AN

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

OF

THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

DURING WORLD WAR II

FIRST DRAFT NARRATIVEPREPARED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION

BUREAU OF SHIPS

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

OF

THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

DURING WORLD WAR II

FIRST DRAFT NARRATIVEPREPARED B? THE HISTORICAL SECTION

BUREAU OF SHIPS

^ V

LIBRARYARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYBUREAU OF St-MPS

WASHtNGTON 25. D. C.

EH8/A3(112)Ser 110 273

^ 8 /sue 1952

From: Chief, Bureau of Ships4o: Chief of Naval Operations

(Naval Records and History - Op. 29)

Sabj! An Administrative History of the Bureau of Ships during World War II;forwarding of

Bad; (1) Subject history

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded for preservation as source Material and forfuture reference.

CMef

o

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VCLUMEJI

CHAPTER PAGE

PARTI"BACKGROUND DURING PEACE"

I. DECLINE OF SHIPBUILDING FOLLOWINGWORLD WAR I ....... ...... ... ..... ............ I

Isolation and. Depression.The New Naval Policy of 193?.Lessons Between Wars .Basis for the Future.

II. TEE ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THEBUREAU OF SHIPS ..... ....... .....,,,.,....... I?

History of Two Shipbuilding Bureaus.Consolidation.Establishment of the Bureau:

The Lav.Organization.Development.

PART II"PRELUDE TO WAR"

III. THE PRE-WAR WORLD AND -THE NAVY ..............The International Situation Leadingto War.The Balance of Fleets.Impact upon the Bureau.

IV. EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING ..... ..... ........ ---- 97Background .War Emergency Building.The Role of the Bureau,Birth of a Ship.Jurisdiction over Production.Effect of the Destroyer-Naval BaseExchange .

V . EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL AND FACILITIESOver-All Expansion.Bureau of Ships Personnel:

Civilian.Military.

Expansion of Facilities.Navy Yards.

ix

APPENDIX VOLUMES

(Bound separately. Available in the History Section of the Bureau ofand in the office of the Director of Naval Records and History)

NO, TITL3

1, Historyof Statistical Analysis in the Bureau of Ships

2, Conservation Program of the Bureau of JShipa

3<, History of If* S, Navy Petroleum Inspection

4, History of Chemistry Section, Research and Standards Branch

3, lMexofContractPri.ee** -M-: .,/ , -.;A'^/.? ' ',;:-. -/

6, Vessels Directed To Be Built and Construction Completed bySelected Type : 1938 thrg #i 1943

7, Vessels Lost^ Transferred, Returned, Sold, Scrapped or OtherwiseDisposed of from 1?40 throng 1?43. (Lead-Lease Vessels Bxcluded),

8k Vessels Leased

9, Bureau of Ships Plant ?acilities Expansion under Bureau of Ships'Appropriations ., . ^ i, ;,

10, ContractsjwardedPrivateShipyarb^ for Construction of NayalVessels - 1 January 1934 to 13 January 1946 ,

11, Vessels Assigned to Navy Yards and Miscellaneous Naval Activitiesfor Construction, 1 January 1934 to 1 June 1943

12.. Ships LaidDo^mSince^ Washington Trea by Authorizing A6 February 1922 to 1 October 1943

13, Chronolos** July 1939 to September 1943 according to General Eventsand Specific Military Engagements; Events within the Navy Departmentand Bureau of Ships; and Estimated Value of New Construction

O

TABLES

Tal.le No,

1 ...... The U.S. Navy at minimum strength, by typesand years, 1931-1932. ........ ........ . .r.v;.;, . ..,.;, . , 4

2 ...... Naval Appropriations, fiscal years 1924-1944. ii. , . . . 13

3 ____ , , New Construction Awarded, 1922-1941 ..... ..... ..... . . 14

4...... Major Combatant vessels of the UnitedtState&,on hand and under construction ....... . .............. 89

5, ..... Major Combatant vessels of the British Empireon hand and under construction ................ ...... 90

6....;. Major Combatant Vessels of Japan on hand andunder construction ............................. , . , . . 91

7...... Balance of fleets, United States, Britain,Japan; on hand and under construction in .1931, 1939 and 1940 ....................... ---- . ..... 92-93

8...... Emergency Shipbuilding, New Construction,Conversions, Acquisitions, 1933-1941. ............... 101-02

9.....^ Emergency New Construction of Combat yessels,: i'1933-1941 ---- . . .. . ...... ....... . . ..... . : .... . . .... 103-03

10- .... Authorized Appropriations, 1937 1941; . .^ . . A* ..^ ..... 107 11

11..... BuShips Personnel on Board, 1933-1941.. ............. 123

12 Navy Yard Personnel, Military and Civilian,Pre-War and Peak Assignments,, 143

13 Pre-World War II Navy Yard Construction,1934-1941 147-49

^O

CHARTS

Chart Nc_

I......... Organization Chart, BuEng, 1939 22

II. Organization Chart, BuC&R, 1936. 23

III. Organization Diagram, Consolidated duties,BuEng and BaC&R, 1939. 33

IV Organization Chart, BaShips, August, 1940 48

V Flow Chart: Control of Navy Yards, 1946. 139

Oxiii

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF NAVAL HtSTORY

WASHtNGTON 25, D. C.

The general,files of the Navy are the main source of naval

history and their completion, arrangement, and preservation must

be given continuous care. Documentation is, therefore, the basis

for the compilation of the History of Naval Operations and Admin-

istration during the Second World War.

Although the documents thus lay the foundation for a com-

plete history, the history itself cannot be written until the

events it records have been correlated and seen in true perspec-

tive. In the meantime, the official documents must be linked

together in order that the files may be brought into manageable

form, and provision made for interpretive digests of the most

significant events.

First draft narratives provide the necessary linkage, and

make the source material readily available to responsible offi-

cials as well as to the historians of the future. As each first

draft narrative is completed, two copies are bound, one for the

originating office and one for the Office of Naval History. Those/'"

important documents which properly form part of the narratives,

as being essential to their understanding, are bound separately

as supplements.

E. C. KALBFUS,Admiral, U. S. N., (Ret.),Director of Naval History.

xv

This copy for

INTRODUCTION

Adhering to the ancient proposition that "What is past is

prologue", the United States Navy in the early stages of the

Second World War commenced the compilation of historical records

to serve as a chronicle of authoritative information for use

in future planning rather than as a mere record of past achieve-

ment. Authorized by the Secretary of the Navy in September 1943,

these histories increased in scope as the conflict with the Axis

Powers confronted the Navy with problems on a scale never faced

before problems as.great in administration, logistics, supply,

research and training as in strategy and tactics.

With the dynamic wartime expansion wi<thin the Navy, one

of the most comprehensive activities became the Bureau of Ships

which ultimately concerned itself with far-reaching logistical

problems of unprecedented latitudes. In the Navy, logistical

function involves supplying the weapons of war which for Naval

warfare center basically about the ship and its armament, plus

the men and equipment to enable the ship and its armament to

function at the time and place and in the manner required. It

is upon the Bureau of Ships that responsibility falls for the

building and maintaining of ships and for the supplying of

equipment so vital to effective operations. Many other Bureaus

and Offices of the Navy are concerned with the multitudinous

Cxvii

technical aspects of this job but this Bureau retains the

management responsibility for the efficient and effective prose-

cution of its mission in servicing the Fleet. Under ibese broad

functions of the Bureau of Ships fall the following responsi-

bilities:

Design of ships and equipment.Controlling the necessary facilities.Recruiting and training civilian labor.Procuring and allocating materials.Administering the field activities (under Bureau ofShips management control) which perform the followingfunctions for the Bureau:

Acquisition of ships,Activation and Reactivation of vessels,Disposal of surplus vessels,Maintenance of the Active fleet,Maintenance of the Reserve fleet,Material stocking and control,Electronic development and installation,Investigation and Test,Other logistic support to fleet as required in

specific areas.

In the fulfillment of tnis mission during the war, the Bureau

of Ships became subject to that "province of uncertainty" charac-

teristic of any military enterprise. It has been stated -that

"three-fourths of the things upon which action in war must be

calculated are hidden". This became particularly true in the

field of logistics upon which modern military operations depend

to such a considerable degree.

Logistic planning, therefore, proved to be of first magnitude

in the successful prosecution of the lightning all-out war

characteristic of this age,where the entire complexion of the

conflict can change with breath-taking and death-dealing rapidity.

xviii

O

Being of the essence, planning was based upon an estimate of pos-

sibilities and this in a war of almost unlimited variables.

The operational counterpart in combat of this logistic estimation

of possibilities is calculated risk: the analysis of all factors

which collectively indicate whether or not the consequences to

ourselves will be more than compensated for by the damage to the

enemy or interference with his plans. Both are based upon orderly

reasoning, but the time requirements of fulfillment cause the

logistic estimation to be projected farther into the future than

the operational calculated risk.thereby enhancing its chance of

of error manyfold. In this vital, dynamic, and uncertain sphere

of World War II activities, the Bureau of Ships played a principal

role. As has been stated by the wartime Commander-in-Chief,

U. S. Fleet: "The war has been variously termed a war of pro-

duction and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as

the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics."

Adhering to the purpose of this documentation for use in

future planning, this history of the Bureau of Ships in the

logistic warfare against the Axis Powers will concern itself

with the presentation of administrative and operational problems,

what solutions were attempted and found ineffective, and what

policy changes resulted from the final determination of the

correct solution. In order to view the problems in the light

of contemporary conditioning factors, this history has been

xix

set down chronologically/ The study of one of the Bureau's

functions, such as facilities or personnel for example, is of

little interest per se except as a record of achievements in

that field. In order for an analytical study to be made of the

solutions of problems encountered in these fields, all of the

attendant contemporary conditioning factors must be included.

In this manner the problem's relative importance in the over-all

scheme of things may also be evaluated. In general the chronology

is divided into five temporal parts:

a) The background during the peace years including a

summary of the shipbuilding decline following World

War I and the origin and establishment of the Bureau

of Ships;

b) The prelude to World War II concerning all factors of

shipbuilding and the attempt to improve our status in

comparison with other Navies of the world;

c) The first half of the war the defensive and turning

of the tide phases and the contribution of the Bureau

of Ships in stemming the on-rushing Axis flood;

d) The second half the offensive phases of the war—and

The Bureau's overwhelming production program which

crushed the enemy in every theater;

e) The post-war era is concerned with a study of the effects

of a new age upon the world and the Navy in general and

The Bureau of Ships in particular, with a resume of the

Bureau's programs throughout the entire var in electronics,

ship design, and research and development, activities vhich

could not feasibly have been broken down into chronological

phases.

Such then is the chronological approach to the history of the Bureau

of Ships. The many problems presented, the solutions attempted, and

the lessons learned during the great conflict vill be revealed as

this chronicle unfolds. Against the background of past experience

and continuing obstacles, two major conclusions for the security of

our post-war world become unequivocally obvious: the preservation

of our unprecedented Naval strength built up during the war must be

assured, and this, for economy's sake, through technical processes

under the jurisdiction of the Bureau; and, the design and research

program must be emphasized to keep our country foremost in technical

developments. Since our Navy's traditional role as our country's

first line of defense is as vital today as it was during the recent

years of fighting, these Bureau responsibilities become paramount in

the interest of world peace. The out-moded philosophy among nations:

"To the Victors belong the Spoils" has gradually given way to a more

enlightened proposition: "To the Victors belongs the responsibility

of maintaining the peace".

May this history present a means of fulfilling this responsi-

bility.

Cxxi

o

PREFACE

Although the initiating authorization by the Secretary of

the Navy for a record of "administrative experience" of the Bureau

of Ships in World War II had looked toward the preparation merely

of a rather brief historical survey, it became immediately

apparent that a thorough exploration of problems was necessary

if the project were to have real value.

In accordance with this directive, Lt. Paul J. Strayer, USNR,

formerly Assistant Professor of Economics, Princeton University,

was assigned in 1943 to accomplish the writing of this history.

A year after the cessation of hostilities, the first draft nar-

rative had been completed and contained supporting articles by

the following contributors:

"Civilian Personnel" Mr. Theodore W. Taylor:Formerly head of the CivilianPersonnel Section, Admin.,Branch, Bureau of Ships.

"WAVES Personnel" Lt. Comdr. H. Barry O'Neil.WAVE Officer, BuShips.

"Navy Yards" Dr. Robert G. Albion,Asst. Director, Office ofNaval History.

"Industrial Relations" Industrial Relations Section,Code 780, Shore Div., BuShips.

"Controlled Materials Lt. Comdr. Mundell, USNR,Plan" CMP Section, BuShips.

"Scheduling Components Lt. L. M. Bernstein, USNR,for Shipbldg., and CMP Section, BuShips.Maintenance"

xx ill

In July 1947, Lt. Edward J. Pope Jr., USNR, historian and .S.

screenplay writer, received an assignment to rewrite the first

draft narrative for final submission to the Office of Naval

History. This was accomplished by the year's end under the :

supervision of Captain L. T. Haugen, USN, Director of Administration,

Bureau of Ships. Articles by the following contributors were

included in the history as re-written:

"Death and Rejuvenation Capt. Homer N. Wallin, USN,at Pearl Harbor." Taken from December 1946 issue

"United States Naval InstituteProceedings",

"Ship Repair Units" Based upon an article by Lt.R. E. Williams, USNR: "You can'tBeat Them If You? Can't Sink Them".

"Operations Crossroads" Excerpts from the officialU. S. Navy reports.

"Research and Develop- Based upon sub-sections' reportsment Chapter" to the Director of Research,

BuShips.

Although .the names of specific individuals are not mentioned,

the policy in the re-written history was consistently followed

of submitting the manuscript to be read by key officers in the

divisions or sections whose programs were discussed. It proved

feasible to furnish to the men whose work came under survey an

opportunity to disclose errors of fact and to dispute matters of

opinion. This however, in no manner was accomplished for the

purpose of shifting any element of responsibility from the "

historian.

Oxx iv

c

Personal interviews^ Bureau files, Bureau publications, the

"United States Naval Institute Proceedings"^ and Admiral King's

three official reports "B. S. Navy at War" provided most of the

material for the preparation of this history as re-written^

If the reader finds this document deviating from the

historical truth or unhappily inclined towards the darker side

in several instances, he may find some source of consolation in

the somewhat questionable position in which the historian has

found himself in endeavoring to sum up such a comprehensive

history. Perhaps the reader may find cheer in the writer's

hope that this document will prove to be to the future planners

of the Navy what the railroad ticket meant to the brilliant but

absent-minded Dwight Morrow who was searching frantically for

his misplaced ducat. "That's alright, Mr. Morrow" consoled

the conductor when he recognized the famous attorney, "just

mail it co the company or send a note." "Hell," bellowed the

absent-minded lawyer, "that's not why I'm looking. I'm trying

to find out where I'm going!"

May the Navy discover in this history what Mr. Morrow

wished to learn from his ticket!

In August, 1951, Mr. James Wi Boatman, historian, was assigned to

proof-read the first draft narrative and to rewrite Chapter XII, "Ship

Salvage and Foreign Ship Repair."

YYV

PART

BACKGROUND DURING PEACE

C

o

THELDECLINE OF SHIPBUILDING FOLLOWING

WORLD WAR I

C

CHAPTER 1.

THE DECLINE OF SHIPBUIIDING FOLLOWING WORLD WAR I.

A. ISOLATION AND DEPRESSION:

The fundamental United States naval policy is "To maintain

the Navy in strength and readiness to uphold national policies and

interests, and to guard the United States and its Continental and over-

seas possessions."

In time of peace it is one thing to say that ve must have and

maintain a Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and

to protect us against potential enemies, but it is another thing to

decide what is and what is not the Naval strength adequate for that

purpose. For a number of years following World War I, the likelihood

of our becoming involved in a war in the foreseeablefuture appeared

remote, and our fortunate geographical position gave us an added sense

of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of national

economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with

a. comparatively small Navy. At the time of the ratification of the

Washington Limitation of Armament Treaty (l$22), however, the United

States still had the largest Navy in the world and a strong shipbuild-

ing industry.

Under the terms of the Washington Treaty, limitations upon capital

ships and aircraft carriers were agreed upon, the ratio established being

five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan,

but it placed no limitation upon cruisers, destroyers, submarines or aircraft.

At the time, the United States scrapped approximately $300,000,000 worth

of Naval vessels because of the agreement to do so contained in that treaty.

C-1-

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In addition to seven new battleships and four new battle cruisers in

process of construction, four dreadnaughts and fifteen pre-dreadnaughte

were destroyed. Pursuant to that treaty, however, the United States

vas permitted to convert the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, then under con-

struction as battle cruisers, to aircraft carriers, whatever the

other effects of the Treaty, that particular provision worked to our

advantage, because those two ships, as battle cruisers, would have

become obsolescent for World War II, but as aircraft carriers they

proved effective units of our fleet.

During the next eight years following the Washington Treaty,

the American naval deterioration steadily continued until it reached

a minimum strength indicated in Table 1.

As an example of the idealism and isolationism prevalent in

the United States, the following is quoted from the Congressional

Record of July 19, 1930:

"Following that conference (Washington) and up to January 1,

1929, the great powers of the world laid down and appropriated

for naval expansion as follows: Japan, 125 naval vessels;

Great Britain, ?4 naval vessels; France, 119; Italy, 82; and,

to the everlasting credit of our own country, the United States,

exclusive of small river gunboats, 11."

During these years from 1922 to 1930, expenditures for new con-

struction never exceeded $40,000,000 in any one year and in 1926 the

appropriations and expenditures fell as low as $17,000,000.

c-3-

TABLE I - Office of Naval IntelligenceStatistical Section

23 July 1947

The United States Navy at Minimum Strength^By Types and Years. 1931-1932

Type of Vessel

Battleships

Aircraft Carriers

Heavy Cruisers

Light Cruisers

Destroyers

Submarines

Total

Built Under ConstructionJuly 1931

No . Tons

13 433,400

3 77,300

10 93,100

10 70,300

223 240,220

81 66,230

344 1,002,970

January 1932No . Tons

13 433,400

3 77,300

9 80,230

10 70,300

222 236,180

81 66,230

340 986,080

July 1932Wf). Tons

13 433,400

3 77,300

9 80,230

10 70,300

222 236,180

82 67.790

341 987,620

July 1931N<? Tons

-1 13,800

7 70,000

'' -

-

3 3,8oo

11 87.600

January 1932No . Tons

-

i 13,800

7 70,000

-

3 7,300

3 3,800

16 93,ioo

July 1932No TQpA

-

1 13,800

7 70,000

-

3 7,300

2 2,260

13 93,360

)

In 1930, at London, the parties to the 1922 Treaty agreed upon

further limitations, this time with respect to cruisers, destroyers

and submarines. As a result of these tvo treaties, which reflected

world conditions at the time, and also because of our decision to

maintain our Navy at considerably less strength than allowed by the

Treaty, we experienced a partial building holiday that threw our

construction program out of balance.

However serious the relative decline in our naval strength

may have been, we suffered an even greater loss by the decline in

our shipbuilding industry.

By 1933? only six private shipyards remained in existence:

the "Big Three", Bethlehem, New York Ship and Newport News; and three

smaller companies, Bath Iron Works, Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock

Company, and Electric Boat Company. Although the Navy Yards had con-

tinued in existence, only six (Portsmouth, Boston, Philadelphia,

New York, Norfolk and Puget Sound) had continued to build any signifi-

cant quantities of new vessels. Mare Island had been acting primarily

as a repair yard, and Charleston had practically closed.

Commercial shipbuilding in this period had suffered as much as,

or more than, the naval. When the Maritime Commission took office on

16 April 1937 only nine new cargo vessels of 2,000 tons and more had

been constructed in the United States during the preceding ten years.

* While the country ranked third in tonnage engaged in international

trade, it ranked fourth as to speed and last among the principal

maritime nations in age of vessels.

C-5-

Severity of the crisis in naval shipbuilding is illustrated

by the fact that after the bulk of the World War I program had been

completed in 1926, the only nev naval construction until 1933 con-

sisted of the completion of the aircraft carriers LEXINGTON and

SARATOGA (mentioned previously) and only thirteen other vessels.

The Cramp Shipbuilding Company in Philadelphia, vhich had been one

of the Big Four, closed vhen it finished its share of the var pro-

gram. Bath had also closed, but it reopened after having reorganized

and received one Navy contract for a single destroyer. The Electric

Boat Company had received a contract for one submarine and continued

in existence, but the Lake Torpedo Boat Company was gone.

The Nev York Shipbuilding Corporation changed hands and con-

trol several times, vhile Newport News was reputedly permitted to

keep going solely because its owner proved willing to cover the

losses. Another large company, Bethlehem Fore River Plant, also

continued in existence solely through the support upon numerous

occasions of its parent steel company. Fortunately, after it com-

pleted the LEXINGTON, the Fore River Plant received sufficient

contracts for cruisers to maintain continued activity at a low work-

load throughout the difficult times.

New York Shipbuilding proved more fortunate in receiving the

contract for the completion of the SARATOGA and then for the cruisers

SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER, INDIANAPOLIS and TUSCALOOSA, which presented

just sufficient work to keep that yard operating.

-6-

Nevport Neve fared, less veil because, after it delivered the

WEST VIRGINIA in 1923, it had no Navy vork until 1927, vhen contracts

for the cruisers HOUSTON and AUGUSTA vere avarded. These assignments,

folloved by the RANGER, kept some Navy production in effect until the

expansion started in 1933-

At one time or another during the period after WORLD WAR I

nev construction completely disappeared from every Navy Yard except

Portsmouth. The Nev York Yard vas vithout nev construction from 1922

to 1926 and again for four months in 1930. Puget Sound found itself

vithout nev construction for almost tvo years between 1924 and 1926.

Philadelphia had to vait six years betveen 1924 and 1930 vithout

laying a keel. Completing its last World War I ship in 1924, Boston

received no more nev construction until 1932. Norfolk and Charleston

had no nev construction from the end of their World War I program

until the NIRA expansion of 1933- Charleston had been very nearly

closed dovn and Norfolk vas reduced to repair and manufacturing after

1922.

