamesthereisanotherNamethatpossessesbothaspectsandisbegottenofthem.Itisanisthmus(barzakh)betweenthem.Thesameholdstrueforoppositequalities:betweenthemthereisaqualitythatpossessesbothaspectsandisbegottenofthem.WhenNamesareunitedwithoneanother,betheyoppositeornot,theybegetinfiniteNames,andeachoftheseNameshasalocusofmanifestationintheexistenceoftherealmofknowledgeandintheexistenceofidentities.36

Whilewecanspeakabouttheninety-ninenames,ortheSevenMothers,ortheFirst,Last,Inward,Outward,wearealwaysspeakingaboutafinitesetofnameswhicharesupposedtorepresentaSelfwhichisbothperfectlyoneandhasinfinitenamesandqualities.Qayṣarīthusspeaksaboutnames“begetting”names,notontologically,butthroughthesamementaloperationthatallowsustosaythatbetweenanytwopointsonalinethereisamidpoint,andbetweenthatmidpointandoneoftheendpointsthereisanothermidpoint,andsoonadinfinitum. Heextendsthisontologyofdivinenamesandqualitiestothephilosophicalnotionofsubstance.JustasallexistencesarereallyExistence,sotooareallsubstancestruly“Substance.”Qayṣarīreasonsthatwhatwecallsubstanceisreallyamanifestationofthedivinenameal-Qayyūm,theSelf-subsistent,thesamewayallmercyisreallyal-Raḥmān(theAll-Merciful),andalllifeisal-Ḥayy(theLiving).Thenotionthatthereareseparatesubstances—thisman,thattree—isjustasillusoryasthenotionthattherearemultipleandseparateexistences.Indeed,eachsubstancecanbeseenasthecombinationofothersubstances.Forexample,amountaincanbeseenasthecombinationofthestone,soil,plants,etc.whichmakeupthemountain.Itisnotthecasethatsubstancesarecombiningto“beget”othersubstances,sincethedistinctionbetweensubstancesisonlyperceptual,justasthecombinationofnamesisnotanobjectivejoiningbutaconceptualdevicetohelpidentifydifferentaspectsoftheoneEssence/Self. Ṣadrāwillspeakaboutsubstanceanditsrelationtodivinenamesinmuchthesameway,inasectionfromal-Shawāhidal-rubūbiyyahdevotedtocomparingsubstancesandGod’squalities:

There isnothing in theworld thatdoesnothave itsprinciple inGod. Anythingthathasa specificdefinition—namely these things in theworld—isconfined tothe ten categories [i.e., “substance” plus the nine kinds of attribute], since theyexistintheimage(ṣūrah)oftheirExistentiator. ThesubstanceoftheworldisanimageandlikenessoftheEssenceoftheExistentiator, as its accidents are of His Qualities: its time of His eternity; itslocationofHismounting theThrone; itsquantityof thenumber (ʿadad)ofHisNames;itsqualityofHisgood-pleasureandwrath;itspositionofHissubsisting(qiyām)inHisEssencewithHistwoHandsoutspread;itspossessionofHisbeingPossessorofDominion;itsrelationofHisdominicality(rubūbiyyah);itsactivityofHisexistentiation;and itspassivityofHisresponding to theonewhoasksofHim;andanalogouslyforthegenera,species,andindividualsofthecategories…. However,onemustconceiveofandbelieve inwhat is there in themostnobleandexaltedway,forHisEssence isof theutmostunityandmajesty. Heresembles nothing, and nothing resembles Him, not in any way. He is not a

36Ibid.,37.

