Daza v Singson

Facts:

Petitioner Rep. Raul Daza was a member of the Liberal Party (LP) and one of the representatives

who was chosen to represent said party in the Commission of Appointments (CoA). A political realignment

in the lower house resulted when the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized. Twenty

four members of the LP formally resigned from that party and joined LDP. This increased the total number

of LDP members to 157 while the LP was left with only 17 members. The House if Representatives

consequently revised its operation in the Commission of Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied

by petitioner Cong. Daza and the chamber elected a new set of CoA representatives which consisted of

the original members except Cong. Daza who was replaced by Rep. Luis Singson. In this petition, Rep. Daza

challenges his removal alleging the reorganization of the representation is not based on a permanent

political realignment because LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political

stability.

ISSUE: WoN a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the

Commission on Appointments

HELD:

YES. The SC has resolved the issue in favour of the House of Representatives to change its

representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire

in the political alignments of its membership. However, it is understood that such changes must be

permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of

political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to

another.

The constitutional provision that there shall be a CoA consisting of 12 Senators and 12 members

of the HREP elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties

therein connotes the authority of each House to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As

a consequence, it may take appropriate measures not only upon the initial organization of the Commission

but also subsequently thereto. The House is clothed with authority to declare vacant seats in the CoA and

fill said vacancies when the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is materially

changed.

Coseteng v Mitra

Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, lone candidate elected to the lower house under the KAIBA party seeks

appointment to the Commission on Appointments and House Tribunal on a request where she is backed

by nine congressmen. The House previously elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12

congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the

Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the

revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of

Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP). Petitioner prays that the Court declare the election of respondent

Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the

constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only

9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She further alleged that she is

qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.

Issue: Whether or not the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. The petition was dismissed because the revision in House representation in CA was based on

proportional representation, contrary to what the petitioner believes. The composition of the House

membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the House

membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL

as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority

choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the

House membership and, hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA. Her endorsements

from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they

signed identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.

The jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson where it was held

that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse

of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by the other government

branches.

Guingona v Gonzales

Facts:

Following the 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3

LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. The parties agreed to use the traditional formula to

suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the COA -- (No. of Senators of a

political party x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5

members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-

LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded

off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also

pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of

the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a

member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against

proportional representation.

Issue: W/N the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as members of COA is in accordance with Article

6, Section 18 of the Constitution

Held:

NO. Article VI, Section 18 assures representation in the COA of any political party who succeeds

in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of Senators so elected enables it to put a

representative in the COA. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party

must have at least 2 senators in the senate to be able to have a representative in the COA, so that any

member less than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the COA. In the light of the foregoing

and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the matter before this court, we declare the

election of Senator Albert Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tanada as members of the COA as null and void

for being in violation of the rule on proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the

Philippine Constitution. Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents

Senator Romulo and Senator Tanada to desist from assuming occupying and discharging the functions of

members of the COA; and ordering the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as

ex-officio chairman of COA, to desist from recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators and

from allowing and permitting them from sitting and participating as members of said commission.

Tio v Videogram Regulatory Board

Facts:

Presidential Decree No. 1987, entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board, was

enacted in 1985 and gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. As

it sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms

as it has adversely affected the movie industry and the proliferation of videograms has significantly

lessened the revenues being acquired from it; holding that such loss may be recovered if videograms are

to be taxed. In Section 10 of PD 1987 imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

Valentin Tio, in 1986, assailed the said Act as it is alleged to be unconstitutional especially with regards to

Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, as it is a rider provision and is not

germane to the subject matter of the law, and that there is also undue delegation of legislative power to

the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other

government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said Act

Issue: WoN PD 1987 is unconstitutional.

Held:

No. The Constitutional mandate regarding the one subject-one title has been sufficiently complied with

if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. As

to the assailed Presidential Decree, the questioned provision is necessary and germane to, the general

object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title.

The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for

regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD. Anent

the second point of the petitioner, the Court holds that there is no undue delegation of legislative powers

to the VRB where the Board is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the

authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law.

Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a

fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and

control of the [VRB].

Lidasan v Comelec

Facts:

The President signed into law House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790 and due to such

enactment, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the

province of Lanao del Sur which brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

Consequently, Bara Lidasan, resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a

qualified voter for the 1967 elections, herein petitioner, prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared

unconstitutional as it did not sufficiently indicate in the title of the said Act that in creating Dianaton, it

would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato. Pursuant to this law, COMELEC

proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton.

