Caffentzis - Oil, Islam & September 11 - An Essay Addressed to the Anti-Globalization Movement

8/12/2019 Caffentzis - Oil, Islam & September 11 - An Essay Addressed to the Anti-Globalization Movement

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Oil, Islam & September 11: An Essay Addressed to the Anti-Globalization MovementAuthor(s): George CaffentzisSource: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 29, No. 91, Sovereignty, Democracy &Zimbabwe's Tragedy (Mar., 2002), pp. 187-198Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006882Accessed: 08/10/2009 17:34

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ACAS Bulletin. It's About Oil 187iii) Transnational companies and theStates should respect the culture andtraditions of the local peoples whoselands they exploit.2. We demand that States should makeconscious and sincere effort to imple-ment the following international con-ventions concerning the rights of thelocal people:i) UN article (2) 1 concerning self-deter-mination;ii) ILO convention 169 concerning indig-enous and tribal people i.e. in inde-pendent countries;iii) Respect to UN 1977 declaration onthe rights of indigenous local people;(iv) UN article 3 on human rights;(v) African Charter article 24 on Humanand Peoples Rights;(vi) Article of the UN Convention onBiological Diversity. 2(b) Compensa-tion rates should be reviewed upwardstaking into account life span of thenatural resources, including economic

trees damaged and life expectancy ofbeneficiary.2c) There should be a moratorium on oiland other mining activities to deter-mine the level of damage to local andindigenous communities and theirnatural environment, as well as waysof remediation.2d) We demand transparency in alltransactions nvolving the World Bank/IMF and the States concerning allprojects in local communities. 3(i) As amatter of urgency all African Statesshould institute the necessary mecha-nism for the implementation of Agenda21 of the UN Rio Conference on Envi-ronmentand SustainableDevelopment.(ii) The participation of local communi-ties should be guaranteed by the Statein environmental protection and de-velopment processes that affects them.(iii) The State should ensure the restruc-turing of the judicial system to enablelocal communities to seek redress atthe law courts.(iv) All African States should guaranteethe protection of the rights of women

and children against dehumanisation,discrimination and exploitation bytransnational companies and state in-stitutions. Strategies 1. There shouldbe an alliance of oppressed local com-munities in Africa and elsewhere toaddress their concerns2. There should be exchanges of informa-tion, materials and experiences of localpopulations colonised by transnationalcompanies to enrich their struggle foremancipation3. NGOs, CBOs and other interest groupsshould support the activities of localcommunities fighting for their envi-ronmental and human rights.4. African States should organise na-tional or regional conferences of mi-norities as part of the process forself-determination.

Oil, Islam & September11:An EssayAddressed to theAnti-globalizationMove-mentGeorgeCaffentzis

I write this essay to participate in adiscussion within the anti-globalizationmovement on the events of September 11.I am anguished about the lives lost in thebombings of that day. I am also con-cerned about the scenario that is in frontof us:* Plans for massive bombings againstAfghanistan and protracted war-

fare against a list of countries (per-haps 60, according to PresidentBush) presumably supporting ter-rorism or lodging terrorists.* The escalation of xenophobia espe-cially against Arabs, but targeting


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188 Reviezw f African Political Economyall immigrants, and this not just inthe US.

* The demonization of the anti-glo-balization movement, accused ofbeing an enemy of "western civili-zation."

* New, widespread restrictions oncivil liberties.What can we do in this situation?Our first task is obviously to stop theescalation of violence, and mobilizeagainst a US-led war on Afghanistan orany other country the Bush administra-tion picks to be a target for its "war"on"terrorism."We also need to build soli-darity with the Arab and immigrantcommunities in the US now under attackphysically and ideologically.But these generalized responses, how-ever correct, are not enough. We mustgain a better understanding of what hashappened and why, since any confusionon this point can have the most seriousconsequences for the anti-globalizationmovement. For the Bush administrationis determined to use the hijackings andmass murders of September 11 as apolitical opportunity to transform thedefinition of dissent here in the US and toproject the US military into the oil-richformer republics of Soviet Central Asia.A purely generalized politics is doomedto taking a reactive stance in this histori-cal situation, even when the Bush admin-istration'scontradictions begin to unravelin the next few weeks.This essay is inevitably tentative andhypothetical, given our present lack ofprecise knowledge concerning the detailsof the crimes - even now, three weeksafterSeptember 11, there is public confu-sion as to the identities of some of theimmediate perpetrators.Also, my aim isclassification and explanation, but notvilification.

