C-IED DCB Overview - NATO DCB: A Case Study. CIED COE DIR NATO UNCLASS REL TO SWE COE C-IED C OUNTER
Embed Size (px)
Transcript of C-IED DCB Overview - NATO DCB: A Case Study. CIED COE DIR NATO UNCLASS REL TO SWE COE C-IED C OUNTER
20160621 DCB: A Case Study. CIED COE DIR NATO UNCLASS REL TO SWE
COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
C-IED DCB Overview21JUN2016http://enciclopedia.us.es/index.php/Archivo:Bandera_de_Suecia.pnghttp://enciclopedia.us.es/index.php/Archivo:Bandera_de_Suecia.png
DCB-definition and process (NATO)
Introduction: CIED COE and DCB
Case Study: Jordan and Iraq
Identified Challenges and Gaps
DCB Definition (NATO)
Nord Atlantic Council 2014 (Defence and related Security Capacity Building - PO(2014)0582, paragraph 5):
Defence and related security capacity building efforts encompass advice,assistance, support, training, education and mentoring activities in thedefence and related security sector. These efforts are focused inparticular on
1) strategic-level advice on defence and related security reform andinstitution building, including national security architecture, policy anddefence planning development and related procedures, and/or
2) defence capability and local forces development, usually focused oneducation and training.
NATO can undertake such activities in support of a partner nation,international organization, or non-partner country, with a view topromoting democratic values and human rights, contributing to securityand stability, and developing or enhancing interoperability.
What is DCB? (1)
What? : Advice, assistance, support, training, education and mentoring in building local defence capacities Strategic-level advice on defence and related security reform and institution
Development of defence capability and local forces, usually focusing on education and training
Who?: Partner nation, international organisation or non-partner country
Why? To contribute to international security and conflict prevention without deploying large combat forces
How? Through tailored assistance to a number of non-member states
Key principles of DCB
Strategic guidance and political control by NAC
Complementarity to other actors, international and national
Coordination is essential
Contribution of Allies and also partner nations
Local SME POC
Review and re-assessment for follow up
How is DCB Organised?
Special Coordinator (Deputy SG)
Executive Board (IS, IMS, SCs)
DCB Task Force
Military Hub (NMA, MPD)
Experts Network in capitals
DCB Trust Fund or others?
1. SG appointed Deputy SG as SC2. Chaired by SC/DSG3. Newly created in IS to enhance political-military coordination
4. DCOS MP also sits on DCB EB5. Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre
DCB Project process
SCs Nats Contributions
NATO SCs must control the process
NNE (inc COEs)
Introduction: CIED COE and DCB from 2014
DRC Congo (under UN/MONUSCO)
Nov 2014: CIAC
Mali (under UN/ MINUSMA):
Jan 2015: CIAC
Ukraine (under ACT / direct request from UKR MIA):
2015: Staff Assessment Visit (SAV)
Jan 2016: UKR MOD / MOI: CIAC (with USAREUR and CAN support)
June 2016: UKR MIA National Police EOD Reorganization: CIED Staff Assessment Visit
Jordan (under NATO SPS):
May 2015: Basic IED Exploitation Course (BIFEC)
June 2015: CIED Staff Assessment Visit (SAV)
Nov 2015: CIED WS for JOR Interagency (Police & Army) Senior Leaders
May 2016: Out brief Dep CHOD and discuss a practical two year plan
Oct 2016: Basic IED Field Exploitation Course (BIFEC) JAF and Police
2017: Senior Leader Engagement (SLE) and 1x MAT (Training or Programs TBD)
Introduction: CIED COE and DCB: 2014-2017
Introduction: CIED COE and DCB: 2014-2017
Egypt (under NATO SPS and IS)
Apr 2016: CIED Staff Assessment Visit
Oct 2016: 2x BIFEC observers (MOD level Training Developers)
2017: New Project ?
Tunisia (under NATO SPS)
Sept 2016: CIED Staff Assessment Visit (DOTMLPF-I)
2017: New Project ?
Iraq (under NATO SPS) Mar-Jun 2016: IRQ Training (KASOTC Jordan)
Oct 2016: IRQ SLE
Sep-Nov 2016: 2nd IRQ Training (KASOTC Jordan)
2017: Confusion WHERE and to WHOM (MoD MoI)
Conducted SLS/SAV/MAT/MTT in 2016
In the POW 2016 six (6) placeholders were determined for: SLS/SAV/MAT/ MTT.