By 1933 the shipbuilding business had become a gamble vhich

vould interest relatively fev young men of capacity and, vith fev

exceptions, practically no one vith capital. Resulting from the

decline in both naval and commercial shipbuilding, a very serious

loss occurred in drafting and design forces capable of developing

detailed designs required for nev construction. As the years had

dragged on, drafting and design forces vere greatly reduced in all

O-7-

activities and experienced men gradually drifted into other lines of

endeavor. When the heavy cruiser program came along and vas awarded

to the "Big Three" shipbuilders, not one of them possessed sufficient

talent to do the job; it became necessary to establish a central design

force set up as a subsidiary corporation to the "Big Three". Naval

establishments exercised a similar expedient vith the establishment

of a central drafting office in the Nev York Naigr Yard to handle the

design of the NEW ORLEANS class. In the year of 1933 vith its world-

wide economic crisis, President Roosevelt set aside for Naval-Defense

purposes $238,000,000 from the large general relief fund granted him

by Congress to provide employment during the depression and to bolster

our declining naval strength. From this sum of money were built in

the following years thirty-two naval vessels (mostly replacements),

including two new Aircraft carriers, four more cruisers, twenty

destroyers and four submarines. The two carriers were considerably

different in design from those previously built, while the new

features of other types were more evolutionary. In connection with

the destroyer design, however, three of the shipbuilding companies,

Federal, United Drydock, and Bath Iron Works, submitted bids, but

all of these companies stated that they possessed no design drafting

boards capable of performing the task. Federal proposed to use a

design made by an independent design agency, Gibbs and Cox of

New York; it had been used on eight destroyers of the FARRAGUT class

laid down the year before.

-8-

In 1934, Congress passed the Vinson-Trammell act, which author-

ized further new naval construction up to tL full limits provided by

the Naval Limitations Treaties. The appropriations authorized by this

act, while not contributing any material expansion in strength, eventu-

ally resulted in the modernization of the Navy by replacement of obsolete

vessels.

This act established a nev naval policy, for it authorized the

permanent maintenance of the Navy at treaty strength and provided that

vessels should be replaced vhen they become over-age. It also author-

ized the President to procure naval aircraft commensurate vith a treaty

Navy and specified that all profits made by shipbuilding companies in

excess of 10% of the contract price should be returned to the treasury.

In 1935 and 1936, destroyers, submarines and cruisers vere laid

dovn under the replacement appropriation of the 13th February 1929 Act

and the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934.

o-9-

B. THE NEW NAVAL POLICY OF 1937 /""*)

When the Washington Treaty and the London Treaty of 1930 for

the limitation of naval armament expired on 31 December 1936, the

naval building race started at full speed throughout the world. All

the other great povers enjoyed a decided advantage over the United

States at that time, for our Navy had been greatly weakened by the

almost complete absence of effort to hold it to the strength to

which our government was legally entitled under the treaties and to

which the other powers had maintained theirs.

In 1937) the Naval Shipbuilding Replacement Appropriation

under the Act of 193 continued with construction of destroyers and

submarines and also with the laying down of the two 35,000 ton battle-

ships, the NORTH CAROLINA and the WASHINGTON. To illustrate the

necessity of foresight in the balancing of naval strength; the original

designs of these battleships were begun in 1935 and two years later,

on 1 July 1937; the New York Navy Yard received the contract to lay

these ships down. Not until over four years later, Immediately prior

to our entry into the war, were these two warships delivered.

In 1933, it had become apparent that in spite of all efforts

on,the part of the United States to reach an agreement covering

limitation of armaments, and thus to establish at least the proba-

bility of world peace, other nations were increasing their navies at

accelerating rates. At that time, in spite of the fact that there *

was a general desire on the part of most people in all countries to

-10-

remain at peace, the world sat on a powder keg towards which the flame

of Axis aggression rapidly approached. In view of this situation,

President Roosevelt, in his message to the Congress, recommended an

increase of 20% in our naval strength, exclusive of replacements

permitted under the Vinson-Trammell Act of 193 . In May 1933 the

Congress authorized the recommended program, giving us on paper what

appeared to be reasonably adequate naval strength. This constituted

the first step taken to increase the United States Navy above the

strength permitted by the Washington and London naval treaties. This

act increased the number and tonnage allowances of combat vessels in

the Navy by approximately 22%; it increased the number of useful

aeroplanes from 2,050 to a total of not less than 3;000; it author-

ized the construction of 26 auxiliary vessels; and it authorized an

appropriation of $15,000,000. to be expended at the discretion of the

President for the purpose of experimenting with light surface craft.

This last appropriation led to an extensive experimental program for

patrol vessels in anti-submarine warfare and for motor torpedo boats.

The so-called agreement at Munich was such as to require an

upward revision of the defense requirements of this country. Subse-

quent events in 1939) resulting in the outbreak of the war in Europe,

not only confirmed the necessity for these estimates but also spot-

lighted the need for speed in naval production. A great increase in

design activity, in preparation for later building programs, began at

this time, for war had become virtually inevitable. On the 3rd of

September 1939; the European War began.

c-11-

Immediately thereafter the President of the United States

declared a state of limited emergency to exist. This delaration

proved important not only in fixing attention upon the condition of

our armed and naval forces but also in calling attention to the

status of our shipbuilding industry as a vhole. At this Juncture,

the industry fortunately found itself in other than a moribund

condition, for the contract awards continuing after 193 provided

all the Yards vith a backlog of vork sufficient to justify fairly

long range planning on the part of the management. This was particu-

larly true in viev of the fact that building periods under peacetime

conditions vere longer than under an emergency status. j.u 1- -"vh

difficult to visualize that had the emergency building program vhich

followed in 1940 and thereafter been attempted in 1933, utter con-

fusion and turmoil would have continued for a considerable period.

To illustrate the growth of shipbuilding appropriations and

their relative position with regard to the entire naval appropriations

throughout this pre-war period, Table 2 is included herewith, together

with Table 3 listing the actual new construction awarded.

DECLINE Arm RENAISSANCE OFTHE NAVY

O

MM .MT7 .tus..

MMMMMW.M47

A'apa! approprMtom, j!*ra

Stttpbotf-Mn, !^,

M4.<X7.0to ]31'. MM. MOM I2".444.tltlO Izt.27.s.t<m23.70!t.t m ;4<.Zm.«<t I4tt.Mtt.l«t I4f.4tm.titm ;7. 4.'<t.lttm ^3A.«* . tHm i43.'Jtl). 7hS4M.KM'. KM 't:t2.wt.\t«t i]t'<t..sm.imti :tittt!ttt3!t.'<t i

t.it47!77t)!MI

\''*TK ) )<« s tt«t in,:'1L..t'i'lr trust

Mt).W<H)<]t)M.X42.CUOH.IO7.::<)M.KM.(M))3.l«n.)l«)t3.4«:.<I.S)13. )IX.4Mt)3.nx.4«) iiy. Ktt. r<h.stt.^t.tMltit. MM. 7.'<;

HttrMuofShtrv

*M<!"Kta]r')° i M*"<M Cort" i FuMtc tEnttnwint ] j

:).7«i.2!.7tm.MHt

y..h4ti.t<«t' .M)M.<t<M44t.34S.3!<t

:.)C4.7H4.«3.M4. tM.413

*

33.330.0103H.674.MMW. 4.CflO3<i. MM. 4X13 !H4.7M)4D.HKH.Mm4mt7.7«)37.3M).M<l3:t.hA).t)tm33.3W. ?.'<)Zt.ZM.zm3x. wm. tttm4o.Mo.tnm

?Jh. KSH. tM)). 497. 47u. mm

H.5M.3MUm.Mx.ti.'iot. ZiH. 347znm.7;rn24. )M5.M:MM.WI.H77K. tlTt). Ml!M. :M. ?«y.'. t41. tt4<iXt.Mt. M)20.Mt.447yt.WI.4Mti!iS. ti4ti. Mi!7. )M. 7)3

St. M)

M.stm.sio i3. l <.2.7M..K[tt t3. .S'.'..:<«4.74ii. stm Iy4)0.75tl i6.3IH. [74 I)ii.M4.f«l)2.1'M.txm:t. 4W.tnt].94ti.ttAt

ttt. nn. "tm4.4t.i.tm"

!)4.ti47.t74ti!. lit'.MItt4.7W.MHtX.St<.S.Uft2tt. nm.ttti3Ht.W.t"M3i.Mtt.omt32.mt.2tt31. tM.nm!3.24.'.. 42t)!t.X47. 4.W

i t-nct'. ttrd ; AHitttit-n i TottH

40. ")'J. 3to3f.!i'<.<<.27t)

.<t. IKt). 444. MM\!A7.W).4TO4.M). 7M.XM

t3o. mo.otmt40.Mttt.tXWH3.*W..'«t14^ ttw. W7t.W. M*.. !K7tA4.A!'J. 7!*2 it.V. 4S4. AmI.S4. tt4tl. X70tM.ta7.!HI144.727.4*1

4S.4!*.M)7 !w. it<t.!M!<;Mt.52.'t.42"7.s.<tt\ 7tt i.St.4.M).MX )M. SKt. 44<t04. 4.56277. S47. mtM.toium I44.INS. Iti7 j

4s!2ta!<t274\ 5Rt.tMA !

M4.73t.477362.343.M!

3fK.!M.m337.7H.OW3S.4tm.tm

4«t.7t<).«t«-.w:t.m<:ttKt. 4V2. Wt :

3J70t.t<M.t<!'4! t.M'. tM.3H :7.434.7!7.M<t

. .3..SO.X9.3Wt*.

xi s]«

-12-

TABLE 3, /fseo/ years

YEAH

1934 . . DBCLINE . .

1935

1926

1927

1928

1929

1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939. B4EBGBNCY .

1940

1941

1942... WAR ..

1943

1944

SHIPBUILDING

$ $4,097,000

30,950,000

28,444,000

38,275,000

23,700,000

48,2oo,ooo

48,550,000

49,400,000

7,450,000

35,063,000

43,910,785

40,619,334

132,905,000

168,500,000

130,000,000

190,613,150

281,604,712

1,047,770,351

3,584,500,000

6,796,260,385

9,118,120,000

ORDNANCE ANOORDNANCESTORES

$ 10,966,000

10,842,000

11,837,250

12,534,000

13,090,000

13,402,050

13,119,400

13,119,400

12,930,585

11,271,000

10,849,750

10,545,600

21,700,000

21,700,000

24,429,800

26,849,600

62,808,000

441,345,298

2,824,704,665

3,954,165,413

3,476,800,000

BUREAU OF SHIPS< CON STRUCT IONAND REPAIR)ENGINEERING

$ 30,400,000

33,330,000

36,675,000

36,275,000

36,100,480

36,824,700

40,888,800

40,217,700

37,300,540

33,851,000

33,380,750

39,204,200

39,800,000

40,550,000

41,539,300

59,681,590

34,072,000

228,898,180

i,497,470,ooo

1,708,979,935

1,735,880,000

MARINE CORPS

$ 25,495,948

25,565,300

23,949,650

23,220,347

23,911,700

24,195,836

24,981,877

27,970,361

35,383,298

22,143,940

2i,64o,64o

20,659,447

23.881,486

35,646,566

27,152,713

37,683,580

39,490,235

81,496,315

340,288,600

778,925,692

973,791,484

PUBLIC WORKS

$ 2,866,500

3,138,000

2,745,500

3,515,300

4,740,500

5,4io,750

6,318,174

15,234,600

I2,i64,ooo

3,490,000

1,946,950

19,103,000

4,46i,ooo

6,839,000

27,681,000

64,398,550

454,618,475

1,796,041,460

1,327,005,021

1,855,317,405

AVIATION

$ 14,647,174

15,150,000

14,790,000

19,865,000

20,100,000

31,956,000

31,580,000

32,033,211

31,145,000

35,345,430

31,957,459

18,643,320

4o,732,3io

38,588,270

51,500,000

48,075,000

lli,459,ooo

452,319,950

6,189,444,100

5,257,981,470

4,583,725,000

PAY, SUBSIST-ENCE, AND

TRANSPORTATION

.# ,141,870,802

130 190,000

i4o,8oo,ooo

143,734,500148,092,927

150,896,957

154,512,782

156,484,500

154,040,870

152,637,831

144,727,450

139,439,992

168,283,083

183,492,981

195,084,579

300,940,752

228,934,217

339,878,019

673,154,723

2,297,750,724

3,701,958,984

ALL OTHERS

$ 50,073,686

48,498,697

58,160,938

59,525,428

75,015,870

51,459,519

56,883,446

65,634,562

77,347,830

54,020,501

44,095,167

51,622,163

45,293,927

45,529,015

52,6o4,4i6

42,001,522

70,593,535

536,862,739

1,776,570,184

1,685,976,141

1,989,194,325

TOTAL

$ 330,417,200

297,653,997

317,403,338

336,944,575

344,751,477

363,345,812

376,834,479

400,094,334

358,262,133

337,712,692

322,508,951

310,734,0%

491,700,806

528,467,832

529,139,808

623,526,194

943,360,249

3,583,189,327

18,682,173,732

23,807,046,781

27,434,787,198

NOTE.—Does not Include trust and special accounts.

Table 3

New Construction Awarded

FiscalYear

Decline

19221923

19241925192619271928192919301931193219331934(lncl.N.

I.R.A.)1935(lncl.I.

N.E.C.)1936193719381939

Emergency19401941

Naval ShipbuildingAppropriations

$ 54,097.00030,950,00028,444,00028,275,00023,700,00048,200,00048,550,00049,400,0007,450,00035,063,00043,910,785

4o,6i9,334

132,905,000168,500,000130,000,000190,613,150

281,604,7121,047,770,351

NavyYardBuilt

00

013j

00423316

13

1111617

4545

PrivateYardBuilt

00

007400322121

11

Total

00

01106oo745437

24

139857

12341

24201474

57386

O-14-

C. LESSONS BETWEEN WARS

Since the fundamental purpose of this history is to serve as

a guide for future planning, it will prove feasible before moving to

the emergency pre-war period to outline broadly several important and

indisputable lessons learned in this era of peace. In general terms,

these would include:

The importance of constantly maintaining a healthy shipbuilding

industry and adequate potential;

the necessity of keeping design personnel active and abreast of

modem research and developments;

the urgency of assuring active scientific research;

the need of maintaining a strategic information collection agency

to keep the policy makers of our nation informed as to our

possible enemies' developments and capacities; and, finally;

the importance of maintaining a first-rate, first-line-of-defense

naval fleet and air arm.

C-15-

D. BASIS FOR TEE FUTURE:

The adequate naval appropriations to be granted, the numerous ships

already under construction, the small but growing fleet in existence, the

stimulated activity in naval architecture and engineering, and the increasing

capacity of shipbuilding facilities and personnel, all constituted the basis

upon which the future Bureau of Ships, would build the strongest Navy in the

history of the world.

-16-

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF

THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

O

y ^ CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

A. THE ORIGIN

1. HISTORY OF TWO SHIPBUILDING BUREAUS

The 76th Congress "by Public Lav 644 established the Bureau of

* Ships on 20 June 1940. This Act, abolishing the Bureau of Construction

and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering, provided that their functions

should be assumed by the Bureau of Ships. With the exception of the

creation of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915, it is

fair to say that this vas one of the most important changes to be made

in the Navy Department since the bureau system vas first established in

1342. It is the purpose of this chapter to indicate some of the steps

leading to the legislation of 20 June 1940 and the organization and

administration of the nev Bureau thereby established.

The Act of 1842, creating the original Bureaus of the Navy Depart-

ment, established the Bureau of Construction, Equipment, and Repair, to

be responsible for the designing, building, and outfitting (except for

ordnance) of ships of the Navy. The Bureau of Engineering, created in

1862, vas first called the Bureau of Steam Engineering. Although the

first steam varship to perform regular service for the Navy vas contracted

for in 1837; steam engineering developments vere somewhat delayed and not

until after the Civil War did steam propulsion become considered fully

' reliable for varships. In all the early steam vessels, steam served as

an auxiliary means of propulsion. Not until the launching the PRINCETON

in 1842 had any varship been equipped vlth a screv propeller or designed

vith engines belov the vater line for protection from gunfire.

o-17-

-18-

M The Civil War gave a tremendous impetus to the development of

steam in the Navy and, after 1861, the use of sails became considered

as auxiliary propulsion to steam. The proponents of sails were hard

to down, however, for as late as 186$, the Navy Department General

Orders stated: "Hereafter all vessels of the Navy vill be fitted with

full sail power. The exception to this will be the tugs and dispatch

vessels not fitted with sails", and not until 1875 did the Navy defi-

nitely decide to make the four-bladed propeller standard. A ship

sailed better with two blades and steamed better with four blades.

There is, apparently, no question that, for some time after the

creation of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, the Bureau of Construction

and Repair dominated the shipbuilding picture. The engine rested in a

hull still designed for sailing and the complex relations between hull,

machinery, and ordnance had not yet developed.

New designs and improvements in technical knowledge soon made the

originally simple relationships between Engineering and Construction and

Repair more and more involved.

As new questions of cognizance began to arise, decisions had to be

made assigning responsibility to one bureau or the other. With little

experience upon which to base these decisions, the authorities necessarily

were required to assign functional jurisdictions which in some instances

were controversial and not wholly definable. Out of these assignments

grew inter-bureau discords. Gradually the principal control over ship-

building as a whole held by Construction and Repair slipped somewhat from

its hands to be shared with the Bureaus of Engineering and of Ordnance.

o-19-

Recognition of these difficulties led to several recommendations

to combine the two "bureaus. Secretary William E. Chandler in his annual

report for 1883 took a strong stand in favor of the creation of single

Bureau of Naval Construction. His statement of his position is as follows:

"It is, however, beyond dispute that methods of navalconstruction change with the transition from wooden tosteel vessels. It will be found Impossible for two In-dependent and equal bureau chiefs to design and supervisethe construction of a modem vessel, the one that of thehull, and the other that of the machinery, and bring allparts together in one perfect ship, without differencesof opinion which cannot longer be safely decided by acommon superior who does not possess technical skill. Thetrue solution of the conflict is to unite these two bureausas a single Bureau of Naval Construction, having for itschief the most competent naval architect that can be found,whether among the present officers of the Navy or in civillife."

In 1886, Admiral Porter recommended In his annual report as Admiral

of the Navy the creation of a single Bureau of Construction, Steam Engineer-

ing and Repair to prevent caviling over the placing of engines, masts, etc.,

and to make one person responsible for mistakes committed in the con-

struction and repair of ships and machinery.

In 1899, Secretary John D. Long reopened the issue stating:

"When a contract is made for the construction of a ship,it is made with one builder. It is not given part to a con-structor of hulls, part to a steam engine manufacturer andpart to an outfitting firm. Whatever various trades enterinto the work are all under one head. This is the method ofprivate shipyards which build the largest ships and which arenot left to the administration of three heads between whomdelicate questions of respective authority and responsibilityare liable to arise, resulting in delays and too often infriction and lack of harmony of cooperation."

-20-

c

However, internal and external opposition to such a merger continued.

Then, in 190$, a vacancy in the position of Chief of the Bureau of Steam

Engineering occurred and Secretary of the Navy Truman H. Newberry grasped

his opportunity. He appointed the Chief of the Bureau of Construction

and Repair to additional duty as Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering.

This, however, was accomplished without the approval of Congress and was

soon declared illegal. Therefore, before any real experience could be

obtained, the Secretary was forced to countermand his order.

Later Secretary Meyer more indirectly attempted to bring about

greater coordination between the two bureaus by developing the aide

system, including an aide for material, but as long as the bureaus had

their separate congressional appropriations and the primary responsi-

bility for the expenditure of appropriations remained in the hands of

the bureaus, the aide or division in the Secretary's office could only

enter into the case after a conflict had already developed.

Following World War I, interest in naval affairs faded during

the era of isolationism and idealism and the organization of the Bureaus

(as indicated - Charts I and II) remained fairly unchanged.

It was not until shortly before the final decision to merge the

Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering in

1940 that several developments occurred which added force to the logic

behind previous attempts to accomplish the same purpose. Interest in

the Navy grew progressively as the European situation deteriorated.

The intense personal interest that President F.D. Roosevelt showed

in the Navy and his knowledge of it resulting from his experience

-21-

as Assistant Secretary in World War I also exerted a tremendous influence.

By 1938 the Bureau of Engineering was as deep into the actual

building of a Naval vessel as the Bureau of Construction and Repair. A

report on the organization of the Bureau of Ships made by the firm of

Booz, Fry, Allen and Hamilton included this comment:

"In the gradual evolution of the two bureaus thedistinct .. between 'hull' and 'machinery' became in-creasingly obscure. Hall ceased to be the dominantpart of the ship, a container of guns and engines,and became part of an intricately mechanized unitinto 'which armor, propulsion machinery, and mecha-nical and electrical power vere built as constituentfeatures of an integral"whole."

This resulted in overlapping and duplication of -work, inefficiency and

confusion.

At this time two extended controversies in "which the Bureau

of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering vere participants

focused attention on the obvious objections to the division of responsibility

between the two bureaus. These two controversies were the high-pressure,

high-temperature steam controversy and the controversy over responsibility

for the so-called top-heavy destroyers. In both cases, the issues, of

great Importance to the reliability and performance of the battlefleet,

were given extensive publicity in the press and were Imown and discussed

in Congress. Controversy added to the deterioration in relationships

between the personnel of the two bureaus and tended to make the degree

of cooperation necessary for successful joint activity more and more

difficult.

C-25-

In addition to the two major issues over steam and stability,

considerable publicity was given to various defects of nev ships,

defects ranging from cracked stem posts to excessive rolling of the

early heavy cruisers. Much of this sort of difficulty might have been

expected as a nev building program got under way, but it all served

to direct attention to the fundamental weakness of the administrative

organization.

The steam controversy became important when the Bureau of Engi-

neering, after installing high-pressure, high-temperature equipment on

the new destroyers of the Mahan class, decided to adopt even higher

temperature and pressure for other ships under construction or planned.

