(c) crown copyright

Catalogue Reference:CAB/128/10 Image Reference:0001

18 T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y O F H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T V S G O V E R N M E N T

Printed for the Cabinet. May 1 9 4 7

S E C R E T

C M . ( 4 7 )

50th Conclusions

C A B I N E T 50 ( 4 7 )

NCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing Street, S.W. 1 , on Friday, 23rd May, 1 9 4 7 , at 1 1 a.m.

P r e s e n t : T h e E i g h t H o n . C. R . A T T L E E , M.P . , P r i m e Min i s t e r (in the Chair).

T h e R i g h t H o n . H E R B E R T M O R R I S O N , The R i g h t H o n . A R T H U R GREENWOOD, M.P . , Min i s t e r wi thou t Por t fol io . M . P . , L o r d P r e s i d e n t of the Council.

T h e R i g h t H o n . Si r STAFFORD C R I P P S , T h e R i g h t Hon . H U G H DAI/TON, M.P . , K.C. , M . P , P r e s i d e n t of the Boa r d of Chancellor of t he Exchequer . T rade .

T h e R i g h t H o n . A . V. A L E X A N D E R , The R i g h t H o n . J . C H U T E R E D E , M . P . , M . P . , Min i s t e r of Defence. Secretary of S ta t e for the H o m e

Depa r tmen t . T h e R i g h t H o n . V I S C O U N T A D D I S O N , T h e R i g h t H o n . A . C R E E C H J O N E S ,

Secre ta ry of S t a t e for Dominion M.P . , Secretary of S ta t e for the Affairs. Colonies.

T h e R i g h t Hon . T H E E A R L OF The R i g h t . H o n . G . A . ISAACS, M . P . , L I S T O W E L , Secre tary of S ta t e for Min i s te r of Labour a n d Na t iona l I n d i a and Secre tary of S ta t e for Service. B u r m a .

T h e R i g h t H o n . E . S H I N W E L L , M.P . , The R i g h t H o n . T . W I L L I A M S , M . P . , Min i s t e r of Fue l and Power . Min i s t e r of Agr i cu l t u r e a n d

Fisher ies . T h e R i g h t H o n . G E O R G E TOMLINSON, The R i g h t Hon . L O R D INMAN, L o r d

M . P . , Min i s t e r of Educa t ion . P r i v y Seal.

Also p r e s e n t : The R i g h t H o n . J O H N STRACHEY, M.P . ,

Min i s t e r of Food.

Secretariat Si r N O R M A N BROOK.

Mr . S. E . V . L U K E .

Subject Page I n d i a 6 8

C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P o s i t i o n .

[ 3 4 1 0 8 - 1 ]

I n d i a .

C o n s t i t u t i o n a l

P o s i t i o n .

( P r e v i o u s

R e f e r e n c e :

C M . ( 4 7 ) 4 7 t h

C o n c l u s i o n s ,

M i n u t e 6 . )

The Cabine t h a d before them a memorandum by the P r i m e Min i s t e r ( C P . (47) 158) covering the d r a f t of a n announcement t o be m a d e by H i s Majes ty ' s Government on the a r r angemen t s proposed for the t r ans fe r of power in I n d i a .

The Prime Minister gave the Cabine t a general account of the recent pol i t ica l developments in I n d i a a n d the resul ts of the discus­sions which the I n d i a a n d B u r m a Commit tee h a d h a d w i t h the Viceroy.

The refusal of t he Mus l im L e a g u e to p a r t i c i p a t e in the work of the Cons t i tuent Assembly h a d destroyed any possibi l i ty t h a t t h e Cabinet Miss ion p lan could be successfully p u t into effect. T h e League had , indeed, entered the I n t e r i m Government , bu t the fa i lure of both P a r t i e s to co-operate w i t h i n t h a t Government made i t improbable t h a t i t could cont inue to hold together for much longer. The extensive discussions which L o r d Moun tba t t en h a d h a d w i t h the va r ious poli t ical leaders since his a r r i v a l in I n d i a h a d convinced h im t h a t the re was no prospect of a U n i o n of I n d i a e i ther on the basis of the Cabine t Mis s ion^ p lan or on a n y other basis, and fu r the r tha t , unless a very ear ly announcement was made of the method by which H i s Majes'ty's Government in tended to t r ans fe r power, widespread communal d is turbances would be inevitable. A l l t he I n d i a n P a r t i e s were now convinced tha t , in view of the recal­c i t r a n t a t t i t u d e of t he Musl im League , some form of p a r t i t i o n was unavoidable . B u t the Congress v iew was tha t , if p a r t i t i o n was to be conceded, i t was a necessary corollary t h a t there should also be a division of Bengal a n d the P u n j a b .

