C-IED DCB Overview - NATO DCB: A Case Study. CIED COE DIR NATO UNCLASS REL TO SWE COE C-IED C OUNTER

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Transcript of C-IED DCB Overview - NATO DCB: A Case Study. CIED COE DIR NATO UNCLASS REL TO SWE COE C-IED C OUNTER

  • 20160621 DCB: A Case Study. CIED COE DIR NATO UNCLASS REL TO SWE

    COE C-IED

    COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE

    C-IED DCB Overview21JUN2016

    http://enciclopedia.us.es/index.php/Archivo:Bandera_de_Suecia.pnghttp://enciclopedia.us.es/index.php/Archivo:Bandera_de_Suecia.png
  • Agenda

    DCB-definition and process (NATO)

    Introduction: CIED COE and DCB

    Case Study: Jordan and Iraq

    Summary

    Identified Challenges and Gaps

    Recommendations

  • DCB Definition (NATO)

    Nord Atlantic Council 2014 (Defence and related Security Capacity Building - PO(2014)0582, paragraph 5):

    Defence and related security capacity building efforts encompass advice,assistance, support, training, education and mentoring activities in thedefence and related security sector. These efforts are focused inparticular on

    1) strategic-level advice on defence and related security reform andinstitution building, including national security architecture, policy anddefence planning development and related procedures, and/or

    2) defence capability and local forces development, usually focused oneducation and training.

    NATO can undertake such activities in support of a partner nation,international organization, or non-partner country, with a view topromoting democratic values and human rights, contributing to securityand stability, and developing or enhancing interoperability.

  • What is DCB? (1)

    What? : Advice, assistance, support, training, education and mentoring in building local defence capacities Strategic-level advice on defence and related security reform and institution

    building

    Development of defence capability and local forces, usually focusing on education and training

    Who?: Partner nation, international organisation or non-partner country

    Why? To contribute to international security and conflict prevention without deploying large combat forces

    How? Through tailored assistance to a number of non-member states

  • DCB Responsibilities

    NationsNATO

    COEs support

  • Key principles of DCB

    Strategic guidance and political control by NAC

    Complementarity to other actors, international and national

    Coordination is essential

    Contribution of Allies and also partner nations

    Local ownership

    Local SME POC

    Review and re-assessment for follow up

  • How is DCB Organised?

    Special Coordinator (Deputy SG)

    Executive Board (IS, IMS, SCs)

    DCB Task Force

    Military Hub (NMA, MPD)

    Experts Network in capitals

    DCB Trust Fund or others?

    IS/IM

    S

    Bi-S

    C

    1. SG appointed Deputy SG as SC2. Chaired by SC/DSG3. Newly created in IS to enhance political-military coordination

    4. DCOS MP also sits on DCB EB5. Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre

  • DCB Project process

    POLITICAL Level

    OPERATIONAL Level

    NATO HQ

    Financial

    Partner Contact

    Nations engagement

    Lead

    SCs Nats Contributions

    EXECUTION Level

    ACT

    ACOPlanning

    D&G

    NATO SCs must control the process

    Nations

    NNE (inc COEs)

    Contractor

    CONTROL

  • Introduction: CIED COE and DCB from 2014

    DRC Congo (under UN/MONUSCO)

    Nov 2014: CIAC

    Mali (under UN/ MINUSMA):

    Jan 2015: CIAC

    Ukraine (under ACT / direct request from UKR MIA):

    2015: Staff Assessment Visit (SAV)

    Jan 2016: UKR MOD / MOI: CIAC (with USAREUR and CAN support)

    June 2016: UKR MIA National Police EOD Reorganization: CIED Staff Assessment Visit

  • Jordan (under NATO SPS):

    May 2015: Basic IED Exploitation Course (BIFEC)

    June 2015: CIED Staff Assessment Visit (SAV)

    Nov 2015: CIED WS for JOR Interagency (Police & Army) Senior Leaders

    May 2016: Out brief Dep CHOD and discuss a practical two year plan

    Oct 2016: Basic IED Field Exploitation Course (BIFEC) JAF and Police

    2017: Senior Leader Engagement (SLE) and 1x MAT (Training or Programs TBD)

    Introduction: CIED COE and DCB: 2014-2017

  • Introduction: CIED COE and DCB: 2014-2017

    Egypt (under NATO SPS and IS)

    Apr 2016: CIED Staff Assessment Visit

    Oct 2016: 2x BIFEC observers (MOD level Training Developers)

    2017: New Project ?

    Tunisia (under NATO SPS)

    Sept 2016: CIED Staff Assessment Visit (DOTMLPF-I)

    2017: New Project ?

