Caesar 17 - Differences of Soviet Leaders

8/4/2019 Caesar 17 - Differences of Soviet Leaders

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Assistant DirectorOffice of Current Intelligenc

APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JUN 2007

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STUDYDIFFERENCES IN TEMPERAMENT AMONG SOVIET LEADERSAS SHOWN BY THEIR APPROACH TO POLICY ISSUES

1945 - 1957(Reference title: CAESAR 1-57]

5 - 1OFFICE OF CTJRRENT INTELLIGENCE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.. . .

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

18. Anti-Semitism and Great Russiani

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. F o r e w o r d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . , . . . . , .,Summary ..............................................

/ .Disputes During Stalin's'Lifetime...................1.. Varga .......................................2. Strippi,ng...................................3. Marshall Plan Participation.. .......... :... .4. Voznesensky ................................5. Link vs. Brigade...........................6. A g r o g o r o d a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7. East Germany ...............................

Dispute in the Post-Stalin Period...................8.9. Virgin Lands Progr m.......,.,.............10. Nuclear Warfare ............................11. China...........................,..........

Consumer Goods Program - 1954... ...........

12. Economic Aid to China..... .................13. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries............14. Relaxation of International Tension - 1955.15.16. 20th Party Congress. ......................17. Stalinism vs. The Thaw - 1956... ...........

Relaxation in Eastern Europe - 1955 .......

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PageChart - Summation...................................... 10Tendencies of Individual Leaders

19.. Zhdanov..................................... 11, !20. Voznesensky.. ............................... 17

21. :Mal'enkov.. ......... ,. ....................... 1822. ber ria....................................... 2223. Molotov ...................................... 23. .24. Kaganovich .................................... ' 2725. Khrushchev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2926. Mikoy,an ...................................... 32'27. . Z h u k o v . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . 35

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DIFFERENCES IN TEYIPERAMENT AMONG SOVIET LEADERSAS SHOWN BY THEIR APPROACH TO POLICY ISSUES1945 - 1957FOREWORD

This working paper is an attempt to determine the per-sonal predictions and policy leanings of top-level Soviqtleaders by analysis of the part they played in various post-war policy disputes.findings are preliminary.analyst in the Office of Current Intelligence, and does notrepresent the position of that office.only within CIA for discussion and background use.

The approach is a new one, and theThis study is the work of anIt is circulated

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The July 1937 upheaval in the Kremlin, resulting in thefall of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov, representedan unusually dramatic moment in a'long series of postwar dis-putes in the Kremlin. As in past climaxes, hierarchical move-ment was expressed in terms of policies espoused or opposed,even though the motivating forces may have been personal ambi-tion, rivalries or revenge. Thus, although Khrushchev's realpurpose in June 1957 may well have been the ultimate elimina-tion of potential rivals for power, the charges he broughtagainst Molotov, Kaganovich, Halenkov and Shepilov made ex-plicit reference to policies which these men had espoused.The victims, in their turn, undoubtedly had their own personalreasons for identifying themselves with a movement againstKhrushchev, but they chose selected policies as the instrumentsthrough which to convey their opposition.

A review of those postwar turning points on which thereis some fragmentary information suggests that, whatever theirreasons, most of the ranking members of the Soviet hierarchyhave shown a certain consistency in the types of policies theyespoused and in the priority each seemed to assigncto variouspolicy goals. There is little evidence of stable cliques orpersonal loyalties among the top leadership. The picture sug-gested is of temporary alliances among individuals whose im-mediate interests or personal tendencies coincided for a time,the composition of the alliances changing as the major issueschanged.thought, basic assumptions, on which their decisions are based.In the Soviet leadership these patterns represent at most dif-ferences in temperament and operate only within the very narrowlimits of the common aims of the group. The question in theKremlin is not W h a t is Communism and do we want to build itor something else," but merely "which is the best way to buildCommunism.f' The existence of these differences in'temperamentis recognized in most political systems, the labels varyingaccording to the type of system or the degree of opprobriumthe speaker wishes to impute. In the West there are reaction-aries and radicals, conservatives and liberals, while Marxismhas its dogmatists, ~ : i ~ ~ % c i n $ . ~ i k ~ L + ,ight-wing and lef t-wingdeviationists. The Western pragmatist or moderate and theMarxist-Leninist who has "acceptancet1 t a given time providethe pivot points from which the ends of the spectrum aremeasured. All these labels change in policy content, however,as the pivot points change--a "liberal" position of one periodmay be a "conservative" position 20 years later. In the USSRthe problem of accuracy in labels is further complicated bythe Communists' own usage of the terms. Their insistence that

Over a period of years, individuals develop patterns of


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a Marxist-Leninist position is both infallible and stable incontent, and their resulting compulsion to re-label each timethe political wind shifts,make the terms extremely difficultfor a Westerner to use with any consistency.

Despite these shifting values for political labels,there are some threads of consistency in these differencesin temperament. In its time, a policy position may generallybe adjudged either cautious or venturesome in the light ofthe common aims of the leadership gm up.entailed. It is wary of the new or the untried, "the time isnot yet ripe" for change and ,'a bird in the hand is worth twoin the bush." The venturesome are more,optimistic, seeingpossible gains, not possible losses. They are more impatientwith flaws, more selt-confident in advancing new panaceas.They prefer a head-on attack on a problem, to the maneuveringof the cautious.

Caution dictates attention to possible losses, to risks

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Individual political leaders will not be found on theextreme ends of this spectrum, but they will generally tendtoward one side more than another. They are entirely consist-ent in conforming to these types, particularly because a 'leaning toward internationalism on the one hand or,isolation-ism on the other may cause either the cautious or the venture-some to find strange political bedfellows. The pragmatist isusually in a moderate position between the two extremes butalso-being basically eclectic in political ideas--may pickup concrete beliefs or stands from either or both extremes anddemonstrates his middle-of-the-road character merely by thelogical inconsistency of his views.The following study is an attempt to identify what theChinese Communists are pleased to call the "tone of work" ofcertain Soviet leaders, past and present, as reflected in thepolicies with which they have been identified from 1945 to1956. It is limited in scope to those policies on which in-fom at io n is available concerning identification of individuals,and to those individuals so identified, and should in no waybe considered an attempted survey of significant policy prob-lems, study of succession in the Kremlin or postwar historyof the USSR. There are gaps in the names, important individ-i k a d l h are missing and the information on those that are listed

is incomplete. It is offered only as a first approach, to beadded to or corrected as additional information comes to light.Identification of individuals with policies in each case ismade very tentatively, with the full recognition that an in-dividual's decision on a given issue might be influenced by-2-


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his special departmental or functional responsibilities, thecurrent personality situation in the Kremlin, or even what hehad for breakfast.Disputes &ring Stalin's Lifetime

There were seven major policy divergences or differencesof view o n w h i c h b w e ave evidence in the postwar Stalin period,1945-19S3, some of which carry over in one form or anotherinto the post-Stalin period:1. Varga: A major question confronting Soviet leaders in1 9 4 5 m a s the evaluation of the remaining enemy's strength,that of postwar capitalism. The Hungarian economist, Varga,cautioned that there was life in the old dog yet.that capitalism had undergone mutations under the stress ofWorld War I1 which would enable it to delay a major economiccrisis, and to control its inherent tendency toward internecinewars. In addition, he warned that these mutations had shiftedpolitical balances in capitalism both between classes and be-tween colonial powers and their colonies, narrowing the fieldof opportunity for Communist revolutionary activity aimed atoverthrowing the existing governments. No ranking Sovietleader took part publicly in the 1947 debate on Varga's views.Public opposition was expressed chiefly by other economistson doctrinal grounds. However, Mikoyan is reported to havetaken a position in 1947 very similar to Varga's on the eco-nomic strength of capitalism. Varga himself seemed to believethat Zhdanov was behind his doctrinal critics, and Molotov isreported to have expected both an imminent economic failureand internal strife between national imperialist interests torend capitalism.

He insisted

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2. Stripping: The evaluation of capitalist strength was atissue in Soviet economic policy in occupied areas. One groupfavored a postwar policy of the economic stripping of alloccupied territories for the rebuilding of Soviet industries.This denuding of occupied areas could only have made sense ifit were premised on caution in the face of a still relativelystrong and cohesive capitalism, and if it were to be followedby withdrawal of Soviet forces to the borders of the USSRfor consolidation at home. A leaning toward isolationismwould also have dictated withdrawal behind the walls of Sovietborders, in preference to entanglement with foreigners inGermany, Hungary, Manchuria et al. Malenkov and Saburov werereportedly among the supporters of this policy, which appearedto have been based on articles written by Varga in 1943.

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Opponents of the stripping policy who apparently envisioned,instead of withdrawal, the permanent annexation of theoccupied territories reportedly included Zhdanov, Mikoyan,Zhukov and Yoznesensky.3. Marshall Plan Participation: The question in the springof 1947 of participation by the Soviet bloc in the MarshallPlan again raised the problems of evaluating the enemy'sstrength and of the desirability of foreign entanglements.Mikoyan and Kaganovich reportedly favored participation.Molotov is alleged to have opposed it, expecting the failureof the plan. A similar position might be inferred for Zhdanovin view of his apparent refusal to accegt Varga's warning ofcapitalist resilience, although there are no reports on thesubject.4. Voznesensky: Voznesensky and his supporters appear tohave believed that both the Soviet economic situation and theinternatdonal situation in 1948 were sufficiently favorableto allow added emphasis in the economy on consumer goods.There is some evidence as to the names of both his supportersand his opponents, but little or none as to their reasons foradherence or opposition.Soviet economic resources to beef up consumer goods productionmust have appeared as a distinctly risky gamble to the morellcautiousllremllnites who had accepted Varga's estimate ofcapitalist resilience. To the more who saw acapitalism rent internally as the only external threat, therisk must have seemed small in comparison to the possiblegains in a more balanced economy.vityanov, G. Kozlov, Shepilov and Kosyachenko. He was' ap-parently opposed by Malenkov, Saburov, Suslov and V. S.Kruahkov.

