By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land …10/1/98 Study Approach • Review lessons learned...

By Systems Assessment Group

NDIA Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee

October 1998

By Systems Assessment Group

NDIA Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee

October 1998

3

10/1/98

Agenda

Page

5

• Introduction 5

• Historical Developments and Technology Migration 13

• Trends in Third World Ballistic Missile Weaponry 43

• Threat Development on a Compressed Schedule 63

• Candidate LRBM Configurations 81

• Summary 107

10/1/98

Study Objectives

• Assess feasibility of Third World countries to develop/acquire LRBMcapability• 3000km - 10000km

• Assess the time required to develop/acquire LRBM capability• One or two demonstrated test articles• Politically effective capability (as few as three missiles)• Fully deployed military capability

• Assess the feasibility of launching warheads of mass destruction

• Assess implications on defense• Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) policy

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Study Approach

• Review lessons learned from historical missile developmentprograms• WW II Germany, North Korea, Iraq• Development time and motivation• Strategic objectives for LRBMs with WMD warheads

• Assess potential range growth of evolving family of Third WorldTBM threats

• Conduct Third World Threat Analysis• Technology assessment

• Development forecast

• Assess Candidate LRBM Configuration Alternatives• Space launch vehicle conversion

• TBM stacking / clustering

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10/1/98

Definitions

TERM DESCRIPTION CRITERIA

TBM TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE <150 kmSRBM SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC

MISSILEUp to 1,000 km

MRBM MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTICMISSILE

1,000 - 3,000 km

IRBM INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTICMISSILE

3,000 - 5,500 km

ICBM INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTICMISSILE

>5,500 km

LRBM LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE 3,000 - 10,000 kmCM CRUISE MISSILE RANGE NOT SPECIFIED

SLBM SUBMARINE LAUNCHEDBALLISTIC MISSILE

RANGE NOT SPECIFIED

LRCM LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE <3,000 kmINF TREATY INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR

FORCES TREATYLIMITED PERFORMANCE &NUMBERS OF TBMs & CMs

(EUROPEAN THEATER)START STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION

TREATYBILATERAL US-RUSSIAN

NUCLEAR FORCES REDUCTIONSALT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

TALKSBILATERAL US-RUSSIAN

NUCLEAR FORCES REDUCTION

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Agenda

Page

13

• Introduction 5





• Summary 107

10/1/98

Historical Analysis Objectives

• Understand the critical event structure & timelines of early ballisticmissile development programs

• Describe technologies required to meet mission requirements inearly missile programs

• Describe innovative solutions that enabled early rapid ballisticmissile development

• Describe the spread of ballistic missile capability over the past 50years tracing its technology and system development genealogy

15

• WW II Germany

• North Korea

• Iraq

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Key In gredients of the German Pro gram

• Political/Cultural Climate• Rocket development not constrained by Versailles treaty• Autocratic rule• Warring factions within the Nazi party for control of ballistic missile program• 1920’s Weimar Republic had strong interest in rocketry and space flight• Use of slave labor

• Technological and Strategic Surprise• Early recognition of the value of ballistic missiles for maximizing surprise (1929)• Extreme secrecy of the program - first large “black” program• Suppression of German amateur rocket societies for security reasons (1933-34)

• Speed of Development• National priority / significant funding resources available• Excellent domestic industrial skill base to develop required technologies• Rapid prototyping using technology demonstrators

• Test / Fail / Fix / Re-Test / …….

Many of these key ingredients are found in Third World programsMany of these key ingredients are found in Third World programs

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German ICBM Desi gn

A9/A10 Manned A9Source: “Secret Wonder Weapons of the Third Reich”, J. Miranda, P. Mercado, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996 21

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Design for Use of Chemical/Radiolo gical Payloads

Payload Compartment

Source: “Vengeance. Hitler’s Nuclear Weapon. Fact or Fiction?”,Phillip Henshall,Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1995 23

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Alternative Concept for Attackin g North America

Project Lifevest

Source: “Secret Wonder Weapons of the Third Reich”, J. Miranda, P. Mercado, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996 25

