Cabestan_How China Demestic Politics and Foreign Policy Interact on the Taiwan Issue_2009

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Taiwan An Internal Affair How Chinarsquos Domestic Politics

and Foreign Policy Interact on the Taiwan Issue

Jean-Pierre Cabestan

Received 25 April 2008 Accepted 7 October 2008

Published online 30 November 2008

Springer Science + Business Media BV 2008

Abstract Taiwan may be an internal affair but the domestic public opinion is not

invited to participate very much in a debate and a decision-making process that have

remained confined to the Chinese Communist Party and the military top leadership

and on purpose involves a very small number of officials and experts Conservative

and nationalist forces do constrain Beijingrsquos Taiwan policy And some leaders are

tempted to use the Taiwan issue for unrelated domestic or foreign policy purpose

Nevertheless what is striking is the potential for flexibility in China rsquos Taiwan policy

While Chinese local governments and companiesrsquo increasing interests in business-

as-usual in the Strait and the unbearable cost of any armed conflict tend to narrow

the government rsquos options concentration of power and the efficiency of the

propaganda machine allow it to rather smoothly manage in particular vis-agrave-vis the

elitesrsquo conservative opinion group as well as its own public opinion this flexibility

Keywords China Decision-making Foreign policy Peoplersquos Liberation Army

Taiwan United States

Introduction

Since 1949 the authorities of the Peoplersquos Republic of China (PRC) have

continuously claimed that Taiwan is not only an inalienable part but also an internal

affair of China At the same time there has always been a strong international

dimension in the Taiwan issue Taiwanrsquos democratization in the late 1980s and quest

for a better international status since the early 1990s if not formal independence

have forced the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership to adjust its own

unification policy And for this reason since Taiwanrsquos missile crisis (1995 ndash 1996)Beijing has better accepted this international dimension and in particular the role

East Asia (2009) 261 ndash 20

DOI 101007s12140-008-9063-y



played by the United States in the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait

Today Beijing wants Washington to help it in preventing Taiwan from moving

towards formal independence mdash even if this danger has receded since Ma Ying-jeoursquos

election in March 2008 mdash and perhaps also in finding a solution to cross-Strait

differences In other words China rsquos Taiwan policy is not only determined bydomestic considerations but also by two other outside factors the United States

policy and the current developments in Taiwan1 Yet there is probably no Chinese

foreign policy issue which is more closely linked to domestic politics

This linkage is more complex than it may appear at first glance On the one hand

Taiwanrsquo separate existence under the name of Republic of China (ROC) has been a

constant reminder of unfinished business the unification of China under the PRC

rule How to reach this objective has always been the subject of vivid discussions

and a source of disagreements among the CCP elite as well as among scholars

Although these debates have partly remained secret and can anytime be hijacked bydomestic considerations they underscore a larger variety of opinions than is often

thought outside of China

On the other hand the survival of the ROC on part of China rsquos territory its

democratization in the 1980s and its renewed quest for a better international status

directly question the legitimacy of the PRCrsquos polity and put growing pressure on the

CCP leaders to contemplate a genuine political reform Taiwan has become a lively

illustration of the successful graft of democratic values on a Chinese society

weakening the arguments of the current CCP leadership on the political value gap

between the West and Confucian societies if not Asia as a whole It is clear thatrather than pursuing ambitious political reform objectives Hu Jintao and his

colleagues have continued to emphasize the drawbacks of Taiwanrsquos democracy and

resort to nationalism including when need be anti-Taiwan sentiments to enhance

the CCPrsquos legitimacy and keep the country united However for nearly two decades

the Taiwanrsquos democratization experience has fed China rsquos own debates about political

reform both within and outside the Party [28]

Yet illustrating Peter Gourevitchrsquos ldquosecond image reversedrdquo the international and

in particular the power politics dimensions of the Taiwan issue constrain to a large

extent the domestic debates in China both on the policy towards Taiwan and the

Taiwanrsquos political experience [15]

For these reasons the linkage between China rsquos Taiwan policy and China rsquos

political reform needs to be carefully analyzed Obviously there is a possible

connection between Beijingrsquos rigid unification policy and its staunch opposition to

study from Taiwanrsquos political experience But as we will see below this connection

is probably a very complex and indirect one While the unsolved Taiwan issue is far

from being the main obstacle to any genuine political reform any recognition of the

survival of the ROC on part of China rsquos territory may challenge the PRCrsquos legitimacy

And a true democratization of mainland China can but bear important consequences

for Taiwan and the relations across the Taiwan Strait Can a democratic China accept

Taiwanrsquos independence Or on the contrary will it precipitate reunification Though

2 East Asia (2009) 261 ndash 20



Regarding the current situation a number of often too-quickly accepted

assumptions should also be scrutinized The CCP leadership often invokes domestic

political pressures to justify its current unification strategy any acceptance of

Taiwanrsquos formal independence would be suicidal for any CCP leadership [23]

p 186) However the difficulty here resides in assessing these domestic pressuresDo they mainly come from the hardliners in the Party and the Peoplersquos Liberation

Army (PLA) Are they really embedded in the society and among its intellectual or

business elite Arenrsquot there members of these elites or even of the CCP leadership

who would be ready to negotiate a more flexible solution to the differences between

Beijing and Taipei What is the role of the CCP official propaganda in preventing

larger segments of the elites and the society from adopting a more open-minded

approach of the Taiwan issue Is popular nationalism as opposed to state

nationalism a true obstacle to flexibility And finally has the centralization of

decision-making on Taiwan not allowed the CCP leadership to manage such pressures and introduce flexibility when it serves its interest

On China One Dream Unification

The policy of the Beijing authorities is well-know and just needs to be summed up here

there is only one China the Peoplersquos Republic of China Taiwan is a ldquosacred part of the

PRCrdquo as indicated in the 1982 state constitutionrsquos preamble the central government rsquo sole

objective can but be the unification preferably by peaceful means of theldquo

motherlandrdquo

on the basis of the ldquoone country two system formula rdquo ( yiguo liangzhi) a political recipe

designed by Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s initially for Taiwan but first applied to

Hong Kong (1997) and then Macau (1999) Article 31 of the constitution instituting

ldquospecial administrative regionsrdquo (tebie xingzhengqu) was also designed for welcoming

back Taiwan More recently in March 2005 an Anti-Secession Law ( fan fanlie fa) was

promulgated both to keep in check Taiwanrsquos pro-independence forces and to better

guarantee ldquo peaceful reunification of the mortherlandrdquo ( zuguo heping tongyi)

Conversely the Party leaders have repeatedly stated that no Chinese government

would accept Taiwanrsquos independence since the island has been part of China ldquosince

ancient timesrdquo Moreover because the Republic of China ceased to exist and was

replaced by the PRC in 1949 the Taiwanese entity cannot be considered as a state

while for a long time Beijing has stopped qualifying Taiwan as a ldquorebel islandrdquo it

usually calls it a ldquo political entityrdquo ( zhengquan) de facto acknowledging that it has been

separated from the mainland but not from China since then Negotiations and talks

across the Taiwan Strait therefore can only be based on the precondition that both sides

accept that there is one China although Beijing accepts not to define this notion and the