In late 1948, however, Voznesensky's policy of shifting

Voznesensky's supporters appear to have included Ostro-

5. Link vs. Brigade: The link vs. brigade controversy inearly 1950 i volved a question of the size of work-teams inagriculture, the smaller link providing for a greater degreeof personal identification for the individual worker with thetotal results of his labor but without the mechanization whichthe brigade was designed to promote. Andreev, in confessinghis error in retaining the link system instead of adoptingthe brigade, noted that his major concern had been production,a cautious "bird in the hand approach.1' His anonymous criticin Pravda, who may possibly have been Khrushchev, insistedt h a t c o r r e c t organization of labor was not only a "tech-nical-productionV1 atter, but also a most important "economic-

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political" task.with increased investment was worth risking if it.resultedin a more politically orthodox organizational form--whichdoctrine promised would be more efficient in the end--and ifit promoted mechanization.6. Agrogoroda: The theme of impatience, acceptance of agamble and belief in "bigness" in agriculture was clearerstill in the agrogorod campaign of 1950-1951. In its fullbloom the plan, clearly sparked by Khrushchev, involved themerging of smaller adjoining collective farms and the re-settlement of the farm workers in farm-cities, with apartments,shops and all the amenities of town life, but cutting theirties with the land. The scheme involved both enormous expenseand major disruption of traditionally conservative peasants,with the risk of production losses. In the spring of 1951 itwas attacked by Arutinov, a Beria proteg6, as doctrinaire andpremature, and by Bagirov, also a Beria protege, as hinderingthe private-plot farming of the peasants. It was again crit-icized as premature during the 19th party congress qn October1952 by Malenkov and Arutinov.7 : East Germany: There appears to have been a possible cor-relation in timing between the varying speeds of socializationin East Germany from 1945 to 1953 and the shifting Kremlinestimate of Western strength. During periods when the resll-ience of capitalism seemed to be accepted, as reflected inthe stripping policy, or the 1949 emphasis on heavy industry,the pace of socialization was slow, When capitalist strengthseemed to be in doubt, the pace was increased. In addition .tothe cautious or venturesome approach to the problem of es-timating Western strength, a leaning toward internationalismor isolationism may have been a factor in any evaluation ofpolicy for East Germany. The greater the degree of' sociali-zation, the greater the Soviet stake in a land which did noteven adjoin Soviet borders.

Fragmentary evidence suggests that Zhdanov may havefavored a fast socialization pace while Berig and Malenkovseemed to advocate a slower pace.Dispute in the Post-Stalin Period

relative strength or weakness of capitalism vis-a-vis the USSR'had been more or less shelved, in the face of the more pressingproblems of rigidity in the Soviet system. The venturesomebecame less expansionist in international terms and more in-clinedto take the risks entailed in relaxing internationaltensions, to gamble possible short-range losses in discipline

A temporary decline in production coupled

By 1953 when Stalin died, the major postwar issue of the

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and "face1' a g a in s t p o s s ib l e l on g- ra ng e g a in s i n dynamism.With t h e growth of t h e "camp of s o c i a l i s m , '* q u e s t i o n s ofa l l e g i a n c e t o t h e USSR began t o come t o t h e fo re . P rob lemsof dogma a l s o moved t o th e f o r e f r o n t w i t h t h e removal of asupreme a rb i t e r . The c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p which succeededS t a l i n had awealth of prophets , four dead and a t l eas t f i v el i v i n g o n e s, b u t no one a u t h o r i t y t o judge whether a givenconcess ion or a given t a c t i c a c tu a l l y c o n t r a v e n e d d o c t r i n eor was mere l y a c r e a t i v e a p p l i c a t io n of it .d iv e r g e n c i e s or differences of view became more f requen t andt h e evidence about t h e l e a n in g s of leaders toward one ora n g t h e r s o l u t i o n became m o r e p l e n t i f u l .1 4 p o l i c y i s s u e s worth examining in t h e 1933-1957 period:8 . Consumer Goods Program - 1954:general agreement w i t h in t h e leadership groups i n mid-1953t h a t some addi t ional emphasis must be given i n t h e economy t ot h e produc t ion of consumer goods. A s stresses developed i nt h e economy due t o t he conc urre nt growth of other programs,t h e i s s u e became one of degree of enthusiasm for a given pro-gram. There w a s some d i f f e r e n c e in p h r a s i n g , i n t h e degreeof enthusiasm shown for t h e consumer goods program, ev id en ti n s p ee c he s made by t h e l eadersh ip g roup over t h e 18-monthp e r io d from August 1953 when t h e program was announced t o e a r l yFebruary 1955 when Malenkov res ig ne d. I n ad di ti on t o thesed i f f e r e n c e s , of course, Malenkov w a s r e p o r t e d l y censured on31 January 1955 for " r i g h t i s t d e v i a t i o n i n a dv o ca t in g t h egrowth of l i g h t i n d u s t r y which meant s lowing t h e growth ofheavy i nd u st r y. " Among t h e less e n t h u s i a s t i c speakers wereVoro shil ov, Molotov, gaganovich and, toward t h e end of t h e 18months, Khrushchev and Shepilov . The en th u si as ts appeare d t oin c lu de Malenkov, Khrushchev in t h e e a r l y months of th e pro-gram and Kosygin, Saburov, P ervu khin and Mikoyan.

The major pol icy

There a re a t l e a s tThere appears to have been

9 . Vi rg in Lands Program: There were two p o s s i b l e approachest o the a g r i c u l t u r a l problem which t h e S o v ie t l eade r sh ip facedI n 1 95 3- -e it he r i n t e n s i f i e d c u l t i v a t i o n b f t h e t r a d i t i o n a lfarming areas invo lvin g long-term investme nt and producin g ag r a du a l b u t s u r e r ise i n p r o d uc t i on , or the expansion ofa g r i c u l t u r e i n t o areas regarded a s m a r g in a l l a n d , a l s o ex -p e n s iv e i n i t s investment demands, a gamble on t h e u n c o n t r o l -l ab le f a c t o r of weather, but promising a b i g i n c r e a s e i n

* Four are grouped under t h e heading "20th Pa rt y Congress."-6 -

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-nproduction quickly if the scheme were successful.program in the virgin lands was clearly Khrushchev's owncreation. There is some evidence that he was supported byMikoyan and possibly Kaganovich, and opposed by Malenkov andMolotov.10. nuclear Warfare: During the winter and early spring of1954, there appeared a series of varying formulations in publicspeeches by Soviet leaders which seemed to reflect theirattempts to grapple with the implications of nuclear warfare.These variations were played on three themes--the destructive-ness of nuclear warfare, estimates of the imminence of war, andthe slice of the economy to be devoted to defense needs. Mal-.enkov, in the "death of civilization" and the "defense needs"themes, appeared to feel that the destructiveness of nuclearweapons was so great as to eliminate war as a feasible instru-ment of foreign policy for either side. Accordingly, defenseneeds did not loom large in his speeches. Mikoyan explicitlystated that the danger of war had decreased, a position closeto Malenkov's in its implications for defense needs. Pospelovcombined the two themes, seeing a decrease in the likelihoodof war and congratulating Soviet scientists on not working forthe "destruction of world civilization." Bulganin made anoblique and critical reference to these formulations, warningthat the USSR could not count on the humaneness of the im-perialists not to use weapons of mass destruction, and threemonths later sounded anunprecedented warning on the dangerof surprise attack from the US. Khrushchev and Kaganovich bothcited the continuing danger of capitalist encirclement, thefirst such references since Stalin's death. Molotov and Voro-shilov at the opposite end of the spectrum from Malenkovappeared to be saying that nuclear destruction did not rep-resent a new factor in world politics and that a third warwould still mean only the "death of capitalism.it Khrushchev,Bulganin and Kaganovich combined with Molotov and Voroshilovin calling for further defense expenditures. Pervukhin andSaburov had not contributed to the nuclear destruction andthe imminence of war themes, but like Malenkov were notablein their lack of concern for defense expenditures.11. China: Certain Soviet leaders seem to have been morec l o s e n d continuously identified with Chinese affairs thanothers, and there are faint hints that internationalist orisolationist leanings might have affected their willingnessto delay achievement of a goal in the USSR for the greatergood of fraternal China. In 1949, the year of the ChineseCommunist victory, Molotov, Khrushchev and-Mikoyan were notedas the regulars at Chinese Communist embassy receptions inMoscow, and in 1950 Molotov and Khrushchev publicly expressedmuch greater enthusiasm for the recent Chinese Communist vic-tory than did Malenkov, Kosygin, Suslov and Beria.

