.4, •

DECLASSIF I ED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPT ION 3B211

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR: (II

(cI c /i,4.2

26 November 1956

Subject : RIA, TATSUMI Eiichi

1. The attached RIA on TATSUMT EiIchi reflects a philosophy withwhich I am reluctant to associate myself. While I am an ardent supporterof the idea of thorough investigation of all persons with whom CIA is inany operational contact, I believe that it is our duty as desk officers tosupport the field while at the same time providing Cl/OA with all the factsavailable omitting irrelevant material.

2. In the case at hand, for example, in the relation cited in theTATSUMI, FURUYA, KASH1MA situation the facts should be placed in theirproper perspective. CIA had begged, pleaded, and cajoled FURUYA into under-taking operations against the ChiComs. After months of effort on the partof CIA, FURUYA finally came up with a suggestion which it developed hadoriginated or been sponsored or suggested by TATSUMI, who, it must beremembered, had been a CRC advisor long prior to FURUYA's association withCRC. It took CIA some time to marshal its information re KASHIMA and theproposed operation and the debunking process was comparatively slow ingetting started. FURUYA's reluctance to cancel the plan came as much ifnot more from (1) our incessant pushin“nr joint ops in China, (2) ourslowness to provide him with any information, and (3) his pride in comingup with any possible joint ops idea, than it did for any high esteem we mighthold for TATSUMI. On the other hand, a person of TATSUMi g s background (allthings considered) of necessity stands high in the eyes of a person new inintelligence as opposed to the police field, particularly when in FURUYA'seyes CIA had yet to be proven. Therefore, I cannot attach too much importanceto the story as told in this memo.

3. The role I see for this Branch vis-a-wvis Cl/OA in seeking OA's atthe field request is one of providing the expertise that Cl/OA lacks. Weshould be in a position to at least judge the pertinence of all info athand and should be able to 9ay to Cl/OA that we have judged from the availableinfo that a subject is or is not appropriate. We should not simply present

- the problem to Cl/OA and leave the entire judgment up to them. They cannever have sufficient expert staff to provide this function on a world-widebasis and we have to perform a role for them as we do for the field. Inthis case, I believe, we should say in conclusion, not that more studyshould be done (Cl/0A will naturally do that), but rather despite all theinformation supplied we believe TATSUIll should or should not be approved orapproved with reservations such as continuing field surveillance of hisrelations with certain suspect Chinese. It is, furthermore, up to us, Ibelieve, to weigh TATSUM1's value to CIA against the possible risk involvedand let Cl/OA know what we think.

4. Another point of concern to me is the necessity of carefullyconsidering, in each individual case, the use of a person for whom an OA is

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sought. If we rermest approval for a person whom we intend to use as a FAthen every shred of information we can garner becomes important. If, on theother hand, we believe that a merson may beoome cognisant of a relationshipbetween his agency and CIA ia a case in point) then we can affordto be far more lenient. We should afisciously think every time we make areouest for an OA just what the subject of that re emest will do for CIA,whether he fits into the relationship of an agency or an operation. I haveseen no information which would indicate that we contemplate a directrelation with TATSUNI nor anything going beyond a CI approval of anexisting situation. Hence TATSRMI's relations, real or only suggested, donot seem to me to cam the weight assigned them in this memorandum.Isn't it Just barely possible that TATSUMI's relations with certain Chinesewere Willoughby directed and continued by Rinalducci - do our files reflectonly what is stated in thin memorandum on this relationship? Have weattempted to find more? Should we make such an attempt?

5. Finally I would like to record a warning relative to the credencewhich can be pl,ced in information supplied by the 441st CIC Det. This CICDet., and I speak from 10 years of experience, reported almost everything itheard on almost any subject. One result is thvt, in my opinion, we shouldexamine carefully any report from this source and be as sure as possible ofthe context from which the report stems before associating ourselves tooclosely with it. In this TATSUHI case I feel confident we could possiblyobtain from other 0-2/FEC files a mass of evidence to show that GeneralTATSUNI is probably one of the best, safest, most qualified persons inJapan today for CIA use. I say "possibly obtain" only because such filesare in the custody of Lt. Col. Rinalducci and not in the regular 0-2 files.