Kuomintang (KMT) indicates that ldquoeach side keeps its own interpretationrdquo ( yige

Zhongguo gezi biaoshu) That is what both the KMT (and the whole pan-blue camp in

Taiwan) and the CCP have since 2000 called the ldquo92 consensusrdquo ( jiursquo er gongshi) a

verbal agreement reached in late 1992 but which ex-president Chen Shui-bian the

East Asia (2009) 261 ndash 20 3



citizens confirm this point As we will see below there may be differences of view

about the specifics of this policy the strategy to privilege or the likelihood of

reunification in the foreseeable future but this very aim is the only one conceivable

by the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population

The efficiency of the CCP propaganda and education machine and its strongldquoorientationrdquo role on the internet as well as the impossibility to expose on the

mainland the historical arguments made by the pro-independence Taiwanese all

contribute to explaining this strong consensus [2] However on the whole this

consensus has an obvious nationalist dimension that constrains any Chinese political

regime be it authoritarian or democratic For most Chinese since its return to China

in 1945 after Japanrsquos defeat Taiwan has been part of the Chinese nation and no other

country has tried to claim it

In other words unification with Taiwan may be a dream but this is the only dream

that the Beijing authorities and most mainland Chinese can contemplate This basicreality narrows the room of manoeuvre of any Chinese government and facilitates all

sort of domestic utilization of the Taiwan issue often as the Chinese Communists

would say ldquofor ulterior motivesrdquo But at the same time the long-term separation of

Taiwan the cost of any military adventure the centralization of decision-making on

Taiwan and the gradual economic integration across the Strait have also created

constituencies pushing for more political flexibility vis-agrave-vis Taiwan This means that

mainland Chinese may just agree about opposing by all means Taiwanrsquos formal

independence and very well disagree about the solution of the ldquoTaiwan issuerdquo

Domestic Obstacles to Flexibility

A number of genuine domestic obstacles have prevented the Chinese government

from adopting a more open-minded approach to the Taiwan issue and on the

contrary often forced it to opt for a very safe and hard-line policy on the matter

However we need to establish a distinction between on the one hand these

genuine obstacles and on the other hand the utilization of the Taiwan issue made by

domestic constituencies pursuing specific political aims as well as the utilization by

Beijing of supposedly-strong domestic pressures as a leverage to exert additional

pressure on Taipei or on Washington

Among the true domestic obstacles to flexibility two major ones should be

mentioned 1) the legitimacy of the PRC and nationalism and 2) the hardliners

within the CCP and the PLA leadership

Regime Legitimacy and Nationalism

Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of communist ideology the PRC

regimersquos legitimacy and survival have been closely linked to its ability to remain the

best promoter of nationalism That is how the CCP leadership sees itself and wants




For this reason on the one hand Taiwanrsquos independence remains inconceivable

It is true that the long-term separation of this island and its de facto independence

have not affected China rsquos successful path towards economic takeoff and interna-

tional rise It is also true that it is more likely today to meet mainland Chinese who

understand Taiwanesersquos lack of interest for unification and would not opposeTaiwanrsquos independence However this opinion group remains small and probably

minuscule Aware of this reality the CCP leadership continues to portrait itself as the

best defender of China rsquos sovereignty and true heir of the national borders left by the

Manchu Empire in 1911 (with the exception of Outer Mongolia which independence

was reluctantly accepted by Chiang Kai-shek in 1945 then Mao Zedong in 1947 ndash

1950) Its offensive against the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan ldquosplittistsrdquo after protest

and violence broke out in China rsquos Tibetan areas in March 2008 is the most recent

illustration of this highly principled policy And again this policy is largely

approved by the Chinese societyOn the other hand although it was excluded from the United Nations for more

than twenty years engaged in an ideological battle against the KMT the Beijing

regime never accepted the coexistence of two Chinese states on the international

stage And Chiang Kai-shek rsquos stubborn attachment to the ldquoone China principlerdquo

actually facilitated the PRCrsquos entry into the UN and the ROCrsquos expulsion in 1971

[3] p 119) In spite of the adoption in 1979 of a peaceful reunification strategy the

CCP leadership has continued to ignore the ROCrsquos survival on part of the national

territory feeding rather than discouraging the pro-independence movement on

Taiwan as well as the Taiwanesersquos quest to return to the UN Justified in several policy documents which try hard to draw a line between China rsquos and other divided

nationsrsquo situations (Germany or Korea) this stance stems directly from a need for the

PRC to preserve its political legitimacy both as the only official representative of

China the best promoter of reunification and also the best polity for China 2

In the last decade or so some critics in China (and of course many more in

Taiwan) have argued that reconciliation and unification can only be based on a

recognition of the reality on the ground and so to speak ldquothe other rdquo [17]

Nevertheless for domestic political reasons eg legitimizing the leading role of the

CCP and the perpetuation of the one party system it remains quasi-impossible for

the current regime to openly embark into a two-China policy Such a change would

provoke a strong political earthquake in China and would risk dividing and even

splitting the CCP leadership into two opposite camps one continuing to refer to

1949 as the founding date of ldquo New China rdquo the other one trying to close the civil war

and moving to another approach to China rsquos division and the Chinese nation

Finally there is a power politics dimension in the Taiwan issue that feeds

nationalism and constrains to a large extent domestic debates both on the policy

towards Taiwan and Taiwanrsquos political experience The close strategic relationship

between Taipei and Washington as well as China rsquos international objectives make any

recognition of the ROC statehood not to mention Taiwanrsquos independence more

uncertain On the contrary China rsquos great power ambitions and strategic competition




can contemplate to address this issue as well as to postponing any prospect for

democratization on the mainland

Hardliners in the Party and the Military

Very often the Chinese military has been identified as the main source of

conservatism on and resistance to a more flexible policy towards Taiwan it is also

presented as the most powerful driver pushing for a military action against the

island All this is true but the reality is more complex China rsquos conservatism on

Taiwan is far from being limited to the military fed as we have just seen by a strong

and politically much-needed nationalism although the military are often perceived

as being more inclined to show strength assertiveness or rigidity towards Taiwan

not every PLA general has a preference for war and are more aware than the

civilians of their own weaknesses and limitations to conquer Taiwan or even to takecontrol of the Strait in a scenario that would involve the USA the Chinese military

may be more prudent than anticipated if the CCP leadership asked them to act [ 5]

It is clear that over the years a number of PLA officials have made public their

strong views about Taiwan and given the impression that they would rather opt for a

military solution of the issue This was particularly the case after Lee Teng-huirsquos

unofficial visit to the USA in May 1995 Leersquos qualification of cross-Strait relations as

state-to-state relations (liangguolun) in July 1999 or August 2002 Chen Shui-bianrsquo

statement that indicated that there was one country on each side of the Strait ( yibian

yiguo) On these occasions Hong Kong media (as monthly magazine Zhengming )reported about pressures mdash often through open letters or petitions mdash exerted by active

or retired PLA leaders on the CCP leadership to show more assertiveness vis-agrave-vis or

even ldquoteach a lessonrdquo (meaning a limited use of force) to Taiwan For instance at the