The latter

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The soul-searching by the Soviet leadership in 1954 onthe implications of nuclear warfare took place six monthsafter the Korean war had been cooled off to a truce, at atime when shots fired in anger between communism and capital-ism were being heard only in Indochina. The United Stateswas publicly considering entering that war t o back the French,the Chinese Communists were already deeply committed to theViet Minh in at last pushing the ten-year-old war to a vic-torious conclusion. Sino-Soviet defense treaty obligationsconfronted the Kremlin in early 1954 with a very pressing needto evaluate the implications of a possible nuclear war spread-ing outward from the Communist Chinese gamble in Indochina.When read with these Far Eastern echoes, Malenkov's "death ofcivilization" speech seemed a warning that the r i s k of a majornuclear war was too great, Mikoyan's estimate of decreasingdanger of war a calming assurance that the Chinese Commun-istgamble would pay off and that a world war would not develop,and Molotov's and Voroshilov's "death of capitalism" themestill further assurance of backing in a gamble which did notseem to them to risk fatal consequences.12. Economic Aid to China: There were also faint hints inthe summer of 1954 th t there were differences of degree amongthe Soviet leaders concerning the amount of economic aid thatshould be spared to Communist China. Bulganin, Khrushchev andMikoyan were the bearers of glad tidings to the fraternal Chi-nese in October 1934. The Soviet premier, Malenkov, and theSoviet foreign minister, Molotov, were notably absent. Therehad been an unusually cool exchange of telegrams between Malen-kov and Mao a month earlier (2 September), traditionally aday for warm affirmations of unity and mutual respect.July 1955 Mikoyan is reported to have enlivened an officialcensure of Molotov with charges of past Soviet "meanness" inthe economic exploitation of other socialist countries, citingan offer concerning joint stock companies which Mao had turneddown.

And in

13. Aid to Underdeveloped Countries: In early 1955 a changewas apparent in Soviet foreign aid policies. Emphasis wasshifted from Eastern Europe to the Middle East and the tempowas sharply increased. There had been sporadic reports of offersto "excolonial countries" even before Stalin's death, but it wasnot until shortly after Halenkov's removal from the post ofpremier and the accession of the B & K team to power that theprogram really took shape. Since that time, Bulganin, Khrush-chev, Mikoyan and Shepilov have been most closely identifiedin public with the program. There are no reports on the sub-ject, but on the basis of Molotov's reluctance to accept the-8-


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!"new flexible" Soviet foreign policy, of which the economic aidprogram was an important instrument, and his apparent economic"meanness" in Eastern Europe, it might be inferred that he,like Halenkov, dragged his feet on the program.14. Relaxation of International Tension - 1955: The springof 1933 was marked by at least four moved by the-USSR de-signed to relax international tension.was aigned, a new disarmament package proposal was produced,the mountain went to Mohammed in Belgrade, and to a meetilig atthe Summit in Geneva. According to most reports, a hard coreof resistance to these moves was provbded by Molotov andVoroshilov and aidejd occasionally by "others," unnamed. Thesetwo had felt that nuclear destruction did not represent a newfactor in world politics and threatened only the death of cap-italism. Bulganin, Khrushchev, Mikoyan and "the new membersof the central committee" reportedly provided the impetus forchange and Shepilov and Suslov .appear sporadically in thislatter group.

The Austrian treaty

15. Relaxation in Eastern Europe - 1955: During the summerand fall of 1955 the problem of Soviet control in EasternEurope, having escaped from Pandora's box in Belgrade, aroseto haunt the Kremlin. The reports of justification and re-crimination during this period show Molotov and Voroshilovjustifying past Stalinist harshness and filled with forebodingconcerning a future in which the "doctrinally impure" Yugo-slavia might infect Eastern Europe Satellites. As in thespring relaxation moves, the impetus for change continued tobe provided by Bulganin, Khrushchev and Mikoyan. Kaganovich,Suslov and Shepilov are occasionally reported as allies o fthe latter group.16. 20th Party Congress: There was, of course, no open dis-agreement at the 20th party congress in February 1956. Therewere, however, certain differences in emphas$s by individualspeakers, apparently reflecting their primary interests andtheir mental reservations. The four major themes were thedenunciation of Stalin's practices in his later years, thepossibility of cooperation in the socialist camp despitediffering views on forms of transition to socialism, the pos-sibility of averting war, and the possibility in certain coun-tries of a transition to socialism through parliamentary meanswithout civil war. The general effect was of enthusiasm onthe part of Khrushchev and Mikoyan, obedient if uninspiredsupport from Bulganin, spotty support from Suslov, Shvernikand Shepilov, and foot dragging from Kaganovich, Molotov andVoroshilov. Malenkov, depending on the subject, ranged fromenthusiasm to complete disinterest.

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17. Stal-nism vs. The Thaw - 1956:to have been three groups in the leadership, differing in thedegree of confidence with which they faced the need for achange from Stalinism in the satellites.ing to one report, Mukhitdinov and Satyukov, who succeededShepilov as editor of Pravda, led in enthusiasm, envisioningstill further c h a n g e s . m & n i n and Khrushchev occupied amiddle position, reportedly hedging to the Yugoslavs on theamount of independent action to be allowed in the future toEuropean satellites, although he had promised a great dealearlier, whil'e Molotov, Kaganovich, Halenkov, Voroshilov,Suslov and Pospelov viewedsthe liberalization already accom-plished with the gravest foreboding.

By mid-1956, there appearMikoyan and, accord-

18. Anti-Semitism and Great Russianism: There have been re-curring themes throughout Russian history.A.A. Kuznetsov, Ryumin, and among the survivors, Khrushchev andFurtseva, have been charged with anti-Semitic prejudices.Beria, Abakumov, Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich andPervukhin reportedly either have Jewish ties or have shown a

Zhdanov, Voznesensky,

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lack of prejudice.Zhdanov has been identifiedRussian "chauvinism, while Beriprobably Khrushchev have shown greater or lesser degrees ofsympathy for national minorities.

ith Greatan and

SUMMATIONVENTURESOME CAUTIOUS

Pro. Varga 1945-6 -on -Z danovMolotov Mikoyan

2. Stripping Cob-Internationalist Pro-Isolationist1946 Zhdanov MalenkovHikoyan SaburovZhukovVoznesensky3. Marshall Plan Con-Isolationist1947

MolotovZ danov?-10-

Pro-InternationalistMikoyanKaganovich


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4 . Voznesensky. 1949

. .5. Link vs.Brigade 1950

. . q s6 Agrogoroda1950-51

7. E. Germansocialization1945-19538. Consumergoods program1954

9. Virginlands 1954

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11. China

VENTURESOME CAUTIOUSConPro -

Voznesensky . MalenkovShepilov Saburov

Brigade -

-SuslovLink

Khrushchev? AndreevPro- Con-K hrus c hev BeriaBagi ovMalenkovFast-Internationalist Slow-IsolationistZhdanovMore-IsolationistMal enkovKhrushchevKosyginSaburovPervukhinMikoyanProKhrushchevMikoyanKa anov ?Unimpressed

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MolotovVoroshilovKhrushchevBulganinKaganovichProMolotovKhrushchevYikoyanBulganinVoroshilov

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BeriaMa len ovLess-InternationalistVoroshilovMo1 ovKaganovichKhrushchevShepi ovConMa 1 nkovMolotov-

ImpressedPospelovMal n ovM iko anPervukhinSaburovCon-MalenkovKos g nSuslovBer la

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VENTJJRESOME12. Economic More-Internationalistaid 1955 KhrushchevBulganinHikoyan13. Aid to Un- Pro-InternationalistderdevelopedCountries Bul anin

Miko anShepilov1955 Khrus chev

14. Relaxation Pro-Internationalistof Interna-tional Tension Khrushchev1955 Bulgan nMikoyanS epi ovSUSlOV

15. Relaxation Pro-Internationalistin EasternEurope 1955 BulganinKhrushchevHikoyanKaganovich?Suslov?Shepi ov?

Same16. 20th Party -ore -Congress 1956a. Denunciation ldlkoyan MalenkovSuslov BulganinShvernlk

of Stalln Khrushchev Molotov

CAUTIOUSLess-Isolat ionistMal nkovMolotovCon-IsolationistMalenkov?Molotov?

Con-IsolationistMol0 vVoroshilovKa anov h?Malenkov?Con-IsolationistMolotovVoroshilov

Less-Kagan viVoroshllov

b. Different Enthusiastic Accepted With ReservationsRoads to So- Or Ignoredcialism Khrushchev Bulganin KaganovichShepilov Mikoyan MolotovMa1 nkovSuslov

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. .. .. , ..

. ........... .'...

, . .

VENTURESOYlE CAUTIOUSc. Possibility Enthusiastic Accepted With Reservationsof Averting Or Ignored

War

d. Parliamen-tary Transi-tion to So-cialism17. Liberaliza-tion in EE

1956-

KhrushchevMikoyanMa 1 n ovKhrushchevMikoyan ,ShepilovEnthusiasticMikoyanMukhi lnov?

18. Anti-Semi- Presenttism and/orGreat-Russian- Zhdanovism \ VoznesenskyKhrushchevFur seva

Bulganin KaganovichMolotov ShepilovSuslovBulganin MolotovKaganovich MalenkovSuslovAccepted ResistedKhrushchev MolotovBulganin KaganovichMalenkovVoroshilovSuslovPospelov

......

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LackingHalenkovMikoyanMolotovKaganovichPervukhinBeria


18/42

... .,.,. ...