113

substance. Otherwise He would have a quiddity and would participate in thecategory of substance, being distinguished by a specific difference, and HisEssencewouldbecompounded,whichisabsurd.HisEssenceisnotqualifiedbyanyqualitysuperimposedupon it,asyouhavecome toknow,soexaltedbeHeabovehavingquality(kayf),quantity,position,location,time,possession,activity,orpassivity.37

RecallthatQayṣarīwasveryclearinanearlierchapterthatGodisnotasubstance,eventhoughhethengoesontorelatesubstancetointrinsicaspectsofGod.Ṣadrāwilldothesame,andgoesevenfurtheranddelineateshoweachattributeofsubstance—usingtheestablishedAristoteliancategories—isamanifestationofadivinequality.Thequasi-illusorycharacterofthiscomparisonispresentinṢadrāaswell,sinceeventhoughsubstanceisliketheEssence/Self,andisamanifestationofit,“Heisnotasubstance.”Thesetwoperspectivescanonlyco-existbecauseofthefundamentalintersectionofepistemologyandontology.Wecansayapparentlycontradictorythingsbecauseourfirststatement,“Substance-attributeisamanifestationofEssence-quality,”ismadefromthepointofviewofduality,while“Godisneithersubstancenorattribute”ismadefromtheperspectiveofunity.ThisisofcourseonlyoneexampleofacomparisonbetweenQayṣarīandṢadrā.Afullanalysisofthesimilaritiesbetweenthetwoandtheextentofdirectinfluencewillhavetowaitforaseparatework.

* * *

Thischapterhadtwomaingoals.ThefirstwastoshowhowQayṣarī’smetaphysics,althoughessentiallythesameashispredecessors,wasasignificantstepforwardinjoiningthatmetaphysicstotheworldofphilosophyandtheologythroughasystematiclanguagebasedontheconceptofwujūdor“existence.”ThesecondwastoshowthatthissystematizationresultedinadoctrineoftheonenessofexistencewhichisidenticaltothelaterontologyofṢadrāinitsbasicdimensionsofoneness,fundamentality,andequivocality.AlthoughthephilosophicaldimensionofQayṣarī’swritingswasemphasizedhere,itisimportanttorememberthathiswritingsarenotdrylyconceptual.Rather,heisabletoshiftbetweenphilosophicallanguageandaddressingspiritualquestionssuchasdreaminterpretationandprayer,butallwithacoherencethatdemonstrateshismasterybothofphilosophyandmysticism,andhisskillinblurringthelinebetweenthemandviewingthemratherastwopolesofasinglecontinuum.

37al-Shawāhidal-rubūbiyyah,ed.Jalālal-DīnĀshtiyānī(Mashhad,1967),1:3:6.

114

ConcludingRemarks

Thisworkbeganwithadiscussionoftheboundariesbetweenmysticism,philosophy,andtheology.Ihavepositedtwobenchmarkthinkers,IbnʿArabīandMullāṢadrā,andhavearguedthatintheinterveningcenturiesthereisacontinuoustraditionofbothdoctrinallyarticulatemysticsandmysticallymindedphilosopherswhosecommonontologicalvisionallowsthemtobecalledtheschoolofwaḥdatal-wujūd. Throughoutthesechapterswehaveencounteredarecurringtheme,namelytheinterpenetrationofepistemologyandontologyamongsttheAkbariansastheygrapplewithontologicalideas.Therealdifferentiatingfactorbetweenmysticismandphilosophy,atleastasconceivedofbysome,isthequestionofknowledge:whatdoweknow,andhowdoweknowit?

ThefundamentalobjectionofGhazālītothephilosopherswashisdenialoftheirclaimknowcertainthingssolelythroughtheworkingsofhumanreason,whichisanotherwayofsayingthatwecannothaveknowledgeofthetruenatureofthingssimplybythinkingabouttheminacommonplacerationalway;somethingbeyondreason—thoughnotnecessarilycontrarytoit—isnecessary.YetitwasalsoGhazālīwhowasinstrumental,alongwithotherssuchasIbnSīnā,inensuringthevictoryofthePeripateticessence-existence/necessity-contingencymodelofdiscussingphilosophicalandtheologicalquestions.Moreover,Mishkātal-anwārsuggeststhathewasnotopposedtoakindof“emanationist”ontology,andtheIḥyāʾshowsclearlythathisviewsonhowhumanbeingscanknowGodareneitherAshʿaritenorPeripatetic,butSufi.TheIḥyāʾandtheMishkātal-anwārareverydifferentworks,however,andthelinksbetweenepistemologyandontologyandnotformalized.