Mr. Edison, in charge of the whole shipbuilding program, and the Bureau

of Engineering generally agreed and praised the new ships. The Board

of Inspection and Survey, however, took the opposite viewpoint. Although

wartime operation supported the advocates of high-pressure, high-temper-

ature steam, the damage in terms of intra-departmental friction had

already been done and the taking of sides spread to the private ship-

yards .

During the 1938 investigation of the propriety of adopting high-

pressure, high-temperature steam, Rear Admiral Bowen stated to the

General Board another cause for argument existing within the service:

-26-

"I -would be derelict In By duty if I did not inviteyour attention to the fact that there is a great schismjn the marine engineering profession of the United States.Some of the elements of this schism are so deep and sofundamental that, in my opinion, it is a vital necessitythat the General Board shall consider them in theirdeliberations. The turbine manufacturers in this country,for both marine and power turbines, are General Electric,Meetinghouse, Allis-Chaljners, and DeLaval. All but Allis-ChalmerB also make gears. It has been the practice of theso-called 'Big Three' shipbuilders, Bethlehem, New YorkShip, and Newport News, to manufacture their own machinery,although I have been assured by Newport Neva and by Bethlehemthat they have no policy at all which prevents them from buy-ing their main machinery when such action seems expedient.It has been the practice of the 'Little Three', Bath, Federal,and United, which has now diminished to the 'Little Two', Bathand Federal, to operate, as far as Naval vessels are concernedas assembly plants. Bath and Federal and formerly UnitedDrydocks, prefer to buy their machinery. In view of the plantinvestment of the 'Big Three' it is only natural that theyshould prefer to make their own machinery. Contrariwise is trueof the 'Little Two'. About four years ago the Bureau ofEngineering under my predecessor, notified the Big Three'shipbuilders that the Bureau of Engineering had decided toenforce the provisions of the Espionage Act and that, there-fore, they would have to sever their licenses under Parsons,Limited, if they wished to proceed under any future Navalcontracts. Since that date I an not aware that any shipyardin the United States has spent any money whatsoever in con-nection with the research and development of turbine design. ****On the other hand I have seen the tremendous effort which isbeing made by the General Electric Company first and Westing-house second, to do everything that can possibly be done tofurther the development of turbine design in the United Statesin order that this country may be entirely free from anynecessity of resorting to English or continental design. Iam informed that Allis-Chalmers has also accomplished muchdevelopment."

In addition to the steam controversy, the new destroyers

proved a constant thorn in the aide of the Navy Department, not only

concerning the engineering equipment and delays in construction, but

also over the stability characteristics of the new ships,, which served

as a source of much recrimination and unfavorable publicity for the new

C-27-

program. The first so-called, top-heavy destroyer was the ANDERSON (DI)4ll).

As the plans for the ANDERSON were substantially duplicated in 35 other

destroyers, the magnitude of the defect found on testing the ANDERSON

enlarged to serious proportions. Although the public impression that

the destroyers might turn over at any time was much exaggerated, the

stability of these ships proved such that danger did exist when fuel oil,

ammunition, and stores ran low and a ship approached its extreme light

condition. Unfortunately, following the original tests, the authorities

held no debate as to the sufficiency of reserve stability in this class

destroyers and the major issue thereafter became the placing of responsi-

bility for the undesirable characteristic and in deciding what steps could

be taken to correct the original design.

When columnists took the opportunity to comment in the press,

thereby making the Departmental split a public issue, it effectively

aided the merger of Bureaus.for the public exerted heavy pressure on

their Congressional representatives for reform.

Investigation proved that material or equipment coming under the

cognizance, of all the bureaus concerned was overweight, but that the

greater part of the excess 'was on items falling under the jurisdiction

of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Engineering.

In a letter dated 3 January 1940 to Chairman Walsh of the Naval

Affairs Committee, Secretary Edison -was frank to admit that the contractor,

through its design agent, Gibbs and Cox, had warned the Bureau of Con-

struction and Repair of their belief that the ships would be lacking in

-28-

C

stability as early as 19 March 193 ? and quoted a letter dated 9 April

1937 which held that DDs 397*399 and subsequent destroyers vere overweight.

However, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, which was responsible for

general design and stability of vessels, did not believe that the excess

weight would impair the stability of the vessels.

Previously, as Assistant Secretary, Mr. Edison had attempted to

bring the Bureau together by having representatives from each acting

as his independent advisors, but lack of legal authority proved a

serious handicap and, as long as bureaus retained their independent

appropriations, the Secretary's office could not exert authority for

revision. His next step was to recommend that a Director of Shore

Activities be given control over the industrial activities of the

Navy, but Congress and the bureaus opposed it.

At this same time, an interchange of correspondence between the

President and the Assistant Secretary is of such interest that it is

reproduced in full: -

The White House* Washington

March 16, 1938

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EDISON

"On the Construction Report, I notice that on accountof ships building at Navy Yards, the following:

Heavy cruiser WICHITA, Philadelphia.Should have been completed January 1, 1938.Completion date now reported February 1, 1939-

Light cruiser HONOLULU, New York Navy Yard - 3 months late

Light cruiser HELENA - 6-1/2 months late.

-29-

The record on submarines is not so bad.

On the 1500-ton destroyers the record, also, is not sobad though In most cases the ships are in the early stages of con-struction and it is too soon to tell.

In the case of the three cruisers, however, the PhiladelphiaNavy Yard and to a less degree, the New York Navy Yard need to be told thatthe Commander-in-Chief is much dissatisfied."

/s/ FDR

In reply, Assistant Secretary Edison sent the followingmemorandum to the President on 1 April 1938:

"Attached is a brief factual statement inregard to delays on the WICHITA, HONOHJUJ and BEIENA.

Most of the causes for delay appear to be somethingover which the building yard had no control.

The situation in regard to delays in shipbuildingis regrettable not only on the above ships but on many others.

Yesterday, Secretary Swanson placed the responsibilityfor coordinating all phases of the Shipbuilding Program squarelyon me and announced this to the Bureaus. It may be said that Ialready had this obligation but it was all rather vague to theBureaus and many times I did not get a chance to get in on somedecision or lack of it until I stumbled over a situation.

Now, with everybody aware of the fact that there isone point of focus, it is my hope that some improvement maybe effected in our building schedules."

Seeking to reduce the frequent changes in design which he believed

were responsible for much of the delay common at that time, Assistant

Secretary Edison required that all changes however small in the plans

and specifications of the destroyers then building or a part of the 1939

-30-

program be stopped unless "written approval was first received from the

Assistant Secretary.

Routine issuance of directives however, proved not sufficient to

correct the deficiencies in organization, A statement prepared by

Assistant Secretary Edison on the "History of the Reorganization Effort"

reviewed the situation as follows:

"*** Early in the spring of 1939 there became apparenta lack of cooperation between the Bureau of Construction andRepair and the Bureau of Engineering. As this lack of cooper-ation seemed to be based rather on personalities than onorganization, I made an endeavor to make certain changes butwas prevented from doing so because the Chief of Naval Opera-tions and the Director of Shore Establishments advised theSecretary of the Navy to the contrary. This clash between thetwo principal shipbuilding Bureaus was brought to the surfaceand to my attention through a difference of opinion concerningthe use of higher pressure and temperature steam conditions inthe main machinery installations in the new ships.

Later on in the spring of 1939 I received unofficial wordthat one of the new Destroyers had failed to successfully passher inclining test, Indicating a deficiency in her reservestability. This matter came officially and formally to myattention in July, 1939. *** nere was a glaring example of thelack of coordination and cooperation between the Bureausresponsible for the construction of a ship, and also an ex-ample of the need for a change in organization and procedurewhich would preclude the possibility of a re-occurrence of acondition of this kind.

C

To preclude the possibility of a re-occurrence of thissituation, and to make the necessary organization changesand refinements, I took the following administrative action: -

(1) I removed the Chief of the Bureau of Constructionand Repair and transferred him to other duty.

(2) I issued an order on August 11, 1939, effecting aconsolidation of the Design Divisions within theBureaus of Engineering and Construction and Repair.

-31-

(3) I directed that the Bureaus submit to the ActingSecretary of the Navy, for his approval; anadministrative plan for effecting thia consolidationnot later than 1 September 1939. This was done.

(4) In view of the fact that since the death of theSecretary of the Navy I had to assume, as ActingSecretary, the duties of both the Secretary and theAssistant, I issued orders to Rear Admiral Samuel M.Robinson, who had recently been appointed Chief of theBureau of Engineering, to assume the duties of the Co-ordinator of Shipbuilding In addition to normal dutiesas Chief of the Bureau of Engineering.

(5) On September 29, 1939, I directed the Chairman of theGeneral Board to conduct a study of the proposed re-organization of the Navy Department as submitted tothe Department with comments by the chairman of theNaval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives. ***"

This account of the Acting Secretary leaves out the important

step of appointing a Board headed by Rear Admiral Robinson to consider plans

of consolidation submitted by the two Bureaus. This board, appointed

31 August 1939, the day before the European war declaration, was the result

of the failure of the two Bureaus to get together to agree on a mutually

satisfactory plan for consolidation. In addition to Admiral Robinson, soon

to become Chief of the Bureau of Engineering for a second time, the board

included Captain Lewis B. McBride, (C.C.); Commander Edward L. Cochrane,

(C.C.); and Lieutenant Commander Paul F. Lee. Although they had been

directed to consider the plans for the combination of the Design Divisions,

the Robinson Board found so many objections to such a partial solution of

the problem that they decided to abandon consideration of the plans sub-

mitted and recommended the complete consolidation of the two Bureaus on

12 September 1<?39. In part, the report states the case for a merger in

these words:

-32-

"As you know, however, ships of the Navy have becomeextremely complicated, and in their earnestness, each designgroup or unit has properly and commendably striven to perfectthat element or feature of the ship for which the unit isresponsible; each considering its part as of governing im-portance and without the means or perspective to evaluate itseffect on the ship as a whole. ***

*** We are convinced however, that the best resultswill come from a complete unification and consolidation of thetwo Bureaus. *** Such a complete reorganization will gain thebenefit of consolidating all the parallel functions of the twopresent Bureaus and assure common policies and uniform adminis-trative procedure and above all will eliminate the potentiallydifficult situation of a single agency reporting to tvo co-equal but independent superiors."

Perhaps the merger would have come in time, but to have it

sponsored by a joint board representing both bureaus made the accomplish-

ment much easier and less disruptive.

The additional burdens falling on Mr. Edison with the death of

Secretary Swanson made him receptive to the delegation and occasioned

his transfer of duties as coordinator of Shipbuilding to Admiral Robinson.

Rear Adminal Robinson was made Chief of the Bureau of Engineering

on 13 September and Coordinator of Shipbuilding on 14 September 1939.

Rear Admiral A. H. Van Keuren was made Chief of the Bureau of Construction

and Repair on 18 September 1939 and- Assistant Coordinator of Shipbuilding

on 21 September 1939- Given the necessary authority, the two chiefs

immediately started to bring their Bureaus as close together as possible

without Congressional action, as indicated in Chart III.

-33-

.CONSOLIDATION (Chart in)

The Organization Manual issued 5 October 1939 assigned con-

solidated duties to the following four principal divisions:

(1) The Design Division(2) The Production Division(3) The Ma-intenance Division(4) The War Plans Division

Following the practice of the Bureau of Engineering, administrative

matters were assigned to offices reporting to the Office of the Coordinator

of Shipbuilding as follows:

(l) Office of the AdministrativeAssistant (in charge of civilianpersonnel, public relations,and security).

f2) The Contracts Office(3) The Personnel Office (in charge

of naval personnel).(4) The Financial Office(5) The Office of the General Inspector

A joint memorandum issued 7 October 1939 corrected the organization

outline given above by abolishing the separate Contracts Office and

establishing a Contracts Section in the Production Division. This transfer

did not change the functions of the Contracts group but did Involve a

change in personnel responsible for the vork.

The most important change in the new consolidated organization was

the establishment of a separate Design Division. In both the Bureau of

Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering the design and

shipbuilding functions had been combined in a single division. The change

instituted in the new organization was, of course, the result of emphasis

-34-

on the need for "better cooperation and more effective work in the design

field that had precipitated the final move to consolidate the bureaus.

Another important change was the allocation of responsibility for radio

and sound work to a branch of the Design Division.

Other changes Included the decision to leave matters of administration

and personnel to an office rather than a division.

Although the recommendation of the Robinson Board to appoint three

assistant Rear Admirals of the Upper HnH* was not followed, the separate

Divisions had been given a relatively free hanc and made responsible for

the major part of their own administrative vork.

While Admiral Robinson and Admiral Van Eeuren were proceeding to

take the preliminary steps necessary to bring their bureaus together under

a unified control, the interested authorities in the Navy Department and

in Congress were considering legislation to completely merge the bureaus.

The new Bureau Chiefs being fully in accord with the proposed

merger, the major issues that remained were the question of armor cognizance

and the effect of the consolidation on the personnel of the two bureaus.

Bringing into the new bureau all activities related to ships

necessarily involved transfer of armor cognizance from the Bureau of

Ordnance.

Although, as might be expected, the Bureau of Ordnance strongly

opposed such a transfer, Secretary Edison ordered armor to come under the

cognizance of the new Bureau. This precipitated an avalanche of protest

C-37-

from interested Naval groups, including the Chief of Naval Operations

and the Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Naval

Affairs; on 24 June 19 0, the President over-rode the directive of

his Secretary of Navy.

The effect on personnel, however, proved an even more volcanic

topic in the consolidation. The bulk of the officer personnel of the

Bureau of Engineering vere line officers, many with the designation

"Engineering Duty only." On the other hand, the Bureau of Construction

and Repair was manned by a staff group known as the Construction Corps.

Both groups had developed a strong feeling of pride in their respective

organizations and had thought of their future in the Navy as members of

one of these groups. To have left these two personnel groups, with

their different systems of selection and promotion, within the Bureau

of Ships would have perpetuated the same sort of rivalry and differences

in outlook that had been one of the main reasons for the reorganization.

The difficulties involved in this issue were deep-seated and were

the result of differences in training and assignment within the Navy as well

as loyalty to a particular corps or line designation. Constructors were

picked from among the very top of the classes at the Naval Academy and

were trained to pursue a career in the fields of naval architecture and

management of shipyards. They were set apart by the fact that they did

not have to go to sea for a regular tour after they had been selected for

the Construction Corps early in their Naval careers. The Engineers were

-38-

regularly assigned to sea, although they did not have the right to assume

command and were selected for engineering duty only much later than the

Constructors.

The Robinson Board being unable to come to conclusions as to the

solution to this personnel problem, Congress on 2 May 1939 resolved that

another Board be formed to study this matter.

Rear Admiral Ernest J. Eing having been appointed senior member of

the Board, it became known thereafter as the King Board. The result of

over four months deliberation, their report reached the Secretary of the

Navy on 9 December 1<?39. The Board split 6 to 3 with the majority favoring

the creation of a "Line Specialist Corpsv with three principal groups:

"'Line Specialists (Construction)' 'Line Specialists (Engineering)', and

'Line Specialists (Aeronautical Engineering)'".

A Bgaarity report submitted by three members of the Eing Board,

stressing the need for greater unity within the Havy and a closer relation

of the constructors, engineers and other specialists to the men who n?m and

operate the ships and aircraft of the Navy, believed that this important

goal could be best achieved by giving additional number line status to the

technical specialists. The Chiefs of the two bureaus most immediately

concerned with the problem, supported this belief,stating that officers

of the Construction Corps transferred to the line might be better able to

absorb the point of view of the line, and the line, in turn, be able to

appreciate the technical point of view of the constructors.

O-39-

In addition to the division in the Board, Rear Admiral Nimitz,

Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, did not vant to amalgamate the

engineers and constructors and favored transfer of the construction

corps to the line if higher authority insisted on some action. The

Secretary of the Navy, hovever, favored the amalgamation of Naval

constructors and the Engineering Duty Only officers; his decision vas

definitive.

The final approval of the consolidation of the tvo bureaus vas

given by Act of Congress on 20 June 1940 (Public 644). The amalgamation

of the personnel of the Construction Corps and the EDO's received

approval on 2$ June 1940 (Public 65?)- One more action remained to be

taken. That was the transfer by the Secretary of the Navy of certain

functions from the cognizance of the Bureau of Ordnance, the Bureau

of Supplies and Accounts, and the Bureau of Navigation to the newly

created Bureau of Ships. This action involved the following items:

"equipage, supplies, and services and repairsto equipage relating to the maintenance and operationof vessels from the Bureaus of Navigation and Suppliesand Accounts to the Bureau of Ships, consumablesupplies (not technical ordnance), regularly drawnfrom the Naval Supply Account afloat for use in theordnance department of a vessel, from the Bureau ofOrdnance to the Bureau of Ships...."

This action, taken by the Secretary in a letter dated 20 June 1940,

became effective 1 July 1$40. The wisdom of this merger, taken after years

of struggling to overcome a myriad of barriers and conflicts, was open to

judgment immediately, for in June 1$40 the newly formed Bureau of Ships

was faced with the problem of meeting the demands for a two ocean na*vy.

Its principal mission being the construction of ships, the Bureau felt

the full responsibility of protecting our country from the danger that

suddenly became evident with the fall of France.

o-41-

B. ESTABLISBMENT OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

1. THE LAW

Providing for the reorganization of the Navy Department,

the ?6th Congress in Public Lav 644 dated 20 June 1940 stated

that "the duties of the Bureau of Ships shall be assigned by the

Secretary of the Navy and performed under his authority and the

orders of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall be considered as

emanating from the Secretary of the Navy, and shall have full force

and effect as such."

It further specified "The Chief of the Bureau of Ships shall

be appointed by the President, by and vith the advice and consent

of the Senate, for a term of four years, from among the officers

of the active list of the Navy who are specially qualified and

experienced in naval engineering or naval architecture." The same

qualifications were required of the Assistant Chief and his rank

while serving was specified as rear admiral. The law further

provided that if the Chief of the Bureau is specially qualified

and experienced in naval engineering, the Assistant Chief must be

qualified in naval architecture, and vice versa.

In accordance with Congressional decree, the Navy effected

this change and incorporated within The Regulations for the Govern-

ment of the Navy the regulations, concerning the new Bureau, which

follow in full.

-42-

O

Art. 517

CHAPTER 13

BUREAU OF SHIPS

516

"The Bureau of Ships, under the direction of the Secretary ofthe Navy, is charged with and responsible for the design,construction,and oaintenance of all ships of the Navy (except district craft as-signed to the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and aircraft). These dutiesand responsibilities vill cover the following:

(a) All that relates to details of design, construction, con-version, fitting out, and maintenance of hulls of vessels includingsmall boats and district craft (except those assigned to the Bureauof Yards and Docks, and aircraft).

(b) All that pertains to the design, construction, installation,operation, and maintenance of all main propelling machinery, togethervith its auxiliaries.

(c) Except as specifically assigned to other cognizance, all thatpertains to the design, construction, provision, Installation, andmaintenance of exterior and interior communication systems, electricwiring and cable, auxiliary machinery, appliances, articles of equip-age on approved allowance lists.

(d) It is charged vith the design, development, and procurementof materials and appliances for defense against warfare chemicals(except as specifically assigned to other cognizance), diving gear,experimental diving units, respiratory protective devices, paravanes,and minesweeping gear. It is also responsible for the design andpreparation of block ships.

(e) It is charged vith the design, development, and procure-ment of materials and appliances for fire protection and fire-fighting equipment in ships and boats; submarine rescue methodsand equipment; submarine escape training facilities.

(f) It is charged with management control of all activities C.N.R.24,2?.comprising the U.S. Naval Shipyards, and of any other similarshore stations that may hereafter be established.

-43-

517

It is charged vith the design, manufacture, installation, andmaintenance of all radio and sound equipage, ashore and afloat,including an appliances used by the Naval Communication Service,except such material as is assigned to other cognizance.

C.N.R.27.

518

It is charged with the research, design, development, prepa-ration of detailed specifications and manufacture of all nev air-craft radio sets, but such research, design, development, detailedspecifications, and manufacture mnst be satisfactory to the Bureauof Aeronautics. The term "aircraft radio" as used herein " 11comprise all radio equipment designed and manufactured especiallyfor use in aircraft for communication and navigational purposes.It does not include plane interior communication systems, gen-erators, and other electrical equipment.

519

It shall prepare and submit outline preliminary plans, ap-proximate data, or both, shoving the designs of a nev ship inaccordance vith the military characteristics recommended by 1&eGeneral Board and approved by the Secretary of the Navy.

520

For the purpose of preparing the outline preliminary plans,it Hh*ni consult the other bureaus of the Navy Department vith re-gard to the features under their respective cognizances.

521

The outline preliminary plans vhen completed and the ap-proximate data necessary for an understanding thereof shall beforvarded by it together vith such comment and recommendationas may appear necessary to the Secretary of the Navy, vho villrefer the same to the General Board for consideration andrecommendation.

522

During the preparations of the final designs of a nev vessel,each bureau shall prepare a detailed statement of all objects underits cognizance which it is proposed to install durjb3g constructionand fitting out complete for sea of the vessel. A copy oJR'gachstatement shall be furnished to the Bureau of Ships vhen requested

-44-

O

by that Bureau, together with such itemized estimates of weight andposition of centers of gravity as may be required by that Bureau.This statement and estimates of -weights and positions of centers ofgravity shall be furnished in sufficient time before the final plansare due to be submitted to the Chief of Bureau of Ships for approvalto permit the Bureau of Ships to prepare such plans without delayand to determine fully the matters of displacement, trim, stability,and strength.

523 ,i

Within three months after the commissioning of a new vessel,a detailed statement, itemized as above, aTiAii be furnished theBureau of Ships by each other bureau concerned, in which theactual weights and revised estimates of the positions of centersof gravity shall be given where necessary.

525

It shall be responsible for the provision of facilities andarrangements for salvage of vessels.

526

It shall have administrative supervision of the drydockingof all vessels and district craft and of the operating and cleaningof drydocks and marine railways, other than those installationsconstructed and used primarily for aircraft.

527

It shall prepare specifications for fuel other than for air-craft and be responsible for its inspection.