'Tendencies of Individual Leaders

. . I. .. . ._

19. Zhdanov: Zhdanov's policy preferences in the postwaryears suggest him as the prototype of the "venturesome."Optimistic and confident, the prizes far outweighed therisks which in his eyes seemed small. He saw no reason tofear serious resistance or reprisal from capitalism and thequestion of a mfijor war between the two systems seemed ir-relevant, Internal capitalist strife had already knocked.'out two major power centers in Europe and Asia and had seri-ouslyu. eakened others. Grave economic problems, nationalantagonisms, colonial strife, and class conflicts were in-herent in the enemy, to be manipulated by communism as theexecutive of the future.The sacrifices and dislocations caused bythe,unprecedented war, the victories scoredover Hitler's Germany and imperialist Japanhave brought about a new political situationall over the world, stirred up the masses ofthe peoples, raised their political activityand given a powerful impetus to the develop-ment of democracy in all countries... p g o -slavia, Poland, Italy, Bulgaria, Ruman a,Hungary arid Finland were cited as part ofthis pro gre 57forgotten that the defeat of the Conserva-tives and the victory of the Labor party inBritain, like the defeat of.the reaction-aries and the victory of the bloc of Leftparties in France, signify a considerablemove to the left in these countries. (Xov1946)

Further it should not be

!

. . . .. I, . . ,

. .. . . ~It should be borne in mind that Americaherself is threatened by an economic crisis.There are weighty reasons for Marshall'sgenerosity. If the European countries donot receive American credits, their demandsfor American goods will diminish and thiswill tend to accelerate and intensify theapproaching economic crisis.... The maindanger to the working class at the presenttime stems from underestimation of its ownstrength and overestimation of that of theenemy. (Sept 1947)

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\

..

.. .. . . . . ., . ... ...

The Cassandras who warned of lessons learned and changesaccomplished in capitalism, of the possibility of serious re-sistance from the enemy, spoke to deaf ears. Confidence inthe ability of a dynamic socialism to predict and to controlthe "objective" factors of its world keynoted his policy pref-erences and his speeches.the executor for the ideological purity campaigns in philosophy,art, literature and music from 1946 until his death In mid-1948. Art forms must be intelligible to the masses but moreimportant, must be imbued with optimism. Socialist culture 'would, of course, prevail because of ,its inherently greaterworth. It was not foreignness which was to be guarded againstbut pessimism, a most antisocialist characteristic.

Whether he was the initiator or not, Zhdanov was clearly

The task of Soviet literature is to help thestate correctly to educate the youth, caterto its needs, rear the younger generation tobe buoyant, confident in its cause, undauntedby difficulties, and prepared to surmount allobstacles. (Aug 1946)H i s optimism and confidence in the ability of socialistman to control his environment by planning extended even toscience, and he provided the seed, although not necessarilythe savagery of tone, for the ideological campaigns whichraged in scientific fields after his death. In his 1947criticism of G. F. Alexandrov's history of philosophy, hereferred scathingly to the "Kantian subterfuges of contem-

porary bourgeois atomic physicists (which) lead them to de-ductions of the "free will" of the electron and to attemptsto represent matter as only some combination of waves andother such nonsense.".,'_.,..,.,,,...,...*. ... . . .. , . ... . I . . Since he rejected Varga's warnings on the postwar re-silience of capitalism, he also opposed the stripping policyand its premised Soviet withdrawal from those areas. H i soriginal opposition to Marshall Plan participation has onlybeen inferred, but he was again clearly the executor for theSoviet riposte, the"formation of the Cominfonn; and thewave of strikes in France and Italy which followed in theautumn of 1947 is generally associated with his influence.If the inference of his opposition to the Marshall Plan is

correct, it could only have been due to his expectation thatit would fail, for there is no hint in any of his speechesor in the part of his career covered here of any isolationism.-15-


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~~ ~ -. - - . .. ~ .. , . .-..a .. .... . . .I .

The roster of Communist leaders gathered under his leadershipin Warsaw in September 1947 is striking for the number of%ational" Communists included. His speeches on nationalismsuggest that his loyalties and his trust ran along class

.. lines, regarding national boundaries as only administrativeconveniences and not as divisive in interests.

, . . ... ......

. .

The wise foreign policy of Stalin... has. . . taken the Soviet Union out of isolationBnd has created and solidified the blocof peaceful nations. (Feb 1946)Internationalism in art does not develop on thebasis of a contraction and in impoverishment ofnational art. Rather, internationalism flour-ishes where national art flowers. To forgetthis is to lose one's individuality and be-come a cosmopolitan without a country. Itis impossible to be an internationalist inmusic or anything else, without being a realpatriot of one's fatherland. (Feb 1948) Onlythe new Russians who are not burdened down bythe long series of scholastic periods of theEurope of previous centuries are able to lookscience full in the face; they honor it and makeuse of its blessings, but they do so withoutexaggerated deference to it. (Feb 1948)

Zhdanov died before the limits of his optimism and inter-nationalism could be gauged--before it was evident that theMarshall Plan had "delayed" an economic crisis in the West,before the establishment of NATO underlined Varga's warningthat wars between capitalist states were not inevitable, be-fore the problem of national Communism reached the boilingpoint of an open break with Tito and began a wide swath ofpurges among the Satellite leaders in the Cominform.Since he departed from the Soviet scene an optimist ap-parently unsullied by second thoughts and forced retreats, hisname has continued a rallying cry for the venturesome in timesof stress. He and Shcherbakov figured in the World War I1rolls of honor with Bulganin and Khrushchev in 1954 and 1955.He was quoted, though not by name, in the Kommunist reprimandto Malenkov's "death of civilization" formulation in March1 9 s .

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... ...

20. Voznesensky: Voznesensky's postwar career was a shortone, 1aSting only three years. During that time, however, hewas quite clearly identifiable with venturesome tendencies.One of his closest colleagues, Ostrovityanov, was a critic ofVarga, both Voznesensky and Ostrovityanov opposed the strip-pdngpolicy of retreat from occupied territories, and bothappear to have been in the vanguard o f the movement to completethe Five-Year Plan in four years, Voznesensky as the head ofGOSPLAN and Ostrovityanov in providing the theoretical ration-ale. Like Zhdanov, Voznesensky appears to have become a symbolof enthusiasm and confidence--indeed overconfidence i n theeyes of the cautious. (It might be noted that the tie betweenZhdanov and Voznesensky was apparently a strong one. Voz-nesensky and his fellow-victim in the Leningrad affair, A. A.Kuznetsov, were the two who accompanied Zhdanov's body whenit was sent to Moscow by train to the funeral.)several unkind comments on "enthusiasm" which may well havereferred to Voznesensky.

Malenkov made

. ._ . .

Exaggeration is a human feeling. There arecomrades among us who suffer from this Vice.These people cannot admire anything withoutgushing.appreciating an achievement at its true worthand noticing the shortcomings in order to re-move them. (Nov 1949)The facts show that successes have generatedin the ranks of the party a mood of self-satis-faction, a pretense of well-being and smugcomplacency, a desire to rest on one's laurelsand rely on past merits. No few officials haveappeared who think that "we can do anything,""everying is child's play to us," "things @regoing well" and there is no use worrying one-self with such a disagreeable task as disclosingdefects and mistakes in the work or combatihg:negative and unhealthy phenomena in our organi-zation. (19th party congress)

Stalin was even more pointed on the same occasion, flatly con-tradicting one of Voznesensky's theses, though without naminghis victim, and'adding:

They are incapable of simultaneously

We, as the leading core, are joined each yearby thousands of new young cadres, fired withthe desire to help us, eager to prove themselves-17-3


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... .... .. . ,.

but lacking an adequate Marxist education,uninformed of many truths well known to usand thus obliged to wander in the dark....They begin to imagine that the Soviet regime"can do anything" and "everything is child'splay to it,'* that it can refute scientificlaws and fashion new ones.

. . , .... .. ..

21. Malenkov: If Zhdanov was the protbtype of the venturesomeinternationalist, Malenkov appears as his complete opposite, acautious isolationist. His stand on Varga's warnings has notg6, and ldalenkov was identified withthe policy corollary to Varga's estimate of capitalist re-silience, the economic stripping of occupied areas. His standon Marshall Plan participation would have depended on whether

his fear of the West was stronger than his desire tb strengthen,;,the homeland through its economic benefits. His part in theviolent reaction against Vo.znesensky's program suggests thatfear may have been uppermost in his mind at least as early as. September 1947 when he first used the formulation which was tosignal priority for heavy industry. Fear runs through hi6early postwar speeches in curious contrast to Zhdanov's buoyantconfidence.In the recent period the party had to wage aresolute struggle against various manifesta-tions of an obsequious and servile attitude .toward Western bourgeois culture.... Theparty had to deal a resolute blow againstseveral specific manifestations of this atti-tude since these manifestations represent, inthe present stage, a serious danger to theinterests of the Soviet state, inasmuch as theagents of international reaction, in order toweaken the Soviet state, seek to utilize peopleinfected with a feeling of servility towardbourgeois culture.... /Compare with Zhdanov'sconfidence s i x months lEter in 1948 thatRussians Would know how to use the good anddiscard the b a d 7 The survivals of these oldcapitalist conceptions are being used today byagents of American and British imperialism whospare no effort in their attempt to find withinthe USSR support for their espionage and theiranti-Soviet propaganda. The agents of foreignespionage services are bending every effort .to

but Varga has generally been re-

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. . ,. . . .