Issue: WoN R.A. 4790 is unconstitutional for violating the one title-one subject rule

Held:

YES. The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace

more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill which is aimed against the evils, of

the so-called omnibus bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or unconsidered

enactments. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation -- a rider

being a provision not germane and necessary to the subject matter of the bill. The title of the assailed Act

projects the impression that only Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton as seen in the

phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety, therefore makes the title misleading and

deceptive. The known fact is that the legislation has a two-divided purpose combined in one statute: (1)

it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and

Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in

Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur; these purposes should be declared in the Title as these

are not necessarily ancillary to one another.

Cruz v Paras

Facts:

The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a municipal corporation,

Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation

of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that

Ordinance No. 84 entited: AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER

TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF

AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS, assailed as invalid is tainted with

nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling,

petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws

were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of

First Instance of Bulacan. The lower court dismissed the case contending that the prohibition of night

clubs were done in practice of their police power.

Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 84s title is void on its face or unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. It is entitled: AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER

TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF

AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. 18 Its first section insofar as

pertinent reads: The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to

regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing

schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of

amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended

to include not merely the power to regulate, but likewise Prohibit 20 The title, however, remained

the same.

The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view

advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation

of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: Every bill shall

embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. 21 Since there is no dispute as

the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as

was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.

Tobias v Abalos

Facts:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the

constitutionality of RA 7675 known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly

Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong. Sponsored by then-incumbent congressional

representative of Mandaluyong, the Act was deemed ratified and in effect following a plebiscite held on

April 10, 1994 where only 14.41% of the voting population attended and where 18,621 voted in the

affirmative.

Petitioners herein assert that the RA 7675, especially section 49 thereof, is violative of the

Constitutional mandate, Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, regarding the titling of a bill

which specifies that Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be

expressed in the title thereof. Petitioners aver that by including section 49 of RA 7675, it effectively 1)

converts Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city and 2) divides the congressional district of San

Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second purpose of RA 7675

is not germane to the subject matter if the same Act, it is in clear violation of the one subject-one bill

rule as provided by the Constitution.

Issue: WoN the designation of a new Congressional district is not germane to RA 7675 and is thus

violative of the one subject-one bill provision of the Constitution.

Held:

NO. In accordance with Article VI, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution, which provides Each city with

a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one

representative, creating a separate congressional district is not a separate subject matter from the

conversion into a highly urbanized city, rather, it is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion.

The title of the statute in contention speaks of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized

city, it is necessarily included in the act that a separate congressional district be apportioned to the City.

Moreover, the one title-one subject rule has been liberally construed by the judiciary so as not

to impede legislation as it was held in Sumulong v COMELEC that the rule should be given a practical

rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title

expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.

Demetria v Alba

Facts:

Petitioners, as members of the National Assembly/Batasang Pambansa, are assailing the

constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as

the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. The section states that, The President shall have the authority to

transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the

Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or

activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after

its enactment.

Issue: Whether or not the first paragraph of Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is constitutional.

Held:

YES. The Constitution provides that, Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer

of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any

item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their

respective appropriations.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical

under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government

and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and

resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the

purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government

branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and

conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose

of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the

appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said

Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,

office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,

bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without

regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the

same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which

said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental

law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor

thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

Guingona v Caraque

Facts:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt

service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations

Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The

said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled Amending Certain

Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign

Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the

Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the

Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising

out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

Petitioners herein assail the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it

being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the

Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE: WON the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional it being higher than the

budget for education

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated

to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of

Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national

interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. Congress is certainly not without any

power to provide an appropriation that can reasonably service our enormous debt. It is not only a matter

of honour and to protect the credit standing of the country but for the very survival of the State when our

economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than

the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby

assailed as unconstitutional.

Philconsa v Enriquez

Facts:

Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994. The GAA

contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of Allocation for

Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded. Philconsa claims that only

the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the

Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves. President signed the

law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP

Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and

Separation Benefits of the AFP.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

Held:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the

realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,

and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to

be made. As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of Sections 25(5) and

29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is

exclusive. The AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

Belgica v Ochoa

Facts:

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel

is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent

several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance

Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act

(GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard projects

(infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship

grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);

b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft

projects;

c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for

soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet

members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for

realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called

presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas

Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the

earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Eversince, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six

whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel

system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their

pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear

that government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects.

