Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Report on Israel Nuclear Arsenal (November/December 2014)

8/9/2019 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Report on Israel Nuclear Arsenal (November/December 2014)

1/19

Bulletinof the

Atomic Scientists

IT IS 5 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT

®

Nuclear notebook

Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

Abstract

Although the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons, it is generally

accepted by friend and foe alike that Israel is a nuclear-armed stateÑand has been so for nearly half a century.The basis for this conclusion has been strengthened significantly since our previous estimate in 2002, particu-

larly thanks to new documents obtained by scholars under the US Freedom of Information Act and other openly

available sources.1 We conclude that many of the public claims about the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal are

exaggerated. We estimate that Israel has a stockpile of approximately 80 nuclear warheads for delivery by two

dozen missiles, a couple of squadrons of aircraft, and perhaps a small number of sea-launched cruise missiles.

Keywords

arms race, cruise missiles, Israel, Jericho missiles, Middle East, nuclear weapons, security

Nuclear policy issues

Since the late 1960s, every Israeligovernment has practiced a policyof nuclear opacity that, while

acknowledging that Israel maintains theoption of building nuclear weapons,

leaves it factually uncertain as to whetherIsrael actually possesses nuclear weaponsand if so at what operational status. Sincethe mid-1960s, this policy has been pub-licly expressedÑand recently reaffirmedby Prime Minister Benjamin Netan-yahuÑas the phrase ÒWe wonÕt be thefirst to introduce nuclear weapons intothe Middle EastÓ (Netanyahu, 2011).

This statement is widely seen as adeception, because it is a long-held con-clusion among governments and experts

that Israel has produced a sizable stock-pile of nuclear warheads (probably unas-sembled) designed for delivery byballistic missiles and aircraft. Commonsense dictates that a country that hasdeveloped and produced nuclear war-heads for delivery by designated delivery

vehicles has, regardless of their oper-ational status, introduced the weapons tothe region. But Israeli governments haveattached so many interpretations toÒintroduceÓ that common sense doesnÕtappear to apply.

Declassified documents from US”Israeli negotiations in 1968”1969 aboutthe sale and delivery of F-4 Phantom air-craft show that the White House under-stood full well that Òthey [Israel]interpreted that [ÒintroductionÓ] to mean

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists2014, Vol. 70(6) 97–115! The Author(s) 2014

Reprints and permissions:

sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.navDOI: 10.1177/0096340214555409

http://thebulletin.sagepub.com

by guest on March 7, 2015bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from

http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/


2/19

they could possess nuclear weapons aslong as they did not test, deploy, or makethem publicÓ (White House, 1969a: 1). In amemo prepared for President Nixon on

the Israeli nuclear program, nationalsecurity advisor Henry Kissinger stated:ÒThis is one program on which the Israe-lis have persistently deceived usÑandmay even have stolen from usÓ (WhiteHouse, 1969a: 7 of attachment).

Both the Johnson and Nixon adminis-trations tried to get a clearer understand-ing of the Israeli interpretation of Òintroduction.Ó During a meeting at the

Pentagon in November 1968, IsraelÕsambassador to the United States, YitzhakRabin, who later succeeded Prime Minis-ter Golda Meir as Israeli prime minister,said that Òhe would not consider aweapon that had not been tested to be aweapon.Ó Rabin noted that this was hispersonal understanding as a former mili-tary leader. Moreover, he said, ÒThere

must be a public acknowledgement. Thefact that you have got it must be known.ÓSeeking clarity, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke asked: ÒThen inyour view, an unadvertised, untestednuclear device is not a nuclear weapon?ÓRabin responded: ÒYes, that is correct.ÓSo, Warnke continued, an advertised butuntested device or weapon would consti-tute introduction? ÒYes, that would be

introduction,Ó Rabin confirmed (Depart-ment of Defense, 1968: 2, 3, 4).

In a follow-up exchange in July 1969,the Nixon administration plainly sum-marized its own understanding of theterm ÒintroductionÓ: ÒWhen Israel saysit will not introduce nuclear weapons itmeans it will not possess such weapons.ÓThe Nixon administration wanted Israelto accept the US definition, but the Meir

government didnÕt take the bait andinstead claimed: ÒIntroduction means

the transformation from a non-nuclearweapon country into a nuclear weaponcountryÓ (Department of State, 1969a).In other words, Israel construed its

pledge not to be the first to introducenuclear weapons to mean that that intro-duction was not about physical posses-sion but about public acknowledgementof that possession.

Kissinger saw a way out of the dis-agreement: He informed PresidentNixon that what the Israelis had donewas to Òdefine the word ÔintroductionÕby relating it to the NPT [Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty].Ó KissingerÕs argu-ment was that the Òdistinction betweenÔnuclear-weaponÕ and Ônon-nuclear-weaponÕ states is the one which theNPT uses in defining the respective obli-gations of the signatories.Ó By arguingthat the NPT negotiations Òimplicitlyleft . . . it up to the conscience of the gov-ernments involvedÓ by being Òdeliber-

ately vague on what precise step wouldtransform a state into a nuclear weaponstate after the January 1, 1967, cut-off dateused in the treaty to define the nuclearstates,Ó and by arguing that the NPT doesnot define what it means to Òmanufac-tureÓ or ÒacquireÓ nuclear weapons, Kis-singer concluded that the new Israeliformulation Òshould put us in a positionfor the record of being able to say we

assume we have IsraelÕs assurance that itwill remain a non-nuclear state as definedin the NPTÓ (White House, 1969b: 1).

KissingerÕs disingenuous interpret-ation provided the United States with away out of a diplomatic dilemma via atacit understanding between Nixon andMeir that the United States would nolonger pressure Israel to sign the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty as long as the

Israelis kept their program restrainedand invisibleÑmeaning that Israel

98 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70(6)




3/19


4/19

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabinmade a similar statement, saying ÒIsraelis not a nuclear country in terms of weap-onsÓ and has Òcommitted to the United

States for many years not to be the first tointroduce nuclear weapons in the con-text of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But atthe same time,Ó he added, Òwe cannotbe blind to efforts that are made in cer-tain Muslim and Arab countries in thisdirection. Therefore, I can sum up.WeÕll keep our commitment not to bethe first to introduce, but we still lookahead to the dangers that others will do

it. And we have to be prepared for it Ó(Rabin, 1994; emphasis added).

The ambiguity left by IsraelÕs refusal toconfirm or deny the possession of nuclearweapons prompted the BBC in 2003 tobluntly ask former Prime MinisterShimon Peres whether the ambiguity wasjust another word for deception: ÒTheterm nuclear ambiguity, in some ways it

sounds very grand, but isnÕt it just aeuphemism for deception?Ó Peres did notanswer the question but confirmed theneed for deception: ÒIf someone wants tokill you and you use deception to saveyour life, itÕs not immoral. If we wouldnÕt[sic] have enemies we wouldnÕt needdeceptionsÓ (BBC, 2003).

Three years later, in a December 2006interview with German television, then-

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared tocompromise the deception when he criti-cized Iran for aspiring Òto have nuclearweapons, as America, France, Israel, Rus-siaÓ (Williams, 2006). The statement,which he made in English, attracted wide-spread attention because it was seen as aninadvertent admission that Israel pos-sesses nuclear weapons (Williams, 2006).A spokesperson for Olmert later said he

had been listing not nuclear states butÒresponsible nationsÓ (Friedman, 2006).

Ambiguity is not just about refusing toconfirm possession of nuclear weaponsbut also about refusing to deny it. Whenasked during a 2011 CNN interview if

Israel does not have nuclear weapons,Netanyahu did not answer directly butrepeated the policy not to be the first toÒintroduceÓ nuclear weapons into theMiddle East. Undeterred, the journalistfollowed up: ÒBut if you take an assump-tion that other countries have them thenthat may mean you have them?Ó Netan-yahu didnÕt dispute that but implied thatthe difference is that Israel doesnÕt threa-

ten anyone with its arsenal: ÒWell, it maymean that we donÕt pose a threat toanyone. We donÕt call for anyoneÕs anni-hilation . . . We donÕt threaten to obliter-ate countries with nuclear weapons butwe are threatened with all these threatsÓ(Netanyahu, 2011).