IfwecanacceptthatIbnSīnāacknowledgedthevaliditySufismonitsownterms(thisisnotasettledquestion),thenwecanarguethatIbnSīnā’sviewsonepistemologyallowforatranscendentmodeofknowingthatisnotlimitedtothecombinationofrationalintuitionandsyllogism.Thatistosay,ifIbnSīnāacceptsratherthandebunksSufism,thegeneralabsenceofSufithinkinginhiswritingmightonlymeanthathewasnotapracticingSufiandthathemighthavebeenambivalentaboutsomeSufiknowledgeclaims.Itisdifficulttosaywhetherhewasambivalent,accepting,orsuspicious,butitisdoubtfulthathewasrejectionistwhenitcametoSufism(ormysticismingeneral).Thereissimplynoevidenceforitandmuchtosuggestotherwise.However,thereisnoevidencethattheepistemologyofmysticismhadanyformativeinfluenceonIbnSīnā’sontology.Rather,anyconnectiontomysticismwouldbeevidentmoreinethics,butaswesawinthefirstchapterIbnSīnādoesnotdiscussethicsextensivelyinanycase.

AlthoughthescopeofthisthesisdidnotallowforanextensivetreatmentofSuhrawardī,hisacknowledgementofmysticalmodesofknowledgecannotbedoubted,whichdoesnotnegatehisphilosophicalcredentials.Moreover,hisepistemologystronglyinformedhisontology,andsincehisepistemologyincludedamysticalelementhisontologyincorporatedanelementofillusion.Forhim,thetruenatureofthingswashiddenundertheirappearancesasitwasfortheSufis.TherearetwokeydifferencesbetweenhimandtheAkbarians,however.ThephilosophicalsystemputforthbySuhrawardīcreatesawholenewbodyoftechnicaltermsformedaroundlightanddarknessveryunlikethePeripatetic-theologicalconsensusprevalentatthetime,andseesitselfasacontinuationofapre-Islamicperennialtradition.TheIslamicrevelationisnot

115

denied,ofcourse,butilluminationistphilosophyishardlyrootedintheQurʾānandḥadīth.