For the Bush administration s deter-mined to use the hijackings and massmurdersof September11 as a politicalopportunity o transform he definitionof dissent here in the US and to projectthe US militaryinto the oil-rich formerrepublicsof Soviet CentralAsia.The legal and moral facts are enough. Thekillings of September 11 constituted oneof the worst one-day massacresin the lastdecade, probably only those in the firstdays of the Rwandan genocide of theTutsis can rival it in terms of numbers.The thousands of murders are a majorcrime against humanity and, though theimmediate perpetrators are dead, theiraccomplices, if they had any, should becaptured and prosecuted in the appropri-ate courts without the US governmentcommitting similar crimes against thehumanity of other countries. That thislast proposition is a matterof controversyin the US at this moment shows howperilous are the times we are inOil, Globalization & IslamicFundamentalismOn a broad level, the events of September11, 2001 can be traced back to the eco-nomic, social, and cultural crisis that hasdeveloped in North Africa, the MiddleEast, and West Asia in the aftermath ofthe Gulf War and, prior to it, the acceler-ating process of globalization, starting inthe late 1970s.(1) The first aspect of thiscrisis has been the impoverishment ofurbanworkers and agriculturalistsin thisarea, due to Structural Adjustment Pro-grams (SAPs) and import liberalization,dating back to Egypt's "open door"policy that cost the life of Anwar Sadatand saw the emergence of Islamic funda-mentalism as a new political force.(2)From the Cairo "breadriots" of 1976, tothe uprisings in Morocco and Algeria of1988,both crushed in blood baths, to themore recent anti-IMFriots in Jordan (andthe list is much longer) the difficulties of


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ACAS Bulletin. It s About Oil 189merely staying alive has become moreand more dramatic for workers, causingmajor splits within the capitalist classesfrom Morocco to Pakistan as to how todeal with this rebellion from below (Mid-night Notes 1992). A further element ofcrisis has been the situation in Palestine.This, too, was made more intense by theGulf War and Israel's response to Pales-tiniandemands, namely moresettlements,the attempted usurpation of Jerusalem,and escalating repression. Regardless oftheir actual disposition towards the Pal-estinians, this situation has become acause of great embarrassment for theseruling classes, revealing, as it does, theirduplicity and the shallowness of theircommitment to Islamic solidarity.For at the moment, at least, our move-ment is the only one capable of leadingan escape from the hellish dialectic ofhomicide and suicide that the forces ofglobal capital and the perpetratorsof theSeptember 11 massacres have launchedinto oblivion.But the most importantfactor of crisis hasbeen the hegemonic role of the US in theregion, as exemplified by the devastationof Iraq, the US government's proprietaryrelationship to the management of oilresources in the Middle East, and thebuilding of US bases right in SaudiArabia, Islam's most sacred land. On allthese counts, deep divisions have devel-oped within these ruling classes pittingpro-American governments - often con-sisting of royal dynasties in the ArabianPeninsula - against a new generation ofdissidents within their own rankswho, inthe name of the Koran, have accusedthem of being corrupt,of squandering theregion's resources, of selling out to theUS, of having betrayed Islam, all thewhile offering an alternative "social con-tract" to the working classes of NorthAfrica, the Middle East and West Asiaand using their wealth to create a multi-national network of groups stretchingthrough every continent and often takingon a life of their own.

As a social program, Islamic fundamen-talism has distinguished itself, in addi-tion to its unmitigated bolstering ofpatriarchal rule, for its attempt to winover the urban populations through theprovision of some basic necessities suchas schooling, healthcare,and a minimumof social assistance.These initiatives wereundertaken often in response to the end-ing of government subsidies and pro-grams in these areas, which was dictatedby the Structural Adjustment Programsdesigned by the neoliberals in the WorldBank and IMF. Thus, for example, it is theIslamic fundamentalist networks that or-ganize health care and education in thePalestinian "territories,"almost function-ing as an alternative government to thePLO at the grassroots level.(3)Over the last decade as the crisis in theMiddle East and internationally has in-tensified, so has the antagonism of theIslamic fundamentalist networks againstthe US and its domestic supporters in thedifferent Islamic countries. But this con-flict has been stalemated in key countriesin the 1990s. In Algeria, for example, theIslamic Salvation Front, which grew rap-idly after the anti-SAP riots of 1988 andalmost took state power by election in1991,was stopped by a military coup. Forthe last decade, through a horrendouscivil war where between 60,000 and70,000 were killed, the Algerian Islamicfundamentalists have been decisivelyweakened by attrition and military re-pression. In Egypt, the Mubarak regimehas used direct repression as in Algeria,as well a system of microscopic socialsurveillance. For "the [Mubarak]govern-ment acted to stem the proliferation ofprivate mosques and associated charita-ble foundations and to end theirextragovernmental autonomy" (Faksh1997: 54). The result has been a majordefeat of fundamentalism in, perhaps, thesecond most importantIslamic state.Fundamentalists seizing state power inSudan and Afghanistan have not dra-matically reversed these setbacks, for in