528

It is charged with the upkeep and operation and also repair,except as excluded in article 484, of the following laboratories:Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Maryland; U.S. NavyRadio and Sound Laboratory, San Diego, California; Naval Boiler andTurbine laboratory, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Material Laboratory,Navy Yard, New York; and the experimental model basins at the NavyYard, Washington, and at Carderock, Ml.

529 ,

^It shall keep the Secretary of the Navy advised as to theadequacy of all shipbuilding facilities and shall, from time totime, inform him when the need for additional facilities develops.

-45-

530

The Chief of the Bureau of Ships is also designated Coordi-nator of Shipbuilding for the Naval Establishment, and the As-sistant Chief of Bureau of Ships as the Assistant Coordinator ofShipbuilding for the Naval Establishment vith authority to issueall orders incident to the performance of this duty.

531

Any written ordera or instructions relating to the coordina-tion of shipbuilding for the Naval Establishment issued by theCoordinator of Shipbuilding shall be by direction of, and shallbe considered as emanating from the Secretary of the Navy."

-46-

With the Congressional Law and the Navy Regulations defining the

Bureau's responsibilities but not any specific pattern of organization,

it is natural that the temporary organization established under the

Coordinator of Shipbuilding in 1939 should be followed. Chart 4

indicates the broad outline of the Bureau as of 15 August 19 0.

For purposes of this analysis, a firm of management engineers,

Booz, Fry, Allen and Hamilton, started a "Survey of Administration

of the Bureau of Ships" in the fall of 1940 and submitted a complete

report 1 August 19*H. Their objective description of the organization

and of some of the organizational difficulties existing at that time follows

in full for this report will provide excellent reference for future

organizational surveys and will serve to analyze the structure as

established.

C-47-

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BUREAUof SHtPS NO.

"TEE ORGANIZATION OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS"

an excerpt from

"Survey of Administration of the Bureau of Ships"

by

Booz, Fry, Allen and. Hamilton

* * * *

"THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION"

The Administrative Division ig the office management andservice unit of the Bureau. Thirteen officers and 430 civiliansare organized into four branches - Finance, Officer Personnel,Publications, and Civil Personnel - and four sections - Mail andFiles, Duplicating and Printing, Supply Section, and StenographicPool. This is the largest division of the bureau outside theDesign Division.

The detailed work of each section can be summarized asfollows:

(1) Finance - handles the preparation of budgets andallotments as veil as budgetary accounting. Actsas the fiscal control for the Chief of Bureau.

(2) Officer Personnel - Responsible for the recruitment,placement and some training of regular and reserveofficers. Keeps officer personnel records and isthe liaison with Navigation (now Bureau of NavalPersonnel.)

C

-49-

(3) Publications - edits and issues all bureau publicationsand orders. Supervises bureau security activities.

(4) Civil Personnel - responsible for the recruitment, place-ment, training and personnel actions involving civilianpersonnel. Keeps personnel records. Prepares bureaucivilian payrolls.

(5) Mail and Files - receives and distributes all generaland confidential mail and dispatches. Handles all out-going mail and dispatches of the same classification.Maintains bureau general and confidential files.

(6) Duplicating and Printing - handles all reproductionwork except printing. Orders printing and paper fromthe Government Printing Office.

(?) Supply - orders, stocks and issues all office suppliesand equipment for the bureau.

(8) Stenographic Pool - handles large typing jobs. Detailsstenographers and typists to other sections. Serves asa personnel reservoir.

The Administrative Division also handles such problems asspace and parking. It relieves the division heads of hundreds ofdetails. The Division essentially provides the tools with whichmuch of the bureau work is done.

THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DESIGN DIVISION

The work of the Division is that of designing, planning, andsupervising the construction of combatant ships, auxiliary machineryand equipment, including radio and radio equipment. The work andorganization are broken down into five branches: Research, Prelimi-nary Design, Contract Design, Development Design, and Radio andSound.

The five branches are, in turn, broken down into 55 sectionscomprising 124 officers and 952 civilian employees as of June 30,194l. The Division comprises a little more than half the personnelof the entire Bureau of Ships.

-50-

!,.) l i i i ! ^, itH.l

'

LVT (A) (4) Landing Vehicle, Tracked (armored) MK IVResearch Division

A ship starts out as a proposal in Preliminary Design. Atthe end of her trial runs, that are finally arranged and super-vised by Development Design, a ship has passed through every branchand section of the Division from the status of a memorandum on paperto the status of a battle unit. The extraordinary superiority orthe fundamental weakness of a ship is already in it when it leavesthe designing boards and the calculating machines of this Division.

1. The Research Branch of Design

In the Research Branch, the study of any practical problemof hydrodynamics and shipbuilding may be undertaken, and thepractical results of solutions effected fan out in all directions.

Officially the activities of Research are confined to theadministration of the practical research problems of the Bureauexcept for the research problems of the Radio Branch, vhich arehandled by the Radio Branch itself. In practice, the activitiesadministered by Research are to some extent spread all over theNaval establishment.

The Naval Research Laboratory at Belleview is under thejurisdiction of the Secretary of the Navy. But, in technicalmatters and in the allotment of funds, the Engineering Experi-mental Station (Annapolis), the David W. Taylor Model Basin(Carderock), the Naval Boiler Laboratory (Philadelphia), andthe Materials Laboratory (Nev York Navy Yard), and numerousother smaller laboratories are all working under the juris-diction of the Bureau of Ships and the Research Branch.

(1) The Technical Investigations Section of the branchconcerns itself with the Bureau's basic projectsof applied research. The Section lists 333 suchprojects (l April 19 0) and most of them arecritical in the progress and operations of theNavy.

(2) The Standards and Tests Section, of which thereare five sub-sections, administers and furnishesdirectives for the laboratory testing of allmaterials and equipment used by the Bureau. Theadministration of materials testing is wellorganized, and is carried out under the directionof thoroughly competent materials engineers.

-52-

I VJl

f-Person Boat

RUBBER RESEARCH, EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND NEW DESIGN

The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

LCR(s) Landing Craft Rubber (Small)

(3) In addition this section ultimately determines standards,and prepares and publishes vhat are termed the Leaflet(standard) Specifications for all materials and equip-ment.

2* The Preliminary Design Branch

Beginning in Preliminary Design, a ship is ordinarily nothingmore than a proposed solution to a set of military problems. Theseproblems may be posed by the General Naval Board or by high rankingofficers. But before the design of a ship can even be started, theship's general feasibility must be determined. When the feasibilityand effectiveness of a proposed ship is approved here, naval archi-tects in this Branch block out the general outlines and contours, themasses, veights, and stability of a ship. The basic character through-out is determined and established. Thereafter, these preliminary plansare turned over to the Contract Design Branch.

Upon the men of this department rest the hopes and plans for agreat ship. They are men of vorId-vide fame, great skill, and highprofessional standing. The vork of the branch is almost exclusivelyprofessional and technical. The Branch has very little correspond-ence and most of that is vith the General Board covering discussionof proposed ships. The unit is highly self-contained and of necessitymaintains its own files. Its vork is in current condition.

A ship protection section of the Branch is engaged in funda-mental study of the military damage of various forms to vhich men-of-var are exposed. It collects, studies, and analyzes the reportson actual var damage and on the extensive experimental researchvhich the Bureau conducts. It keeps in convenient form for refer-ence and ready use the data necessary to the design of protectivefeatures for nev ships and to the planning of changes in existingships.

3. The Contract Des i%n Branch

The Contract Design Branch picks up ship plans as they comefrom Preliminary Design and carries to a high degree of completionthe details of designing, drafting, and specification vriting. Thebasic character of the ship that comes from Preliminary Design is,in Contract Design, converted to specifications upon vhich a buildercan bid.

-54-

There are two things especially to be noted about the workof this branch: First, in the design of a ship, the mass ofdetailed and highly specialized work that must be done beginsto develop and to be ramified in this branch, and, secondly, thedegree of completion of detail to which the vork may be carriedin this branch is to some extent variable.

The various kinds of specialized work begin to show up inthe organization and vork of highly specialized sections. Ofthe 10 sections in this branch, 4 specialize in the vork to bedone on "hull", and 6 of the sections specialize in "machinery"design and computations.

The four "hull" sections are: Hull Plans, Stabilityand Computing, Standard Plans and Small Boats Design, andHull Specifications. Tvo of these sections call for dis-cussion here.

(1) Stability and Computing is a section devoted tocomputations that determine both the static anddynamic stability of a ship. This section vorksvery closely with the Preliminary Design Branch.In fact, when the feasibility of a ship vas beingdetermined in Preliminary Design that feasibilitydepended to a large extent upon presumed factorsof stability. This section also must of necessityvork very closely vith the War Plans Division ofthe Bureau since one of the biggest problems inthe redesigning and refitting of merchant shipsrequisitioned by the Navy is the problem ofretaining stability vhen the character of theship is greatly changed.

(2) Hull Specifications is a section engaged inconverting the designs of Hull Plans to thevritten specifications (Detail Specifications)necessary to the letting of a contract.

"Hull specifications" and "machinery specifi-cations" can not nov be vritten up in one,unified form, "ship specifications". Thepurchase (detail) specifications for "hull"are prepared in a volume titled "DetailSpecification for Hull". And the corre-sponding specifications for the "machinery"of a ship are titled "Special Specificationsfor Machinery".

c-55-

The filing and referencing system of each is differ-ent. "Hull" uses the old Construction and Repairfiling system while "machinery" uses Navy Manualfiling as a base for all filing and referencing.The plans of each are also keyed, numbered, refer-enced, and filed differently.

Because of this some striking duplications occur,and the various engineering systems of a ship cannot be treated as vhole systems.

Thus, separate piping and valve specificationsmust be prepared for both "hull specifications"and "machinery specifications". "Hull Speci-fications" vill carry a pipe up to a certainelbov or union, but beyond the particular elbowor union, the same pipe is no longer "hull piping"It is now "machinery piping", and the specifica-tions from there on have to be written up in"machinery specifications". This same dupli-cation exists in numerous other places. Inelectrical specifications, for instance, "HullSpecifications" will carry one part of a wiringsystem while "Machinery Specifications" willcarry another part of the same system.

The six "Machinery" and Computing Sections in ContractDesign are: Machinery Plans, Electrical Plans, MachineryComputations, Propellers, Machinery Specifications, and Weights.Two of these sections call for discussion here.

(1) Electrical Plans is a section engaged in electricaldrafting, the making of standard plans, and thepreparation of weight estimates. Presumedly, thissection prepares and writes the electrical contractplans and specifications for all ships. Actually,the greater part of the electrical specificationsare prepared by the electrical technical sectionsin Development Design. After the contract for aship is let, the work of this section is practi-cally finished.

(2) The Propellers section has full cognizance of thatsubject including design and drafting. In addition,the Section acts as do technical sections (discussed

-56-

cMain Turbines and Gears (covered)CV-9 (ESSEX) class

MACHINERY ACCORDING TOBUREAU'S CONTRACT DESIGN

-57-

under Development Design) in that it takes plan actionon contract changes during the building period of aship. In like manner it takes plan action for theShipbuilding, Maintenance, and Ma**" Plans Divisions.

4. The Development Design Branch

Development Design is the largest and most complex branch ofthe Design Division. In this branch, specifications are preparedin detail; materials, and changes and developments in building, aresupervised and approved; requisitions are approved; and approvalis given for the award of contracts. In addition, trial programsare arranged and carried out under the direction of this branch.The branch comprises more than half of the Design Division.

The detailed and highly specialized vork of modem navalconstruction that began to show up in Contract Design runs itscourse in Development Design. Thus ve find here two kinds ofactivity, both highly ramified, that converge and flow together.These two kinds of activity are centered in (a) Ship Type Desks,and (b) Technical Sections.

Ship Tyj)e Desks Administer the Building of the DifferentKinds of Ships

In Development Design the specialization in different kindsof ships is represented in the ship type desks -- 8 of them, oneeach for battleships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines,patrol craft, auxiliary vessels, and district craft.

The different kinds of naval vessels call for widelydifferent application, at times, of all that the various tech-nologies embrace and indicate as necessary. For instance, allthe main power demands of our latest battleships are for alter-nating electrical current, but submarine power demands are fordirect current. Again, there are constant changes in technologicdetails of each type of vessel.

All these developmental modifications that unfold in thebuilding of a ship of highly specialized character are administeredand controlled by the ship type desk.

The ship type desk for a cruiser pulls together in one lineof action all that the various technologies (technical sections)have to offer in the building of that ship. The ship type deskthinks of the cruiser "as a whole". In either building or mainte-nance, "the ship is the thing" for the ship type desk as well as

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for the Bureau. Ship type desks are, therefore, characteristicallya part of the Bureau's "vertical" organization.

Each "desk" has at present one or several officers, for both"hull" and "machinery", but in most instances the senior officeris a "hull" man. Two observations should be made here.

(1) These desks are undermanned at present.

(2) The plan of organization of ship type desks under thenew Bureau of Ships has not, generally speaking, beenworked out in full. Whether the "Hull" officer andthe "machinery" officer are to act administrativelyas a unit (be administrative alter egos) or each, inhis own field ("hull" or "machinery") is to act assuperior is an unsettled question. The tendency istoward the establishment of administrative alteregos, but investigation of the work of each "desk",and statements made on the question by various officersof the Division are sometimes contradictory.

The Technical Sections Pass Upon Changes in the SpecializedTechnologies

The second kind of activity in Development Design resultsfrom the fact that the various technologies themselves are forevermultiplying and then breaking down into sub-technologies of extremespecialization.

For instance, an electrical engineer was formerly an expertin everything electrical. Later, the application of electricalpower became more diverse, and an electrical engineer became anexpert, not in everything electrical, but in motors or generatorsor communications. Soon, an electrical engineer will not be anexpert in motors, but an expert in direct current motors oralternating current motors etc., etc.

The administration of changes in the specialized technolo-gies, changes of application, and the expression of expert opinionin the various technologies is centered in the technical sections.

(l) The increasing specialization in technology is nowrepresented by the following 19 technical sections:Electrical (gen.), Fire Control and Interior Com-munications, Gyro Compass, Boilers, Turbines andGears, Heat Arrangements, Equipment Design, Aux-iliary Machinery, Internal Combustion Engines, Hull

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Structure, Welding and Casting, Air Conditioning,Piping and Valves, Damage Control and ChemicalDefense, the Change Desk, Hull Plan Files, andMachinery Plan Files. Several of these sectionshave already broken up into sub-sections that bidfair to become technical sections themselves.

Technical Sections are "Horizontal" Organizations

The technical sections are, what might be termed, "servicesections". Each technical section has cognizance of only a detailof any ship. If a line of action producing a type of ship (theaction of a ship type desk) is termed "vertical" then the lineof action that cuts across the ship production line properly maybe termed "horizontal".

To the ship type desk a specific type of "ship is the thing".The electrical generator, for instance, is an incidental matter.But to a technical section, the specific generator in any ship is"the thing"; the ship is an incidental matter. The two groups oforganizations, ship type desks and technical sections, think, planand act right across each other.

The activity of the technical sections not only cuts acrossthe activity of the type desks in the Development Design Branchbut technical section activity also cuts across the activity ofother branches in the Division and other divisions in the Bureau.On matters in which a technical section has cognizance, it takesplan action not only for Design but for the Shipbuilding orMaintenance divisions as veil.

There is Still Some Unnecessary Duplication of Effort inTechnical Sections

Each of the former bureaus had technical sections. In themerger most of the obvious duplications were eliminated or compro-mised. The Welding and Castings Section is an example of a com-plete merger of two such sections. Piping and Valve's is a partialmerger of two old sections. Auxiliary Machinery is another. Insome instances new sections had to be organized along somewhatdifferent lines in order to pull related work together. MachineryArrangements is such a section.

All duplication of effort or material cognizance has by nomeans been eliminated. This results in one of the real "bottle-necks" in Bureau work. There is no clearly formulated distinctionbetween functional cognizance and material cognizance.

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LI' .^ r l ' , ' ' < r Ci' ,< liR. BIJIiEr

It was previously stated that the plan of organization ofship type desks under the merger is not worked out in detail. Inaddition, there is some question of the relation between technicalsections and ship type desks; some question of hov they shouldinteract.

From a functional point of view it might appear the ship typedesk would take action on all matters relating to production of theship; and that the technical section would take administrative orplan action only on matters relating to the independent developmentof specific machines or materials.

However, this is not the case. Technical sections take bothadministrative and plan action on matters relating directly to pro-duction of the ship. Both groups take administrative action or actaa expert technologists, and action in many instances is overlapping.

5. The Radio Branch

The Radio Branch in its present organization is highly autono-mous, and its activities spread over a wider range than is ordinaryin branch organization. It has responsibility for all radio andunderwater sound equipment. It designs, develops, and tests radioequipment for ships, aircraft, and shore establishments and for theMarine Corps. It also designs, develops, and tests underwater soundequipment. In these activities it does not differ greatly fromother design branches having cognizance of other materials andequipment. Here, however, the parallel ends.

The Radio Branch conducts all of its own research, preparesall of its own material specifications. The Research Branch of theDivision does no research work or specification writing for Radio.

Besides preparing its own material specifications, thisbranch.prepares its own requisitions and gives directions for pro-curement, either by purchase or by manufacture. The Branch alsosupervises distribution, installation, maintenance, and alterationof radio and sound equipment on ships and on shore. Beyond delivery,it does not install, maintain, etc. on aircraft -- the Bureau ofAeronautics being responsible for that.

In all these things, the Branch steps outside the usualbranch organization of the Division. The main reason for thisdivergence derives to a large extent from two things:

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(1) Radio and Sound was formerly a division of the oldBureau of Engineering, and in the merger many of theprerogatives of a division have been retained for theBranch.

(2) The major developments in radio and underwater soundapparatus are recent, and there has been scant oppor-tunity to reduce activities in these fields to veilroutined procedure.

WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SHIPBUILDING DIVISION

In a general way, the Shipbuilding Division handles the"business end" of the acquisition of ships and the procurement ofmaterials and equipment for the Bureau. When merchant ships areacquired for conversion to naval auxiliaries the Division decideswhat Navy Yards or private yards shall do the work.

It supervises conversion of such ships when plans areapproved by the Design and War Plans divisions. In this activity,however, the actual cognizance of the Division is often in doubt.

The Division accumulates a great deal of data on shipbuild-ing, shipbuilding facilities, naval and industrial production, andon materials costs and availability. It carries on a variety ofactivities of an "expediting" or follow-up nature. But, again,in most of these activities the Division has no real authority,and is in many instances duplicating the activities of otherdivisions or bureaus.

Personnel in the Division has increased very rapidly, muchmore rapidly than any other Division in the Bureau. There were59 officers assigned to the Division on June 30, and at that time236 civilians were employed. A year ago there were less than athird of that number.

The work of the Division is divided among four branches:Departmental Contracts, Procurement, Progress and ShipbuildingFacilities. A fifth organization, the Lease-Lend Section isattached directly ot the office of the Head of the Division.

1. The Departmental Contracts Branch

Departmental Contracts was specifically designated by orderssetting up the organization of the Bureau as a branch that shouldhandle all legal matters involving the Bureau. Such legal matters

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almost invariably attach to procurement activities. In consultationwith the office of the Judge Advocate General, this Branch preparesall departmental contracts for the purchase, acquisition, and con-version of ships and for the procurement of materials and equipment.This Branch also advises the Procurement Branch on all mattersrelating to NOs Contracts — Supplies & Accounts Contracts.

All recommendations vith regard to awards, changes in depart-mental contract terms, liquidation of damage agreements, and settle-ment of claims are prepared by this Branch. In addition the Branchpasses upon earnings under adjusted compensation clauses, and uponadjustments for labor and materials variations in cost.

The Branch follows and comments on all existing or pending!.: r.slation affecting the Bureau.

2. The Procurement Branch

The Procurement Branch of Shipbuilding is responsible for allpurchases of the Bureau made through the Bureau of Supplies & Accounts.Specific exceptions are made for certain materials purchased for ShipsEquipment (Maintenance), machine tools for Navy Yards, and for certainRadio, and Sound purchases. Even in Radio and Sound purchases, however,Procurement assists in the following of requisitions and NOs Contracts.

This Branch is organized very simply and s.oundly in threesections: Requisitions, Contracts, and Stocks and Materials.

(1) The Requisitions Section prepares all requisitionsfrom specifications furnished by other divisionsof the Bureau; follows through all requisitionsuntil recommendations for award are made to Supplies& Accounts; and maintains files of all requisitionsand schedules.

A requisition follow-up "desk" operates directlyunder the head of the Requisitions Section. Itsduties are to check on the progress of the requi-sitions and contracts through the ShipbuildingDivision and the Bureau of Supplies & Accounts.Inquiries on progress are answered here and avisible card file is used to indicate schedulesand deliveries on contracts.

(2) The Contracts Section picks up all NOs Contractsas soon as they are made by Supplies & Accounts;authorizes inspection; handles liquidation ofdamages, penalties, and bonuses; exercises optionsin the contract; and follows up delivery.

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A-BATTLEWAGON UNDER THE SHIPBUILDING DIVISION'S JURISDICTION

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(3) The Stocks and Materials Section handles all ship-ment orders and stocking of materials and equipmentin Naval establishments; is especially responsiblefor the development, specification, and testing ofballistic steel (up to 3"); and handles all shipmentof Navy furnished materials to private shipbuilders.The Section also keeps up the Bureau of Ships sectionof the Standard Stock Catalogue.

3- The Progress and Estimating Branch

The responsibilities and activities of the Progress Branchof the Division are numerous, varied and not very clearly defined.Originally, organization orders made the Branch responsible fort e "expeditious prosecution of work" on major shipbuilding pro-jects, including new construction, conversions and maintenance andrepair. "Expeditious prosecution" is not a very tangible orobjective phrase. Interpretive memoranda have been issued repeated-ly in order to clarify duties and responsibilities, especially togive explicit cognizance to the various ship type desks set up inthe Branch. These interpretations have not, hovever, been muchmore explicit than the original orders, and in any event, theyhave not eliminated duplication of effort and conflict vith otherdivisions of the Bureau.

