BUILDING GUDERIANS DUCK: GERMANYS RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN FRONT ANTITANK CRISIS, 1941 TO 1945

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Military History

by

SCOTT M. CHAFIAN, LCDR, USN B.A., California State University, San Francisco, California, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2004

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ii

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: LCDR Scott M. Chafian, USN Thesis Title: Building Guderians Duck: Germanys Response to the Eastern Front Antitank Crisis, 1941 to 1945 Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair LTC John A. Suprin, M.S. , Member Samuel J. Lewis, Ph.D. , Member Brian D. Allen, M.A. Accepted this 18th day of June 2004 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Report Documentation Page Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering andmaintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, ArlingtonVA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if itdoes not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 17 JUN 2004 2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED -

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Building Guderians Duck: Germanys response to the eastern frontantitank crisis, 1941 to 1945.

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) Scott Chafian

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) US Army Command and General Staff College,1 Reynolds Ave,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027-1352

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONREPORT NUMBER ATZL-SWD-GD

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITORS ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITORS REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT The appearance of the T-34 in 1941 caused a crisis for German antitank forces. Existing antitank gunswere nearly impotent against the new Russian tank, while antiaircraft and artillery pieces, thoughsuccessful when pressed into action, were insufficiently mobile to accompany mechanized forces. TheGerman Army Ordnance Office, the Heereswaffenamt, was responsible for development of new weaponsand would be responsible for countering the threat of Russian armor. The Heereswaffenamt would need tonot only counter the T-34, but also do so in an environment of shifting political relationships and with anincreasingly stressed industrial system. Utilizing lessons from the bitterly contested battlefields of westernRussia, the Heereswaffenamt developed a tankdestroyer, the Jagdpazer IV, using the existing chassis of thePanzer IV tank, and the guns of both the Panzer IV and Panther tanks. The Jagdpanzer IV, known by itscrews as Guderians Duck, proved to be a capable tank killer against both the T-34 threat of 1941 and1942, as well as the improved versions of 1943 and 1944.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

1

18. NUMBEROF PAGES

100

19a. NAME OFRESPONSIBLE PERSON

a. REPORT unclassified

b. ABSTRACT unclassified

c. THIS PAGE unclassified

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

iii

ABSTRACT

BUILDING GUDERIANS DUCK: GERMANYS RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN FRONT ANTITANK CRISIS, 1941 TO 1945, by LCDR Scott M. Chafian, USN, 100 pages. The appearance of the T-34 in 1941 caused a crisis for German antitank forces. Existing antitank guns were nearly impotent against the new Russian tank, while antiaircraft and artillery pieces, though successful when pressed into action, were insufficiently mobile to accompany mechanized forces. The German Army Ordnance Office, the Heereswaffenamt, was responsible for development of new weapons and would be responsible for countering the threat of Russian armor. The Heereswaffenamt would need to not only counter the T-34, but also do so in an environment of shifting political relationships and with an increasingly stressed industrial system. Utilizing lessons from the bitterly contested battlefields of western Russia, the Heereswaffenamt developed a tankdestroyer, the Jagdpazer IV, using the existing chassis of the Panzer IV tank, and the guns of both the Panzer IV and Panther tanks. The Jagdpanzer IV, known by its crews as Guderians Duck, proved to be a capable tank killer against both the T-34 threat of 1941 and 1942, as well as the improved versions of 1943 and 1944.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project presented a unique opportunity for a Naval Officer to indulge his

interest in World War II Germany under the tutelage of Army Officers and German

history experts. It would not have been possible without the support of a number of

people to whom I am greatly indebted. LTC John Suprin and Mr. Brian Allen both spent

long hours reviewing my work and giving guidance and advice as members of my thesis

committee. Dr. Sam Lewis, despite his heavy workload, served as a committee member

and mentor in the study of History in general, ensuring I always strove to determine the

truth behind the story.

My children: Kayla; Nick; Tori; Katie; and Matthew, each in their own special

way, never let me forget the little but so very important things in life, be it pushing a

swing or playing catch. Most importantly, my wife Cindy put up with long hours taking

care of a family and house while I researched and wrote. Without her help, this would not

have been possible.

Lastly, I humbly dedicate this to the millions of soldiers, both German and

Russian, who honorably gave their lives for their countrymen. Regardless of ideology,

they stood up for what they believed in, and paid the ultimate price.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............. ii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................iv

ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... vii

ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................... viii

TABLES .............................................................................................................................ix

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

Lithuania, 24 June 1941...................................................................................................1 Purpose and Organization of Thesis ................................................................................2 Definitions .......................................................................................................................3 Measures of Effectiveness ...............................................................................................4 Background: German Antitank Forces, September 1939 to June 1941...........................5 Barbarossa to Stalingrad: June 1941 to February 1943 .................................................11 Lessons...........................................................................................................................14

CHAPTER 2 THE HEERESWAFFENAMT AND GERMAN INDUSTRY...................18

Oberkommando das Heeres and Subordinate Weapons Development Commands ......18 Heereswaffenamt ...........................................................................................................19 Theoretical Tank Development Cycle ...........................................................................21 German Tank Industry, 1943 .........................................................................................23 Operational Dynamics ...................................................................................................25 Summary........................................................................................................................30

CHAPTER 3 THE CRISIS: RUSSIAN ARMOR AND GERMAN GUNS .....................33

T-34 and KV-1...............................................................................................................33 German Countermeasures, 1941......................................................................