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190 Reviezw f African Political Economyboth countries they inherited, and havenot been able to end, long-standing civilwars. Butstalematedoes not mean defeat,and there is no doubt that Islamic funda-mentalism continues to have an attrac-tion within the ruling circles of thewealthiest Islamic nations. This internalcontradictionhas created a tangled net ofconsequences, which are now embarrass-ing and endangering many people in theUS government and in the governmentsof the Middle East. For they have fi-nanced and trainedthe very generationofdissidents that is now so violently turn-ing against them. On the one side, aportion of the Middle Eastern oil rev-enues has been used to finance assaultson symbols of the New World Order,because of the divided loyalties of theMiddle Eastern ruling classes; on theother, the US government has financedand trained many members of this dissi-dent branch of the Middle Easternrulingclasses in its effort to destabilize theSoviet Union in Afghanistan.On the basis of this analysis, then, theSeptember 11 attacks on New York Cityand Washington, DC were the "collat-eral damage" of a struggle over the fateof oil politics in its heartland: the Ara-bian Peninsula.The governmental and informal financialand military support of armed Islamicfundamentalists did not end with theSoviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989.These militants played important eco-nomic, military and ideological roles thatforwarded US policy against Yugoslavia(in Bosnia and Kosovo) and against Rus-sia (in Chechnya, Dagestan, Uzbekistan)up until September 10, 2001. The dealapparently was: do the dirty work offighting and destabilizing secular com-munist, socialist and nationalist regimesin EasternEurope, Caucasia and CentralAsia and you will be rewarded. These"free floating" militants did the US'sdirty work for 20 years, but they obvi-ously increasingly were convinced thatthe US had not delivered. They were not

given their proper reward: taking powerat the center of the Islamic world, theArabian Peninsula.This complicity and deal-making is why,perhaps, the Bush administration is sohesitant to do what would be naturalafter such a massive intelligence andsecurity failure attested to by the Septem-ber 11crimes:get rid of the incompetents.That would be difficult, for many of thosewho have been brought backto power inGeorge W. Bush's administration werethe ones who were responsible, duringhis father's presidency, for the trainingand financing of the very organizationsthey now hunt under the banner of"terrorism."Therefore,the executive dy-nasties in both the US and Saudi Arabiamust both be worried about "familymembers" who have been compromisedby their past connections to the networksthey now claim are responsible for theevents of September 11. This goes up tothe President's family. For example, theWall Street Journal (9/28/01) reportedthat the President's father works for thebin Laden family business in Saudi Ara-bia through the Carlyle Group, an inter-national consulting firm, as do otherclose associates of the President likeformerSecretaryof StateJames Baker.The crude and desperate attempts byideologists of the Bush administrationtosomehow connect, in ever more arcaneways, the anti-globalization movementwith the Islamic fundamentalistsis fueledby a desire to distract public attentionand hide a real anxiety on its side whichis summed up in the question: when willthe long list of real connections betweenthe "terroristnetwork"the Bush adminis-tration is hunting and its own personnelbe revealed? That is why, perhaps, Presi-dent Bush harkened back to his child-hood memories of "Wanted Dead orAlive Posters" (with the emphasis on"Dead") when speaking of Osama binLadin and his associates. Forthe adminis-tration's legitimacy would be under-mined, if they ever spoke the truth.


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ACAS Bulletin: It's About Oil 191

Why Now? Why so Desperate?These generalized facts concerning thehidden civil war within the oil producingcountries from Algeria to Iran serve todescribe the context of the attacks on theWorld Trade Center and the Pentagon.For I am assuming that the immediateperpetrators of the attacks were commit-ted to some branchof Islamic fundamen-talism. But these facts do not help usunderstand why the attackstook place inSeptember 2001 and why the resistance tothe US took such a desperate form. Forthese attacks are symptoms of despera-tion not of power, as they will likely leadto a devastating US military responsewith predictable results: the destructionof thousands of Islamic fundamentalistmilitants along with tremendous collat-eraldamage on the people of Afghanistanand many other countries in North Af-rica, the Middle East and West Asia. Whoon the ground can survive in such amaelstrom? Indeed, the actual perpetra-tors and their accomplices, whoever theyare, must have been very desperate totake such a risk with their own networkand the lives of millions of people of theregion. It is also probable that many(perhaps most) people even in the mostmilitant Islamic fundamentalist circlesobject to the bombings in New York andWashington, DC, if not for moral, thensimply for strategicreasons, knowing fullwell that their hard-fought for achieve-ments might all go up in smoke as a resultthese actions.Clearly something very important was inprocess of occurring that the perpetratorsof September 11 needed desperate andinherently uncertain measures to thwart.Whatwas it? Ifmy hypothesis is right, thesource of this desperation are events atthe geographical center of Islam, SaudiArabia, which echoed throughout theIslamic world. My view is that the politi-cal factors motivating the mass murderand suicides of September 11 involvedthe oil industry and globalization in theArabianPeninsula. Here is the story.