The Viceroy had convened a conference of I n d i a n leaders for 2nd J u n e , a t which he would make a final effort to secure ag reement on the basis of the Cabine t Mission 's p lan . If, a s he expected, he fai led to do so, he in tended to lay before the Conference the text of an announcement by H i s Majes ty ' s Government , which was conta ined in the A n n e x to C P . (47) 158. T h e p lan out l ined in t h a t document h a d a l ready been discussed w i t h the I n d i a n leaders, and represented the m a x i m u m degree of common agreement t h a t was ever likely to be achieved. The announcement s t a ted t h a t H i s Majes ty ' s Government h a d reached the conclusion t h a t the a t t e m p t to secure a Un ion of t he whole of T n d i a on the basis of the Cabinet Mission 's proposals mus t now be abandoned , and tha t a r r a n g e m e n t s mus t therefore be m a d e whereby power could be t r ans fe r red to more t h a n one au tho r i t y . I t then proceeded to set ou t a de ta i led p lan unde r which the different p a r t s of I n d i a could choose, t h r o u g h elected representa t ives , whe ther the i r fu tu re Const i tu t ions should be f ramed by the ex i s t ing Cons t i tuen t Assembly or by a new Cons t i tuen t Assembly composed of represen ta t ives from those areas which held aloof from the m a i n body; a n d i t provided for the estab­l ishment of a new Cons t i tuen t Assembly for the areas which op ted for separa t ion . The probable resu l t of t h e p lan would be tha t , in the N o r t h - W e s t of I n d i a , Sind, the Wes te rn P u n j a b a n d possibly also the N o r t h - W e s t F r o n t i e r would s t a n d out from the ex i s t ing Cons t i tuen t Assembly. I n the N o r t h - E a s t there were good hopes t h a t Bengal migh t decide to remain un i t ed on the basis of a coali t ion Government elected on a jo in t electorate. If, however, t h a t d id not happen , E a s t e r n Bengal a n d the one p redominan t ly Mus l im d i s t r i c t of Assam were likely also to s tand out .

The P r i m e Min i s te r drew a t t e n t i o n to the difficulties and dangers necessari ly inheren t in a n y scheme of pa r t i t i on . T h e s i tua t ion in many p a r t s of I n d i a w a s a l ready h igh ly inflammable. I n the P u n j a b , in pa r t i cu l a r , t he proposed announcement w a s l ikely in the Governor ' s view to provoke serious d isorder a n d blood­shed. T h e app l i ca t ion of the p l an to t h a t P rov ince would involve the division of the S ik h communi ty in fa i r ly even propor t ions between the two successor States , t hough the i r posi t ion m i g h t to some extent be eased by the B o u n d a r y Commission, which would establ ish the final boundary . P a r t i t i o n would also involve h ighly complex a d m i n i s t r a t i v e problems, such as the division between the successor S ta tes of t he I n d i a n A r m y a n d such subjects as finance, t r a d e and indus t ry , which were a t p resen t the responsibi l i ty of the