An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the

exposes of Luy et al.

Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others filed various petitions before the

Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES:

1.) W/N the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

2.) W/N presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:

1. NO, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates

the principles of Separation of Powers, Non-delegability of Legislative Power, Local Autonomy, and of

Check and Balance.

Separation of Powers -- As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of

funds. The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF

is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats

happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which

projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a

violation of the principle of separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the

PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

Non-delegability of Legislative Power -- As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in

Congress alone. That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate

further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution. Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) Delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;

(ii) Authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared

national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to

such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage

and wharf age dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development

program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which

his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power

to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not

lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can

delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.

Principle of Checks and Balance -- One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power

of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is

already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now

identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto

the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA

again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given

power of the President useless.

Local Autonomy -- As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.

Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies

concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the House of

Representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the

LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government meddles with the

affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on

local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF

becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

2. YES, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential

pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution

which provides No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made

by law. Petitioners emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya

and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well

as PD 1869, which amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation -- (i) PD 910: Section 8

thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall form

part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource

development and for other purposes which the President may direct; (ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section

12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential

Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects. These are sufficient laws which

met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein

does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD

910 and PD 1869.

Araullo v Aquino

Facts:

Annually, Congress approves the General Appropriations Act (GAA) or budget. In general, it

contains an estimate of revenues and funding sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital revenues

(like proceeds from the sales of assets), (3) grants, (4) extraordinary income (like dividends of government

corporations) and (5) borrowings. The budget also contains itemized public expenditures allotted to the

three main branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and the independent agencies

(Commission on Audit or COA, Commission on Elections or Comelec, Office of the Ombudsman, etc.). The

current budget totals about P2 trillion.

Often, the estimated revenues are exceeded by actual receipts. These excess funds are referred

to as unprogrammed funds. Examples are unexpected large dividends from government institutions like

the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System. Often, too, the estimated

expenditures are not spent; hence savings occur. The DAP aims to pool these unspent funds, and uses

them to fund projects that stimulate the economy. Citing the World Bank, the Supreme Courts decision

(p.36) acknowledged the programs success, saying that the continued implementation of the DAP

strengthened growth by 11.8% year on year while infrastructure spending rebounded from a 29%

contraction to a 34% growth as of September 2013.

Issues: The following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget

Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section

25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely:

(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the

withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal

year and without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General

Appropriations Acts;

(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other

offices outside the Executive; and

(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not covered by any appropriation in the

General Appropriations Act.

Held:

The DAP is not an appropriation measure and does not contravene Section 29(1), Article VI. The

President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion during the

execution of the budget to adapt the budget to changes in the countrys economic situation. He could

adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded

under the DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be funded

under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the money had been already set

apart from the public treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive did not usurp

the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution [that no money shall be

paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law].

Requisites of a valid transfer of appropriated funds under Section 25(5), Article VI. The transfer of

appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5), [Article VI of the Constitution], must be made upon

a concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) There is a law authorizing the President, the

President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;

(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices;

and (3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their

respective offices.

It is then indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when the purpose for which

the funds had been allocated were already satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for

only then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents the Executive from unduly

transgressing Congress power of the purse.

Tolentino v Sec. of Finance

Facts:

The Value-added tax (VAT) is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money

of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of

services. Republic Act No. 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, was

enacted into law, it widens the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by

amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Consequently, various suits for certiorari and prohibition,

challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds were filed. The petitioners

alleged that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, Congress violated the Constitution since it was not passed

by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference

Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the

Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this

manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law.

Furthermore, Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively"

in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact

the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Article VI, Sections and 26 of the Constitution.

HELD:

No. This argument will not bear analysis. It is only the revenue bill which is required by the

Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this,

because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result

may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be

discussed later. To persevere that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House bill

would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose

amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress

and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.

Certainly, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax

bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come

from the House of Representatives. This is based on the theory that, the members of the House are

elected from the districts, can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does

the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill

from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days because the President had certified the same as urgent.

Under the constitution, the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on

separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of

legislative practice.

Lung Center v QC

Facts:

Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No.