• WW II Germany

• North Korea

• Iraq

27

• 1975 ~ DF-61 Program with China Terminated

• 1981 ~ Egypt Supplies Scud-B Missiles for Evaluation

• 1984 ~ Scud-B Mod A Tested

• 1985 ~ Scud-B Mod B Tested

• 1987 ~ Scud-B Mod B Exported to Iran

• 1989 ~ Scud-B Mod C Deployed

• 1990 ~ Nodong-1 Program Underway

• 1993 ~ Nodong-1 Tested

• 1995 ~ Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2 Programs Underway

• 1996 ~ Nodong-1 Exported to Iran

• 1998 ~ Nodong Technology Incorporated in Pakistani Ghauri• 1998 ~ Potential Space Launch/LRBM Capability Demonstrated

29

North Korean Ballistic Missile Programs

• WW II Germany

• North Korea

• Iraq

31

Iraqi Ballistic Missile Programs

• 1970s -- Iraq receives first Scud-B ballistic missiles fromUSSR (813 imported by 1990)

• 1982 -- First Iraqi Scud-B attack on Iran

• 3 August 1987 -- Al Husayn tested (500 km range)

• February - April 1988 -- 189 Al Husayn missiles fired in“war of the cities”

• 25 April 1988 -- Al Abbas missile fired on Tehran (860 km)

• 1980-1988 -- Total of 361 Scud-B and Al Husayn missilesfired in Iran-Iraq war

• 5 December 1989 -- Successful launch of Al Abid SLV

• 7 December 1989 -- Tammuz 1 SLV announced (2,000 kmrange)

• 1991-- Desert Storm saw 88 Al Husayns fired

• 1997 -- Iraq announces Al Hamid ballistic missile (150 kmrange)

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Genealo gy of Technolo gy Transfer After WWII

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

India• SA-2 SAM (Back Engr to SRBM) • U.S. Scout Solid Rocket Technology

USSR CIS

FRG Iraq

Argentina

Egypt

North Korea

Iran

Syria

Libya

Peoples Republic of China

South Afr Saudi Arabia

Israel

France

United States

• R-17 (SCUD B SRBM)

• Personnel• Technology

• Funding for Condor 2 MRBM • Badr 2 MRBM (Based on Condor 2)

• Vector IRBM (Terminated)

• SS-1B(SCUD B SRBM)

• Funding • SCUD B • SCUD C Production

• Personnel

• Technology

• R-17 (SCUD B)

• R-17 (SCUD B)

• SCUD B • SCUD C (Transshipped)

• R-1 (V-2 copy)• R-2 (SS-2 SRBM)• Technology

• People(H.S. Tsien Deported)

• DF-3 (CSS-2 IRBM)

• Jericho 2 / RSA-3

• People/Technology

19501940

USSR

Germany

• Technology

• V-2 (A-4 SRBM)• Personnel (Von Braun & team)• Technology

• V-2 (A-4 SRBM)• Personnel• Technology• Facilities

FRG

35

10/1/98

International Technolo gy Transfer

Israel India Egypt Iraq Pakistan Iran Libya Saudi SyriaArabia

Trained Personnel/Advisors NL, US AT, DE, ES, AR, AT, BE, CL, EG, CN KP DE DE, PK,CH, SU, US FR, DE, LI, KP, CN, CN, US

CH, US, SU

Reentry Vehicles DE, CH, US CL, EG, FR, DE, LY, CN CLSU US

Ballistic missile Propulsion AT, BE, FR, DE, IT, CN, KP CS, IR, ITLI, CH, US LY, SU

Guidance/Navigation ZA, TW BR, FR, DE, US HK, JP IL, CNUS

Flight Controls BR, DE HK, JP

Production Assistance FR, DE AR, DE, KP AR, AT, BE, BR, EG, DE, CN KP, CN DE DE CS, DE,LYNL, US SA, CH, US FR, DE, IT, MC, KP KP, SA,SU

CN, CH, GB, US, SU

Materials Manufacture US DE, LI, GB, US CA, FR,CH, US

Computers US SA, CH, US DE NO, GB US

Testing/Ranges ZA MR

Notes: (1) This information was extracted from the International ballistic missile Proliferation Project database, compiled by the Monterey Institute of International studies underthe direction of Dr. William C. Potter and Dr. Edward J. Laurance. It is a compilation of open source material and covers only reports of actual deliveries and transfers since1989. The table does not include information relating to proposals, offers, negotiations, or orders (unless clear transfers have resulted).