59 C M . SO ( 4 7 )

Cen t ra l Government . Bu t , wha tever the p rac t i ca l difficulties involved, there a p p e a r e d to be no a l te rna t ive to pa r t i t ion . Unfo r ­tunate ly , there w a s now reason to fear t h a t the Mus l im League migh t after a l l decide to oppose t he p lan . I n t h a t event, t he best course would be to impose i t as a n a w a r d by H i s M a j e s t y ^ Government. I t seemed unl ikely t h a t t he a t t i t u d e of t h e Congress leaders to the p l an would s imi la r ly change. I f i t d id , a more difficult posi t ion would a r i se a n d the whole p lan would then h a v e t o be reconsidered. D u r i n g the p a s t fo r tn igh t , however, t he r e h a d been a fu r ther development of ma jo r impor tance which p u t the whole m a t t e r in a different l ight . W h i l e M r . J i n n a h h a d always claimed t h a t P a k i s t a n would wish to r emain w i t h i n the Br i t i sh Commonwealth, i t h a d been the policy of t he Congress P a r t y t h a t I n d i a should be a sovereign independen t republ ic a n d they h a d seamed a resolut ion to t h a t effect in t he Cons t i tuen t Assembly. T h e prospect t h a t one p a r t of I n d i a would wish to remain w i t h i n the Coaamonwealth when the other h a d become an independent republic h a d always involved issues of g r ea t complexity. I t now appeared , however, t h a t some of the Congress leaders h a d become increasingly apprehensive about the difficulties which the g r a n t of immedia te independence would involve, and a most significant app roach to t he "Viceroy h a d been m a d e by P a n d i t Neh ru a n d S a r d a r Pa t e l , who h a d suggested t h a t in the event of p a r t i t i o n H i n d u I n d i a should be g ran ted Dominion s ta tus , a t a n y r a t e a s a t empora ry measure . They h a d expla ined t h a t they would hope to secure t he agreement of the i r suppor te r s to th i s course by a r g u i n g t h a t acceptance of Dominion s ta tus would enable power to be t r ans fe r red to I n d i a n h a n d s a t a da te substan­t ia l ly earl ier t h a n J u n e 1948, a n d t h a t onee she h a d a t t a ined Dominion s t a tu s H i n d u I n d i a would be free to secede a t a n y t ime from the Commonwealth.

Th i s was a most i m p o r t a n t development, a n d the I n d i a and B u r m a Commit tee h a d felt that , full advan tage sfeouid be t aken of i t . I f Dominion s t a tu s were conferred on the two successor S ta tes as p a r t of the p l a n for the t rans fe r of power, t h i s would grea t ly ease the difficulties inheren t in pa r t i t i on . For example, both the I n d i a n P a r t i e s wished to r e t a in the services of E u r o p e a n officers of the I n d i a n A r m y to assist in ca r ry ing out thes division of the a rmy between the new Sta tes and bu i ld ing u p effective mi l i t a ry o rgan isa t ions on a fresh basis : th i s would not he possible if the successor S ta tes h a d become independent republics. More impor­tan t , i t was reasonable to suppose t h a t the I n d i a n P a r t i e s , in the l i gh t of p rac t i ca l experience of the advantages of Dominion s ta tus , would be slow to exercise the i r r i g h t to secede a t a la ter s tage. I n d i a ' s decision would also, no doubt, be closely watched by Burma , who would short ly have to choose between independence and Dominion s t a t u s ; a n d Ceylon would also be grea t ly influenced by the l ine taken by I n d i a on th is question. B u t i t m u s t be remembered t h a t the proposal made by the Congress leaders w a s t ha t Dominion s t a tus should be g r a n t e d a n d power t r ans fe r red as early as possible in 1947. Moreover, af ter the proposed announcement h a d been made, the i n t e r i m Government would become increasingly ineffective; a n d i t was essent ia l for p rac t i ca l reasons t h a t the in t e r im per iod between the announcement a n d the ac tua l t r ans fe r of power on the basis of Dominion s t a tus should be reduced to a min imum. I t would, therefore, be essential t o enact, before the end of the presen t Session, legis la t ion amend ing the Government of I n d i a Act , 1935. The purpose of th is legislat ion would be to confer Dominion s t a t u s on the Sta tes emerging from t h e p l an for the p a r t i t i o n of I n d i a and to provide the necessary madfoinery enabl ing the new Cons t i tu t ions to be established a n d the division of powers to be g r adua l l y completed.