The nuclear alert

One of the scenarios where Israel mightdecide to ÒintroduceÓ its nuclear arsenalis in a crisis that poses a threat to the veryexistence of the state of Israel. It iswidely believed such an incident mighthave happened in October 1973 duringthe Yom Kippur War, when Israeli lea-ders feared Syria was about to defeatthe Israeli army in the Golan Heights.

The rumor first appeared in Time maga-zine in 1976, was greatly expanded uponin Seymour HershÕs book The SamsonOption in 1991, and several unidentifiedformer US officials allegedly stated in2002 that Israel put nuclear forces onalert in 1973 (see e.g., Sale, 2002).

But an interview conducted by AvnerCohen with the late Arnan (Sini) Azar-yahu in January 2008 calls into question

the validity of this rumor. Azaryahu wassenior aide and confidant to Yisrael Galili,





5/19

a minister without portfolio who wasGolda MeirÕs closest political ally andprivy to some of IsraelÕs most closelyheld nuclear secrets. In the early after-

noonoftheseconddayofthewarÑOcto-ber 7, 1973Ñwhen the Israeli militaryappeared to be losing the battle againstSyrian forces in the Golan Heights, Azar-yahu said that the defense minister,Moshe Dayan, asked Meir to authorizeinitial technical preparations for a Òdem-onstration optionÓÑthat is, ready nuclearweapons for potential use. But Galili andDeputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon

argued against the idea, saying Israelwould prevail using conventional weap-ons. According to Azaryahu, Meir sidedwith her two senior ministers and toldDayan to Òforget itÓ (Cohen, 2013. For ana-lysis of the Azaryahu interview and itsimplications, see Cohen (n.d.).)

A study by the Strategic Studies div-ision of the Center for Naval Analyses

(CNA) in April 2013 appeared to confirmMeirÕs rejection of DayanÕs Òdemonstra-tion optionÓ and that IsraelÕs nuclearforces were not readied. The reportstates that even though the authors Òdidexhaustively scrutinizeÓ the documentfiles of US agencies and archives andinterviewed a significant number of offi-cials with firsthand knowledge of the1973 crisis, ÒNone of these searches

revealed any documentation of an Israelialert or clear manipulation of its forces,Óand Ònone of our interviewees, save one,recalled any Israeli nuclear alert or sig-naling effortÓ during the Yom KippurWar (Colby et al., 2013: 31”32).

Even so, the single former official whorecalled seeing an Òelectronic or signalsintelligence reportÓ at the time thatÒIsrael had activated or increased the

readiness of its Jericho missile bat-teriesÓÑand the extreme government

secrecy that surrounds the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons in generalÑledthe authors of the CNA study to con-clude that Òthe United States did observe

some kind of Israeli nuclear weapons-related activity in the very early days of the war, probably pertaining to IsraelÕs Jericho ballistic missile force . . . .Ó(Colby et al., 2013: 34). The studyÕs overallassessment was that ÒIsrael appears tohave taken preliminary precautionarysteps to protect or prepare its nuclearweapons and/or related forcesÓ (Colbyet al., 2013: 2; emphasis added).

The conclusion that Israel did some-thing with its nuclear forces in October1973Ñalthough not necessarily placethem on full operational alert or preparefor a Òdemonstration optionÓÑseemssimilar to the assertion made by Peres in1995, who in an interview with the authorsof We All Lost the Cold War Òcategoric-ally denied that Jericho missiles were

made ready, much less armed. At most,he insisted, there was an operationalcheck. The cabinet never approved anyalert of Jericho missilesÓ (Lebow andStein, 1995: 463, footnote 47).

Evidently, some uncertainty persistsabout the 1973 events. But then, presum-ably as well as now, the Israeli warheadswere not fully assembled or deployed ondelivery systems under normal circum-

stances but stored under civilian control.And since no official confirmation wasmade back then either via a test or anannouncement, no formal Òintroduc-tionÓ of nuclear weapons occurredÑatleast in the opinion of Israeli officials.

Six years later, on September 22, 1979,a US surveillance satellite known as theVela 6911 detected what appeared to bethe flash from a nuclear test in the south-

ern parts of the Indian Ocean (for back-ground on the 1979 Vela incident, see

Kristensen and Norris 101




6/19

Richelson, 2006). Despite widespreadrumors about Israeli involvement in the

test, which would constitute Òintroduc-tionÓ of nuclear weapons by the Israelidefinition, Israeli governments havecontinued since to state that Israelwould not be the first to introducenuclear weapons in the region.

How many warheads?

Absent official public information fromthe Israeli government or intelligencecommunities of other countries, specula-tions abound about IsraelÕs nucleararsenal. Over the past several decades,news media reports, think tanks, authors,and analysts have sized theIsraeli nuclearstockpile widely, from 75 warheads up tomore than 400 warheads. Delivery vehi-cles for the warheads have been listed as

aircraft, ballistic missiles, artillery tac-tical or battlefield weapons such as artil-lery shells and landmines, and morerecently sea-launched cruise missiles.We believe many of these rumors areinaccurate and that the most crediblestockpile number is on the order of 80warheads for delivery by aircraft, land-based ballistic missiles, and possiblysea-based cruise missiles (see Table 1).

In 1969, the US State Department con-cluded: ÒIsrael has moved as rapidly as

possible since about 1963Ó in Òdevelopinga capability to produce and deploy

nuclear weapons, and to deliver themby surface-to-surface missile or byplaneÓ (Department of State, 1969b: 1;Department of State, 1969c: 3). By 1974,the CIA concluded: ÒIsrael already hasproduced and stockpiled a smallnumber of fission weaponsÓ (CIA, 1974:20). ÒSmallÓ is a relative term; to someanalysts it meant an arsenal of a dozen

or two dozen weapons, but the publicestimate would later balloonsignificantly.

Most publicly available estimatesappear to be derived from a rough calcula-tion of the number of warheads that couldhypothetically be created from theamountof plutonium Israel is believed to have pro-ducedinitsnuclearreactoratDimona.Thetechnical assessment that accompanied

the 1986 Sunday Times article aboutformer nuclear technician MordechaiVanunuÕs disclosures about Dimona, forexample, estimated that Israel had pro-duced enough plutonium for 100 to 200nuclear warheads (Sunday Times, 1986a,1986b, 1986c).2 In the public debate, thisquickly became Israel possessing 100 to200 nuclear warheads, the estimate thathas been most commonly used ever

since.Thereisuncertaintyabouttheoper-ationalhistoryorefficiencyoftheDimona

Table 1. Israeli nuclear forces, 2014

LAND-BASED MISSLES

Jericho II 1984–1985 1,500+ Possibly 25–50 at Zekharia for TELs in caves

Jericho III ? 4,000 ? In development

SEA-BASED MISSLES

Dolphin-class submarines 2002 ? ? Possibly modified cruise missile for land-attack

TYPEYEAR FIRSTDEPLOYED

RANGE (KM) COMMENT

AIRCRAFT

F-16A/B/C/D/I Fighting Falcon 1980 1,600 Nuclear bombs posssibly stored at undergroundfacility near Tel Nof Air Base

F-15I Ra’am (Thunder) 1998 3,500 Potential nuclear strike role





7/19

reactorÕs operation over the years, butplutonium production is thought to havecontinued after 1986, making for a total of roughly 840 kilograms of plutonium for

military purposes.3

That amount couldpotentially be used to build 168 to 210nuclearweapons,assumingasecond-gen-eration, single-stage, fission-implosionwarhead design with a boosted pit con-taining 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium.4

Total plutonium production is a mis-leading indicator of the actual size of theIsraeli nuclear arsenal, however, becauseIsraelÑlike other nuclear-armed sta-

tesÑmost likely would not have con-verted all of its plutonium intowarheads. A portion is likely stored as astrategic reserve. And given that Israelprobably has a limited portion of its air-craft and missiles that are equipped todeliver nuclear weapons, it would inany case not produce many more war-heads than it can actually deliver.