Withthesequestionsinmind,IarguethatuniquetotheAkbariantraditionistheunionof(1)theIslamicrevelationandpersonalinspirationinthecontextofthatrevelation;(2)aconceptualvocabularywhichretains,inamodifiedform,theprevailingphilosophical-theologicallanguageofIslamicintellectuallife;and(3)anepistemologywhichjoinstogethertheinsightsgrantedthroughmystical“unveiling”—modesofknowledgebeyondreasonbasedonQuranicrevelation(waḥy)andpersonalinspiration(ilhām)—withanontologythatharmonizeswiththatepistemology.Thatistosay,theAkbariansjointogetherIslamic/orthodox,philosophical,andmysticalcredentials. ThedifferencesbetweenthisAkbariantraditionandPeripateticthoughthavebeendiscussedextensivelyintheprecedingchapters,andarebaseduponthePeripatetics’denialofaconcreteexistenceencompassingallexistences/existents,andtheAkbarians’assertionthatindividualexistencesareanillusionandthatthetruerealityisasingleexistence.Thisdimensionofillusion,absentinPeripateticthoughtinthesensethattheAkbariansbelievethattruerealityofthingsisaccessibleonlytoaselectfewwhoseconsciousnesshasdevelopedtothelevelofsainthood,becomespartandparcelofAkbarianontology.Moreover,eventhoughthePeripateticsdiscussprophecyandevenwrotecommentariesuponQurʾānicverses,theorthodoxcredentialsofthephilosopherswereweakandremainedsoafterGhazālī’sattackuponthem. TheAkbariansaresetapartfromIlluminationistphilosophyinbeingamanifestationofSufism,whoseindigenousidentityaspartofIslamicreligiouslifeenabledthemtoidentifywithasignificantsectorofIslamiccivilization,whereastheIlluminationistscouldonlybeseenasmembersofaphilosophicalelite.Althoughthephilosophicalandsystematizingdimensionhasbeenbroughtoutinthisthesis,oneshouldnotforgetthattheAkbarianwritings,fromIbnʿArabīthroughQayṣarī,arefilledthroughandthroughwithQurʾānicthemesandaconsciousself-identificationwiththeconcernsofSufis;thephilosophers(ḥukamāʾ)areatbestworthycolleaguesamongtheahlal-naẓar. Fortheirpart,thetheologianssharethesameconcernswhenitcomestoIslamicthemes,butkalāmisquitedifferentinitsintentionfromeitherSufimetaphysicsorphilosophy.Allpiouseuphemismsaside,kalāmbeginswithcertainpremisestobedefendedforthesakeofIslam,andisboundupwithpoliticalaswellas“pastoral”concernsforthegreatercommunity.ThevoluntarismandatomismofAshʿaritetheologyforexample,stemsfromasensibilitythatseekstopreservethewillandpowerofGodoverallthingsandtoremovetheroleofnaturalcauses.Byvocationandalmostbydefinitionthemutakallimlacksthephilosopher’sfreedomtodelveintofundamentalpremisesaboutthenatureofthings,eventhenatureofreligionandrevelation.ThereisanelementofdogmatismpeculiartokalāmwhichisnotpresentintheAkbarianwritings. “TheSchooloftheOnenessofBeing,”anamewhichderivesfromacertainkindofontology,alsorepresentsanewsynthesisofdisciplineswhichbegantheirlifeinIslamiccivilizationseparately.IsQayṣarīamutakallim?aSufi?aphilosopher?ThereisnodoubtthatheisaSufi.HeisnotamutakalliminthestrictsenseofbeingaconfessionalMāturīditeorAshʿarite,buthisdiscussionofthedivinenamesandqualities,prophecy,eschatology,andethicscoverallthesubjectsatheologianwouldaddress,andwithasimilarreligioussensibility.Heisnotaphilosopherinthesensethatheisneithera

116

Peripatetic,noranIlluminationist,butasIattemptedtoargueinthelastchapterheadaptedphilosophyinasystematicwaytohisepistemology.HislinktoMarāghahandhiseducationinphilosophyandmathematicsallowedhimtomovehisexpositionofmetaphysicsbeyondadhocassertionsusingphilosophicalideas. Threehundredyearslater,Ṣadrāwouldtakethissynthesismuchfarther,includinginhisvisionnotonlywhatQayṣarīsoughttobringtogether,butalsoIlluminationistphilosophyandancientGreekthought.ThepresentworkleavesoffwithQayṣarīasaturningpointintheunionofmysticismandphilosophy,butinordertoreachṢadrāanotherstoryneedstobetold:theadoptionbyphilosophersandtheologians,especiallyShīʿiteones,ofthemysticaldoctrinesoftheschoolofIbnʿArabī.Aswasmentionedintheintroduction,figuressuchasʿAllāmahal-HillīandIbnTurkahal-Iṣfahānīcarriedouttheirownbrandsofsythesisbetweendisciplines.Indeed,Ṣadrādidnotproducehisal-ḥikmahal-mutaʿāliyahinanintellectualvacuum;butadiscussionofthestepsleadinguptoitwillhavetowaitforanotherstudy.

117

BibliographyAddas,Claude.QuestfortheRedSulphur,Cambridge,1993.Ahsāʾī,MuḥammadibnAbīJumhūr.Kashfal-barāhīnfīsharḥrisālātZādal-musāfirīn.

Beirut,2002.Alper,Omer.“Gazālī’sviewofthePhilosophicalTradition:WasHeReallyAgainst

Philosophy?”İstanbulÜniversitesiIlāhiyatFakültesiDergisi,vol.4,87-107.d’Alverny,MarieThérèse.“Anniya-Anitas,”MélangesoffertsàEtienneGilson,Paris,

1959,59-91.AminRazavi,Mehdi.“TheSignificanceofSuhrawardī’sPersianSufiWritingsinthe

PhilosophyofIllumination,”TheLegacyofMediaevalPersianSufism,ed.LeonardLewisohn,London,1992,259-283.