Beginning in 1998(afterthe collapse of oilprices due to the Asian Financial Crisis),the Saudi monarchy decided, for "strate-gic reasons," to globalize its economyand society beginning with the oil sector.The oil industry had been nationalizedsince 1975, which means that foreigninvestors were allowed to participateonly in "downstream" operations likerefining.But in September 1998 Crown PrinceAbdullah met in Washington, DC withsenior executives from several oil compa-nies. According to Gawdat Bahget, "TheCrown Prince asked the oil companies'executives to submit directly to himrecommendations and suggestions aboutthe role their companies could play in theexploration and development of bothexisting and new oil and gas fields"(Bahget 2001:5).These"recommendationsand suggestions" were then submitted tothe Supreme Council for Petroleum andMineral Affairs in early 2000 (afterbeingvetted by the Crown Prince),and, by mid2000, the Saudi government began torespond cautiously by ratifying a newforeign investment law. Under the newlaw, "taxholidays are abolished in favorof sweeping reductions in tax on profitspayable by foreign entities,bringing themnearer to levels that apply to local compa-nies.Wholly owned foreign businesses willhave the right to own land, sponsor theirown employees and benefit from conces-sionary loans previously available onlyto Saudi companies" (Bahgat 2001:6, myemphasis) (NB: it is obvious why "theright to own land"would be a red flag foranyone committed to the sacred characterof the Arabian Peninsula.) The MiddleEasternexperts were literally falling overthemselves in their effort to highlight thenew Investment Regulation. One de-scribed it in the following words, "Keepyour fingers crossed, but it looks as ifSaudi Arabia is abandoning almost 70years of restrictive,even unfriendly policytoward foreign investment" (MacKinnon


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192 Reviezw f African Political Economy2000). This law constituted, in effect, aNAFTA-likeagreementbetween the Saudimonarch and the US and European oilcompanies.At the same time as this law was beingdiscussed, a ministerial committee an-nounced that up to $500 billion of newinvestments would be deployed over thenext decade to change the form of theSaudi national economy. Foreignoil com-panies had already promised $100billionof this investment. InMay of 2001 the firstconcrete step in this stepped up globali-zation process was concluded whenExxon/Mobil and Royal Dutch/ShellGroup led eight other foreign companies(including Conoco and Enron from theUS) to take on a $25 billion natural gasdevelopment projectin Saudi Arabia. Thefinancialpress noted that the deal wouldnot be very lucrative in itself, but that

It's part of a long-term ploy of the oilcompanies, [which] want ultimately toget access again to Saudi crude (LATimes,5/19/2001).

Thus, by the summer of 2001, the Saudimonarchy cast the die and then legally,socially and economically entered theRubicon of globalization (but with its"fingers crossed," undoubtedly). It "glo-balized" not because the Saudi Arabiandebt was unmanageable (as was the casewith most other countries thatbent to theglobalizing dictates of the IMF) but be-cause, faced with intensifying opposition,the King and his circle realized that onlywith the full backing of the US andEuropean Union could they hope topreserve theirrule in the coming years. Inother words, confronted with significantsocial problems and an insurrectionalelement within its own class that couldnot be defeated by open confrontation,since it took on the garb of Islam too, theSaudiArabiangovernment seems to havedecided that a rehaul of its economywould defeat its dangerous oppositionthrough attrition and would further so-lidify its alliance with US and European

capital. The strategy was aimed at reduc-ing the large and growing unemploy-ment rate among its young citizens, itsdependence on oil exports, and its hugeforeign labor force (in 1993 therewere 4.6million foreign workers out of a totalpopulation of 14.6 million; today they areapproximately 6-7 million in a popula-tion of about 22-23 million) by "gettingthe economy moving again."(4) This re-quired a radical departure from theclientelistic methods of social control theSaudi monarchy had used in the past tokeep social peace, which was made possi-ble until recently by its immense oilwealth. But this wealth is not infinite andindeed was declining on a per capitabasis - for example, GNP per capital fellfrom approximately $13,000 to $8,000from 1983 to 1993 and has since contin-ued to fall (Cordesman 1997:64).Inevita-bly, this initiative would impact theeconomic policies of the other oil produc-ing governments in the region, especiallythe Gulf Cooperation Council states -Oman, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain,and Kuwait.It is now a foregone conclusion thatanyone interested in understanding Af-ghan-centered aspects of the Bush ad-ministration will have to take intoaccount the "oil factor."If it works, this strategy would deal adecisive blow to the Islamist opposition,undermining its ability to recruit con-verts who would be employed in theupper echelons of a "globalized economyand society" instead of being driven todespair by political powerlessness andlong periods of unemployment. But theintroduction of foreign ownership of landand naturalresources,backed up by largeinvestments, and the hiring of moreexpatriates from Europe and the US,would force a major social change.(5)Thecat-and-mouse game that the Saudi mon-archy had played with the fundamental-ist dissidents (by which the King and hisdynasty claimed to be even more funda-mentalist than them) would end. What-ever hopes the Islamic opposition in the