And this is where the estimates of 200to 400 warheads strain credibility.Assuming that Israel has no more than25 single-warhead land-based ballisticmissiles, such a large stockpile wouldimply as many as 150 to 350 air-deliveredbombs, or a significant inventory of othertypes of nuclear weapons. In comparison,the 180 US bombs deployed in Europehave roughly 20 bombs allocated to each

nuclear-capable fighter-bomber squad-ron. IsraelÕs nuclear posture has notbeen determined by war-fighting strategybut by deterrence needs, so a more realis-tic estimate may be that Israel only has acouple of fighter-bomber squadronsassigned to the nuclear missions with per-haps 40 bombs in total.

The higher stockpile estimates appearto come from rumors that Israel has pro-

duced a significant number of othertypes of nuclear weapons, or tactical

nuclear weapons. A variety of differentsources over the years has claimed, with-out providing much evidence, that theother weapon types include artillery,

landmines, suitcase bombs, nuclear elec-tromagnetic pulse weapons to take outelectronic circuits, and enhanced radi-ation weapons (neutron bombs).5

Seymour HershÕs 1991 best-seller, TheSamson Option: IsraelÕs Nuclear Arsenaland American Foreign Policy, claimedthat Israel had manufactured ÒhundredsÓ(Hersh, 1993: 276) of low-yield neutronnuclear warheads and that at least three

nuclear-capable artillery battalions wereestablished after 1973 with self-propelled175-mm cannons assigned more than 108nuclear artillery shells. Additional nuclearartillery shells were supplied for IsraelÕs203-mm cannons. Moreover, Hershclaimed, the warhead that was tested inIsraelÕs suspected nuclear test in 1979Òwas a low-yield nuclear artillery shell

that had been standardized for use bythe Israeli Defense ForceÓ (Hersh, 1993:271). The New York Times reported theseclaims but also mentioned that the Òfor-malÓ United States intelligence estimatewas Òfewer than 100Ó warheads, quotedthe Carnegie Endowment as saying thatmost outsiders estimated as many as 200warheads, but ended on HershÕs estimateof an Israeli stockpile of Ò300 or moreÓ

warheads (Brinkley, 1991).Partly building on these claims, an art-

icle published in JaneÕs Intelligence Review in 1997 by photo-interpreterHarold Hough used commercial satellitephotos to examine IsraelÕs suspected mis-sile base near the town of Zakharia. Thearticle concluded that the base mighthouse 50 Jericho II missiles and that fivebunkers at a nearby depotwere capable of

storing 150 weapons. ÒThis supports indi-cations that the Israeli arsenal may





8/19

contain as many as 400 nuclear weaponswith a total combined yield of 50 mega-tons,Ó) Hough (1997) asserted.6

Thesatellite photos were notvery clear,

however, and imagery experts laterpointed out that Òclose examination of the published photos indicates that manyof these identified features are notvisuallyevidentÓ leaving Òlarge uncertainty asso-ciated with these identificationsÓ (Guptaand Pabian, 1998: 97). Possibly indicatingsimilar doubts, a New York Times articlereminded readers that a RandCorporationstudy commissioned by the Pentagon and

reported by the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz had concluded that Israel onlyhad enough plutonium to make 70 nuclearweapons (Schmemann, 1998).

The Rand estimate was in the samerange as the 60 to 80 nuclear warheadsthe US Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) listed in a 1999 classified report(US Defense Intelligence Agency,

1999).

7

Leaked and later published in2004, this report is to our knowledgethe most recent publicly available docu-ment that provides an official estimate of how many nuclear warheads Israel has.The report, the timing of which coin-cided with the commissioning of thefirst of IsraelÕs six Dolphin-class submar-ines, also contained a projection for thearsenal by 2020: 65 to 85 warheads.

During the 15 years that have passedsince the DIA report, Israel presumablyhas continued production of plutoniumat Dimona for some of that time (althoughthe reactor is getting old) and probablyalso has continued producing nuclearwarheads. Many of those warheads wereprobably replacements for warheads pro-duced earlier for existing delivery sys-tems, such as the Jericho II missiles and

aircraft. Warheads for a rumored JerichoIII ballistic missile would probably

replace existing Jericho II warheads on aone-for-one basis. Warheads for therumored submarine-based cruise missile,iftrue,wouldbeinadditiontotheexisting

arsenal but probably only involve a rela-tively small number of warheads.

Warhead designs

The large variety of warhead designs thatwould be needed to arm the many differ-ent types of launchers rumored toexistÑreentry vehicles for ballistic mis-siles, gravity bombs for aircraft, artillery,

landmines, and a neutron bombÑwouldbe a significant technical challenge for anuclear weapons complex that has onlyconducted one nuclear test, or even a fewtests, 35 years ago.

It took other nuclear weapon statesdozens of elaborate nuclear test explo-sion experiments to develop such variedweapon designsÑas well as the war-

fighting strategies to justify the expense.According to some analysts, Israel hadÒunrestricted access to French nucleartest explosion dataÓ in the 1960s (Cohen,1998: 82”83), so much so that Òthe Frenchnuclear test in 1960 made two nuclearpowers not oneÓ (Weissman and Kros-ney, 1981: 114”117). Until France broke off deep nuclear collaboration with Israel in1967, France conducted 17 fission war-

head tests in Algeria, ranging from a fewkilotons to approximately 120 kilotons of explosive yield (CTBTO, n.d.; NuclearWeapon Archive, 2001).

Based on interviews with Vanunu in1986, Frank Barnaby, a nuclear physicistwho worked at the British Atomic Weap-ons Research Establishment, later saidthat VanunuÕs description of Òproduc-tion at Dimona of lithium-deuteride in

the shape of hemispherical shells. . .

raised the question of whether Israel





9/19

had boosted nuclear weapons in itsarsenalÓ (Barnaby, 2004: 4). Althoughhe didnÕt think Vanunu had much know-ledge about such weapons, Barnaby con-

cluded that Òthe information he gavesuggested that Israel had more advancednuclear weapons than Nagasaki-typeweaponsÓ (Barnaby, 2004: 4).

Barnaby did not mention thermo-nuclear weapons in his 2004 statement,even though he concluded in his bookThe Invisible Bomb in 1989 that ÒIsraelmay have about 35 thermonuclear weap-onsÓ (Barnaby, 1989: 25). At the time, the

director of the CIA apparently did notagree but reportedly indicated that Israelmay be seeking to construct a thermo-nuclear weapon (Cordesman, 2005).Yet The Samson Option claims that USweapon designers concluded fromVanunuÕs information that ÒIsrael wascapable of manufacturing one of themost sophisticated weapons in the nuclear

arsenalÑa low-yield [two-stage] neutronbombÓ (Hersh, 1993: 199). The authors of The Nuclear Express in 2009 echoed thatclaim, stating that the product of IsraelÕspartnership with South Africa would be Òafamily of boosted primaries, generic H-bombs, and a specific neutron bombÓ(Reed and Stillman, 2009: 174).

While a single-stage, boosted fissiondesign warhead was probably within

IsraelÕs technical reach at the time, theclaim that Israel also was capable of pro-ducing two-stage thermonuclear war-head designs, or even enhancedradiation weapons (which are also two-stage thermonuclear designs), is harderto accept, based on the limited informa-tion that is publicly available aboutIsraelÕs nuclear testing and design history.

Whatever the composition of the

Israeli nuclear arsenal, we neither seethe indicators that Israel has sufficient

nuclear-capable launchers for 200 to400 nuclear weapons, nor understandwhy a country that does not have a strat-egy for fighting nuclear war would need

that many types of warheads or warheaddesigns to deter its potential adversaries.In our assessment, a more credible esti-mateÑtaking into consideration pluto-nium production, testing history, designskills, force structure, and strategyÑisan Israeli stockpile of approximately 80boosted fission warheads.