    Iraq (under NATO SPS) Mar-Jun 2016: IRQ Training (KASOTC Jordan)

    Oct 2016: IRQ SLE

    Sep-Nov 2016: 2nd IRQ Training (KASOTC Jordan)

    2017: Confusion WHERE and to WHOM (MoD MoI)

  • Conducted SLS/SAV/MAT/MTT in 2016

    In the POW 2016 six (6) placeholders were determined for: SLS/SAV/MAT/ MTT.

    During 1st Semester 2016 the following SLS/ SAV/MAT/ MTT were conducted:

    a. UKR CIAC (MTT), 20-31 JAN: 5 PAX (2x MTT)

    b. NATO SHAPE SLS 11 APR: 2 PAX -

    c. SAV EGYPT, 11-15APR: (1x MAT)

    d. IRQ IED Clearance and T3, 1APR-17JUN, 1PAX -

    e. Search Course, 16-30APR: 4 PAX (2x MTT)

    f. T3-course: 1JUN-17-JUN: 5 PAX (2x MTT)

    g. UKR MIA SAV: 7-11JUN: 3 PAX (1x MAT)

    8 SLS/SAV/MAT/MTT

  • Case Study: Jordan and Iraq (1)

    Jordan Iraq2 Date approved Apr2015 Jul2015 (Actual start 4 March2016)

    3 Objectives DCB Package for Jordan (PO(2014)0755) is initiated at the Wales Summit (Sep2014).

    Approval of package incl. measures of support in 7 priority areas C-IEDto IRQ.

    4 Program execution (what, who, when, where)

    a. Basic IED Exploitation Course (BIFEC), CIED COE.

    b. C-IED Staff Assessment Visit (SAV), CIED COE and SPS

    c. CIED SLS WS for JOR Police & Army Senior Leaders, CIED COE

    May and Nov2015, CIED COE, Madrid (BIFEC/ CIED SLS. June2015, Amman (SAV).

    a. Prep-course JAFb. Search-course CIED COE/ SNc. IEDD-course ISSEE/ CIED COEd. T3-course ISSEE/ SN/CIED COE

    March-Jun2016, KASOTC, Amman

  • Case Study: Jordan and Iraq (2)

    Jordan Iraq

    5 Lead agency NATO SPS NATO SPS

    6 Stakeholders JAFSPS, CIED COE

    IRQ MOI and MODKASOTC-organisation, JORD GOV, SPS, NSPA, ISSEE (contractor), JAF, CIED COE, Sponsoring Nations (SMEs)

    7 COO(Chief Operating Officer)

    COO in place. No COO.

  • Observations

    Jordan

    The DCB-package ( BIFEC, SAV and SLS WS) was developed after receivingpolitical guidance from NATO HQs, and in close coordination between CIEDSMEs and Jordanian SMEs. It was executed in 8 months since approval, bothin Madrid and Amman (SAV) by CIED COE with a realistic time frame forplanning and execution. The number of stakeholders was limited.

    Iraq

    The Iraq training program (Prep, Search, IEDD and T3) actually started morethan 6 months after approval by the nations. Between actual start andexecution less than 1 month preparation time. SPS had the lead and therewas no coordination between the Iraqi and the CIED COE. The number ofstakeholders was numerous and complex. Besides the program had to beexecuted in a third country.

  • Identified Challenges and Gaps (1)

    Both cases were under the control of SPS. In case of Iraq timewas lost at the tactical level while waiting for guidance.

    A mismatch between the intended TA and the actual TA. In theJordan training this was not the case.

    TA was uninformed and unprepared for the 11 week Iraqtraining program.

    Lack of equipment has hampered course execution during theSearch Course.

  • Identified Challenges and Gaps (2)

    In the Iraq project the COE was asked to provide training in MilitarySearch TTPs. Military Search is more a MILENG function.

    The Iraq training program were developed by different trainingentities without coordination and finally showed redundancy withregards to subjects and lessons.

    In case of Jordan there was only one training entity.

  • Recommendations (1)

    1. The IS should provide political guidance and desired end state veryearly in the process, before engaging with partner nations

    2. ACO or a lead nation should lead DCB execution; using their robust staffsand if requested with COEs in support

    3. Coordination between partner nation and NATO SMEs must begin duringprogram development

    4. All DCB projects should begin with an assessment (SAV) in order toestablish a baseline and to develop useful training programs

    5. Partner nation must receive preparatory information and TA selectioncriteria directly from the COE; this is critical to minimize confusion priorto arrival

  • Recommendations (2)

    6. Before course execution starts the procurement of all neededequipment has to be complete and training facility set up

    7. Recommend limiting number of different agencies providingdifferent related courses of instruction; deliver a completetraining team

    8. Complete, sequence and approve all POIs in advance of trainingbeginning

    9. Permanent review, re-assessment and adapt for follow up

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