The g r a n t of Dominion s ta tus to the successor Sta tes would, of course, m e a n t h a t the I n d i a Office should cease to be responsible for the h a n d l i n g of U n i t e d K i n g d o m re la t ions w i t h I n d i a : th i s was a po in t on which the I n d i a n leaders w e r e emphat ic . The a l ternat ive a r r angemen t s needed fu r the r consideration but i t

[ 3 4 1 0 8 - 1 ] ' B 2

seemed possible t h a t the best solution m i g h t be to e x p a n d t h e Dominions Office in to a D e p a r t m e n t for Commonweal th Rela t ions responsible for h a n d l i n g our re la t ions , no t only w i t h t he ex i s t ing Dominions, but also w i t h I n d i a a n d B u r m a and subsequent ly w i t h Ceylon a n d any o ther t e r r i to r i e s which m i g h t a t t a i n a pos i t ion of ^ i n d e p e n d e n c e w i t h i n the Commonwea l th . "

I n discussion the following po in t s were ra ised :— (a) W h e n these Cons t i tu t iona l changes in the s t a t u s of India­

took effect, i t would be necessary t h a t The K i n g should divest h im­self of t he t i t l e " E m p e r o r of I n d i a . " H e would become K i n g of those p a r t s of I n d i a which a t t a i n e d Dominion s ta tus . H i s Majes ty h a d a l ready ment ioned th i s po in t to the P r i m e Min i s t e r .

(V) Th i s possible change in the s t a tus of I n d i a also emphasised the need for some fu r the r review of the ex is t ing re la t ions between the var ious p a r t s of the B r i t i s h Commonweal th . T h o u g h i t m i g h t prove possible and a p p r o p r i a t e t h a t p a r t s of I n d i a should a t t a i n the s t a tu s prescr ibed for Dominions by the S t a t u t e of Wes tmin ­ster, there were other p a r t s of H i s Ma je s ty ' s Dominions for which some different form, of " independence wi th in the Common­w e a l t h " m i g h t be more a p p r o p r i a t e . The Prime Minister sa id t h a t he was t a k i n g s teps to set in h a n d a comprehensive review of t he cons t i tu t iona l re la t ions between the var ious p a r t s of the B r i t i s h Commonweal th .

(c) H o w would I n d i a ' s a t t a i n m e n t of Dominion s t a tus affect the pos i t ion of I n d i a n s in South A f r i c a ? The Cabinet were informed t h a t these people, t hough I n d i a n s by race, were most ly South A f r i c a n cit izens by n a t i o n a l i t y ; a n d the i r na t iona l s ta tus would not be affected by I n d i a ' s achieving self-Government as a Dominion. The pol i t ica l difficulties which h a d a r i sen over the posi t ion of these I n d i a n s would a t least be no g rea t e r if I n d i a became a Domin ion t h a n if she became a foreign country .

(d) The Lord President sa id t ha t , i n view of the congestion of the P a r l i a m e n t a r y t imetable, there would be no hope of pa s s ing a Government of I n d i a Bil l before P a r l i a m e n t ad journed i n the summer unless th i s legislat ion had the full suppor t of t he Opposi­t ion. The Prime Minister said t h a t he h a d received a firm assurance i n w r i t i n g from the leader of t he Oppos i t ion t ha t th i s suppor t would be for thcoming if the proposals of H i s Majesty*s Government proved genera l ly acceptable to the leaders of the I n d i a n P a r t i e s .

(e) The Prime Minister sa id t h a t communal feeling in I n d i a was now in tense and i t was possible t h a t serious d isorders migh t b reak out i n the P u n j a b a n d ce r t a in o ther Provinces a t any t ime af te r the announcement of the p l an for p a r t i t i o n i n g I n d i a . I t w a s the V i c e r o y s considered view t h a t the only hope of checking wide­spread communal w a r f a r e w a s to suppress the first s igns of i t p rompt ly a n d ruthlessly, u s ing for th i s purpose all the force required , inc lud ing t a n k s a n d a i rc ra f t , a n d g iv ing full publ ic i ty th roughout I n d i a to the act ion t aken and the reasons for i t . I n this v iew the Viceroy h a d the unan imous s u p p o r t of h i s I n t e r i m Govern­ment . I t w a s i m p o r t a n t t h a t he should also be assured t h a t this policy h a d the suppor t of H i s Majes ty ' s Government .