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ACASBulletin:t's AboutOil 193ruling classes of the Arabian Peninsulahad ever harbored of getting their gov-ernments to send the American troopspacking and turning their oil revenuesinto the economic engine of a resurgentIslam were facing a historic crisis in thesummer of 2001. Without a major re-versal, the Islamic fundamentalist oppo-sition would have to face the prospect ofa total civil war in their own countries orfaceextinction.Certainelements- whetherthey were individuals or groups, I cannotknow now - of this opposition decidedthat only a spectacular action like theSeptember 11 hijackings and destructionof thousands of people in New York andWashington could turn back the tide.Perhaps they hoped that if enough tur-moil and uncertaintycan be generatedbythe attacksin the US, they would generatea strategic US retreat from the ArabianPeninsula, just as the bombing in Leba-non in 1983 led to the US pull out there.On the basis of this analysis, then, theSeptember 11 attacks on New York Cityand Washington, DC were the "collateraldamage" of a struggle over the fate of oilpolitics in its heartland: the ArabianPeninsula. Moreover, in order to test thishypothesis in the coming weeks weshould investigate the developments inthe Peninsula, which will undoubtedly behidden from sight, more than the soundand fury that will be directed towardsAfghanistan for more obvious reasons.The Bush Reaction:A "War' on"Terrorism"& US MilitaryPenetrationof CentralAsiaIt is important that we understand thepolitical and economic aims of the hijack-ers and their accomplices, but it will beeven more important for us to be clearabout the Bush administration's agenda.For one need not indulge in conspiracytheories to recognize that the Bush ad-ministration will use the events of Sep-tember 11 as best as it can to forward itsprogram (while acknowledging that theshock of the destruction of lives and

property on that day has profoundlydestablized President Bush's domesticeconomic and social agenda).There are two clear territorieswhich theBushadministrationhas strategicallyusedthe death and destruction of September11 to move on: a conceptual restructuringof the political horizon and a geopoliticalthrust into the former Central Asianrepublics of the USSR that became nationstates in 1991. These states, especiallyKazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turk-menistan, have significant oil and gasreserves. "The proven and possible en-ergy reserves in or adjacent to the Cas-pian region - including at least 115billionbarrels of oil - are in fact many timesgreater than those of the North Sea andshould increase significantly with con-tinuing exploration. Such plentiful re-sources could generate huge returns forUS companies and their shareholders.American firms have already acquired 75percent of Kazakhstan'smammoth Tengizoil field, which is now valued at morethan $10billion" (Kalicki2001:121).Thesecountries, along with the former andpresent Caucasian republics, form thesouthern border of Russia's "NearAbroad," which the US has been aimingto penetrate militarily for some time bothfor immediate economic purposes andfor the ultimate goal of disintegratingRussia itself into a set of pliable statelets.Theminute PresidentBushnamed Osamabin Ladin as "the prime suspect" and"his" camps in Afghanistan as the train-ing ground for the terrorists that de-stroyed the Twin Towers, everydiplomatic move aimed at setting upforwardmilitarybases and fly-over rightsto attack bin Ladin also doubles as a toolfor the US military occupation of CentralAsia itself. After all, we are being toldequivocally by the administration boththatbin Ladin is the center of the evil andthat even his capture ("Dead or alive")will not end the threat of terrorismfromthat quarter.Therefore,the military cam-paign against both bin Ladin and terror-


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194 Reviewo f African Political Economyism (we are assured) will be quite pru-dential and take months, even years toaccomplish. Perhaps the most damagingthing that might happen to this double-edged US government campaign wouldbe for bin Ladin and his circle to departfrom the scene while leaving behind awell-documented history of their involve-ment with the US government over thelast 20 yearsThe recognition that this US war againstOsama bin Ladin and his supporters inthe Taliban government is also a way torealize one of the main post-Communistgoals of US foreign policy was immedi-ately apparent to analysts of the oilindustry and critics of the NATO war inYugoslavia after September 11. The read-ing of the Bush administration's moves asthe new "GreatGame," a.k.a. "the war foroil and destabilization in Central Asia",was easily documented because much ofthe relevant material required for thisinterpretation had been researched in1999 when many were trying to under-stand the motives of the Clinton adminis-tration's involvement in the war againstYugoslavia above and beyond its ostenta-tiously decried (and newly found) con-cern for Kosovars' human rights (cf. forexample, Chossudovsky 2001, Federiciand Caffentzis 2000, Talbot 2000). Itbecame clear then that one of the reasonsthe US attacked Yugoslavia (one of thefew remaining Russian allies in Europe)was to impress on the Russiansthat it willuse all of its might to discourage themfrom interfering with its investments inCaucasia and Central Asia.It is now a foregone conclusion thatanyone interested in understanding Af-ghan-centeredaspects of the Bush admin-istration will have to take into accountthe "oil factor" (especially given thedirect involvement of many members ofthe Bush administrationin the oil compa-nies that are heavily invested in thisarea.)