Ansari,AbdulHaq.“TheDoctrineofDivineCommand:AStudyintheDevelopmentof

Ghazālī’sViewofReality,”IslamicStudiesvol.xxi(1982),1-47.Askar,Mustafa.MollaFenariveVahdet-ivucudanlayisi.Ankara,1993.Bayraktar,Mehmet.LaPhilosophiemystiquechezDawuddeKayseri,Ankara,1990.————.KayseriliDawud,Ankara,1988.————.(ed.)al-Rasaʾill-Dawudal-Qaysari.Kayseri,1997.————.“Davud-iKayseri.”IslamAnsiklopedisi.Burckhardt,Titus.IntroductiontoSufism.SanFrancisco,1995.————.TheWisdomoftheProphets(Fususal-Hikam),Gloucestershire,England,

1975.Burrell,David.“AvicennaandGreekPhilosophy,”Mélanges,v.17:53-66,1986.Chittick,WilliamC.TheSufiPathofKnowledge:Ibnal-ʿArabī’sMetaphysicsof

Imagination.Albany,1989.————.TheSelf-DisclosureofGod:PrinciplesofIbnal-ʿArabī’sCosmology.Albany,

1998.————.“Rūmīandwaḥdatal-wujūd.”PoetryandMysticisminIslam:TheHeritageof

Rūmī.AminBanani,RichardHovannisian,andGeorgesSabagh,eds.Cambridge,1994.

————.“IbnʿArabī.”HistoryofIslamicPhilosophy.SeyyedHosseinNasrandOliverLeaman,eds.London,1996,pp.497-509.

————.“TheSchoolofIbnʿArabī.”HistoryofIslamicPhilosophy.SeyyedHosseinNasrandOliverLeaman,eds.London,1996,pp.510-23.

————.ImaginalWorlds:IbnʿArabīandtheProblemofReligiousDiversity.Albany,1994.

118

————.“IbnʿArabīandhisSchool.”IslamicSpirituality:Manifestations.S.H.Nasr,ed.NewYork,1990,pp.49-79.

————.“TheFiveDivinePresences:Fromal-Qūnawītoal-Qayṣarī.”TheMuslimWorld72(1982),pp.107-128.

————.“TheLastWillandTestamentofIbnʿArabī’sForemostDiscipleandSomeNotesonitsAuthor,”SophiaPerennis,4:1(1978),43-58.

————.“TheCentralPoint:Qūnawī’sRoleintheSchoolofIbnʿArabī,”JournaloftheMuhyiddinIbnʿArabīSociety,xxxv(2004),25-45

————.“MysticismversusPhilosophyinEarlierIslamicHistory:Theal-Ṭūsī,al-QūnawīCorrespondence,”ReligiousStudies17:1(1981),87-104.

Chodkiewicz,Michel.AnOceanWithoutShore:IbnArabi,theBook,andtheLaw.

Albany,1993.————.TheSealoftheSaints.Cambridge,England,1993.————.TheSpiritualWritingsofAmirʿAbdal-Kader.Albany,1995.————.AnOceanWithoutShore:IbnʿArabī,theBook,andtheLaw,NewYork,

1993.Chodkiewicz,Michel,W.C.Chittick,CyrilleChodkiewicz,DenisGril,JamesW.Morris.

LesIlluminationsdeLaMecque/TheMeccanIlluminations:TextesChoisis/SelectedTexts.Paris,1988.

Corbin,Henry.CreativeImaginationintheSufismofIbnʿArabi.Princeton,1969.————.LeLivredespentrationsmetaphysiques.Tehran-Paris,1964.————.Terrecelesteetcorpsderesurrectiondʾapresquelquestraditionsiraniennes.

Paris,1961.————.“LaplacedeMollaSadradnaslaphilosophieiranienne.”StudiaIslamica,vol.