6. I cannot approve this R1A in its present form.

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Atteahment to !keenest for Operatianii Approval, 15 November 1956

Migta 'AWLThe following in data on Sublect l e post-war aetivitlea which any be interpreted

AS derogatoryt

At tv end at 'Way war, Subject Coomender at tte Third Division in CentralChina, be been tavanforrod to Shan;brai. In order to *veld being held in Chine,he agreed to divot 4 network or Janenemel be would provide Intel:Lion/two to theChinese Nationalists, and then :vomited DOI Akio. 4. Under the empire, of theSecond Section of the Ministry of National Derma*, two Rentipftlovietft groupswere Paresis one heeded by DOI to work Prue headqvarters at Shanghai, and theother headed by ?USW to work in Japen unesr the Chineae Manion in Takyo.2Under thee, arrangements, ama was repetriated abant June 1946, and thefollowing October oontected WI= 'Am-ohleng who is esti to lave jnit joined theChinese missies in 1647o.,

While TATSOHI was employed by the 2nd Department of the C:liNat Miniotry ofNational Defense in T6k70, BOI, his :counterpart, meded the Japanese Section oftha, Shanghai areneb ztt41 International 7rotaane Research Institute, Thinorganization, eetablieme, by UANG ?wig-slang, Ned been inamnIxavaad into the2nd Department a t aa FED after 1.N, ver.4

In 1946, the same year was repatriated and began oontaating theChinese Mission, MILS Ban-kuen, Secretary of the International Problems ResearchInstitute wader JOG Peng-shoal, was, on WagOl s rearendation, assigned as enintelligence officer to the Camess Eiseien, ibkyo.

Meanwhile DOI WAS apparently closely amaocisted with Withl)Pene.,pheng, 'awingbeen aescribed as "living 1atturions1y6 with in Nanking in 1947.°

W'hea ;mum arrived in Japan in 1946, 'IP bezen to make contacts &Tithe.number of Japanese who, before his departure Cron China, had been reocesszeided to1.ba by DDI as intelligence prospoete tzong the* l aaleadnals were ltrAS.1 Sebum,

OTANI !tree. NISKDVRA 7oahle, OSNCHT Mrose (C 1, slIEAKI Sueneri, YAMChute (C.. ::)), and l'.14914= 3in, 1 Working for

27t*To Dept. HND.through the

Gaines. MLesion, ha me prabably alao An :.0eueh with LISLIA flan-kuan.°

In Marsh 1947, VAUO Peng-ohang Wan assigned to the Clime Miamian in rdkio.e became laud of the Intelligence &motion at the tUseion. PDX .o was =waled

into Japan in Seatenber 1947 anli hidden at the Chimes 2rtessY. Au WW1* DOI wasin hiding, •fA:3D111 palmed to tOI l a wife the living elcaenneewhieh the Chinese:Union van furnishing 'amr. Ewing the 7:car that Vifl van in hiding et the Mission,"ANT.J1 vete providina iatelligence to t:c Mission." According to 3 report Prom

(based =C._jtonetr7atiens and TATSUMIl e statements), this nativityfor the Chime° ?Nestor' wee for varieuei tatoons unsuceeseful, and about tlae end of1947, =:101 ves recruited for LS 0-2.14

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7he Del/TAT:AM relatioaseip continued tdD be elope. in 194e, nein hisconnection with aeneral WILLOMBI, TAMUI mnpealad :or r:CI l s official repatri-ation and in December 1949 cox was officially repe-xlved.13

In 1950, DOI became a member of .̀«.113nI t e eretnieation, the '.:AWAAE Kikan,formed hy TAtallfl in 1948 at the request of leneral "v:ILLUtgegir end nomad forKAWAre Torn:third who is alleged ta %aye been the "front men" of he oreanisatien.14In 1951, (I A eaid the DOI/IATSUMX relationship was ,-ttry close, that,TAfSDXItold him that be (iresuia) persomally handled XI for tne MASS Kiesn,45

In 1951, TAM:II was described as being tore involved with US and ChineseIntellieence fctivity than mad be speoifically identified in hie present weekfor 3-2 SCAP.40

In 1952, an tee other hand, C______reported that UTZUMI had no fin:tidalrelations with the Clings.' since the dissolution of his intelligence organisation(far the Chinese Missibe) in 1947•17

Yet it 1952 TATSCMI was still in close tench with Dar who ems still visitiMthe Chinese Wow, and who apeeared te be suppeOeituthe activities of aso-called "Telrd Faroe" ereep..led try LI Isune-jen and C::12,1 Cenng-ful :lead of theCeinese Democratic Alliance. 40 DDI else appears to have participated in Poracesanoperations of the Japan /wrench or 41A1i3 Peng-shenes tntQrrrntioa1 Affairs reinesarchInetitute, the Par &astern Affairs Reaearch Institute,

What is significant in the above data is the background at the Chinese “"Naeionalists" with whom msrv.: and AI were cooperating. After is death,