The events of September 11 and theirconsequences have been a tremendousblow against the anti-globalization move-ment, since it has given the governmentsall over the planet the opportunity toclose public spaces and to repress dis-sent from whatever source in the inter-ests of "public safety."This is not to say that this geopoliticalthrust into Central Asia was high up onthe Bush administration'sagenda priortoSeptember 11. The expansion of drillingrights within the US was one of its firstoil-related initiatives and preoccupied itthroughout the summer of 2001. Indeed,JanKalicki,a "point man" in the Clintonadministration on CentralAsian oil, wrotean article for the September/October2001 Foreign Affairs complaining aboutBush's back sliding in CentralAsia. Afterdetailing the Clinton administration'sac-complishments, he fretted that they

are nowvat risk of unraveling due toinadequate attention from the Bushadministration and restrictive US poll-cies. In contrast to the Clinton adminis-trat on's vigorous support of Caspianenergy initiatives, the Bush team seemsto have placed those issues on the backburner (Kalicki2001. 130).

Kalickiended his article with the follow-ing words: "For the US to squander itspast success and future potential in theregion through complacency and inatten-tion would be a serious mistake." He isundoubtedly now pleased by the swiftend of Bush's "complacencyand inatten-tion" to Central Asia after September 11and welcomes a return to oil business asusual there.

Looking Back CarefullyThe events of September 11 and theirconsequences have been a tremendousblow against the anti-globalization move-ment, since it has given the governmentsall over the planet the opportunity toclose public spaces and to repress dissent


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ACAS IBulletin: t's About Oil 195from whatever source in the interests of"public safety."In order to regain the initiative we mustunderstand our situation: the anti-glo-balization movement is in a struggleagainst both the supra-national agenciesof globalization, which are now drapingthemselves in US flags, and the dissidentrulers-in-the-wings of the Middle East,who drape themselves in Islamic flagsand want a better world-class deal forthemselves and their "followers." Tobegin to move again we must free our-selves to resee our own past in order tounderstand our future in this context. Letus remember our own story. FromSeattlein November 1999 to Genoa in July 2001,the anti-globalization movement ex-pressed in the FirstWorldthe recognitionthat the supranational agencies (IMF,World Bank,WTO, G8) which claimed todeal with the economic and politicalproblems of humanity are illegitimate ontwo counts: (a) they have failed to solvethese problems (e.g., the Third Worlddebt has increased dramaticallysince theDebt Crisis of the early 1980s) and (b)they have no democraticresponsibility tohumanity (e.g., the IMFand World Bankare largely controlled by their largestshareholders: the US, Japan and the EUcountries). The anti-globalization move-ment which had started in the mid-1980swith the resistance against structuraladjustment in the countries of the ThirdWorld had finally surfaced in the streetsof the First.(6)But that was the problem: though theanti-globalization movement was able toblock or disrupt their meetings, thesupranational agencies stonewalled themovement's positive demands. Neithermassive debt cancellation,nor fairertradeprovisions nor a "Marshall Plan for theWorld" nor the abolition of the WorldBankand IMFwere launched in responseto the movement's efforts (whatever thedebates within the movement about theeffectiveness of these demands). On thecontrary, the economic and political cri-

ses caused by globalization have intensi-fied in the last two years. Moreover, theofficial response to the movement hasbecome increasingly violent and repres-sive. This violence reached a climax inGenoa in July with the police's shootingof Carlo Guiliani, their maiming andtorture of hundreds of protesters, andtheir beating of thousands of others.Therewere, however, not only two forcesin confrontation in 2001 - the circle ofglobalizing capitalists and the anti-glo-balization movement consisting of thou-sands of peasant, worker, feminist,environmental and human rights groupsacross the planet - there was a third: themilitary Islamic fundamentalist, repre-senting with arms the political demandsof the dissident members of the Islamicruling class This group was and is com-mitted to mortal violence, patriarchyandreassertion of the Islamic ruling class'scontrol of the energy resources of theirregion from Algeria to Indonesia againstthe claims of the transnational oil compa-nies. It stepped into the vacuum ofdespair the stalemate between the anti-globalization and the supranationalagen-cies of globalization inevitably generated,driven by its own crisis as outline above.The power of the anti-globalizationmovement is in its potential to build areal, not simply ideological, politicalstruggle of the world's working peopleagainst the plans of globalizing capital-ism.On the basis of looking back carefully,then, I conclude that we in the anti-globalization movement must not becaught between the huge bombs of Bushand the smaller bombs of Islamic funda-mentalism or be the grass trampled bythe lopsided struggle between the giantand the small elephants. For at themoment, at least, our movement is theonly one capable of leading an escapefrom the hellish dialectic of homicide andsuicide that the forces of global capitaland the perpetratorsof the September 11