XVIII,pp.81-113.————.AvicennaandtheVisionaryRecital,NewYork,1960.Dagli,Caner.TheRingstonesofWisdom,Chicago,2004.Dalal,Ahmad.“GhazālīandthePerilsofInterpretation,”JOAS,122:4,773-787.Elmore,Gerald.“Sadral-Dīnal-Qūnawī’sPersonalStudyListofBooksbyIbnal-

Arabi,”JournalofNearEasternStudies,56:3(1997),161-181Fakhry,Majid.AHistoryofIslamicPhilosophy,NewYork1970.Farābī,AbūNaṣr.Kitābal-ḥurūf,ed.MuhsinMahdi,Beirut1970,71RichardFrank.al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,Durham,1994.————.“Theoriginofthephilosophicaltermanniyya”(MuséeLavigerieCahiersde

Byrsa6,Paris,1956,181-201).Gairdner,W.H.T.al-Ghazālī’sMishkātal-Anwār(“TheNicheforLights”),Lahore,1952

119

-----“al-Ghazālī’sMishkātal-AnwārandtheGhazālīProblem,”DerGhaẓalī,AbūḤāmid.TheIncoherenceofthePhilosophers.TranslatedbyM.Marmura.

Utah,1997————.DeliverancefromError,tr.RichardMcCarthy,Louisville,KY,1999.————.TheNicheofLights,ed.D.Buchman,Utah,1998,34————.Mishkātal-anwār,ed.Abū’l-ʿAlāʾʿAfīfī,Cairo,1964.————.Miʿyāral-ʿilmfīʾl-mantiq,Beirut,1964.————.Maqāṣidal-falāsifah,ed.SulaymānDunyā,Cairo,1960.Gianotti,Timothy.al-Ghazālī’sUnspeakableDoctrineoftheSoul:Unveilingthe

EsotericPsychologyoftheIḥyāʾ,Leiden,2001.Gilis,Charles-Andre.LeLivredesChatonsdesSagesses.Beirut,1997.Gutas,Dimitri.AvicennaandtheAristotelianTradition,Leiden,1988.————.“IbnṬufaylonIbnSīnā’sEasternPhilosophy,”Oriens,34:222-41.————.“Avicenna’sEastern(‘Oriental’)Philosophy.Nature,Contents,Transmission,”

ArabicSciencesandPhilosophy,vol.10:159-180.————.“TheHeritageofAvicenna:TheGoldenAgeofArabicPhilosophy,1000—ca.

1350,”inAvicennaandHisHeritageeditedbyJ.JanssensandD.DeSmet,Leuven,2002.

al-Ḥakīm,Suʿad.al-Muʿjamal-ṣūfī,Beirut,1981.ḤaydarĀmulī.Asrāral-sharīʿahwa-aṭwāral-ṭarīqahwa-anwāral-ḥaqīqah.Editedby

MuḥammadKhwājawī.Tehran,1982.————.InnerSecretsofthePath(Asraral-shariʿah,English).Translatedby

Assadullahal-DhakirYate.Shaftesbury,England,1989.————.Jamiʿal-asrarwamanbaʿal-anwar.EditedbyHenriCorbinandOsman

Yahya.Tehran,1969.————.Tafsiral-muhital-aʿzam.Editedbyal-SayyidMuḥsinal-Mūsawīal-Tabrīzī.

Tehran,1993.Heath,Peter.AllegoryandPhilosophyinAvicenna(IbnSīnā),Philadelphia,1992,151.Hertenstein,StephenandM.Tiernan(eds.)MuhyiddinIbnʿArabī:ACommemorative

Volume.Shaftesbury,1993.Ibnal-ʿArabi,Muyhiʾl-dinMuhammad.Fuṣūṣal-ḥikam,ed.byA.ʿAfīfī,Beirut,1946.————.al-Futūḥātal-Makkiyyah,ed.OsmanYahia,Cairo,1972—(incomplete);

Beirut:Daral-Fikr,1994.————.al-Tadbīrātal-ilāhiyyahfīiṣlāhal-mamlakahal-insāniyyah,ed.ḤasanʿĀsī,

Beirut,1993.IbnSīnā,AbūʿAlī.K.al-Shifāʾ,ed.IbrāhīmMadkūr,Cairo,1991.