... .... .

seek out weak and vulnerable points amongcertain unstable sections of our intelli-gentsia who still bear the stamp of the oldlack of faith in their own forces and areinfected with the disease of servility toeverything foreign. (Sept 1947)

If a consumer goods program in addition to other demandson the economy was too risky in 1948 and 1949, with the Westshowing signs of resilience and a Soviet military re-equipmentprogram to be undertaken, the agrogorod scheme of' 1950-1951was equally premature in Malenkov's eyes. And, like Beria, heseems to have been reluctant during these years to push so-cialization in East Germany. How much of this was due merelyto a personal sense of timing, a distaste for drastic and pos-sibly disruptive measures and how much to a belief that Sovietble to ud e with any degree of accuracy. Accordingalenkov was charged in January 1955 wibourgeois democracy.enemies to put the worst possible face on what was no morethan caution. On the other hand Malenkov's speeches, morethan those of any other l ea de qhav e shown a strong sense ofthe physical entity of Russia.

withdrawal might some day be necessary or advisable -e's proposal to allow German reunification as aThis may have been an effort by hisWe should remember that we are sufficientlystrong to defend the interests of our people.We have won a victory and want to protectour Motherland from any eventuality whatso-ever. We do not want to pull the chestnutsout of the fire for others. If there arechestnuts available we will use them for thegood of our glorious Soviet people ... (Feb1946)The October Revolution liberated the peoplesof Russia from economic and spiritual en-slavement to foreign capital. Soviet powerhas for the first time made our country afree and independent state. (Sept 1947).Never in the history or our country have thepeoples inhabiting its vast expanses been soclosely united.... Never in all its historyhas our country had such just, well-orderedstate frontiers as it now has.... Never be-fore in all its history has our country beensurrounded with neighboring countries sofriendly to our state. (Nov 1949)

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. -- - - . . .-. - .- 1 _-_ -.......-.. ~ . . .

. . .. . . .. . .. . ,

. . .

We would not have achieved the successesin peaceful construction in which we nowtake pride if we had permitted the weak-ening of our state. If we had not strength-ened our state, our army, our punitive andintelligence agencies, we should have beenunarmed in the face of our enemies and con-fronted by the danger of a military defeat.The party turned the Soviet country into animpregnable fortress of socialism by streagth-ening the socialist state in every way and itis continuing to strengthen it. (19 partycongress) Certain officials,absorbed in eco-nomic affairs and achievements, begin to for-get that the capitalist encirclement stillexists and that the enemies of the Sovietstate are persistently trying to smuggle intheir agents and utilize unstable elementsin Soviet society for their own vile ends.(ibid) In the northwest we have new fron-tiers, more just and corresponding betterto the interests of the defense of the coun-try . . . . Today the state frontiers of theSoviet Union correspond best to the his-torically evolved conditions of the develop-ment of the peoples of our country. (ibid)

Moreover, a recent FBIS study of speeches made in thepost-Stalin period has noted that both Malenkov and Kaganovichseemed genuinely to fear a revival of German vitality whichnot even a German socialist system could control.tive neutralization of a potential rival to Russia and itsestablishments as a buffer state would have had much greaterappeal to him than the rebuilding of that rival, even in thefraternal unity of socialism.

If cautious isolationism characterized Malenkov's careerunder Stalin, it was still more apparent under the "collectiveleadership." By 1953 it seems to have been generally agreedwithin the collective leadership that some relaxation of ten-sion was needed both internationally and internally. The con-sumer goods program at its inception does not appear to havebeen controversial, and it was not until other demands on theeconomy in the shape of agricultural and defense needs andforeign aid programs became equally pressing that matters oftiming and degree became grounds for differences within thegroup. As might have been expected, Malenkov appears to havepreferred the slower but surer path of further investment intraditional farming areas to the admitted gamble of the virginlands.

The effec-

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I * ~ , 1 . ,-

During the 1954 efforts of the group %o grapple withthe implications of nuclear warfare, his attitude appears tohave been that war in a nuclear age was quite literally un-thinkable, thp risks being too great for either side to allowwar to impinge on their consciousness even as a possibility."War can and must be averted," and backing the Chinese gamblein Indochina was no way to avert it. The defense establish-ment should'be retained at its current strength, but need notaffect consumer goods priorities. Equally, foreign aid pro-grams, whether within the camp to fraternal China and thesatellites or to purely problematic allies in underdevelopedcountries,were all very well, but not until recognized eco-nomic imbalances in the consumer goods field at home had beencorrected.

. ' .

. ...

.. .. ... .. ,. . .Khrushchev has been reported as protesting that Western

commentators were misinterpreting Malenkov's fall in Februaryority as the deciding factor.Malenkov's formultbtions of the consumer goods program werenever so gradiose as those of Ylikoyern who survived the policyshift relatively unscathed. Even here Halenkov seems to baverun true to form in his cautious approach to a recognizedneed for reform, and in his apparent belief that Russian needscame first.

- 1955 by overemphasizing the question of consumer goods pri-And it is quite true that

klalenkov's performance at the 20th party congress wasmarked by guarded acceptance of de-Stalinlzation, lack of in-terest in the progress of socialism outside of Russia, butfervent support for Khrushchev on the subject of avoiding war,The supplanting of the capitalist system bya higher social order, socialism, is inevita-ble. When and how will this take place? Whatwill be the forms of the transition to social-ism? It is up to the people of capitalistcountries to solve these problems. It is onlythey who can determine the fate of their states.But, one must time and again draw attention tot-he most important proposition put forward inthe report of Comrade Khrushchev when he con-firmed that war is not inevitable. War can andmust be prevented.

, ... ..

., .

Certain parallels in timing in the early post-Stalincareers of Halenkov and the Hungarian liberalization symbol,Imre Aagy, have led to speculation identifying Malenkov withearly post-Stalin liberalization. Extremes in either direction,-21-


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........_.1

"too rigid" political and economic controls or "too speedy"relaxation seem to have been equally distasteful to Halen-kov. Even in the period following Voznesensky's executionwith its strong emphasis on heavy industry, Beria by 1951and Malenkov by 1952 were publicly recognizing the need toredress imbalances in the economy by increased attention toconsumer goods.the consumer goods problem the need for some relaxation ofcontrols seems to have been generally agreed upon immediatelyafter Stalin's death, and Malenkov may well have backed Hagy'searly program.

Malenkov did not appear in the roster of those concernedabout the pace of liberalization in Eastern Europe until mid-1956 when he was reported among the cautious foot-dragginggroup. A t this point he was able to attack a powerful rivalwho had participated in his downfall 18 months before, to doso on a subject which was congenial to him, and to do soo notin suicidal isolation, but with the backing of allies equallyconcerned about the "risks" they foresaw.22. Beria: Beria's few appearances in policy issues on theside ofut iou s isolationism may seem curious for a man withas evil a personal reputation as his. It is possible, however,that his long responsibility for internal security made himaware of the hazards of arousing widespread popular discon-tent in the USSR and of overextending the Soviet controlsystem in unwilling allies. His opposition to the drasticdislocation of the peasants envisioned in the agrogorod schemeand his respect for their ties to their private plots havealready been noted, as has his reluctance to push socializa-tion in East Germany.

In the case of satellite controls as in

Joseph Koevago, mayor of Budapest during the October 1956Hungarian rebellion, reports1953 Hungarian liberalization program. Beria reportedly as-sured Hagy of his personal protection from reprisal by Rakosi.-is struggle for power in Moscow, "Rakosi seizedcontrol again after Beria's arrest and repealed the Xagyhat Beria had personally super-by Imre Ragy in the springnoted in connection with Beria's fall that as a

-22-

. . . . .

.':.:.'.". . . . .... . ....

. . . ..

.. ... . .Two years after Beria's fall, Molotov was reportedlyaccused of having tolerated Beria's policy in the DDR "insolving the question of unifying the peasants, with the re-sult that a combination of force and technical unpreparedness"had led to mass flights of farmers to the West.


27/42

. .~

. ..... .. .. ..~ , "

. .. .. ... .....> ..

-nreforms." Tlagy's program was described as "legality," whichhad indeed been a keynote of Beria's speech at Stalin's fu-neral. More far-reaching than prison reforms and amnesties,tllegality" n Nagy's and possibly Beria's programs seems tohave included lessening of pressures to force the life ofthe country into the political and economic molds of communism.in the DDR with which Beria was charged seems to have describedhis policy tendencies--ready use of individual terror to dealwith flagrant rebelliousness or unrest, but a reluctance toinstitute further measures--no matter how politically orthodox,efficient or desirable from the point of view of expandingeconomic and political system of communism--that might disruptthe work and living habits of large sectors of the population.Certainly, the continued existence of private plots in theSoviet economic system constituted "technical unpreparedness"for a hoped-for transition to communism.socialization policy in East Germany would constitute "tech-nical unpreparedness'' for transition to a fully socialistsystem.23. Molotov: Molotov's postwar career presents a curiouspicture of willingness to accept risks of war in the inter-national field but caution in other aspects of policy. Theanswer to this apparent split personality may be partially inhis dependence on "the book," in itself a form of caution infollowing blindly the "infallible" guidance of another, andpartially in his long association with foreign affairs.

The "combination of force and technical unpreparedness"

Similarly a slow

Like Zhdanov, he refused to accept Varga's postwar esti-mate of capitalist strength, insisting that the Marshall Planwould fail because of the inherent weaknesses in capitalismwhich orthodox doctrine had foreseen. In March 1950 he wasstill insisting that capitalist economic collapse had actuallybegun :The American figure of minus 22 percent(fall in industrial output 1948-9) testi-fies to the beginning of an economic crisisin the United States and at the same timeto the crisis which mounts in all capitalistcountries.