Beidaihe meeting that took place just after the Taiwanese president rsquos July 1999

statement some generals (probably both active and retired) argued for a military

action against Taiwan (as taking control of one of Taiwanrsquos off-shore islands) [4]

p 5 [23] p 193)

After Chen Shui-bianrsquos first referendum and reelection in March 2004 this

pressure did not stop and actually intensified In July 2005 putting the stakes pretty

high General Zhu Chenghu then president of the National Defense University

threatened to use nuclear weapons against America if the USA decided to intervene

in an armed conflict over Taiwan3 Although the Chinese government took rapidly

its distance from Zhursquos views this statement was clearly understood as a trying

balloon by both Taiwan and the US

It is hard to deny that there are probably more hard-line views about Taiwan

within than outside the PLA for two main reasons its responsibility is to prepare for

war not to negotiate peaceful reunification the job of the civilian government as

3 He was quoted as saying ldquoIf the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition into the




candidly stated a PLA officer in 19994 and as every military the PLA is less open to

ldquoliberalrdquo opinions innovative solutions or difficult compromises than the rest of the

CCP leadership or the society

At the same time when bluntly asked by Jiang Zemin in the summer 1999 ldquoif the

United States intervenes to defend Taiwan are you sure to prevailrdquo the PLAleaders admitted that they were not ready True thereafter addressing their request

Jiang decided to increase the PLA budget more rapidly and give them the means to

ldquosolve the Taiwan problem by force if peaceful methods failrdquo5 Nevertheless it

remains to be seen whether all the military leaders would be ready to embark without

hesitation in such an adventure even when the PLA has mastered the ldquoasymmetrical

weaponsrdquo it claims to possess and is able to use them to deter the US from

interfering in a military operation against Taiwan Actually it can be argued that in

such circumstances some PLA generals could show more caution and moderation

than civilian ideologues and hardliners that may on the contrary for politico-ideological reasons mdash as guaranteeing the CCPrsquos grip to power push for a daring

armed conflict in the Strait

While it remains hard to speculate on the future China rsquos past practice and

experience may serve as an indicator As documented in many studies the Chinese

military never voiced their views alone such views are usually heard in a context of

crisis triggered by a Taiwanese or an American initiative which contributes to the

building of a hardlinersrsquo coalition made of both civilian and military leaders that can

exert strong pressure on the CCPrsquos top leadership the Politburorsquos Standing

Committee (PBSC) the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the SecretaryGeneral (GS) [26] pp 289 ndash 336)

Such a coalition took shape in June 1995 after Lee Teng-huirsquos rebuttal of Jiang

Zemingrsquos overture (his January 1995 Eight Points) and Leersquos visit to the USA Then

Jiang had to give in to such a coalition (made of among others Li Peng Li

Ruihuan Qiao Shi Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen) and in order to

consolidate his position proposed two series of missile tests in the vicinity of

Taiwan instead of one [32] p 8) Later in March 1996 he decided to test missiles

much closer to the island provoking a well-known US reaction the dispatch of two

aircraft-carrier groups to the Taiwan area

It is worth noting that while the Central Committeersquos Taiwan Affairs Leading Small

Group ( Zhonggong zhongyang Taiwan shiwu lingdao xiaozu TALSG) of which

Jiang had taken control as early as June 1993 became in the year 1994 ndash 1995 the

main decision-making body on Taiwan (it drafted Jiangrsquos Eight Points) this leading

group did not make any key decision during the crisis this power was exerted

collectively by the PBSC with the participation of the CMC [26] pp 319 ndash 327)6

A similar scenario occurred in the summer 1999 Then Jiang had not only to

promise the PLA additional resources and let its Air Force violate on several

occasion Taiwanrsquos airspace as a show of force He was put on the defensive by a

number of hardliners who estimated that contrary to what Deng had thought before




ldquo peace and development rdquo were no more the main trends in the world [12] But again

decisions were not made in the TALSG but in the BPSG and later at the Beidahe

meeting including Politburo CMC and retired military leaders

However these two examples differ on one point in 1999 Jiang was a stronger

leader than in 1995 and in a better position to resist the most extreme proposals

Weak Leader and Strong Leader

The division of responsibilities between the TALSG and the PBSG is quite a logical

one although including a military leader (the deputy chief of the general staff in

charge of intelligence then Xiong Guangkai) the TALSG could not make any

decision of military nature on Taiwan However the TALSGrsquos scope of competence

and more generally China rsquos ability to draft and carry out coherent policies and

initiatives towards Taiwan depend upon the status of the CCP Secretary General In1995 Jiangrsquos position as number one of the Party and the military had not yet been

fully consolidated Deng Xiaoping had just retired from politics (he died in February

1997) and Jiang was on his own trying as head of the CCP and as his predecessors

(Mao and Deng) to take control of China rsquos Taiwan policy

Having to lead but also to negotiate as a primus inter pares (first among equal)

with two powerful groups of leaders mdash the members of the PBSC and the CMC mdash

he was under unprecedented pressure to deliver This pressure was intensified by the

fact that in the PRC leaders from both leading bodies often get together with

additional officials who may have a say in the matter in informal enlarged meetingsthat tend to intensify the influence of the dominant opinion group of the time For

instance Zhang Zhen a CMC leader but not a PBSC member and Foreign Minister

Qian Qichen a simple Politburo member took part in the key meetings that

endorsed the decision to test missiles Conversely in 1999 Jiang was more in a

position to resist conservative pressures not only thanks to the USrsquos help7 but also

because he had been able to strengthen mdash e g through a series of promotions mdash its

control over the PLA and consolidate his power at the 15th Party Congress in 1997

Today Hu Jintaorsquos status appears much stronger than 1995rsquos Jiang Since September

2004 he has chaired the CMC and since the 17th Party Congress (October 2007) has

on the whole strengthened his grip on the leadership A year earlier in May 2003 Hu

had already taken over the TALSG chairmanship Of course then several of Jiangrsquos

allies still sat in the TALGS including Jia Qinglin number four of the BPSG and

Chairman of the Chinese Political Peoplersquos Consultative Conference (CPPCC an

assembly symbolizing the CCPrsquos united front policy) who then became TALSG vice-

chairman Wang Gang head of the CCP General Office Guo Boxiong the CMC first

vice-chairman and PLA boss Xiong Guangkai deputy chief of staff in charge of

intelligence Tang Jiaxuan State Councillor in charge of foreign affairs and Ms Liu