(2) The two-letter codes used in this table are the American National Standard Institute (ANSI) international country codes, defined as follows: AR - Argentina, AT -Australia, BE - Belgium, BR - Brazil, CA - Canada, CH - Switzerland, CL - Chile, CN - China, CS - Czechoslovakia, DE - Germany, EG - Egypt, ES - Spain, FR -France, GB - United Kingdom, HK - Hong Kong, IL - Israel, IR - Iran, IT - Italy, JP - Japan, KP - North Korea, LI - Liechtenstein, LY - Libya, MC - Monaco, MR - Mauritania,NL - Netherlands, NO - Norway, PK - Pakistan, SA - Saudi Arabia, SU - Soviet Union, TW - Taiwan, US - United States, ZA - South Africa.

37

Technology Recipients

Technology S

uppliers

10/1/98

Missile Technolo gy Control Re gime (MTCR)

• Missile technolo gy non-proliferation partnership formed in1987 as a voluntary agreement between members• United States and G-7 partners were original members• Current membership totals 29 countries

• Objective is to restrict proliferation of ballistic missiles,cruise missiles, UAVs, and related technolo gies• Applies to systems carrying payloads of 500 kg or greater• System ranges of 300 km or greater• Includes all warhead categories -- conventional or NBC• NOT intended to impede national space programs or int’l

cooperation in such programs

• Restricted technolo gies include• Complete ballistic missile/cruise missile/UAV systems and some

subsystems• Production facilities

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What MTCR Doesn’t Control

• MCTR does not “control” anythin g. Its si gnersagree to exercise “restraint”. There are not evenrestraints on the followin g:• Transfer of missiles and components from non-si gnatory

states (e. g., North Korea and China)• Emigration of scientists, en gineers and technicians• Technical education in sciences and en gineerin g which

provides missile skills

41

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Agenda

Page

43

• Introduction 5





• Summary 107

10/1/98

Third World Countries with Ballistic Missiles *

Brazil

Argentina

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

LibyaSyria

Israel

Egypt

Iraq

Iran

India

Taiwan

N. Korea

China

YemenPakistan

Vietnam

3000 km

3000 km

* Greater than 90 km range

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10/1/98

Third World Weapons Options Favor Missiles

Country BallisticMissiles

Cruise Missiles

Aircraft GroundSystems

NavalSystems

Tac

tical

SR

BM

’s

1

LRB

M’s

Gro

und

Air

Sea

Fig

hter

s

Bom

bers

Hel

icop

ters

Art

iller

y

Roc

ket L

aunc

her

Mor

tar

Sur

face

SS

K’s

SS

N’s

China

India

Iraq

Iran

Israel

Libya

North Korea

Pakistan

X X X

X X

X 2

X X

X X X

X X

X

X

X X X

X X

X

X X X

X X

X X X

X X

X X

X

X X

X

X X X

X X

X X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X X

X X X

X X

X X X

X X

X X

X X

X X

X X1 500 km range or less2 Currently banned under UN Gulf War resolutions

Expected MissionSuccess

Yes LimitedLimited No No No

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10/1/98

Third World Indi genous Capabilities

Israel India Egypt Iraq Pakistan Iran Libya Saudi Syria Arabia

Human Resources

Ballistic missiles

Space

Technical Artillery

Resources Ordnance

Aircraft

Electronics

Test Resources

Reference: “Rest of World (ROW) Response to GPALS:Technology and Industry Bases”, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, June 1992

Substantial capability:•Large numbers of expertsand technicians

• Indigenous manufacturing• Instrumented test ranges

Rudimentary capability:•Few experts ortechnicians

•Repair and refurbishment•Limited test facilities

Modest capability:•Some experts andtechnicians

•Spare parts manufacturing•Component test/ground test

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10/1/98

Current Third World Ballistic Missile Capabilities

Country Missile System Status Propulsion LaunchWeight (kg)

PayloadWeight (kg)

Range(km)

China CSS-1 (DF-2A)

CSS-2 (DF-3)

CSS-2 (DF-3A)

CSS-3 (DF-4)

CSS-4 (DF-5A)

CSS-5 (DF-21A)

DF-25

DF-31

DF-41

1966 IOC

1971 IOC

1986 IOC

1978 IOC

1986 IOC

1987 IOC

Reported Stopped

1996 IOC

Under Dev.