The activities of the Branch are, at present, organized inthree sections: (a) Ship Type Desks, (b) Priorities, and (c) aScheduling and Estimating Section.

(1) The Ship Type Desks are presumed to have responsibilityfor "progressing" construction, conversion, and mainte-nance and repair of the principal types of naval vessels.Actually the type desk officers are "expediting" deliveryof materials and equipment, in so far as any two of themare doing the same kind of job. On one type desk, thedesk handling all combatant ships except submarines, theenergies of the officer in charge are almost vholly usedup in "expeditious prosecution" of the delivery of armor.

When the Shipbuilding Division acquires a merchant vesselor a private ship for conversion to a naval auxiliary,the Auxiliaries Ship Type Desk has cognizance of, andsupervises, the conversion within the limits of planssubmitted by the War Plan Division. In like manner,

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ships acquired to be converted, to district craft areturned over to the District Craft Desk, Both desksare instructed to refer to the Design Division anyquestion of fundamental change in design. Again,the term "fundamental change in design" is notexplicit.

The management of the Auxiliaries Desk has turnedin a remarkable performance record in conversionsunder conditions of extraordinary stress. However,it should be noted that the good record is a tributeto the individual abilities of the present manage-ment rather than to the soundness of organization ofvork in the Branch.

(The District Craft Desk also supervises the buildingof certain nev ships, especially smaller vessels.)

After such conversions, the type desks in Shipbuildingturn the ships over to corresponding ship type desksin the Maintenance Division. Often the conversionshave not been completed when the ships are turned overto Maintenance. Maintenance must, then, finish theconversion. Incidentally, Maintenance supervises allconversions of vessels already in naval service.

(2) The Priorities Section is at present a small, nevsection. This section "expedites" priorities formaterials needed by the Navy or by producers for theNavy. The Section maintains for the Navy liaisonwith all the federal priorities groups, and thehead of the Section is included in several suchcommittees or sub-committees.

(3) The Scheduling and Estimating Section is a servicesection. It prepares numerous reports coveringprogress in shipbuilding, erection schedules, andacquisition of critical materials. The sectionaccumulates cost records and prepares cost esti-mates. Because of its excellent organization andinterpretation of this basic data, the section isin a position to recommend allocation and assign-ment of major construction projects.

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This section was the Progress and Estimating Sectionof the former Bureau of Engineering. It was attacheddirectly to the office of Chief of Bureau and itactually had responsibility for scheduling criticalmaterials and delivery dates, and for selection andassignment of building facilities.

In the present Shipbuilding Division, all responsi-bility for scheduling of materials and for selectionof construction facilities has been taken away fromthe Section'. Yet an examination of the quality andthoroughness of the work done in the Section willreveal no section better prepared to bear the re-sponsibility. The man in charge of the section forseveral years shows a thorough comprehension ofscheduling and estimating problems.

4. The Shipbuilding Facilities Branch

The responsibilities, duties, and activities, of this branchfall into two categories. First, records are maintained and reportsmade covering all shipbuilding activities, private and governmental.Secondly, on the basis of these records, recommendations are madecovering appropriations, allotments, and assignment of major ship-building projects.

Running records are compiled and maintained covering allshipbuilding facilities — those in use, those available for use,and those that are inactive. Studies of private yard developmentsare made, and continuing records are kept of all Navy Yard andNaval Station projects for the Bureau of Ships.

This Branch reports all Bureau of Ships financial obli-gations for Yard and Station projects, and prepares the Bureau'sreport for the Shore Station Development Board.

This Branch makes recommendations covering allocation ofmajor production programs. This* calls for recommendations ofappropriation for such things as machine tools for Navy Yards andStations. In the present emergency, it also makes recommendationsof financial subsidy for private shipbuilding facilities.

The various activities of the Branch are organized in fivesections. Some of them cover the activities of Naval establishments;others cover similar activities in private yards and plants.

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5- The Lease-Lend Section

Recently a Lease-Lend. Section has been established in theShipbuilding Division under the direct administration of anassistant to the Head of the Division. Organization of the workand activities of this section is not complete, but the Sectionhas been set up on the premise that it should act as a centralagency for the compilation and coordination of all reports madeunder cognizance of the Bureau of Ships for Lease-Lend activities.

This section handles procurement of all Bureau of Shipsrequisitions coming under the Lease-Lend Lav except repairs tovessels. In the course of its activities it prepares Lease-Lendrequisitions, requests funds to cover them, recommends award ofcontracts, and supervises contracts.

WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MAINTENANCE DIVISION

When a naval ship has been turned over to the Fleet by theDesign Division or the Shipbuilding Division, it is transferredto the cognizance of the Maintenance Division. It remains in thecognizance of the Maintenance Division until for any reason it isstricken from the roster of U.S. Naval vessels. Even when a shipis decommissioned, it remains the responsibility of, and withinthe cognizance of, the Maintenance Division.

The Maintenance Division of the Bureau concerns itselfwith, and is responsible for, three principal activities: (l)the maintenance of naval ships; (2) the equipment of Ships; and(3) the salvage of ships. Thirty-seven officers and 118 civiliansare assigned to the performance of this work and the Division isclosely associated in its work with the Design Division and theShipbuilding Division.

1. The Ship Maintenance Branch

Maintenance of naval vessels includes upkeep, overhaul,alterations, conversion, modernization, and repair. Admittedlythese terms are loose, and major overhauls or alterations mightchange the basic design of the ship. Certainly modernizationdoes. In cases where basic design is changed, the MaintenanceDivision refers all questions or problems of design to theDesign Division for approval. In the cases, recently, ofseveral large modernization projects, the whole problem ofredesign of the ships was returned to the Design Division.

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In conversion activity, a peculiar situation develops. Ifthe ship "be already in= or previously in, naval service, the wholeconversion job is the responsibility of Maintenance, exceptingonly when basic design is changed. Here, again, Maintenance seeksthe advice and recommendations of Design, and ultimately proceedson the approval of the.Design Division. Maintenance is, therefore,thoroughly experienced in conversions.

But if the ship be a merchant vessel acquired by the Navyfor conversion, the conversion is handled by one of the ship typedesks in the Shipbuilding Division. This produces a highlyanomalous situation in which there is considerable duplication ofeffort.

All the work in the Ship Maintenance Branch of the Divisionis organized and handled through a series of ship type desks, eachof which is responsible for a certain type or types of vessel.There are seven such ship type desks, one each for berttleships(and carriers), cruisers, destroyers, submarines, minesweepers,auxiliaries, and patrol boats and district craft.

(l) The ship type desk organization in Maintenance issimilar to that in Development Design. Each "desk"has a "hull" and a "machinery" officer, and it ispresumed that each, in the absence of the other,will administer the "desk". In survey of theMaintenance Branch it was clearly indicated thatthe ship type desks were manned by thoroughlycompetent and experienced personnel that wentabout the work with a clear cut knowledge ofproper procedure.

In the performance of work and in the discharge of responsi-bilities, the ship type desks in Maintenance call upon technicalsections for technical advice and recommendations just as the shiptype desks in Development Design do, and technical sections willtake plan action for Maintenance just as they do for Design orShipbuilding.

Maintenance ship type desks are also responsible forrecommending the allotment of Maintenance funds, the preparationof estimates for the Bureau budget, and for recommendations andapproval of allowance lists for naval ships.

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2. The ShipsJ Equipment Branch

The Ships' Equipment Branch of the Division is charged withresponsibility for approval of all ships' allowance lists, theissue of equipment, and the stocking and issuing of special itemsof hull and machinery materials.

The work of this Branch is organized along lines strictlyof material cognizance. Three sections of the Branch handle,respectively, (a) general equipment, (b) allowances, and (c)special equipment.

(1) The General Equipment Section handles, among otherthings, ships' boats (hulls and engines), groundtackle, and minesweeping paravanes. It maintainscomplete records of boats, boat engines and lifefloats. Similar records are kept on ground tackle,paravanes, minesweeping gear, and such materialsas towing bridles.

(2) The Allowance Section handles all ships allowancesincluding type ships' allowance lists and individualships' allowance lists. This includes ordinary hulland machinery allowances, flags, mess gear and laborsaving devices, and navigational equipment andsupplies.

(3) The Special Materials Section handles all materialsnot usually or regularly included in allowance listsor equipment.

A fourth section in the Equipment Branch, NavigationalEquipment, is really a technical section that passes on technicalquestions of navigational equipment. The Section is located atthe Naval Observatory.

3* The Salvage Branch

The Salvage Branch is largely a "paper organization" setup to function in certain situations of national emergency or war.At present the Branch comprises one officer and one clerk, butthere is little doubt that the Branch will of necessity be greatlyenlarged.

The Branch is set up to be responsible for the provision offacilities and arrangements for salvage of vessels. It is presumedthat this will be accomplished by the organization and employmentof salvage contractors through annual salvage contracts. The Branchis charged with the responsibility of preparing plans for salvagework in case of war.

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s; -I'

'<.t<-'' .,,--

A PROBLEM FOR THE MAINTENANCE DIVISION OF THEBUREAU. U.S.S. FRANKLIN - CV13 Brooklyn Navy Yard

The officer in charge of this Branch has just recently returnedfrom England where he made an extensive study of salvage activitiesunder war time conditions.

THE WORK AND ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR PLANS DIYISION

The War Plans Division was organized and functions principallyfor the purpose of collecting and collating all data and informationavailable on merchant ships and critical materials that may "be re-quired "by the Navy in time of war.

With regard to merchant ships that may be required, this callsfor the collection and organization of all obtainable data and speci-fications of merchant ships already in service. It also calls forthe Rtudy of plans and specifications of merchant vessels proposedby the Maritime Commission so that recommendation may be made coveringtypes of merchant vessel best suited to naval purposes in time of war.

The Division prepares structural, mechanical, and electricalplans and specifications for the conversion of merchant ships tonaval auxiliaries. In addition, it is presumed that the Divisionwill prepare data covering the possibilities of reproduction ofcertain types of naval vessels.

War Plans maintains a running record of decommissioned navalvessels, and a record of the priority with which they will be re-commissioned by order of the Chief of Naval Operations, in case ofneed.

In the matter of critical materials that will be requiredby the Navy in time of war, the Division prepares material esti-mates relating to shipbuilding plans of the Bureau of Ships, toplans for conversion of merchant vessels, and to recommissioningplans. This also requires study of sources of supply of criticalmaterials, and preparation of records of availability of suchmaterials. This section will shortly be transferred to the Ship-building Division.

As a matter of security, the Division handles the distributionof all secret correspondence and documents in the Bureau of Shipsand maintains files for this material.

Organization of the Division

To carry out these responsibilities the War Plans Divisionhas an organization of 40 employees (4 officers and 36 civilians) inWashington and a separate but related organization of 55 employeesat the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

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The Division organization in Washington has been divided into4 sections: Administrative, Hull, Engineering, and Materials Esti-mates. The latter section will soon be transferred to the Shipbuild-ing Division.

It was customary for the Washington unit to vork uponly the general or skeleton plans and type specificationsfor conversions in case of need. The plans were thenreferred to Philadelphia where detail plans were prepared.Under the present emergency, however, the Washington unitis working up detailed plans for immediate conversions ofmerchant vessels, and the present situation has put aheavy pressure on the Division.

The conversion work of this Division has all been predicatedupon the assumption that merchant ship data including detailed plansand specifications, and especially stability and weight factors,would be obtainable and susceptible to good organization. Actually,in the case of stability and weight factors, for instance, satis-factory data has not been available or where available it has notbeen obtained because of shortage of field personnel. The resultis that in most conversion jobs now being done, the Bureau muststill rely on empiric data. As a result some converted ships maynot live up to the original expectations or purposes.

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3- DEVELOH4EMT OF THE BUREAU:

This in general summarizes the original organization of the Bureau of

Ships as in effect 15 August 1940. In the Bureau history of World

War II 'which follows, one fact should be kept in mind throughout:

that is, the eiqpansion in the war effort made it incumbent on the Bureau

of Ships to adjust its organization continually. What would have been

good practice in August 19 0 at its formation vould not be acceptable

in the middle or at the end of the -war.

The survey made by private management engineers pointed out three

basic organizational problems:

(a) What should be the relation between the different sets of

ship type desks, the Design, Maintenance, and Shipbuilding Divisions

each having a set?

(b) What should be the proper interrelation of the ship type

desks of the three Divisions and the technical sections in Design?

(c) What were the proper duties and responsibilities of the

operating Divisions, particularly the Shipbuilding Division?

These basic problems became evident throughout the development of the

Bureau, not only Immediately in the expansion period prior to our entry

into the war but also during the pressing war years. The impact upon

the organizational structure of the Bureau during these periods and

the changes effected are discussed in the applicable chronological phases

of this history.

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PART II

PRELUDE TO WAR

CHAPTER III

THE PRE-WAR WORLD AND THE NAVY

CHAPTER III. THE PRE-WAR WORLD AND THE NAVY.

In time of peace, it is frequently difficult to evaluate the

threat posed by foreign powers and the ships, planes, and

trained men needed to provide reasonable safety to the nation.

In any study of the expansion of navel power, therefom, it may

be veil to study first the international situation provoking it.

Chapter I indicated the decline in shipbuilding following

World War I and the extent to which the United States denuded

itself of naval power. The following excerpts from Admiral

King's report to the Secretary of the Navy on 27 March 1944

will indicate the situation which occasioned the shipbuilding

expansion in an effort to conform with the fundamental

United States naval policy: "To maintain the Navy la strength

and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and

to guard the United States and its continental and overseas

possessions."

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION LEADING TO WAR

"As a result of German's policy of expansion by political,

economic and military aggression, culminating in the invasion

of Poland, the European war began on 3 September 1939. While our

position was for the time being.not clearly established, it vaa never-

theless apparent that this war would affect the United States in a

degree which might extend to our becoming involved in a var for our

national existence.

A. THE LIMITED EMERGENCY

"The first atep taken by the United States vas the declaration

of the limited emergency by the President on 8 September 1939. The

immediate effect of this, so far aa the Navy vaa concerned, vas to

fix the authorized enlisted personnel strength of the Navy at 191,000

instead of 131,48$, and to authorize the recall to active duty of

officers and men and nurses on the retired and reserve lists of the

Navy and Marine Corps. Other direct effects vere that the procurement

of materials and equipment, and the taking over of land needed for mil-

itary purposes, could be accomplished more readily. Also, the Coast

Guard could be made a part of the Navy if it appeared desirable, by

Presidential order. Indirectly, the limited emergency vas responsible

for changes in contracting authority vhich eliminated competitive

bidding, and for the suspension of certain labor provisions relating

to hours of vork on government contracts.

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U.S. Naval Shipyard, Brooklyn, New YorkOnce more the great naval shipyards resounded with workers' voices and the pounding of hammers.

B. NEUTRALITY

On 2 October 1939, the Congress of American Republics assembled

at Panama agreed upon a resolution which establiphed a neutral zone

surrounding the Americas, with the exception of Canada, at an,average

distance of 300 miles. By the terms of the resolution, belligerent

raiders and submarines were to be prevented from operating close to the

Western Hemisphere, as they had done in World War I, the thought responsi-

ble for the resolution being that if belligerent operations took place

in that area, the United States and her Latin American neighbors might

veil become involved in the war. The United States Navy being the

only armed force equal to the task of maintaining petrol in this exten-

sive area, the primary responsibility for the implementation of the

proclamation was obvious. The patrol was in fact taken by the United

States Navy, and at that time a portion of the 111 decommissioned

destroyers vere recommissioned for the purpose of making it effective.

Preceded by heated debates, during which it was argued that,

for insufficient reason, we would be abandoning our traditional policy

of freedom of the seas, the Neutrality Act of 1$39 became law on 4

November 1939, and American vessels and citizens were thereby prohibited

from entering combat zones. The Act also established a so-called cash

and carry policy, under which all belligerents were required to do their

own transporting of goods purchased in the United States, and pay for

them before being granted clearance. In addition, it authorized the

President to place restrictions on the use of ports and territorial

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waters of the United States by submarines or merchant vessels of for-

eign states (pursuant to vhich he prohibited their nee by foreign sub-

marines of belligerent states, except when there by force majeure) and

prohibited the use of United States ports as bases for furnishing men

and supplies to ships of belligerent states lying off those ports.

Other consequences of the Neutrality Act were to make effective certain

lavs previously enacted, having for their purpose the maintenance of

neutrality. These included prohibitions against sending our armed

vessels for delivery to belligerents, and contained provisions for

detaining armed vessels or vessels manifestly built for warlike purposes

or conversion thereto. Included, also, insofar as detention and per-

missible length of stay were concerned, were lavs covering the use of

our ports by foreign vessels.

C. NAVAL EXPANSION

"in view of the situation, our requirements as to naval strength

were again presented to the Congress, in January 1940. At that time,

the part the United States was to play in the war was still not clear,

but with due regard for our national safety and with aggressor nations

disregarding treaties and pacts without hesitation - the immediate result

being rapid changes in the international situation - Congress recognized

that our security would be measured by our ability to defend ourselves.

Coupled with this uncertainty was the knowledge that the international

situation had been very difficult to predict. Many keen observers were

certain that no European war would break out in 1939, and there were

others who felt that we would be able to stay out of the war.

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Pursuant to the recommendation of the Navy Department, and

following a careful examination of world conditions, the Congress

authorized an expansion of 11 per cent in our combatant ships, and

the President signed the bill on 14 June 1940.

"Meanvhlle^ the aggressor nations had succeeded in imposing their

will upon numerous European countries. Germany had disposed of France

and had overrun the Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Poland, and

stood on t'.a Channel coast, poised for an all out attack on Britain, In

view of that alarming situation, the Congress passed the so-called Two-

Ocean Navy Bill, which we signed by the President on 1$ July 1940s The

increase in our naval strength authorized by this Act was 1,323,000 tone

of combatant ships-by far the largest naval expansion ever authorized,

This authorization was followed by the necessary appropriations in dne

course, and^ in the making, we bad a Navy commensurate with our needs.

D. TEE

"During the summer of 1$40, the Battle of Britain was in its initial

stages and. the German submarine campaign had been prosecuted with telling

effect. At the beginning of the war Great Britain had suffered severely

from the general attrition of operations at sea, particularly in destroyers

in the Norwegian campaign and during the retreat from Dunkirk. Faced with

this situation^ Great Britain entered into an agreement with the United

States, under the terms of which 50 of our older destroyers no longer

suited for the type of fleet service for which they had been designed, 'but

still adequately suited for antisubmarine duty, were exchanged for certain

O-82-

rights in various localities suitable for the establishment of naval

bases in the Atlantic area, and essential to the national defense. In

addition to the bases acquired in return for the $0 destroyers, we were

granted .reely and without consideration' similar rights with respect

to the leasing of bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda.;<This acquisition of bases operated to advance our sea frontier

several hundred miles in the direction of our potential enemies in the

Atlantic, and as the bases were leased for a term of $9 years, we could

profit by their strategic importance to the United States not only imme-

diately, but long after the crisis responsible for the exchange.-9< ' : -*

E. LEND-LEASE AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION

" On 11 March 1941, the so-called "Lend-Lease" .Act was signed by

the President. The provisions and effects of that Act are too well known

to require comment in this report. Naturally, we were unwilling to see

a large part of the material built with our labor and money lost io transit,

and our only recourse was to give the British assistance in escorting the

convoys carrying that material within North American waters.

"incident to our decision, the United States entered Into an agree-

ment with Denmark on 9 April 1941 relative to the defense of Greenland,

and on that day our Marines were landed there to prevent its being used

by Axis raiders. The Coast Guard cutter CAYUGA had already landed a party

there to conduct a survey with respect to airfields, seaplane bases, radio

stations, meteorological stations and additions to navigation, and on 1

June, the first of the Greenland patrols was organized, consisting chiefly

of Coast Guard vessels and personnel.

-83-

On 2? by 1941, an unlimited national emergency was proclaimed

by the Resident.

"On 7 July l$4l, United States Marines were landed in Iceland and

relieved some of the British forces stationed there.

' On 11 August 1941, on board the United States cruiser AUGUSTA,

the President and Brlme Minister of Great Britain agreed upon a joint

declaration covering the principles of mutual interest to the two countries,

"For soine months, for the purpose of ensuring safe passage of goods

shipped under the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act, our naval forces had

been patrolling waters in the vicinity of the convoy routes, and had

been broadcasting information relative to the presence of raiders,. On

4 September 1941, GREER, a four-stack United States destroyer was enroute

to Iceland, with nail, passengers and freights When about 175 miles

south of Iceland, she detected a submarine ahead. The submarine fired

a torpedo at her and missed, whereupon GHEER counterattacked with depth

charges. Another torpedo was fired at GREER but it also missed , and

GREER continued to Iceland. As a result of this incident, our naval

forces were ordered by the President to ahoot on sight any vessel attempt-

ing to interfere with American shipping, or with any shipping under

American escort.

"On 15 October, KEARNY., a new destroyer, one of a number of vessels

escorting a convoy from Iceland to North America, was torpedoed amidships.

Eleven of her crew were killed and seven were wounded, and the ship was

badly damaged but able to make port.

-84-

f?Qa 30 October^ the naval tanker SALINAS was hit by two torpedoes

about 700 miles east of Newfoundland. There were no casualties to per-

sonnel, and SALINAS reached port safely.

"On 31 October in the same vicinity REUBEN JAMES; another old

destroyer, was atruck amidships by a torpedo. The ship was broken in

tvo; the forward, part at once, "but the after part stayed afloat

long enough to enable 4$ men to reach the deck and launch life rafts

from which they were rescued. About 100 men were lost in this sinking,

"Whatever the situation technically, the Navy in the Atlantic was

taking a realistic viewpoint of the situation. During the month of

November, further steps were taken to enable our naval forces to meet

the steadily growing emergency. On 1 November the Coast Guard was made

a part of the Navy. Prior to that time ten Coast Guard cutters were

transferred to the British. On 17 November sections 2, 3 and 6 of the

Neutrality Act of 1939 were repealed by an act of Congress, thereby per-

mitting the arming of United States merchant vessels and their passage

to belligerent ports anywhere.