1823. It is the registered owner of the land on which the Lung Center of the Philippines Hospital is erected.

A big space in the ground floor of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small

store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics. Also,

a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for commercial purposes to a private

enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. Lung Center seeks exemption from real

property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital building.

Petionters filed a claim for exemption on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a minimum of

60% of its hospital beds exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital

operation is to serve charity patients. The request was denied, and a petition hereafter filed before the

Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City

Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under

Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

judgment of the CBAA.

Issue: WoN the Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution and is therefore exempt from

real property taxes.

Held:

YES but NO. The petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and 1987

Constitution but, NO, they are not exempt from real property tax. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a non-

profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the decree, is to be administered by

the Office of the President with the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The

purpose for which it was created was to render medical services to the public in general including those

who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. However, under the Constitution, in

order to be entitled to exemption from real property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that

(1) it is a charitable institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used

for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of patients and the

dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other portions thereof are being

leased to private individuals and enterprises. The portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients

are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not exempt from such taxes.

Tan v Del Rosario

Facts:

Petitioners herein assail the constitutionality of RA 7496 as having been violative of their right to

due process as the same Act, known as the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme (SNIT), is violative of

the uniform and equitable rules of taxation as required by the Constitution in Article VI, Section 28.

Petitioners aver that the Act takes a step back from the net income basis of taxation and imposes a

taxation based on gross income. Petitioners asserts that the Act is not uniform and is thereby in violation

of the Constitution.

Issue: WoN the Constitutional mandate on the uniform and equitable rules on taxation is violated by RA

7496.

Held:

NO. The enactment of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme does not violate

the uniformity and equitability in the rules of taxation. As held in Pepsi Cola vs City of Butuan, uniformity

in taxation is not violated as long as 1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not

arbitrary, 2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, 3) the law applies, all things

being equal, to both present and future conditions, and 4) the classification applies equally well to all

those belonging to the same class.

It may be true that in the new rule, allowable deductions have been significantly reduced prior to

the amendment; however, it merely shifts the income taxation to a more schedular approach in the

deductions that can be made only when provided for in the law and, the fact that it was decreased, does

not necessarily make the new rule not uniform nor equitable.

Garcia v Executive Secretary

Facts:

Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, assails the validity of Executive Orders Nos. 475

and 478. He argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of Section 24, Article VI of the

1987 Constitution which provides Sec. 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing

increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the

House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. He contends that

since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume

such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating

measures.

Executive Order No. 475 reduced the rate of additional duty on all imported articles from nine

percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which

continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem. Executive Order No. 478

levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem and all other

existing ad valorem duties) a special duty of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil

and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.

Issue: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

Held:

YES. under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and

tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive

Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming

they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must be

enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such

limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage

dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the

Government. There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President

subject to such limitations and restrictions is [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff

rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . .

John Hay PAC vs Lim

Facts:

President Fidel V. Ramos issued Proclamation No. 420 Series of 1994 which declared a portion of

Camp John Hay as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and created a regime of tax within the John Hay Special

Economic Zone. The proclamation was pursuant to RA 7227 An Act Accelerating the Conversion of

Military Reservations into other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development

Authority for This Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes. Petitioners allege inter alia

that said proclamation in so far as it grants tax exemptions is invalid and is an unconstitutional exercise

by the President of a power granted only to the legislature. Petitioners also contend that the proclamation

violates the rule that all taxes should be uniform and equitable. In maintaining the validity of Proclamation

No. 420, respondents contend that by extending to the John Hay SEZ economic incentives similar to those

enjoyed by the Subic SEZ which was also established under RA 7227, the proclamation is merely

implementing the legislative intent of the said law to turn the US military bases into hubs of business

activity or investment. Respondents insist that the governments policy of bases conversion cannot be

achieved without extending the same tax exemptions granted by RA 7227 to Subic SEZ and other SEZs.

ISSUE: Whether the grant by Proclamation No. 420 of national and local tax exemption and other

privileges to the John Hay SEZ is void for being violative of the Constitution

HELD:

YES. The legislature has the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class of property

from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. Other than Congress, the

Constitution may itself provide for specific tax exemptions or local governments may pass ordinances on

exemption only from local taxes. The challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the

Constitutions imposition that a law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority

of all members of the Congress. In the same vein, other kinds of privileges extended to the John Hay SEZ

are by tradition and usage for Congress to legislate upon.