L

L/L

L/L

L/L

L/L

L/L

S/S/S

S/S/S

S/S/S

26,000

64,000

64,000

82,000

183,000

14,700

1500

2000

2150

2200

3200

600

2000

700

800

1250

2650

2800

4750

13000

1800

1700

8000

12000India Agni I

Agni II

Flight Tested

Dev. Initiated

S/L

S/S

16,000 1000 >2000

Iran Shihab 3

Shihab 4

Shihab 5

Labour 1(No Dong 1 import)

Labour 2(No Dong 2 joint effort)

Flight Tested

Early Stages of Dev.

Engaged Effort

In Dev.

L

S

L

L/L

750

1000

1700

3000

3000+

51

1000 3000

10/1/98

Current Third World Ballistic Missile Capabilities (Cont)

Country Missile System Status Propulsion LaunchWeight (kg)

PayloadWeight (kg)

Range(km)

Iran(cont.)

Tondar 68(Iran 700)

Zelzal –3(modified M-11)

M-18(import form China)

Dev. Prototype L or S

S

S

500 700-1000

1000-1500

700-1000

Iraq Al Abid

Tammuz 1

Badr 2000

Dev. Cancelled

Dev. Cancelled

Dev. Cancelled (JointIraq, Egypt, Argentinaeffort)

L/L 48,000

750

450

2000

2000

900

Israel Jericho 2B (YA-2B)

Jericho 3 1990 IOC

S/S

S/S 29,000 1000

1300

4800NorthKorea

NoDong 1(aka Rodong-1)

Taepo Dong 1(aka No Dong 2, Rodong-2)

Taepo Dong 2

Flight Tested

In Dev. / Poss. 1 Flt Test

Engaged Effort

L

L/L

L/L

21,000

21,000

800

1000

1000

1300

1500-2000

3,500-6000Pakistan Ghauri/Mk III One flight test L 500-750 1500SaudiArabia

CSS-2(imported from China)

1988 IOC L 65,200 1900 3100

53

10/1/98

Selected Countries withBallistic Missile Development Pro grams

• Argentina 1• Brazil 1• China• Egypt 2• India• Iran• South Africa

1 Development efforts in-abeyance or cancelled2 Currently only involved in short range weapon systems3 Development efforts interrupted as result of Gulf War4 Deployment of CSS-2 IRBM’s only

• Iraq 3• Israel• Libya 2• North Korea• Pakistan• Saudi Arabia 4• South Korea

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10/1/98

Potential Iranian LRBM Covera ge

-90

-60

-30

0

30

60

90

-180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180

Launch Point

6000 km

8000 km

10000 km

57

Iran’s Ballistic Missile Development Program Schedule

Scud-B/Shahab-1

Shahab-3/Zelzal-3

Scud-B Mod C/Shahab-2

Oghab/Nazeat etc RDT&E

Oghab IOC

Manufacturing Capability

Export to Syria∆ ∆

∆

Combat Use

∆ ∆

RDT&E

EngineTests ∆

FlightTest

"Tondar-68" (Iran-700)

Test Fire∆

RDT&E

Test Fire∆

???????

Manufacturing Capability∆Delivery∆

∆

SS-4 Technology

Transfer

Shahab-4RDT&E

∆IOC ?

"Shahab-6"

∆IOC (Target Date)

"Shahab-5"

∆IOC ?

Nodong-1

Test Fire∆ Delivery∆

∆Fajir-3 ∆

Export of Fajjir 3

Manufacturing Capability∆

300 km

700 km Tech Demonstrator

600 km

1,200 km

1,400 km

2,000 -2,500 km

3,500 - 5,500 km

5,500 - 10,000 km

45-200 km

∆

M7 Acquired

∆

M11 Acquired

∆

DF-3A Technology Transfer (?)

Extensive Chinese & NK Technology Transfers

SS-20 Technology Transfer (?)

Project FlowerIsraeli Technology Transfer

from YA-2 (Jericho 1 Follow On)

Program Ranges (km)

Al Husayn Technology

Transfer∆

SS-12 Technology

Transfer∆

∆

Mushak-120/160/200

201020052000199519901985198019751970

IOC ?

59

10/1/98

Potential North Korean LRBM Covera ge

-90

-60

-30

0

30

60

90

-180 -120 -60 0 60 120 180

Launch Point

6000 km

8000 km

10000 km

61

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Agenda

Page

63

• Introduction 5





• Summary 107

10/1/98

Challen ges to Third World LRBM Development

(1) Access to Critical Technologies -- MTCR and economic sanctions(2) Engineering and manufacturing infrastructure -- old facilities(3) Missile system integration skills -- limited technical manpower

Clustering & Stackingexisting short range

ballistic missile propulsion

Simple flight programmerwith GPS-aided navigation

National top-priority funding

Off-the-shelf components(acceptable risk)

Existing structural materialsand techniques

...may be miti gated b y innovative shortcuts:...may be miti gated b y innovative shortcuts:may be miti gated b y innovative shortcuts:

Obvious limitations...Obvious limitations...Obvious limitations...