Aircraft and airfieldsOver the past 30 years, the Israeli AirForce (IAF) has had several types of US-produced aircraft capable of carry-ing nuclear gravity bombs. Theseinclude the A-4 Skyhawk, F-4 Phantom,and more recently the F-16 and F-15E.Moreover, Israel has purchased 20 F-35A Lightnings to replace older F-16s,

and plans to buy more.The A-4 and F-4 served long careers asnuclear strike aircraft in the US military,and their potential roles as similar nu-clear weapons delivery vehicles withinthe IAF was the focus of much attentionat the time they were in use. As noted ear-lier, when it bought these aircraft, Israelformally promised the United States thatit Òagrees not to use any aircraft supplied

by the U.S. as a nuclear weapons carrierÓ(Embassy of Israel, 1968: 1). But theexperience with IsraelÕs interpretation of its promise not to be the first to Òintro-duceÓ nuclear weapons in the MiddleEast makes it hard to take its promisenot to use American aircraft for nuclearmissions without a pinch of salt.

Since the 1980s, the F-16 has been thebackbone of the Israeli Air Force. Over

the years, Israel has purchased well over200 F-16s of all types, as well as specially





10/19

configured F-16Is. Various versions of the F-16 serve nuclear strike roles in theUS Air Force and among NATO allies,and the F-16 is the most likely candidate

for air delivery of Israeli nuclear weap-ons at the present time.

Since 1998, Israel has also used theBoeing F-15E Strike Eagle for long-rangestrike and air-superiority roles. TheIsraeli version is characterized by greatertakeoff weightÑ36,750 kgÑand rangeÑ4,450 kmÑthan other F-15 models. Itsmaximum speed at high altitude is Mach2.5. The plane has been further modified

with specialized radar that has terrain-mapping capability and other navigationand guidance systems. In the US AirForce, the F-15E Strike Eagle has beengiven a nuclear role. It is not known if the Israeli Air Force has added nuclearcapability to this highly versatile plane.

Regardless of what happens with theF-15E, Israel has decided to replace a por-

tion of its F-16 fleet with a new planeunder development in the UnitedStates: the F-35A. In so doing, it willbecome the first non-US country to oper-ate the aircraft. The first F-35AÑtheIsraeli version will be known as the F-35I (named ÒAdirÓ for ÒawesomeÓ orÒmightyÓ)Ñwill arrive in 2017, with thefirst squadron expected to become oper-ational at Nevatim Air Base in the Negev

desert in 2018. Israel purchased 20 of anearlier F-35 design in 2012, and plans tobuy over 100 of the new F-35Is, but thehigh cost of the F-35 might limit theplans. The F-35I will be adapted withIsraeli weapons and has, unlike the F-15Iand F-16I, the ability to fly long-rangemissions with internal weapons. TheUS Air Force is upgrading its F-35As tocarry nuclear bombs, and IsraelÕs Chan-

nel 2 reported that an unnamed Òseniorlevel US officialÓ refused to say if Israel

had requested such an upgrade for its F-35 s (Channel 2, 2014).

It is especially difficult to determinewhich Israeli wings and squadrons are

assigned nuclear missions and whichbases support them. The nuclear war-heads themselves may be stored inunderground facilities near one or twobases. Israeli F-16 squadrons are basedat Ramat-David Air Base in northernIsrael; Tel Nof and Hatzor air bases incentral Israel; and Hatzerim, Nevatim,Ramon, and Ouvda air bases in southernIsrael. Of the many F-16 squadrons, only

a small fractionÑperhaps one or twoÑwould actually be nuclear-certified withspecially trained crews, unique proced-ures, and modified aircraft. The F-15 sare based at Tel Nof Air Base in centralIsrael, and Hatzerim Air Base in theNegev desert. We cautiously suggestthat Tel Nof Air Base in central Israeland Nevatim Air Base in the Negev

desert have nuclear missions.

Land-based missiles

IsraelÕs nuclear missile program datesback to the early 1960s. In April 1963, sev-eral months before the Dimona reactorbegan producing plutonium, Israelsigned an agreement with the Frenchcompany Dassault to produce a sur-

face-to-surface ballistic missile. Themissile system became known as the Jericho (or MD-620).

The first purchase of 30 missilesoccurred in early 1966, but soon after theSix-Day War in June 1967 France imposedan embargo on new military equipment toIsrael. Jericho production was transferredto Israel and the first two missiles deliv-ered in 1968, with 10 more by mid-1969.

The program was completed around 1970with 24 to 30 missiles. Apparently not all





11/19

were nuclear, with only 10 of the missilesÒprogrammed for nuclear warheads,Óaccording to the White House (Depart-ment of State, 1968: 2; White House,

1969a: 1).8

Apparently, the other missilescould be armed with chemical warheads,probably nerve gas (White House, 1969c).The short-range Jericho could deliver a1,000-kilogram (2,200 pound) reentryvehicle, with a range of about 480 kilo-meters (298 miles). Theaccuracywas esti-mated to be roughly within 926 meters(approximately 0.6 miles) of its target(CIA, 1974: 22).

Most sources assert that Jericho was amobile missile, transported and firedfrom a transportable erector launcher(CIA, 1974). But there have occasionallybeen references to possible silos for theweapon. A US State Department studyproduced in support of National SecurityStudy Memorandum 40 in May 1969 con-cluded that Israel believed it needed a

nearly invulnerable nuclear force todeter a nuclear first strike from its ene-mies, Òi.e., having a second-strike cap-ability.Ó The study stated: ÒIsrael is nowbuilding such a forceÑthe hardened silosof the Jericho missilesÓ (Department of State, 1969d: 7; emphasis added). It isnot clear that the claim of ÒhardenedsilosÓ constituted the assessment of theUS intelligence community, and only a

few subsequent sourcesÑall non-gov-ernmentalÑhave mentioned Israeli mis-sile silos.9 We did not find any publicevidence of Jericho silos.

The Jericho range was sufficient totarget Cairo, Damascus, and all of Jordan, but not the Soviet UnionÑwhichwas gaining importance in IsraelÕs plan-ning. In collaboration with South Africa,Israel in the late 1980s developed

the medium-range Jericho II that putthe southern-most Soviet cities and the

Black Sea Fleet within range. Jericho II, amodified version of the Shavit spacelaunch rocket, was first deployed in theearly-1990s, replacing the first Jericho.

Unofficial estimates of the Jericho IIÕsrange vary greatly and tend to be exag-geratedÑsome even up to 5,000 kilo-meters (3,100 miles).10 The Jericho wasfirst flight-tested in May 1987 to approxi-mately 850 km (527 miles). The trajectorywent far into the Mediterranean Sea.Another test in September 1989 reached1,300 km (806 miles). The US Air ForceNational Air Intelligence Center in 1996

reported the Jericho II range as 1,500 kilo-meters (930 miles) (NAIC, 1996).

Half of Iran, which has increased inimportance to Israeli military strategyover the past two decades, is out of JerichoIIÕs reach. That includes Tehran (barely).Rumors abound that Israel has beendeveloping a longer-range missile, pub-licly known as Jericho III, with an esti-

mated range of 4,000 kilometers, or 2,480miles. With such a missile, Israel would beable to target all of Iran, Pakistan, and all of Russia west of the UralsÑincluding, forthe first time, Moscow. Jericho III wasfirst test-launched over the MediterraneanSea in January 2008, again in 2011, and mostrecently in July 2013. Unidentified defensesources told JaneÕs Defence Weekly that Jericho III constitutes Òa dramatic leap

in IsraelÕs missile capabilitiesÓ ( JaneÕs Defence Weekly, 2008: 5), but many detailsand current status are unknown.

How many Jerichomissiles Israel has isanother uncertainty. Estimates vary from25 to 100. Most sources estimate thatIsrael has 50 of these missiles, and placethem at the Sdot Micha facility near thetown of Zakharia in the Judean Hillsapproximately 27 kilometers, or about 17

miles, east of Jerusalem. (There are manyalternative spellings and names for the





12/19

base, including Zekharyeh, Zekharaia,Sdot Micha, and Sdot HaElla.)