Contrary to the respondents suggestions, the claimed statutory exemption of the John Hay SEZ

from taxation should be manifest and unmistakeable from the language of the law which it is based. If it

were the intent of the legislature to grant John Hay SEZ tax exemptions and incentives to the Subic SEZ, it

would have so expressly provided in the RA 7227.

Fabian v Desierto

Facts:

Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development

Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.

Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).

Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian tried to

terminate their relationship, but Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of

employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an administrative case

against Agustin, which eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman, but the Ombudsman, Aniano

Desierto, inhibited himself. But the case was later referred to the deputy Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.

The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is final and executory. Fabian

appealed the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770

(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that In all administrative diciplinary cases, orders,

directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a

petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or

decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: WoN Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid in accordance with Section 30, Article VI of the

1987 Constitution.

Held:

No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section

27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman

in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of

the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No countervailing

argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That

constitutional provision was intended to give the SC a measure of control over cases placed under its

appellate jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate

jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.

Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of

the SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over final judgments and orders of lower courts, that is,

the courts composing the integrated judicial system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or

agencies.

Tolentino v Secretary of Finance

Facts:

Arturo Tolentino et al, herein petitioners, assail the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known

as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino maintains that the revenue bill did not exclusively

originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even

though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not

complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means

Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that

what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text

of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text of the

HB.

ISSUE: W/N the EVAT law is procedurally invalid.

HELD:

NO. The Court rejected the petition, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the

power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HOR. What

the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HOR.

There were also several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HOR

version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution

has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no

showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt this over what has been done.

Philconsa v Enriquez

Facts:

House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and

approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and

limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the

President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels

allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the

passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the

President for consideration and approval. Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General

Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the Realignment of

Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.

Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the

ones authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress

themselves. President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain

provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension

funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

Held:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the

realignment. Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings,

and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to

be made. As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and

29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is

exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given authority.

Gonzales v Macaraig

Facts:

Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, also known as the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal

Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted

by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the

said Bill to the President for consideration and approval. Consequently, the President signed the Bill into

law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven Special Provisions

and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed. The Senate passed Resolution No. 381 a Petition for

Prohibition/ Mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining

Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking

to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688.

The Comment submitted by the Solicitor General after several extensions granted, was

considered as the answer to the Petition. Petitioners filed their Memorandum, but eventually filed a

Motion for Leave to file and to Admit Supplemental Petition, which was granted, this time questioning

the Presidents veto of certain provisions. The Solicitor Generals Comment on the Supplemental Petition,

on behalf of respondent public officials was submitted. The Court then required the parties to file

simultaneously their consolidated memoranda, to include the Supplemental Petition, within a period of

thirty days from notice. However, because the original Resolution merely required the filing of a

memorandum on the Supplemental Petition, a revised Resolution requiring consolidated memoranda,

within thirty days from notice. The Consolidated Memoranda were respectively filed by petitioners and

respondents. Thereafter, both Memoranda were noted and the case was deemed submitted for

deliberation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution

HELD:

No. The President did not exceed the item-veto and said veto is constitutional. When Sections 55

and 16, therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved or

reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of the President and other

key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and

efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests

in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway granted being

delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from

savings. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be struck down because they contravene the

constitution because it limits the power of the executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR

5.)

Indeed, a Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress

but in the case at hand, the Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners

argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" has lost force and effect with

the executive veto having been herein upheld.

Bengzon v Drilon

Facts:

Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently

receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos repealed section 3-A of RA

1797 which authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted

members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic

readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices

was not. The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and

privilege thus RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. President Aquino then vetoed HB 16297

as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court

of the Philippines and the Lower Courts when her advisers gave the wrong information that the

questioned provisions in 1992 General Appropriations Act were an attempt to overcome her earlier veto

in 1990.

Issue: W/n president Aquino's veto of GAA of FY 1992 is constitutional

Held:

No. General Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1992 is valid. Any argument which seeks to remove

special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there should be no grant of distinct

privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores the Constitutional provision which

provides that the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the

appropriations law. and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the

Judiciary be repealed. The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the

Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of

the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of

the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in

other items of the judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy

freedom in law.