Foreign TechnicalAssistance in Spite of MTCR

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Key Technical Challen ges

• Propulsion Systems• Liquids

• Ground handling and loading of propellants -- toxicity & volatility• Valves and flow control for predictable burnout

• Solids• Propellant grain consistency (motor-to-motor)• Dangerous large grain mix, pour, and cure

• Structures• Design, fabrication, and assembly of truss structures and interstages• Cluster/stack integration• Dynamic load margins throughout flight

• Control Electronics• Accurate navigation, timing, sensing of booster variations• Staging• Power supplies and thermal control for LRBM duration flight

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• Reentry Systems• Payload packaging for high deceleration shock loads• Stable dynamic shape design and balancing techniques• Thermal protection against heating loads at LRBM reentry

velocities• Fusing for payload detonation/dispersal at desired altitude

• System Test and Verification Technology• Onboard system performance instrumentation• Telemetry electronics and antennas (ballistic missile and

range)• Flight data analysis tools

Key Technical Challen ges (Cont)

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Critical Technolo gies

• High Energy Propellants

• Light Weight Subsystems

• Dynamic Structures Design and Analysis

• Aerodynamic Heat Protection Materials

• Advanced Flight Dynamics Control Systems

• Multi-Stage Separation and Ignition

• Payload Separation and Stabilization

• Payload Reentry Survival

• Warhead Fusing

• Guidance and Control Computers

• GPS/INS Platforms

• Flight Test Tracking and Telemetry

• High Fidelity Computer Simulation

• Test Range Availability71

10/1/98

Required En gineerin g Development Infrastructure

• Technical Expertise• System design engineering• Fabrication methods• Materials & processes• Flight mechanics• Guidance & control• Modeling & simulation

• Flight Test• Range• Range instrumentation• Data analysis

• Industry• Propellant processing and handling• Propulsion subsystems• Electro/mechanical control systems• Structures manufacturing/assembly• Materials processing• Electronics production• Precision guidance fab. & assembly• Computer hardware and software

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Desired Missile Capability can be attainedby a combination of development “investments”that may be hard to identify

? Critical Unknowns:

1) Level of missile technology at “start point”

2) Foreign assistance to expedite systemintegration of acquired components

Desired Missile Capability can be attainedby a combination of development “investments”that may be hard to identify

? Critical Unknowns:

1) Level of missile technology at “start point”

2) Foreign assistance to expedite systemintegration of acquired components

Third World Development Time Compression

Accelerating Missile Development

IndigenousDevelopment

Iran’s Missile Program Evolution• Combines imported systems with indigenousdevelopment and testing

• Extensive use of foreign expertise

• Steady range growth beyond regionalrequirements

+ Technology andSubsystems

Mis

sile

Per

form

ance

+ Expertise

Development Time

?

?

Ran

ge (

km)

1000

Shahab-6 ?

Shahab-5 ?

1985 90 95 2000 05

3000

Shahab-1

Tondar-68

Nodong-1Zelzal/Shahab-3

Shahab-4 ?

6000

75

?

10/1/98

Development Time Estimate

1 2 3 4 5

Years to First FlightDevelopment

Option

• Buy Russian ICBM

• Buy & Convert SpaceLaunch Vehicle

• Cluster/Stack ExistingMissiles

• Design/Build Booster -Stack Existing Missilefor Upper Stage

• Design/Build EntireMissile

Earliest Possible Launch

Most Likely First launch

?

?

?

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Effective Time to Respond

Years from First LaunchDevelopment

Option

• Buy Russian or Chinese ICBM

• Buy & Convert SpaceLaunch Vehicle

• Cluster/Stack ExistingMissiles

• Design/Build Booster -Stack Existing Missilefor Upper Stage

• Design/Build EntireMissile

Program Start

Most Likely First launch

Program Start

First Indicator may be First Test Launch!First Indicator may be First Test Launch!First Indicator may be First Test Launch!79

-3 -2 -1 1 2 3

Program Start

Program Start

Earliest launch

?