Commercial satellite images showwhat appear to be two clusters of what

might be caves for mobile Jericho IIlaunchers. The northern cluster includes14 caves and the southern cluster has ninecaves, for a total of 23 caves. This numberof caves roughly matches the 24 to 30 mis-siles mentioned in a 1969 White Housememo(White House, 1969a). Each clusteralso has what appears to be a covereddrive-through facility, potentiallyfor mis-sile handling or warhead loading. A sep-

arate circular facility with four tunnels tounderground facilities could potentiallybe for warhead storage. Consequently,we conclude that estimates of 50 to 100missiles are exaggerated and estimatethat Israel deploys about two dozenmobile launchers for Jericho missiles.

Most reports only mention one missilesite, but a US State Department back-

ground paper from 1969 stated that therewas Òevidence strongly indicating thatseveral sites providing operationallaunch capabilities are virtually com-pleteÓ (Department of State, 1969c: 4;emphasis added). The Sdot Micha baseis relatively small at 16 square kilometers,and the suspected launcher caves arelocated along two roads, each of which isonly about one kilometer long. Although

this layout would provide protectionagainst limited conventional attacks, itwould be vulnerable to a nuclear surpriseattack. For the Jericho missiles to havemilitary value, they would need to beable to disperse from their caves.

Sea-based missiles and

submarines

Rumorsabound that Israelhas developeda nuclear warhead for a sea-launched

cruise missile, which would be launchedfrom diesel-electric Dolphin-class attacksubmarines that Israel has acquired fromGermany. Some rumors say that the

nuclear-capable sea-launched cruisemissile is a modification of the conven-tional ÒPopeye TurboÓ air-to-surfacemissiles, while others claim that Israelconverted the US-supplied HarpoonÑalong-standing US anti-ship missileÑtonuclear capability.

It is difficult to say with certaintywhen the rumors first emerged orwhere, but one early candidate is a

Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies study from 1998, which listed:ÒVariant of the Popeye air-to-surfacemissile believed to have nuclear war-headÓ (Cordesman, 1998: 17). There wasno source for the claim, but it quicklymade its way into The WashingtonTimes under the headline ÒIsrael buying3 submarines to carry nuclear missiles.Ó

The article also referenced a June 8, 1998report in the Israeli paper Haaretz ÒthatIsraeli military planners want to mountnuclear-armed cruise missiles on thenew submarinesÓ (Sieff, 1998).

An article published by Gerald M.Steinberg from Bar Ilan University in

RUSI International Security Review in1999 described Òunconfirmed reportsthat Israel is developing a cruise missile

(known as the Popeye Turbo) with arange of 350 kilometers, to be operationalin 2002,Ó that Òcould become the basis of a sea-based second strike deterrentÓ(Steinberg, 1999: 215”224).

When the Clinton administration pro-posed returning the Golan Heights toSyria, the Israeli government respondedwith a $17 billion security package requestthat included 12 long-range BGM-109

Tomahawk sea-launched cruise mis-siles. (The US Navy possessed a





13/19

nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawkbetween 1983 and 2012.) Israel argued thatit would need the Tomahawk to compen-sate for the loss of strategic depth if it

gave up the Golan Heights, although tar-geting Iran was clearly also a factor. Butthe Clinton administration turned downthe Israeli request in March 2000.

Only three months later, in June 2000,an article in the Sunday Times quotedunnamed ÒIsraeli defense officialsÓ assaying that Israel had secretly tested asubmarine-launched cruise missile to arange of more than 1,500 kilometers

(930 miles) in the Indian Ocean (Mah-naimi and Campbell, 2000).

The reports about a nuclear Popeyecruise missile and a 1,500-kilometercruise missile test were soon conflatedinto one missile, which has been referredto as fact in numerous publications eversince. After the widely respected book

Deadly Arsenals printed this information

in June 2002 (Cirincione et al., 2002),coverage in The Washington Post addedunnamed former Pentagon and StateDepartment officials who confirmed thatIsrael was arming three newly acquireddiesel submarines with Ònewly designedcruise missiles capableof carrying nuclearwarheads.Ó The report said the US Navymonitored the Israeli cruise missile test,although a former Pentagon official cau-

tioned: ÒIt is above top secret knowingwhether the sub-launched cruise missilesare nuclear-armedÓ (Pincus, 2002).

The lead author of the Sunday Timescruise missile test article, Uzi Mahnaimi,has written other articles about IsraelÕsnuclear capabilities, some of which laterturned out to be incorrect. A 2007 articleclaimed Òseveral Israeli military sourcesÓhad told the Sunday Times that two Israeli

air force squadrons were training to blowup an Iranian facility using low-yield

nuclear Òbunker-bustersÓ (Mahnaimi andBaxter, 2007). In 2010, Mahnaimi claimedÒthe decision has now been takenÓ to con-tinuously deploy at least one of IsraelÕs

Òsubmarines equipped with nuclearcruise missiles . . . in the Gulf near theIranian coastline.Ó The article quoted anunidentified navy officer saying that theÒ1,500-km range of the submarinesÕcruise missiles can reach any target inIranÓ (Mahnaimi, 2010). These and otherarticles have caused media critics, includ-ing Marsha B. Cohen on PBSÕs Frontline, todescribe Mahnaimi as a ÒsensationalistÓ

with Òa long and consistent recordÑforbeing wrongÓ (Cohen MB, 2010).

Up until 2002, news media reportsfocused on a naval version of the air-launched Popeye Turbo missile. But inOctober 2003 the Los Angeles Timesquoted unnamed US and Israeli officialssaying that Israel had modified the US-supplied Harpoon cruise missile to carry

nuclear warheads on submarines. ÒTwoBush administration officials describedthe missile modification and an Israeliofficial confirmed it,Ó the paper stated(Frantz, 2003).

This added to the mystery because therange of the Harpoon is even shorter thanthe range of the Popeye Turbo (110-pluskilometers, or about 68 miles, versus300-plus kilometers, or about 186 miles).

Former Israeli Deputy Defense MinisterEfraim Sneh dismissedthe Harpoon story:

Anyone with even the slightest understanding of

missiles knows that the Harpoon can never be

used to carry nuclear warheads. Not even

[IsraelÕs] extraordinarily talented engineers and

its sophisticated defense industries can trans-

form the Harpoon into a missile capable of

doing this. ItÕs simply impossible. (Haaretz, 2003)

SnehÕs claim that Òthe Harpoon cannever be used to carry nuclear warheadsÓ





14/19

is not entirely correct. Between 1973 and1980, the United States considered equip-ping the Harpoon with a nuclear warhead,but the program was terminated (Coch-

ran et al., 1984). IsraelÕs nuclear weaponsengineering capability is much lessadvanced than that of the United States,and the PentagonÕs Defense SecurityCooperation Agency, which overseesUS military sales abroad, told Arms Con-trol Today that although IsraelÕs contractfor Harpoon missiles does not explicitlyprohibit Israel from modifying them tocarry nuclear warheads, Òwe have had

no reason to believe that the governmentof Israel had any intention to modify orsubstitute the warheads of these missilesÓ(Boese, 2003).

Contrary to the Harpoon rumor, thenormally well-informed Avner Cohenwrites in The Worst-Kept Secret that thesubmarine cruise missile developed forIsraelÕs sea-based strategic leg of its

nuclear deterrent has been Òdevelopedand built in IsraelÓ (Cohen A, 2010: 83).Israel plans to operate six Dolphin-

class submarines. The last three submar-ines are 10 meters (approximately 33feet) longer than the first three due tothe addition of an improved air-indepen-dentpropulsion system. After delivery of the first three submarines, rumors of nuclear capability reportedly prompted

Germany to demand that Israel assurethat the additional submarines itwanted would not be carrying nuclearweapons (Ben-David, 2005).

Whether the German demand wasactually made remains unknown, but in1999, after delivery of the first Dolphinsubmarine, then-Prime Minister EhudBarak told the National Defense Collegethat the submarines Òadd an important

component to IsraelÕs long armÓ (Barak,1999). And the Israeli defense force chief

of staff made it clear in 2005 that Israelwas modifying its military capabilities inresponse to IranÕs suspected nuclearweapons ambitions. ÒWe cannot sit

indifferent in the face of the combinationof an irrational regime with non-conven-tional weapons. We have to concentrateall our efforts to create different capabil-ities that would allow us both to defendand to reactÓ (Ben-David, 2005: 4).

