Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Structure and Performance in AsiaPerformance in Asia

United Nations University

http://www.unu.edu/

Julius CourtJulius CourtPeace & Governance Programme and Office of the RectorPeace & Governance Programme and Office of the Rector

court@hq.unu.edu

Bureaucratic Structure and Performance (in Asia) Rationale - evidence on bureaucratic

performance based mostly on case studies Objective – extended systematic data collection

on bureaucratic structure and performance Innovative Methodology - survey of high level

bureaucrats using country coordinators Results - extended database on bureaucracy and

analysis (for researchers) and country sheets (for policy-makers and practitioners)

From: Court, Kristen and Weder, 1999.

Simple Framework

Development Performance

Bureaucratic Performance

Bureaucratic Structure

Knack and Keefer, 1995

Evans and Rauch, 1999a

World Bank, 1997 (WDR)

Weber, 1968

Evans and Rauch, 1999b

World Bank, 1993 (EAM)

Bureaucracy DatabaseBureaucracy Database “extended global database on bureaucracies”

• Coverage: 50 countries

• Timespan: c1970-1998

• Sources: Evans-Rauch database, WDR 1997, UNU survey.

http://www.unu.edu/hq/academic/Pg_area4/b-structure.html

Bureaucratic Structure and Performance - Empirical Analysis

Agency power - influence of core economic agencies in formulating new policies.

Autonomy - do top civil service move when political leadership changes.

Career opportunities - internal promotion, duration and civil service opportunities.

Relative wage - compares public sector salaries to the private sector ones.

Entrance mechanism - entrance via a formal exam and university degrees.

Empirical Analysis Framework Bureaucratic

Performance

Bureaucratic Structure

Dependent Variables• Bur. Quality• Consultation• Corruption• Efficiency• Implementation

Independent Variables• Agency Power• Autonomy• Career Opportunities• Private Sector Career• Relative Wage

Regression Findings

  Bur. Quality

Consult‘n Lower Corrup‘n

Efficiency Implemt‘n

Agency power *** *** ** * 

Autonomy * 

**   

Career Opps      **

 

(Private Sect Career)

       *

Relative Wage  ***

 ** ***

Significance: * - ten; ** - five; *** - one % level.

Total Structural Quality

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10.00

Agency Power

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10.00

Autonomy

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

Career Opportunities

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10.00

Relative Wages

0.00

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

8.00

9.00

10.00

Tentative Conclusions

• New results with expanded data set are more solid than for original Evans / Rauch database.

• Certain structural issues are associated with cross-country differences in bureaucratic performance.

• Better bureaucratic performance is associated with greater autonomy to formulate policy; good career opportunities; good pay for public servants (and no shifting to the private sector).

World Governance Survey World Governance Survey ObjectivesObjectives

To better understand why and how political institutions matter for growth and poverty reduction

General

• Open governance debate in a constructive manner

• What aspects of governance matter at different stages

• Provide policy advice

Specific

• Cohesive, global database on perceptions of governance

• Track changes over time within countries – diagnostic

• Cross-country statistical analysis

UNU at a Glance

 Mission: - “generating and sharing knowledge for human security and development.”

Key Facts:  Rector – Hans van Ginkel Vice Rector for Peace and Governance –

Ramesh Thakur Staff – 211 Budget – US$ 36 m Headquarters – Tokyo, Japan 13 Institutes around the world Networks