Mikoyan's formulation on 10 March 1950 made an interestingcontrast 'in its pro forma reference to "inevitability" butwith escape clauses:-23- ,


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. . .

. .

The newly invented talisman for the struggleagainst crises so inevitable under capitalismand the reassuring assertions of the rulingcircles only temporarily can produce but anappearance of relief and only temporarilycontain the panic and fear of the consequencesof the crisis.Molotov and Kaganovich were the only speakers at the19th party congress in October 1952 who mentioned the late-lamented Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. It is possible that .theydid so because they gave the ceremonial opening and closingspeeches. On the other hand, Zhdanov as the leading post-war exponent of optimism and confidence and a major opponent.of Varga's views would have been a natural ally for Molotovon foreign affairs. In addition, the Zhdanov-Shcherbakov

combination received heavy emphasis in 1954 apparently as asymbol of orthodoxy in heavy industry and defense needs andacceptance of foreign policy risks when Bulganin, Khrushchev,Molotov and Kaganovich were 'united in backing this policycomplex.There bavebeen several indirect references to Molotovas a lfbookuan'r arxist and dogmatist. Malenkov's 19th partycongress speech warned that "those who live by rote" as wellas those who believe that "we can do everything" would bethrown into the discard by life. Khrushchev in his secretspeech noted that Molotov and Mikoyan had been in danger ofliquidation in the fall of 1952. The Kommunist editorial inSeptember 1955 which attacked, without naming Molotov, the

latter's error of February 1955 concerning the building ofsocialism in the USSR spoke ominously of the danger of sepa-rating theory from practice, of transposing formulas of thedistant past to present conditions, and warned that dogmatismis especially inadmissible "in the sphere of international1 fe ,"Marxist-Leninist doctrine said nothing about communismgambling on rainfall--Molotov reportedly opposed the virginlands program. There was no reference in "the book" to newweapons so destructive as to make war a Pyrrhic victory evenfor the inevitably victorious Soviet Union-Molotov more thanany other leader was identified with the "death of capitalism"theme in the spring of 1954 when Chinese Communist adventuresin Indochina raised the problem of Soviet treaty obligationsto China. His repetition of this theme, together with hispromotion of the CPR to co-head of the camp of socialism dur-ing the offshore islands tension in February 1955, seems tohave served the same purpose of assuring Soviet backing for

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.. , .

. ... ..

. . . . . .. ,,' , : !, . .. . , . ..I .

. .. ..... ... . . ... . .

t h e Chinese in a p o s s i b l e war w i t h t h e US.was s t i l l a f e a s i b l e ins t rument of f o r e i g n p o l i c y , d e f e ns eneeds must be m e t by emphasis on heavy indus t ry .

The September 195 5 Kommunist re prim and of Molotov whichseems t o have evened a l l s o r t s of o l d s c o r e s , deal t particu:l a r l y harshly with Soviet economists who s a w "expanded re-product ion" replaced by "diminished production" and t h e "self -s t r a n g u l a t i o n " of modern capital ism.

And since war

Undoubtedly the deepening of t h e g e n e r a lcr i s i s of t h e c a p i t a l i s t system bears wit-n es s t o t h e f u r t h e r r o t t i n g of c a p i t a l i s m ,b u t , a s Lenin po in ted ou t , it would be a .mistake t o t h i n k t h a t t h e t en de nc y t o r o texc ludes t h e rapid growth of capi ta l i sm.I t warned fur ther t h a t s uc h d i s t o r t i o n s of t h e i n t e g r i t y oft h e p r i n c i p l e s of M a r x i s t t e n e t s leads t o c o nc lu s io n s a tv a r i a n c e w i t h o b j ec t i ve r e a l i t y and t h e p o l i c y o f t h e p a r t y ,and f o r good measure c i t e d t h e h or r i b le example of t h e woe-begone economists who drew wrong and p o l i t i c a l l y harm fulconc lus ions i n denying t h e need fo r . p r e f e r en t i a1 deve lopmentof heavy industry . That t h i s was a far from academic matteris suggested by Milsoyan's speech a t t h e 2 0 t h par ty congresswhich con ta ined t h e o n ly s u b s t a n t i v e cri t ic ism of S t a l i n ad-vanced by an a u t h o r i t a t i v e f i g u r e . His cr i t i c i sm was di rec teda t t h i s same t h e s i s of t h e s e l f - s t r a n g u l a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m .Molo tov ,c ling ing g r imly t o doc t r i ne , appears to have beens t i l l i n s i s t i n g in 1955 t ha t . c&pi t a l i sm w a s on t h e verge ofc o l l a p s e a n d t h a t "in order t o accomplish something w e donot need these new methods of negot i tk t ions" such as t h eA u s t r i a n t r e a t y , t h e new disarmament package proposal, t h eYugoslav rapprochement, t h e Summit meeting, t h e a i d t o u nd er -deve loped count r ies , improved re la t ionswi th Japan, et a l .Acceptance of t h e r i s k of a w a r which communism would i n -e v i t a b ly w in was r i g h t and proper. But ta kin g one s t e p back-ward, in r e l a x i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n si o n , i n o r d e r t o taketwo forward w a s a recommended technique o n l y in t h e face ofs t r o n g o p p o s i t i o n , a n d h i s f a i t h i n t h e imminent cr i s i s ofc a p i t a l i s m w a s undimmed.

I n a d d i t i o n t o b e ing c a u t i o u s an d d o c t r i n a i r e ev en t ot h e e x t e n t of a c c e p t i n g g r av e r i s k s of war, Molotov seemst o have been s t r o n g l y i s o l a t i o n i s t . There i s a s u g g e s t i o nof t h i s i n t h e Kommunist e d i t o r i a l which warned t h a t t h eproblems of b ui ld i ng communism i n t h e USSR cannot be con-s ide red separate ly f rom the problems connected w i t h t h ecamp of s o c i a l i s m . To t h i s w a s added a

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. . . ,

... .. . .. . . .

call for "tolerance on all matters touching on rad calquestions of principle on Marxist-Leninist ideology andpolicyv1 nd recognition of national peculiarities and dif-ferences in rates of transition to socialism.

Like Halenkov, his early postwar speeches suggest adistrust of foreignness.Of course, acquaintance with the life o f .other nations will certainly be of bene-fit to our people and will broaden theiroutlook. It is interesting, however,that Soviet people return home with evenmore ardent feelings of loyalty to theirhomeland and the Soviet system. (Aov1945) Hot all of us have yet rid our-selves of obsequious worship of the West,of capitalist culture. It was not fornothing that the ruling class of oldRussia were often in a state of suchprofound spiritual dependence on thecapitalistically more highly developedcountries of Europe. ... Unless one ridsoneself of these shameful survivals, onecannot be a real Soviet citizen. That iswhy our Soviet people are filled with suchresolute determination to put an end asquickly as possible to these survivals fromthe past, mercilessly to criticize all andevery manifestation of obsequious worshipof the West and of its capitalist culture.(Nov 1947)

This isolation had a different slant, however, fromthat of Malenkov who seems to have been genuinely disin-terested in progress outside Russian borders.possibly because of his foreign policy responsibility, anincrease in the size of the Soviet empire was to be hailedwith rejoicing but only as an added field for exploitationfor the homeland, not as an ally to be strengthened in itsown right.He may have "tolerated Beria's policyv1 n the DDR becauseinternal policy in East Germany was not his direct responsi-

bility, but on the subject of East Germany vis-a-vis the West,his stand was unequivocal. On 16 October 1954 in an unusuallyexplicit speech he said:

For Molotov,

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* . . . . .

. . .

The development of the DDR has been soplanned that it must become an integralpart of the socialist bl oc, while atthe same time guaranteeing a peacefulexistence to a-large part-of Germany.

His opposition to liberalization in the satellites in 1955and 1956 which had been refer-red to in the Kommunist edi-torial seemed to be based on the same principal-jly suis,j'y reste.The 1955 charges against Molotov concerning the inso-lence of Soviet diplomats and the suggestions that Molotovwas being held responsible, at least in part, for past economicexploitation of the fraternal satellites and attempts to doso in Communist China have already been noted.At the 20th party congress, Molotov was among the moretemperate speakers concerning the "great harm" caused by cer-tain "abnormalities" in Stalin's later years. He apparentlycould not bring himself to discuss the possibility of parlia-mentary transition to socialism, contended that national char-acteristics had from the beginning been retained in EasternEuropean construction of socialism, and he was restrained inhis comments on the possibility of averting war. He refusedto accept the Yugoslav rapprochement as 8 contribution tosocialism, presumably because, as he reportedly once charged,the Yugoslav Communist party could not be regarded as doctri-nally pure. He went to some pains, however, to praise thesuccesses in socialist building of the Chinese Communists

whose doctrinal footwork had been more sure-footed at leastthrough 1955.24. Kaganovich: During Stalin's lifetime, Kaganovich appearedonly once in reported alignments on postwar problems. Thatone occasion was on the subject of participation in the Mar-shall Plan,which he allegedly favored. This may have beenbecause of his departmental responsibilities and a hope thatthe cement industry could be given a much-needed boost. Theother possibility is, of course, that the report was wrong.As late as 8 May 1955, long after the need for conformitywith the 1947 decision was past, and indeed after the subjecthad been dropped by other leaders, Kaganovich was insistingthat the Marshall Plan had been both 8. trap and a failure. Hetold the Czechs:

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r .. .