120

————.al-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt,Qum,2002.Inati,S.C.RemarksandAdmonitions(al-Ishārātwaʾl-tanbīhāt),Toronto,1984.————.IbnSīnāandMysticism,London,1996.al-Iṣfahānī,ʿAlīibnMuḥammad(IbnTurkah).Tamhīdal-qawāʿid(Beirut,2003)Izutsu,Toshihiko.SufismandTaoism.LosAngeles,1983.————.TheConceptandRealityofExistence.Tokyo,1971.Janssens,Jules.“al-Ghazālī’sTahāfut:IsitreallyarejectionofIbnSīnā’sphilosophy?”

JournalofIslamicStudies,12(2001),1-17.al-Kāshānī,ʿAbdal-RazzāqibnMuḥammad.SharḥFuṣūṣal-ḥikam.Cairo,1966.————.Rashḥal-ẓulalfīsharḥal-alfāẓal-mutadāwilahbaynaarbābal-adhwāqwaʾl-

aḥwāl.EditedbySaʿīdʿAbdal-Fattāḥ.Cairo,1995.————.Sharḥmanāzilal-sāʾirīn.Beirut,1995.————.Kashfal-wujūhal-ghurrli-maʿānīnaẓmal-durr:sharḥTāʾiyyatIbnal-Fārid.

Tehran,1901or02.————.Sharḥfuṣūṣal-ḥikam.Cairo,1966.Keklik,Nihat.IslamDunyasindaTesevvufveFelsefeArasandakiHesaplaşmalar,

SadreddinKonavi-NasireddinṬūsīFelsefeleri,IstanbulÜniversitesiEdebiyatFakültesi,1962(DoctoralThesis).

Kilic,MahmudErol.“Fususuʾl-hikem,”IslamAnsiklopedisi.————“el-Futuhatuʾl-Mekkiyye,”IslamAnsiklopedisiKnysh,Alexander.IbnʿArabiintheLaterIslamicTradition.Albany,1999.Lory,Pierre.LescommentairesésotériquesduCorand’ápresʿAbdal-Razzāqal-

Qāshānī,Paris,1991.Marmura,M.“PlottingthecourseofAvicenna’sthought,”JOAS,111[1991].————.“GhazālīandDemonstrativeScience,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,

Oct1965,183-204.————.“Ghazālī’sAttitudetotheSecularSciencesandLogic,”EssaysinIslamic

PhilosophyandScience,ed.G.Hourani,Arberry1975.————.“GhazālīandAshʿarismrevisited,”ArabicSciencesandPhilosophy,vol.12

(2002),91-110.Mayer,Toby.“IbnSīnā’s‘Burhānal-ṣiddīqīn’,”JournalofIslamicStudies12:1(2001),

18-39.Morris,James.“IbnʿArabiandhisInterpreters.”JournaloftheAmericanOriental

Society106(1986),pp.539-51,733-56;107(1987),pp.101-19.

121

————.TheWisdomoftheThrone.Princeton,1981.Nasr,S.H.ThreeMuslimSages,chapter3.NewYork,1976.————.Ṣadral-DīnShīrāzīandHisTranscendentTheosophy.Tehran,1997.————.IslamicSpirituality:Manifestations(ed.S.H.Nasr,NewYork,NY,1991).Netton,RichardIan.“TheNeoplatonicSubstrateofSuhrawardī’sPhilosophyof

Illumination:FalsafaasṬasawwuf,”TheLegacyofMediaevalPersianSufism,ed.LeonardLewisohn,London,1992,247-260.

al-Qayṣarī,Dāwūd.Maṭlaʿkhuṣūṣal-kalimfīmaʿānīfuṣūṣal-ḥikam,ed.Muḥammad

Ḥasanal-Sāʿidī,Iran,1995.————.Sharḥ-ifuṣūṣal-ḥikam,ed.Jalālal-DīnĀshtiyānī,Tehran1996.al-Qūnawī,Ṣadral-DīnMuḥammadibnIsḥāq.Miftāḥal-ghayb.EditedbyMuḥammad