"Another effect of the European war, of major importance to the

United States, was the alliance by which on 27 September 1940 Japan

became one of the Axis powers.

"For many years it had been predicted and expected that eventually

Japan's policy of expansion would conflict with our interests in the

Pacific. Recognition of that possibility, plus Japan's growing naval

strength, were indicated by her being a party to the 1922 treaty on

limitation of armaments, and to subsequent treaties dealing with that

subject.

C

'At the time of the 1922 treaty Pearl Harbor and Manila were forti-

fied bases, and Guam was being fortified. None of our other Pacific

territories and possessions was fortified. When, therefore, the parties

to that treaty agreed to maintain the fortification of certain Pacific

islands in status quo, the fortification of Guam was halted. Subsequently

conforming to the treaty provisions, we maintained the status quo at

Guam and Corregidor, and confined our precautionary measures in the Pacific

to the strengthening of Pearl Harbor and our vest coaat bases.

"Our foresight in developing Pearl Harbor and our vest coast

bases has increased, immeasurably, our ability to carry on the var in

the Pacific. Whether or not Guam could have been made sufficiently

strong to withstand the full force of enemy attack is of course problem-

atical, but we appear to have had an object lesson to the effect that if

we are to have outlying possessions ve must be prepared to defend them*

"when, in the winter of 1935-19%, the Japanese declared themselves

no longer willing to abide by existing treaty provisions or be a party

to further negotiations, it gave rise to a feeling of uneasiness concern-

ing the trend of Japanese policy and activities. Unfortunately, the full

import of that move did not become apparent until later.

"in 1931; Japan had embarked on a policy of aggression by the

seizure of Manchuria. This was followed by other conquests in China, and

as ve have since learned, was accompanied by the fortifying of certain

islands mandated to Japan by the League of Nations, in direct violation

of the treaty provisions. A complete history of our relations with Japan

-86-

during the period. 1931-1941 was issued by the State Department in

the so-called "White Paper" dated 2 January 19 3.

"Continuing her aggression, Japan moved into French-Indo China in

1940. In 1941, the United States was engaged in protesting these and

other moves, and vhile conversations with the Japanese vere being held,

the German offensive in Russia was being successfully pressed. It seems

likely that this influenced the Japanese decision to attack Pearl Harbor.

"Whatever the reasons, Japan, vhile her representatives in Washing-

ton vere still engaged in discussions, presumably vith a. viev to finding

a means of preventing var, on the morning of 7 December 19 1 attacked

our ships at Pearl Harbor. * * *

"A fev hours later a similar but less damaging attack vas made on

the Philippines. * * *

"On the f olloving day ve declared.. .'that a state of var vhich has

thus been thrust upon the United States by the Imperial Government of

Japan is hereby formally declared.' On 11 December a similar declaration

vas made concerning Germany and Italy."

o-87-

II. BALANCE OF FLEETS.

By 1931-1932 the American Navy had declined to its lowest point

but in the late thirties the pendulum reversed itself and the United

States vith the rest of the nations of the vorld began to re-arm.

Warfare, however, being a situation of relative strengths, this decline

and renaissance must be viewed in relation to the major naval powers with

which this country was to become allied or opposed.

In the naval warfare of World War II, only three countries

played major roles: Japan on the one hand and Great Britain and the

United States on the other. The comparisons with regard to major combatant

vessels of these nations are presented in Tables 4 to for the years

1931 (lowest point) and 1938, 1939, and 1940 (the major periods of em-

ergency building and wartime expansion).

-88-

o r

TABLE 4

MAJOR COMBATANT VESSEIS OF THE UNITED STATES* * O N HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION

00

Year

1931193819391940

1931193819391940

1931193819391940

On Hand.

BattleshipsNo. Tons !

13 455,40015 464,30015 464,30015 464,300

Airct. CarriersNo. Tons

3 77,5003 80,5005 120,1006 134,800

Heavy CruisersNo. Tons

10 93,10017 161,20018 171,20033 171,200

Light CruisersNo. Tons

10 70,50010 70,50017 137,77519 157,775

.

DestroyersNo . Tona

225 240,220203 243,340221 273,490159 216,950

SubmarinesNo. Tona

81 66,25085 77,36589 83,175104 105,010

TotalNo. Tona

344 1,002,970333 1,097,205365 i,250,o4o321 1,250,035

Under Conatruction

2 70,0008 300,00017 770,000

1 13,8003 5 ,5002 34,50012 311,300

7 70,0001 10,000

14 266,000

9 90,0006 44,ooo4o 368,000

49 76,05043 68,380166 325,470

3 3,8oo15 21,74025 35,25081 121,675

11 87,600 !79 322,29084 482,130330 2,162,445

On Hand and. Under Conatruction

15 455.40017 534,30023 764,30032 1,234,300

4 91,3006 135,0007 154,60018 446,ioo

17 163,10018 171,20018 171,20032 437,200

10 70,50019 160,50023 181,77559 525,775

225 240,220252 319,390264 341,870325 542,420

84 70,050100 99,105114 118,425185 226,685

355 1,090.570 !412 1,419,495 ;449 1,732,170651 3,4i2,48o

TABLE 5

MAJOR COMBA.3RNT VESSELS OF THE BRITISH EMPIREON HAND AND UNDER CONSTROCTION

Year

1931193819391940

1931193819391940

BattleshipsNo. Tons

19 581,30015 474,70013 474,70015 394,250

5 175,0007 255,0008 300,000

Airet. CarriersNo. Tons

6 115,3006 115,3507 136,9008 160,900

5 114,0005 115,0003 69,000

Hea-vy CruisersNo. Tons

19 186,22615 145,12015 145,62015 145,620

Under Cc

-

fs— TT*.—J — — J! Tt-J

On Band.

Light CruisersNo. Tons

39 177,68544 266,54047 294,63530 326,065

instruction

4 26,00017 123,50021 146,50019 129,050

DestroyersNo. Tons

163 175,065161 200,529178 233,339184 258,459

21 28,59133 57,35037 69,3506 9,220

SubmarinesNo. Tons

60 57,28954 55,90955 56,91949 51,360

2 2,40018 18,41514 15,69028 16,216

TotalNo. Tons

306 1,292,865295 1,258,148317 1,342,133321 1,336,654

27 56,99178 488,26584 601,54064 523,486

Ot

1931193819391940

19 581,30020 649,70022 729,70023 694,250

6 113,30011 229,33012 251,90011 229,900

19 186,22615 1*3,12015 145,62015 145,620

43 203,68561 390, o4o68 441,13569 455,115

134 203,656194 257,879215 302,709190 267,679

62 39,68972 74,32469 72,60977 67,576

333 1,349,856373 1,746,413401 1,943,673385 i,86o,3,4o

O

o

TABLE 6

MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS OF JAPANON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Year

1931193819391940

BattleshipsNo. Tona

10 312,00010 312,00010 312,00010 312,000

Alrct. CarriersNo. Tons

3 61,2706 88,4706 88,4707 103,470

On ]

Heavy CruisersNo. Tons

8 82,00017 202,50018 217,00018 217,000

Kand

Ll tt CruisersNo. Tons

17 81,80317 81,80517 81,80517 81,805

DestroyersNo. Tons

52 78,40581 120,00587 129,90594 141,405

SubmarinesNo. Tons

44 52,61360 76,94360 76,94363 83,403

TotalNo. Tons

134 668,093191 881,723198 906,123209 939,083

Under Construction

1931193819391940

1931193819391940

1 45,000l 45,000l 45,000

10 312,00011 357,ooo11 357,00011 357,ooo

1 7,100 ;2 59,6003 74,6003 74,6oo

4 68,3708 148,0709 163,07010 178,070,

5 78,0001 14,500

On Hand and. I&

13 160,00018 217,00018 217,00018 217,000

1 6,000

der Construction

17 81,80517 81,80517 81,80518 87,805

7 11,80013 21,45015 24,75019 35,350

L

59 90,20594 141,455102 154,655H3 176,755

3 5,170

3 6,46oU 23,990

47 57,73360 76,94363 83,40374 107,393

16 102,07017 140,55022 150,81035 184,940

150 770,163208 1,022,273220 1,056,933244 1,124,023

TABLE 7

BALANCE OF FLEETSUNITED STATES, CHEAT BRITAIN, AND JAPAN

MAJOR COMBATANT VESSELS1931 - 1939 - 1940

ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION(tonnage in thousands)

]

BattleshipsAircraft CarriersHeavy CruisersLight, CruisersDestroyersSubmarines

Total

BattleshipsAircraft CarriersHeavy CruisersLig&t CruisersDestroyersSubmarines

Total

1931

U.S.

No. Tons

GR. BR.

No. Tons

JABAN

No. Tons

15 4553 7710 9310 70225 24o81 66

344 1,002

19 5816 11519 18639 177163 17560 57

306 1,292

10 3123 618 8217 8152 7844 52

134 668

1939U.S.

No. Tons

GR. BR.

No. Tons

JAPAN

No. Tons

1940

U.S.

No. Tons

GR. BR.

No. Tons

JAPAN

No. Tons

ON HAND

15 4645 12018 17117 137221 27389 83

365 1,250

15 4747 13615 14547 294178 23355 56

317 1,342-

10 3126 8818 21717 8187 12960 76

198 906

15 4646 13418 17119 137159 216104 105

321 1,230

15 3948 16015 14550 326184 25849 51

321 1,336

10 3127 10318 21717 8194 14163 83

209 939

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

1 137 70

3 3

11 87

4 2621 282 2

27 56

i 75 78

7 113 5

16 102

8 3002 34

6 4443 6825 35

7 2333 11-5

21 14637 6914 15

84 482 } 84 601

l 453 74

15 243 6

22 130

17 77012 31114 26640 368166 32581 121

330 2,162

8 3003 69

19 3296 928 16

64 323

1 453 7*

1 "619 3511 23

35 184

o

TABLE 7, Cont'd

BattleshipsAircraft CarriersHea*vy CruisersLight CruisersDestroyersSubmarines

Total

1931

U.S. GR. BR.

No. Tons No. Tons

JABAN

No. Tons

1939

U.S.

No. Tons

GR. BR. ! JAPAN

No. Tons! No. Tons

1940

U.S.

No. Tons

GR. BR. JAPAN

No. Tons No. Tons

ON HAND AND UNDER CONSTRUCTION

15 4554 9117 16310 70255 24o84 70

19 5816 11519 18643 203184 20362 59

355 1,090 333 1,349

10 312' 4 68' 13 16017 81

i 59 90^ 47 57

3.50 7701

23 7647 15418 17123 181264 341114 118

449 1,732

22 72912 25115 14568 441215 30269 72

4oi 1,943

11 3579 16318 21717 81102 15463 83

220 1,056

32 1,23418 44632 43759 525325 542185 226

651 3,412

23 69411 22915 1*569 455190 26777 67

385 1,860

11 35710 17818 21718 87U3 17674 107

244 1,124

- 2 -

Careful study of these charts reveal many interesting facts—

the magnitude of the Allies' shipbuilding expansion being exceeded as

the most outstanding fact only by the figures indicating the compara-

tive ship building stagnation on the part of the Japanese. Our enemy's

steady growth in the earlier years indicates their long range prepara-

tion for the outbreak of war.

American expansion, however, was rapid. Naturally, some classes

of ships were stressed more strongly than others. As illustrated by

the preceding tables, from 1938 to 1940tlienumbercf the United States'

battleships under construction jumped from 2 to 17 J During this same

period, the aircraft carrier program expanded from 3 to 12, the cruiser

program from 10 to $4, the destroyer program from 4$ to 166, and the

submarine program from 15 to 81J In tonnage, this building program

sky-rocketed from less than one-third million tons in 1938 to well

over two million tons in 1940.

Great Britain's construction remained almost constant from 1937

until after our entry into the war. In like manner, Japan suffered no

"Topsy"-like expansion, but continued steadily to increase her con-

struction program from 1934 on. No particular class of vessel received

special emphasis, although, if one must be chosen, the data indicates

that the most marked increase occunxd in the submarine program.

-94-

C

Baaed upon the above figures and upon further data, Chapter VI

vill compere in more detail the major fleets as they stood in late 1941,

for in these statistica of relative sea pavers may be found reasons for

the premeditated Japanese attack on Pearl Hajrbor.

Before that, however, ve may first study the problems encountered

by our country under the emergency shipbuilding program and the concomi-

tant expansion of personnel and facilities under the cognizance of the

Bureau of Ships.

-95-

CHAPTER IV

EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING

O

HI. IMPACT UPON THE BUREAU

During the period 1940-41 major organizational developments

did not occur within the embryonic Bureau of Ships. The youth of

the organization, the desire of those in control to gain experience

in management of such an organization, end the tremendous increase

in work load made any major changes impractical? Minor modifications,

however, did occur. One in particular, concerning Division status,

reflected changing Bureau responsibilities. The War Plans Division

was disbanded on 6 September 1941; its duties and personnel were

transferred to other Divisions in the Bureau. This move was dictated by

the fact that preparation for war had reached a point where the plan-

ning of the conversion of merchant ships and procurement planning, which

had been the main functions of the Division, were no longer matters to

be left to a staff office. Instead, they had become major operating

responsibilities and had to be tied into the new construction and pro-

curement program of the Bureau as a whole. Somewhat earlier, on 21

July 1941, the Statistical Section of the War Plans Division had been

consolidated with the Scheduling and Estimating Sections and designated

Scheduling and Statistics Section of the Shipbuilding Division. This

action proved to be one of the first indications of the merging of the

Bureau's planning and operating functions as the national defense program

gathered momentum.

-96-

O

CHAPTER IV

EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING

A. BACKGROUND

With the outbreak of the European War on September 9; 1939; the

United States found itself in an inferior status with respect to the

other world powers' naval strengths. As explained in Chapter I, the

NIRA $238,000,000 appropriation by President Roosevelt and the Vinson-

Trammel Act of 1934 authorizing.the construction of a fleet of treaty

strength provided first impetus to the revival of our shipbuilding program.

At this time Japan's warring on Manchuria and Hitler's rise to power in

Germany constituted far off threats to our national security. Appropri-

ations sky-rocketed in 1936 and 1937, followed by the Act of May 1938

providing an increase of 20 percent in our naval strength, exclusive of

replacements permitted under the Vinson-Trammel Act of

-97-

B. WAR EMERGENCY BUILDING

Constituting the first step taken to increase the United States

Navy above the strength permitted by the treaties, the Act of 1938

increased the number and tonnage allowances of combat vessels in the

Navy by approximately 22$; increased the number of useful aeroplanes

from 2,050 to a total of not less than 3;000; authorized the construction

of 26 auxiliary vessels; and authorized an appropriation of $15,000,000

to be expended at the discretion of the President for the purpose of

experimenting vith light surface craft. This act, however, indicated

a compromise in the thinking of our political leaders. On the one hand,

it provided for a great expansion, but hardly a building program of war-

time magnitude;*on the other hand, it reflected a nev attitude towards

shipbuilding appropriations, since it provided a general fund which the

Commander-in-Chief might use to whatever advantage he and the armed

services wished.

In peace time the amount of discretion left to the Navy inevi-

tably proved to be very limited. If the Navy desired new vessel con-

struction, it had first to present its request to the Bureau of the

Budget for approval. After approval by the Bureau of Budget, the

request went to the House Naval Affairs Committee, although under the

rules this legislation may have originated in the Senate Naval Affairs

Committee. With any authorization given, it then became necessary to

go through the identical procedure for the necessary appropriation

authority. In both cases the authority granted carried specific

limitations as to the type and number of snipe to be built.

-98-

O

The Act of 1938 altered this authorization procedure with the

$15,000,000 for "experimental small craft". The only definition in the

act stated "no single ship may exceed 3,000 tons". Although the amount

proved meager, the precedent had been established and became of great

value as the emergency shipbuilding program grew. With the 1939 un-

precedented appropriation for naval shipbuilding of almoat $200,000,000

the new construction awarded to Navy Yards and private yards jumped over

night. During 1939 the Navy Yards built 17 combatant vessels and the

newly expanded private yards constructed 57. All of these vessels did

not come under the nev appropriations, but the increase indicated the

healthier state of our building facilities and of our preparations for

defense.

The major change, however, came vith the passage of the 11 per-

cent Expansion Act of June 1940 which increased the combatant strength

of the Navy by 167,000 tons in the following amounts:

79?500 tons aircraft carriers

66,500 tons cruisers

21,000 tons submarines

It provided for variations of tonnage for the various types by 33?400 tons

in the aggregate. The next month another piece of legislation, the 70%

Expansion Act of July 1940, followed the same procedure but permitted the

transfer of tonnage to the extent of 30 percent of the total. The terms,

following the practice of allowing the Navy to exercise its discretion, .

stated: "1,325,000 tons of combatant vessels, 100,000 tons of auxiliary

vessels, and patrol craft, and $93,000,000 to remain available until

-99-

expended." As is customary, the actual production did not follov the

appropriations, for money grants extend over periods of years. During

the fiscal year of 1940 the Navy Yard nev construction jumped to 4$

ships, while private yards production slipped back to 12. Following

the 70% Expansion Act in July, authorizations steadily poured from the

Congressional chambers to the Navy Department:

9 September 1<?40: 186,640 tons auxiliary vessels

31 January 1941: 400 patrol, mine, and small craft

5 April 1941: 77,164 tons auxiliary vessels

24 May 1941: 550,000 tons auxiliary vessels

21 November 1941: 400 patrol, mine, and small craft

Indicative of the war feeling which pervaded the entire world as

hostilities raged in the Orient and Europe, the shipbuilding industry

during the fiscal year 1941 produced the first emergency mass con-

struction, with the activated Navy Yards turning out another 4$ ships,

while off the ways of the established private shipyards and of the

many new companies springing up throughout the country came the un-

precedented total of 34l ships. The emergency ship production during

the critical years of 1938 to 194l, together with construction com-

pleted during the previous five years of recovery are depicted by the

following Tables 8 and 9.

-100-

Table 8

EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING

NEW

COMBATANT

PATROL CRAFT

AUXILIARY

DISTRICT CRAFT (S.P.)

DISTRICT CRAFT (N. S. P.)

TOTAL DISTRICT CRAFT

LANDING CRAFT (SMALL)

TOTAL LANDING CRAFT

SMALL BOATS

TOTAL ALL TYPES

COMBATANT

PATROL CRAFT

AUXILIARY

ISTRICT CRAFT (S.P.)

DISTRICT CRAFT (N. S. P.)

TOTAL DISTRICT CRAFT

LANDING CRAFT (SMALL)

TOTAL LANDING CRAFT

SMALL BOATS

TOTAL ALL TYPES

CONSTRUCTION, CONVERSIONS, ACQUISITIONS

19No.

Vessels

9

4

13

114

127

19No.

Vessels

22

2

9

1

10

2

2

235

271

1933 -

Tonnage

1,284

485

1,769

314.4

2,083.4

36

Tonnage

42,010

4,000

1,870

47

1,917

9.8

9.8

727.3

48,664.1

1938

1954No.

Vessels

10

25

1

26

150

186

Tonnage

69,215

2,270

50

2,320

436.7

71,971-7

1937No.

Vessels

27

1

3

4

1

1

250

282

Tonnage

74,410

538

215

753

4.9

4.9

955.3

76,123.2

1955No^

Vessels

6

10

10

134

150

Tonnage

8,365

910

910

443.9

9,718.9

1938No.

Vessels

20

2

1

n

3

3

154

180

Tonnage

97,535

810

15

825

14.7

14.7

567.5

98,942.2

-101-

Table S Continued

EMERGENCY SHIPBUILDING

NEW CONSTRUCTION, CONVERSIONS,

1939 -

1939No.

Vessels

COMBATANT

MINE CRAFT

PATROL CRAFT

AUXILIARY

DISTRICT CRAFT (S.P.)

DISTRICT CRAFT (N. 8. P.)

TOTAL DISTRICT CRAFT

LANDING CRAFT (LARGE)

LANDING CRAFT (SMALL)

TOTAL LANDING CRAFT

SMALL BOATS

TOTAL ALL TYPES

26

1

6

1

7

30

30

319

383

Tonnage

65,075

1,267

1,177

200

1,377

79.8

79.8

880.3

68,679.1

ACQUISITIONS

1941

I94o )34<No.

Vessels Tonnage

28

22

23

32

8

4o

114

114

842

1,069

56,900

2,764

130,891

4,847

2,064

6,911

584.0

584.0

2,521.3

200,571.3

No.Vessels

XX

94

84

82

202

124

326

1,042

1,042

1,252

2,913

Tonnage

154,458

26,712

22,284

533,887

34,345

20,915

55,260

7,950.8

7,950.8

5,275.0

805,826.8

-102-

Type

Table?

EMERGENCY NEW CONSTRUCTION

OF COMBATANT VESSELS

193? - 19351933 193JL 1935

No. No. No.Vessels Tonnage Vessels Tonnage Vessels Tonnage

Battleships (BB)

Aircraft Carriers

CV

CVE

CVL

CVB

14,500

Cruisers

CA

CB

CL

3 49,775

Deetroyera (DD) 2,710 6 8,365

Destroyers Escort (DE)

Destroyer Escort (British)(BDE)

Submarines (SS) 2 2,230

TOTAL COMBATANT 10 69,215 6 8,365

-103-

Table 9 Continued

Type

EMERGENCY NEW CONSTRUCTION

OF COMBATANT VESSELS

1936 - 1938

1936 1937 1938No. No. No.

Vessels Tonnage Vessels Tonnage Veaaele Tonnage

Battleships (HB)

Aircraft Carriers

CV

C7E

CVL

CVB

19,800

Destroyers Escort (BE)

Destroyer Escort (British)(BDE)

Submarines (SS)

TOTAL COMBATANT

5 6,580

22 42,010

5 6,660

27 74,410 20

19,800

Cruisers

CA

CB

CL

Destroyers (DD)

1 9,375 1 9,400

1 9,700 6 57,575

16 26,055 19 28,850 7 11,550 -

8,610

97,535

-io4-

v^-

Type

Battleships (BB)

Aircraft Carriers

CV

CVE

CVL

CVB

Table 9 Continued

EMERGENCY NEW CONSTRUCTION

OF COMBATANT VESSELS

1939 - 19M

1939 1940 1941No. No.