Yandong director of the CCP United Front Department 8

7




But after the 17th Party Congress and Ma Ying-jeoursquos election Hu reshuffled

and slightly reformed the institutional composition of the TALGS underlining a

change of policy emphasis moving from the military to trade and (hopefully)

from threat to economic integration On the one hand Guo Boxiong apparently

left the TALGS Since 2008 the PLA has been only represented by Ma Xiaotian the new deputy chief of the general staff in charge of intelligence On

the other hand in April 2008 Commerce Minister Chen Deming (Bo Xilairsquos

successor) was promoted to the TALGS And the majority of the other ex officio

representatives of the various ldquo bureaucratic constituenciesrdquo concerned with Taiwan

are now closer to Hu than to Jiang they include Ling Jihua the new head of the

CCP General Office State Councillor Dai Bingguo Du Qinglin the new CCP

United Front Department Director Geng Huichang the new minister of State

Security and Wang Yi the new Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) director (and former

deputy foreign minister) Only Jia Qinglin and Chen Yunlin the new ARATS(Association for the Relations across the Taiwan Strait) chairman and Wang

Daohanrsquos long-awaited successor (Wang died in December 2005) have long been

associated with Jiang However they both have no other choice today but to work

for Hu [8] p 7)

That said the pattern described above would again apply in case of crisis and

past practice has always given an advantage in such circumstances to the most

prudent and nationalistic opinion group forcing the leadership to shelf or refrain

from making any bold initiative For instance under Chen Shui-bianrsquos presidency

hardliners utilized and even exaggerated the strength of the pro-independenceforces on Taiwan the rise of the Taiwanese identity and the magnitude of the

Taiwanese societyrsquos lsquodesinisationrdquo ( feizhongguohua) to prevent the resuming of

any talks without preconditions mdash -a return to the ldquo1992 consensusrdquomdash with Taipei9

And they are subject to take excuse of the ROCrsquos unabated quest for a better

international status to sabotage future negotiations if Ma Ying-jeou does not

compromise enough

This is not to say that a crisis is likely to break out in the coming years As we

will see below KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeoursquos victory in Taiwanrsquos March 2008

presidential election and Taiwanrsquos return to the so-called ldquo1992 consensusrdquo are

conducive to ease Hursquos job allowing him and the TALSG to conduct most of

Taiwanrsquos policy Nevertheless if an important agreement is to be approved (as an

end of hostility accord or military confidence-building measures) the BPSC and

the CMC will have to endorse it giving an opportunity to more conservatives

forces within the leadership to express their view and influence the final decision

[14]

In other words the CCP top leadership remains subject to genuine pressures from

the hardliners in the Party and the PLA as well as the nationalist elements of the

society And these pressures intensify in case of an unwelcome initiative of the part

of Taiwan or the USA facilitate the constitution of a conservative and sometimes

bellicose coalition and are harder to resist when the CCP Secretary General (and




Political Utilization of the Taiwan Issue for Domestic Purpose

The Taiwan issue has sometimes been utilized by forces or institutions pursing a

domestic political agenda that is not necessarily or directly related to Taiwan This

was particularly true at the time of Mao Zedong when the slogan ldquowe must liberateTaiwanrdquo (women yiding yao jiefang Taiwan) was used more as a glue to mobilize

the society around domestic political goals than as a marching order to launch an

attack against the ldquorebel islandrdquo

Since 1979 and in particular the early 1990s this type of instrumentalization of

the Taiwan issue has become quasi-marginal Of course as we have seen the CCP

has promoted state nationalism as a key feature of its ideology And nationalist

media such as Huanqiu shibao (Global Times) and commentators as Yan Xuetong

are encouraged to air their views on Taiwan and launch vitriolic attacks against

Taiwan or the USA every time tension increases in the Strait Besides Chinesemedia know pretty well that Taiwan is a topic that sells well

Nevertheless as far as Taiwan is concerned even when Taipei launched an

initiative that it condemned the CCP leadership never encouraged the society to get

mobilized and organize demonstrations against Taiwan independence or separation

In this respect there has been a staunch contrast with the CCP laissez faire attitude

about and utilization of protests against the US (for example in the aftermath of the

NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade) Japan (the 2005

demonstrations against history textbooks) or France (the April 2008 boycott

movement of Carrefour chain stores after the disrupted passage of the OlympicTorch in Paris) In other words the CCP leadership seems to remain much more

hostile to political participation on the Taiwan issue as if it wanted to keep as much

room for manoeuvre in terms of political decision-making and options including mdash

and probably especially mdash in periods of crisis

This last point is probably not unrelated to the temptation of some segments of the

politico-military elite to use Taiwan for domestic political purpose Two cases of

instrumentalization have taken place in the past 1) by some members of the CCP

leadership in order to weaken or even destabilize the top leader and 2) by PLA

generals in order to get more resources

The June 1995 offensive launched by leaders as different as Qiao Shi Li Peng Li

Ruihuan and Liu Huaqing is probably the best example of a concerted pressure on

the Secretary General by opinion groups following conflicting domestic political

agendas It made sense that hardliners such as Li Peng and military leaders such as

Liu Huaqing criticized Jiangrsquos Taiwan policy as too soft But the attacks of more

reformist leaders such as Qiao Shi and Li Ruihuan were probably motivated by their

own rivalry with Jiang whom they tried to weaken and perhaps destabilize [25]

p 262) And probably Li Peng and Liu Huaqing also took advantage of the situation

to try to clip Jiangrsquos wings This is to say that Taiwan is such a sensitive issue that

political challengers are often inclined to use it as a leverage for pushing interests

that are not necessarily related to this matter




leverage to receive additional resources that are not going to be allocated to the

Taiwan theatre As we know for a few years a debate has developed in the PLA

about the place Taiwan should occupy in the PLA modernization plan and strategic

objectives10 Should all the modernization effort be concentrated on the establishment

of a capacity to conquer or submit Taiwan Or should the PLA limit itself todeploying weapons aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independence mdash as the

1300 plus conventional short-range missiles targeted at the island in spite of their

questionable value [22] Although the debate is far from being over it underscores a

recognition of the greater diversity of security objectives followed by the PLA

borders air defence nuclear second strike capability internal order in particular in

Xinjiang and in Tibet sea lines of communications participation in UN sponsored

Peace-Keeping Operations protection of the growing number of PRC nationals living

abroad and especially in unsafe areas like Africa

Taiwan remains of course a prominent political and diplomatic objective but China rsquos own strategic ambitions in East Asia vis-agrave-vis the USA and in the rest of the

world are conducive to actually move away its attention from Taiwan as a military

objective provided that Beijing and Washington keep a close level of understanding

and cooperation on that matter For these reasons the PLArsquos vocal concerns and

strong views about Taiwan should be scrutinized with attention and not always taken

at face value

Utilization of Domestic Pressures for Diplomatic Purpose

Similarly the Chinese government has often been tempted to instrumentalize the

domestic pressures and ldquo public opinionrdquo as a leverage to extract more diplomatic

concessions on the part of the Taiwanese or the American authorities For example

between 2004 and 2007 the risks of constitutional change or formal declaration of

independence were obviously exaggerated in order to secure additional American

and KMT pressures on Chen Shui-bian

This exaggeration is also perceptible in a number of American analyses of the Taiwan

issue For instance in the chapter on Taiwan of Susan Shirk rsquos otherwise excellent book