Colonel Yoni, the head of the Israelisubmarine fleet, in 2006 refused to com-ment on reports about the submarinesÕrumored nuclear capability but added

that Òhitting strategic targets is notalways a task the Air Force or the infan-try can carry out . . . a submarine can per-form the mission,Ó he explained. ÒThefact that foreign reports refer to the sub-marines as a deterring factor says some-thingÓ (Greenberg, 2006).

In June 2009, Israeli defense sourcesreported that the INS LeviathanÑone of

the first three diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines but without the air-inde-pendent propulsion of later purchases of submarineÑhad sailed through the SuezCanal on its way to a naval exercise. Somenews media reported the submarinesailed for an exercise in the Persian Gulf,but instead it docked at the Israeli navalbase at Eilat in the Red Sea. Speculationserupted about the deployment being a

signal to Iran and therefore indirectly aconfirmation of the Dolphin-submarineÕsrumored nuclear capability, and thatIsrael might deploy submarines perman-ently at Eilat. But an Israeli defense offi-cial said there would be no permanentsubmarine deployment in Eilat: ÒIf any-thing, we are scaling down our navaloperations in EilatÓ (Haaretz, 2009).

Even so, an article published by the

Sunday TimesÑwritten by the samereporter that wrote the article about the





15/19

1,500-km cruise missile test and the plansto bomb Iran with low-yield nuclearbombsÑclaimed that Israel had made adecision Òto ensure a permanent presence

of at least oneÓ of the Dolphin-class sub-marines in thePersian GulfÒnear the Iran-ian coastlineÓ (Mahnaimi, 2010).

The German magazine Der Spiegelreported in 2012 that the German govern-ment had known for decades that Israelplanned to equip the submarines withnuclear missiles. Former German offi-cials said they always assumed Israelwould use the submarines for nuclear

weapons, although the officials appearedto confirm old rumors rather than pro-vide new information. The articlequoted another unnamed ministry offi-cial with knowledge of the matter:ÒFrom the beginning, the boats were pri-marily used for the purposes of nuclearcapabilityÓ ( Der Spiegel, 2012).

Setting the record straight

From these examples, it should be appar-ent that there is much that is unclearabout what kind of nuclear weaponsIsrael has, how many there are, underwhat circumstances they would beused, or how they would be deliveredto their targets. All Israeli governmentshave preferred to keep this information

secret. Nevertheless, from our examin-ation of the publicly available informa-tion, we conclude that widespreadclaims of an Israeli nuclear stockpile of 200 to 400 warheads and 50 to 100 Jerichomissiles are exaggerated.

In our assessment, based on analysisof available sources and examination of commercial satellite imagery, we esti-mate that Israel has a stockpile of

approximately 80 nuclear warheads fordelivery by two dozen mobile Jericho

missiles, a couple of squadrons of air-craft, and perhaps a small inventory of sea-launched cruise missiles. Muchuncertainty remains, however, about

the structure and diversity of IsraelÕsnuclear arsenal because of IsraelÕspolicy of keeping its nuclear capabilityambiguous and because other countriesdonÕt reveal some of what their intelli-gence communities know.

Despite IsraelÕs stated policy that itwill not be the first to introduce nuclearweapons in the Middle East, there is littledoubt that Israel has already introduced

nuclear weapons in the region and thatonly a deception based on a narrow inter-pretation of what constitutes Òintroduc-tionÓ keeps Israel from officially being anuclear weapon state. Thanks to invalu-able research by researchers such asAvner Cohen and William Burr, previ-ously unknown nuances of IsraelÕsopaque nuclear policy have become

available to the public.

Funding

This research was conducted with generous support

from the New Land Foundation and the Ploughshares

Fund.

Notes

1. For collections of declassified U.S. govern-

ment documents relating to IsraelÕs nuclear

weapons capability, see Cohen and Burr

(2006).2. Frank Barnaby, who cross-examined Vanunu

on behalf of the Sunday Times, stated in 2004

that the estimate for IsraelÕs plutonium

inventoryÑsufficient for Òsome 150 nuclearweaponsÓÑwas based on VanunuÕs descrip-

tion of the reprocessing plant at Dimona

(Barnaby, 2004: 3”4).3. International Panel of Fissile Materials (2013:

20). For additional information about Israelifissile material production, see International

Panel of Fissile Materials (2010: 107”116).





16/19

4. The 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per war-

head assumes high-quality technical andengineering performance for productionfacilities and personnel. Lower perform-ance would need a greater amount of pluto-

nium per warhead and therefore reduce thetotal number of weapons that Israel couldpotentially have produced.

5. For examples of claims about tactical and

advanced nuclear weapons, see Hersh(1993: 199”200, 216”217, 220, 268, 276 (note),312, 319).

6. The 400-warhead claim apparently wasbased on an earlier article in the samemagazine (Brower, 1997).

7. The secret document was leaked and repro-duced in Scarborough (2004: 194

”223). It is

important to caution that as a DIA docu-ment, the report does not necessarily rep-resent the coordinated assessment of the

U.S. Intelligence Community as a whole,only the view of one part of it. An excerptfrom the DIA report is available at Kristen-

sen and Aftergood (2007).8. Another declassified document at the time

stated: ÒIsrael plans to produce and deploy

up to 60 missilesÓ (Joint Chiefs of Staff,1969: 2).

9. For examples of sources claiming Jerichomissiles are deployed in silos, see Cordes-

man (2008); Missilethreat.com (2012). Cor-desman references the Nuclear ThreatInitiative country profile on Israeli missiles

as the source for the silo claim. The NTI hassince updated its page, which no longermentions silos. See: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/delivery-systems/.

10. For examples of large range estimates forthe Jericho II, see Hough (1997: 407 ”410); Missilethreat.com (2012).

References

Barak E (1999) Address by Prime Minister Barak to

the National Defense College. Israeli Foreign

Policy, August 12. Volume 18: 1999”2001. Available

at: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFA

Documents/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%

20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20

the%20National.aspx.Barnaby F (1989) The Invisible Bomb. London: I.B.

Tauris.

Barnaby F (2004) Expert opinion of Charles Frank

Barnaby in the matter of Mordechai Vanunu.

Sunday Times, June 14. Available at: http://

fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdf .

BBC (2003) IsraelÕs secret weapon. March 2003.

Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼

z6Aq24Q2xXc.

Ben-David A (2005) Israel looks to acquire more

German submarines. JaneÕs Defence Weekly,

November 30.

Boese W (2003) Israel allegedly fielding sea-based

nuclear missiles. Arms Control Today, November

2003. Available at: http://www.armscontrol.org/

act/2003_11/Israel.

Brinkley J (1991) Israeli nuclear arsenal exceeds ear-

lier estimates, book reports. New York Times,

October 20. Available at: http://www.nytimes.

com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.html.

Brower KS (1997) A propensity for conflict: Potential

scenarios and outcomes of war in the Middle East.

JaneÕs Intelligence Review, special report no. 14,

February, pp. 14”15.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (1974) Special

National Intelligence Estimate. SNIE 4174.

August 23. Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/

nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdf .

Cirincione J, Wolfsthal J, and Rajkumar M (2002)

Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass

Destruction. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow-ment for International PeaceAvailable at: http://

m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-

deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-

destruction/8ggz.

Channel 2 (2014) F-35 Lightning II plane can carry

nuclear weapons. March 26. Available at: http://

www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-

11d7f8f4b2df441004.htm (in Hebrew).

Cochran T, Arkin WM, and Hoenig MM (1984)

Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I: U.S.

Nuclear Forces and Capabilities. Cambridge, MA:

Ballinger.Cohen A (1998) Israel and the Bomb. New York: Col-

umbia University Press.

Cohen A (2010) The Worst-Kept Secret: IsraelÕs Bar-

gain with the Bomb. New York: Columbia Univer-

sity Press.

Cohen A (2013) When Israel stepped back from the

brink. New York Times, October 3. Available at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/

when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.html.