During 1st Semester 2016 the following SLS/ SAV/MAT/ MTT were conducted:
a. UKR CIAC (MTT), 20-31 JAN: 5 PAX (2x MTT)
b. NATO SHAPE SLS 11 APR: 2 PAX -
c. SAV EGYPT, 11-15APR: (1x MAT)
d. IRQ IED Clearance and T3, 1APR-17JUN, 1PAX -
e. Search Course, 16-30APR: 4 PAX (2x MTT)
f. T3-course: 1JUN-17-JUN: 5 PAX (2x MTT)
g. UKR MIA SAV: 7-11JUN: 3 PAX (1x MAT)
Case Study: Jordan and Iraq (1)
Jordan Iraq2 Date approved Apr2015 Jul2015 (Actual start 4 March2016)
3 Objectives DCB Package for Jordan (PO(2014)0755) is initiated at the Wales Summit (Sep2014).
Approval of package incl. measures of support in 7 priority areas C-IEDto IRQ.
4 Program execution (what, who, when, where)
a. Basic IED Exploitation Course (BIFEC), CIED COE.
b. C-IED Staff Assessment Visit (SAV), CIED COE and SPS
c. CIED SLS WS for JOR Police & Army Senior Leaders, CIED COE
May and Nov2015, CIED COE, Madrid (BIFEC/ CIED SLS. June2015, Amman (SAV).
a. Prep-course JAFb. Search-course CIED COE/ SNc. IEDD-course ISSEE/ CIED COEd. T3-course ISSEE/ SN/CIED COE
March-Jun2016, KASOTC, Amman
Case Study: Jordan and Iraq (2)
5 Lead agency NATO SPS NATO SPS
6 Stakeholders JAFSPS, CIED COE
IRQ MOI and MODKASOTC-organisation, JORD GOV, SPS, NSPA, ISSEE (contractor), JAF, CIED COE, Sponsoring Nations (SMEs)
7 COO(Chief Operating Officer)
COO in place. No COO.
The DCB-package ( BIFEC, SAV and SLS WS) was developed after receivingpolitical guidance from NATO HQs, and in close coordination between CIEDSMEs and Jordanian SMEs. It was executed in 8 months since approval, bothin Madrid and Amman (SAV) by CIED COE with a realistic time frame forplanning and execution. The number of stakeholders was limited.
The Iraq training program (Prep, Search, IEDD and T3) actually started morethan 6 months after approval by the nations. Between actual start andexecution less than 1 month preparation time. SPS had the lead and therewas no coordination between the Iraqi and the CIED COE. The number ofstakeholders was numerous and complex. Besides the program had to beexecuted in a third country.
Identified Challenges and Gaps (1)
Both cases were under the control of SPS. In case of Iraq timewas lost at the tactical level while waiting for guidance.
A mismatch between the intended TA and the actual TA. In theJordan training this was not the case.
TA was uninformed and unprepared for the 11 week Iraqtraining program.
Lack of equipment has hampered course execution during theSearch Course.
Identified Challenges and Gaps (2)
In the Iraq project the COE was asked to provide training in MilitarySearch TTPs. Military Search is more a MILENG function.
The Iraq training program were developed by different trainingentities without coordination and finally showed redundancy withregards to subjects and lessons.
In case of Jordan there was only one training entity.
1. The IS should provide political guidance and desired end state veryearly in the process, before engaging with partner nations
2. ACO or a lead nation should lead DCB execution; using their robust staffsand if requested with COEs in support
3. Coordination between partner nation and NATO SMEs must begin duringprogram development
4. All DCB projects should begin with an assessment (SAV) in order toestablish a baseline and to develop useful training programs
5. Partner nation must receive preparatory information and TA selectioncriteria directly from the COE; this is critical to minimize confusion priorto arrival
6. Before course execution starts the procurement of all neededequipment has to be complete and training facility set up
7. Recommend limiting number of different agencies providingdifferent related courses of instruction; deliver a completetraining team
8. Complete, sequence and approve all POIs in advance of trainingbeginning
9. Permanent review, re-assessment and adapt for follow up
Ctra. M-618 Colmenar Viejo-Torrelodones ,km 14
28240 - HOYO DE MANZANARES
N 40.62962, W 3.875594
Phone: +34 918 561 048
Fax: +34 918 562 390