After the war they (the American im-perialists) came forward with theMarshall Plan.... They managed tomake the ruling class of certaincountries dependent on them, but theyfailed and they will never succeed insubdugating the peoples of these coun-tries. I am sure that their assist-ance to France and to other countriesnot only failed to sponsor economicdevelopment but it undermined eventhe normal trade relations betweencountries.

He may have backed the virgin lands gamble and he seemedto be aligned with Bulganin and Khrushchev in the discussionof the imminence of war in 1954. Kaganovich and Molotov werethe first leaders to warn publicly against the danger of pre-occupation with consumer goods at the expense of heavy in-dustry, and Kaganovich was the only leader besides.Khrushchevto remind the partyof the continued threat of "capitalistencirclement" in 1954. He reportedly backed the 1955 relaxa-tion in Eastern Europe, but the relaxation of internationaltension in the same year seems to have been too much for him.With Molotov he fought a losing battle against each step.at a time when the USSR was reinstating various trade con-tracts in Western Europe which they had canceled three tofour months earlier.distrust of Western economic stability, seeming to hark backwith nostalgia to the economic isolationism of the late 40'sand were in strong contrast to the K4rushcheV line of peace-ful coexistence coupled with economic competition.

His remarks.on the Marshall Plan in May 1955 were madeThey sounded a curiously dour note of

i

. .. .

Despite the warning directed at Molotov in September1955, Kaganovich's 1955 October Revolution speech was star-tling in its neglect of the "Geneva spirit" as well as itsinsistence on Western "contradictions which are growing moreacute." "These /Os economic7 crisis phenomena did not spreadthroughout the wcrld, but tEere are no grounds at the momentfor speaking of a real establishment of some balance."On 25 November 1955, Kaganovlch was shorn of one of hishonors when the Moscow subway which had been named for himwas renamed, leaving him with the faint consolation of onestation as his namesake. On the same day Mikoyan receivedbirthday greetings which,according to an FBIS analysis,notably

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outranked the one Kaganovich had earlier received. In lateNovember and early December Pravda devoted two editorials toreproof of dogmatists who separate theory from practice andfail to appreciate the need for adjusting tactics to changedconditions.Mikoyan appeared.to be the caretaker in Moscow. flaganovichhad officiated while Bulganin and Khrushchev were-in Geneva.7

When Bulganin and Khrushchev went to India,

At the 20th party congress Kaganovich, with Malenkov,Molotov, Bulganin and Shvernik, referred only to "certain ab-normalities" in Stalin's later years which had done "greatharm." Kaganovich in particular seemed reluctant to go fur-ther, calling the struggle against the cult of personality"no easy question."speed in wage reforms and revision of norms, Kaganovich askedfor time and careful study of .the question. He depicted a"dying and decaying capitalism," a colonial system "burstingat the seams." On the possibility of averting war he echoedStalin's 19th party congress speech. He omitted Yugoslaviain his bow to national roads to socialism, although he citedChina and "the People's Democracies," and his acceptance ofparliamentary transition to socialism was equally tepid.

Until he joined with Molotov in resistance to measuresto relax international tension, Kaganovich does not appear tohave exerted any great degree of personal leadership. Aftersymbol of efforts to hold the line in both domestic and foreignaffairs.

Where Bulganin emphasized the need for

, the winter of 1955 he became with Molotov and Voroshilov a

25. Khrushchev: During Stalin's lifetime, Khrushchev ap-peared in only two reported postwar policy questions, both inagriculture.relying on forms of organization and bigness of operation toensure progress in agriculture. This concern with form andsize was echoed in the virgin lands program of 1954 which notonly had the advantage ofthedramatic gesture with a possiblefast payoff but also increased the proportion of state asopposed to collective farms in the economy. There are alsosigns of these themes in his theses on the economic reorkganization in the USSR, in a tendency to substitute party forministerial channels and ingrandioseness of concept.

In both cases, he was found on the side of change,

Khrushchev seems with the rest of the leadership to haveaccepted the consumer goods program initially, although hisphrasing was more restrained than that of Malenkov or Mikoyan.During the reassessment of nuclear warfare in early 1954,-29 -


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Khrushchev, Bulganin and Kaganovich took a middle position,Where Malenkov recoiled from the idea of nuclear warfare asunthinkable and therefore not to be prepared for and Molotovrefuted the probable extent of destruction, insisting onpreparation, Khrushchev seemed to be insisting on prepared-ness, regardless of whether war was a feasible instrument offoreign policy or not. His estimate of the irhminence of warand his concurrent revival of the encirclement theme con-trasted strongly with Hikoyan's confidence that war would notcome. Whether this indicates a more pacific appraisal byMikoyan of Western intentions or whether it suggests a greaterwillingness on Khrushchev's part to contemplate the possibil-ity of war is not clear.

Khrushchev's pronouncements on the probability of warwere not as immediately applicable to the Chinese gambit inIndochina as were the "death of civilization" and "death of 1capitalism" speeches. As has already been noted, however,the area of greatest tension and the most probable source ofa clash in 1954 and early 1955 was the Far East. If hisspeeches are read with a Far Eastern echo, they suggest againa middle ground between Malenkov's revulsion from and Molotov'sreaffirmation of Sino-Soviet defense treaty obligations.

By September 1954 it was clear that the combined demandsof the consumer goods program, the virgin lands program, defenseneeds and Chinese Communist demands for economic aid were toogreat for all to receive top priority. Something had toagive,and for Khrushchev it was consumer goods. He made it quiteplain, however, that this was a temporary shift and thatdoctrine to the contrary, the proportion of emphasis on con-sumer goods might well be increased in further Five-YearPlans. One purely internal goal was to be delayed in favorof another, that of increased agricultural production, to-gether with a defense program which would enable the USSR toconduct a foreign policy in the direction either of concilia-tion or war, and economic aid to the fraternal Chinese. Whichof these latter three factors weighed most heavily is impossi-ble at this point to say. The choice of which internal goalto sacrifice was made easy for him--he had authored one, Mal-enkov was closely identified with another, and Yalenkov wasa rival.

With the change in defense priorities accomplished,Khrushchev embarked on a more flexible foreign policy from amilitary position of strength. Unlike Molotov, his "risks"in foreign policy consisted of wooing possible allies ratherthan stonewalling them, abandoning a few unproductive po-sitions and risking the blurring of ideological purity in the


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hope of greater gains in Soviet influence internationally.His choice of tactics may have been dictated in part of arecognition that some additional over-all relaxation oftension was desirable since the stonewalling had proved bothdangerous and unproductive, and in part by a decision to moveagainst another rival in an area in which the latter seemedvulnerable. Malenkov had been cut down to size; Molotov wasnext.peaceful coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systemsnot only possible but necessary.sive about the new foreign policy, however, despite its con-ciliatory air.to capitalism were dropped.question, disarmament negotiations and, according to the July1957 charges against Molotov, the normalization of relationswith Japan. The concept of struggle was by no means abandonedbut merely transferred to the slightly less inflammable fieldsof ideas and trade. And, to balance these semiretreats, Sovietinfluence was to be expanded into new areas in excolonial coun-tries by an economic aid program and by judicious appeals tothe established governments regardless of their political com-plexions. His special interest in this program is suggestedby the fact that at the 20th party congress Khrushchev wasthe only one who noted that excolonial countries can "now"draw on the achievements of the socialist camp.

,

By kay 1955, Khrushchev had Joined Malenkov in callingThere was nothing unaggres-

Certain unproductive positions of hostilityThese involved the Austrian Treaty

Khrushchev's gambling instincts and his fervent optimismhave apparently enabled him to accept with equanimity therisks of new clashes which this expansion may entail. War isto be avoided--the possibility of doing so is real--but if itcomes let it be on a new and more productive issue. Communismis after all the future.

1 In internationalism, too, he seems to have held to amiddle ground between Malenkov's isolationism and Mikoyan'sfree-wheeling tolerance of foreign influences. Khrushchevrecognized the needs both economic and politico-military tothe Chinese Communists; under his aegis Mikoyan launchedhis charges of economic exploitation of the satellites; andKhrushchev was among the first to push for liberalizationof Soviet controls in the satellites.If the Poles are to be believed, however, he showedqualms about the growth of national characteristics whichbroke with the Soviet mold at a time when Hikoyan was stillenthusiastically calling for further liberalization.

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H i s retreat from Stalinism was exactly that, a retreatrather than an escape. He did not denounce Stalin, evensecretly, until Mikoyan had done so publicly on a substan-tive point, and his denunciation when it came was primarilyof the tragic irony of Stalin's mistaken belief that he hadto destroy loyal comrades for the good of the socialist cause.the Poles that Khrushchev is no theoretician. He showed scaptregard for doctrine in his.three "new possibilities" at the20th party congress, "creatively applying" it in tactics asthe situation seemed to him to warrant. For Khrushchev's pur-poses Subarno's overthrow by revolution and replacement witha Communist leadership is not immediately necessary when alittle economic aid and a lot of personal flattery will at aminimum deny him to the West as a trustworthy ally. Thedoctrinal problem can be dealt with later of whether Sukarnoand his office should be regarded as representative of abrand of capitalism even though Indonesian independence fromthe Netherlands has been announced, or whether as a nativeleader of a newly independent excolonial country he can beregarded as representing national interests. In his own fieldof agriculture, however, Khrushchev has shown a continuingconcern for orthodoxy in organizational forms, he has retainedthe classic concept of strife and struggle against capitalism,and he has reiterated again and again his concern lest politi-cal coexistence be extended to ideological coexistence. Heseems willing to experiment tactically with doctrinal changesuntil these shifts threaten ground already gained when hereverts to orthodoxy.