Khwājawī.Tehran,1995or96.————.Kitābsharḥal-ḥadīthal-arbaʿīnal-nabawī,Cairo,1906or07.————.MurāsalātbaynaṢadral-Dīnal-Qūnawīwa-Naṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī.Editedby

GudrunSchubert.Beirut,1995.————.Fukūkfīasrārmustanadātḥikamal-Fuṣūṣ.EditedwithPersiantranslationby

MuhammadKhwajawi.Tehran,1992.————. Iʿjāz al-bayān fī taʾwīl umm al-Qurʾān. Edited by ʿAbd al-Qādir

AḥmadʿAtāʾ.Cairo,1969.————.al-Nafaḥātal-ilāhiyyah(Persian).EditedandtranslatedbyMuḥammad

Khwājawī.Tehran,1996.Radtke,BerndandJohnO’Kane.TheConceptofSainthoodinEarlyIslamicMysticism:

TwoWorksbyal-Ḥakīmal-Tirmidhī,Richmond,Surrey,1996.Rahman,Fazlur.ThePhilosophyofMullaSadra.Albany,1976.Rosenthal,Franz.“IbnʿArabībetween‘Mysticism’and‘Philosophy’,”Oriens,vol.31

(1988),18-19.Schimmel,Annemarie.MysticalDimensionsofIslam,ChapelHill,1975.Schubert,Gudrun.Annäherungendermystisch-philosophischeBriefwechselzwischen

Sadrud-Dīn-iQonawiundNaṣīrud-Dīn-iṬūsī(al-MurasalatbaynaSadral-Dīnal-QūnawīwaNaṣīral-Dīnal-Ṭūsī),Beirut1995.

————.“TheTextualHistoryoftheCorrespondencebetweenSadral-DīnQūnawīandNaṣīral-DīnṬūsī,”ManuscriptsoftheMiddleEast,3(1998),73-78.

Sirriyeh,Elizabeth.SufiVisionaryofDamascus:ʿAbdal-Ghanīal-Nābulūsī,1641-1731,

NewYork,2004.

122

Tahrali,Mustafa.“MuhyiddinIbnArabiveTurkiye’yeTe’sirleri.”KubbealtiAkademi

Mecmuasi.23:1,pp.26-35.al-Tilimsānī,ʿAfīfal-DīnSulaymānibnʿAlī.Dīwān.EditedbyYusufZayd.Cairo

1989?.————.SharḥMawāqifal-Niffarī.EditedbyJamālal-Marzūqī,Cairo,1997.Valsan,M.“LecommentaireésotériqueduCoranparAbdu-r-Razzākal-Qāchānī,”

Etudestraditionelles,LXX(1969),255-64.vanderBergh,S.“Anniyyah,”EI2.vanEss,J.“DieTuḥfatul-ihwāndesʿAbdurrazzāq-iKāšānī,einFutuvatnāmader

Īlḫānidenzeit,”ẒafarNāme,MemorialVolumeofFelixTauer,ed.R.VeselyanE.Gombar,Pragne,1996,85-99.

vonSchlegell,Barbara.PrinciplesofSufism,trans.,Berkeley,1992.Walbridge,J.TheWisdomoftheMysticEast,“Ghazālī,theGhostatSuhrawardī’s

Feast.”NewYork,2001.————.TheLeavenoftheAncients:SuhrawardīandtheHeritageoftheGreeks,New

York,2000————.TheScienceofMysticLights,Cambridge,MA,1992.Watt,W.M.IslamicPhilosophyandTheology,Edingurgh,1985.————.“AForgeryinal-Ghazālī’sMishkāt?”JournaloftheRoyalAsiaticSociety,

1949,5-22Wisnovsky,R.Avicenna’sMetaphysicsinContext,London,2003.Ziai,H.andJ.Walbridge.ThePhilosophyofIllumination,Provo,Utah,1999.