?

?

10/1/98

Agenda

Page

81

• Introduction 5





• Summary 107

10/1/98

Options for LRBM Development

• Buy LRBM (MRBM, IRBM, ICBM)

• Buy & Convert Space Launch Vehicle

• Cluster/Stack Existing Tactical Missiles

• Design/Build Booster - Stack Existing Missile for Upper Stage

• Design/Build Entire Missile

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Available IRBMs

Missile Payload(kg) Range(Km) Warhead Country IOC

• DF-3/DF-3A 2000/ 2150 2800 Conv./ NBC China 1971/ 1986 CSS-2 1900 3100 Conv. Saudi Arabia 1988• CSS-3 2200 4750 Conv./ NBC China 1978• DF-25 2000 1700 Conv./ NBC China Dev. Stop 1996

• Agni 1 1000 2000 Conv. India 1998• Agni 2 1000 3000 Conv./ NBC India 2002?

• Shahab 4 1000 3000 Conv./ NBC Iran 2002• Shahab 5 ? ? Conv./ NBC Iran 2005?

• Jericho 3 1000 4800 Conv./N? Israel 2000?

• TD-1 1000 1500-2000 NBC N.Korea 1998?• TD-2 1000 2000-4000 NBC N.Korea 1998?

85

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• Cluster/Stack Existing Tactical Missiles



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CIA Assessment of SLV-LRBM Conversion

• Only unique ballistic missiletechnology is the warhead

• RV, separation, guidance &control, and strap-on booster SLVtechnologies may be adequate

• Staging, propellants, airframe,engines, thrust control, andnozzles are the same as SLV

• Only unique ballistic missiletechnology is the warhead

• RV, separation, guidance &control, and strap-on booster SLVtechnologies may be adequate

• Staging, propellants, airframe,engines, thrust control, andnozzles are the same as SLV

Figure from 5/14/98 CIA briefing; as depicted inAviation Week & Space Technology, June 1, 1998.

Solid Propellant

SLV

Liquid Propellant

ICBM

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Indian ASLV Conversion

• Propulsion Configuration• 4-stage solid propellant booster (SLV-3)• 2 strap-on rocket motors

• Space Launch Capability• Launch weight 39,000 kg• Payload weight 150 kg• Orbit altitude 400 km• Inclination 46 degrees

• Ballistic Missile Capability• Launch weight 40,000 kg• Payload weight 1000 kg• Range (NRE) 4,000 km

• Propulsion Configuration• 4-stage solid propellant booster (SLV-3)• 2 strap-on rocket motors

• Space Launch Capability• Launch weight 39,000 kg• Payload weight 150 kg• Orbit altitude 400 km• Inclination 46 degrees

• Ballistic Missile Capability• Launch weight 40,000 kg• Payload weight 1000 kg• Range (NRE) 4,000 km

Drawing from Federation of American Scientists:http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/india/launch/aslv.htm

ASLV

23.6 m X

1.0 m. Dia.

91

From Jane’s Information Group

10/1/98

Israeli SHAVIT Conversion

• Propulsion Configuration• 3-stage solid propellant booster

(based on Jericho 2)• NEXT, slightly larger follow-on

• Space Launch Capability• Launch weight 29,000 kg• Payload weight 800 kg• Orbit altitude 400 km• Inclination Polar

• Ballistic Missile Capability• Launch weight 29,000 (est.)• Payload weight 1,100 kg• Range (NRE) 5,000-7,000 km

• Propulsion Configuration• 3-stage solid propellant booster

(based on Jericho 2)• NEXT, slightly larger follow-on

• Space Launch Capability• Launch weight 29,000 kg• Payload weight 800 kg• Orbit altitude 400 km• Inclination Polar

• Ballistic Missile Capability• Launch weight 29,000 (est.)• Payload weight 1,100 kg• Range (NRE) 5,000-7,000 km

SHAVIT SLV

14 m. X

1.56 m. dia.

Jerico 2 From Federation of American Scientists web site:http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/Israel/launch/index.htm

• Demonstrated160 kg payloadto 207 x 1587 kmelliptical orbit @143 degreeretrogradeinclination.

• Demonstrated160 kg payloadto 207 x 1587 kmelliptical orbit @143 degreeretrogradeinclination.