The Cabinet agreed t h a t t he policy which the Viceroy proposed to follow i n th i s m a t t e r should have the i r full suppor t .

(/) The Prime Minister expla ined the a r r angemen t s which were being made for t he publ ica t ion of the proposed s ta tement of policy. I t was expected t h a t the Viceroy would be r eady to publ i sh the announcement in I n d i a on the evening of Tuesday, 3rd J u n e ; a n d any las t -minute changes in t he text would be t e legraphed to London so as to enable a s imul taneous announcement to be m a d e in both Houses of P a r l i a m e n t . The Viceroy also proposed to b road­cast, la ter t h a t evening, a message to the people of I n d i a . I t w a s hoped t h a t he would record th is in London before r e t u r n i n g to I nd i a , so t ha t i t m i g h t be broadcas t s imultaneously i n th i s

61 C M . 5 0 (47)' country . The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s broadcas t would then t ake the form of an in t roduc to ry s ta tement by way of preface to the Viceroy ' s broadcast .

The Cabinet endorsed the p l an ou t l ined in C P . (47) 158 for de te rmin ing the successor au tho r i t i e s to which power should be t rans fe r r ed in I n d i a . They welcomed the fu r the r proposals which h a d been expla ined by the P r i m e Min i s t e r for the early a t t a i nmen t of Dominion s t a tus by the var ious p a r t s of a pa r t i t i oned I n d i a . They expressed the i r w a r m apprec ia t ion of the ou t s t and ing ser­vice rendered by the Viceroy, and by the P r i m e Minis te r a n d h is colleagues on the I n d i a a n d B u r m a Commit tee , in evolving these new proposals for fu r the r const i tu t ional development in Ind i a . I f th is scheme could be ca r r i ed th rough successfully, i t would be a notable l a n d m a r k in the development of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister, in summing u p the discussion, p a i d t r i bu t e to the remarkable skill and in i t i a t ive which the Viceroy h a d shown in his conduct of these difficult negot ia t ions w i t h the I n d i a n leaders . I t was essential tha t , in the concluding stages of the negot ia t ions , the Viceroy should be given a large measure of discret ion to amend the deta i ls of the p lan , w i thou t pr ior consulta­t ion w i t h H i s Majes ty ' s Government , so long as he kept w i t h i n the l imi t s of the b road policy which h a d now been approved by the Cabinet .

The C a b i n e t ­(1) Approved in pr inc ip le the d r a f t announcement annexed t o

C P . (47) 158 r e g a r d i n g the procedure for de te rmin ing the successor au thor i t i es to whom power would be t r a n s ­fe r red in I n d i a ; and agreed t h a t th is should be adop ted by the Viceroy as a basis for his final discussions w i t h I n d i a n leaders on 2nd a n d 3 rd J u n e .

(2) Took note w-ith approva l of the proposals outl ined by the P r i m e Min i s t e r for the ear ly a t t a i n m e n t of Domin ion s t a tu s by the var ious p a r t s ofa pa r t i t i oned I n d i a ;

(3) Agreed tha t , in the concluding stages of his negot ia t ions w i t h the I n d i a n leaders, the Viceroy should have a la rge measure of discret ion to amend the detai ls of th is p l an provided he kep t w i t h i n the broad l imits of the policy approved by the Cabine t ;

(4) Agreed t h a t H i s Majes ty ' s Government should give full suppor t to the policy which the Viceroy proposed t o l U i i u w , vviLji UNC AGIcmiieiiL. UI MA -Li iLerim VJROVERIMIEIIB, in us ing whatever force migh t be necessary to check the first s igns of any widespread outbreak of communal w a r f a r e in I n d i a a f te r t he announcement of the proposals for P a r t i t i o n .

Cabinet Office, S. W. 1, 23 r^ May, 1947.