Pong-sheng was Imperial to have been a communist. 20 Hsra sem-tempSecretary of WANa l s Institute, who was employed at the Ceinsee kission as anintelligence officer had a long batftround of Communist activity, and wasMealy released fres: the Chinese :Amnion for leftist activities. RSIBB weehad boon giving direction to ths Few Lastern Affairs Research Soolety at limaas early as leM, ,loinod the organisation officially when it had became Jon=entervelees. e.1 DOL was liaising with Jason through :MAX tion-shen,subordinate, end believed to be the co:mutest KAY Ven-:'cng. 22 Cte ormosanActivities ef Jonan Zatorprises uere directed he HXIMAan-knan 3.21 10 was 'sexierin Seem of -she ?Opine eponeoree Taiwan Democratic Leagne.P5

It is possible 1.hat A:STS and DeI arc invelved in 313 C:iCom targetedactivity (penetration). It is also possible that they are • le cooperatingwith the ChiComs. Unfortunetele most et the data on :12SZ17 comes from personsehe are km close (=paretic= with his end tem likely to cover for hin. Anincident which mieht,eeveyer„ shedlieht on the zetlene of ritrami or anthose of c a(rurza Tern) is the poreietent atteept of YeM:oru to sellCAA= a propo

e itvalving tee use of geSTIMA Soliro e As &

principal agent in en opera•lan amlaat Comeandst China. F.A.:.;.trzt.1 %Tee to go to,eACAD apparentle te contact is seurcen of infereetion 4.eere. Yvee when infereed

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tAS4IMA was thrice arrested es a young Ocadneist, had'participated in :canoeistactivitychcring the war, and has recently boon under investigation for asugglingactivities, StRCTA insisted that sines eontrollcd KASUAA and :OdUnl.teltICASatit VIM reliahle, we ald use f.A31flo.1 in ver 40Int onerations with C=.44

What is particularly intersoting is ;hat in 3.947 laSnkA w portai to beconnected witb tlso esenreh inotiteto or Internet:oval affair..' This organisationis aleo cal:ed internatienal,PrehIops Research Institute foondea by WANGPengoebeng mid montionn, ahove.4p

On 19 March 1956, Arl iltr and General LIAltrA (Hitoehl) :%naginf; Arectorof the LAIKO KAI (forma. ArAr Officers' (lub), deeided to reenumed Lt. aen.DOI (Akio) end a Naj. len t_ to the Nslegatien of form. Niliteristeto visit Coononiet The kground of this re7iort is pertinent inpointing up a:ain a load tack to WsIa 9en-iluen4 When Schwa visitedChips with 7211.11 7atsu in t .'4, fell lt 1955, Alo ree-bmg Invited 2=0 tovisit Ctdca again with a Am:rap or finer Jsknencee Illiterista. After returniegto Japes, S2D0 set up t!‘c Organiser* Society for a %legation of fornorMilitarists to visit ,12aszeint China. MDO discussed t ile trip with= )b-lowhen latter was in Japan (December 1955), mul AYe the lotto: certain tonnaregarding the visit branding a repeat that brentty former servicemen beselected by the "Japsnase side* to =ft V* trip. After ECa returned to CA.na,TIDO received n corooa*/ letter trenNL Nan.kuan stating that ConmomistChina would 1' Do a delegation of rty forneres-aervionern to visit theeountry with all expanses paid. n the 16th of 'Arch, 141D0 re4eived aflameletter inviting the delegatien to visit Cine4 this WAD a fellowmp of thelet . er from The form' irrsiUition cane from 7:A rl !lei-jo, Chairmanof vle Peoples, Council on Diplomacy of Com=niet China. i's =7011TP(apparently the t'evanissos Society or tne :41ogation) net and decided to pinkten fres among tbemaelles and ton from usage other servicetea t a orxenizat.iens.The selection WIS let erairlay r.16 DOI A-lo and Maj. Inn. :A4ASWHA ofthe Cabinet Itinsurch tnieber *ore reocnotondgriby 3tI oni Gn. 111.%:510.t ofthe ILITO KAL"

.t;

Alt‘vmethL3.UA r _a) reccricoi that Di4 nosy not be acceptable tOConounist China because hie .dentity as an inte/ l igence orficer is too we/1eotablisbed, OCI would hardly hive boon ucanatme to MLR who one wA"0'ens Shames eabordinote at :be Chinese gission and leader in the &can Uroupvithwnich MI liaised thrmijh 7!..7:2il e subordinate, KUA!: 40e.ohan. (UJI visitedthe office of CS Air foree Into/A.1mm in :okyo on 6 August 1956 prior to hisdeparvere to Cox:monist Crdna with 15 eleJa rAineee Arm and Navy arriCOM DOI,Valmftled to leave on 9 August, praetor, to payAnothsr visit to the Air tarosIntelligenoe orrice and to report on is rip. )'#

The above data indicates at least 4 need to rarther ntuey the noliticalorientation of he Chinese with wham TA:3U2 and L01 apnear to have beencooperating, and to :laterals* :Ardtx,t s relationship with thaw

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.1. zsx 56, 28 Mar 52, r_ 2.2.