Cohen A (n.d.) Arnan ÔSiniÕ Azaryahu. Nuclear

Proliferation International History Project, Woo-

drow Wilson Center. Available at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/arnan-sini-azaryahu (accessed

October 4, 2013).



http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/delivery-systems/http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/delivery-systems/http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdfhttp://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdfhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Aq24Q2xXchttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Aq24Q2xXchttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Israelhttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Israelhttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.htmlhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdfhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-11d7f8f4b2df441004.htmhttp://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-11d7f8f4b2df441004.htmhttp://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-11d7f8f4b2df441004.htmhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.htmlhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/arnan-sini-azaryahuhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/arnan-sini-azaryahuhttp://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://www.wilsoncenter.org/arnan-sini-azaryahuhttp://www.wilsoncenter.org/arnan-sini-azaryahuhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/opinion/when-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brink.htmlhttp://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-11d7f8f4b2df441004.htmhttp://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-11d7f8f4b2df441004.htmhttp://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-11d7f8f4b2df441004.htmhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://m.ceip.org/2002/06/12/carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction/8ggzhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB240/snie.pdfhttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/20/world/israeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reports.htmlhttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Israelhttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Israelhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Aq24Q2xXchttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6Aq24Q2xXchttp://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdfhttp://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/barnaby.pdfhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook13/Pages/24%20Address%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Barak%20to%20the%20National.aspxhttp://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/delivery-systems/http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/israel/delivery-systems/


17/19

CohenAandBurrW(2006) IsraelCrosses theThreshold.

Electronic Briefing Book no. 189, National

Security Archive. April 28. Available at: http://

www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/

index.htm.

Cohen MB (2010)LondonÕs Sunday Times: All the nukesunfit to print? PBS Frontline, May 31. Available

at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teh-

ranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-

nukes-unfit-to-print.html .

Colby E, Cohen A, McCants W et al. (2013) The Israeli

ÔNuclear AlertÕ of 1973: Deterrence and Signaling

in Crisis. Center for Naval Analysis, April. Avail-

able at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/

research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdf .

Cordesman A (1998) India, Pakistan, and Proliferation

in the Middle East . Center for Strategic and Inter-

national Studies, June 3. Available at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-

98[1].pdf.

Cordesman A (2005) Proliferationof Weapons of Mass

Destruction in the Middle East: The Impact on the

Regional Military Balance. Center for Strategic

and International Studies, March 25 (revised

draft). Available at: http://csis.org/publication/

proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-

east-impact-regional-military-balance.

Cordesman A (2008) Israeliweapons of massdestruc-

tion: An overview. 1st working draft, June 2. Avail-

able at: http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080602_israeliwmd.pdf .

CTBTO (n.d.) 13 February 1960 ” The first French

nuclear test. Available at: http://www.ctbto.org/

specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-

french-nuclear-test/ (accessed September 8,

2014).

Department of Defense (1968) Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense. Memorandum of Conversa-

tion, Subject: Negotiations with Israel ” F-4 and

Advanced Weapons. November 12. Available at:

http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/israel/docu-

ments/battle/12-01.htm.

Department of State (1968) Briefing Memorandum,

Parker T. Hart to the Secretary Dean Rusk, Sub-

ject: Issues to be Considered in Connection with

Negotiations with Israel for F-4 Phantom Aircraft.

October 15. Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/

nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-01.pdf.

Department of State (1969a) Memorandum of Con-

versation, Subject: Israeli Nuclear Program, Octo-

ber 15; enclosure to Elliot L. Richardson,

Memorandum for the President, Subject: IsraelÕs

Nuclear Program, October 17; attachment to Mem-

orandum, Kissinger to Nixon, Subject: IsraelÕs

Nuclear Program, November 6. Available at:

http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdf .

Department of State (1969b) Henry Owen to Secre-

tary, Subject: Impact on U.S. Policies of an Israeli

Nuclear Weapons Capability ” ACTION MEM-

ORANDUM, February 7. Available at: http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/


Department of State (1969c) Memorandum, U.S.

Department of State, Theodore L. Elliott, to

Henry Kissinger, Subject: Briefing Book ” Visit

of Mrs. Golda Meir, September 19. Available at:

http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/


Department of State (1969d) I. IsraelÕs Nuclear

Weapon Intentions, enclosed as Basic Study to

Letter, John P. Walsh, U.S. State Department, to

the Assistant to the President for National Secur-ity Affairs, et al., Subject: Israeli Nuclear Weapons

Program ” NSSM 40, May 30. Available at: http://

www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/

docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20

report.pdf .

Der Spiegel (2012) IsraelÕs deployment of nuclear mis-

siles on subs from Germany. June 4. Available

at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/

israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsub

marinesa836784.html.

Embassy of Israel (1968) Letter, Ambassador Lt. Gen.

Y. Rabin to Assistant Secretary of Defense PaulWarnke. November 22. Available at:

www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/israel/documents/

battle/14-01.htm.

Frantz D (2003) Israeladds fuel to nuclear dispute. Los

Angeles Times, October 12. Available at: http://the-

handstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/

shamir.htm.

Friedman M (2006) Israel nuke comment sparks con-

troversy. Associated Press, December 12. The ori-

ginal article is no longer available online, but a

copy is posted here: www.freerepublic.com/

focus/f-news/1752227/posts.Greenberg H (2006) Sub fleet chief: We can hit targets

overseas. Ynetnews.com, February 28. Available

at: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-

3221853,00.html.

Gupta V and Pabian F (1998) Viewpoint: Commercial

satellite imagery and the CTBT verification pro-

cess. The Nonproliferation Review Spring”Sum-

mer: 89”97. Available at: http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/

serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersec-

tion_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-

1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdf .

Haaretz (2003) Experts scorn report on IsraelÕsnuclear submarines. Associated Press, Octo-

ber 13. Available at: http://www.haaretz.com/



http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-print.htmlhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-print.htmlhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-print.htmlhttp://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdfhttp://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-98[1http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-98[1http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-98[1http://csis.org/publication/proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balancehttp://csis.org/publication/proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balancehttp://csis.org/publication/proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balancehttp://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080602_israeliwmd.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080602_israeliwmd.pdfhttp://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test/http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test/http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test/http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/12-01.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/12-01.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/12-01.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-01.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-01.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784.htmlhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_8/www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/14-01.htmhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_8/www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/14-01.htmhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_8/www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/14-01.htmhttp://thehandstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/shamir.htmhttp://thehandstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/shamir.htmhttp://thehandstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/shamir.htmhttp://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1752227/postshttp://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1752227/postshttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3221853,00.htmlhttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3221853,00.htmlhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/experts-scorn-report-on-israel-s-nuclear-submarines-1.102495http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/experts-scorn-report-on-israel-s-nuclear-submarines-1.102495http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/114492/ichaptersection_singledocument/2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367d/en/Viewpoint04-Gupta.pdfhttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3221853,00.htmlhttp://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3221853,00.htmlhttp://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1752227/postshttp://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1752227/postshttp://thehandstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/shamir.htmhttp://thehandstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/shamir.htmhttp://thehandstand.org/archive/november2003/articles/shamir.htmhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_8/www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/14-01.htmhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_8/www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/14-01.htmhttp://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_8/www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/14-01.htmhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784.htmlhttp://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784.htmlhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%206%205-30-69%20NSSM%2040%20report.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-21.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-05.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-25.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-01.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-01.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/12-01.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/12-01.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/israel/documents/battle/12-01.htmhttp://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test/http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test/http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test/http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080602_israeliwmd.pdfhttp://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080602_israeliwmd.pdfhttp://csis.org/publication/proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balancehttp://csis.org/publication/proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balancehttp://csis.org/publication/proliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balancehttp://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-98[1http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-98[1http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/prolifinme-brief6-3-98[1http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdfhttp://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/DRM-2013-U-004480-Final2.pdfhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-print.htmlhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-print.htmlhttp://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/05/londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-print.htmlhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htmhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/index.htm


18/19

print-edition/news/experts-scorn-report-on-

israel-s-nuclear-submarines-1.102495.

Haaretz (2009) Israel wonÕt base submarines in Red

Sea, says defense official. Reuters, July 5. Available

at: http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-

page/israel-won-t-base-submarines-in-red-sea-says-defense-official-1.279380.