Vessels Tonnage Vessels TonnageNo.

Vessels Tonnage

14,700

70,000

19,800

Cruisers

CA 1 10,000

CB

CL 2 20,000

Destroyers (DD) 15 23,420 20

1 6,000

31,900 16 26,080

Destroyers Escort (DE)

Destroyer Escort (British) (BDE)

bmarines (SS) 8 11,655 7

TOTAL COMBATANT 26 65,075 28

10,, 300 11 14,998

56,900 31 136,878

-105-

C. BUREAU OF SHIPS

This nev construction, which proved the "backbone of our naval

defense when the United States joined the Allied Powers in declared

warfare against the Axis, came under the cognizance of the newly

formed Bureau of Ships. As explained in Chapter II of this history,

the merger of two separate Bureaus into one unified entity on June 20,

1940 placed the full burden of bringing our Navy up to an adequate

wartime strength under one jurisdiction. Appropriations are one

thing but production another. With a stimulated building industry

at its disposal, the new Bureau began an intensive, unified program

to utilize to the full the expanded facilities and'to take advantage

of the Congressional financial grants in order to bring the United

States naval strength to an unsurpassed position in the world. The

production effected from 1937 until our entry into the war is tabulated

in Table 10 according to the authorized appropriations under which these

vessels were built. This well illustrates the lag between appropriation

and actual construction.

-106-

TABLE 10

FISCAL YEAR&

PROBMM NO.

1937NoTT(20 Comb't)

1938No. 4(12 Comb't2 Aux.)

1939ND. 5(23 Comb't14 Aux. )

20 VIN30N-TRAMMELLAUGOST 1916 27 MARCH 1934

12 Deatroyere6 ERAs2 Battleahipa

3 Destroyer a4 Subs

4 Battleships2 Cruisers8 Destroyers6 Subs

AUXILIARY30 JULY 1937

1 Seapl. Tdr.1 Dost. Tdr.

1 Sub. Tdr.1 Oiler1 Fit. TugIMineSv.

ACTS OP 70% IKP. ACT OF ACT C# **NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 11%EXP. ACT 26 JUNE 1940 ACT 19 ACT OF 31 5

17 MAY 1938 15 JUTE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 14 JUNE 1940 17 MARCH 1941 JULY 1940 9 SEPT 1940 JAN 1941 APRIL 1941

2 Cruisers1 CarrierIDest. Tdr.3 Seapl. Tdr.

1939No. 6Experlmt.Program

2 OilersIMineSv.2 Fit. Tugs1 Mine Lay.

1 Catap. Lter.5 Subchasers20MTB's12MBSubch.

1940No. 7(20 Comb't3 Aux.)

2 Battleships2 Cruisers8 Destroyers8 Subs1 Repair Sh.2 Seapl. Tdr.

-107-

FISCAL YEAR& 20 VimON-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY

PROGRAM NO. AUGUST 1916 27 MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937

1940 ( Cent 'd)No. 8(2 Comb't)

No. 8A(2 Aux.)

1941r!b. 9 1 Battleship(19 Comb't 4 Subs5 Aux.)

ACTS OF 70%EXP. ACT OF ACT OF ACT OFNAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 11%EXP. ACT 26 JUNE 1940 ACT 19 19 31 5

17 MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 14 JUNE 1940 17 MARCH 1941 JULY 1940 SEPT 1940 JAN 1941 APRIL 1941

Modernization2 Carriers

1 Misc. Aux.1 Transport

1 Battleship1 Carrier2 Cruisers8 Destroy.2 SubsIMineSw.1 Sub Tdr.3Seapl. Tdr.

No. 10

No. 11

No. 12

No. 13 1 Transport(1st Supple) 6 Cruisers(67 Comb't 22 DestroyerslAux.) 7 Subs

3 Subs

Moderni zation5 Battleships

2 Cruisers7 Destroyers

Major Over*haul3 Battleships

3 Carriers5 Cruisers14 Subs

-108-

FISCAL YEAR& 20 VIN30N-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY

PROGRAM NO. AUGUST 1916 2? MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937

1941Nb. 15(1st Supple130 ShipsOldNEF)

ACTS OF 70%EXP. ACT OF ACT OF' ACT OF **NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 11%EXP. ACT 26JUNE1940 ACT 19 19 31 517 MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 14 JUNE 1940 17 MARCH 1941 JULY 1940 SEPT 1940 JAN 1941 APRIL 1941

2Mtb Tdrs.1 Net Carto Ship15 Minesweepers60 Coastal Minesv.1 Coast Minelay.2 Minelay.3 Unclass.2 Gunboats9 Yachts19 Coastal Yachts

No. 16(159 Sm.Cr.)

Nb. 17(7 Aux.)

Nb. 18(2nd Supplemt)(252 Comb't56Aux.)

2 Battleships 2 Best. Tdr.1 Minesv.2 Oilers1 Sub Tdr.2 Seapl. Tdr.

2 Mtb. Tdrs.7 Minesw.4GasTkrs.3 LCV9 Sea.IRep.1 Sub Tdr.

Tdr.Sh.

19 Out Patrol

159 Small Craft

7Auxil.

1 Battleship16 Carriers24 Cruisers155 Destr.46 Subs1 Best. Tdr.3 Oilers1 Gas Tk.2 LSViTrana.2 Rep. Ships

-109-

ACTS OF 70% ISP. ACT OF26 JUNE 1940 ACT 19 917 MARCH 1941 JULY 1940 SEPT 1940

FISCAL TEAR&

PROGRAM NO.20 VINSON-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF

AUGUST 1916 27 MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937 1? MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 APRIL 1939 25 JULY 193911%EXP. ACT14 JUNE 1940

ACT OF31 JAN 1941

ACT OF5 APRIL 1941

No. 18(2nd. Suppl.)(Cent'A)

(252 Comb't.% Aux.)

No. 19(24 Aux.)(Old ANV)

186,640 T.

No. 20(4th Suppl.).(400 Patrol &Diet. Crft.)

No. 21(12 Aux.)(old ANV)77,164 Tons

3 Sub. Tdre.5 Sub. Res.Bte.4 Carrier Eacs.IMisc. Bt.

3 Cargo Ships9 Transports Att.2 Transports1 Repair Ship3 Sub Tdrs.2 Seapl. Tdrs.1 Carrier Esc.1 Gunboat1 Harbor Tug1 Repair Ship

. ) Minesweepers7 Fit Minesvs.14 Coast .Mine&ws.2 Fit Tugs40 Sub Chasers4MTBs.1 Diving Tdr.17 Mtr. Minesvs.2 Misc. Ves.7 Sub Chasers

(Control)4 Sub Chasers

(Control) 110'

-110-

2 Destryr. Tdrs2 Amm. Ships2 Provsn.St.Shs.4 Aux.Car.Shs.2 Car.Shs. &Aircraft Ferry

FISCAL YEAR ""*** ' A C T S O F 7 0 % A C T O F A C T O F A C T O F& 20 VIN30N-TRAMMELL AUXILIARY NAVAL EXPAN. ACT ACT OF 20 ACT OF 11%EXP. ACT 26 JUNE 1940 330?. ACT 9 31 5

PROGRAM NO. AUGUST 1916 2? MARCH 1934 30 JULY 1937 17 MAY 1938 15 JUNE 1938 AERIL 1939 25 JULY 1939 14 JUNE 1940 1? MARCH 1941 19 JULY 1940 SEPT 1940 JAN 1941 APRIL 1941

1941(4 Suppl.)(Cont'd)

No. 22(72 PatrolCraft)

16 Sub Chasers1 MTB4 Sub Chasers(Control)

-111-

o

D. BIRTH OF A SHIP

Upon receiving financial appropriations from Congress baaed, upon

requests from the Navy, the Bureau of Ships could then place a contract for

the construction of naval vessels-, Prior to this, however, several

authorities within the Navy Department of necessity had to concern them-

selves with the planning of any proposed shipbuilding programs. The

Chief of Naval Operations determined the operational needs of the Fleet

and the Ship Characteristics Board, composed of personnel possessing

fleet service experience, worked out the characteristics of the ship in

order to comply with the purposes of the plan. These specifications

were drawn up in coordination with the preliminary design section of the

Bureau of Ships to determine whether or not the Bureau was able to

accomplish what was desired. The recommendations then passed to the

General Board composed of naval officers appointed by the Secretary of the

Navy to serve as his advisers. After forwarding their recommendations to

the Secretary, he passed the conclusions on, together with his comments,

to the Chief of Naval Operations for his final perusal. If approved, the

entire plan reverted back to the Bureau of Ships and only then did work

commence on the preliminary design.

1. PRELIMINARY DESIGN.

With the feasibility and effectiveness of a proposed ship already

approved, naval architects in the preliminary design branch of the Bureau

of Ships blocked out the general outlines and contours, the masses, weights

and stability of the proposed ship. By this operation the basic character

of the ship is fully determined and established.

-113-

BLRTH OF ANOTHER U. S. NAVAL GOLIATH

-114-

2. CONTRACT DESIGN.

The Contract Design Branch of the Bureau of Ships picks up ship

plans as they come from Preliminary Design and carries to a high degree

of completion the details of designing, drafting and specification

writing. The basic character of the ship that comes from Preliminary

Design is converted in Contract Design to specifications upon which a

builder can bid..

3* DEVELOPMENT DESIGN.

In this branch specifications are prepared in detail. Materials

and changes and developments of building are supervised and approved,

requisitions are passed upon, and approval is given for the award of

contract. In addition, trial programs are arranged and carried out

under the direction of this branch. Now that contracts have been let,

two kinds of activity, both highly ramified and coverging, center on two

subdivisions of the Development Design Branch:

(a) The Ship Type Desk,

(b) Technical Sections.

The Ship Type Desk specializes in different types of ships, one

being set up for each of the following: battleships, carriers, cruisers,

destroyers, submarines, patrol craft, auxiliary vessels and district craft.

All of the developmental modifications that unfold in the building of a ship

of highly specialized character are administered and controlled by this desk.

This activity thinks of the ship "as a whole".

The second kind of activity in development design, however, results

from the fact that various technologies themselves are forever multiplying and.

o.-115-

then breaking down into sub-technologies of extreme specialization. Ri

order to handle these problems, technical or service sections exist within **

the Bureau of Ships.each having cognizance of similar componentsof any

ship under construction, i.e., air conditioning, piping, propellers,

anchors, etc.

4. MAINTENANCE.

When a naval ship has been turned over to the fleet by the Design

Section of the Shipbuilding Division it is transferred to the cognizance

of the Maintenance Division. It remains under this cognizance until, for

any reason, it is stricken from the roster of U.S. Naval Vessels, and

even when a ship is decommissioned it continues to be the responsibility

of and within the cognizance of this division. The Maintenance Division

of the Bureau of Ships concerns itself with and is responsible for three

principal activities: (1) the maintenance of naval ships, (2) the equip-

ment of ships, and (3) the salvage of ships.

-116-

e

E. JURISDICTION OVER PRODUCTION.

After the Navy has received its Congressional financial appropri-

ation and the Bureau of Ships its directive to proceed with design and

building, there still remain the questions of the rate of production and

the relative importance of the early completion of all vessels in the

program vhich were controlled by the Office of the Chief of Naval Oper-

ations. Master precedence lists were established which assigned a

position of relative importance to all vessels which the Bureau was

directed to build and, in some cases of extreme urgency where large

numbers of vessels were involved, monthly rates of production were

established. In the development of the construction program, the data

available in the Bureau on availability of facilities and building

periods was used by Operations but the final decision was made outside

of the Bureau.

-117-

Consuming veil over tvo years in constructionalone, this largest of naval vessels was "basedupon long range requirements of the fleet.

-118-

F. THE DESTROYER-NAVAL BASE EXCHANGE.

In viev of the relationships between Great Britain and. the United

States, the planning of the American shipbuilding program took into account

not only the naval strength and requirements of possible allies but also

the relative strength and composition of possible enemies. As already

discussed in Chapter III, during the summer of 1940 the Battle of Britaini

was in its initial stages and the German submarine campaign had been prose-

cuted vith telling effect. At the beginning of the war, Great Britain had

suffered severely from the general attrition of operations at sea, particu-

larly in destroyers in the Norwegian campaign and during the retreat from

Dunkirk. Faced vith this situation, Great Britain entered into an agree-

ment vith the United States under the terms of vhich $0 old destroyers,

no longer suited for the type of fleet service for vhich they had been

designed but still adequately suited for antisubmarine duty, vere

exchanged for certain rights at various localities suited for the

establishment of naval bases in the Atlantic area and essential to the

national defense. In addition to the bases acquired in return for the

50 destroyers, the United States vas granted "freely and without con-

sideration" similar rights vith respect to the leasing of bases in

Nev Foundland and Bermuda. This acquisition of bases operated to

advance America's sea frontier several hundred miles in the direction

of its potential enemies in the Atlantic and, as the bases vere leased

for a term of 99 years, the United States could profit by their strategic

importance not only immediately but long after the crisis responsible for

the exchange. This loss of fifty destroyers naturally had a considerable

effect upon the shipbuilding program of the Bureau of Ships.

O-119-

CHAPTER V

EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

C

C

CHAPTER V

EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES

A. OVER AIJ E ANSION:

With the deterioration of diplomatic relationships through-

out the world and the United States' swinging away from isolationism

prior to the outbreak of World War II, an expansion occurred in

every phase of American naval activity. Chapters I and IV described

the renaissance of the United States' Naval shipbuilding program and

indicated the widespread reactions occasioned by this growth. The

Bureau of Ships personnel and its associated activities—Navy Yards

and shipbuilding facilities—expanded coincident in time and at a

rate corresponding with the expansion of the Navy.

In view of the dynamic wartime situation existing as regards

the Bureau's personnel and the nation's shipbuilding facilities,

our study here will be confined solely to general trends and facts

concerning these topics before our entry into the war, permitting

a comprehensive survey to be conducted in Chapters VIII and IX

concerning our wartime personnel and facilities expansion and

organization.

-121-

\

^

As more ships began to near completion like the U.S.S. WASHINGTON

under the impetus of the emergency

program, an unprecedented ex-

pansion of personnel and facilities came to pass.

O

B. BUREAU OF SHIPS PERSONNEL

1. GENERAL:

Within the Bureaus of the Navy Department, personnel are

broken down into two general groups: civilian and military. Prior

to June 1940, when the Bureau of Ships came into existence, per-

sonnel concerned vith shipbuilding was divided between the Bureau

of Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair. The

breakdown of personnel from 1933 to the United States' entry into

World War II is presented in Table 11. In general, military

officers assume charge of officers, and civilians come under the

jurisdiction of civilian officials. Discussion of the relation-

ships and of the difficulties occasioned by this type of command

is covered fully in Chapter VIII.

2. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS:

As illustrated in Table 11 from 1933 to 1941 the total

civilian complement engaged in shipbuilding increased from 269

to 2200 for the Bureau of Ships headquarters office in Washington.

The eight-fold increase in civilian capacities as compared to

officers four-fold multiplication may be readily understood in

view of the expansion within the clerical echelons. The below

listed table presents a breakdown of employees by type of service

for the years 1940 and 1941 to illustrate the relative and factual

proportions employed:

-123-

BUREAU OF SHIPS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES BY SERVICE

31 Dec

1940

onal 472

eesional 86

795

1 113

%of

Total

32.2%

5.9%

34.2%

7-7%

31 Dec

1941

706

135

1181

131

% of

Total

32.1%

6.1%

'53-6%

8.2%

Clerical

Custodial

1466 2203

Total employees on "board.

Since the most dynamic personnel situation occurred after our

entry into the war, the administration of the civilian personnel

and. their development vithin the organizational structure of the

Bureau are fully discussed in Chapter VIII.

-124-

TABLE II

BUREAU OF SHIPS PERSONNEL ON BOARD

1933-1941

Date

June 1933

June 1934

June 1935

June 1936

June 1937

June 1938

June 1939

June 1940

June 1941

End 1941

TotalPersonnel

344

445

531

607

637

696

884

1107

2001

2498

OFFICER

Ships

221

298

Eng

50

48

50

53

54

62

62

71

C&R

25

272528

32

34

37

46

Total

75

75

75

81

86

96

99

117

221

298

%

22

17

14

13

13

14

11

11

11

12

CIVILIAN

Ships

1787

2200

Eng

133

162

190

224

237

288

353

449

C&R

136

208

266

302

314

312

432

541

Total

269

370

456

526

551

600

787

990

1787

2200

%

78

83

86

87

87

86

89

89

89

88

-125-

3. MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS

In June 1940, 11? officers were on duty in the Bureau of Ships

and 77 officers on duty in the two main groups of field officers of the

Bureau; namely, the Supervisors of Shipbuilding and Inspectors of Machinery.

By 194$ these numbers had grown to 1,533 and 1,102, respectively, and in

addition to these activities the Bureau of Ships was interested in the

procurement and training of officers to fill billets in the industrial

departments of the Navy Yards and other naval activities, as well as being

directly concerned with various laboratories and certain degaussing stations.

While the story of this incredible expansion is fully discussed

in Chapter VIII, this chapter will summarize briefly the expansion during

the pre-war period as illustrated by table 11. In time of peace the ship-

building divisions of the Navy Department, like the operating fleet of the

Navy, are manned almost entirely by officers of the Regular Navy, most of

whom are graduates of the Academy. Several years before the war, the

Navy set up an over-all program for the training of prospective officers

since the supply of regular Navy Officers would prove wholly inadequate

for wartime needs. Emphasis rested particularly upon the preparation of

line officers under the Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps units

established at various colleges throughout the country and, with the

declaration of a limited emergency, these officers were the first to be

ordered to active duty.

In order to meet the demand for specialists, the Bureau of

Ships first made a survey of the retired and reserve officers who might

be ordered to active duty. Valuable additions to the staff were obtained

-126-

as the result of this survey, "but few reservists had teen trained, as

constructors or engineers and. many of those who might have been used,

in these capacities proved too valuable in their civilian jobs to be

ordered to active duty. Among the regulars"', both on active duty and

retired, fev were designated for engineering duty only and many of

those were required for duty in their capacity with the Fleet.

Although the Bureau immediately undertook to have additional officers

designated for engineering duties from the regular line, the Bureau

of Naval Personnel became reluctant to transfer man;/; as the forces

afloat experienced equally pressing demand for officers.

After the first survey had been made and the Bureau fully

appreciated the nature of the officer personnel shortage, it

cooperated vith other materiel bureaus and the Bureau of Naval

Personnel to establish a program for the training and recruiting

of qualified engineering students to become reserve officers. This

program, initiated toward the end of 1$40 by the B&teriel bureaus,

included the Bureau of Ships and came under the direction of Admiral

Yarnell. Major engineering colleges in the country were visited

and applications solicited fron qualified engineering students

graduating in l$4l or the subsequent year. This program became the

forerunner of the various college training programs later developed

to procure officers vith suitable qualifications.

At approximately the sane time the Bureau found that appli-

cations for appointment in the Naval Reserve of former graduates of

the Naval Academy who had resigned from the Navy was being discouraged.

-127-

As a result of the Bureau's recommendation, this policy soon changed

and many valuable officers joined the reserve' organization.

Prior to the emergency, appointments to the Naval Reserve had

been processed through the offices of the various Naval District Commandants

but,with a major recruiting campaign under way, this method proved too slow

and uncertain. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, therefore, established the

offices of Naval Officer Procurement to recruit reserve officers with skills

needed by the various sections of the Navy. As this program progressed

the Bureau of Ships never suffered from a shortage of candidates available

for assignment to the Bureau. Nevertheless, it found that officers available

did not have sufficient skill or training to do the vork required both in

the Bureau and in the field. A partial solution of this problem was found

by the establishment of training schools in naval architecture and other

technical specialties, and in many cases the Bureau ordered specialists

to specific limited duties which required little education or training

outside of their particular field. For this reason, the turnover of officer

personnel within the Bureau of Ships proved to be surprisingly small through-

out the prosecution of the war. Although the Bureau established the general

type of training required, each course was set up in collaboration with the

Bureau of Naval Personnel and the educational institution* offering its

facilities and instruction staff. A comprehensive study of this training

program is covered in "The Bureau of Naval Personnel History, Training

Division, Volume 4".

From this procurement procedure the Bureau of Ships learned one

valus.ble lesson: to keep the specialist officers under its jurisdiction

-128-

in a state of readiness by encouraging participation of its officers in

reserve activities and by keeping them informed of the latest developments

in the particular field in which they might be interested or in which they

might prove valuable in the event of any future emergency. To reap the

reward of this lesson, the Bureau has established an active office within

its organization to assure continued contact with its cognizant reserve

officers on inactive duty and liaison with the Bureau of Naval Personnel

in all matters pertaining to the Bureau of Ships reserve program.

In the chart listed herewith, the part which reserve officers

played in the expansion of the Bureau under emergency conditions is well

illustrated. Sixteen months after the declaration of a limited emergency

reserve officers still formed only 23.4% of the Bureau of Ships military

personnel. Twelve months later they constituted $4%, having increased

fourfold. At the end of the war, it reached 90%.

BUREAU OF SHIPS OFFICER PERSONNEL

DATE USN

June 1940 x

June 1941 128

July 1941 138

End 1941 138

By the peak at war's end, the number of officers within the Bureau

and under its jurisdiction at Supervisor of Shipbuilding and Inspector of

Machinery posts amounted to 2,666, which does not include numerous other

activities with which the Bureau directly concerned itself. A detailed

study of this expansion of military personnel within the Bureau of Ships

and its cognizant activities is fully covered in another section of this

history.

-129-

% OF TOTAL

X

77%

60%

46%

USNR

X

39

92

160

% OF TOTAL,

X

23%

4o%

54%

TOTAL

100

167

230

298

TOTAL %INCREASE

X

67%

4o%

30%

B. EXPANSION OF FACILITIES

The problem of expanding facilities to meet the needs of the Navy

in World War II is one of the most important and interesting phases of the

entire shipbuilding program. Without an adequate expansion of facilities

the Bureau of Ships program vould have failed, making it impossible for

the allied fleet at critical operational periods to engage the enemy

forces. In view of its importance, therefore, a review of the difficulties

experienced in the expansion of facilities prior to and during World War II

should prove of continuing interest for the future.