China A Fragile Superpower it seems that the influence of the hardliners the pro-

war leaders is overestimated past crises (1995 ndash 1996 1999 2002) are presented in

too of an alarmist way as if they could have degenerated into an armed conflict and

the positive role played by the US in these crises is also artificially swollen

We know from other sources that in 1996 since the very beginning Beijing had

informed Washington about the scope of the exercises or the limits of the incursions

Of course miscalculation is a problem However past crises such as the EP3

incident in April 2001 have demonstrated that after having covered if not endorsed

aggressive behaviours the Chinese authorities can also rapidly de-escalate when

they want Moreover while drawing the lessons from the 1995 ndash 1996 crisis Beijing

and Washington had developed a better channel of communication and level of

understanding in the following crises that actually shortened them More generally




interlocutors of the strength of the hardliners and the ldquowarmonger rdquo factions Given

on purpose a free ride in time of crisis the nationalist media and commentators are

also used in that aim

Yet as we have seen neither in 1996 nor in 1999 the PLA was ready to launch

any kind of attack against Taiwan In 1999 the pro-war leaders were actually easilyconvinced by Jiang Zemin to calm down They were allowed to fly fighter planes

across the middle line in the Taiwan Strait In return Jiang just pretended to be

ldquotoughrdquo in promising more high tech weapons to the military and in continuing to

accumulate missiles targeted against Taiwan [23] p 193) And since 2000 in spite

of Chen Shui-bianrsquos election the CCP leadership has embarked onto a new policy

initiated by Jiang himself and deepened by Hu Jintao after 2004 that instead of

trying to accelerate unification and imposing a deadline on that process has

concentrated on preventing Taiwanrsquos formal independence and ldquowinning the heart of

the Taiwaneserdquo

In other words the changes that have occurred in China rsquos Taiwan

policy since the early 2000 underscore that there is more room for manoeuvre than

anticipated They also force us to reassess the genuine strength of the ldquo pro-war or

pro-military solution factionrdquo in the Chinese leadership and the ability of the PLA to

influence the Taiwan policy

Domestic Factors of Flexibility

This larger-than-often-recognized room of manoeuvre stems from a number of domestic factors of flexibility Often overlooked these factors include the

centralization in the RPCrsquos decision-making process on Taiwan the efficiency and

versatility of its propaganda machinery the growing influence of the business

community and finally the cost of any conflict with Taiwan

The Centralization of Decision-Making

Generally the Chinese government has been rather successful in insulating its

Taiwan policy as the rest of its foreign policy from domestic constrains In this

sense Chinese leaders are pro-active realists they try as much as possible and

usually manage to isolate its Taiwan policy from domestic political pressures outside

of the top CCP leadershiprsquos inner circle The centralization of decision-making on

Taiwan has not only limited any domestic constituencies from interfering in this

process but also reduced the influence of leaders who are not involved in the policy

towards Taiwan on a day-to-day basis

Recognizing himself the failure of the past objectives (eg speeding up

unification) in 2000 Jiang was able in spite of Chen Shui-bianrsquos election to

introduce a more flexible policy towards Taiwan Of course some important external

factors also forced China to reassess its strategy including George W Bushrsquos

election in November 2000 However once his power was consolidated Jiang was




de-link the negotiations on commercial matters from any hypothetical acceptance by

Chen of the ldquoone China principlerdquo or even the ldquo1992 consensusrdquo allowing semi-

direct charter flights across the Strait to start on the occasion of the Chinese New

Year in 2003 and to resume in 2005 In October 2002 when visiting the USA for

the first time Jiang proposed Bush to freeze the deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan in exchange for a halt to American arms sales to Taiwan And after March

2000 (and Zhu Rongjirsquos famous warning to the Taiwanese voters) aware that past

threats and admonitions had actually backfire the CCP leadership has refrained from

interfering in Taiwanese elections

All these initiatives would have been hard to make without this degree of

concentration of power and a very limited scope of discussion among the leadership

and experts Satisfied of the additional resources allocated to them and working on

the modernization of their weapons the PLA leaders did not apparently try to stop or

even to criticize this new policy nor did the hardlinersAfter taking control of the TALSG in May 2003 Hu managed to deepen this

evolution despite Chenrsquos unwelcome initiatives (referendum) and re-lection in March

2004 True Hu has not abandoned the final goal put forward by his predecessors

including Deng Xiaoping He has continued to intensify China rsquos military pressure on

Taiwan in order to change in its favour the bilateral military balance He never tried to

open unconditional talks with Chen However he decided to de-emphasize Deng

Xiaopingrsquos ldquoone country two systemrdquo formula 11 He succeeded to strengthen China rsquos

united front strategy and cultivated closer contacts with Taiwanrsquos opposition parties

Taking advantage of the political polarization in Taiwan he wooed the blue camp(KMT and Peoplersquos First Party) and convinced it in 2005 to establish direct relations

with the CCP in spite of the adoption of an anti-secession law

Actually the 2005 anti-secession law is another illustration of this relative

moderation of Beijingrsquos Taiwan policy Initially the Chinese government was reported

to work on a unification law perhaps establishing a deadline by which Taiwan was

supposed to reunify with the mainland For instance in November 2002 Chinese

scholar Yu Yuanzhou associate professor in the Law School of the Jianghan University

in Hubei Province drafted a ldquonational unification promotion lawrdquo12 And after Chen

Shui-bianrsquos re-election some Chinese officials in particular in the State Council

Taiwan Affairs Office became very interested in this draft and proposed to adopt it in

order to warn Chen and prevent any additional move towards independence However

by the end of 2004 it became clear that the CCP had preferred to draft an anti-

secession law putting stringent restrictions to any unilateral change of the status quo

by the Taiwanese authorities but not trying to precipitate unification

This law was obviously a compromise and included a threat to resort to ldquonon-

peaceful meansrdquo ( fei heping fanshi) to solve the Taiwan issue But the wording of the

second casus belli introduced in the February 2000 White Papers (the first one is a

declaration of independence) was somewhat toned down war would not be started

any more in case of Taiwanrsquos sine die refusal to open unification negotiations

instead ldquonon peaceful meansrdquo would be employed if ldquoall the possibilities for a




peaceful reunification should be completely exhaustedrdquo13 And the ldquoone country two

systemrdquo formula was not enshrined in the law In other words the anti-secession law

underlines that priority should now be given to fighting against a formal

independence of Taiwan not to questioning the status quo

At the 17th Party congress Hu Jintao went further and emphasized the promotionof a ldquo peaceful development of cross-strait relationsrdquo (liang rsquo an heping fazhan) as well

as the ldquocommunity of liferdquo ( shengming gongtongti) across the Strait or the ldquoshared

destinyrdquo of both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese a transparent echo to Taipeirsquos

1994 White Papers that underlined that the Taiwanese had created their own

ldquocommunity of liferdquo or nation ldquoPeaceful development in the Strait rdquo is a reference to

Hursquos ldquo peaceful riserdquo (heping jueqi) a concept that he had to abandon in the spring