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196 Review of African Political Economymassacres have launched into oblivion.Looking ForwardAccording to my hypothesis, then, notonly have thousands of people in NYCand Washington, DC been killed aspawnsin a power struggle in the ongoing "oilwars" of the Middle East, the attack onthe WorldTrade Center and the Pentagonhas brought us back to the politicalstructure that prevailed during the ColdWar;that is, a structure where we in theanti-globalizationmovement have to con-front both sides, since neither side repre-sents the interests of working people inany partof the world. The IslamicFunda-mentalists' misogynous treatment ofwomen - culminating with the politics ofopen enslavement embraced by theTaliban - the autocratic way in whichSharia Law has been imposed on manyunwilling citizens; the atrocity of thepunishments inflicted on those who breakit (including capitalpunishment);and thechauvinistic brand of Islam imposed atall social levels by self-proclaimed Is-lamic fundamentalist governments likeSudan's and Afghanistan's - all speakunequivocally on this point. In this con-text, the priority of the anti-globalizationmovement is to offer an anti-war, anti-patriarchalalternativeto the deadly poli-tics of the fundamentalists and theirglobalizing adversaries by showing thatwe can address the issues that have leadto this situation:* Control of natural resources. Whyshould the US and Europe claimpossession of the world's resourcesas if they were their birthright?How can the population of NorthAmerica and Europecontinue to beblind to the social cost of the oilthey put in their cars, and theeconomic and social inequities builtupon it?* The construction of a Palestinianhomeland. For how long will gen-erations of Palestinians have to

grow up in refugee camps withnothing to hope for and the burn-ing, unquenchable anger of theterrible injustice done to them - aninjusticereaffirmed with every newIsraeli settlement in what was oncetheir land?The politics of WBIIMF. Can weafford a globalization program thatreduces the people of vast regionsto refugees, paupers, and immi-grants? Can we allow a worldwhere the majority are displacedfrom their lands, their basic meansof survival, and are forced to mi-grate across the world in a newDiaspora resembling the slavetrade?

Further, it is crucial that the anti-globali-zation movement begin to build a con-nection with the Middle East - byaddressing its more urgent demands. Forit is plausible that had this process beenmore advanced it would been far moredifficult for the perpetrators of the Sep-tember 11 massacre to portray all thepeople in the US as enemies of Islam, andby the same token it would be moredifficult now for the US government tocontemplate indiscriminate bomb attackson nations in North Africa, the MiddleEast and West Asia. This making ofconnections will present many difficul-ties, logistic and otherwise;but a startingpoint is to make a connection with theimmigrant Middle Eastern and WestAsian communities in our own countries.The crucialpoint is to avoid the situationthat prevailed during the Cold War,when for half a century the Russianworking class and the workers of NorthAmerica and Europe had nearly no con-tact, except sporadically, through themediation of communist parties with theresult that by the 1990s, even the seem-ingly most militant among the SovietUnion's workers- the miners - could befooled by "experts" from the AFL-CIOinto accepting privatization,as happenedin the last days of the Soviet Union.


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ACAS Bulletin. It's About Ol 197Thepower of the anti-globalization move-ment is in its potential to build a real, notsimply ideological, political struggle ofthe world's working people against theplans of globalizing capitalism. Farmersfrom India, trade unionists from Canada,students from Europe marched, talkedand organized together in the great anti-globalization events of the last two years.This increasing unification of peopleacross barriers of all kinds: geographical,religious, gender, political - has chal-lenged the agendas of both the Islamicfundamentalists and the capitalistglobalizers. The suicidal attack on Wash-ington and New York and the Bushadministration'sresponse, therefore, alsoareattackson the anti-globalization move-ment because they both are calculated tobring increasing divisiveness and despairwithin a planetaryworking class that wasbeginning to see, articulated in bothwords and images, an alternative non-violent, non-chauvinist, non-racist, andnon-sexist reality taking shape. It is cru-cial that we do not let the war drums andincreasing restrictions on civil libertiesand the freedom to move across borderssucceed in erasing the movement's or-ganizing achievements.Notes1)Therehavebeenmanyproblems n describingthe unbroken succession of nations states that,according to naive political geography, beginswith Morocco nthewest andendswithPakistanin the east. It is not Arab, but is it Islamic?Doesn't such a description succumb toorientalism? After all, we do not describe thearc of nations from Chile to Russia throughIreland and Iceland as "Christendom,"eventhough thedominantreligiousaffiliationof theirpopulations (if they have any) is some brand ofChristianity. But if not Arab and not Islamic,then what? I have chosen as nominalist a pathaspossiblein thisessay, with the fullrecognitionof its problems.2) Again, a definitional problem rears its head:what is Islamic fundamentalism? Given thatthere aremanygroups andmovementsclaimingtobe Islamicfundamentalistsorbeing describedas Islamic fundamentalists, the definitionaleffort is difficult.Forthepurposes of ideologicalcategorization, heIslamicfundamentalistsseek