The expansion of facilities, which began on a large scale after the

legislation of June and July 1940, was concentrated at first in shipyard

facilities. It was generally recognized that such an increase would have

to be undertaken, but it wag not realized that facilities for the building

of many ship components would likewise have to be expanded. Until Pearl

Harbor, shipbuilding schedules and actual construction programs in the

yards had not reached a point where serious delays or cut-backs were

necessary and at no time were real delays experienced because of the

shortage of shipbuilding facilities (ways) themselves.

Up until Pearl Harbor, serious difficulties were experienced, how-

ever, in obtaining sufficient machine tools to equip yards and general

industrial facilities and periodically crises would arise requiring special

expediting efforts to obtain components or materials. Unfortunately,

attention being fixed upon production, these difficulties were not regarded

seriously until almost too late. This critical situation in component pro-

duction brought to force the ancient saying "Because of a nail the kingdom

was lost", for in like manner, perhaps because of a gear or steel or ship

shortage, naval battles and possibly the war might have been lost.

-130-

In 1938, Bear Admiral Bowen stated, to the General Board.:

"I would, be derelict in my duty if I did. not invite your attentionto the fact that there is a great schism in the marine engineeringprofession of the United. States. Some of the elements of this schism areso deep and. so fundamental that, in my opinion, it is a vital necessitythat the General Board, shall consider them in their deliberations. Theturbine manufacturers in this country, for both marine and power turbines,are General Electric, Westinghouse, Allis-Chaibners, and Delaval. All butAllis-Chalmers also make gears. It has been the practice of the so-called"Big Three" shipbuilders, Bethlehem, New York Ship, and Newport News, tomanufacture their own machinery, although I have been assured by NewportNews and by Bethlehem that they have no policy at all which preventsthem from buying their main machinery when such action seems expedient.It has been the practice of the "Little Three", Bath, Federal, andUnited, which has now djbninished to the "Little Two", Bath and Federal,to operate, as far as Naval vessels are concerned as assembly plants.Bath and Federal and formerly United Drydocks, prefer to buy theirmachinery. In view of the plant investment of the "Big Three"it is only natural that they should prefer to make their own machinery.Contrariwise is true of the "Little Two". About four years ago theBureau of Engineering under my predecessor, notified the "Big Three"shipbuilders that the Bureau of Engineering had decided to enforce theprovisions of the Espionage Act and that, therefore, they would haveto sever their licenses under Parsons, Limited, if they wished toproceed under any future Naval contracts, Evince that date I am notaware that any shipyard in the United States has spent any money whatsoeverin connection with the research and development of turbine design. ***on the other hand I have seen the tremendous effort which is being madeby the General Electric Company first and Westinghouse second, to doeverything that can possibly be done to further the development ofturbine design in the United States in order that this country may beentirely free from any necessity of resorting to English or continentaldesign. I am informed that Allis-ChaJjners has also accomplishedmuch development."

This warning was not needed until after Pearl Harbor.

Also quoted in Chapter II of this history.

-131-

By December l$4l the number of yards engaged in new con-

struction had increased to 1% and those concerned vith conversion

and repair had expanded to ?6.

The financing of this expansion of shipbuilding facilities

resulted in a large measure from direct investment of funds by the

Bureau under Bureau of Ships contracts. The subsequent total expendi-

tures revealed this financing was divided fairly equally between Navy

Yards and other naval establishments on the one hand and private ship-

builders on the other. Only a relatively meager sum had been invested

in general industry concerned vith producing components of the ship-

building industry.

An additional source of funds for the expansion of facilities

resulted from legislation permitting private investment necessary for

var vork to be amortized for tax purposes vithin a five year period.

This vas made possible by a modification of the Internal Revenue Lav

passed in October 1940. It provided that for facilities acquired or

constructed after 10 June 1940, an annual deduction of 20% of the cost

could be taken at the election of the tax payer, if the expansion vere

certified as necessary in the interest of national defense. Although

no government funds vere given directly to the contractor, the provision

for such rapid amortization had substantially the same effect under the

conditions existing from 1940 on.

-132-

u. s,yard

Naval (Norfolk) Ship-1940-1941 Anns? - 1945

The Bureau of Ships under this lav however approved Certificates

of Necessity with considerable reluctance, wishing to rest the effort

on private competition and investment. During the first fiscal year of

this emergency program from July 1, 1940 to July 1, 1941, the Bureau of

Ships sponsored a total dollar value of $75,910,829.00. Not included

in this figure is combined financing under Defense Plant Corporation,

where the expansion worked to the benefit of several agencies.

Although the overall facilities expansion is discussed at greater

length in Chapter IX, one conclusion reemphasized in several portions

of this history may be drawn at this time. This conclusion concerns

the essential need for the healthy condition of facilities for the

production of shipbuilding components, material or whatever, as well as

for shipbuilding. One vital factor in the evaluation of the necessary

capacity thus needed is a careful breakdown of raw materials and com-

ponents going into ships on a bill of material basis so that reasonably

accurate estimates of needs may be prepared. During the war, failure

to heed this factor led to a mountainous confusion regarding true

requirements and led to an almost fatal number of bottlenecks.

C. NAVY YARDS

A total of 8 continental Navy yards, 2 U. S. Naval Drydocks,

and 1 Navy yard at Pearl Harbor have made a major contribution to the

Shipbuilding program and particularly to the repair and maintenance

of the fleet in World War II. Until the reorganization of the Navy

yards and drydocka, made effective 14 September 194$, the role of

the Bureau of Ships in management and supervision of the work in the

Naval industrial establishments had been restricted, in spite of its

predominant interest, and had been subject to qualifications and

limitations growing out of the evolution of the field administrative

organization of Naval establishment as a whole.

1. EARLY HISTORY*

The origin of many of the difficulties in defining the Bureau

of Ships role in Naval yards goes back to 1 July 1868 when Secretary

Welles extended the Bureau system to the individual yards. In this

action each bureau was assigned its own department in each yard and

was permitted to handle its own supplies and materials„ Each bureau

dealt directly with its own yard department, with the result that

cooperation often proved to be completely lacking. Although a

Commandant commanded each yard, primary allegiance of department

heads gravitated towards their bureau.

* This historical background is based on a memorandum prepared byDr. Robert G. Albion, Assistant Director Office of Naval History,"Historical Background of Shore Establishment Administration."

-135-

This decentralized organization continued for its first

fifteen years without being seriously questioned. By the early

'80's however,.with the quickening spirit of the "New Navy" in the

air, the inefficiency of the system began to attract attention.

Secretary Chandler in his 1884 report advocated "placing one techni-

cal head - a competent shipbuilder - over all persons engaged in

building or repairing the ships, over the hull, the machinery, and

the equipment". One of these supervisory Naval constructors was

to have charge at each of the three "Naval workshops". Secretary

Chandler also recommended that the three supervisory Naval Con-

structors should be made responsible to the Chief of the Bureau of

Naval Construction and made fully accountable for all work carried

on at their establishments. Nothing came, however, of these recom-

mendations.

One of the first steps to bring order out of the chaotic

Navy Yard situation was made in 1892 with the assignment of

responsibility for work in the Navy Yards to the Assistant Secre-

tary of the Navy, who also received authorization to approved

reports of Boards of Wages and classified schedule of employees

at Navy Yards.

Another step was taken in 1904, when scattered depart-

mental power plants were concentrated into a single plant in

each yard. Following this a great deal of agitation concerning

-136-

Navy yard control developed particularly an the result of the

activity of the Naval Constructor Holden A. Evans, who in 1908

drew up a comprehensive set of recommendations coordinating Navy

Yard control and submitted them directly toAseistant Secretary

Newberry. Many of these recommendations were embodied in General

Order 9 issued 26 January 1909 by Secretary Newberry. This order

stated that "all the mechanical departments, all the laborers of the

yard, the care of buildings and grounds, and all civil engineering

were placed under the direction of a manager, and a single payroll

for the manufacturing department was created. Under the new plan

the manager was able to reorganize the manufacturing and repair

work, — to reduce the number of shops, and to distribute more

economically the machinery and tools. The Commandant was left

nominally in control, but with little real supervison over the

manager."

Many of these innovations made by Secretary Newberry

were modified shortly thereafter when the Taft Administration

appointed Secretary Meyer. As a consequence of decentralized,

independent organizational growth and the different responsi-

bilities of each Navy Yard, many variations existed in par-

ticular yards. The general organization established by

"The Regulations for the Government of the Navy" proved a

flexible blue-print and by the time of our entry into World

War II each naval activity differed from the other in

many respects. Not until the end of the war was a

major change effected (See Chapter xxm).

The flow chart (Chart 5 ) indicates the controls

and lines of responsibility from the Navy Department

organization to the Navy Yards as existing prior to and

throughout the war.

2. TYPE NAVY YARD ORGANIZATION:

The Norfolk Navy Yard, Portsmouth, Virginia, discussed

herewith, represents in general the form of organization

followed by each of the yards. All of them varied in some

phase of their structure, but this study will present some

idea of the functional and jurisdictional complexities of.

such an activity.

THE COMMANDANT

The Commandant is in command of the Navy Yard and isresponsible for the administration of all its activities.This duty includes supervision of the condition and safetyof buildings and equipment, the direction of all work andthe general responsibility for all personnel, both militaryand civilian connected with the Yard. He is also responsiblefor all vessels out of commission.

SHIPS IN COMMISSION

The Commanding Officer of a ship in commission isresponsible for his ship. His representative is the officerof the deck (O.O.D.)

-138-

CHART 5 FLOW CHART — WORLD WAREaw aw

TOP

DtSTRtCT

COMMANDANT

)EFF^ALM!ON3

t—

muTAw wsauws MmrsACOOWWMATWK

SECRETARYOF

MAVY

WS-!CV COMTMM-

)ctvn

EXECUA3S!8T

!e^ ***<**

NAVY YAR8

COMMANDANT

BUREAUOF

YARDS a DOCKS

BUREAUOF

SHtPS

BUREAUOF

ORDMANCE

-t-I

CAPTAtNOF THE YARD

SUPPLYDEPARTMENT

!NOUSTR!ALDEPARTMENT

BUREAUOF

SUPPUESAND

ACCOUNTS

THE MANAGER

The Industrial Manager, commonly called the Manager,is senior industrial aide to the Commandant and is in chargeof the Industrial Department. He is responsible for theplanning of all construction, repair, and conversion workon ships. Planning of the work is done through the PlanningOfficer and the work is executed through the ProductionOfficer. The Manager is also responsible for public worksand for laboratory activities (materials).

The Manager is responsible for the administration ofthe outlying industrial activities in the Naval District inthe conversion, repair, and degaussing of naval ships. Inthese activities he is assisted by Assistant IndustrialManagers.

He is responsible for the general conditions and re-pair of all shops, facilities and equipment used by theIndustrial Department and for finishing work on ships in time.

He is responsible for the Personnel Relations Divisionwhich performs functions for all departments of the Yard.

THE CAPTAIN OF THE YARD

The Captain of the Yard is the executive officer andmilitary aide to the Commandant. He is the head of theMilitary Department, responsible for Yard security, and incharge of all Yard military activities except Marine Barracks.

The Operations Officep is an assistant to the Captainof the Yard and is responsible for the maintenance andoperation of the Yard Craft (tugs, floating cranes, barges,etc.), the supervision of pilots and tugmasters, the inspectionof the waterfront for cleanliness and good order and makingrecommendations for improvement of it.

In case of strong winds or unusually high water he hasfrequent inspections made and renders assistance to insuresafety of vessels and Yard Craft.

All berthing and movement of ships, vessels and allfloating equipment is under the control of the OperationsOfficer.

All serious infractions of the law occurring withinthe Yard and all occurrences which require investigationare to be reported immediately to the Captain of the Yardor the Military Duty Officer,

Other officers or functions under the Captain of theYard include: Executive Officer, Enlisted Personnel, Ship'sService Officer, Welfare Officer, officers in charge of theofficers' quarters and messes, and the officer in charge ofthe Commissary Store.

SUPPLY OFFICER

The Supply Department procures all supplies, materials,equipment and apparatus to meet the specific needs of theNavy Yard; procures and maintains stocks of those items ofmaterials for which this Yard is the designated source ofsupply for certain other Naval Activities; is responsiblefor the receipt, inspection, payment, storage, care andpreservation, issue, shipment and accounting for all supplies,materials, etc.; and the disposition by sealed bid sales ofcondemned, excess and surplus materials.

%Each of the groups is organized into divisions and

sections, and. depending upon the complexity of their work,some sections are further sub-divided into units.

SERVICE GROUP - The Service Group furnishes servicesto the various activities of the Supply Department, such as:The employment and distribution of labor and materialhandling equipment to various outside activities of theSupply Department; the General Correspondence Files; yearlyand monthly budgetary estimates of funds for departmentaloperating and maintenance expenses; personnel records; timeand attendance return for pay roll purposes; general messengerservice; stores accounts and returns; and stock inventory.

PURCHASE GROUP - Disposes, by sealed bid sales, ofcondemned, excess and surplus materials, Receives, from theRequisition and Order Section, Stock Control Division, allapproved Purchase Requisitions for Materials and/or Services;issues proposals to prospective suppliers inviting bids,either formally or informally; makes awards to lowestsatisfactory bidders; prepares contract and/or order, asappropriate; and passes the file folder to the—

INCOMING STORES GROUP - which conducts follow-upwith contractors on Yard contracts and/or orders, andBureau contracts also, to insure receipt of deliveries ofpurchased materials by the due dates indicated therein;also follow-up shipments of materials due from otherNaval and Governmental activities; receives and reportsall materials arriving in the Yard; sees that allpurchased materials are inspected; prepares PublicVouchers in payment for materials and services; keepsStock Cards showing all receipts and issues; initiatesprocurement action when stock material balances are low;and performs other jobs related to the procurement andrecording of receipts and issues of materials.

ST'LAGE GROUP - Receives material from Receiver'sSection of the Incoming Stores Group and IndustrialDepartment Shops and is responsible for the storage,preservation and issue of all standard and special materialsin the custody of the Supply Department, for use in newconstruction, repair, conversion, and maintenance ofnaval vessels; for the inventory and operation of shopstores, and the operation of the Salvage Yard.

OUTGOING STORES GROUP - Receives and records allincoming ship's requisitions, Bureau shipment orders,shipment requests, and other forms of material orders fromall activities without the Yard and initiates action tosupply the materials covered thereby. Maintains completefiles of Ships' Allowance Lists; initiates action toassemble and supply all authorized outfits for vesselsscheduled for commissioning; maintains records of reservationand disposition of outfits delivered to store by vesselsdecommissioned; prepares and distributes all Store Invoicescovering issues of materials; plans for and effects deliveriesof material via motor trucks from and to storehouses, IndustrialDepartment Shops, other Yard departments and to vessels at theYard; handles, assembles and packs all materials and householdeffects for shipment; makes necessary arrangements for allshipments; prepares bills of lading and all other necessaryshipping papers, plans for and effects deliveries of shipmentsto carriers' terminals and/or loading of cars, etc.

THE ACCOUNTING OFFICER

The Accounting Department computes earnings, retirementdeductions and withholding tax from time reports (clock cards,clock tapes, or muster reports) submitted by shop or office.By subtracting from total earnings the retirement deductions

-142-

tat

and withholding tax, plus any bond deduction authorized,it determines the amount of pay check and prepares thecheck and earnings statements for delivery to shop oroffice.

It maintains a record of employment for retirementpurposes, the amounts deducted from pay for retirement purposes,gross earnings and withholding tax for the calendar year, andat the end of the year furnishes the employee and the Collectorof Internal Revenue a statement of earnings and the tax withheld.

Materials are procured and labor is employed in the Yardonly on specific or general authorization. The AccountingDepartment keeps a cumulative summary of expenditures undereach appropriation, project or other form or allotment, andthe balance under each, and submits periodic reports ofstatus of allotments to Yard management and makes monthlyreports of the expenditures to the various Bureaus of the NavyDepartment. It also calculates charges to Yard activitiesand ships for utilities furnished by the Yard Power Plant.

THE DISBURSING OFFICER

The Disbursing Officer's responsibilities includecarrying the accounts of the officers of the Navy Yard andissuing pay checks, together with other fiscal duties.

THE MEDICAL OFFICER

The Medical Department, in order to keep as manyemployees continuously at work as possible, carries on thefollowing activities.

It treats employees for occupational injuries anddiseases suffered from industrial hazards in the Yard.

It is concerned with sanitation of the Yard andcooperates with civilian authorities in mosquito control.

At the men's and women's examining rooms near the LaborBoard it examines civil service applicants prior to theiremployment.

It cooperates with the Safety Officer in. industrialhygiene and safety engineering.

-143-

It examines and treats patients under the joint jurisdictionof the Medical Department and the U. S. Employees Compensation Com-mission.

In the Main Dispensary it carries out treatment for personalillness or non-service-connected injuries whenever such treatmentwill enable an employee to continue at vork.

It maintains a Volunteer Blood Donors' Service of civilianemployees for the benefit of these employees and dependent membersof their families.

3. NAVY YARD PERSONNEL:

Even with the declaration of a limited emergency in September

1939? the civilian personnel employed and the military personnel

assigned to the Navy Yards proved by var-time standards to be

exceedingly fev. Table 12 lists the pre-var civilian employment

at the various yards as of July 1, 1938; and. for comparison purposes

includes the peak number employed during the var. The military

assignments to the yards are also enumerated, vith the figures

broken down into officer and enlisted categories. To present the

relative increase occasioned by our entry into the var, the peak

for the over-all program (June 1, 19 5) is tabulated. These

figures include not only the Navy Yards within the continental

limits, but also two domestic repair bases and three outside

continental activities. All of these are affiliated directly

with the Bureau of Ships and the officers assigned were princi-

pally components of the Bureau's specialist personnel.

TABLE 12

Portsmouth, N.H.

loston, Mass.

New York, N.Y.

Philadelphia, Pa.

Norfolk, Va.

Charleston, S.C.

Terminal Island

San Francisco

Mare Island

Puget Sound, Wash.

Total,

Pearl Harbor

San Juan

Cavite

New Orleans

San Diego

TABLE 12

NAVY YARD PERSONNELMILITARY AND CIVILIAN

PRE-WAR AND PEAK ASSIGNMENTS

CIVILIAN MILITARY

FKE-WAR7/1/38

3,273

2,860

6,876

5,636

5,179

1,632

-

-

4,756

3,469

33,6811

1,974

-

-

-

PEAK WAREMPLOYMENT

20,461

50,128

69,128

46,454

42,372

26,014

15,971

17,174

39,736

32.643

360,081

ON BOARDOFFICER

60

91

128

104

114

83

-

-

104

106

1/1/40ENLISTED

37

70

65

80

225

70

-

-

206

81

OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL LIMITS

24,910

-

-

113

-

48

REPAIR BASES

2,029

-

—

-

226

-

87

'EAK FROM OVER AltPROGRAM 6/1/45)FFICER ENLISTED

154

552

976

560

482

390

432

276

666

518

006

149

486

971

274

906

392

102

653

1292

514

5,739

774

27

-

2,53K

87-

-

-

S4

387

11D12

3,593

t 1

-145-

4. NAVY YARD CONSTRUCTION - PRE-WAR:

The deplorable condition into which our naval and

privately owned shipbuilding facilities were allowed to

degenerate is fully covered in Chapter 1. Commercial and

government yards suffering equally in the decline, both

shared in the expansion of our replacement naval construction

program commencing to a slight degree in 1934 and accelerating

in 1937 with the abandoning of the armaments limitation

treaties. In 1938 with the 20% increase of our naval

strength, exclusive of replacements, the shipbuilding yards

throughout the country were assured of long range programs

which stimulated their activity accordingly.

The decline and rejuvenation of the eight Navy Yards

within the continental limits prior to our entry in World

War II are indicated on Table 13 , showing the yearly

construction class of ship assigned to each yard from 1934

to 1941.

-146-

TABLE 13

TYPE

DD

DE

AVP

DISTR CR

SM. Boat

DD

DIST CR.

SM. BT.

DD

DE

SS

AS

DIST CR

SM. BOAT

BB

CV

CL

DIST CR

SM BTS

PRE-WORLD WAR 11 -NAVY YARD CONSTRUCTION

(1934 - 1941)

BOSTON (MASS. )

1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 193_9

2 2 4 2 2

l l

18 9 25 4i 30 34

CHARLESTON (S.C.)

1 2 1 2

2 2 4

6 2 2 2 2

MARE ISLAND (CALIF. )

1

1 1 1 1 1

1

2 4

33 31 50 42 18 79

NEW YORK (N.Y. )

1 1

1 1

3 32 26 18 13 41

1940 1941

17 3

12

2

4 6

137 207

12 1

4 1

24

6 6

4

l 7

123 275

1

l

1 2

171 199

-147-

TABLE 13, cent'd..

NORFOLK (VAJ

TYPE 1934

BB

DD 3

AM

Diet Cr. 1

Sm. Bts. 27

B B

CA 1

DD

DB

FT

PC

AM

CM

AV

AW

DiStCr.

Sm. Bts. 19

SS 2

DistCr.

SM. Bts.

1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940

1 1

2 2 2

2 1

1 1 3 4

11 38 64 18 3 104

PHILADELPHIA (PA.)

1 1 2

1 1 2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2 21 24 19 17 83

PORTSMOUTH (N.H.)

2 2 2 2 3 14

9 16 10 16 63

1941

123

6

l

1

130

7

1

62

-148-

TYPE 1334 1231 1936

TABLE 13, cont'd.

1937 1938 1333 1940 1941

PU&ET SOUND (WASH.)

DD 2

DE

AM

ATP

Dist Cr.

Sm. Bts. 29

1 1 1

1

3

3 3

31 38 39 29 42

8

8

3 3

99 80

9 i 9 0

LIBRARYARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

o