2004 because of opposition from both moderates (concerned about the rise) and the

hardliners (irritated about the idea that peace was a must) But the idea is the same

time is for stabilization andldquo

normalizationrdquo

with Taiwan not unificationMa Ying-jeoursquos election in March 2008 will probably contribute to keeping the

PRCrsquos decision-making pattern on Taiwan highly centralized but this centralization is

not new And even in times of crises the Chinese leadership never gave the impression

of being uncoordinated on Taiwan The PLA never took any decision that was not first

not only approved by the CCP leadership but also well publicized to the other side

(including the daring incursions in the Taiwanese airspace in 1999) Recent

dysfunctions between the PLA and the Foreign Ministry around the Anti-satellite

test in January 2007 or the US Aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk rsquos port call in Hong Kong in

November 2007 may be a source of concern in Taipei or in Washington Howeverthere are no precedents of such dysfunctions in the Taiwan Strait

The Versatility of the Propaganda Machine and Popular Nationalism

As indicated in the first section the PRCrsquos propaganda machine has always been

efficient at framing the terms of the debates among the Chinese elites and public

opinion For instance when Beijing wants to exert pressure on Taipei and

Washington it intensifies its attacks against ldquoseparatist forcesrdquo in Taiwan portraying

every Taiwanese politician that wishes to improve the island-statersquos international

status as a ldquosplittist rdquo This type of offensive was common after Lee Teng-huirsquos visit

to the USA or publication of his ldquotwo state theoryrdquo A similar kind of tactic has been

used since unrest and violence in Tibet broke out in March 2008 against the Dalai

Lama who although he abandoned for a long time any quest for independence is

still presented as a ldquosplittist rdquo aiming at dismantling China

The PRC authoritiesrsquo official discourse has a strong impact on the domestic

public opinion in the 1990s most Chinese thought that Lee Teng-hui wanted to

definitely separate Taiwan from China Actually in his July 1999 famous interview

with the Deutsche Welle that triggered the second crisis in the Strait Lee had also

shown some moderation for instance he was the first to make public 18 months

before Chen Shui-bian the concept of ldquo political integrationrdquo ( zhengzhi tonghe)




between the two sides of the Strait The same can be said of the Chinesersquos popular

perception of the Dalai Lama today

However the CCP propaganda machine has demonstrated an ability to reverse its

own discourse rather quickly when new priorities are designed Beijingrsquos

reconciliation with the KMT after 2000 is a well-known example And its non-confrontational attitude vis-agrave-vis if not tolerance of Ma Ying-jeoursquos quest for a

better ROC international status is a more recent illustration of this flexibility [21] In

such cases differences are put aside and objectives that would have been taboo

before can be contemplated For instance Michael Swaine indicates that in the mid-

1990s three basic approaches to the Taiwan issue emerged in the Chinese

leadership 1) accelerate the unification process 2) gradually move towards

unification through two stages peaceful agreement first and unification negotiations

later 3) give priority to preventing Taiwan independence [26] pp 316 ndash 317) The first

view was strong in the PLA the state security apparatus and the Ministry of ForeignAffairs the second view prevailed in the TALSG and in the Taiwan Affairs Office

and was initially supported by Jiang Zemin the third view was held by a minority of

officials and experts

Yet since early 2000 and even more so after Hu Jintao took over the TALSG in

2003 China and its propaganda machine have embarked into promoting the third view

For example in 2004 a Communist Party Propaganda Department magazine

declared

ldquoOur opinion is that the basic pattern of cross-strait relations that have

developed over a long time has been gravely challenged but not basicallychangedrdquo ldquoWe have basically contained the overt threat of Taiwanese

independence since Chen took office avoiding a worst-case scenario and

maintaining the status of Taiwan as a part of Chinardquo ldquoThe balance of power

in the Strait continues to shift in our favourrdquo14

More self-confident China banks on both Taiwanrsquos economic integration and

growing military vulnerability to gradually impose its conditions and favour long

term-unification But at the same time it has developed a discourse aimed at

preparing the public opinion to accept the status quo and the negotiations of what

can be called ldquonormalizationrdquo agreements with Taiwan (direct air links tourism and

later end of hostility agreement military confidence-building measures) This new

discourse seems to have had a decisive impact on the Chinese society As an opinion

poll released in January 2004 by Horizon Research in Beijing indicated some 58

of the 4000 people surveyed believed military action was unnecessary and both

sides should work towards economic integration Only 15 supported immediate

military action [19]

Finally popular nationalism as opposed to state nationalism should be put into

perspective China rsquos modernization drive and rise to a great power status is based on

this countryrsquos internationalization In everyday life this mean that the Chinese

society is probably one of the least nationalistic importing and consuming foreign




Chinese exports and culture True in time of crisis nationalist fever can rapidly rise

it can be also utilized or even stirred up by the Chinese leadership However

precedents have shown that usually the temperature comes down also quite quickly

for the reasons indicated above [7] They are ldquored linesrdquo in the Chinese mind as far

as Taiwan is concerned a formal declaration of independence is the main and probably the only one But these red lines are unlikely to be crossed in the

foreseeable future not only because of Beijingrsquos and Washingtonrsquos pressures but also

because the Taiwanese society remains divided and prefer to postpone any decision

about its long term future

The Chinese Business Community and Taiwan

Growing economic integration between China and Taiwan has contributed to

creating new constituencies on both sides of the Strait that have a vested interest not only to keep the relations between Beijing and Taipei stable but also to see them

improving and intensifying in other words becoming ldquonormalizedrdquo

Studies on the Taiwan business people (Taishang ) established in China have

demonstrated a growing influence on the islandrsquos government as well as political

elites To some extent Ma rsquos victory can be understood as a success of this business

communityrsquos lobbying (and China rsquos united front work) but these studies have also

shown that the Taishang have been unable to really influence Beijingrsquos policy

towards Taiwan Their relations with the local governments on the mainland

through the Taiwan business associations cannot be neglected Though the localTaiwan affairs offices officially control these associations and have been instrumental

in order to influence the voting behaviour of their members in Taiwan elections they

also try to address their demands which are for most of them not of political but

commercial nature [29]

However because of the hyper-centralization of policy-making on Taiwan there

is no evidence that these associations or Chinese local authorities have been able to

influence national policies on this issue

Having said that the situation may be gradually changing For one thing the

number of Taishang on the mainland has been increasing steadily and may be over

1 million today Most large Taiwanese high tech or computer companies are

established in China and have developed close relations with a number of big city or

provincial governments mostly in the Southern half of the country (Shanghai

Jiangsu Zhejiang Fujian and Guangdong in particular) Being politically more

ldquo bluerdquo than ldquogreenrdquo (it is thought that two third of them voted for the KMT in the