2. zaa 26,29 Feb 52# c: ZJJ 12i(ORODORI Rirose) from personalobservation and TATSUMI ls own statements.

3. ZJJ 56, 28 Har 52#Tsoe above #2).

4. ra 2713, Peiping, Oct 46, 8.2; 1,CP 372 and 272a, 4 Mar 470 Peipiag4 q.;41.

5. Fak 2265; 1641/4-100 # 25 Jena 47.

6. ZCS 1051, 10 Dee 47 and 2ITTA 47# 6 Jan 48.

7. See 13.

8. Soo 05.

9, ZOS 1051, 27 Hex 4.

10. F:BA 1124 13 Jul 54; ZJJ 26, 29 Fab 524:_

II. sae 42 and #10.

12, ZIJ 56, 28 Mar 520 C ,:lfrom own obserestions and TATSNMI s a statemants.

13. ZJJ 26, 29 Fah 32, B-3,C

14, Sos 122 end FM 1120, 13 Jul 54.

15. RASO 0441 tri 26459, 18 Sept 51; sAao 043, IN 28150, 26'Se/A 51# Tep Secret onrasum/boI re1ation:141#.

16. Assessment of Staff Office, WAS 2884, 29 Mar 51.

17. See #12.

18. Noose appoor on Feb 52 isms of umeaaine Democratic Front.

19. DOI vas named among those in &urge of student volunteers far Manama inShinaacmgazine# 15 Feb 50, This magazine is JOPtmaked# bovevar the namesgiven chock out with other available data, Persons named were me:bere of ParSantora Maim anaemnan goalatuerInstitute, NSIER ***Awn, known oomnoniatload FMARS operations direoted toward Formoaa. SRINSO gorse no indication tbepersona named were an anti.CHIANG group. cm:mum leader in Japan of thePeiping eponoored TAIWAN DMORLTIC LEAGUE.)

20, Monthly Connter4ntelligenoe Sumoar7, 15 Jul 49.

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21.na 515; SO 6326S, SO 672961 SO 99412; SO 77031 and CS 31160; pee also POFAVdiaries and reports,

22. ZJL 714, 13 Sept 51, B-2. Backer:mod date on MIMI Wen-shen and &AR oen-reng-avo been conwed. Chine desk ocnourrad on probability KUAN and XAM was onoperem

23. See #20.

24. 'MBA 9120, 9 klar 56, (__

This same roport rurther explains that in connection with the Cabinet ResearchCbamhees operations against the Chinese Communist, 11081aLTn1 Hasmentiomed that LI Teung..jen was involved. In 1952, Lr reungi-jan as mentionedin text of this paper, edited the magazine Democratic Pronto a publication ofCESX C1ung4u0 s Chinese Dettocratic Alliance. DOI Aldo l e name appeared withthat of another sponsor an the Feb 52 issue of tNetsmemmine. LI is also theperson for whom the cement:it SSIEH Nan,knan interceded with rimo MinisterYOTaDA, sazeating that while 103:11D4 was in the US signing the Norm TreatyImip could 'lave a conference with LI. (HOW 141g, IN 25256, 30 Aug 51) LI has211=s reeently bean contacted bylanAM Ichiro. (See SATOIAHA dossier) Lirepresents `desalt no an advocate or a "Third ?brae; be tins been reportedcooperating with the Chinese Communiots.

25. ;CIZI 24, 4 Aug 47.

26. See attachment to mil 47, 3-2, 3:4 Inter-Office Memorandum, 24 Dec 47.

27. ZS'S& 9530, khrob 1956, PT

28. VJBA 9530, Horeb 1956 and ?JD 21A1, which is based on foregoing reports,includint; pertinent comments.

Former Lt. Gen. ADO was con of the fifteNeeven Zfrpanese invited by the WorldPeace Cluncil to attend the extreordimary general meeting to be hold in Der/In.(Tokyo, ageu, PIS R98, 20 Mel 54,) He was also present et the initialmeeting of the Lea4ue for t!is Mestoratim of Diplomatic Selations with CommunistChina and the USSR. (Tokyo, las420 17 Oct 54) ln December 1954, he wasappoimted Vice Minimemr of Mance under the new 1!ATOXAMA Ichiro Cabinet.trms, 14 Dec 54) In 1955, be was ineluded in the ectod-will MISS1012 to CommunistCUna of the People' League for Sate gnarding Uvo Constitution. (MIS 1201,Tokyo, !nib 17 Oct 55) An MO Saburo vim listed am a known member of thejapansee Comunist Party in the FEC/NIS Somexrf on JCP membership, 1 *iv 49.

29. IV 114 63031 (0) tug. 56)