There have been somewhat caustic comments reported from

26. Mikoyan: Mikoyan appears in the postwar years to havehad a wider tolerance for new ideas regardless of their doc-trinal orthodoxy and a stronger bent toward internationalismthan any of the other leaders. The result combined with con-fidence verging on the venturesome has made for some verycurious ,bedfellows for him.During Stalin's lifetime, when the issues turned onvarying estimates of capitalist strength, Mikoyan appearedconsistently to accept Varga's unorthodox estimate of rela-tive strength. His reaction to this strength in 1946 dif-fered from Malenkov's, in the same way that their reactionsto the 1954 assessment of nuclear warfare differed. In 1946Zhdanov was insisting that capitalism was relatively weak.Xalenkov saw it as still relatively strong and planned to re-

tire into the fortress of the Soviet homeland in a state ofsiege. Mikoyan too accepted Varga's estimate of the continu-ing relative strength of capitalism but proposed to build abastion of socialism in the occupied territories to meet thecapitalist enemy.-32-


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In t h e s p r i n g of 1954 when Malenkov seemed t o b e ar gu in gt h a t n uc le ar wa rfar e made t h e Chinese Communist gamble i n Indo-chin a and, indeed, any war to o r i sk y t o contemplate , and Molo-t o v was r e t o r t i n g t h a t t h e d e s t r u c ti o n e n t a i l e d in n u c l e a rwarfare would not be g r e a t e r t h an t h e Soviet Union could afford,Mikoyan seemed t o be r e a s s u r i n g them b o t h t h a t i t would not comet o war on a major scale .l a t e r a t t h e 2 0 t h p a r t y c o n gr e ss where he s t a t e d t h a t t h e im -p e r i a l i s t s were restrained from launching World War I11 bySovie t possess ion of t h e a tan ic and hydrogen bombs and capa-b i l i t y t o d e l iv e r them.

If p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e new-fangled gadget of t h e MarshallPlan (which would not c ol l ap se , de sp i t e Molotov 's d i re fu l proph-esies) could be t u rned t o th e advan tage o f soc ia l i sm , well andgood. There was nothing in for eig nn ess t o daunt an Armenianworking i n a Russian government t o bui ld an in te rn at io na l so-c i a l i s t s y s t em i n polyg lot Ea s tern Europe .

When S t a l i n d i e d and t h e need for added emphasis on con-sumer goods w a s genera l l y r ecogn ized, it was Mikoyaq, everre ce pt iv e t o change, who w e n t f u r t h e r t h a n any o the r speakerin h a i l i n g '*a new stage" in t h e development of t h e Sovie teconomy which would allow a fo rced pace fo r t he p roduc t ion o fconsumer goods.During 1954 Mikoyan had l i t t l e or nothing t o s a y on t h esub jec t of de fense needs , a l though h i s 1956 claims f o r t h ede te rr en t power of Sov iet m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h su gg es t t h a t h e .may have been concerned e a r l i e r . H e w a s c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e dw i t h economic a i d t o C hina in th e f a l l of 1954 and he s e e m s a tt h e same t ime t o have backed Khrushchev i n th e v i rg in lan dsprogram. As in t h e case of Khrushchev, it is d i f f i c x l t a t t h i spo in t t o de te rmine which of t h e l a t t e r th ree p r i o r i t y claimsweighed more in Mikopan's mind i n d ropping or d e l a y in g t h econsumer goods program.

H e made h i s t h e s i s e x p l i c i t two y e ar s

, Mikoyan was reported among the leaders who showed ane a r l y i n t e r e s t i n C hina, he made r e a s s u r i n g n o i s e s d u r i n g t h eFar Eas te rn t e n s i o n of e a r l y 1954, he accompanied Bulganinand Khrushchev on t h e i r g i f t -bea r ing junke t in t he f a l l oft h a t y e a r , he was i d e n t i f i e d wi th a n i n t e r e s t i n economic a i dt o Egypt a s e a r l y a s February 1954, he has been frequentlyid en t i f i ed i t h th e Yugoslav r approchementand wi th t ng II z a t i o n in Ea ste rn Europe, and hetoured Sou theas t A s i a i n e a r l y 1956 b e a r in g g i f t s and o f f e r sof economic a i d . I n t h e Eas te rn European l i be ra l i za t i on hehas been reported a s p lay ing a l e a d i n g ro le i n c r i t i c i s m of-33-

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ups IA the Kremlin-the Stalinists led byauL,,s L n a L a b b i m b C A y I b b b A - * u w - L b 'Molotov, Khrushchev's "thaw'' group and a group led by Mikoyanadvocating far-reaching democratization exceeding anythingenvisioned by the middle ground of the "thaw" group.A recent FBIS study of speeches by the collective leader-

ship in the post-Stalin period concludes that Mikoyan and Per-vukhin seemed to show a noticeably greater degree of confidencein the ability of socialism to control the warlike tendenciesof the Germans than do those of the isolationist Malenkov andKaganovich.Another FBIS study (RS.lO) has raised the possibility ofa personal contact between Hikoyan and Burzdhalov, the hereticeditor of Problems of History, at the time of the 20th partycongress. Burdzhalov in the ensuing 12 months publishedarticles which brought into question an unusually wide rangeof established policies. It is not suggested that Hikoyanshared Burdzhalov's doubts on all these policies. It is sug-gested that he, more than the other leaders, has a respect for

ideas, that he is in fact the egghead of the group.of his internationalism and his confident acceptance of newideas. He was the only one publicly to criticize Stalin on asubstantive issue. H e d o n e praised the liquidation of militarybases in China and Finland, liquidation of "the isolation ofSoviet public and state organizations from the outer world. 'The time is past when the Soviet land of socialism was isolatedand when we were an oasis in the capitalist encirclement. Nowthere is no questSon of it!' He complained that the USSR wasseriously lagging behind in its study of contemporary capital-ism, and lamented the abolition of research institutes bothin this field and in oriental studies.

Mikoyan's 20th party congress speech was characteristic

A State Department study of his 20th party congress treat-ment of the wage problem concluded that he was mr ee ga li ta ri anIn his approach than any of the other speakers. Only Mikoyan-34-


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and Saburov cited the split of GOSPLAN into long and short-range planning groups as a major achievement, and Mikoyanfollowed this up with a plea for improved statistical workin the USSR, again showing an interest in ideas, not rules.27. Zhukov Zhukov s appearance in policy qu&t ions havebeen rare.in the early postwar years. Opposition to withdrawal fromterritories won in war is not surprising from a military leader.The re- is suggestion that he may have been discussing thefldeathnofivilization" problem in the late spring of 1955,but by this time Khrushchev had joined Malenkov in insisting,that war can and must be prevented, and only Molotov, Voroshilovand possibly Kaganovich were opposing efforts to relax inter-national tension. In the summer of 1955 both Tito and Kardeljstated that Zhukov was personally responsible for proposing theSoviet-Yugoslav talks leading to a rapprochement.

He is reported to have opposed the stripping policy

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Zhukov vas Said t be isoiaei gm o m fnterrerknce or involvement in currentThat he wished to avoid a repetition of the 1954-55uestions.discussions of who contributed most to victory in World War I1is quite probable.that Zhukov was oppdsing K O K O S S O ~Zhukov's example" in Poland by attempting to get rid of Wita-ze ws Bi ls olitical management of the Polish armed forces.controls,both political and military, over the Polish armedforces on its doorstep would align Zhukov willy-nilly witheither Khrushchev's "thaw group" or possibly even the MolotovStalinists on this particular question. His waiting game mayhave consisted of refusing involvement in other questions inwhich the Brmy did not have a clear professional stake.

The Soviet army's natural preference for maximum Soviet

The fleeting glimpse gained here suggests a middle-of-the-roader somewhat like Khrushchev's past performances. ]Inaddition to his canny balancing ability, however, Khrushchevlikes gambles and drama. Whether Zhukov shares these tenden-cies with him is not yet clear.


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28. Other Ranks: In a d d i t i o n t o t h e major f i g u r e s s e en int h e precedin g pages, th e re have been f ragmentary gl impses ofminor members of t h e l ea der sh i p g roup , some ju n i or in age andr a n k , o t h e r s l i k e B u lg an in a n d V o ro s hi l ov s e n i o r in age andr a nk b ut j u n i o r i n t h e f o r c e of t h e l e a d e r s h i p th e y seem t oe x e r t .more than an echo for Khrushchev in t h e i n i t i a t i o n of p o l i c i e s .H i s p h r a s in g i n t h e e a r l y months of t h e consumer goods programw a s correct b u t n o t e n t h u s i a s t i c . H e d i d not appear a t a l l int h e a g r i c u l t u r a l problem .t h e contin 'uing danger of c a p i t a l i s t e nc ir cl em e nt i n u r g in g t h ecause of defense expendi tu res .t h a t t h e danger of w a r had decreased.month warned:

B u lg a nin , d e s p i t e h i s p o s i t i o n , h a s n o t emerged a s much

In February 1954, Khrushchev c i t e dMikoyan in March 1954 contendedBulg

Caesar 17 - Differences of Soviet Leaders

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