Miller v Mardo

Facts:

In a consolidated labor dispute cases, the question whether the regional offices, as established by

the Reorganization Plan 20-A of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, holds exclusive

jurisdiction over labor disputes including disputes arising from the Workmens Compensation Law, all

cases affeceting money claims arising from the violation of labor standards on working conditions, and all

cases of unpaid wages over the Courts of First Instance.

The Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was established by RA 997 and amended

by RA 1241, creating for its purpose the abolishment of departments, offices, agencies, or functions which

may not be necessary, or the creation of those which may be necessary for the efficient conduct of the

government service, activities, and functions. Although, admittedly, the same provision under the

Commission refers only to administrative and not judicial functions, by virtue of the process under the

Commissions establishment, namely Sec 6a of RA997 which provides that those submitted by the

President to the Congress, if not revoked or admitted by the same legislative body within 70 session days

shall be deemed approved, and where the Reorganization Plan 20-As delegation of judicial powers to the

regional offices of the Department of Labor was not rejected nor approved by the body, it was deemed

approved by the Congress; therefore validating the delegation of judicial powers to the exclusive

jurisdiction of the regional offices of the Department of Labor.

Issue: WoN the delegation to the Department of Labor the exclusive jurisdiction over labor disputes can

hold ground.

Held:

NO. Section 6(a) of RA 997 cannot bear more weight than the elementary parliamentary

proceedings in a tri-departmental scheme for democracy. The Court likened the Section to Section 20(1)

of the 1935 Constitution and held that the process as provided in Section 6(a) of RA 997 is a dangerous

measure, and cannot be sustained as it dispenses with the passage, as the word denotes, by the two

separate houses of the Congress which effectively defeats the purpose and elementary parliamentary

proceedings in a tri-departmental scheme for democracy. Upon these grounds, the Reorganization Plan

20-A of the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission is decreed invalid and of no effect insofar

as confers exclusive judicial power to the regional offices of the Department of Labor.

ABAKADA Guro v Ermita

Facts:

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for

prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337,

amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section

4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of

goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These

questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the

Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006. Petitioners argue that the

law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate

of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power which violates Article 6 Section

28(2) of the Constitution.

Held:

NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the

execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly

delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his

authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go

forward. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent

and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply

execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to do so in such a manner is not within the province

of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret the law.

Tanada v Tuvera

Facts:

Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle

that in order for laws to be valid and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or

otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners Tanada et al seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera

et al to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various Presidential Decrees,

Letters of Instructions, Presidential Proclamations, Executive Orders and Administrative Orders.

Respondents contend that publication is unnecessary since the issuances in question already provide their

own dates of effectivity.

Issue: Whether or not the various Presidential issuances must be published before they take effect

HELD:

YES. Publication is indispensable in legislation. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall

take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless

it is otherwise provided. The SC has held that Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication

in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity, as they constitute

important legislative acts. The clear objective of the Civil Code provision is to give the public adequate

notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and

publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is

mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their

violation or otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this

category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as

administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been

circularized to all concerned.

Arnault v Balagtas

Facts:

The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2 estates, the Buenavista and

Tambobong Estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the

purchase which was effected. The price paid for both estates was P5, 000,000.

Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the

validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation,

petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440, 000, was delivered. Petitioner refused

to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered

his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the

new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who

received the P440, 000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed a habeas

corpus proceeding.

CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of petitioner pursuant to a Senate

Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not considering

his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made.

Further, on the ground that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is

consequently entitled to be released and discharged.

ISSUE: W/N the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt

HELD:

YES. The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This is

implied or incidental or necessary to the exercise of legislative power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the

principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective

authority; it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independent of the

other's authority and power.

Provided that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is committed in the

course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious

witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere

exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the

authority is not subject to judicial interference.

The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in order to enable it

to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from the judicial process wherein

offenders are brought to the courts of justice for punishment that criminal law imposes upon them. The

former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the courts; because

the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or process, while the latter has to do with

the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Facts:

PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices,

schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.

The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over

personal privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First

Manila Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the

possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC])

started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to

appear before it and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to

Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that

their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.

SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation

of the matter. The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the

defendants of the civil case

ISSUES: WoN the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose

Held:

No. The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of

the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the

implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the

formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution

in Congress and/or in the Senate alone. It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by

respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the

jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of

the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

Senate v Ermita

Facts:

The President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,

Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials appearing in

Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes.