to establish an Islamic state, which is to bemodeled on the way of life of the early Muslimcommunity. Of course, we must rememberMarx's old consumer advice: be wary of thewords of the tailor who is trying to sell you acoat For an excellent analysis of Islamicfundamentalismand itspolitical andideologicallimitations see (Faksh1997).3) For the role of Hamas, the major IslamicFundamentalist organization in Palestine, insocial reproduction see (Nusse 1998).4) For a trenchantdescription of the crisis thelong-term social, demographic and economictrends forebode for the Saudi monarchy,published on the eve of the decision to goforward on the path of globalization, see(Cordesman 1997:47-76).5) A littlenoticed development in Saudi Arabiamight indicatethesurprising angentsproducedby the new legislation. In November of 2000,two car bombings in Riyadh left one Britishman dead and five other foreigners injured.Was it the result of Islamic dissident action?Perhaps that was the first reaction, but inFebruary of 2001 Bill Sampson, a Canadian,confessed to the crime along with AlexanderMitchell,a Briton,and RafSchyvens, a Belgian.The Saudi government claimed that the threemurdered and maimed theirvictims as part ofa turf war over the country's illegal alcoholtrade.Whatever the truthof this accusation, thealcohol business in Saudi Arabia is a verylucrative one - "alitrebottle of locally brewedwine or beer costs $60, a case of Budweiser$259,and abottle ofJohnny WalkerBlackLabelScotchgoes for $225"(Fennelland Snider2001:18) - and will get more lucrative now that thenew Investment Regulation has given foreigncompanies headquartered in non-Islamiccountries a green light to bring in their ownemiployees.6) For a discussion of the slow growth of theanti-globalization movement from the ThirdWorld to the First, see the "Introduction"of(Midnight Notes 2001).

BibliographyBahgat,Gawdat 2001.'ManagingDependence:American-Saudi Oil Relations'. Arab StudiesQuarterly,Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 1-14.Chossudovsky, Michel 2001.'Who is Ousmanabin Ladin?'posted athttp: /globalresearch.caarticles/CHO109C.htmlCordesman, Anthony H. 1997. Saudi Arabia.Guarding the Desert Kingdom. Boulder, CO:Westview Press.


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198 Retviewof African Political EconomyFaksh, Mahmud A. 1997. TheFutureof IslamhitheMiddleEast.Fundamentalismn Egypt,Algerza,and SaudiArabia.Westport, CT:Praeger.Federici, Silvia & Caffentzis, George 2000.'War and Globalization in Yugoslavia.' RadicalPhilosophyReview,Vol. 2, No. 1.Fennell, Tom & Snider, Michael 2001. Prisonerof Riyadh. Maclean's, 6/25/2001, Vol. 114,26.MacKinnon, Colin 2000. 'Saudi Arabia: MajorChange in Investment Climate'. WashingtonReportonMiddleEastAffairs,Vol. 19, Issue 6, p.72-73.Midnight Notes 1992. Midnight Oil. Work,Energy, War, 1973-1992. New York: Auto-nomedia; 2001. Aurorasof the Zapatistass:ocaland GlobalStruggles in the Fourth World War.New York:Autonomedia.Nusse, Andrea 1998. Muslim Palestine. TheIdeology of Hamas. Amsterdam: HarwoodAcademic Publishers.Talbot, Karen 2000. 'Chechnya:More Blood forOil'.Covert Action Quarterly, 69.Posted as:http:/ /www.covertaction.org/full-text_69_03.htm

Algeria: Contested &EmbattledMeredeth TurshenA decade of violence and news ofbloody massacres have replaced thepositive images of Algeria - the FLN'ssuccessful fight to liberate the countryfrom French colonialism, which wascaptured for many of us in Pontecorvo'sfilm, TheBattle ofAlgiers;the pioneeringwritings of Frantz Fanon based on hisAlgerian experience; and Algeria's lead-ership (with Cuba) of the Group of 77,which launched the New InternationalEconomic Order in 1974 and called forself-reliant national developmentgrounded in a strategy of collectiveThird World action.Violent attacks began after the FLN-ledgovernment cancelled the second roundof national elections in December 1991,which the FIS (the Islamic SalvationFront) was likely to win. At first, thetargets were single intellectuals, profes-sionals, bureaucrats, journalists, foreign-ers, army recruits, and nonconformingwomen; later, whole neighborhoods ofmen, women, and children were massa-cred.According to some estimates, as many as100,000 people were killed. The questionsome are asking is, killed by whom? Andjust when it seemed that the violence wassubsiding, new fighting erupted, thistimebetween the militaryand the Berbers,who account for 15-20%of the popula-tion. In April angry high school studentsrioted in the densely settled mountaintowns of Kabylia east of Algiers, wherethe Berbers are concentrated. Repressedby government forces, the unrest leftaround 50 dead. In May peaceful demon-strations organized by arch (tribal) andvillage committees alternatedwith deadlypolice confrontations in the streets ofTizi-Ouzou, the regional capital, and

Caffentzis - Oil, Islam & September 11 - An Essay Addressed to the Anti-Globalization Movement

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