2004 presidential election) these companies have privileged access both to these

local authorities and now the new Taiwanese government It remains of course to be

seen whether key Taiwanese executive can play a role in improving cross-Strait

relations in the coming year but they are in a position to lobby powerful provincial

or city CCP officials Again these officials do not directly participate in the

decision-making process on Taiwan Nevertheless the close links that several local




particular electronic industryrsquos dependence upon Taiwanese products a boycott of

these products would be very hard if not impossible to carry out

As early as 2000 in the aftermath of Chen Shui-bianrsquos Wang Daohan indicated

that Northern China wanted war with Taiwan but Southern China was opposed to

it 15

In 2008 nobody talks of such options but the antiwar lobby in China iscertainly much stronger than in 2000

The Cost of War

Indeed the cost of war with Taiwan would be very heavy if not unbearable to

China The Chinese government has repeatedly argued that China would not back

off from an armed conflict if its sovereignty was threatened And as we have seen in

the previous crises in the Strait some PLA generals or CCP ideologues were ready

to conduct a military operation against the island egldquo

teach a lesson to Taiwanrdquo

At the same time most Chinese specialists admit that a war in the Strait would have

great difficulties in remaining a local and limited armed confrontation Even if some

PLA strategists regularly try to test the USrsquos resolution to intervene China has not

acquired the certainty that Washington would stay aside The rapid modernization of

the PLA and its acquisition of both means to project forces and asymmetrical

weapons are gradually changing the balance of power in the Strait in favour of

China at a time when the US is busy on other fronts (ie Iraq and Afghanistan) and

would be unable to conduct two wars at the same time [1]

However Washingtonrsquos close albeit unofficial politico-military links with Taiwan(loosely defined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act) its strong strategic relationship with

Japan and the need to maintain its international credibility would probably force it to

take action turning a local armed conflict around Taiwan into a regional if not a global

war probably also involving Japan causing huge damages to all the parties involved

Moreover any war in the Taiwan Strait in which the US would intervene would

increase the risk of a nuclear face off between Beijing and Washington This risk is

paradoxically not discussed as much as it should be neither in China nor in the USA

In any case such a risk is also an additional factor against war in the Strait since the

danger of nuclearization of any war directly involving nuclear powers have in the

past prevented these powers from crossing the threshold of military confrontation It

is conducive on the contrary to convince the Chinese authorities to explore more

innovative peaceful solutions to their differences with Taiwan

Of course the militaryrsquos mission is to improve its readiness to the worst case

scenario and we have seen how successful the PLA generals have been to guarantee

a higher budget every year However they obviously privilege deterrence on war

since using military force in the Taiwan Strait would contribute to rapidly destroying

the PLArsquos newly acquired capability and therefore China rsquos great power status

Finally can a social or economic crisis push the CCP to embark into a military

adventure against Taiwan This is unlikely if we look at past experience on the

contrary when facing internal difficulties the Chinese government has so far never




Conclusion

We end up this short exploration of the connections between domestic politics and

foreign policy on Taiwan as a paradox Taiwan is an internal affair but the domestic

public opinion is not invited to participate very much in the debate It is solicited toair its view and side with the government in particular in time of crisis in the Strait

However the mobilization does not usually go further than letting the usual

conservative media and experts get excited on the matter although their views are

often used by the Chinese diplomats as a leverage to add pressure on Taipei or

Washington (or other capitals) hoping that this latter capital(s) will intensify its

(their) own pressure on the former Policy debates and disputes have remained

confined in the CCP top leadership and involve a handful of officials

This is not to say that domestic forces and considerations have not constrained

Beijingrsquos Taiwan policy We have seen how many conservative and nationalist elites

in the CCP as well as in the PLA have remained influential For example it still

cannot ldquoresuscitaterdquo the officially-defunct ROC without taking political and

ideological risks Some Chinese officials in the ARATS or the TAO are still

resisting against abandoning the ldquoone country two systemrdquo formula 16 And Hu

Jintao seems resolute to defend his country against any ldquocontaminationrdquo from

Taiwanrsquos democratic experience Nevertheless what is striking is the potential for

flexibility in the CCPrsquos Taiwan policy

There is clearly a two level game in China in which actual bargaining with

Taiwan can somewhat be disconnected fromldquo

domestic persuasionrdquo

[11] Simulta-neously the rapid internationalization of China may not automatically enhance the

chances of peace but it obviously increases the cost of war and even of prolonged

tension in the Taiwan Strait [18] Having said that the political obstacles to a

solution acceptable by both sides to the differences between Beijing and Taiwan

should not be underestimated because even if extreme scenarios as forced

unification or unilateral independence are now more likely to be excluded the

acceptance of a middle-ground resolution depends not only upon China but also

Taiwan and its own political forces and public opinionanother and even more

troublesome domestic politics-foreign policy connection

Acknowledgements This is the revised version of a paper prepared for the Conference ldquoForeign-

Domestic Linkages in China rsquos International Behaviour rdquo University of Victoria British Columbia Canada

24 ndash 25 April 2008

References

1 Annual Report to Congress (2008) Military Power of the Peoplersquo s Republic of China 2008 Washington

DC Office of the Secretary of Defense pp 40 ndash

44 httpwwwdefense linkmilpubschinahtml2 Brady Anne-Marie 2008 Marketing Dictatorship Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary

China Lanham Rowman amp Littlefield




4 Cabestan Jean-Pierre (1999)rsquoState to Statersquo Tension Rises Again Across the Taiwan Strait China

Perspectives 25 September ndash October 4 ndash 13

5 Cabestan Jean-Pierre (2003) Chine- Taiwan la guerre est-elle concevable (China-Taiwan Is a War

Conceivable) Paris Economica

6 Cabestan Jean-Pierre amp Vermander Benoicirct (2005) La Chine en quecircte de ses frontiegraveres La

confrontation Chine-Taiwan (China in quest of its frontiers The confrontation between China andTaiwan) Paris Presses de Sciences Po

7 Cabestan Jean-Pierre 2005b The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism China Perspectives 59

May ndash June 26 ndash 40

8 Chao Chien-min amp Chang Wu-yen (2008) Managing Stability in the Taiwan Strait Non-military

Policy towards Taiwan under Hu Jintao Paper presented at the International Conference on Politics in

the Hu Jintao Era CCPrsquos Adaptation to Domestic and Foreign Challenges organized by Sciences-Po

June 27 Paris

9 China National Defense in 2006 httpwwwchinaorgcnenglishfeaturesbook194421htm

10 Cliff Roger Burles Mark Chase Michael S Eaton Derek amp Pollpeter Kevin L 2007 Entering the

Dragonrsquo s Lair Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States Santa

Monica Ca Rand

11 Evans Peter B et al 1993 Double- Edged Diplomacy International Bargaining and Domestic

Politics Cambridge Mass Harvard University Press

12 Finkelstein David M 2000 China Reconsiders Its National Security ldquo The Great Peace and

Development Debate of 1999rdquo Alexandria Va Project Asia The CNA Corporation December