The Senate through its various Committees conducts inquiries and investigations in aid of

legislation and the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the

Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project

of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group. They

also issued invitations on several AFP officials for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing

for the privilege speech of the some senators. Senate Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary

Ermita a letter respectfully requesting for the postponement of the hearing to which various executive

officials have been invited in order for said officials to study and prepare for various issues so they can

better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation. However, Sen. Drilon was unable to grant

such request because it was sent belatedly and all preparations are complete within that week. Pres.

Franklin Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita a copy of E.O. 464 and that executive

officials invited were not able to attend because they failed to secure the required consent from the

President.

Several petitions were filed before the court also challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464 and

infringe on their rights and impede them to fulfill their respective obligations.

ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in the Congress.

HELD:

Congress undeniably has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought

in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged,

it must state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. The power of inquiry, a power vested in

the Congress, is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 of Article VI because, according to the Court, a legislative

body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which

the legislation intended to affect or change; thus, making it an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the

legislative function. However, the infirm provisions of E.O. 464, allow the executive branch to evade

congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering

its reasons. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries

in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Sabio v Gordon

Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution

No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred

by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications

Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged

improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Senate Res. No. 455 was

submitted to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations and Committee on Public Services. On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under

the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein

petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the

Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The

purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455. On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio

declined the invitation because of prior commitment.7 At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O.

No. 1 which provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce

evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official

cognizance. The constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon

the Senates power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: WoN All PCGG members or staff are exempt from testifying in any judicial, legislative or

administrative proceeding

Held:

No. Article VI Section 21 provides, "The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its

respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published

rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." At

any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of

Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of

power to the committees. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power

upon the committees and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to effectively

perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees. The conferral of the legislative

power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for

its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI, Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and

usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign

and local.

Neri vs Senate

Facts:

Petitioner, Romulo Neri, herein invokes his right to executive privilege following a summon by the

Senate Committee on the investigation about the anomalous dealings regarding the publicly scrutinized

NBN-ZTE deal. In his capacity as the Director General of the National Economic and Development

Authority or NEDA, he was invited to attend the joint investigation regarding the abovementioned project

where he testified, before invoking his right to executive privilege, that he received an offer of P200

Million as a bribe in exchange for his approval of the project. When further asked questions regarding the

NBN-ZTE project, the petitioner refused to answer invoking executive privilege especially the questions 1)

whether or not the President (Arroyo) followed up the NBN Project, 2) whether or not she directed him

to prioritize it, and 3) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

After invoking executive privilege, he was issued a subpoena requiring him to attend a hearing

and testify which he did not do so saying that he was barred from attending upon the orders of the

President herself stating that the deal contained delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic

matters.

Issue: WoN executive privilege may be invoked upon the three questions asked to the petitioner

regarding the NBN-ZTE deal.

Held:

YES. In order for a claim to executive privilege to be valid, the Court cited the case of US vs Nixon

where three elements have been laid out in order to claim executive privilege: 1) the protected

communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power, 2) it must be

authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial

test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President, and 3) it may be overcome by

a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence, and

by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Anent the first element, it is maintained that the information regarding the three questions may

impair diplomatic as well as economic relations with China, and thus was held to be a matter related to

the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations. For the second

element, the petitioner is a member of the Presidents Cabinet. Third, there was no showing of a

compelling need to justify the revocation of the privilege as the questions do not fall under Section 21 of

Article VI of the Constitution regarding information that is in aid of legislation. Whereas this power of the

legislature under section 21 is mandatory upon a compelling interest to aid legislation, the question asked

to the petitioner falls under Section 22 of the same Article which speaks of the Congress oversight

function over the Executive, this power to compel the heads of departments is not mandatory.

Pimentel v Joint Commission

Facts:

Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence

of the Joint Committee of to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass

and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10,

2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. The petition corollarily

prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from

conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on

Canvassing. Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth

Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said

Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner

goes on, "all pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance

this view, he relies on legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both

Houses of Congress. Petitioners claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure,

precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by

Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This

section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory

recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the

elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the Joint Committee canvassing even Congress session has been terminated is

constitutional.

Held:

NO. Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its

regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number

of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of

Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time. Contrary to

petitioner's argument, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the

adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.

Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by peti