Hersh S (1993) The Samson Option: IsraelÕs Nuclear

Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. London:

Faber and Faber.

Hough H (1997) Could IsraelÕs nuclear assets survive

a first strike? JaneÕs Intelligence Review, Septem-

ber: 407”410.

International Panel of Fissile Materials (2010) Global

Fissile Materials Report 2010. Princeton, NJ: Prin-

ceton University, Program on Science and Global

Security. Available at: http://ipfmlibrary.org/

gfmr10.pdf .International Panel of Fissile Materials (2013) Global

Fissile Materials Report 2013. Princeton, NJ: Prin-

ceton University, Program on Science and Global

Security. Available at: http://ipfmlibrary.org/

gfmr13.pdf .

JaneÕs Defence Weekly (2008) Israel launches leap in

IRBM capabilities. January 23.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (1969) Memorandum, Earle

Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to

Melvin Laird. March 26. Available at: http://

www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/

docs/Doc%204A%205-5-69%20stash%20re%20Feb%201969.pdf .

Kristensen HM and Aftergood S (2007) Nuclear

weapons. Federation of American Scientists, Janu-

ary 8. Available at: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/

israel/nuke.

Lappin Y (2013) IAF will house F-35 fleet at Nevatim

base. Jerusalem Post , October 1. Available at:

www.jpost.com/Defense/IAF-will-house-F-35-

fleet-at-Nevatim-base.

Lebow RN and Stein JG (1995) We All Lost The Cold

War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

LevKay Y (2009) Israeli subsails through Suez Canal,sending warning to Iran. Arutz Sheva 7 , July 5.

Available at: http://www.israelnationalnews.

com/News/News.aspx/132206#.U_t4vuZdU_A.

Mahnaimi U (2010) Israel stations nuclear missile

subs off Iran. The Sunday Times, May 30.Available

at: https://web.archive.org/web/20110506200452/

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/

europe/article7140282.ece.

Mahnaimi U and Baxter S (2007) Revealed: Israel

plans nuclear strike on Iran. The Sunday Times,

January 7. Available at: http://www.information-

clearinghouse.info/article18688.htm.Mahnaimi U and Campbell M (2000) Israel makes

nuclear waves with submarine missile test.

Sunday Times, June 1. Available at: http://fas.org/

news/israel/e20000619israelmakes.htm.

Missilethreat.com (2012) Jericho 1/2/3. November 5.

Available at: http://missilethreat.com/missiles/

jericho-123.

National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) (1996) IsraelÕs Satellites and Missiles. NAIC-ID(RS)T-

0568-96. December 18. Available at: http://oai.

dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb¼getRecord&metadata

Prefix¼html&identifier¼ADA321046.

Netanyahu B (2011) Interview with PM Netanyahu on

CNN ” Piers Morgan Tonight. March 17. Israel

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://

mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/Inter-

view_PM_Netanyahu_CNN_17-Mar-2011.aspx.

New York Times (1981) Dayan says Israelis have the

capacity to produce A-Bombs. June 25. Available

at: http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/25/world/dayan-says-israelis-have-the-capacity-to-pro-

duce-a-bombs.html.

Nuclear Weapon Archive (2001) FranceÕs nuclear

weapons: Origin of force de frappe. December

24. Available at: http://nuclearweaponarchi-

ve.org/France/FranceOrigin.html.

Pincus W (2002) Israel has sub-based atomic arms

capability. Washington Post , June 15. Available at:

http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra0532.htm.

Rabin Y (1994) Press Conference with President Clin-

ton, King Hussein, and Prime Minister Rabin, the

White House. July 26. IsraelÕs Foreign Relations,Selected Documents, Volume 13”14, 1992”1994,

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at:

http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADo-

cuments/Yearbook9/Pages/215%20Press%20-

Conference%20with%20President%20Clinton-

%20King.aspx.

Reed T and Stillman D (2009) The Nuclear Express: A

Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation.

Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press.

Richelson J (2006) The vela incident: Nuclear test or

meteorid? Electronic Briefing Book no. 190,

National Security Archive, May 5. Available at:http://www2.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/

NSAEBB190.

Sale R (2002) Yom Kippur: IsraelÕs 1973 nuclear alert.

UPI , September 16. Available at: http://www.upi.

com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/

09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/

UPI-64941032228992/print.

Scarborough R (2004) RumsfeldÕs War. Washington,

DC: Regnery.

Schmemann S (1998) Israel clings to its Ônuclear ambi-

guity.Õ New York Times, June 21. Available

at: http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/21/world/

israel-clings-to-its-nuclear-ambiguity.html.



http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/experts-scorn-report-on-israel-s-nuclear-submarines-1.102495http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/experts-scorn-report-on-israel-s-nuclear-submarines-1.102495http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/israel-won-t-base-submarines-in-red-sea-says-defense-official-1.279380http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/israel-won-t-base-submarines-in-red-sea-says-defense-official-1.279380http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-print-page/israel-won-t-base-submarines-in-red-sea-says-defense-official-1.279380http://ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdfhttp://ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr10.pdfhttp://ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr13.pdfhttp://ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr13.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%204A%205-5-69%20stash%20re%20Feb%201969.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%204A%205-5-69%20stash%20re%20Feb%201969.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%204A%205-5-69%20stash%20re%20Feb%201969.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%204A%205-5-69%20stash%20re%20Feb%201969.pdfhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb485/docs/Doc%204A%205-5-69%20stash%20re%20Feb%201969.pdfhttp://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nukehttp://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nukehttp://www.jpost.com/Defense/IAF-will-house-F-35-fleet-at-Nevatim-basehttp://www.jpost.com/Defense/IAF-will-house-F-35-fleet-at-Nevatim-basehttp://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/132206#.U_t4vuZdU_Ahttp://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/132206#.U_t4vuZdU_Ahttps://web.archive.org/web/20110506200452/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7140282.ecehttps://web.archive.org/web/20110506200452/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7140282.ecehttps://web.archive.org/web/20110506200452/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article7140282.ecehttp://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18688.htmhttp://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18688.htmhttp://fas.org/news/israel/e20000619israelmakes.htmhttp://fas.org/news/israel/e20000619israelmakes.htmhttp://missilethreat.com/missiles/jericho-123http://missilethreat.com/missiles/jericho-123http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA321046http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA321046http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA321046http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA321046http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA321046http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA321046http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/Interview_PM_Netanyahu_CNN_17-Mar-2011.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/Interview_PM_Netanyahu_CNN_17-Mar-2011.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/Interview_PM_Netanyahu_CNN_17-Mar-2011.aspxhttp://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/25/world/dayan-says-israelis-have-the-capacity-to-produce-a-bombs.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/25/world/dayan-says-israelis-have-the-capacity-to-produce-a-bombs.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/25/world/dayan-says-israelis-have-the-capacity-to-produce-a-bombs.htmlhttp://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.htmlhttp://nuclearweaponarchive.org/France/FranceOrigin.htmlhttp://www.converge.org.nz/pma/cra0532.htmhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/215&percnt;20Press&percnt;20Conference&percnt;20with&percnt;20President&percnt;20Clinton-&percnt;20King.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/215&percnt;20Press&percnt;20Conference&percnt;20with&percnt;20President&percnt;20Clinton-&percnt;20King.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/215&percnt;20Press&percnt;20Conference&percnt;20with&percnt;20President&percnt;20Clinton-&percnt;20King.aspxhttp://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook9/Pages/215&percnt;20Press&percnt;20Conference&percnt;20with&percnt;20President&percnt;20Clinton-&percnt;20King.aspxhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/21/world/israel-clings-to-its-nuclear-ambiguity.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/21/world/israel-clings-to-its-nuclear-ambiguity.htmlhttp://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://bos.sagepub.com/http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/21/world/israel-clings-to-its-nuclear-ambiguity.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/21/world/israel-clings-to-its-nuclear-ambiguity.htmlhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2002/09/16/Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alert/UPI-64941032228992/printhttp://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NS

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Report on Israel Nuclear Arsenal (November/December 2014)

Documents

Transcript of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Report on Israel Nuclear Arsenal (November/December 2014)