13 Friedman Edward 1997 Chinese Nationalism Taiwan Autonomy and the Prospects of a Larger War

Journal of Contemporary China 614 5 ndash 32

14 Glaser Bonnie amp Glosserman Brad Promoting Confidence Building Across the Taiwan Strait

Washington DC CSIS September

15 Gourevitch Peter (1978) The Second Image Reversed The International Sources of Domestic

Politics International Organization 32 4 Autumn 881 ndash 912

16 Gries Peter Hays 2004 Chinarsquo s New Nationalism Pride Politics and Diplomacy Berkeley Ca

University of California Press17 He Baogang 2001 The Question of Sovereignty in the Taiwan Strait Re-examining Peking rsquos

policy of opposition to Taiwanrsquos bid for UN membership China Perspectives 34 March ndash

April 7 ndash 20

18 Keohane Robert Oamp Milner Helen V (Eds) (1996) Internationalization and Domestic Politics

New York Cambridge University Press

19 Kuhn Anthony (2004) Democratic Challenges The View from Beijing A Sliver of Hope would be

Welcome Far Eastern Economic Review 4 March

20 Li Xiaomin (2002) Zhongguo de xin anquan guan (China rsquos New Security Concept) Heping yu

fazhan (Peace and Development) 2 44 ndash 47

21 Romberg Alan D (2008) Cross-Strait Relations First the Easy Steps Then the Difficult Ones China

Leadership Monitor 26 September22 Shichor Yitzhak (2008) Missiles Myths Chinarsquo s Threat to Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective

Taipei CAPS Papers 45 August

23 Shirk Susan 2007 China Fragile Superpower Oxford UK Oxford University Press

24 Unger John (1996) (ed) Chinese Nationalism Armonk NY ME Sharpe

25 Suettinger Robert L 2003 Beyond Tiananmen The Politics of US-China Relations 1989 ndash 2000

Washington DC Brookings Institution Press

26 Swaine Michael D 2001 Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan 1979 ndash 2000 In David M

Lampton (Ed) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Ear of Reform (pp 289 ndash 336)

Stanford Ca Stanford University Press

27 Swaine Michal D Yang Andrew N D amp Medeiros Evan S (Eds) (2007) Assessing the Threat

The Chinese Military and Taiwanrsquo s Security Washington DC Carnegie Endowment28 Wang Fei-ling (2006) Taiwan A Key to China rsquos Rise and Transformation Foreign Policy In Focus

December 21 2006 httpwwwfpiforgfpiftxt3817




31 Zheng Yongnian 1999 Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China Modernization Identity and

International Relations Cambridge USA Cambridge University Press

32 Zhao Suisheng 1999 Introduction In Zhao Suisheng (Ed) Across the Taiwan Strait Mainland

China Taiwan and the 1995 ndash 1996 Crisis New York amp London Routledge

Jean-Pierre Cabestan is head and professor at Department of Government and International Studies

Hong Kong Baptist University He is also associate researcher at the Asia Centre Paris His most recent

publications include (with Benoicirct Vermander) La Chine et ses frontiegraveres La confrontation Chine-Taiwan

Paris Presses des Sciences Po 2005 (translated into Chinese and published in a special issue of the

Journal Renlai Taipei in January 2007) and (with Seacutebastien Colin Isabelle Facon and Michal Meidan)

La Chine et la Russie entre convergences and meacutefiance Paris Unicomm 2008 He has also published

numerous articles and contributions in English on China rsquos political system and reform Chinese law

Chinese foreign policy the relations across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwanese politics






played by the United States in the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait

Today Beijing wants Washington to help it in preventing Taiwan from moving

towards formal independence mdash even if this danger has receded since Ma Ying-jeoursquos

election in March 2008 mdash and perhaps also in finding a solution to cross-Strait

differences In other words China rsquos Taiwan policy is not only determined bydomestic considerations but also by two other outside factors the United States

policy and the current developments in Taiwan1 Yet there is probably no Chinese

foreign policy issue which is more closely linked to domestic politics

This linkage is more complex than it may appear at first glance On the one hand

Taiwanrsquo separate existence under the name of Republic of China (ROC) has been a

constant reminder of unfinished business the unification of China under the PRC

rule How to reach this objective has always been the subject of vivid discussions

and a source of disagreements among the CCP elite as well as among scholars

Although these debates have partly remained secret and can anytime be hijacked bydomestic considerations they underscore a larger variety of opinions than is often

thought outside of China

On the other hand the survival of the ROC on part of China rsquos territory its

democratization in the 1980s and its renewed quest for a better international status

directly question the legitimacy of the PRCrsquos polity and put growing pressure on the

CCP leaders to contemplate a genuine political reform Taiwan has become a lively

illustration of the successful graft of democratic values on a Chinese society

weakening the arguments of the current CCP leadership on the political value gap

between the West and Confucian societies if not Asia as a whole It is clear thatrather than pursuing ambitious political reform objectives Hu Jintao and his

colleagues have continued to emphasize the drawbacks of Taiwanrsquos democracy and

resort to nationalism including when need be anti-Taiwan sentiments to enhance

the CCPrsquos legitimacy and keep the country united However for nearly two decades

the Taiwanrsquos democratization experience has fed China rsquos own debates about political

reform both within and outside the Party [28]

Yet illustrating Peter Gourevitchrsquos ldquosecond image reversedrdquo the international and

in particular the power politics dimensions of the Taiwan issue constrain to a large

extent the domestic debates in China both on the policy towards Taiwan and the

Taiwanrsquos political experience [15]

For these reasons the linkage between China rsquos Taiwan policy and China rsquos

political reform needs to be carefully analyzed Obviously there is a possible

connection between Beijingrsquos rigid unification policy and its staunch opposition to

study from Taiwanrsquos political experience But as we will see below this connection

is probably a very complex and indirect one While the unsolved Taiwan issue is far

from being the main obstacle to any genuine political reform any recognition of the

survival of the ROC on part of China rsquos territory may challenge the PRCrsquos legitimacy

And a true democratization of mainland China can but bear important consequences

for Taiwan and the relations across the Taiwan Strait Can a democratic China accept

Taiwanrsquos independence Or on the contrary will it precipitate reunification Though






















motherlandrdquo



































































































































p 5 [23] p 193)






























































































7



















for Hu [8] p 7)










compromise enough









[14]




































































at face value





































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20


























































motherlandrdquo



































































































































p 5 [23] p 193)






























































































7



















for Hu [8] p 7)










compromise enough









[14]




































































at face value





































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20



















































































































































p 5 [23] p 193)






























































































7



















for Hu [8] p 7)










compromise enough









[14]




































































at face value





































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20























































































































7



















for Hu [8] p 7)










compromise enough









[14]




































































at face value





































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20























































for Hu [8] p 7)










compromise enough









[14]




































































at face value





































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20



































































































at face value





































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20




















































the Taiwaneserdquo




















































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20
































































































normalizationrdquo
















































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20


























































declared





































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20





















































































it 15


The Cost of War






































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20








































Conclusion


































References



















June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20



















































June 27 Paris




Monica Ca Rand














April 7 ndash 20






































Cabestan_How China Demestic Politics and Foreign Policy Interact on the Taiwan Issue_2009

Documents

Transcript of Cabestan_How China Demestic Politics and Foreign Policy Interact on the Taiwan Issue_2009