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Japanese M-3 or M-5 Conversion

• The M-3 space launch vehicle“family”could be converted into an IRBMwith a 500+ kg payload and a range of4,000+ km. The Japanese Government hasofficially refuted this allegation. *

• The M-5 is a three- or four-stage, solidpropellant launch vehicle designed tocarry payloads of 2,000 kg to 200 km;1,200 kg to 500 km and 800 kg to GTO. *

• Three-stage version shown:• Length = 31.0 m

• Diameter = 2.5 m

• Launch weight = 130,000 kg

M-5 LRBM performance has not yet been assessed

• The M-3 space launch vehicle“family”could be converted into an IRBMwith a 500+ kg payload and a range of4,000+ km. The Japanese Government hasofficially refuted this allegation. *

• The M-5 is a three- or four-stage, solidpropellant launch vehicle designed tocarry payloads of 2,000 kg to 200 km;1,200 kg to 500 km and 800 kg to GTO. *

• Three-stage version shown:• Length = 31.0 m

• Diameter = 2.5 m

• Launch weight = 130,000 kg

M-5 LRBM performance has not yet been assessed

M-5 SLV

9 m.

Insulated payloadfaring &

Third stage w/ ENEC& TVC

6.7 m

2nd stage w/ ENEC &TVC

13.7 m

1st stage w/movable nozzle

Source: Jane’s Strategic Weapons 95


10/1/98




• Cluster/Stack Existing Missiles



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Two Feasible LRBM Desi gns

• Clustered M-9 ballistic missilesStage 1 -- 7 M-9’sStage 2 -- 3 M-9’sStage 3 -- 1 M-9

Payload -- 750 kgGuidance -- 150 kgLaunch Weight -- 59,000 kgReentry Angle -- 30 degrees

Time of Flight -- 28.5 minutesRange -- 6,500 km

• Clustered M-9 ballistic missilesStage 1 -- 7 M-9’sStage 2 -- 3 M-9’sStage 3 -- 1 M-9



Separateat burnout

Solid

• Clustered CSS-2 ballistic missilesStage 1 -- 3 CSS-2’sStage 2 -- 1 CSS-2



• Clustered CSS-2 ballistic missilesStage 1 -- 3 CSS-2’sStage 2 -- 1 CSS-2



Separateat burnout

Liquid

99

10/1/98

Design Issues Considered in Assessment

• RV structure & materials for 30 degreereentry

• Payload separation at boosterburnout; G&C stays with spent upperstage

• Interstages between booster stagessized for flight loads at increaseddiameter

• Revised raceways and electricalsystem wiring

• Guidance subsystem increased powerand cooling

• Truss structure for clustered rocketmotors

• Extendible nozzle exit cones (upperstages only)

• Booster separation mechanisms• Booster thermal protection for aero

loads and motor nozzle heat

1st Stage(3 ClusteredDF-3s)

2nd Stage(1 StackedDF-3)

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Range Sensitivity to Payload Wei ght

Ran

ge (

km)

Payload Options (kg)

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

500 750 1000 1250 1500 2000

M-9 C lusterCSS-2 C luster

Nominal payload/range performance of modeled LRBMs

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Evaluation Methodolo gy

• AS-2530 Flight Simulation Code• 3 - degrees of freedom• Non-rotating spherical earth• Standard atmospheric properties

• Powered ascent flight profile• Vertical launch• Instantaneous pitchover• Gravity turn• Payload separation at booster burnout

• Payload flight profile• Keplarian free flight• Keplarian reentry• No reentry angle of attack

• Missile characteristics• Nominal ballistics• Nominal weights• Estimated drag properties

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Agenda

Page

107

• Introduction 5





• Summary 107

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Summary

• Third World Countries are capable of achieving LRBM capability• Innovative technical shortcuts may be used for different national goals

• Political or coercive vs military capability

• Time to First Flight may be much earlier than currently anticipated• Time from observed threat to first launch may be very short• MTCR is not stopping missile technology proliferation• Developed countries are currently marketing critical ballistic missile

technologies, systems, and personnel

The Time Between Inescapable Evidence of aDeveloping Threat to When That Threat is Fielded May

be Less Than the Time in Which We Can Respond

The Time Between Inescapable Evidence of aDeveloping Threat to When That Threat is Fielded May

be Less Than the Time in Which We Can Respond

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By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land …10/1/98 Study Approach • Review lessons learned...

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Transcript of By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land …10/1/98 Study Approach • Review lessons learned...